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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
18 MAR 1976

Colby Opposes Disclosure Of CIA's Annual Budget

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former CIA Director William E. Colby has testified that the disclosure of the agency's budget for a single year would set a precedent for an annual release of the figure and in turn would harm national security.

Comparing the dollar amount spent yearly on CIA programs to the "missing piece" in a jigsaw puzzle sought by intelligence agencies of other countries, Colby said foreign economic analysts could use the information to determine the CIA's spending priorities.

Colby also described as inaccurate published estimates of the CIA's budget as being $750 million a year. His testimony came in a deposition taken in an American Civil Liberties Union lawsuit seeking disclosure of the intelligence agency's expenditures in fiscal 1974 and its budgetary spending authority in 1976.

Colby made it clear that disclosure of the budget would not reveal the full scope of its operation, since funds are often transferred to and from other government agencies to finance public and covert CIA projects.

However, he said he considered the CIA's budget alone important enough to be kept secret. He said the U.S. intelligence community had used similar figures from other countries to make estimates of "certain important things," which he would not describe.

Colby's defense of the CIA budget secrecy was the strongest and most detailed he has made publicly, according to attorneys involved in the litigation. He said the agency's budget has been subject to "substantial" fluctuation over the last 15 years.

While saying that "intelligence today is more and more the study of open material" and that even the President's State of the Union message is useful to foreign intelligence agencies, Colby said the CIA still does "secret work."

"We are not just reading copies of Pravda around here," Colby said. "We are looking a little more vigorously than that for information held by closed societies.

"... I think we have a problem of protecting this democracy of ours and in the process we need to run some secret operations, and will in the future run them," he said.

The Rockefeller commission that studied the CIA had recommended that portions of the CIA budget be made public. The House of Representatives last October rejected an attempt to make the appropriation public.

Colby was questioned by ACLU attorney John H. F. Shattuck at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., on Feb. 17. Colby left the CIA Jan. 30 and was replaced as director by George Bush. The deposition was filed yesterday in U.S. District Court here in the Freedom of Information Act suit brought against the CIA by former National Security Council aide Morton Halperin.

The former CIA director said he "hardened" his position against any disclosure of the agency's budget while he was serving as the director.

He cited the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, which issued a total budget figure in 1947 that amounted to one line and 25 years later was issuing 15 pages of detailed explanations of its budget.

Instead of starting a disclosure precedent, Colby said, he preferred that only the congressional oversight committees be kept aware of the agency's budget.

He added that he thinks the American intelligence community "is in great danger of too much exposure."

Colby, who is writing a book on his government service, said there probably would be no immediate effect on national security if the agency's budget for one year was announced. But, he added:

"I think they [foreign intelligence agencies] would just take that back and start doing some studying. They might study for three months or they might study for six months and at that time they might start turning electronic gadgets on or off or they might start following people around, they might start covering things up that were left open.

"There are a whole variety of things. They might go out and sail around the sea in different places than they were in the past—various things."

WASHINGTON POST
19 MAR 1976

State Dept. Halts 2 Personnel Lists

By Lars-Erik Nelson
Reuter

The State Department has halted publication of two official booklets that made it easy for outsiders to identify Central Intelligence Agency personnel posing as diplomats.

Department officials said yesterday that one of the documents, the Foreign Service List, woould not appear again.

The other, the Biographic Register, is being revised and, when eventually reissued, will be classified "for official use only." Both booklets had previously been on sale to the public.

The Foreign Service List, containing the names of all Foreign Service officers serving both in Washington and at embassies abroad, used to be issued every three months but has not appeared since last August.

It is the only listing U.S. officials have on which diplomats are in which embassies and its disappearance will be a handicap for officials trying to locate colleagues around the world.

The Biographic Register, which provides thumbnail sketches of all employees in the field of foreign affairs, is normally issued once a year. But it has not appeared since 1974.

In the past year, a number of people disaffected with the CIA have written books or articles explaining how the two booklets could be used to help identify CIA agents serving at embassies.

Christian Science Monitor
12 March 1976

CIA seen losing confidence abroad

Washington

The criticism and disclosures that marked 1975 as a year of turbulence for the Central Intelligence Agency are costing the agency a unique opportunity to develop Soviet sources, according to a former agent.

"Because of the dissidents' movement, the CIA has a unique opportunity to work with the Soviets today," said Mike Ackerman, who quit the agency last May to defend it publicly and because he felt the year's debate made his job impossible to perform.

He said in an interview, however, that the sources have become reluctant to cooperate with the CIA because "we don't look like a winner" and because they fear their identities will not be kept secret.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 MARCH 1976

CIA aide sees rise of world terrorism

Washington

A CIA official is predicting that incidents of international terrorism will increase and may some day include holding a whole city hospeared since 1974.

tage to the threat of nuclear disaster.

William E. Nelson, deputy director of operations for CIA, speaking before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Washington, also says he sees an increase in Soviet subversion because of the "military standoff" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

THE ATLANTIC
April 1976

THE INTELLIGENCE TANGLE

The CIA and the FBI face the moment of truth

by Sanford J. Ungar

Once the secret agents of the republic patrolled what Dean Rusk called "the back alleys of world politics" without much question about their mission. No longer. *The Atlantic*'s Washington editor examines the past and present of the tangled "intelligence business" and the prospects now for reform.

"The committee does not believe that the acts which it has examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.

"The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.

"Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past."

—Epilogue to the interim report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, "Alleged Assassination Plots involving Foreign Leaders."

I. What We Have Learned

It seemed at times the cruelest kind of juxtaposition. Crises were breaking nearly everywhere, at home and abroad, demanding official attention and perhaps action. Terrorism: a siege at the headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna; a bomb explosion at a baggage claim area of La Guardia Airport in New York. International tension: a civil war in the newly independent African nation of Angola between factions loyal to the communists and the "free world"; a situation that threatened to reach the same point in Angola's former colonial parent, Portugal, a NATO ally. A United Nations increasingly unfriendly toward and uncomfortable for its American hosts. A virtually complete underground society in the United States that permits fugitives to evade the authorities for years without serious threat of capture. Religious and ethnic strife: in Lebanon, where it could explode a fragile Middle Eastern peace; and in Northern Ireland, where many of the arms were paid for by American partisans. Doubts about détente; curiosity about the Chinese; ominous-looking antennas on the roof of the Soviet Embassy on Sixteenth Street in Washington, which may be intercepting the most sensitive deliberations of the American government. In an ever more complex world, full of trouble and danger, the need, obviously, was for information, for good "intelligence"—a loaded and often undefinable word—and for some formula that would permit the country to cope and to calculate its roles carefully, to avoid the prospect and the appearance of becoming a helpless giant.

At the same moment, the nation was steeped in self-doubt, painfully examining events in the recent past that raised questions about the society's commitment to its own most fundamental principles. In the post-Watergate era, when nothing is any longer sacred, men and women once considered the ultimate patriots who could do no wrong—the likes of J. Edgar Hoover—are put under a microscope, and the enlargement is not pretty. The misbehavior of those responsible for gathering this commodity called intelligence has been so severe, says Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, that at one point "the possibility existed of destroying freedom in order to save it." A black congressman from Detroit, Charles Diggs, travels to Addis Ababa, where the Organization of African Unity is meeting, to denounce his own government's policy in Angola as "the biggest blunder in the history of [American] relations with Africa." The international image of the United States has been severely damaged. Once regarded as the bulwark of freedom—and as the country which saved Western Europe from successive totalitarian threats in the 1940s—it has come to be widely identified with the torturers in Chile, the racial separatists of South Africa, and assorted minor anticommunist despots. Richard Welch, the station chief for the Central Intelligence Agency in Athens, is murdered, setting off a new round of recrimination about who is revealing too much and who concealing too much. Is Welch's death a result of American policies and practices, or of their disclosure? Or of sloppy "cover"? Or is it a coincidence shamelessly played

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upon by an agency seeking relief from its pain?

At the center of this affair of state is, naturally enough, the United States Congress, itself dizzy with dreams of renewal and enhanced power at a time when the presidency stands discredited. The accusations are a bit overdrawn at times, the personalities flawed, and the exultation over disclosure sometimes extreme. There is an air of examining yesterday's events with today's morality and an oh-so-much-wiser perspective than that of the last generation. One of the ironies is that many of the examiners—the bright young professors and lawyers on the congressional committee staffs—are out of the same mold and tradition and education as those who once went into the CIA with notions of saving the world.

The political climate is typical, suggests Attorney General Edward H. Levi, of a country that has just come through a war, this time an especially unpopular war which left wounds not yet healed. William E. Colby, the career spy in reformist clothes whose term as director of central intelligence was cut short by the uproar, says the situation reminds him of the 1920s, when the Western world was inclined to ignore realities because it was tired, disgusted with war, economically depressed, and myopic about better days on the horizon. Yet the intelligence-spying debate of 1975–1976 has also renewed some of the most encouraging qualities of a self-conscious democratic government. The country has been forced to evaluate itself, discuss some very embarrassing facts in public, and pick up the pieces and move on—while much of the world watches with a mixture of amazement and horror. It is an all-American adventure.

For Congressman Morgan F. Murphy, an old-line Democrat from Chicago who seemed at once honored and pained by the opportunity to participate, the congressional inquiries were a matter of "getting into the bowels of the FBI and the CIA." Senator Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania, a liberal Republican who had been quiet through most of his first term in the Senate, discovered in himself a sense of outrage and found an exciting issue to apply it to: the need to re-examine President John F. Kennedy's assassination. To Democratic Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, a black man from Berkeley who has been the target of official surveillance now and again, there was a genuine danger that the congressional investigations would turn out to be a charade: "We are working with people who have been trained to disinform, to lie, and to falsify," he warned. Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona, guardian of the conservative Republican faith, could not be bothered to attend many of the hearings; he took every occasion to proclaim that "enough is enough," and he advocated suspending the investigations in midstream before they damaged national security and "prove[d] harmful to the United States and to freedom everywhere." Henry Kissinger, the aggrieved secretary of state whose world view was challenged by the nature and substance of the inquiries as by other contemporaneous developments, saw it all as one more case of American "self-flagellation," the kind of exercise that, he believes, makes it impossible for the country to deal confidently and confidentially in international affairs.

Frank Church of Idaho was selected as chairman of the Senate Select Committee precisely because he was not among the many Democratic candidates for President; but soon the national exposure and opportunity for center-stage performing inherent in his role as chief inquisitor aroused old dreams and aspirations. He showed genuine concern over and insight into the intelligence business, but he began indulging in routine pronunciamentos. Church's tendency to speak slowly and sanctimoniously, in near-perfect syntax, brought on the accusation that he was converting the hearing room into a campaign platform. Otis Pike, a Democratic congressman from Long Island with half an eye on a New York Senate seat, became chairman of the House Select Committee when it was reorganized and sent belatedly into the fray. Sassy and sarcastic, Pike aimed for the jugular and the headlines. His pyrotechnics, including staged personal confrontations with Kissinger over access to classified documents (at one point he tried to obtain a contempt-of-Congress citation against the Secretary of State), tended to obscure the real substance of his committee's inquiry. He was accused of rank showboating.

It was, at best, a confusing and chaotic effort, this congressional surge to investigate, expose, and, presumably, improve the intelligence community. There were moments when the investigating legislators appeared to be shouting, "Here, look! We have discovered a corner of the executive branch that has been misbehaving all these years. Let us tell you about it." What they were not saying, but were dramatically demonstrating, is that Congress is a reactive institution, moving clumsily now to unravel a web and to expose a subculture that it had itself been weaving, creating—and, at least on paper, overseeing—for decades.

Congress was reacting this time, as in other recent crises of public conscience, to newspaper stories: the revelation by the New York *Times* that the Central Intelligence Agency had, probably in contravention of its legal mandate, conducted extensive domestic intelligence investigations and kept improper files on American citizens; and the timely reminder by the Washington *Post* (repeating what the Chicago *Tribune* and others had said previously) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had extensively wiretapped and bugged the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., most notably at the 1964 Democratic national convention in Atlantic City where it was also doing other political chores for Lyndon B. Johnson.

Those were the starting points, the stimuli, for a grand round of public, and well-publicized, congressional hoopla. To unravel and expose, and to demonstrate unwittingly the degree of Congress's own dereliction since World War II—the extent to which it has permitted and encouraged these governments-within-a-government to develop and flourish—the Senate Select Committee will have spent about $2.5 million, and its counterpart in the House some $400,000, by the time they close up shop. It is an investment with an uncertain return.

Even before the congressional committees were formed, Gerald Ford—who, as a graduate of the

Congress, had every reason to anticipate how slow and scattershot in approach the investigative process would be—moved to upstage them. He named a commission of eight public figures, chaired by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller (then still useful to the President and in his good graces) and including Ronald Reagan (whom the President then thought he could neutralize), to study CIA activities within the United States. Although many of its members had at some point helped to design, direct, or defend the Agency's work, and although its investigation was hurried and superficial, the Rockefeller Commission produced a report that showed the CIA to be systematically insensitive to its legal limitations and to the civil liberties of Americans. The report's tone was mild and almost apologetic—it used language on the order of "such missteps as did occur" to describe circumstances that others might have called a shocking pattern of abuses—but it included an impressive litany of Agency wrongdoing.

But even with some of the most significant information about the CIA already skimmed off the top of the investigative pot, the committees would try to catch up. Church's committee stepped into the uncertain legacy—and the same locale, the Senate Caucus Room—of the "Watergate Committee" that broke open the Nixon Administration scandals in the summer of 1973. While millions of Americans had thrilled to the televised folksiness of Chairman Sam Ervin, many of his Senate colleagues had not; they criticized Ervin's investigation for being politically stagey, disorganized, riddled with leaks of sensitive information, and for failing to come up with any reform legislation. Church, desperate to avoid comparable bad notices from his peers, installed a security system worthy of Fort Knox at his committee offices and pursued a course of studied moderation: "Unless I could instill a sense of confidence that we were doing this in a responsible manner," he said later, "I knew we would create a tremendous backlash."

When, after six months of private mulling, the Senate committee finally did go public in September, it was with a set of hearings on how the CIA, apparently out of control and beyond supervision, had disobeyed presidential orders by storing a deadly cache of shellfish toxin and other poisons (information made available to Church by the Ford Administration and already rejected by Pike). To Church it was evidence to support his favorite theory of the CIA as "rogue elephant." Eventually, as evidence gathered that higher authorities had known about and approved of many other Agency capers and misdeeds, Church, embarrassed, backed away from his characterization.

Before long, Church was on the defensive. His committee looked grossly overstaffed (120 at its peak) and sounded pompous, especially by comparison with the sparer (a staff of 31) and more earthy House committee, which held quick and lively hearings on what Pike called the fundamental issues—the costs and risks of intelligence-gathering, as well as the value, accuracy, and usefulness of the product. Although the preparation was at times shallow and inadequate and the questioning (except for that of the chairman and a few of the younger members) dreary, Pike's group stayed in the news as it hopped from one topic to another like a pack of waterbugs. But in contrast to the senators, the congressmen had little hope of winning legislative support, from their brethren; 122 members of the House had voted against letting the committee go to work at all, and still others were alienated by Pike's tactics of confrontation with the Ford Administration (by a two-to-one majority the House refused to release the Pike committee report without censorship by the White House). While Church appealed for reason and calm and the long, careful view, Pike charged that the intelligence agencies had so lost their bearings that they might not even be capable of alerting the nation to the possibility of an impending foreign attack.

Some of the congressional revelations were not so new or, by the time they came, devastating. Press stories based on leaks, many from within the Ford Administration or from CIA alumni, told most of the details about Agency involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders whose philosophies and policies put them on the hit-lists of successive Presidents and secretaries of state: Fidel Castro in Cuba, Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (now Zaire), Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, and Rene Schneider in Chile. It was known that American intelligence had failed to predict international crises like the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, and the 1974 Greek and Turkish moves on Cyprus. The Justice Department and regularly constituted congressional committees had been revealing bits and pieces of the FBI's counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) since late 1973. Attorney General Edward Levi had already provided an unusually extensive accounting of some of J. Edgar Hoover's secret personal files.

Yet when the investigating committees addressed these subjects, they lent additional credibility, an official imprimatur, and a certain drama to the information. And much of the detail was fresh and sordid: back-room mail-openings; COINTELPRO actions, justified on the basis of preventing violence, but used to frighten people and to destroy their family life and livelihood, even when there was no sign of violence or illegal activity on their part. The FBI, it emerged, was handy at the impersonation of newsmen; at "DO NOT FILE" procedures to prevent the uncovering of illegal "black bag jobs"; at looking the other way while local police wiretapped illegally and then shared the catch with their friends the Feds. Frederick A. O. Schwarz and Curtis R. Smothers, majority and minority counsel respectively for the Church committee, one white and one black, scored a theatrical coup when, sitting before the senators and the television cameras, they testified in grotesquely specific detail about Hoover's vengeful pursuit of Martin Luther King, Jr. Church's controversial report on the assassination plots, perhaps the most significant document to emerge from the entire process, drew a stark portrait of the well-bred gentlemen in the CIA and the White House scheming to take the lives of foreign statesmen who posed no actual threat to the United States—a secret government at its worst that had flourished in an atmosphere of euphemism, subterfuge, and cynicism.

The committees also shed new light on the intelligence activities of the Internal Revenue Service,

and the fact that its reservoir of personal information on individuals had long been exploited for political purposes, converted into, as Church put it, "a lending library of tax information." And there was a first public glance into the National Security Agency, ostensibly responsible to the secretary of defense, exposed as a sort of electronic gun for hire that does little thinking about who its targets will be, but stands ready to zero in on one or another "watchlist" when so ordered by its superiors, listening for evidence of everything from travel to Cuba to international drug trafficking and "possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances." It became clear how easily the NSA made the transition from matters of foreign concern to domestic ones. And all of these findings came in the context of a General Accounting Office report to the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that the federal government spends $2.6 billion a year on police, investigative, and intelligence-gathering activities (including $482 million for the FBI, but not including the budgets of the CIA, NSA, and "certain sensitive activities of the Defense Department"). Piecing evidence together, the Pike committee estimated that the United States spends $10 billion on all intelligence activities, more than three times what is acknowledged in the annual appropriations budget.

II. How the Jungle Grew

The real importance of the congressional probes lies less in headlines about assassinations or statistics than in the investigations' long-range impact: the universalization of concern about federal agencies that have slipped out of control and strayed from their original purpose; the lessons they teach about the past; and, with any luck, the creation of a climate for thoroughgoing reform of the system and the structures that led to the abuses.

The investigations also had a subtler lesson: that the "intelligence community" has indeed become a genuine community within the government, a special-interest group that lobbies for its own positions, struggles for influence and authority in policy-making circles, and becomes haughty or defensive when it is challenged.

This community consists largely of intelligent, well-educated, well-motivated, and patriotic men and women. But they—especially those whose attitudes are formed during assignment to CIA and FBI headquarters in Washington—are inclined to act as if they are above the public dialogue, forced to deal with politicians and other petty men who do not share their wisdom.

Where did this intelligence community come from, and how did it evolve into a many-headed monster? The clumsiness and heavy-handedness may be explained in part by the fact that Americans are new to the intelligence business. Unlike the European powers that had empires and a wide range of vested interests to protect, and thus have intelligence establishments dating back centuries, the United States used to view intelligence, both offensive and defensive, as it did armies and armaments: something to build up in wartime and dismantle in peace. As a result, the country was an easy target for spies and terrorists; indeed, German agents had a field day here in the years leading up to both world wars, and the Soviets were suspected of doing the same during the 1930s. It was out of concern over that situation that Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the FBI back into the intelligence field in 1936 (it had been ordered out more than a decade earlier, when Hoover was appointed director by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, because of the abuses of its authority during the post-World War I "red scare" and the Harding Administration scandals). The threats from foreign agents and from their domestic allies—in such organizations as the German-American Bund and the American Communist party—were seen as one.

Only as actual American involvement in the European hostilities became a prospect did the United States contemplate setting up its own apparatus to conduct espionage. Espionage was not a part of American tradition; it involved exhorting foreign citizens to commit treason and otherwise to violate their own countries' laws and standards of behavior. But various government agencies clamored for the job, and Roosevelt, in a Solomonlike solution, split it up among them: the FBI won jurisdiction over all of the Western Hemisphere except Panama; the Navy over the Pacific; and the Army over Europe, Africa, and the Canal Zone. The derring-do of the Bureau's Special Intelligence Service in Latin America, mostly unheralded at the time, was soon to be overshadowed by the newly created, quasi-military Office of Strategic Services, which operated mostly in Europe, including behind enemy lines.

Thus began a competition that has continued to this day. Hoover and the chief of the OSS, General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, were old rivals—dating back to the 1920s, when they were both in the Justice Department—and their organizations tried to match each other in currying favor with the British (whose secret intelligence service, MI-6, had trained most of the OSS teams) and with the White House. After the war, Donovan's successor, Allen Dulles, and his regiment of well-bred Ivy League spies beat out Hoover's corps of law-enforcement types for the ongoing foreign intelligence assignment. They became the Central Intelligence Agency and were given responsibility by the Truman Administration and its successors for a major piece of the American action abroad. Still, Hoover did not give up or forgive easily. He kept some of his men overseas as "legal attachés"; they were billed (and still are today) strictly as liaison officers with foreign police, but they also collected (and still collect) intelligence. And the Bureau held on to its growing domestic role in the fields of counterintelligence and internal security.

The charters of the CIA and the FBI that emerged from World War II were designed to be open-ended, and were fitted out with loopholes. Roosevelt's dispatch of the Bureau into the security field had been accomplished through executive orders and press statements. As Hoover wrote to Roosevelt and Attorney General Homer Cummings on October 20, 1938:

> In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of the present structure of intelligence work, it is believed imperative that it be proceeded with the utmost degree of secrecy in order to avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an ex-

> pansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive . . . it would seem undesirable to seek only special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude.

And there, in bureaucratic ambiguity, the matter would stand; the FBI had a splendid reputation, and the country seemed prepared to trust it with virtually any job. Similarly, the National Security Act of 1947, which formally created the CIA, was deliberately written to be vague. Because the drafters "were dealing with a new subject with practically no precedents," says one of them, Clark Clifford, a Truman adviser and later secretary of defense under Lyndon Johnson, "it was decided that the Act . . . should contain a 'catch-all' clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies." So it was that the CIA would be asked to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Within the framework of Cold War policies, the United States would be vigilant against the communists abroad and, in the name of "internal security," against the Left at home.

"A desperate struggle [was] going on in the back alleys of world politics," is how former Secretary of State Dean Rusk perceived the situation, and the United States would have to meet the challenge. In order to measure up, said a special committee that reported to President Eisenhower in 1954, the country might have to reconsider "long-standing American concepts of fair play" and adopt tactics "more ruthless than those employed by the enemy." Out of this philosophy came a heavy reliance on "covert actions," in which the Agency moved beyond its reporting and evaluation roles to try to influence the course of events more directly. As William Colby puts it, "You were asked to go do the job, without anybody telling you what it was or being willing to share the responsibility for it." The CIA's covert operatives had advanced technology and brilliant technicians available to them, they had the confidence of the rest of the government, and they had to report to no one outside the Agency about how they spent their money.

There was another complicating—and, for the intelligence community, liberating—factor: a double standard in international affairs between the pretense of official behavior and the reality of what went on behind the scenes. Looking back on the crisis in 1959 when Francis Gary Powers was shot down and captured by the Soviets during his aerial reconnaissance mission for the CIA, Colby recalls that "the Soviets knew for some years that we were flying U-2s over. When we used the cover story that it was a weather plane, they weren't going to do much about it." It was only after a controversy developed within the United States over the fact that the intelligence collectors were responsible, and after Eisenhower admitted that this was true, Colby says, that "Khrushchev went up the wall," not because of that specific flight but because the Americans were, in effect, breaking the unwritten rules by publicly asserting the right to violate the Soviet borders and airspace. Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy went on to sign the Vienna Convention of 1962, which stressed, among other points, the inviolate nature of each other's embassies. But as one source close to the CIA puts it, "The embassies are to the intelligence agencies as the bank was to Willie Sutton—where the money is. That agreement was never intended to be respected, and it never was."

Other treaties and agreements paid ritual lip service to the sanctity of the mails and of other international communications; but each side seemed to assume that they were written to be mutually broken. "Oh, *that* mail—yes, that mail was opened," CIA officials would acknowledge discreetly, when pressed to say whether the agreements, not to mention domestic laws, had been honored. Little wonder, then, that Nathan Gordon, a CIA scientist, could not fathom a presidential order to destroy the Agency's precious reserve of shellfish toxin, so powerful that 11 grams (a couple of teaspoons), if properly administered, could kill 55,000 people. Gordon had spent much of his career developing the potion; to destroy it must have seemed tantamount to destroying himself. Yes, the United States had signed a treaty outlawing chemical and biological warfare, and yes, CIA Director Richard Helms had issued a directive implementing it; but nobody bothered to tell Gordon whether this was one of those things we *really* meant to do.

The CIA's daring and profligacy was reinforced by a certainty that its Soviet counterpart, the KGB, was far more ruthless about its covert activities. Everyone knew, or assumed, how nasty the KGB could be and how often the Kremlin sent it to the ramparts to implement its needs and desires. At times, the conception of the threat posed by the KGB was based less on actual evidence than on an assumption that *they* must be playing the same subversive games abroad that *we* were playing, and that even if they were not we had to keep the game going lest they join in. The logic became a conundrum that could only have the effect of strengthening both the CIA and the KGB, throwing them into a symbiotic relationship. They became an international community of interest, probably more similar than either would ever admit. Each needed the threat of the other to justify its own existence.

There was a home-front parallel to overseas covert action, something the FBI came to call "preventive action" and to justify under the rubric of "counterintelligence programs." Domestically, too, the threat was ill-defined and the development of tactics left in the hands of the implementers. Although the Bill of Rights officially guarantees certain basic freedoms to every citizen, political hysteria made some people less equal than others under the Bill of Rights provisions. First communists, then fringe Marxist groups, and eventually others—the Ku Klux Klan, the "New Left," and "black extremists"—came in for special treatment. Unchecked, unmonitored, that treatment included disruption of personal lives and maneuvers that seemed to be intended more to foment violence than to prevent it. As with the CIA, intelli-

gence came to mean both investigation and action. The two activities seemed inseparable. The world had to be set right.

The community was not only doing what it perceived to be its duty, but after a time it was also having fun. As times grew more tense and complicated, business got better. Presidents, secretaries of state, attorneys general, aroused politicians, and editorial writers fulminated in the most general terms over the need to "do something" about the likes of Fidel Castro, the Klan, or the Black Panthers. The agencies did something: they developed exploding cigars and poisoned diving suits. They ordered Klansmen informants to sleep with the wives of other Klansmen. They wiretapped and bugged beyond the most energetic agents' ability to read and digest the product. The CIA, ever ambitious and sensitive to presidential whims, got more into the FBI's line of work, and the FBI, ever defensive and the best of bureaucratic infighters, got into the CIA's. The Bureau reached out further for targets, finding among ecologists and women's liberation groups and other purveyors of discontent sure signs that the revolution was at hand. The CIA zeroed in on the Grove Press and the American Indian Movement, among other purely domestic targets. The higher authorities winked and went about their work, taking refuge in "plausible deniability," express or implied. Congress saw clear enough hints of what was going on to have set off alarms, but none came from Capitol Hill. The secret war in Laos was funded time and again; J. Edgar Hoover's quite public lists of targets for special attention were perused regularly in the course of annual congressional appropriations testimony.

III. What Can Be Done?

Those congressmen who expected some degree of contriteness from the agencies under investigation were in for a disappointment. The first level of reaction was more on the order of anger, coupled with a warning that the committees might be doing grave harm to the FBI and the CIA, not to say the national security.

Old rules of the game and standards of behavior, a sense of politesse and stoicism in the service of a noble cause, prevent the community from expressing publicly the full outrage it feels over being dragged ungratefully through the mud. But there is plenty of complaining in private. "The whole ambience these days, the increase in the decibel count . . . is damaging," said one CIA man; "you begin to wish that something harmless would come along, like a typhoon, to distract attention." FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, who had the delicate problem of trying to renounce the abuses of the past without damaging the morale and pride of old-timers still in powerful positions, was fuming. "Some of the charges people have made against us are absolutely ridiculous," he said, "but we're just going to sit here and take it. We're not going to fight back." "Fight back" is exactly what the FBI would have done in the old Hoover days—with a public relations offensive, even to the point of seeking to undermine the reputations of the congressmen and journalists who were the bearers of bad tidings about the Bureau.

But the best revenge, the proof of the community's strength, may be business as usual. Even while the congressional committees were conducting their investigations, the CIA set out on new secret and controversial projects—about $50 million worth of aid to pro-Western factions in Angola (the exact amount of the assistance was unknown, because the Agency undervalued some of the arms it shipped to Angola via Zaire) and an infusion of $6 million to the noncommunist centrist political parties in Italy, to bolster their effort in that country's next parliamentary elections. Both initiatives were dear to the heart of Kissinger, who was determined to prevent the Italian Communists from joining a coalition government in Rome, notwithstanding their well-known differences with Moscow, and who wanted to use Angola to score points with critics of his policy of détente with the Soviets. The only reason the American public found out about these two involvements was that Congress passed a law in 1974 requiring the director of central intelligence to brief six congressional subcommittees on any plans for covert actions; Angola leaked through the Senate and Italy through the House. The leaks, rather than their substance, gave the agencies a new ground for crying foul. But beyond the charges and countercharges the leaks gave proof, if any was needed, that for all the CIA's humiliations and consequent internal reforms, the basic process had not changed a bit: the Agency could be sent off on chores that bore little clear relationship to any national policy known to the public.

There were modest reforms at the FBI too, aimed at avoiding repetition of past abuses, beginning with Acting Director L. Patrick Gray's 1972 order that every "security" case state some formal basis for the Bureau's jurisdiction, and continuing through to Attorney General Levi's decision in the last days of 1975 to scrap the "administrative index" (ADEX), a catalogue of people who would come in for intensive investigation in time of national emergency. (Under the old "security index," predecessor to the ADEX, they could have been put in detention camps.) FBI Director Kelley, while defending some of the Bureau's excesses in the 1960s on grounds of the "temper of the times" then, swore that they could not happen again. No more professors getting fired because of their political views and associations; no more agents flying from Washington to Atlanta to mail poison-pen letters. And yet the FBI was still conducting voluminous domestic intelligence investigations against targets of its own choice, coordinated out of the Internal Security Section of its Intelligence Division at Washington headquarters. A study by the General Accounting Office showed that barely 3 percent of these actually led to federal prosecutions.

Both agencies invited—in effect, dared—Congress and the executive branch to go beyond fighting the last war and to write new rules that would be appropriate for this and future seasons, that would respect civil liberties without neglecting the genuine dangers of the real world. It is not an easy job, especially if one wants to do something more than tinker (an extra deputy director here and strengthened powers for an inspector

general there), but stop short of dismantling the intelligence community entirely.

A fundamental problem is how to define, and perhaps realistically limit, modern-day American intelligence needs. The United States does not confront the threat of invasion by a foreign power. With new electronic and photographic capabilities, fewer and fewer people are directly involved in the collection of tactical military intelligence. What nations want to know about each other, and need live bodies to collect and analyze, is more in the nature of political, economic, and social information, the kind of knowledge that helps governments to perceive the intentions and understand the motives of both their friends and their potential enemies. Much of that can be learned through the press, especially in the Western world, or through normal diplomatic channels. But dealing with closed societies may require some use of clandestine sources and methods.

There is strong sentiment in Washington in favor of new ground rules that would be based more squarely than ever on American concepts of fair play and due process. Senator James Abourezk, Democrat of South Dakota, for example, has repeatedly proposed legislation that would, in its broadest application, prevent the United States from doing anything in its overseas intelligence operations that would be a violation of the law if done at home, and he has a small but solid bloc of votes on his side. But Walter Mondale, Abourezk's colleague from Minnesota, no unreconstructed cold warrior himself, criticizes this as a "simple answer" that ignores crucial realities. The United States might gain something in self-righteousness and moral certitude if it stops listening in on private conversations overseas and no longer urges foreign nationals to commit espionage and treason against their own governments, even if most other powers continue to do these things with impunity, but would it not at the same time lose in other very important ways?

In the same vein, the American Civil Liberties Union has proposed that the FBI give up "all foreign and domestic intelligence investigations of groups or individuals unrelated to a specific criminal offense," without suggesting anyone else who could take over the Bureau's counterintelligence function. The intent is pure, but does the proposed remedy go too far when, according to Colby, every year sixty to eighty Americans are approached overseas and asked to spy for the Soviet Union, and when there is evidence of a substantial network of illegal foreign agents operating in this country? Should the government not be looking for those agents well in advance of any hard probable cause to believe that specific acts of espionage have been committed? Even Mondale, disturbed as he is over FBI abuses, thinks that it should. "We have to be able to keep track [of foreign agents] without abiding by all of the requirements of due process," he concedes. But then what about the "agents of influence," the American citizens, fully protected by the Constitution, upon whom the foreign agents depend? And the "dormant assets," the potential spies who are in place and waiting to be activated? Where to stop?

The best solution, obviously, would be to achieve some measure of détente in those back alleys of the world, as well as in the official channels. Indeed, during the closing days of World War II, when Soviet-American cooperation against the Axis was still operative, "Wild Bill" Donovan proposed an exchange of security delegations in Moscow and Washington between the OSS and the NKVD (forerunner of the KGB). The intended purpose was to trade information about sabotage operations behind German lines, but the cooperation presumably would have continued after the war. At the time, Hoover interceded to shoot down Donovan's plan; and the CIA and KGB agents in the embassies in Moscow and Washington today are hardly there on a formal exchange basis. Even if Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev were to startle the world by swapping lists of secret agents, as some seriously propose, each would suspect the other of a nasty trick, and they would probably both be right.

Failing that, where can and should the United States draw the lines? Much of the recent dialogue has focused on the red herring of the intelligence investigations, covert actions. The Abourezk proposal, in a somewhat milder form, and recommendations of the Center for National Security Studies, among others, would ban them completely. Morton Halperin, a former official of the Defense Department and the National Security Council, and now director of the center's "Project on National Security and Civil Liberties," told the Church committee that "covert operations are incompatible with our democratic institutions." But Cyrus Vance, who was himself concerned with national security issues as deputy secretary of defense and in other government positions, argues, "It is too difficult to see that clearly in the future. . . . I believe it should be the policy of the United States to engage in covert actions only when they are absolutely essential to the national security."

The real question is whether the United States wants, and considers it to be in the interests of national security, to influence events in other nations. If the answer is yes, as it probably is, then some of that influence may have to be exercised secretly, because sovereign governments are not likely to welcome open interference in their affairs. Ironically, a democratic system like the American one has a problem the Soviets do not. Our government cannot funnel its aid through an organization like the Communist party and say that it is simply helping kindred political spirits.

Certain hypothetical dilemmas are easily solved: the United States almost surely would have liked to be able to assassinate Hitler before or during World War II; that act might have saved millions of lives and earned the gratitude of people the world over. In drawing up standards for peacetime, however, it is easier to delineate what should be prohibited than what should be permitted. No assassinations or even peripheral involvement in plots that might lead to them; no interference in the electoral processes of other countries; no more secret wars; no misleading propaganda that distorts the truth about the world situation; no drug-dealing or other activity that affects the health, livelihood, and well-

being of people at home or abroad. But what about secret support for an underground publishing network in the Soviet Union which advances freedom of expression by making the writings of dissidents available to Soviet citizens who want to read them? And what about continuing the postwar tradition of American help to democratic parties in Western Europe that might otherwise be swamped, and eventually repressed, by minority parties that are heavily endowed by Moscow? Or help even to the Western Communist parties that have broken from the Soviet Union and are committed to working for Marxist principles through free elections? Those are tougher cases.

Mitchell Rogovin, a liberal Washington attorney who has represented the CIA through its recent trials and tribulations, proposes a three-part standard for evaluating future proposals for covert action: "Does it advance the legitimate interest of the country [the United States]? Is the means [of carrying out the action] acceptable in a moral sense? If it is revealed, would it hurt more than it would help?" But even that kind of standard would make sense, Rogovin acknowledges, only within the context of basic, well-defined and -articulated national policies—which are nonexistent right now. If those policies were openly debated and established (along with reformed and strengthened procedures for review and accountability), then even if the actions themselves remained secret, the public could know the fundamental attitudes being implemented.

As for "preventive action," the FBI's equivalent of the CIA's "covert operation," it is only a little easier to decide. Again, there is no trouble drawing up a list of prohibited activities: no character assassination; no interference with freedom of speech and association and travel; no indiscriminate electronic surveillance; no provocation to violence. Tentative guidelines drawn up by a Justice Department-FBI committee named by Levi would permit some official preventive actions—at times when violence threatens, on the condition that the attorney general authorize the action in advance and later report on it to Congress—but Senator Mondale, for one, feels that this might set a dangerous precedent. He argues for use of the arrest power, when necessary under the conspiracy laws, in such circumstances. (People who share his view contend that even an occasional "bad" arrest, which is thrown out of court later, would be preferable to an express government policy of disruption.)

Whatever the standard, all police and intelligence work is bound to continue to include a certain number of unofficial counterintelligence techniques; any smart policeman or agent will make a pretext phone call to try to determine whether a fugitive is home before he goes out to arrest him. And doesn't society want and expect its protectors to find out about terrorist plans in advance and then prevent occurrences such as the bomb explosion at La Guardia?

How much reform and restructuring is really necessary? Levi insists that however many fail-safes are built in, "you have to trust someone at some point." Otis Pike believes that if "more people have to sign off" on controversial policies and actions (that is, if more of the agencies' superiors in the executive branch have to record their approval of such steps) and share responsibility for the outcome, they are likelier to foster and enforce caution and care. But the recent sorry record of abuse of trust and sheer neglect by government officials at all levels provides little basis for relying on the human instincts and personal judgments of those to whom the FBI and CIA must answer. Nor can the solutions be left to the courts; their arbitration of such matters generally comes after it is too late to protect the innocent victims of government excesses.

Proposals for assuring greater accountability and better behavior are now as numerous as the past abuses, but general agreement is crystallizing around a few basic propositions:

- A new apparatus—either a single special assistant or a small committee—reporting directly to the President on intelligence matters. As envisioned by Ralph Dungan, who was ambassador to Chile when the CIA launched its program of covert activity as a parallel to official American policy there, the new chain of command would assure that all controversial activities could ultimately be said to be carried out in the President's name, and would make the decision-making process on covert actions less casual and informal.
- A new system of congressional oversight of and participation in intelligence decisions. Although it would mean offending both the powerful apologists for the intelligence community and some of the more effective existing units, the wisest course would probably be to establish a new Joint Committee on Intelligence or, preferably, a separate committee in each house, with exclusive jurisdiction in the area. The members would be selected to represent a cross-section of the Congress, and they and their staffs would automatically rotate off the committee after fixed terms to prevent the kind of cozy buddy system and protection of the agencies that has characterized congressional oversight in the past.

Once a reasonable system is developed for protecting that narrow category of confidential information that legitimately deserves to be kept confidential, Congress could begin to be consulted in advance on any covert actions. (The threat of fines or even suspension from Congress might be necessary to assure adequate security. As matters stand now, a single member of Congress can effectively sabotage or even veto delicate Administration plans with a clever leak.) Some procedure might ultimately be devised for the legislative branch to overrule plans that it considers to be in clear violation of the public interest. The committees could weigh the question of whether the CIA's budget should continue to be kept secret, in apparent violation of the Constitution.

- The writing of detailed charters for both the FBI and CIA, so that they no longer have to rely upon loopholes, outdated executive orders, and secret communications from the White House for major areas of their jurisdiction. Enacted into statutes, the charters should be specific enough to make it clear what the agencies are forbidden to do. (The GAO has privately told the Church committee that Levi's draft guidelines for the FBI would permit a repetition of virtually all the ques-

tionable activities it discovered in its audit of the Bureau's domestic intelligence operations.) But they should not become so specific as to eliminate executive discretion altogether. (Levi has pointed out that once rulemakers get into the business of proscribing certain areas of investigation—for example, personal sexual preference or drinking habits—they may also change their minds and require just such areas of investigation later.)

In all of these areas, Congress, the Executive, and, for that matter, the public must realize that a durable solution will not come overnight. Exact definition of terms and the ability to forecast all hypothetical situations may well elude the drafters, just as they did in 1947. The intelligence community will probably require frequent checkups and routine re-examination of its ground rules. And other problems lie ahead: one is the issue of what Senator Mondale calls "idle hands," large bureaucracies within the bureaucracies whose job it is to spot subversion or dream up covert actions.

Many people, including Dungan and former CIA covert operator David Phillips, suggest taking covert actions out of the Agency and attaching them instead to the Department of State or Defense. A similar solution might be necessary for the Internal Security Section of the FBI. One problem is that when reform of the FBI and the CIA is complete, the old ways of doing business might crop up in the NSA and other lesser-known dark corners of the intelligence community. (Exact numbers vary, depending on whom you talk to about what figures, but an informed estimate is that even now the CIA's budget of approximately $1.5 billion accounts for only 15 percent of the total intelligence community's budget, compared to the NSA's 25 percent.) As Senator Gary Hart puts it, "The danger is not so much the assassin or the black bag job as the Orwellian electronic capacity. . . . It outruns the human ability to control it."

Little can be accomplished, however, until public confidence in the intelligence community is restored. That will take time, and the appointment of a politician like George Bush to be director of central intelligence does not help. One of the most tangible effects of the congressional investigations was indeed to lower this confidence still further, to reinforce and legitimize the fears of dirty tricks that were so widespread in the 1960s and early 1970s. For all the assurances that the FBI and the CIA have changed, that they are no longer misbehaving, many people remain skeptical. They are still not sure whether they are getting the truth. Washington reporters working on sensitive stories still retreat to pay phones for their most delicate calls, and controversial politicians worry about the privacy of files in their offices and homes. (Indeed, when the homes of two members of the Church committee, Howard Baker and Charles Mathias, were burglarized, valuables were ignored but documents were gone through. Police were unable to solve the crimes.) Otis Pike asked the Capitol police to sweep the offices of all members of his committee for wiretaps and bugging devices.

Some executive branch officials agree that it is always a good idea to be careful—one never knows to what lengths the spies of the Soviets, the Chinese, and other potentially hostile foreign powers might go. But it was not those spies whom the journalists, senators, and congressmen feared; it was the ones who work for their own government. □

HOUSTON POST
20 FEBRUARY 1976

Post/commentary

The KGB & the CIA

Strip by strip, publications are peeling away the anonymity that has protected American CIA agents and contacts. The process is so widespread and so effective that observers experienced in the ways of the Soviet Union are convinced that this is no matter of chance but a new, deliberate and successful offensive launched by the Soviet KGB against its longtime adversary, the CIA.

So many names of American agents and their informants have been published, with whereabouts and home addresses included, that we have to see this as a threat comparable to the Soviet build-up in arms and a strategy as damaging as the Soviet thrusts into Africa. British security services, so closely allied with American, have watched in alarm and are expecting to become the next target for this unwanted and destructive publicity.

Oddly, few questions have been raised publicly as to where the sudden spate of name-lists have been coming from. They could not come from defectors like former CIA agent Philip Agee. His knowledge was fairly limited to Latin America and dates back to the 1960s. Instead, some observers believe, the publication of CIA names is the second phase in a KGB offensive that began three or more years ago with the marked increase in the number of KGB agents throughout Western Europe and Britain.

NATO reports that there are now more than 900 KGB and GRU (military intelligence) officers in Western Europe, compared to the 776 suspected or known in 1972. Even then, the intelligence personnel made up more than a third of all the Soviet officials in the area. An American news magazine recently cited the large Soviet embassy in small Luxembourg and estimated that of its 36 staff members, 12 are KGB agents, compared to 7 in 1972. Though Austria was guaranteed neutrality by a 1955 state treaty signed by the USSR, the number of KGB and GRU men has increased from 50 in 1972 to 75 now. In neutral Sweden the number has grown from 35 to 43 since 1972. Switzerland's complement has swelled from 87 to more than 100.

It is possible to grant that some of the newspapers publishing the American CIA lists are striking back at what they believe to be CIA malpractice in some countries like Cuba or Chile. But it is not possible to believe that the KGB had no hand in providing at least some of them with the CIA lists to publish.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1976

Excerpts From Nixon's Responses to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 11—Following are excerpts from the text of the sworn answers, in writing, to questions put to former President Richard M. Nixon by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The answers were released by Mr. Nixon's attorneys.

Opening Statement

The following submission of responses to the interrogatories propounded to me by the Senate Select Committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, as was my offer to meet informally with the ranking members of the committee to discuss any matter within the committee's jurisdiction, is made voluntarily and following careful consideration of the propriety of a former President responding to Congressional questions pertainings to activities which occurred during his term in office.

It is my opinion that Congress cannot compel a President to testify concerning the conduct of his office, either in justification or in explanation of actions he took. The existence of such power in the Congress would, without doubt, impair the Executive and his subordinates in the exercise of the Constitutional responsibilities of the Presidency. The end results would be most unfortunate. The totally uninhibited flow of communication which is essential to the Executive branch would be so chilled as to rended candid advice unobtainable. No President could carry out his responsibilities if the advice he received were to be filtered by the prospect of completed disclosure at a future date. The result would be the interference and interruption of the open and frank interchange which is absolutely essential for a President to fulfill his duties.

Truman Letter Quoted

As President Truman stated in a letter to a Congressional committee in 1953, this principle applies to a former President as well as to a sitting President. In his words:

"It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expired when he is sought to be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he is President. .

"The doctrine would be shattered, and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory of Constitutional government, would become a mere arm of the Legislative branch of the Government if he would feel during his term of office that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for political purposes."

In their wisdom, the founders of this country provided—through the Constitutional separation of powers—the safeguards prerequisite to three strong, independent branches of government. The zeal with which the Congress has guarded and defended its own prerogatives and indepence is a clear indication of its support of that doctrine where the Congress is involved.

The Decision to Respond

I believe, however, it is consistent with my view of the respective powers and privileges of the President and Congress for me to reply voluntarily to the committee's request for information. In responding, I may be able to assist the committee in its very difficult task for evaluating the intelligence community of this nation. By doing so voluntarily, future Presidents or former Presidents need not be concerned that by this precedent they may be compelled to respond to Congressional demands.

Whether it is wise for a President, in his discretion, to provide testimony concerning his Presidential actions, is a matter which must be decided by each President in light of the conditions at that time. Undoubtedly, as has been the case during the 200 years of this nation's history, the instances warranting such action may be rare. But when the appropriate circumstances arise, each President must feel confident that he can act in a spirit of cooperation, if he so decides, without impairing either the stature or independence of his successors.

Finally, I believe it is appropriate to inform the committee that the responses which follow are based totally upon my present recollection of events—many of which were relatively insignificant in comparison to the principal activities for which I had responsibility as President—relating to a period some six years ago. Despite the difficulty in responding to questions purely from memory, I wish to assure the committee that my responses represent an effort to respond as fully as possible.

Interrogatory 10

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 2 concerning N.S.A. [National Security Agent] intercepts of non-voice communications, it is my recollection that:

A. The intercepts occurred in the course of two investigation programs I authorized for the purpose of discovering the sources of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive, security-classified information. The first investigation involved primarily members of the National Security Council staff. The second investigation involved an employee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

B. The first investigation occurred between approximately May 9, 1969, and Feb. 10, 1971. The second investigation occurred between approximately December 1971 and June 1972.

C. My knowledge of both investigations stemmed from my participation in authorizing their implementation.

D. I authorized both investigations.

E. I did not participate in the termination of the first investigation. With regard to the second investigation, I did not participate in the decision to terminate the intercepts. However, when the identity of the individual who had disclosed classified information was discovered, I directed that he be reassigned from his then present duties to a less sensitive position and that his activities be monitored for a period sufficient to insure that he was not continuing to disclose classified information to which he had been exposed during his earlier assignment.

Secret Service Intercept

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concerning the secret service intercept of telephonic communications, it is my recollection that:

A. The intercepts occurred as a result of efforts to determine whether my brother, Donald Nixon, was the target of attempts by individuals to compromise him or myself.

B. The intercepts occurred during an approximately three-week period in 1970.

C. I discussed with John Ehrlichman my concern that my brother's trips abroad had brought him in contact with persons who might attempt to compromise him or myself. I directed Mr. Ehrlichman to have my brother's activities monitored to determine whether this was in fact occurring. I subsequently learned that the surveillance revealed no attempts to compromise my brother or myself and that the surveillance was therefore terminated.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concerning F.B.I. or C.I.A. capability to intercept telephonic or other communications involving certain foreign embassies, the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 4 concerning the unauthorized entry into a place of business, it is my recollection that:

A. The entry was into the office of a psychiatrist.

B. I do not know on what date the entry occurred.

C. I received the information from the counsel to the President, John Dean, in a conversation on March 17, 1973.

D. I did not directly authorize or approve of the action.

E. I learned of the event nearly two years after it occurred and therefore had no reason to act to terminate it.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 5, the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 9, it is my recollection that:

A. I learned from J. Edgar Hoover that during each of the five previous Administrations which he had served as Director of the F.B.I., that agency had conducted, without a search warrant, telephonic intercepts in connection with investigations to discover the sources of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. I also learned, perhaps from Mr. Hoover or others, that prior Administrations had engaged in surreptitious entries and intercepts of voice and non-voice communications.

B. My understanding was that these activities, or certain of them, had taken place at various times during each of the five Administrations preceding mine.

C. My information concerning the use of telephonic intercepts by prior Administrations to discover the sources of unauthorized disclosures of classified

information came from the Director of the F.B.I. in discussions in which he informed me that based upon over 20 years' experience, the F.B.I. had concluded that this investigative method was the most effective means of discovering the source of unauthorized disclosures, with regard to the use of unauthorized entries and intercepts of voice and nonvoice communications by prior Administrations, I cannot specifically recall when and from whom I received the information except as reflected in the special report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc).

Interrogatory 34

I assume that the reference to "actions otherwise 'illegal'" in this interrogatory means actions which if undertaken by private persons, would violate criminal laws. It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently governmental actions which, if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interest of the nations' security, are lawful but which, if undertaken by private persons, are not. In the most extreme case, for example, forceable removal of persons form their homes for the purpose of sequestering them in confined areas, if done by a person—or even by government employees under normal circumstances—would be considered kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment. Yet under the exigencies of war, President Roosevelt, acting pursuant to a broad war-powers delegation from Congress, ordered such action be taken against Americans of Japanese ancestry because he believed it to be in the interest of national security. Similarly under extreme conditions but not at that point constituting a declared war, President Lincoln confiscated vessels violating a naval blockade, seized rail and telegraph lines leading to Washington, and paid troops from Treasury funds without the required Congressional appropriation. In 1969, during my Administration, warrantless wiretapping, even by the Government, was unlawful, but if undertaken because of a Presidential determination that it was in the interest of a national security was lawful. Support for the legality of such action is found, for example, in the concurring opinion of Justice White in Katz v. United States.

This is not to say, of course, that any action President might authorize in the interest of national security would be lawful. The Supreme Court's disapproval of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills is an example. But it is naive to attempt to categorize activities a President might authorize as "legal" or "illegal" without reference to the circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary. Assassination of a foreign leader—an act I never had cause to consider and which under most circumstances would be abhorrent to any President—might have been less abhorrent and, in fact, justified during World War II as a means of preventing further Nazi atrocities and ending the slaughter. Additionally, the opening of mail sent to selected priority targets of foreign intelligence, although impinging upon individual freedom, may nevertheless serve a salutory purpose when—as it has in the past—it results in preventing the disclosure of sensitive military and state secrets to the enemies of this country.

In short, there have been—and will be in the future—circumstances in which Presidents may lawfully authorize actions in the interests of the security of this country, which, if undertaken by other persons or even by the President under different circumstances, would be illegal.

Interrogatory 39

It is my present recollection that the Sept. 15, 1970, meeting referred to in Interrogatory No. 36 was held for the purpose of discussing the prospect of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency of Chile. At that time, as more fully set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 44, I was greatly concerned that Mr. Allende's presence in that office would directly and adversely affect the security interests of the United States. During the meeting in my office, I informed Mr. Helms that I wanted the C.I.A. to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean Congress. It was my opinion that any effort to bring about a political defeat of Mr. Allende could succeed only if the participation of the C.I.A. was not disclosed. Therefore, I instructed Mr. Helms that the C.I.A. should proceed covertly. I further informed Mr. Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende would have to be supported by the military factions in Chile.

Because the C.I.A.'s covert activity in supporting Mr. Allende's political opponents might at some point be discovered, I instructed that the American embassy in Chile not be involved. I did this so that the American embassy could remain a viable operation regardless of the outcome of the election.

I further instructed Mr. Helms and Dr. Kissinger that any action which the United States could take which might impact adversely on the Chilean economy — such as terminating all foreign aid assistance to Chile except that for humanitarian purposes—should be taken as an additional step in preventing Mr. Allende from becoming President of Chile, thereby negating the Communist influence within that country.

Interrogatory 44

In 1964 Salvador Allende made a very strong bid for the Presidency of Chile. I was aware that at that time the incumbent Administration in the United States determined that it was in the interests of this nation to impede Mr. Allende's becoming President because of his alignment with and support from various Communist countries, especially Cuba. It is important to remember, of course, that President Kennedy, only two years before, had faced the Cuban crisis in which the Soviet Union had gained a military base of operations in the Western Hemisphere and had even begun installation of nuclear missiles. The expansion of Cuban-styled Communist infiltration into Chile would have provided a "beachhead" for guerrilla operations throughout South America. There was a great deal of concern expressed in 1964 and again in 1970 by neighboring South American countries that if Mr. Allende were elected President, Chile would quickly become a haven for Communist operatives who could infiltrate and undermine independent governments throughout South America. I was aware that the Administration of President Kennedy and President Johnson expended approximately $4 million on behalf of Mr. Allende's opponents and had prevented Mr. Allende from becoming President.

It was in this context that in September 1970, after Mr. Allende had received a plurality but not a majority of the general electorate's votes, that I determined that the C.I.A. should attempt to bring about Mr. Allende's defeat in the Congressional election procedure. The same national security interests which I had understood prompted Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to act from 1962 to 1964 prompted my concern and the decision to act in 1970.

Interrogatory 45

I do not recall discussing during the Sept. 15, 1970 meeting specific means to be used by the C.I.A. to attempt to prevent Mr. Allende from assuming the Presidency of Chile. I recall the meeting as one that focused upon the policy considerations which should influence my decision to act and upon the general means available to accomplish the objective. As I have previously stated, I recall discussing the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende's opponents, the termination of United States financial aid and assistance programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy and the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military, behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the Congressional confirmation procedure.

I do not recall specifically issuing instructions that the activity being conducted by the C.I.A. in Chile not be disclosed to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. However, I do recall instructing that the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile be carried out covertly in order to be effective and that knowledge of the C.I.A.'s actions be kept on a need-to-know basis only.

Interrogatory 48

I do not recall being aware that the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile were being carried out under designations such as "Track I" or "Track II." In any event, I do not know what, if any, of the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile were known to:

A. Secretary of State Rogers;
B. Secretary of Defense Laird;
C. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson;
D. Deputy Secretary of Defense (David) Packard; or
E. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. (Thomas) Moorer.

Interrogatory 52

My present recollection is that in mid-October 1970, Dr. Kissinger informed me that the C.I.A. had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the support of various factions in attempts by Mr. Allende's opponents to prevent Allende from becoming President had not been successful and likely would not be. Dr. Kissinger told me that under the circumstances he had instructed the C.I.A. to abandon the effort. I informed Dr. Kissinger that I agreed with that instruction.

Interrogatory 54

I do not recall receiving information, while President, concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of Gen. René Schneider or any other Chilean.

Interrogatory 55

My recollection is that I was not aware that the C.I.A. passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officials known to the C.I.A. to be planning a coup attempt.

Interrogatory 56

I recall that during, I believe, September 1970, I received a call from Mr. Donald Kendall [chairman of Pepsico,

Inc.] who informed me that Mr. Augustin Edwards [owner of the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio of Santiago], a man I had met during my years in private life, was in this country and was interested in informing appropriate officials here concerning recent developments in Chile. I told Mr. Kendall that he should have Mr. Edwards talk to Dr. Kissinger or Attorney General Mitchell, who was a member of the National Security Council. I do not recall whether I subsequently instructed either Mr. Mitchell or Dr. Kissinger to meet with Mr. Edwards. It is quite possible that I did.

Interrogatory 57

I do not recall directing Mr. Helms to meet with Mr. Edwards nor do I recall instructing anyone on my staff to so instruct him.

Interrogatory 58

I do not recall that either the timing or the purpose of the Sept. 15, 1970, meeting concerning Chile had any relationship to Mr. Augustin Edwards' presence in Washington or the information he may have conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, Attorney General Mitchell, or Director Helms. Therefore, I do not believe that any instructions Director Helms may have received during that meeting were given as a result of information, concerning conditions in Chile, supplied from Mr. Edwards to Mr. Kendall.

Interrogatory 59

I do not remember informing Mr. Kendall, in words or substance, that I would see to it that the C.I.A. received appropriate instructions so as to allow it to take action aimed at preventing Allende from becoming President of Chile.

Interrogatory 60

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had made any offer of money to the United States Government to be used for the purpose of preventing Allende from taking office.

Interrogatory 65

None of the instructions I recall issuing prior to Mr. Allende's becoming President of Chile, nor any of the information I recall receiving during that period, led me to believe that it was necessary to issue instructions to the C.I.A., to insure that Chilean military officials, with whom the United States had been in contact prior to Allende's inauguration, knew it was not the desire of the United States Government that a military coup topple the Allende Government.

Interrogatory 67

It is my opinion that the actions which I authorized the C.I.A. to take in September 1970 to prevent Mr. Allende from becoming President of Chile, and which with my approval were terminated in October 1970, were not a factor in bringing about the 1973 military coup.

Interrogatory 73

Considering the pressures and the enormous problems confronted by the intelligence community, I believe that, with some unfortunate exceptions, the quality of intelligence received during my Administration was relatively adequate. Intelligence collection is a very difficult, highly sophisticated art and the United States has progressed in its development. Naturally, any President, holding the tremendous power he does —including the power to wage nuclear war—desires and needs the very best intelligence information available. It is comforting, for example, when sitting down to difficult negotiations, to know the fallback positions of our adversaries or their areas of vulnerability—an advantage that can be gained or lost not only through adept intelligence work but through deliberate or unwitting leaks of such information; a problem I faced at various times during my Administration and have referred to earlier.

Desiring the very best intelligence information, of course, will in itself lead a President to believe that improvements are possible and warranted. On the international level, for example, better intelligence concerning the 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East might have permitted moves to avert it. On the domestic front, the need for improved information is equally as great. Terrorist activity in the United States, which had reached unprecedented heights in the late 1960's and early 1970's, seems again to be on the increas. The tragic bombing at La Guardia Airport, in which 11 persons were killed, may only be a forerunner to a new round of premeditated violence. It was in a similar context in 1970—a time at which incidents of bombings and hijackings had reached an all-time high —that I requested officials of the various intelligence agencies to evaluate domestic intelligence capabilities in this country and to recommend steps for its improvement. What many persons refused to recognize when the existence of the Huston evaluation became known, but what your committee's investigation has now established beyond doubt, is that none of the recommendations contained in the Huston evaluation departed from actions taken under at least four or five earlier Administrations. Indeed, the recommendations set forth in that study were in most respects similar to the recommendations emanating from the current reviews of the intelligence community. The difference, of course, was that in utilizing the various intelligence methods suggested, such as C.I.A. informants within the United States to trace Communist alliances with terrorist organizations who had threatened domestic violence to protest the iVetnam War, my Administration was viewed as bent upon stifling dissenting political views. The intermixture of protected political activity, civil disobedience, and acts of terrorism—all under the antiwar rubric —was so great that to move against terrorism was to be guilty of political suppression. Unfortunately, the tools available to get at the one while avoiding the other were not as delicate as the surgeon's scalpel. Perhaps this committee's recommendations in the area of improved domestic intelligence will more closely resemble the instruments of a surgeon. If, however, by overreacting to past excesses this committee impedes domestic or foreign intelligence capabilities, it may later find that in a period of terrorists bombings, kidnapping and assassinations, the public interest will require more authoritarian measures—despite their impact on personal liberties—than the more delicate but less effective alternatives.

Interrogatory 77

In 1947 as a freshman Congressman and member of the Herter Committee, I visited a devastated European continent. Seeing Berlin in the agonies of partition and seeing Italy under the severe challenge of Communist takeover. Indeed, seeing Europe emerge from war in an age of stark ideological conflict—all these as well as other factors fostered my firm belief in the need for a strong, determined and effective intelligence system during a period of cold war.

The world has change since 1947, and I have been privileged to have played a role in much of that change. Tragically, however, there is much that has not changed. The realities of international war in an age of stark ideological con- intelligence or for an agency of intelligence. Throughout history, where the great powers are concerned, during a period of détente the danger of war goes down but the danger of conquest without war goes up.

Consequently, I have found recent efforts to emasculate the Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence organizations to be not only incredibly shortsighted but potentially dangerous to the security of all free nations. The greatest disservice of the Select Committee would be to take any action or make any recommendation which would diminish by the slightest degree the capabilities of our intelligence community.

Even as a distant observer I can say without reservation that the revelations and investigations over the past year have had the obvious effect of lessening United States intelligence capabilities in the world. Even the least sophisticated among us can see that morale among these essential public servants is probably at an all-time low.

The Issue of Responsible Journalism

The secrecy that is crucial to a successful intelligence system has been routinely violated, causing in many quarters a casual indifference to the need for security. For the national media to publish and disseminate classified national security information is in my view irresponsible journalism. That they and those who leak classified information to them in violation of the law would continue to be oblivious to the harm they are doing to the nation reflects not on their patriotism but on their intelligence and judgment.

From my experience in the Executive branch I would be prepared to predict that because of what has happened over the past year, vital intelligence sources have dried up. I am certain that other governments' readiness to accept our word as bond and to be assured that we can keep their confidences have steadily diminished. What new opportunities have been lost or what unwished consequences we might have suffered becaus of constant attacks in the media and by the Congress are not possible to know. It is all too likely that we will learn of them "the hard way."

I realize it is in vogue to rail against covert activities and clandestine operations. Some have even rhetorically questioned the very need for secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Perhaps there was a time when some of this criticism was necessary or even helpful. However, I think that paraphrasing an old aphorism is apt here: Nothing exceeds like excess.

The pendulum has swung too far. Were today's conditions in existence seven years ago it is highly questionable whether the historic new opening could have been made to the People's Republic of China. Efforts to get the return of our P.O.W.'s and achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam might well have been aborted. Significant new initiatives in the Middle East would have been delayed. Nuclear arms limitations and other agreements with the Soviet Union —difficult achievements under the best of conditions—would have been much

more difficult.

Recommendations For Reform

Therefore, I make the following recommendations:

1. That Congressional oversight responsibilities, which are appropriate as a mechanism for legislative participation in the policy decisions affecting intelligence activities be delegated to a joint Committee consisting of not more than 12 Senators and Representatives.

2. That no information or material made available to the Joint Oversight Committee be made available to any Congressional staff member, except the staff of the Joint Committee, which should be limited to not more than six members.

3. That a statute be enacted making it a criminal violation to reveal to any unauthorized person information classified pursuant to applicable law or executive order.

4 That a committee consisting of representatives from each of the intelligence agencies be established to coordinate their respective activities.

5. That the Joint Intelligence Committee study the question of the extent to which continued limitations on C.I.A. domestic intelligence activities, where there is a direct connection to matters of foreign espionage, sabotage or counterintelligence, should be continued.

Freedom without security produces anarchy. Security without freedom produces dictatorship. Maintaining the delicate balance between freedom and security has been the genius of the American democracy and the reason it has survived for 200 years. Failure to provide this balance has been the cause for the failure of democratic governments to survive in many other parts of the world.

The Executive, the Congress, and the Judiciary have inherited a great legacy and have a special responsibility to maintain that balance so that our American system of government will continue to survive in a time when security and freedom are in jeopardy at home and abroad.

It is important at this time to step back and assess not only what action should or must be taken with respect to a particular matter, but also the immediate circumstances which seem to compel that action be taken at all. In assessing the present circumstances, it is my opinion that the indiscriminate denigration that has been heaped recently upon the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and our other intelligence agencies has been most unfortunate. In the zeal of some to reform and others to expose, we have come very near throwing the baby out with the bath water. We live in imperfect times in an uncertain world. As a nation we need every possibly capability, not merely to survive but to be better able to build the kind of world in peace that has been man's perpetual goal. I fear that the moralizing and posturing with regard to our intelligence agencies over the past year have caused us to lose much of that capability. Let us hope that it does not cause us to lose the peace.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER
28 FEBRUARY 1976

The intelligence report

The Daniel Schorr—*Village Voice*—intelligence report controversy will continue for some time and could be damaging to press freedom. Certainly, it has done nothing for the advancement of a "shield law" in Congress.

Publication of the secret document, the leaked story, has been prevalent in recent months and years. This one, however, has an ingredient not present in other such cases. Editors, columnists and reporters ought to examine it from the point of view of the average reader or citizen.

This was not a report being suppressed by a bureaucrat, a government agency, or a congressional committee. Essential parts of the report had been reported but the full text was not available until Schorr obtained a copy. Schorr noted: "I could not be the one responsible for suppressing the report."

What made him think this was his sole responsibility?

Publication of the report had been approved by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. But, the full membership of the House voted to countermand that decision until the report had been cleansed of what it believed to be important classified information.

This was not a whimsical decision. Enough members of the House were convinced of its importance to national security to take another look.

We are aware of and sensitive to all the arguments about the "people's right to know." We have used them repeatedly on this page and we remain dedicated to that principle.

However, here, for the first time to our recollection, the people's elected representatives (the House of Representatives) decided in behalf of the people (its constituency) that information of importance to the national security (the people's security) should be re-examined before it was released.

At that point, a member of the press disagreed and took it upon himself to act as the people's surrogate in releasing the information in spite of the fact that the people's *elected surrogate* decided otherwise. It brings up the charges we have all heard before: "Who elected the press?" And, more and more people are asking themselves that question, rightly or wrongly.

This is a difficult issue for the press. It must insist on its right to investigate, to probe, to uncover, to expose, to report. But, can it expect the support and appreciation of its readers if it exposes national security and/or international intelligence information that a majority of the House of Representatives believes should not be revealed? It is a confrontation in which we believe the press will come out second best.

WASHINGTON POST
6 MARCH 1976

Personalities

Seven Days, a successor to the radical magazine Ramparts, was announced Thursday night in New York.

David Dellinger, former Chicago Seven Defendant, who will be an editor, announced the new magazine, whose first issue will be out next week.

Ramparts was the first American publication to expose covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Dellinger said Seven Days will have as contributors New York Times investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, and former CIA agent Philip Agee, who has written a book about the CIA's inner workings.

SATURDAY REVIEW
6 March 1976

Have We Gone Overboard on "The Right to Know"?

Ironically, requirements for complete disclosure of information could make it impossible for government to operate effectively.

by Warren Bennis

The British Foreign Office gives its fledgling diplomats three cardinal rules of behavior: (1) never tell a lie, (2) never tell the whole truth, and (3) never miss a chance to go to the bathroom. An old Tammany boodler, who disliked leaving any traces of his dealings, had a terser rule: "Don't write. Send word." Both sets of rules, I fear, are likely to become more and more a tacit standard of conduct for those who, in the post-Watergate climate of suspicion, share the hazardous privilege of running large organizations, including, in my own case, the nation's second largest urban multiversity.

Never before have the American people felt such universal distrust of their presumed leaders—whether in government, the law, the clergy, or education. After years of calculated deception over Vietnam, compounded by the conspiracy, skulduggery, and chicanery of Watergate, they now trust almost no one in authority. Consider a recent Gallup survey in which college students were asked to rate the honesty and ethical standards of various groups: political officeholders (only 9 percent rated "very high") were eclipsed only by advertising men (6 percent); lawyers were rated 40 percent, and journalists 49 percent. I am proud that college teachers rated highest (70 percent), but inasmuch as college presidents were not included, I can't seek shelter under that umbrella. Ralph Nader received a higher rating than President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and Ted Kennedy. Labor leaders came out even worse than business executives —19 percent of the former rated high versus 20 percent for the latter.

In short, virtually all leaders are in the doghouse of suspicion. And the understandable reaction to all these credibility gaps is creating a growing insistence that every public act, of whatever public institution, be conducted, as it were, in Macy's window.

Here are some symptoms.

• "Sunshine laws" have now been passed by numerous states, prohibiting closed meetings. Hawaii has even made it a crime to hold a private meeting of *any* sort without giving advance notice.

• The Buckley Amendment requires that in institutions with federal support all records (particularly those concerning students) be open to inspection by persons concerned.

• The Freedom of Information Act, first passed in 1967 and recently strengthened over the President's veto by amendments that became effective on February 19, 1975, requires that most records of federal agencies be provided to anyone upon request.

The intended purpose of all such measures is wholesome. It is to create a standard, for all public business, of what Woodrow Wilson called "open covenants openly arrived at." I believe wholeheartedly in such a purpose. During many years of consulting, teaching, and writing on the achievement of organizational goals (for all organizations, but particularly those of business and government), I have always stressed the importance of openness. I have argued that goals will be achieved effectively almost in proportion to the extent that the organization can achieve a climate in which members can level with one another in open and trusting interpersonal relationships. I believe this, because denial, avoidance, or suppression of truth will ultimately flaw decision-making and, in the case of business, the bottom line as well.

So, I dislike secrecy. I think the prophet Luke was right when he wrote, "Nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest." And I believe Emerson's law of compensation: "In the end, every secret is told, every crime is punished, every virtue rewarded, in silence and certainty." At the same time, as a practical administrator, I am convinced that these well-intended goldfish-bowl rules will have unintended results worse than the evils they seek to forestall. They are likely to produce more secrecy, not less (only more carefully concealed), and on top of it, so hamstring already overburdened administrators as to throw their tasks into deeper confusion.

For secrecy is one thing. Confidentiality is another. No organization can function effectively without certain degrees of confidentiality in the proposals, steps, and discussions leading up to its decisions—which decisions should then, of course, be open, and generally will be.

An amusing case in point: the Nixon government moved heaven and earth seeking to restrain, perhaps even imprison, *New York Times* editors in their determination to publish the Pentagon Papers. The *Times* won the right from the Supreme Court (under some continuing criminal risk) to resume publishing these assertedly "secret" studies of Vietnam War decisions. Yet the editors themselves surrounded their preparation of these stories with a secrecy and security that the Pentagon might have envied—renting a secret suite of hotel rooms, swearing the members of a small secret staff to total secrecy, for weeks confining them almost like prisoners, restricting their communications to an elite handful with "need to know," and setting the stories themselves on sequestered, closely guarded typesetting machines. Thus the ultimate challenge to "official" secrecy was performed in ultimate "private" secrecy. What the *Times* editors knew, of course, was what every decision-maker knows instinctively. The mere fact of discussions' becoming known, at the wrong stage of the procedure, can prevent a desirable decision from ultimately being carried out.

We have seen this happen in the case of the long, arduous, confidential negotiations Secretary of State Kissinger was making with the Soviets to tie trade concessions to larger, mutually agreed quotas of emigration for Soviet Jews. Through quiet negotiation he had already obtained large but unstipulated expansions of the actual numbers of émigrés, who began arriving in Israel by the thousands. He obtained similar agreement to larger expansions. But zealous senatorial advocates of larger emigration demanded that all this be put in Macy's window—that it be publicly recorded, that the Soviets publicly confirm what they were privately conceding. The outcome was to rupture détente itself and the progress already gained in emigration.

ON A LESS COSMIC LEVEL, some experiences of my own bring home how vital confidentiality can be in determining whether or not "open decisions openly arrived at" can be made at all.

CASE NUMBER ONE. Shortly after I had become president of the University of Cincinnati, of which General Hospital, the city's largest, is a part, a U. S. senator announced an investigation of the whole-body radiation that was carried out at General on terminal-cancer patients. The charge, that the program constituted "using human beings as guinea pigs," was false, but there were some awkward aspects in the way the whole thing had been handled which caused me to investigate the reasons privately.

The investigation was on the eve of a Hamilton County election that was absolutely crucial to the hospital, on which thousands of the poor rely for treatment. It was far from certain whether a major bond levy for General Hospital would pass or fail. It did pass, but during three critical weeks I had either to evade all questions, or fuzz my answers, relating to my own and to the senator's investiga-

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tion. I never lied. I never told the whole truth. I often went to the bathroom.

CASE NUMBER TWO. Our university, which began as a city-funded municipal college and still receives from the city of Cincinnati $4.5 million of the annual $140 million budget, now draws the bulk of its funding from the state. But it is not a full state institution like Ohio State. If it *were* fully state affiliated, it would receive sufficient extra funds to meet a worsening financial crisis. The possibility of such affiliation therefore not only *needs* to be considered but also *has* to be considered; I would be derelict in my duty to do otherwise.

But if we decided to seek full state status, timing was very important, because it would involve not only action by the legislature but also a change in the city's charter. What was even more important, I learned to my sorrow, was confidentiality. One of our state senators, preparing for a television interview, asked me whether it was all right for him to say that the university was "considering" such a move. I said certainly, because obviously I had to consider it. By night this statement of the obvious was "big" news flashing across my television screen. By morning local and state politicians were making a pro-and-con bean bag of the question, and by then the furor was so great that it was difficult even to weigh or discuss the problem on its merits. Happily, that frenetic period has now passed, and the question is being calmly and thoughtfully debated: but I learned a lesson.

CASE NUMBER THREE. Last year a group of black graduate students charged their college faculty with racism. I met with this group and heard out their grievances. I told them that if the faculty agreed, I would ask a blue-ribbon panel of distinguished local citizens, including two black leaders, to investigate and report on the matter.

That was Wednesday. On the next day, Thursday, the dean of the college had arranged to meet with the faculty. The plan was to make this proposal for such a committee. I had no reason to think that the faculty would object. But by late Wednesday afternoon, the Cincinnati *Post* was blazoning the entire story: the protest meeting, my proposal to the blacks, the Thursday meeting arranged with the faculty, and so on. Obviously, the protesters had "leaked" the details of our meeting, apparently assuming the disclosure would further their cause. The opposite happened. The faculty members were irritated by reading about arrangements they had not been consulted about. By the time I *could* consult them, they were sufficiently angry to vote down the whole proposal of an outside committee. Werner Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" affects human as well as molecular relations: the mere act of observing a process publicly *can impede the process itself.*

So, in my own mind it is certainly clear that there are times when confidentiality is a necessary prerequisite to *public* decisions for the *public* benefit. But when one asks, or is asked, where this desirable good blends into the undesirable evil of secrecy—for secrecy's own sake or for concealing mistakes—it is hard to set any very clear or definitive standards or rules of thumb. One almost has to come back always to the character and the integrity of the individual concerned. If he or she is worthy of trust, his judgment must be trusted as to when, and under what circumstances, confidentiality is required.

Unquestionably, however, certain individuals are by nature so obsessed with secrecy and concealment that one suspects that, as infants, they were given to hiding their feces from their parents. One thinks immediately of Richard Nixon. His former speech writer, William Safire, reveals in his book, *After the Fall*, that Nixon was so secretive that prior to his election, he mistrusted even the Secret Service men guarding him. His foreign-policy adviser, Richard Allen, wanted to bring him together with Anna Chennault, widow of the Flying Tiger general, who was pulling strings to block a Johnson bombing pause in North Vietnam. "Meeting would have to be absolute top secret," wrote Allen, to "D C" (Nixon's code name). Secretive old D C scribbled opposite this reference to "top secret": "Should be but I don't see how—with the SS [Secret Service]. If it can be [secret] RN would like to see—if not could Allen see for RN?" Note that for extra secrecy, he even writes of himself in the third person; D C, even to himself, is R N.

We all know where this excessive passion for secrecy led. Kissinger not only had Safire's phone tapped but also recorded—without his knowledge—conversations with such co-equals as budget director George Shultz. Safire has written: "This tolerance of eavesdropping was the first step down the Watergate road. It led to eavesdropping by the plumbers, to attempted eavesdropping on the Democratic National Committee, and to the ultimately maniacal eavesdropping by the President, on the President, for the President, completing the circle and ensuring retribution. Eavesdropping to protect Presidential confidentiality led to the greatest hemorrhage of confidentiality in American history and to the ruination of many good men."

Indeed, I sometimes think it is such *needless* passion for secrecy in many of our institutions, corporate as well as governmental, that has set off the present demand to wash, as it were, all public information in Macy's window. It has set off, as well, the unprecedented epidemic of public litigiousness, so that every leader of any institution now has to consult his lawyer about even the most trivial decisions.

So even while I defend the need for confidentiality, I argue for the utmost possible openness—for "leveling"—in every institutional hierarchy. In the Sixties, when I made some organizational studies for the State Department, I quickly learned that junior foreign-service officers often decided not to tell their boss what they knew from the field situation (they believed that the boss would not accept the advice) only to learn later that the boss felt the same way but in turn kept silent for fear that *his* boss would disapprove. This went on, up and down the line, to the very top. Although each privately knew what was right, all enclosed themselves in a pluralistic ignorance, much like the husband and wife, neither of whom wants to go to a movie but thinks that the other does, so that both go although neither wants to.

It is reminiscent of Khrushchev's answer, at his New York press conference, to one of the written questions handed up to him: "You were close to Stalin. What were you doing during all his crimes you later exposed?" Khrushchev was livid with rage. "Who asked that question? Let him stand up." Nobody stood. "That's what I was doing," said Khrushchev.

People in power have to work very hard to get their own key people to tell them what they do know and what they truly feel. But the whole Vietnam mess is a study in the failure, by people who knew better, to say what they really knew—either while they were in power or after they had resigned because they could no longer stomach the ascending pyramid of lies and deceptions.

WE ARE LEFT with a paradox. The more we can establish *internal* truth—true openness, true candor, true leveling—within an organization and its hierarchy, the better able it will be to define, and defend, the proper areas of *external* confidentiality. Once an executive is convinced that the enemy is not across the hall but across the street, the less inclined he will be, so to speak, to hide his feces.

Nevertheless, the national mania for "full information" is very much with us and is now part of the turbulent social environment that every administrator must deal with. Dealing with it wisely will challenge all his tolerance for ambiguity. Freud's definition of maturity was the ability to accept and deal with ambiguity.

Among colleges one result is already clear. The Buckley Amendment is laudable in its intent. But henceforth school and college administrators are going to be chary of putting any very substantive information into any student's record. What will be set down will be so bland and general as to be useless, for example, to college-entrance officials who want to make a considered judgment of an applicant's overall merits. If, for example, he had threatened to cut a teacher's throat but had not done so, he could scarcely be described as "possibly unstable." The student or his parents might sue.

Edward Levi, the new Attorney Gen-

eral, who was the dean of Chicago's law school and president of the university, is able to see these problems from all those perspectives. As a respected civil libertarian, he has publicly exposed flagrant abuses by the FBI's late director, J. Edgar Hoover—most notably an asinine "Cointel" game of sending anonymous letters to both Mafia and Communist leaders with the intention of stirring up conflict between them. At the same time Attorney General Levi has stressed the necessity of confidentiality, not only for government but also for private groups and citizens. As for Wilson's famed "open covenants," Levi quotes Lord Devlin: "What Wilson meant to say was that international agreements should be published; he did not mean that they should be negotiated in public."

In government the Macy's-window syndrome is going to make for greater inefficiency, because officials are going to spend more and more of their time processing requests for documents on *past* actions instead of applying the same energy to *future* actions. Levi points out that the FBI, which received 447 "freedom of information" requests in all of 1974, last year received 483 requests in March alone.

Such demands can, it seems, be self-defeating. One suit to compel disclosure of Secretary Kissinger's off-record briefing on the 1974 Vladivostok nuclear-arms negotiations yielded 57 pages of transcript, but three pages were withheld on grounds that "attribution to Mr. Kissinger could damage national security." What is more important is that it raised the question of whether any future briefings would be equally informative—or, in some cases, discontinued entirely. As the Supreme Court observed, even while denying President Nixon's right to withhold the crucial Watergate tapes: "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process."

In the case of meetings of public bodies—school boards, college regents, and the like—the disclosure mania will make for more and more cliques that meet privately beforehand to agree on concerted actions subsequently revealed only at the public meeting. What is likely to emerge are the "pre-meeting meetings" that novelist Shepherd Mead described in ad-agency conferences in his *The Great Ball of Wax*.

In every important decision that is likely to impinge on this new "right to know," there will likely be far fewer written, recorded discussions, far more private, verbal discussions, far more tacit rather than "official" decisions. And there will be more winks than signatures ("don't write; send word") if for no other reason than the avoidance of some new capricious lawsuit. The public will be learning more and more about things of less and less importance. It will be poorer served by administrators trying to fight their way through irrelevant demands for "full information" about old business, to the neglect of attending to new business.

I am not saying that individuals who have been unjustly accused should not be able, as Freedom of Information provides, to examine their own dossiers. Nor am I saying it is unwholesome for any government or public agency to be prodded out of its passion for hiding its mistakes under "classified" labels. That kind of file cleaning is needed. Furthermore, scholars are finding the law to be a great boon in gaining quicker access to needed documents and archives.

What I *am* saying is that in the long run we are likely to get better government, better decisions, if we focus our energies on finding leaders whose innate integrity, honesty, and openness will make it unnecessary for us to sue them or ransack their files later on. Attorney General Levi, it seems to me, cuts to the heart of the dilemma in this observation: "A right of complete confidentiality in government could not only produce a dangerous public ignorance but destroy the basic representative function of government. But a duty of complete disclosure would render impossible the effective operation of government." □

POST, Vicksburg, Miss.
19 Feb. 1976

Dean Rusk On The CIA

Speaking at the John Stennis Forum on Politics at Mississippi State University, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk said there is a "definite need" for a strong Central Intelligence Agency and some form of secrecy should be maintained in CIA operations. Mr. Rusk also remarked "There is a mean, dirty, unpleasant back-alley contest going on in the world and many countries are participating. We must keep our hands in it with some form of intelligence gathering." He said the American people have a right to know about intelligence operations, but America's press should not play a "snooping game" with the CIA.

Probably no agency has been under such deadly publicity as the CIA. It has become fashionable to charge the agency with every type of wrongdoing whether in this country or abroad. It is true that in many instances the CIA has overstepped its bounds, and has violated constitutional rights on some individuals. But we do not believe the sins of the CIA, so publicized, have brought any type of confidence in what should be our real source of international intelligence. The CIA is absolutely necessary to counter the intelligence of other nations, particularly those who are unfriendly. The Soviet KGB and other international agencies of intelligence, have gained a definite advantage over our intelligence apparatus, which has been muted while the present rage of investigations has been carried on and which has been reported in such a widespread manner.

There is dirty work in the world, and it is to our very best interests to be able to know about it and to counter it. The Angola situation is a good example, as Soviet-backed Cubans are in the process of developing a foothold in that African country, but America, the supposed champion of the free world, has its hands tied because of the CIA investigations.

There should be strong and forceful supervision of the CIA but we should avoid actions which tend to restrict the effectiveness of the agency.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 March 1976

Colby and Semantics

To the Editor:

William Colby's Feb. 26 Op-Ed article, "After Investigating U.S. Intelligence," is surely a challenge to the intelligence of most Americans. Virtually the entire piece rests upon the existence and honorable behavior of an undefined someone or something he calls "intelligence." Only in the last line is the shift made to "the best intelligence *service* in the world."

If Mr. Colby means by "intelligence" those Government agencies which conduct spying, data-gathering and covert actions against foreign governments, the limited Congressional and public scrutiny he praises has already invalidated his claim. If, on the other hand, he is referring to the data gathered, the results of spying and the long-run outcomes of covert actions, his claim is hardly justified without a much fuller disclosure of intelligence agencies and their activities—at the least the release of the House Committee report.

In light of President Ford's recent initiatives to block forever the opportunity for accountability to anyone other than himself, Mr. Colby's suggestion that C.I.A. stand for "constitutional intelligence for America" is an utter debasement of both the U.S. Constitution and the English language. His efforts to capitalize on a purported swing of public opinion toward secrecy and national security are clearly based on an assumption of American unintelligence.

RICHARD K. SCHARF
Chicago, Feb. 27, 1976

THE NEW REPUBLIC
13 March 1976

An Oriana Fallaci Interview

The CIA's Mr. Colby

Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist, spent "one long Friday morning and a long Sunday afternoon" in February interviewing former CIA Director William Colby at his home in Washington. She regards the encounter as an "exhausting and nasty fight" between spy and victim. But it was a strange fight. While her voice "trembled with rage," Colby was unperturbed—cool, controlled, polite—as he answered her accusations. She thought she saw anger occasionally in his blue eyes, but "his lips did not stop smiling, his hands would not stop pouring coffee in my cup."

Oriana Fallaci: The names, Mr. Colby. The names of those bastards who took CIA money in my country. Italy isn't some banana republic of the United Fruit Company, Mr. Colby, and it isn't right that the shadow of suspicion covers a whole political class. Don't you think that Mr. Pertini, the president of the Italian Parliament, should have those names?

William Colby: No, because our House has said by vote that those reports must remain secret. CIA should protect its associates and people who work for them. Of course the decision to give or not to give those names does not depend on CIA; it depends on the government of the United States and I am not speaking for my government; I'm speaking for CIA. But my judgment is no; my recommendation would be no. No names. It's the only thing I can do to maintain my agreement with the people I worked with. . . Those who feel covered by the shadow that you talk about only have to stand up and deny [involvement]. They only have to say, "It isn't true, we didn't get the money." It's fine with me. I cannot sacrifice somebody for this theory that somebody is under suspicion. I have promised those men to keep the secret and I must maintain it because, if I break my promise, when I go to someone new he'll say that my promise is no good. Why don't you ask the Soviet government for the names of the Communists who take Moscow's money in Italy? The Soviets are doing exactly the same.

Fallaci: We'll talk later about the Russians, Mr. Colby. Now let's talk about CIA. Tell me, please, if I came here, as a foreigner, and financed an American party, and 21 of your politicians, and some of your journalists, what would you do?

Colby: You would be doing an illegal thing and, if I found it out, I would report it to the FBI and have you arrested.

Fallaci: Good. So I should report you and your agents and your ambassadors to the Italian police and have you all arrested.

Colby: I won't say that.

Fallaci: Why not? If it is illegal that I come here to corrupt your politicians, it is as illegal that you come there and corrupt my politicians.

Colby: I am not saying that you would corrupt. I am saying that it is against our law for you to come and do that.

Fallaci: It is also against mine, Mr. Colby! And I'll tell you more: there is only one human type that is more disgusting than the corrupted one. It is the corruptor.

Colby: We don't corrupt at CIA. You may have a problem with corruption in your society but it was in existence long before CIA got there. Saying that we corrupt is like saying that we give money to do things for us. That isn't why we give money. We give money to help somebody to do what he wants and cannot do because he hasn't enough money. We are basically supporting the democratic countries and, of all the countries that should understand this, Italy should. Because the American assistance in Italy helped it from becoming an authoritarian Communist state for 30 years. . .

Fallaci: Your clients, as you call them in the Pike report. Tell me, Mr. Colby, what do you mean by the word "clients"?

Colby: Well. . .what is an attorney doing when he deals with a client? An attorney helps a client.

Fallaci: I see! You consider yourself the attorney of the Christian Democrats and of the Social Democrats in Italy.

Colby: Right. Well, no. . .I will not comment about any particular situation.

Fallaci: Why? Had you answered with a lie when saying "right"?

Colby: I don't lie! And I suffer when they accuse me of lying. . . .Sometimes I refuse to give information; sometimes I keep a secret; but never lie. My Congress won't let me, my press either. The head of intelligence in America cannot say that it is not true when it's true. Our intelligence is under the law, not outside the law. Anyway, I want to put a question to you: would it have been right or not if America had helped the democratic parties against Hitler?

Fallaci: Here is my answer, Mr. Colby. There is no Hitler in Italy. And the $800,000 that Ambassador Graham Martin wanted to give to Gen. Vito Miceli, with Kissinger's blessing, did not end up in democratic hands. It ended up in the hands of Hitler's followers, the neofascists.

Colby: I will not discuss any specific CIA operation. First, I have great respect for Ambassador Martin. We have been together in different parts of the world and I have always found him a very strong ambassador, always taking positions and responsibilities in the interest of the United States. Secondly, I believe that in this kind of activity CIA can have a view and the government can have another. It is up to the President to decide. In any of these kinds of operations, CIA follows the directions of its government. . . . Until a year ago, the President could call the head of CIA and say to him: "Do that and don't tell anybody."

Fallaci: Good, good. So it was really Nixon, with Kissinger of course, who wanted to give that money to Miceli. If you see them, please thank them for the bombs that neofascists built with that money.

Colby: I cannot talk about that. I don't know. But I know that neofascists in your country represent only eight

percent and I know that the real threat in Italy comes from the Communists. Since the end of World War II we have been helping the various democratic forces against the Communist threat. And this lasted for 25, no, 30 years.

Fallaci: And the result of that help, Mr. Colby, is that the Communists are now at the borders of government. Let's be honest: do you think all that money was well spent? Do you think that your intelligence has been acting intelligently?

Colby: Usually we don't spend money for foolishness. And you cannot judge things from one factor alone, like the last elections in Italy. Maybe American activities in Italy haven't been perfect, since World War II, but they have been useful. Yes, positive. This includes NATO, the Marshall Plan, CIA. When I was in Rome, in 1953, people were riding Vespas. Now they are in cars. You live better today than you would have lived if you had had a Communist government in 1948. Or in 1960. The average Italian has a better life than the average Pole. So the American policies have not been a mistake in Italy. We did a good job. In Italy you always see things catastrophically. In 1955 Italians said that Italy was going to collapse, that the government was no good, hopeless. Now I hear the same words I heard in 1955. But you did not collapse then and you will not collapse now because there are good Italians.

Fallaci: Not certainly those who serve you as clients, Mr. Colby.

Colby: I'm talking of the ordinary people. . . .

Fallaci: Tell me, Mr. Colby. Who was the man that you liked best when you lived in Italy?

Colby: De Gasperi, I would say. But I cannot mention names. I must not. Besides I did not know many people. I was a junior officer, I was interested in collecting information . . . because I spoke Italian. But I can tell you that yes, I was for an opening to the left at that time. I mean to the Socialists. I respected them; I still do because the Socialists are Western Europeans. They are liberal; they are not authoritarian as the Communists are. They can be trusted.

Fallaci: To what extent did your work take place within the American embassy? Does it still?

Colby: Very much. Sure. I used to work a lot with the embassy. I was political attaché. We always work with the embassies. Most information we get through our embassies, of course.

Fallaci: But it isn't only through embassies that CIA works abroad. We all know that SID (Italian Secret Service) is the pied-à-terre *of CIA in Italy. Now tell me, Mr. Colby, what right do you have to spy on me at home and use the secret service of my country? What right do you have, for instance, to control my telephone there?*

Colby: I get news from around the world. There is nothing wrong with trying to understand what is happening in the world, what people are doing or thinking. It isn't a matter of invading others' privacy. It's a matter of looking to see if you have a pistol to shoot me or another weapon to hurt me, and prevent it. You ask if a nation has the right to conduct clandestine intelligence activities in other nations? Well, there is a law in every country that says no, and almost every country does it. So do I have the right to try to find out what happens in order to protect my country? Yes, I morally have it. Though it is illegal.

Fallaci: Let's see if I have understood you. You're saying that it is illegal yet legitimate to spy on me in my country even through the secret service of my country. . .

Colby: It depends. Sometimes another intelligence agency will help you. It depends on a country's policy. Sometimes two countries have a mutual interest and they are very close to their allies and very concerned about penetration, so we work together.

Fallaci: As I said. Now tell me, is it or isn't it true that your best operation with SID was the case of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana? [Allegedly, the CIA and SID had cooperated in placing an Italian colonel close to Svetlana and charged with bringing her out of Russia.]

Colby: I couldn't tell. I have said . . . that we must not tell about our associates nor about our relationship with foreign intelligence services because if we talk about them they will not trust us anymore. An intelligence service cannot talk about its associates. You cannot imagine how much these leaks hurt around the world. A lot, a lot. There are people now saying: my goodness, can I have anything to do with you, can I trust my life to you, my job, or will you tell it to your Congress and leak it? People turned away from us, people who had been working with us said no, I am not staying with you anymore. Even other international intelligence services have said no, we used to give you very secret material but we are not going to give it to you anymore. We lost a few agents because of the fear that the secret wouldn't be kept.

Fallaci: Only agents or clients also?

Colby: Those too. Some have said, don't give me anything anymore because you will reveal it. People who were new and people who were old clients. They felt betrayed. We have fought very hard at CIA to keep those names, you know. Very hard. And we have won, I must say. But the publicity has hurt us all the same. These things do not happen with KGB. You have quite a few KGB agents in Italy and there are many Italians working for KGB of course. Yet nobody asks KGB to make those names public. One finds all these wrongs about CIA, and KGB—nobody accuses them.

Fallaci: You're wrong, Mr. Colby. We don't want either you or them. We are sick and tired of you both.

Colby: Fine, fine. Americans and the Soviets help about the same in Italy. All the material that goes back and forth to the Soviet Union passes through agencies that give a percentage to the Italian Communist party. A good system. Complicated yet good. What would you say if a percentage of all American trade went to one party?

Fallaci: You don't need that, Mr. Colby. It's CIA that takes care of that, and your ambassadors like Graham Martin, and Lockheed and Gulf. . . .

Colby: Wonderful how you rationalize and indirectly conclude that they are just nice fellows, just marvelously good people. In Poland. . .if they don't want to do what the Soviets want them to do, a delegation comes from Moscow, and it sits with the Central

Committee of the party, and says that they better behave. Would you like Italy to be run like that? But suppose that the Communists are clean. And because of that you let them run the government? Are you going to run that risk, letting them run the government? Name a country that has been Communist and has then changed from Communism. Name one! Name one!

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, what would you do to us if the Communists win the elections in Italy?

Colby: Name a country! Name one!

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, would you punish us with a coup as in Chile?

Colby: Name a country. Just one! Romania? Poland? Czechoslovakia, Hungary?

Fallaci: Please answer my question, Mr. Colby. Another Chile?

Colby: And suppose there is not another election? The way it happened with Hitler and Mussolini? Don't you understand that they played at the democratic game all these years because they were a minority? Do you really think that when they are on the top they will still go on being democratic?

Fallaci: You could be right. Yet I remind you that it is you Americans who throw the countries into the arms of Communists, always. You who buy and corrupt and protect all the Fascists in the world. America, Mr. Colby, is the biggest factory of Communists in the whole world.

Colby: I don't accept that and I say that you are speaking out of your own ideological bias.

Fallaci: As you like. But tell me please: according to the information you had as director of CIA, do you see any difference between the Communist party of Cunhal and the Communist parties of Carillo, of Marchais, of Berlinguer?

Colby: The Italian Communist party is trying to build a bridge between the Soviet way and the Western way of life, trying to live in both camps. There is an ambivalence in them that the French and the Spanish have just followed. The Italian Communist party has always pretended to be very revolutionary . . . at the same time it pretends to be very Italian . . . And if you ask me "Do you trust Mr. So and So when he says he is for pluralism," I answer: it is not a matter of trust in the individuals. It is a matter of political imperatives. At this time, with Western Europe reasonably united and strong and protected by American interests, the political imperative for the Communists is to join Western Europe, to be a part of it. But if the political imperative changes, if you have economic problems in Western Europe, or a change of leadership in the Soviet Union, their political imperative could change. And they could become more authoritarian and more loyal to the Soviets.

Fallaci: Recently the Italian Communist party and the French Communist party, and the Spanish Communist party have clearly attacked the Soviet Union.

Colby: This is easy to do. They did it also in 1968 on Czechoslovakia. But they also support the Soviet Union in many situations, and they continue to have a good relationship with them. Their policy is that there shouldn't be NATO or the Warsaw Pact. But the easiest thing is to eliminate NATO. It is hard to eliminate the Warsaw Pact. And their policy is to reduce Italy's contribution to NATO. They say, well, we will get to the Warsaw Pact later. But what do you think the degree of collaboration would be between the Italian military and the American military, between the Italian government and the American government if you had a Communist prime minister? I have no doubt that there would be great difficulties.

Fallaci: Perhaps. And I insist you answer the question. What would the Americans do to us if the Communists came to power in Italy?

Colby: I don't know. This is the policy of the United States. I don't know.

Fallaci: Sure you know. Another Chile?

Colby: Not necessarily. This is an hypothetical question I cannot answer. It depends on so many factors. It could be nothing, it could be something, it could be some mistake.

Fallaci: Some mistake like Chile? Come on, Mr. Colby. Do you think it would be legitimate for the United States to intervene in Italy with a Pinochet if the Communists came to power?

Colby: I don't think I can answer that question. Your Pinochet is not in America. He's in Italy.

Fallaci: I know. But he needs you. Without you, he can do nothing. Mr. Colby, I am trying to make you admit that Italy is an independent state, not a banana republic, not a colony of yours. And you don't admit it. I am also trying to explain to you that you cannot be the policemen of the world. Chiaro?

Colby: Chiaro ma sbagliato. After World War I we said that the war had been wrong and badly fought, and we had a period of innocence. We reduced our army to something smaller than the Romanian army, 150,000, and we decided to have an open diplomacy, and the Secretary of State dissolved the intelligence service saying that gentlemen don't read others' mail. And we thought that we were going to live in a world of gentlemen, and that we wouldn't involve ourselves any more in foreign affairs. Then we had problems rising in Europe. But we did not intervene. And we had problems in Manchuria, it was too far away. But we did not intervene. Then Spain. And we were neutral. But it did not work very well, no, and we had economic problems; authoritarian leaders who believed they could dominate their neighbors. And then came World War II. And after World War II we did as we had done. In 1945 we dissolved our intelligence service, the OSS, and we said: peace again. But the cold war started and it was obvious that Stalin was . . . becoming a threat in Greece, in Turkey, in Iran. And we learned the lesson. And we applied the lesson. We collected our security again, and we attempted to contain the expansionist Soviet Union through NATO and through the Marshall plan and through CIA. Liberals and conservatives together, both of us convinced that we had to help. I was one of those liberals. I had been a radical when I was a boy and . . .

Fallaci: For Christ's sake! How could you change that much?

Colby: Clemenceau said that he who is not a radical when he is young has no heart; he who is not conservative when he's old has no brain. But let me go on. NATO worked. The containment of Soviet expansionism worked. The subversive plans of the

Communists were frustrated. It wasn't the right against the left. It was a democratic solution. We decided that we would go any distance to fight for freedom. And in the course of this there were some situations in which local leaders were somewhat authoritarian or more authoritarian than people liked.

Fallaci: From Gen. Franco to Caetano, from Diem to Thieu, from Papadopoulos to Pinochet, without counting all the Fascist dictators in Latin America, the Brazilian torturers for instance. And so, in the name of freedom, you became the supporters of all those who killed freedom on the other side.

Colby: Like in World War II when we supported Stalin's Russia against a greater threat. We work now in the same way we worked with him then. In the '50s wasn't communism the biggest threat? If you support some authoritarian leader against a Communist threat, you leave the option that the authoritarian state could become democratic in the future. With the Communists, the future offers no hope. I mean, I don't see any scandal in certain alliances. One makes an alliance in order to face a bigger threat. My government recognizes Pinochet's Chile as the legitimate government. True. But don't I accept that 200 million Russians live under Soviet Communism? Pinochet is not going to conquer the world. Nobody is worried about Pinochet.

Fallaci: I'll tell you who's worried about Pinochet, Mr. Colby. The Chileans, first, who are imprisoned and persecuted and tortured and killed by Pinochet. Secondly, those who really care about freedom. Thirdly, the countries that are afraid to become a second Chile. Like mine.

Colby: You're so wrong in choosing Chile. If you read carefully the Senate report on Chile . . . you'll find that from 1964 we helped the democratic center parties against a man who said that he was associated with Castro and the Communists. CIA had no part in overthrowing Allende in 1973. Read my denial in the Senate report when I say: "with the exception [of] about six weeks in 1970."

Fallaci: Sure. November 1970 when Nixon called Richard Helms and ordered him to organize a coup to overthrow Allende, who had just won the elections.

Colby: It only lasted six weeks . . . And we did not succeed . . . We had no part, later.

Fallaci: Really? Tell me about the financing of the strikes that ruined Allende's government, Mr. Colby. Tell me about the interventions through ITT.

Colby: Well, we gave a little bit of money, yes. A tiny amount that, I remember, was about $10,000. We gave it through other people. I mean we gave it to a group that passed it to another . . . The rest of our program in Chile was to support the central democratic forces from the threat of the left. The Senate Committee has found no evidence against us, except in 1970. It wasn't our policy to overthrow Allende in 1973. We were looking to the elections of 1976 where we hoped the democratic forces would win. Certainly we did not help Allende but we are innocent of that coup. The coup came from the fact that Allende was destroying the society and the economy in Chile, from the fact that he was not acting democratically as the Supreme Court of Chile and the Congress of Chile and the controller general said when issuing statements that Allende was outside the constitution. Even the free press had been suppressed by Allende . . .

Fallaci: What, Mr. Colby, are you out of your mind? But you cannot falsify history like that. The opposition press tormented Allende till the end.

Colby: The opposition papers had lots of difficulties under him. And saying that Allende was democratic . . . well, it is your opinion. There are his own words when he said that he wanted to suppress opposition. He was an extremist. And an oppressor. I have good information.

Fallaci: If all your information is like that, Mr. Colby, I understand why CIA makes itself ridiculous so often. But here is what I want to know from you who claim to fight in the name of democracy: having won the elections democratically, did Allende have the right to govern his country? Yes or no? . . . Don't be silent, Mr. Colby. Do answer, Mr. Colby.

Colby: Didn't Mussolini win elections? Didn't Hitler become the chancellor of Germany in an election?

Fallaci: This is what I call bad faith. You know very well that those were not free elections, Mr. Colby. And you cannot, just cannot, compare Allende with Mussolini and with Hitler. This is pure fanaticism, Mr. Colby!

Colby: I am not fanatic. I believe in a Western liberal democracy.

Fallaci: What? In what way? Through killing, Mr. Colby? Tell me about the murder of Gen. Schneider in Chile, Mr. Colby.

Colby: CIA had very little to do with the assassination of Gen. Schneider. Very little. It's written in the Senate report. Apparently the group that tried to kidnap Schneider wasn't the same group that received money from CIA. Your view of CIA is purely paranoiac. You behave like the American press when it got so excited about the Black Pistol [the poison dart gun]. We never used it. Never. It is you, the press, who give a false impression of CIA. Sure, somebody got killed in the course of our activities in the world! Our agents too got killed, and people on the other side. But no assassinations. I know those who work for me, I know them, and they are good Americans, real patriots who fight to protect their country. And it is their right, our right, to protect freedom in the world . . .

Fallaci: Why don't you take that right with Pinochet, Mr. Colby?

Colby: This is a matter of policy and it is up to the government to decide it. Each nation has a decision to make. You don't see it because you're being ideological in your logic. I am not being ideological, I am being rational and pragmatic. And, pragmatically, I say to you that it's up to the United States to decide where they want to help and where they don't. And it was our right to support the opposition to Allende as well as it is our right to help in Europe those who oppose the growth of communism. And CIA has done this for 30 years, I repeat, and does it well, and Italy is the best example.

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, you portray the CIA as an association of Boy Scouts mainly occupied reading books and speeches in some library. Let's be serious. To begin with, you are spies.

Colby: One moment. Yes, in the old image, intelligence used to be spying. Mata Hari and so on. Today

intelligence is an intellectual process of assembling information from the press, radio, books, speeches. Which is why we're called Central Intelligence Agency. All this information is centralized and studied by people who are specialists in various fields. And then there are electronics, computers, technology. In the last 15 years technology has so changed intelligence that we don't need to spy to get secrets to give to generals to win battles. Intelligence is far beyond that. It is a technological phenomenon. We used to wonder how many missiles the Soviets might have. Today we don't wonder; we count them . . .

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, CIA may be that partly. But it also is something worse, something dirtier. I mean a political force that secretly organizes coups d'état and plots and assassinations. A second government that punishes whoever is against the interests of the United States in the world. Spying is much nobler than that.

Colby: What you are talking about is five percent of our budget. Only five percent goes for any kind of political or paramilitary activity. And this is an activity that is necessary in the world we live in because a little help in some countries to some friends can avoid a serious crisis later. In the '50s this was 30 percent of our budget. In the '80s, if the world goes on facing totalitarian developments, we might go back to that 30 percent again or more. But now it is five percent, and all this excitement is about that five percent. Which is legitimate because isn't it easier than to defend ourselves with bombs and soldiers? Isn't it easier to help some political group?

Fallaci: Yes, but the point isn't financing here and there, or corrupting here and there to protect your interests that are not always noble interests. The point is the assassination of foreign leaders, Mr. Colby!

Colby: In 1973, long before this excitement started, I issued a directive against assassinations. I have turned down suggestions of assassinations on several occasions . . . saying that assassination is wrong. But there are people who will say to you that if Hitler had been assassinated in 1938, the world would be better.

Fallaci: Lumumba was not Hitler, Mr. Colby. Castro is not Hitler.

Colby: Well, Castro allowed the Soviet Union to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, which put American cities under nuclear threat.

Fallaci: And because of this you kill Castro.

Colby: In Italy, at the time of Renaissance, there were many people inside and outside the church who discussed the rights and wrongs of tyrannicide. And discussion had started long before the Renaissance; it isn't new. Yes, this assassination business did not occur in America yesterday, it's been a political tool for centuries. How did the princes die in the various states of Italy? How did Caesar die? Don't, as an Italian, stand on moral lessons on this. I don't accept moral lessons from you.

Fallaci: Caesar was not killed by an American. He was killed by some Romans. The Medici, in the Renaissance, were killed by the Florentines not by Americans. And Pericles erected monuments to the Greek who killed the tyrant, not to the Americans who killed a Cuban in Cuba.

Colby: I tell you that this has always happened and I say that it is difficult for any country to give moral lessons to another.

Fallaci: By God, Mr. Colby! It is you who claim to be more moral than others. It is you who introduce yourselves as the Angel Gabriel sacrificing for democracy and freedom.

Colby: Maybe our morals are not perfect but they are better than others. American policy is regarded all through the world as a pillar of freedom. There are a few things, over 28 years, that we shouldn't have done. Like opening the mail. Yes, there was a period in the '50s when we opened the mail to and from the Soviet Union. And we shouldn't have done it, though one can understand why. There were Soviet spies running all over America. However we shouldn't have done it and . . .

Fallaci: Come on, Mr. Colby, I am not talking about opening letters! I am talking about murdering people!

Colby: CIA has never assassinated anybody. Including Diem. Saying that CIA does assassinations all the time is unfair. There were a few occasions in which we wanted to try, and none of them worked.

Fallaci: Even if you spoke the truth, Mr. Colby, which I doubt, isn't it shameful enough for CIA to plan such projects like Al Capone?

Colby: People do it all over the world. Lots of different countries, whether it's wise or not. Personally I was always against it. People came to me with such proposals and I said: "You will not do it." But I recall that Jefferson said: "The tree of freedom has to be watered every 20 years by the blood of tyrants."

Fallaci: In other words, once in a while is all right. Are you religious, Mr. Colby?

Colby: Sure I am. I'm a Catholic and a rigid one.

Fallaci: One of those who go to church every Sunday?

Colby: Yes, sure.

Fallaci: One of those who believe in Hell and in Paradise?

Colby: Yes, sure. I believe in everything the Church teaches.

Fallaci: One of those who love people as Jesus Christ wanted?

Colby: Yes, sure. I love people.

Fallaci: I see. Tell me about the Mafia; I mean the use CIA makes of the Mafia.

Colby: One case. Only one case. 1960 for Castro! After Castro took over Cuba there was some consideration given to working with some people who . . . whose friends were still in Cuba. Friends who had been in the Mafia and who would try to kill Castro. And it was very . . . well, it did not work. Allen Dulles and then [John] McCone were directors of CIA at that time. And McCone said later he did not know about it.

Fallaci: Bobby Kennedy knew. And that allows one to think that John Kennedy knew as well. Who is the more discredited by these revelations, CIA or the American presidents?

Colby: The revelations show that CIA was working as part of American policy. I mean, CIA was not a wild elephant, or a separate state or a state in the state, or a

government in the government. And now that the country is going through a process of revisionism, CIA in a way is the scapegoat of that revisionism. The evidence that presidents wanted specific things is not very clear. In some cases it isn't even clear whether the president knew it or not. The facts simply indicate that CIA was operating within a policy that seemed to allow it to go in that direction.

Fallaci: Which means that, from Eisenhower to Nixon, none of them come out totally clean. What happened under Johnson? Oh, yes. Papadopoulos' coup in Greece.

Colby: CIA did not support the colonels' coup. No, it didn't. When the colonels ran Greece, we had a liaison for exchanging information, yes. We did not reject them, it's true, but we did not support them either. We just worked with them and the rest is myth. Dealing with authoritarian leaders doesn't mean to support them.

Fallaci: You are the one who opened up. Don't you ever regret that you told those things to the congressional committees? Could you have refused?

Colby: No, I don't think I could have. I don't think I would be allowed to. I did not have much choice. But certainly I don't regret having told the truth. There was no doubt in my mind. Not that I expected things to stay secret, but I did not appreciate the way those cases were sensationalized. The point is that there are some problems with living in a society as open as the American society. Just consider the case of Richard Welsh, the CIA officer they killed in Athens. An officer named John Mark wrote an article in a magazine here in Washington alleging that he could tell how to identify CIA people in the embassies. And he did so. An American. So they started the publication of names and we couldn't forbid it. We have very weak legislation in that sense, legislation that doesn't take care of the fact that we cannot run serious intelligence unless we protect some of our secrets. And Welsh was killed by some terrorist. And it took Welsh's death to make people understand the problem, for the Congress to stop the Pike report's publication. And it was a great loss, the loss of Welsh. He was an extremely good officer.

Fallaci: Let's talk a while of the Pike report, Mr. Colby. Because, if in the Church report CIA sounds so bad, in the Pike report it looks rather ridiculous. Is it true as Pike remarked that, if America were to be attacked by another country, CIA would not know of it in advance?

Colby: The House Committee report is totally partial, totally biased, and done to give a false impression of CIA. The Church report, that is the assassination report and the Chile report, well . . . I think they were reasonably fair. Yes, fair reports. Also the Rockefeller commission's report is a fair report. Pike's report is not a fair report. And that Pike remark . . . it's nonsense. He did not publish things we did right. He chose what we had done wrong. For instance, in the spring of 1973 we told our government that, unless there is movement on a political level, there probably will be a war in Middle East. And we helped our government follow everything that was happening. On October 5th in the evening we made an assessment: "There are certain signs that indicate that there shouldn't be a war. In balance we think that there will not be a war." Well, this was a mistake. Why did we make that mistake after having given good advice? Well, we don't have a crystal ball, we don't know 100 percent what is going to happen.

Fallaci: Let's face it, Mr. Colby. Saying that war is not going to happen when it's about to happen doesn't reflect very well on what you portray as the "best intelligence in the world." Nor was it the only case. Take Portugal, for instance. You hadn't the vaguest idea that the army would overthrow Caetano.

Colby: We did know something, despite Pike's report. We knew that there was unrest and dissent in the army. We reported it. But, as with the Arab-Israeli war, one may know the general background and then make a mistake on little things. The fact is that Mr. Pike takes the little thing and applies it to the whole. It isn't true, as he says, that we had a total ignorance of the Portuguese situation . . . People see CIA under every sofa. People see CIA all the time, even in a contest for the best sheepdog. . . . We really haven't the time to be in every village. It is reasonable to think that, later, in Portugal, we had to work harder on what was happening.

Fallaci: A little help here, a little help there . . .

Colby: No comment. Not on Italy, not on Portugal, not on any specific country.

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, you don't want me to believe that Italy was the only country in Europe where CIA spent billions. Let's take Germany . . .

Colby: You cannot compare things, they are quite different. Each country is a different case. We worry and have been worrying about all Europe of course. All of Europe is very important to the United States. And I don't think that Italy was the country where we had more work to do. But I will not comment on any specific operation. What I can say is that the place where CIA policy has been more successful is Western Europe. A real success program. I'm glad you did not mention Vietnam.

The fact about Vietnam is that we made some major mistakes, and the first mistake was to turn against President Diem. We did it, saying that he was too authoritarian, and, first of all, he was not. He was not a dictator. Secondly what did we get from opposing him? We got five years of instability. Only at the end of those five years did we have a reasonably steady government under President Thieu, who was very much like Diem. The next mistake we made in Vietnam was to fight a military war when the enemy was fighting a people's war. The technique in a people's war is to get people on your side, like the Communists were doing with a combination of nationalism and discipline. And they did it pretty well. Diem had begun a program to get people on his side in 1961 with the strategic hamlets. The overthrow of Diem was the end of that approach. Because of that we had to fight the war on a military level. Only in 1967 did we decide on the pacification program to get people on our side and. . .

Fallaci: It went so well that in 1968 you had to suffer the Tet offensive. Come on, Mr. Colby.

Colby: The pacification program really started in 1968—organizing the villages, having elections in the villages. Shortly after the Tet offensive the proposal was made to give guns to the people in the villages to defend themselves. And many people said that it was a bad idea because the people would give the guns to the

Communists. But President Thieu decided to provide those guns, and he gave out 500,000 of them. And it worked. The people did not give them to the Communists. They did defend themselves. And then there was the economic aid, and you will agree when I say that there were no guerrillas in the 1972 attack.

Fallaci: Sure. You had exterminated them with the Phoenix program, Mr. Colby.

Colby: Now, you are wrong. They were not exterminated. They turned to their government. The Phoenix program did not exterminate. It was a necessary program to identify who the Communists were, who the leaders were. We were not interested in the followers. And the program was so organized in such a way that we had to have three different reports, not just one, to determine whether a man was a leader or a cadre or a follower. And we had limits on how long a man could be kept in jail without a trial; the followers would have a maximum six-month sentence. Were you in Vietnam then?

Fallaci: I was in Vietnam in 1967, and 1968, and 1969, and 1970, and 1972, and in 1975, Mr. Colby, and I know enough about that dumb war to have a good fight with you about what you are saying. Please do not try to tell me stories as you did about Chile! The murders of your Phoenix program. . .

Colby: I lived continuously in Vietnam for seven years. I have worked on Vietnam for 12 years altogether. And I tell you that the Phoenix program was not a secret program. It was publicized with posters carrying the photos of leaders and saying. . ."and, Mr. Nguyen, if you want to come as a Chou Hoi, you may come in and you will not be punished." And a lot came.

Fallaci: Not a lot, Mr. Colby. A few, despised by everybody as cowards or deserters. Even the American soldiers rejected them. I remember being in the field in 1970, in the fishhook area, and. . .

Colby: 200,000 came.

Fallaci: And you won the war in Vietnam.

Colby: We did not lose the war. I mean, we won the guerrilla war, we lost the military war. Just as France had lost the military war. The fact is. . . Well, President Thieu expected the main attack to occur in 1976 when the Americans would be holding elections. So he had to save equipment for that time. And when the attack came in 1975 he decided to withdraw and return to a more restricted area in order to. . .

Fallaci: It was not a withdrawal, Mr. Colby! It was a shameful disordered flight, with the South Vietnamese generals trying only to save their lives and their property, with the soldiers killing civilians to scramble onto the planes and the helicopters. We all saw that. You cannot change history like that, Mr. Colby!

Colby: Listen, I know a lot about Vietnam. I'm writing a book about Vietnam too and. . .

Fallaci: Oh God! Will you write that you had the right to be there?

Colby: I have no doubt, even today, that we Americans had to be there. And when you say that it was none of our business you are saying that Manchuria was too far away.

Fallaci: Mr. Colby, why don't you talk about Watergate instead of Manchuria?

Colby: CIA had two contacts with Watergate. Just two. Howard Hunt used to work for CIA; he came to CIA with Ehrlichman's request. And CIA gave Howard Hunt a couple of things like that speech device. We also produced photographs for him. But we didn't know what Hunt was doing in that psychiatrist's office in Los Angeles. We did not know. And when Hunt asked for several other things, CIA said no. We said: it isn't our business. The second connection we had was when the White House asked CIA to write a psychological profile of Ellsberg. And we did it. He was an American and we shouldn't have done it. They also tried to get us to stop the FBI investigation, but we said no.

Fallaci: OK, Mr. Colby, OK. Let's forget now this old bitterness of yours. There is another thing that puzzles me when you say that CIA is the best intelligence in the world. Is it really? Hasn't KGB been more successful than you?

Colby: Oh, no. Besides, it's so different, you can't compare. Most of the work of KGB, for instance, takes place inside the Soviet Union: they are the FBI, the CIA, the State police, the Carabinieri, everything. And most of its effort is there. Well, when they used to spy here they had some good operations, some very impressive ones. I mean the atom spies. When they recruited a young lady from the counterespionage section of our Department of Justice, for instance. She told them everything we knew about their spies, and this was a good operation indeed. And when they put a bug inside the shoe of one of our diplomats. That was very impressive too. Very. You know, those people are serving their government and I disagree with their philosophy, but about their professional side I must say that they can do a good job.

Fallaci: How interesting. I smell a touch of professional admiration in you.

Colby: Well . . . the fact that they can do a good job doesn't mean that . . . I mean, one must distinguish between the ability and the end. The ability may be good and the end may be bad. Our philosophical justification is a good end: the self-defense of our country. Theirs instead is . . .

Fallaci: . . . the self-defense of their country. Mr. Colby, who wanted you out of CIA? Was it Kissinger?

Colby: No. Kissinger has always been a great supporter of intelligence and, though sometimes I agree with Kissinger and sometimes I disagree, we are not enemies. Both Kissinger and Rockefeller have been nice to me, and I think that Kissinger has been a brilliant Secretary of State. I also say that he deserves another Nobel Prize for the Middle East. I am out of CIA because the President indicated that he wanted to offer me another job and . . . The President may have many reasons why he wants somebody else as head of CIA. It is his privilege. He is the President, not me. Make a change? Fine. Besides I knew it would happen. I had said many times that I would probably be replaced when this investigation came to an end. Then the President offered me many jobs, good jobs, but I said that I could help more if I write a book about what intelligence really is. As I am doing. One on CIA and one on Vietnam.

Fallaci: And you do not feel bitter.

Colby: Not at all. I do not feel like a scapegoat.

Fallaci: Do you feel relieved then?

Colby: Neither bitter nor relieved.

Fallaci: Sure. What could shake your icy imperturbability? You never show your emotions, do you?

Colby: I am not emotional, I admit it. Just a few things bother me. For instance, what happened when I was nominated and some people put posters around Washington—posters illustrated with a very poor picture of me, by the way. They called me a murderer. And my children had to live with that. But it didn't really bother me. Not much. Oh, don't watch me like that. You're looking for something underneath which isn't there. It's all here on the surface, believe me. There is nothing behind or underneath. There are not two or three layers. I told you: I'm religious, I'm conservative. . .

Fallaci: Do your children ever call you "reactionary" or worse?

Colby: No. We have different views. They were against the war in Vietnam. We discuss things at the dinner table. And I admit that . . .

Fallaci: . . . you like Nixon?

Colby: I voted for him. He appointed me. And I think that, in international politics, he did a splendid job. Splendid. Just think of China, of the SALT agreement.

Fallaci: Just think of Chile, of Cyprus. Mr. Colby, I'm exhausted. Only when I interviewed Cunhal did I suffer as much as I did today with you.

Colby: Tell me, tell me: what kind of fellow is he?

Fallaci: I told you. In the end, a type like you.

Colby: What?

Fallaci: Yes, a priest like you. Oh, Mr. Colby! You'll never know how much you two resemble each other. Had you been born on the other side of the barricade, you would have been a perfect Stalinist.

Colby: I reject such a statement. But . . . well . . . it might be. No, no. It might not. And I am not a priest. At the most, I'm a puritan. Any other question?

Fallaci: Only one, Mr. Colby. Can I see the file that CIA keeps on me?

Colby: Under American law, you can write a letter to CIA and ask for anything they have on you. They must charge you a little, but then they will give it to you, unless they have some reason to keep it secret.

Fallaci: I think it is disconcerting. But everything you said was disconcerting. Mr. Colby. And very, very sad.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
10 FEBRUARY 1976

BILL COLBY—AN OUTSTANDING, DEDICATED AMERICAN

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the swearing in of George Bush as the new Director of Central Intelligence has brought an end to the career of one of the finest Americans ever to serve in the intelligence profession, William E. Colby.

The dimensions of Bill Colby are truly extraordinary. He is a consummate intelligence professional, a brilliant and innovative administrator, and a true patriot.

Mr. Colby's intelligence career had its beginnings in parachuting behind enemy lines in France and Norway during World War II. He continued to serve his Government in a series of demanding assignments which called for ingenuity, intelligence, and integrity, not to mention personal courage, which he was always able to provide. Finally, the crowning touch for a dedicated professional, Mr. Colby was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Director of Central Intelligence.

Man is plagued by not knowing what could have been. It is obvious that the energy and talents he brought to the office of Director, his contributions to a stronger, more effective, and more efficient foreign intelligence service to serve his country's needs have been of inestimable value. No man served more ably in this difficult task. It is indeed unfortunate that his services were at a time when congressional investigatory hearings on CIA operations worldwide were in progress. Those who conscientiously sought to learn the facts about the CIA, to correct its mistakes, to avoid a repetition of mistakes, were overshadowed and much of their efforts to improve the CIA were lost through sensational disclosures. In fact, the destruction of the CIA has appeared to be uppermost in the minds of some individuals and the hearings were used to advantage for this purpose. Attempts aimed at full disclosure of every secret known to the CIA through leaks or otherwise, provided the news service with a happy new circus replacing Watergate. Mr. Colby, despite his ability, his candid recital of his important work of CIA, and his strong administration of that organization, had the misfortune to serve during this chaotic period.

But let no man believe, Mr. Speaker, that Bill Colby as Director of Central Intelligence has left anything behind him other than a record of outstanding achievement.

He has served as CIA Director during the most tumultuous period in that Agency's 28-year history. In this role, he must take his place along with others in our history who have served their country with distinction, dedication, and sacrifice.

During these trying times, Mr. Colby assumed full responsibility as Agency spokesman for certain misdeeds of the past. He made extraordinary efforts to communicate his views of the past, the present, and the future. This included the termination of all questionable activities which were identified in an internal Agency review which he and his predecessor, Dr. Schlesinger, initiated.

Mr. Colby realized that part of the price for restoring confidence in the CIA was openness and candor in discussing the past. My personal view is that this erosion of confidence was not so much justified as it was an illusory image created by those who should have known better or by those who were not well informed.

In taking the brunt of the clamors against the Agency, in never failing to meet with those he considered responsible Americans no matter how much they differed with him in viewpoint, and in telling the unvarnished story of a modern intelligence structure serving our country within our constitutional framework, Mr. Colby had no peer. He was Mr. Integrity; he was inflappable; indefatigable; and he was undefeatable.

But there are other ways of measuring the length and breadth of a man—the reaction to him of those who work for and with him. This was reflected in the spirit of the tribute and emotional farewell he received from his colleagues during the swearing-in ceremony of Ambassador George Bush as the new Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Bush, I am sure, will receive from CIA employees that same loyalty and the same intellectual and moral commitment which Bill Colby perceived as contributing to the effort to provide an able and effectual intelligence service.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 March 1976

The Pike-C.I.A. Battle

To the Editor:

I would like to see a national referendum to decide which would be more disastrous for the country: the destruction of Otis G. Pike by the C.I.A., or the destruction of the C.I.A. by Otis G. Pike.

BERT GOLDSMITH
New York, March 10, 1976

WASHINGTON POST
10 MAR 1976

• A U.S. Congressional report on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency does not name any Italian politicians who may have received money from the agency U.S. House Speaker Carl Albert said in a letter to the president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

WASHINGTON POST
16 MAR 1976

• The directors of five Greek newspapers were sentenced to four months in jail each on charges of defying a ban on reports of the aftermath of the assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch. All were freed pending appeal.

THE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
1 March 1976

Expansion of the Soviet KGB

While the morale and operational efficiency of America's CIA, DIA, and FBI have been seriously lowered, and various state, congressional, and police countersubversive agencies have been completely disbanded due to left wing pressure (much of it Communist-inspired), the Soviet KGB is expanding steadily and now numbers slightly over 300,000 personnel, including border police and internal security units. This figure includes approximately 9,000 "legal" (with official Soviet diplomatic cover) KGB espionage agents, but it does not include thousands of "illegal" (without some type of official cover) KGB agents and their covert contacts, nor does it include a massive global fifth-column of indigenous Communist parties and their sympathizers acting under guidance from Moscow.

Also being expanded is the Soviet GRU, the military intelligence division of the Soviet General Staff, headed by General Petr Ivanovitch Ivashutin. The KGB oversees the GRU and controls the propaganda and counterintelligence services within the Soviet armed forces. An unclassified US Army intelligence document (International Communism, published by the US Army Intelligence School) states the following:

> "Soviet intelligence objectives may be classified into two major fields. First, to maintain the Communist dictatorship within the Soviet Union. Second, to contribute toward world revolution in order to achieve world domination. . . . The Soviet intelligence service is extensively involved in subversion, sabotage, and espionage in furtherance of the established goal — world conquest."

Major KGB intelligence targets

Acquisition of classified scientific, industrial, political, and military data remains the major KGB intelligence target. The KGB is also involved in shadowy special tasks on a global basis, including subversion, armed insurgency, sabotage, deception, political and military penetration, psychological operations, bribery, blackmail, and specific assassinations. Yuri V. Andropov, KGB director since May 1967, is now increasing the number of KGB "legal" and "illegal" espionage agents in America, thus exploiting the current crisis in the US intelligence community.

In 1959, Nato intelligence had identified some 300 "legal" KGB agents in the United States; today, there are at least 900 under surveillance. A January 1976, report from Rome states that the Soviet Union has about 90 KGB agents and almost a thousand informants working in Italy, primarily in political, economic, cultural and other circles to collect information on the security and defence systems of Italy in Nato. Another 1976 report from Paris claims that approximately 1,000 KGB agents are operating in France under the KGB resident-director, the third ranking counsellor of the Soviet embassy in Paris. The director of clandestine GRU operations in France also holds counsellor rank in the Soviet embassy. A January 1976 report from Amsterdam states that the KGB contingent in the Netherlands now numbers about 60, double what it was in 1972. A 1976 Pentagon report mentions stepped-up Soviet activities in Africa, including the overt stationing of 2,900 Russian military advisers in 11 African nations. Gabonese security forces recently seized a Soviet Antonov An-30 aircraft, specially equipped for aerial photography, which was on a covert air reconnaissance mission over Chad, Cameroon, Ghana, and Gabon.

The fight against the KGB

Unfortunately, it has never been the policy of Washington to "roll back" Communism but merely to "contain" it. The containment policy, as witnessed by Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, has not been successful. Détente is proving to be an even greater failure. In Soviet power politics, the KGB serves as a clandestine advance guard of internation Communist aggression. The fight against the KGB is best waged by the West's counterintelligence services. This is also the only effective answer to the current expansion of the KGB. As pointed out on numerous occasions by this Service, Western counterintelligence agencies have been seriously weakened and often neutralized by left wing pressure or outright Communist subversion.

The telephone tapping of some 2,000 Soviet Bloc personnel in the US has ended. This was formerly a routine counterintelligence service of the FBI whilst it was being directed by J. Edgar Hoover. The CIA counterintelligence staff has been purged and the DIA is in danger of being abolished. Ray S. Cline, former director of the US State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has recently accused US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of withholding vital "raw" intelligence of Soviet activities detrimental to détente and as having "ended up controlling dissemination and analysis of intelligence." The time to strengthen, not weaken, Western intelligence agencies is now at hand. This must be done if freedom is to survive. The previously quoted US Army intelligence document concludes: "In the current battle for the minds and loyalties of men, we who believe in freedom cannot falter or our cause will be lost. We must be convinced of the rightness of our cause and we must be willing to fight for it. In the words of a famous American orator, William Jennings Bryan: 'We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the world.'"

NEW YORK TIMES
13 MAR 1976

INTELLIGENCE PANEL EXPANDED BY FORD

WASHINGTON, March 11 (UPI) — President Ford announced yesterday that he was expanding his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 10 to 17 members and that two former Cabinet members, John B. Connally and Melvin R. Laird, would serve on the panel.

In a statement, Mr. Ford said he was expanding the panel as part of his overhaul of the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gathering agencies. Mr. Ford said that Leo Cherne, a New York economist, would serve as board chairman.

"My actions were designed to achieve two objectives," Mr. Ford said. "First, to insure that we have the best possible information on which to base our policies to other nations. Second, to insure our foreign intelligence agencies do not infringe on the rights of American citizens."

Mr. Connally is a former Treasury Secretary and Mr. Laird formerly served as Defense Secretary.

Mr. Ford announced that he was appointing the following panel:

Former Representative Leslie C. Arends, Republican of Illinois.
Former Army Secretary Stephen Ailes.
Edward Bennett Williams, a Washington lawyer and prominent Democrat.
Gordon Gray, a broadcasting executive and former Army Secretary.
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, retired.
Robert D. Murphy, a diplomat.
William J. Casey, a Washington lawyer.

Reappointed were the following:

Clare Booth Luce, former Ambassador to Italy.
Adm. George W. Anderson, retired.
Edward Teller, the atomic scientist.
Ulgen H. Laird, chairman of the board of the Polaroid Corporation.
Robert W. Galvin, chairman of the board, Motorola Inc.
John S. Foster Jr., vice president, T.R.W. Inc., and Litton Systems, Group of Palos Verdes Estates, Cal.
Watson O. Baker, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
13 March 1976

CIA buys British

By MARTIN WALKER

A British technological breakthrough — a combined miniature TV camera and microphone bug — is to be used by the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, according to a former CIA officer.

The camera is tiny, with the visible part of the lens and directional microphone having a diameter smaller than ¼in. The machinery behind the camera is only about 6in. long and less than 4in. deep, according to one of the few men who has handled the device, the chief security officer of a leading London retailer.

"At the moment we have no such device in our store," he said yesterday, "although we are interested in this one. I saw this device in London about three months ago. There are certainly many areas in which it could be used."

The camera bug was originally developed to help retail stores to deal with shoplifting but its intelligence potential quickly led to a wider market and to a security blanket being imposed.

"We have nothing to do with bugging devices. We have no information on this at all," a Ministry of Defence spokesman said yesterday. Would he say anything even if there were information? "No, we probably wouldn't," the spokesman said.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 MAR 1976

Pike Charges C.I.A. Effort At Retaliation for Findings

Accuses Agency of Seeking to Discredit Him and Congress So as to Gloss Over Report by House Select Committee

By RICHARD D. LYONS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 9 — Representative Otis G. Pike accused the Central Intelligence Agency today of waging a campaign to discredit both himself and Congress in an effort to gloss over the findings of his House Select Committee on Intelligence.

The Suffolk County Democrat took the House floor twice to relate hitherto undisclosed incidents of his dealings with the C.I.A., including a telephone conversation in which he quoted the agency's special counsel as having stated:

"Pike will pay for this, you wait and see—we'll destroy him for this."

According to Mr. Pike, the conversation was between Mitchell Rogovin, special counsel to the Director of the Central Intelligence, and A. Searle Field, the committee's staff director.

Mr. Rogovin, reached in a telephone interview, denied that he had ever threatened Mr. Pike's political standing or said anything that could have been construed as a political threat.

Mr. Rogovin said he called Mr. Pike today after learning of the Congressman's remarks and asked him where he heard about such political threats. He said Mr. Pike had told him that the threat had been relayed to him by Mr. Field. "I told him he was dead wrong and that Field was dead wrong," Mr. Rogovin said. "I flatly deny every inference of Mr. Pike's statement."

Moreover, he said that he has met with Mr. Pike on several occasions since the alleged threat and that Mr. Pike never mentioned it before. "He was always very cordial," Mr. Rogovin said.

Mr. Pike's comments came during a day of charges and countercharges focusing on the investigation into the circumstances of the publication last month of the Pike committee's report, and previous accounts in The New York Times of the report's contents.

Other members of the House took the floor to describe their awareness that copies of the report had bobbed up in various Government agencies, both in Washington and overseas.

Representative Robert N. Giaimo, Democrat of Connecticut, said he had been told "in a trans-Atlantic" telephone conversation that portions of the report had appeared in Government offices "on the other side of an ocean."

Meanwhile, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct formally started its investigation of the Pike committee leak today with a meeting attended by seven committee members, David Bowers, the retired official of the Federal Bureau of Inestigation who will direct the committee's investigators, and C. B. Rogers, the Atlanta attorney who will serve as general counsel to the committee.

After the meetings, members said the discussion had centered on how the inquiry would be conducted and who would take part.

One committee member, Representative Charles H. Bennett, Democrat of Florida, said after the meeting, "It's kind of sad to waste all this time and energy and money, but I guess we've got to do it."

The House voted overwhelmingly last month on a resolution directing the committee to investigate the circumstances surrounding the leaking of the Pike committee report. Although the resolution was not directed at any individual, the board of governors of the National Press Club announced today that it "condemns" the action of the House, "in singling out a reporter in its investigation of a leaked document."

"The National Press Club considers this action to have a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press," the statement said, adding, "There is no intent on the part of the National Press Club to defend or condemn the actions of Daniel Schoor of CBS, the reporter involved."

NEW YORK TIMES
12 March 1976

Senate Intelligence Panel Is Given an Extra Month

WASHINGTON, March 10 (UPI) — The Senate approved today a resolution giving its Select Intelligence Committee an additional month to complete a report on the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies.

The resolution, approved by voice vote, gives the committee until April 15 to submit the summary of its investigation. It was originally due March 15.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 March 1976

CORNELL DEPLORES TREATMENT OF KY

Faculty Committee Declares That Freedom of Speech on Campus Was Violated

By HAROLD FARBER
Special to The New York Times

ITHACA, N.Y. — A special faculty committee on academic freedom at Cornell University issued a report last week concluding that freedom of speech on the campus had been violated when Nguyen Cao Ky, the former vice president of South Vietnam, was booed off the stage here last December.

The report took on special significance because it was issued a few days before another controversial speaker was scheduled to appear on the campus, with student groups organizing heckling and booing demonstrations and other protest activities.

William H. Colby, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is to speak at 8 P.M. tomorrow in his first appearance on a college campus since his retrement. His topic will be "Secrecy in a Free Society."

In an editorial last Thursday, The Cornell Daily Sun, the undergraduate newspaper, drew a distinction between the two appearances, criticizing Mr. Ky as "a mercenary" but describing Mr. Colby as "in his own eyes a patriot." It urged students to listen to Mr. Colby as an educational experience.

Academic Freedom Affirmed

"For if William Colby could come to believe that illegality in the name of liberty is not a crime, what is to prevent the products of the rest of America's bureaucratic and educational establishment from doing the samex" the aditorial said. "The answer can only be found by listening to Colby and by trying to understand him."

Both speakers were invited by the same student groups, the Interfraternity Council and the Oliphant Fellowship of the Sigma Phi Fraternity. The fellowship was set up as a private endowment by Sigma Phi alumni to bring contemporary speakers to the campus. The fee for Mr. Colby's speech was reported to be $2,500.

The faculty committee's report on Mr. Ky's appearance was a strong affirmation of academic freedom on the campus, witha recommendation that faculty members who interfere with or incite others to interfere with free speech be subject to suspension or dismissal.

The report, issued at a special faculty meeting last Wednesday, defined the rights of dissenters to make their opinions known as long as they did not interfere with the speaker's ability to give his views or of the rights of others to listen.

The report listed the rights of dissenters as the following: distributing leaflets outside the meeting room, picketing peacefully, boycotting the speech, walking out, asking pointed questions and, with limits set by the moderator, expressiong displeasure with evasive answers.

"Exercise of the right of free speech ought not to depend on the speaker's willingness to endure prolonged, massive verbal hostility and a shouted collective demand to leave, lasting over two minutes," the report said, referring to the Ky incident.

About 1,500 people attended that meeting, which the report described as a boisterous and demonstatrative gathering, hostile to the point that the moderator concluded that Mr. Ky could not give his prepared address. By agreement with some of those attending and the speaker, the format was changed to a question-and-answer session.

Report Called Unfair

Although the faculty committee said it was not reaching a judgment that any indiviiual had violated any law or university regulatuonion, it singled out two professors by name as those who had spoken at the meeting before Mr. Ky left the stage. They were Michael C. Parenti, visiting professor of government, and Richard M. Miller, assistant professor of philosophy.

"I feel that the report is not fair and misrepresents my role," Professor Parenti said, adding:

"It implies, without presenting evidence, that I had something to do with a disruption. There were those there who were dead set to disrupt the meeting. I attempted to salvage the meeting by offering another format, which was voluntarily accepted."

Professor Miller, who is on leave teaching at the University of California in Los Angeles, was not available for comment. But Professor Parenti said he felt that the report also misrepresented Professor Miller's role. "All he did was make a statement," he said.

The report said that, following Professor Parenti's remarks, Mr. Ky had made a three-minute statement and then had answered suestions for 10 minutes, when Professor Miller spoke.

"At this point the crowd exploded," the report said. It "The response was electric. Part of the crowd (common estimates are 150 to 250) rose to their feet. At first the crowd was shouting and clapping. It then turned to rhythmic applause and the chant of 'Out, out, out, which continued until Ky left the stage."

Sunday, March 14, 1976 The Washington Star

Agee and Welch: Fused By the 'Company's' Events

By Tom Dowling

"This American risked his life to tell the truth about the CIA" — so reads the legend beneath the photo of the stern, *apparatchik*-looking Philip Agee on the back cover of his Bantam paperback, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary."

What, then, of Richard Welch, the slain CIA station chief in Athens, whose high-domed, blandly cerebral 50ish features have merged into a blurred identity with Agee's appearance of penetrating intensity, of youth recaptured through commitment? Did Welch die because Agee told the truth?

Moreover, how odd that Agee's paperback publishers should choose to promote their author with the one phrase best designed to conjure up recollections of Welch. Crass commercialism? An innocuous copywriter's touch coincidentally overtaken by developments in Athens? Another instance of CIA propaganda wiring on the domestic front. As Graham Greene, himself a World War II British secret agent, has observed: In the intelligence business you never can be sure whether you're getting the fat or the lean.

STILL, LIKE IT or not, Agee and Welch have become irrevocably fused by events; the death of one and the book of the other have made them men whose villainy or heroism — depending on your point of view — resists finality in an espionage world where fat can be lean and vice versa.

So, the juxtaposition of Agee (the man who risked his life to tell the truth?) and Welch (the man who lost his life by having it told?) is so neat, so perfectly timed, so uncanny in its presumed cause and effect relationship as to be blatantly suggestive, even suspicious.

Let us suppose that working for the CIA and betraying it are alike occupations of some risk. Who has the highest actuarial odds of an unexpectedly violent demise: Agee the disaffected fugitive operative whose four-year kiss-and-tell book project was well-known to the Langley establishment? Or Welch, a desk-bound senior bureaucrat who had spent the last 15 years working under U.S. embassy cover so flimsy as to be obvious to even the most slow-witted rival spook browsing through the foreign service Biographic Register — a book available to the public from the U.S. Government Printing Office?

TWO CENTRAL FACTS would seem to stand out on the face of things. First, there is nothing in the recent, if only partially disclosed record of CIA operational theory to lead one to suppose that the "company" had squeamish aversions to taking out anyone, particularly anyone even half so troublesome as Agee. Second, all — or at the very least practically all — CIA agents functioning with an overseas State Department cover are as readily identifiable from the Biographic Register as Welch was. Yet while numerous legitimate State Department foreign service officers have been murdered abroad, Welch is the first CIA agent with a diplomatic passport to be singled out for assassination.

So why Welch and not Agee? Perhaps the CIA is more chary about dusting a fellow countryman than a Castro, a Trujillo or a DeGaulle — though it is hard to see why this should be. Perhaps Welch's slaying had nothing to do with his CIA connection, or perhaps his elimination marks an abrupt change in the "live and let live" gentleman's agreement by which world intelligence services have hitherto operated. Indeed, wildly improbable as it may be, perhaps it is Agee who is still the CIA loyalist and Welch, the spy who decided to come in from the cold. That, certainly would be the standard plot denouement in any CIA thriller that made use of the Agee-Welch connection — and it is a twist very much in keeping with the notion of black propaganda, which is the CIA's most regularly employed operational tactic.

IN THE END WE have no definitive answer to the question of why Welch and not Agee. Yet their juxtaposition is inescapable — even above and beyond the eerie echoes struck by the blurb on the back of the Agee paperback. This is so because the publication of Agee's book and the murder of Welch increasingly appear to be seminal events in their interconnection.

To deal with matters consecutively, let us begin with "Inside the Company," which Agee brought out in 1974 in Great Britain in order to prevent the CIA seeking judicial restraints prior to publication. Assuming that Agee's book is what it purports to be — an ex post facto diary account of a CIA field agent's workaday experience — would judge it to be among the single most important documents on U.S. post-World War II foreign policy yet published.

This is not one of those orotund statesman's apologias for a life of unremitting self-sacrifice and nobility at the top. On the contrary, the book's function is cathartic, not self-celebratory. It is a retrospective diary written with a researched denseness and exactitude meant to capture precisely what Agee did as a CIA man in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico and how he felt about it at the time. The flat, impassive narration is a remarkable piece of self-discipline; the external facts of CIA operational practice are presented with a mastery of detail that is astonishing in its variety and significance. It is the book Kim Philby must have given the KGB in his debriefing. As an invaluable primary source for historians of the future, it will — again assuming its legitimacy — surely stand in such select company as the "Civil War Diaries" of Gideon Welles.

AND THIS IS PERHAPS the most bizarre aspect of Agee's book. Welles was, after all, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln, an influential insider at Cabinet deliberations, whereas Agee went to Ecuador as a GS-9, hardly a slotting designed to put a man at the center of the American foreign policy maelstrom in the ordinary scheme of things.

But the extraordinary thing about Agee's book is that it documents just how much of an insider, a shaper of events he really was. Indeed, if his account is to be credited, it can be argued that the real contours of American foreign policy are drawn at the field operational level far removed from Washington's control, its knowledge, and even at total variance with its official pronouncements. What this posits are two radically new implications about the implementation of policy.

In the first instance, Agee's experiences indicate that an American overseas bureaucracy becomes responsive to its own immediate environment, not Washington. Thus the American mission in Quito ultimately operates in an Ecuadoran context, not an American one, with the upshot that the embassy in Quito becomes not so much an extension of American policy made in Washington as an independent institution operating within the Ecuadoran infrastructure.

Secondly, the American mission itself is bifurcated into two distinct units, one overt and largely meant for public consumption and the other covert and meant to run things. Needless to say, the two parts of the whole often work at cross purposes, and in a way that assures dominance to the covert part of the operation.

THUS, DURING AGEE'S tour in Ecuador the official Washington policy in Latin America is the Alliance for Progress, trumpeted by Kennedy, Rusk, et al, as an effort to use foreign aid for leverage to promote liberal reforms. This sounds fine and the overt part of the American mission in Ecuador is compelled to pay lip service to the Alliance for Progress even though the American diplomats are astute enough to know that the Ecuadoran oligarchy's interest in liberal reform is nonexistent and, in any case, unnecessary since they'll get their aid money anyway merely by floating rumors of the Communist menace, Che Guevarra's presence in the jungle, that sort of thing.

So the upshot is that the diplomats on the spot have no illusions about the efficacy of the Alliance for Progress. Indeed, it seems doubtful that Kennedy was all that serious about it. According to Agee, Ecuador's President Arosemena, a hopeless lush, makes a big hit with Kennedy while visiting Washington by jovially remarking in his cups that he can name all the American presidents since Washington but cannot perform the same feat with Ecuadoran presidents since they have been deposed with such eye-blinding regularity. As it would turn out, Arosemena's remark had a certain prescient gallows humor about it.

IN ANY EVENT, whatever the overt lip service to liberal reform, the reality of Ecuadoran national life is dominated by the American mission's covert operations. Almost every influential segment of Ecuadoran society is on the CIA payroll in one form or another: The president's family, his personal physician, cabinet officers, journalists, bankers, businessmen, police, the military establishment. Some are selling information, others are paid to disseminate misinformation. But the bottom line is that the Ecuadoran ruling class, already corrupt by custom, is encouraged to become even more corrupt by the CIA. Who do Ecuadoran leaders believe: Agee, on the spot delivering his monthly retainer check, or Kennedy back in Washington delivering his pronouncements of reform, integrity, democracy? Well, in this kind of showdown the man with a shoebox full of money is the effective policymaker. So in Ecuador the real president of the United States is Agee, the GS-9 with the bankroll, not Kennedy, the presidential spokesman whose every grandiloquent utterance is a comical sham.

The same pattern prevails throughout Latin America — and presumably the rest of the world, for that matter. In Mexico, for example, President Luis Diaz Ordaz, the legatee of the revolution, gets the CIA to present a new automobile

to his mistress. When the sitting Mexican president gets wind of Diaz Ordaz's arrangement, does he wire Kennedy, complaining that this is an apparent denial of everything the Alliance for Progress stands for? No, he insists that the CIA supply his own girlfriend with a new set of wheels.

NO DOUBT THE CIA has been considerably discomfited by Agee's decision to name names; not only the three successive Mexican presidents who were CIA men, but dozens of Latin American eminences who enjoyed similar arrangements, not to mention scores of CIA agents, some of them secreted away in "deep cover" positions. But while these revelations unquestionably invest Agee's diary with a compelling literary sense of verisimilitude, the groundbreaking significance of his work lies in another area.

In the intelligence world new politicians can always be bought, new American spies recruited, new informants squirreled away in the host country infrastructure. No doubt the process of replacement is embarrassing and even complicated, but, like having a code cracked, the damage is finite. The real devastation of Agee's diary is that it so painstakingly and precisely describes the institutional system by which the CIA operates. If there is one fundamental rule of modern bureaucratic life, it's that men come and go, but large organizations are immutable, unalterable. The CIA, like the Veterans Administration or the Department of Defense, is a self-perpetuating monolith, a piece of machinery conditioned to run in a repetitive pattern that no directive from on high can alter. The CIA has 16,500 employees, all of them taught to function by second nature in a given way, to approach every problem with one particular strategy and a time-tested set of tactics. It is a highly systemized and interconnected bureaucratic process — and from Agee's account an unusually efficient one. His diary, then, is not an individual's autobiography, but a manual of operations.

THE KEY ISSUE raised by Agee's disclosures is whether a secret agency can function at all when every last detail of its rote operations is laid out on the public record. The answer, if history is any guide, is that the CIA will continue to operate as if nothing has changed. After all, the CIA that Agee worked for in the 1960s continued to employ exactly the same operational techniques of the 1950s, even though Kim Philby, who had complete run of the CIA as the British secret service liaison in Washington in the meantime openly defected to Moscow. The fact is that a spy organization has only two choices when its whole operation is blown: to disband or pretend that nothing has happened. Needless to say, no bureaucracy ever disbands. It simply keeps a stiff upper lip, draws up a few new organizational charts and expands. After all, the meaning of Philby's defection, in the words of one CIA man, was that from the period of 1944 to 1951 the whole Western intelligence community was "a minus advantage. We'd have been better off doing nothing."

And true to form after Philby went over to the other side, the CIA merely continued in the same fashion but on a larger scale so that Agee's defection could put it at another "minus advantage."

Agee's diary spills the beans to the whole world with consequences presumably as disheartening to the KGB as the CIA. Moreover, his direct public disclosure of a "minus advantage" came at a time when the very concept of secret government was under intense, wide-ranging public attack as a result of Watergate. The whole secret, extralegal American establishment seemed poised to come unraveled, with unknowable, potentially chaotic consequences — not only for the CIA, but for the multinational corporations, the political establishment, the whole power structure.

AGAINST THAT BACKDROP, the role of Richard Welch's martyrdom becomes especially instructive. We are told by the CIA that his murder was indirectly inspired by the publication of Agee's book — although Welch, an old Latin American hand, is not mentioned therein. Nonetheless, President Ford gives implicit support to the notion that the breach of CIA secrecy has gone too far by attending the Welch funeral. Newspapers by and large take the same editorial line, with the result that the whole thrust of journalistic and governmental exposure of CIA secrecy is suddenly blunted and then reversed.

The Rockefeller Commission confines itself to a few domestic red herrings and then turns matters over to the Congress. The Church Committee appears to have limited its investigation mostly to subjects for which the already disgraced Nixon can take the blame. The Pike Committee comes up with a largely bland document that is leaked to Daniel Schorr that CBS can make an example of him. Ford caps the whole investigation by proposing an American version of the British Official Secrets Act — a law which has kept the full consequences of Philby's treachery covered up to this very day.

SO THE CIA IS off the hook. Interestingly enough, alternate spoors have been offered up to the hounds of discovery. We can if we wish explore which news executives were in the CIA's hip pocket, which American corporations bribed which foreign leaders to peddle their wares, which American politicians had unsavory pasts.

What we are confronted with, of course, is a rather pointed warning that our own infrastructure is positively Ecuadoran in the variety and depth of its corruption. Needless to say, this is a form of self-incrimination that our institutions are not very likely to visit on themselves by pursuing. And so the curtain of secrecy will no doubt descend again, allowing us to pretend that our total "minus advantage" does not exist.

The remarkable thing in retrospect is that Nixon must have had the goods on everyone — the CIA, the multinationals, the CIA's news media connections, his predecessors in the oval office. Yet unlike Samson, he did not choose to bring the temple crashing down. Born, bred and reveling in the pervasive code of covert power, he went out as its meek, silent martyr, the establishment's surrogate villain, just as Richard Welch was its surrogate hero. In such a world even a book like Agee's makes no difference — if indeed we can even be sure in such a world which is the lean and which is the fat.●

WASHINGTON POST
10 MAR 1976

Colby Says Hill Could Handle Data

ITHACA, N.Y., March 9 (AP)William E. Colby, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said Monday night that a small group of legislators could be told all of the nation's secrets "as long as they don't leak them to everybody else."

Colby's speech was interrupted several times by applause and about an equal number of times by jeers from a capacity crowd of 2,000 at Cornell University's Bailey Hall.

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
6 March 1976

Missionary, CIA probe asked

THE AMERICAN Friends Service Committee has asked Sen. Frank Church [D., Idaho], head of the Senate select committee on intelligence, to hold public hearings on Central Intelligence Agency relationships with missionaries. "We urge most strongly that you take into account the wrongness of government agents making use of, or infiltration of, religious, educational, or philanthropic groups," the Friends committee told Church. Church's committee is drafting legislation to increase congressional oversight of the nation's intelligence activities. George Bush, the new CIA director, has said the agency would stop recruiting of agents among clergy but would continue to accept information volunteered by missionaries or other clerics. Legislation has been introduced to prohibit any use of missionaries for CIA operations.

NEW TIMES
20 FEBRUARY 1976

Naming names: The CIA's men in charge of Angola

The Ruling Class

By Robert Scheer

The assassination of Athens CIA station chief Richard Welch the day after he was identified in a Greek newspaper has made the Western press very reticent about publishing the names of CIA agents, and indeed has taken much of the wind out of investigations of the CIA's abuses. While it is understandable that the press does not want to precipitate vendettas against individuals who are carrying out policies they did not formulate, this new self-censorship begs the question: Is it not necessary on occasion to expose the identities of agents when their activities are suspect and worthy of public scrutiny? I believe it is—particularly in the case of Angola. And in the attempt to illuminate the myriad CIA activities in that country, I have decided to print the names of three CIA agents most instrumental in the field decisions of the Angolan war.

The most controversial aspect of the Angolan war concerns the entry of South African troops. There is some evidence to indicate that the U.S. CIA was behind this South African entry. The one person who would know if that is true or not is the man who was CIA station chief in South Africa when the decision was made, Francis Jeton. Journalists and congresspeople ought to be asking him some pretty tough questions about what the hell he has been up to.

I learned Jeton's identity from a news release of InterNews, an extremely useful and sober leftist news-monitoring group based in Berkeley, California. Steve Weissman, the InterNews correspondent in London, filed a report on January 28 of this year that one of the leading South African newspapers, the *Rand Daily Mail*, would on the following day reveal the names of past and present CIA officials stationed in South Africa. The *Daily Mail* never ran its story, probably for fear of prosecution under South Africa's very stringent Official Secrets Act. But Weissman named Jeton and went on to report that he had recently been moved to the CIA's Paris station, which is now the planning center for attempts to ally the French, South Africans and the CIA in a new arms deal for Angola. This end-run was made necessary by the fact that the American Congress had voted to cut off direct aid. It is a highly questionable practice to have a U.S. secret agent working for a policy objective that the U.S. Congress has specifically rejected. Jeton ought to be held accountable by Congress, which might also want to question Drowin Wilson, who, according to InterNews is Jeton's replacement in South Africa.

These gentlemen seem to have been central to the Angolan operation, and it would be therefore useful to query them about current efforts of the CIA to recruit foreign nationals to fight in Angola, an activity that seems to contradict the expressed intent of Congress. Evidence of such recruiting has cropped up recently in the British press. On February 1, Reuters reported that "the conservative Sunday Telegraph said more than twenty million dollars was being supplied by the CIA to recruit British mercenaries to fight on the side of the pro-Western factions in Angola." Reuters also quoted the head of one such mercenary recruitment outfit, who identified an American military attaché, Major James Leonard, as a liaison officer who funneled some American money for the recruitment of the mercenaries.

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen promptly denied the English reports but conceded that "a limited amount of money is going to countries which support our goals in Angola," and then added, "We do not know to the last penny how it is being spent."

It is clear that if Congress wants to find out what's going on, it must interview people below the level of Nessen and newly appointed CIA Director George Bush. Major Leonard, Francis Jeton and Drowin Wilson wou'd be good people to start with.

Another important point of contention in the Angolan episode is whether the active U.S. involvement came before or after that of the Russians. It is therefore interesting that InterNews and Weissman, in another dispatch from London, have identified the build-up of a major U.S. CIA team in Zaire, a country deeply involved in support for the American-backed forces in Angola. This build-up occurred in November 1974, which comes before the March-April 1975 date commonly used for the start of the Soviet Angolan escalation. Weissman relied on information provided by former CIA agent Phillip Agee to identify at least 18 CIA agents in the Zaire team. Ten of the 18 are assigned to handle top-secret telecommunications. Additionally, there are six "case officers" and two secretaries working under cover in the political section of the American embassy. The substance of Weissman's report is printed here for the first time.

According to Weissman and Agee, the team is headed by Stuart E. Methvin, who was formerly active in Laos and Indonesia, two countries that have had their share of CIA meddling. Methvin and the members of his team must know a good deal about many of the murkier aspects of U.S. involvement in Angola, and if that country is not to become another Vietnam, it is best that a congressional investigation begin sooner rather than later.

In the event that Mr. Methvin proves uncooperative, a congressional committee should talk to the other members of his team, and, in the hopes of aiding such an investigation, I would be happy to provide upon request the names of the other 17 agents working for the CIA in Zaire, as supplied by Mr. Agee. Again, these are all men and women known to various political factions in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. Their identity, as usual, is secret only to the people in this country who should be questioning them—the members of the press and Congress. Indeed, it is my view that these names should also be printed in this column, but unfortunately the editor and publisher felt otherwise.

COMMONWEAL
13 FEBRUARY 1976

Inside the Company: CIA Diary

PHILIP AGEE

Stonehill, $9.95

STU COHEN

Thanks to two disillusioned CIA officers, a former state department employee, and a series of Congressional investigations, the American people are beginning to learn about their "invisible government." We are at last discovering truths long known to those in countries where our "secret police force" plies its trade.

The hearings have concentrated upon CIA activities within our borders. The excellent book by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, explores the structure and policies of "the company" (as it is known internally). This is natural, for Marchetti's experience was at the upper echelons of the agency.

The most exciting revelations, however, have come from a man who spent 12 years as an operations officer, on the line in Latin America, Philip Agee. In 1956 Agee was a bright, patriotic and bored college graduate looking for something meaningful to do with his life. Those qualities were to lead him into the company, just as his sensitivity and changing conceptions of political morality were to lead him out.

For the first time, in Agee's book, we have a detailed account of the training of CIA officers. The description of his indoctrination is fascinating, especially the growing boyish pleasure in being a member of a "secret society":

> I'll be a warrior against communist subversive erosion of freedom and personal liberties around the world—a patriot dedicated to the preservation of my country and our way of life.

Once achieving the status of an operations officer and on his first assignment in Quito, Ecuador, there is a growing sense of power, too. The Quito CIA station launches a campaign against a leftist minister and suddenly, "Araujo's out!" "I've taken over my first operations and met my first real-live agents—at last I'm a genuine clandestine operations officer."

And so it goes, recruiting and paying agents, tapping telephones, writing outright lies for propaganda purposes—and always with the same goals; to isolate Cuba and reduce any Soviet influence in the hemisphere.

After 3 successful years in Ecuador, Agee is transferred to Montevideo, Uruguay, a step up the ladder. He fit in easily and worked very effectively until April 28, 1965: "I don't quite understand this invasion of the Dominican Republic." The Dominican adventure, the use of U.S. Marines to assure the defeat of Juan Bosch's popular constitutionalist government at the military's hands, was an opening chink in Agee's cold war armor.

> By September, the rift is widening: The more I think about the Dominican invasion the more I wonder whether the politicians in Washington really want to see reforms in Latin America . . . I think I may not have chosen the right career after all.

One year later Agee is back in Washington, separated from his wife, working on the Mexican desk at headquarters, and desperately looking for a way out. An assignment to the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City comes up and he snaps at it as a way of making potential job contacts outside the agency. His work at the Olympics is appreciated by the chief of the Mexico City station, Winfield Scott. Scott asks Agee to transfer to political work after the Olympics. The thought of more covert operations was repellent and, thus, "One more CIA career comes to an end. It was a little earlier than I had expected. . . ." That day Agee formally resigned.

By January, 1970, he had begun working on a book about the CIA. He is more than aware of the potential dynamite and personal danger inherent in the enterprise: "One word to the Mexican service and I get the one-way ride to Toluca—except it's a lovely way to go, disappearing down one of those canyons."

Agee's most important decision about the book was, ". . . to name all the names and organizations connected with CIA operations and to reconstruct as accurately as possible the events in which I participated. No more hiding behind theory and hypothetical cases. . . ." It is this decision which gives the book its flavor and importance. Not only because some of the names belong to Presidents, senators, police chiefs, or high ministers of state but because the inclusion of such names helps corroborate the events reported.

The last sections of the book are taken up with some of its most exciting moments—the writing of the manuscript, itself. Agee traveled to Montreal, to Paris in search of a publisher and to Cuba for research materials. In October of 1971 he decided to speak out and sent a letter to the Uruguayan leftist periodical, *Marcha* concerning CIA meddling in Uruguayan elections. The letter, he admits, ". . . was a mistake." Almost immediately an old friend from the CIA appeared with "advice." Not long after the visit Agee found himself followed in the streets. He was befriended by a man and a woman who planted a bugged typewriter on him. His family was visited by company representatives. As a result his wife refused to allow his children to come to Europe for a visit. The agency thus hoped to force Agee back to the U.S. for "discussions." He finally fled to London and began utilizing the resources of the British Museum. A British publisher, Penguin, with a solid interest in the third world, gave him a contract. After approaching every major publisher in the United States, all of whom demurred, a small, new publisher, Stonehill, was found and the book finally appeared in print here.

We have before us then an important and reasonably well written book. And yet, somehow, it doesn't completely succeed. Agee adopted a diary format and *Inside the Company* presents itself as a (reconstructed) diary of the times it describes. This format is valuable and helps to impart a sense of immediacy to the events. But there are also inherent defects. A great diarist, say Samuel Pepys, speaks not only of events but also of their emotional content. This is Agee's great failing—the book is cold. Even when he mentions emotions (rarely) he is of course writing of reconstructed feelings. Are they accurate? We'll never know. You cannot express emotions merely through exclamation points. Real diaries are full of ephemera—little flashes of stuff which, although unimportant in retrospect, give the work flavor and body. This too is missing. Nor is this mere stylistic quibbling. When Agee's conversion comes we are emotionally unprepared to accept it and it becomes difficult to accept at face value.

Another weakness, although less serious, is Agee's occasional bursts of rhetoric. Increasingly toward the book's conclusion the reader is lectured about politics, economics and the class struggle. The writing here never approaches real analysis and the attempt unnecessarily clutters the whole.

These, however, are comments about what the book is not. What it is is a frighteningly clear window on a world supported by public funds for longer than some of us have been born. We have long feared these truths. Now we know them beyond any doubt. What shall we do with the knowledge?

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
4 March 1976

60 CIA agents in London named by Marxist paper

By GERARD KEMP

THE International Marxist Group's newspaper "Red Weekly," formerly "Red Mole," today publishes the names, addresses and telephone numbers of what it claims to be "the largest list" yet given of agents of the American Central Intelligence Agency.

Over 60 "agents" are identified as working in the American Embassy in London, the head of "the CIA station in London" being named as Mr Cord Meyer junior, whose address is given together with his Embassy telephone extension.

Mr Meyer has been frequently named over the past year as the CIA chief in Britain.

As well as the list of agents, the Marxist paper names Cabinet Ministers Mr Crosland and Mr Healey as having been linked in the past with the CIA.

The newspaper claims that they "have in fact been assisted by the CIA, though doubtless without their knowledge."

Accurate information

The International Marxist Group (IMG) first sprang to prominence in 1968 under the direction of Tariq Ali who has now handed over his role as national secretary to Mr Bob Pennington.

Last night Mr Mick Gosling, the "Red Weekly" reporter who compiled the dossier of CIA names, said: "As far as we know, this is the largest list of American intelligence operatives published at a single go anywhere in the world. All the information is accurate as of a few weeks ago and some of it was unearthed as recently as last week. It has been exhaustively checked.

"The largest list previously published appeared in an Italian newspaper—they revealed 45 names—and I know that a Spanish magazine published about 11 names."

Numerous CIA men were betrayed earlier by Mr Phillip Agee, an ex-CIA agent, in his book "Inside the Company: CIA Diary." Mr Agee is connected with "Fifth Estate" an American organisation operating from a poky office in Washington. He is on the board.

Last year the organisation printed the name of the CIA's man in Athens, Mr Richard Welch, in its publication "Counterspy." Mr Welch was subsequently shot dead outside his Athens home last December.

He was one of seven people named as CIA men in the English-language daily *Athens News*.

Mr Agee, a close friend of Mr Paul Foot, a prominent member of the International Socialists and nephew of the Employment Minister, Mr Michael Foot, was indirectly referred to recently by Lord Chalfont who denounced as "enemies of the state" anyone who exposed CIA agents.

Lord Chalfont, a former Junior Minister at the Foreign Office in Mr Wilson's 1964 Government, defended the work of the CIA as part of the West's defence system against Communism. He said that naming CIA agents made them "vulnerable to every psychopath with the price of a gun or a stick of gelignite."

Referring to alleged links between the CIA and Mr Crosland and Mr Healey, "Red Weekly" says today: "Crosland was for a whole period a paid adviser to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a CIA front organisation . . . Healey was the paid London correspondent of the 'New Leader,' a virulent anti-Communist magazine financed by the CIA."

Last night a spokesman for Mr Crosland told me: "The suggestion that Mr Crosland was ever in any way linked with the CIA is just too laughable for words.

I understand that Mr Crosland, together with a number of other prominent people were connected with the Congress for Cultural Freedom through paid articles written for the magazine "Encounter."

One source told me: "At the time these people were writing for 'Encounter' none of them had any idea of there being any links between it and the CIA."

A spokesman for Mr Dennis Healey said last night: "Mr Healey is at the opera tonight. We are informing him of this newspaper's reference to him."

THE WASHINGTONIAN
MARCH 1976

CAPITAL COMMENT

SAVING SANIBEL
The CIA Agent as Conservationist

Except for a close circle of coworkers, few people knew the three men were CIA agents when they arrived on the tropical island. They came separately and quietly. Natives paid little heed.

The men moved into nice, upper-middle-class neighborhoods and settled into the community, gradually taking active roles in its young revolutionary movement. The revolutionaries wanted independence: they called it "home rule." The three newcomers had lived in Washington and they knew what those words could mean.

Realizing the power of the press in such battles, the three joined two other revolutionaries and set up a local newspaper, appropriately called the *Island Reporter*. They set out to give readers all the facts, a switch for Agency men. As it turned out, the facts presented a pretty good case for home rule.

And thus the revolution was successful—in a very democratic way. In a referendum on the island, the people voted 689-394 for home rule. A new city was born. One of the CIA men became mayor and, backed by the newspaper, plunged into the grueling task of protecting the city from the menace of outside agitators.

This is neither a fable nor another CIA scandal. It is a true story. The men have left the CIA (although some say there's no such thing as a "former" CIA agent) and are deeply involved in the government of a 13-mile-long, crescent-shaped island off the west coast of Florida. The

island is Sanibel, named it is said, by explorer Ponce de Leon for his queen, Isabella. It recently has become popular with tourists lured by its wildfowl sanctuaries, shelling beaches, and the boating, fishing, and swimming in the Gulf of Mexico and Pine Island Sound.

For years Sanibel was remote, accessible only by ferry. In 1952, its permanent population was estimated at 150. In 1975, it was 3,000 and climbing rapidly. Sanibel last year was the fastest-growing city in the fastest-growing county in the nation. Islanders were horrified.

The turning point came in 1963 with the opening of a three-mile causeway linking Sanibel and the mainland. Cars streamed onto the island. As if the causeway weren't bad enough, the big Florida building boom hit Sanibel in 1973 and threatened to engulf the place. The Charlotte County government, remote and unsympathetic, extended its own liberal zoning codes to the tiny island. Unchecked, county ordinances eventually would have allowed for 90,000 people.

It was the sight of condominium apartments rising along the Gulf beach that provided the impetus to get the revolution going. The spooks-turned-conservationists quickly joined in—Porter Goss, who had served in London and was to become mayor of Sanibel; Don Whitehead, who had served in Paris and was to become editor of the paper; Fred Valtin, who had served in Germany and was to oversee the paper's business and advertising departments.

Even with all their fingers in the dike, however, it may be impossible to stem the advancing tide. During Christmas week, for instance, the island's narrow roads were so crowded the traffic jam never ended. As an emergency measure, the new city council adopted an ordinance barring big motorized campers from staying the night on island streets. But there's no way to keep them away altogether, and they lumbered across the causeway in a steady stream, even though there are no parks or picnic areas on Sanibel.

The Sanibel of graceful wild birds and exotic shells and soft sandy beaches has become a city. Porter Goss often sounds like any other mayor, talking about budgets and plans for bond issues. But he does offer some hope. He won't vote for traffic signal lights, for example. Traffic lights are sort of a symbol: Once installed, the game is over—the developers have won. "We're out to preserve the unique natural assets of this island for all," he says. "We're not going to blow the appeal of this place...It's not a crusade exactly, but it's close."

Now, isn't that a fine project for the CIA? —SHIRLEY ELDER

GENERAL

SATURDAY REVIEW
6 March 1976

Is Détente Worth Saving?

A distinguished student of American foreign policy argues that détente has been "oversold" in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. but is still a goal that must be pursued.

by George F. Kennan

Some years ago, for reasons I have never entirely understood, an impression got about that there was beginning, in our relationship with the Soviet Union, a new period of normalization and relaxation of tensions, to be sharply distinguished from all that had gone before and to be known by the term "détente."

This image of détente, in which, for all I know, there may have been at one time some slender basis of reality, came to be rather seriously oversold. It was oversold—for different reasons in each case—by our government, by the Soviet government, and by the American press; and as a result of this overselling, many people came to address to the behavior of both countries expectations that were unreal and could not be met fully.

Today an almost predictable reaction has set in—a reaction against what people understand to be "détente." It has set in partly as a consequence of the earlier overselling of this idea; partly because real mistakes have been made here and there, on both sides; partly because an improvement in political relations appeared to threaten the formidable interests vested in a continuing state of high military tension. In addition, there seem to be a number of people in our political and journalistic world for whom a certain Cold War rhetoric has long been the staff of life, who have been alarmed by an apparent favorable trend in our relationship to Russia that has threatened to undermine the basis for this rhetoric, and who now welcome the chance to attack that trend. The result has been the emergence of a school of thought which appears to believe that something useful could now be achieved in our relations with Russia by a policy of strident hostility on our part, by reversion to the Cold War slogans of the Fifties, by calling names and making faces, by piling up still greater quantities of superfluous armaments, and by putting public pressure on Moscow to change its internal practices, and indeed the very nature of Soviet power.

Granted this tangle of motivations and outlooks, just where should the United States stand regarding détente? Is it a mere governmental public-relations ploy, without grounding in the realities? Or is it a major fact of international life, which will lead on to ever-widening vistas of mutual Soviet-American support?

THE BEST WAY of getting at these questions is, it seems to me, to step back from them so that the riddle of détente can be brought into historical perspective.

There is no need to dwell at any great length on the curious sort of symmetry—sometimes one of similarity, sometimes of diametrical opposition—that has marked the development of the Russian and American peoples, particularly in the modern age—by which term I am thinking of the past 200 to 250 years. Many thoughtful observers—including even Tocqueville, who had never been to Russia—have noted it and commented on it. At the start of that period, the two peoples were marked by their respective inhabitation of vast, underpopulated, and relatively underdeveloped but potentially enormously fruitful territories in the north temperate zone of the planet. In the 18th century both were just emerging out of a former obscurity onto the great stage of the international life of the civilized world. The Russians were emerging into this limelight after several centuries of relative isolation—which one might call a historically compelled isolation—from the main cultural and religious and political centers of Western civilization. They were emerging in the manner with which we are all familiar. By that time a limited westward territorial expansion had brought them to Poland and to the Baltic Sea. The construction of a new and partially Europeanized capital on the banks of the Neva was creating a governmental center reasonably open to contact with Western Europe, in contrast to the former remote and self-immolating Grand Duchy of Moscow, with its religious intolerance, its dark suspicion of the heretical outside world, its pious abhorrence of contact with the individual Western foreigner.

In that same century we Americans were emerging onto the world scene for the first time as a discrete entity, but emerging in quite a different way: not as an old people, isolated from Europe by the workings of a long and unhappy history, but as a young people newly born, so to speak, out of the wombs of old England and Scotland and certain parts of the Continent. We bore with us, to be sure, the traditions, the customs, the inherited outlooks of the European societies that had mothered us. But we were now in the process of being changed to some degree by the very discipline of our physical encounter with the great American wilderness and were, in any case, appearing now for the first time as something in our own right, something visible and active on the landscape of world politics, preparing to take an independent part in the affairs of the world.

To this concept we must add, now, the reflection that around the same time both of these two peoples, starting from a position of what we might call proximity to the main centers of Western European power and culture, began in earnest their respective processes of developmental expansion away from those centers: the Russians eastward across the Volga and the Urals into the immense expanses of central Asia and Siberia; the Americans westward across their own empty, magnificent, and underdeveloped continent. Both were destined, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to close the circle and to meet, in a sense, on the shores of the Pacific—to meet as peoples by this time of immense demographic, physical, and potential military power, each towering already in these respects over any of the individual entities, if not the totality, of the old Europe from which they had taken, in so high degree, their origins and their inspirations.

So far I have dealt mostly with similarities. But these similarities in physical and geographic experience were accompanied by profound, almost antithetically related differences in political and social outlook. With these differences, too, most of us are familiar. The Russians inherited the outlook of a great continental land power, almost

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totally cut off from the world oceans, surrounded over great periods of their history by fierce and dangerous land neighbors; and they became accustomed to that intense concentration of political authority that marks all societies and communities that find themselves virtually in a state of siege. The Russians learned to regard as natural the subordination of the individual to this concentration of authority. They were grateful, no doubt, for whatever liberties and immunities might be conceded to the individual at any given moment, but they tended to accept these as the product of an act of grace on the part of constituted authority rather than as absolute rights, inherent in the condition of individual man. We Americans, on the other hand, were heirs to the mercantile and commercial traditions of latter-day England and Scotland. Shielded in effect on the oceanic side—whether we recognized the fact or not—by English sea power, and facing on our mainland only insignificant military challenges, we were able to proceed in relative peace to the development of our continent, enjoying, indeed taking increasingly for granted, these rights and procedures of self-government that were actually in high degree the achievements of the European civilizations out of which we had emerged.

The differences between these two outlooks were, as you see, profound. But the two peoples had one thing in common: a tendency to attribute to their own political ideology a potential universal validity—to perceive in it virtues that ought, as one thought, to command not only imitation on the part of other peoples everywhere but also recognition of the moral authority and ascendancy of the respective national center from which these virtues were proceeding. The Russians had inherited this messianic view of their own place in the world from old Byzantium, with its strong sense of religious orthodoxy and its universalistic political pretensions. We Americans had it because, failing to recognize the relationship between our freedoms and achievements on the one hand, and the uniquely favorable conditions in which it was given to us to lead our national life on the other, we mistook those achievements and freedoms as the products of some peculiar wisdom and virtue on our own part and came to see in the system of government we were now enjoying the ultimate salvation of most of the rest of the world. So each of these great peoples went along into the 20th century nurturing vague dreams, if not of world power, at least of a species of exemplary and moral world leadership, which entitled it to some special form of admiration, deference, imitation, or authority—call it what you will—at the hands of other less favorably endowed peoples.

It was, then, against this background that the relations between the two peoples and their governments developed up to the end of the 19th century. In the geopolitical sense there were no serious conflicts between them; on the contrary, there was much, particularly in their respective relationships to England, that gave to each of them a certain limited positive value in the other's eyes. But ideologically the two official establishments remained poles apart. They viewed each other with uneasiness and distaste. The image of Tsarist autocracy remained no less repulsive in American eyes than did American republicanism in the eyes of the court and bureaucracy of Petersburg. And over the whole period of Tsarist power these differences continued to constitute a complicating factor in Russian-American relations, not wholly inhibiting the development of those relations but limiting in some degree the dimensions and intensity they could assume.

TOWARD THE END of the 19th century, another complication began to make itself felt in the form of the growing restlessness of the non-Russian nationalities within the framework of the Russian Empire and the growing power of their appeals to congressional and, to some extent, popular sympathies within this country. This was a factor that has to be distinguished from the general incompatibility of the two political systems to which I have just referred, because this restlessness arose not mainly from discontent with the general political system prevailing in Russia (although there was this, too), but rather from the treatment by the Tsarist regime of the particular non-Russian nationality in question, which was a different thing. The phenomenon became a complicating factor in Russian-American relations only when individuals from among these minority nationalities began to appear in significant numbers among the immigrants to this country. Particularly was this true, of course, of the Jews—Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian—whose migration to this country in considerable numbers began in earnest in the 1880s, and whose powerful resentment of the treatment of their co-religionists in Russia soon began to become a factor of importance in American political life. The legislative branch of the American government has always had, it would seem, a peculiar sensitivity to the feeling of compact blocks of recent immigrants residing in our great urban communities. So, at any rate, it was in this case, with the result that the tales of the sufferings of these non-Russian nationalities soon came to exercise upon political and congressional opinion in this country an influence stronger than anything ever evoked by the tales of the sufferings of the Russian people themselves at the hands of their autocratic government. It is curious, in a certain melancholy way, to recall that in December 1911 the House of Representatives adopted almost unanimously a resolution calling on the President to terminate the old trade treaty with Russia that had been in force ever since 1832; and the purpose of this resolution was to compel the Russian government to liberalize its treatment of the Jews within Russia. The one vote cast against the resolution in the House of Representatives was cast by a man who complained that this sort of pressure by a foreign government would not help the Jews in Russia but would appreciably damage American business; President Taft, pursuant to this resolution, did so terminate the treaty, with the result that Russian-American relations, down to the Revolution of 1917, remained very cool and unhappy indeed.

This, then, was the general shape of Russian-American relations as they existed in the final years of the Tsarist Empire, and it was against this background that the whole question was overtaken by the Russian Revolution, in 1917.

The initial impact of this revolution on the relationship consisted primarily of sheer confusion. The reaction of the American public was confused by the fact that it was not one revolution but two: a moderate-democratic one in February 1917, with which all Americans tended to sympathize; and an extreme, left-wing-Marxist one, dictatorially oriented, in November, the seriousness and durability of which was at first widely questioned. This reaction was even more confused by the fact that there was at that time a war in progress—a great European war which the United States was then just in the process of entering. The emotional reaction to the experience of being at war soon came to dominate American opinion and to distort all other issues. Thus the Russian Provisional Government, resulting from the first revolution, was idealized because it attempted to carry on in the war against Germany, whereas the Bolshevik regime, taking over in November 1917, was scorned, resented, and opposed in large measure because its first official act was to take Russia out of the war entirely.

Similar confusions prevailed, of course, on the Bolshevik side. Lenin and his associates attached enormous significance to their own seizure of power. They saw it as the first step in a political transformation of the world far more important than any of the issues over which the world war was being fought. And for this reason they insisted on seeing America's reluctant and trivial participation in the Allied military intervention in Russia, in 1918–1920, as the expression of an ideological hostility to themselves, rather than as an event in the prosecution of the war against Germany, which it really was.

These early confusions and misunderstandings yielded only slowly and par-

tially to the passage of time, and they helped to engender a deep mutual antagonism between the two parties concerned. But they were not the most important cause of the antagonism. The most important cause was another situation produced by the revolution—a situation that was not at all a misunderstanding: the fact, namely, that the Bolshevik leaders looked upon the political and social system of this country as a misconceived, regressive, iniquitous one, disreputable in its origins and purposes and deserving of violent overthrow; and they conceived it as their duty, however poor the prospects for success, to encourage such an overthrow and to contribute to its realization wherever they could. This, too, of course, bred a reciprocal reaction here. It was a reaction flowing in part from resentment of the Soviet attitude—resentment, that is, of the hostility addressed by the Bolshevik leaders to cherished American ideals and institutions. But it also flowed from a very genuine distaste on the part of most Americans for what they could learn of the ideology of the new Communist leaders and of the manner in which their dictatorial authority was being exercised.

So THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN relationship came to be burdened in the Twenties and Thirties not only by the great differences in historical experience and political tradition of which I have spoken but also by those special elements of ideological and political antagonism introduced by the establishment of Communist power in Russia.

All of this was sufficient to render relations in the period between the two wars—not just in the early years of nonrecognition but even after diplomatic relations were established in 1933—distant, meager, and unpleasant. Now these sources of contention were in their entirety a serious burden on an international relationship (and no one could have been more aware of their seriousness, I think, than those of us who served in the American Embassy in Moscow at the time). But they were not, I would point out, the source of any particular military tension between the two countries; and there was no great urgency about the resolution of the conflicts they produced. They represented serious long-term problems, but these were not problems wholly immune to those immutable laws of change that eventually affect all societies, transform all customs, and erode all militant ideologies; and for this reason there was no need to despair of their ultimate peaceful resolution. Above all, the preservation of world peace, not to mention the inviolability of civilized life on the planet, did not depend on their early solution.

It was in this last respect, above all, that the outcome of World War II worked its most significant and most fateful changes. There were two of these changes that stand out in my mind. Both were of a quasi-military nature.

The first was the elimination of Germany and Japan as major military powers standing between the United States and the Soviet Union, the attendant creation of great political and military vacuums, and the advance of Soviet military power, by way of filling one of these vacuums, into the heart of Europe. This produced a direct confrontation between American and Soviet military power that had never existed before.

As far as conventional forces were concerned, even this was not necessarily a fatal complication. The presence of both Soviet and American forces in the heart of Europe is an anomaly of history, awkward in some ways to both parties and to the peoples whose territory is affected. For this very reason, given continuing restraint and patience on both sides, it may be expected to yield eventually to a more normal and less dangerous state of affairs.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the second of the two great military-political consequences of World War II, for this was the acquisition and cultivation by both American and Soviet governments of the nuclear capability—of the capability, that is, of putting an end to civilized life not only on the territory of the other party but on great portions of the remainder of the surface of the planet as well.

The fears and other reactions engendered by this nuclear rivalry have now become a factor in our relations with Russia of far greater actual importance than the underlying ideological and political differences. The real conflicts of interest and outlook, for all their seriousness, are limited ones. There is nothing in them that could not yield to patience, change, and a readiness for accommodation. There is nothing in them, above all, that could really be solved by—and, therefore, nothing that could justify—a major war, let alone the sort of global cataclysm that seems to preempt so many of our plans and discussions. Yet this fact is constantly being crowded out of our consciousness by the prominence, and the misleading implications, of the military competition. An image arises, if only initially for purposes of military planning, of an utterly inhuman adversary, committed to our total destruction and committed to it not for any coherent political reason but only because he has the capacity to inflict it. This unreal image presents itself to both parties; and in the name of a response to it whole great economies are distorted, whole populations are to some extent impoverished, vast amounts of productive capacity needed for constructive purposes in a troubled world are devoted to sterile and destructive ones; a proliferation of nuclear weaponry is encouraged and pursued that only increases with every day the dimensions and dangers of the problem to which it is supposed to be responsive; and the true nature of our relations with the Soviet Union and its peoples becomes obscured and distorted by the cloud of anxieties and panicky assumptions that falls across its face. The nuclear rivalry, in other words, begins to ride along of its own momentum, like an object in space, divorced from any cause or rationale other than the fears it engenders, corrupting and distorting a relationship that, while not devoid of serious problems, never needed to be one of mortal antagonism.

OUR FIRST TASK, then, is to master, and to bring under rational control, this fearful capacity for suicidal destruction that has been let loose among us; and of this I would say only that so terrible are the dangers of a continued failure to master it that we would be fully warranted in accepting very considerable risks to avoid this failure. The risks, for example, of a total ban on the testing of nuclear weapons seem to me to be trivial in comparison with the risks involved in the continued proliferation of these weapons on a world scale. Yet we shrink from it. Is this timidity really justified? Is the tail of military fear not wagging the dog of constructive and hopeful political opportunity at this point?

I find myself disturbed by these reactions not only because of their obvious negativeness and sterility, and not only because they stimulate exaggerations and distortions of the real situation in world affairs, but also because they tend to obscure both the real limitations and the real possibilities to which our relations with the Soviet Union are subject. Let us remember that for the reasons I have just outlined there has always been an area where collaboration with Russia, as we would like to see it, has not been possible. This was true before the revolution. It is true today. It will continue to be true long into the future. But there is another area in which collaboration—and mutually profitable collaboration—*is* possible. The relative size and nature of these two areas is not immutable; it has not failed to change with the years; and only someone unfamiliar with the history of Soviet-American relations could fail to recognize that since Stalin's death the direction of this change has been in general a favorable one—the one we would like to see.

This has been, if you will, a small gain, but it has been a real one and the only kind we can hope to make. And it should be recognized that none of the complicating factors—neither the asperities of our military rivalry, nor the apparent conflict of our aims with those of the Soviet Union in specific geographic areas and countries, nor the somewhat dated but now traditional Communist rhetoric to which the Soviet leadership is committed—none of these things constitutes any adequate reason, nor do all of them together, why we should not exploit to

the full those areas in which our relations with Russia are or might be capable of constructive development and where exchanges might be pursued, cultural as well as commercial, which would be mutually profitable and would give greater depth and stability to the relationship as a whole.

We have burdens enough in Soviet-American relations without adding to them by the neglect of those areas where possibilities for improvement do actually exist. In a world so troubled as ours of today, the favorable opportunities have to be cherished and nurtured, not sacrificed to prejudice, vanity, or political ambition. □

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
26 February 1976

R. H. C. STEED on the continuing debate on detente

How do you tame the Russian bear?

TEN years of so-called "détente" have been a period of astounding strategic and political success for Russia and of discomfiture for the West. Russia has achieved the fastest and most far-reaching reversal of the global balance of power in history. In addition she has consolidated and secured international "legitimisation" for her illegal East European empire.

From this power base she exercises an immense and threatening military preponderance over Western Europe, which in effect she holds hostage for overseas adventures. She turns the tables on the West on the "human rights" issue by winning Third-World-wide acclaim as the "liberator" of Africa. Western democracy is in disarray, while the Italian and French Communist parties, cleverly exploiting "détente," are reaching out towards power through the ballot box.

Clearly the West has not found the right formula for dealing with the mighty, nuclear, world-revolutionary, imperialist, chess-playing Russian bear, and has no time to lose if it does not want to join those already in its comradely hug. In a book most opportunely published today,* 15 of the world's leading experts seek the right method of handling this unique animal — whether by feeding, taming, restraining, house-training or by some combination of all four.

It is a collection of interviews broadcast from Munich to Eastern Europe by Radio Free Europe. Every West European still possessing an instinct for self-preservation, and every Prime, Foreign, Defence and Interior Minister, should keep it by his bedside.

Several of the contributors complain that Russia has largely succeeded in imposing on the West the argument that the only alternative to "détente" is nuclear war, and that this involves acceptance of "détente" on Russian terms. This, they explain, is the familiar technique of "terminological subversion," "dialectical casuistry" or the "semantic trap."

Russia's aim, most agree, is to secure the fruits of victory without the risks of war. But as Prof. Brzezinski, of Columbia, points out Russia, even if firmly opposed, does not want nuclear war any more than America does. If America allows Russia to get away with this blackmail she is showing herself unequal to the game that Russia is playing.

The next Russian ploy under examination is the assertion that "détente," far from *excluding* "ideological conflict," predicates its *intensification*. This justifies the tightening-up of ideological control in the Communist countries against any contamination from Western ideas.

In addition, it is intended to legitimise whatever action against the West that the Russians think they can get away with without sacrificing the benefits of "détente" or risking war. This does not only mean that the Russians can carry on subversion, disruption and industrial sabotage in the open democratic societies by all means, including the "institutionalised leverage" of the Communist parties.

The "ideological struggle" also covers Russian activities like those in the Middle East—which keep the area in a state of actual or suspended war, and which engineered the crippling oil embargo against the West. The far-flung apparatus for training, arming, and directing terrorists and "freedom fighters" also comes under this heading. So, of course, in the last few months since this book was written, does the supply of Cubans to Angola and Syria, of North Korean pilots also to Syria for service against Israel and of North Vietnamese to assist Libya and Algeria in the coming war against Morocco in the Spanish Sahara.

Helping 'the people'

Surely, the Russians say, the West is not so afraid of a sporting may-the-best-creed-win political competition as to suggest that this constitutes interference! It is just proletarian solidarity, helping "the people" everywhere against "the class enemy" wherever he may crop up, which happens to include all Governments and institutions anywhere in the world not yet under the Kremlin's control.

On top of all this, what Russia wants from "détente" is vast amounts of credit, technology and economic aid.

So long as Communist bureaucracy and dogma maintain their stultifying political grip, so long will industry and agriculture lag far behind the West.

The cream of what is available goes for defence, regardless of cost and living standards, while the civilian sector does not even get the normal "spin off" because of obsessive secrecy and compartmentalisation. Thus Western aid not only benefits the Russian military sector, but is also an alternative to political reform.

The majority in the symposium was against support for the Soviet régime in this way unless the appropriate price was extracted in terms of human rights, disarmament and so on, on the basis of strict accounting. Sir William Hayter, former Ambassador in Moscow, did not believe, however, that the Russian Government would submit to such pressure, and quoted the failure of the Jackson Amendment to secure freer emigration from Russia in return for credits.

Another difficulty is competition between Western countries and the eagerness of the business communities to get Russian contracts.

Opinions also differed as to whether Western contracts would lead to the increasing sophistication of Russian scientists, technologists and managers and thus generate pressures for liberalisation. The same applied as to the effect of accelerated "consumerism" on the general public. The general view was sceptical.

In startling contrast, however, to general concern about the difficulties of projecting liberalising influences through the Iron Curtain, Prof. Kernig of Trier feared that *success* in this field would be positively dangerous for the West. It could, he argued, upset the bipolar balance on which the safety of the world depends.

Russia, he said, was not an ordinary modern State. It should not be subjected to shocks. The West had a vested interest in the stability of the Soviet system and

* "*Détente*," *edited by G. R. Urban. Maurice Temple Smith, £8*

régime. For this reason too it might be necessary to support the leaders against the dissidents.

Prof. Kernig maintained that the supreme need was for co-operation with Russia to meet global ecological dangers. Mr. Leopold Labetz said that this was difficult in view of the fact that Russia used these terrifying problems for political ammunition.

For the rest, the majority view was that bogus "détente" had exploited and contributed to a growing decay of morale and political will in the West, had accelerated its one-sided de-militarisation and also conferred prestige and respectability on the Western Communist parties.

There are many notable dicta. The Finnish General Halsti, who describes Finlandisation from the inside, says: "America has gone mad. A country that does not know how to use its enormous power, has none." And again: "Russian confidence can only be gained by submission" (a course which he urges the West to resist at all costs).

Bruno Pittermann, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor, refers to Western gullibility on détente. "Cheat me once, shame on you. Cheat me twice, shame on me."

And finally G. R. Urban: "The old observation that humanity abhors chaos more than it abhors unjust government is poignantly relevant to our condition. If the world's ecological and demographic problems prove intractible to the kind of order that the libertarian societies of the West can impose on them or inspire by their example, then the promise of a harsh but orderly world . . . may prove irresistible."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, March 12, 1976

The Change in Eldridge Cleaver

By BENJAMIN STEIN

Los Angeles

Can America love a former revolutionary Black Panther who used to want to destroy "the pig power structure"? Can a middle-aged, former terrorizer of police find happiness as an upholder of the status quo?

Eldridge Cleaver is going to give America and himself the chance. He came back last November from seven years in various Third World, Communist and West European countries along with his beautiful wife, Kathleen, and he sees things very differently from the way he saw them when he left.

He is currently awaiting trial on a variety of charges in Alameda County jail, near San Francisco, under restrictions which make it hard to talk to him. But his wife was recently in Los Angeles talking about the changes they have been through —changes that are amazing when one remembers his former image of gun-toting antisocial desperado.

Cleaver believes that two things have happened. First, he sees a vastly changed America, and second, he sees a vastly more educated Eldridge Cleaver.

Since 1968, Cleaver believes, America has shown enormous evidence of political progress. He considers the removal of President Nixon from office a sign that the people, through their political processes, can make their views felt and can have their wishes carried out.

He sees far greater participation by blacks and other minorities in the governing process. Legal and governmental discrimination against minorities have virtually vanished, he thinks.

Moreover, American participation in the Vietnam war is over, and Cleaver sees no signs of American imperialism in the world. This too is the result of the people making their voices heard through the governmental process. Cleaver believes that this working out in practice of the principles of democracy is unique, and makes America the best place, politically, in the world.

That, in itself, from Eldridge Cleaver, would be enough to make a person wonder if his wife were playing an elaborate practical joke, but there is more.

During his seven years as a self-imposed exile, Cleaver traveled all over the world. He did not like most of what he saw. He thinks that most Third World countries are minuscule dictatorships.

Their governments do not represent their people as much as a particular ruling class, and we Americans should pay no attention to them. He sees no reason why they should have an equivalent vote in the United Nations to the United States.

The Communist countries are the worst of all. They supply certain minimum necessities of life to their citizens, but they are completely unresponsive to the will of their people. Their governments exist only to perpetuate themselves and do this by denying any political rights to the vast majority of the people.

This all came as a big surprise to Cleaver. He had been part of a movement that systematically denigrated America and touted the Third World and Communist countries, and he now sees that as completely wrong.

He says that all the elites in Third World and Communist countries promote only their own countries and what is in their own selfish interest. American intellectuals, on the other hand, spend their time criticizing American society and praising the countries which Cleaver sees as fundamentally politically rotten.

He wants American intellectuals to experience a rebirth of American patriotism, as he has. American ideologues should do all they can for America, which is good not only for America, but also for the rest of the world, since America is the best political example for the rest of the world.

This means supporting a strong American military establishment, which he now sees not as an instrument of repression, but as the means to defend freedom. The world would not be a good place, he believes, if the only countries with strong militaries were totalitarian countries.

Cleaver has some particularly harsh words for the Arabs vis-a-vis the Israelis. For the Arabs to call the Israelis racists, Cleaver thinks, is the height of hypocrisy. In fact, the Arabs are the most racist people in the world, he says, especially towards blacks.

Kathleen Cleaver says that she and Eldridge actually saw blacks as slaves and indentured servants, even in Socialist Arab countries like Algeria. The Israelis, on the other hand, being Jewish, have a long history of being violently discriminated against, yet nonetheless lead in helping other minorities.

The change in Cleaver's thinking about the United States is by no means complete. He still sees America as a monopoly capitalist society where people do not have the economic rights they have in many countries which are far worse politically. But he says that Watergate has shown that all necessary changes can come from within the system.

It does no good to blow up a factory, as he and Kathleen see it, because that doesn't give anyone a job or a decent home. But economic goals can be achieved through the political process.

There is a lot more to Cleaver's thinking, but he clearly has changed dramatically, and he sees America changed dramatically for the better. It is profoundly moving to hear all this from the lips of Kathleen Cleaver. The air of the prodigal son having come home or the convert to the true light surrounds her.

What she and Eldridge Cleaver are saying is perhaps not new for readers of this page, but it is brand new for the circles in which Cleaver used to travel. It would be wonderful if those people were open-minded enough to listen. (A fund-raising effort for his legal fees, led by Bayard Rustin, has had little success.)

But so far the remnants of "the movement" have given Cleaver the cold shoulder since his return. Apparently he will have to use all his revolutionary rhetorical skills to turn on his former comrades-in-arms to some painfully acquired common sense.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
10 March 1976

ROD CHAPMAN, Geneva, Tuesday, on the UN's "instrument of evil"

The Catch 22 travesty

ONCE upon a time, before the days of the dragon Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the United States and others saw the United Nations as the champion of human rights and impartial defender of general faiths.

Disillusionment — and not just American disillusionment — has now reached such a level that the US delegate at this year's annual session of the UN Human Rights Commission could call the Commission's work a "travesty of human rights" and accuse the Commission of having become an "instrument of evil."

On the evidence of the five-week meeting which ended last Friday, the UN has now become so bogged down in obscure procedures and secrecy, and so deferential to power blocks, that the Commission will turn a blind eye to many widespread violations of the most fundamental human rights.

The saddest aspect is that the confidential procedures laid down over the years are now a guarantee that countries violating human rights get off without even a public mention.

Under the Catch 22 procedures, prisoners and other victims write to the UN Human Rights Division in Geneva, which decides to examine countries accused of a pattern of widespread violation of human rights. The division then obtains replies from the governments concerned, and a special working group studies the cases.

By the time the governments get around to replying, the original allegations are usually so outdated that the group decides it cannot possibly condemn the country concerned. Catch 22.

So the demonology of the Commission virtually never changes. Chile, Israel and South Africa are the only devils ever cast out, while perpetual offenders against human rights such as Indonesia and Iran never figure in the debates.

Even more serious is the accusation made by an Amnesty International observer at this year's meeting that governments are now receiving secret "pardons" from the Commission — which they flaunt like Good Housekeeping seals of approval. Indonesia has even written to Amnesty stating that the UN has found it not guilty of violating human rights.

The credibility gap between original UN ideals and current practice is most cruelly evident in the UN Human Rights Commission. The Soviet delegate for several years has been Valerian Zorin, an old hardliner.

Zorin played a major rôle this year in heading off every American proposal and contributing to the immense frustration of the US delegate, Leonard Garment, a former adviser to ex-President Nixon and Moynihan. The Americans called on the Commission to complete a declaration on religious intolerance (which it has been working on for years) but were blocked by Zorin.

Many human rights experts and UN officials have become overtly cynical. The UN working group on Chile, whose report was adopted by this year's commission meeting, treated Dr Sheila Cassidy well — but witnesses with less standing often received highly unsympathetic treatment.

The group interrupted one witness who was recounting how he had been starved in gaol with a comment about the need to break for lunch. Another witness emerged in tears, claiming that the cross-examination made her wish she was back in Chile.

In theory, the work of the Commission should assume a renewed importance for two reasons. The first is the introduction of the new international covenants on human rights, which are a far stronger legal instrument than the vaguer universal declaration of human rights.

But so far few Governments have signed the conventions, and some that have are now trying to back out. One of the most vociferous participants at the Commission was Uruguay, which cast several aspersions on the integrity of the Commission. Uruguay signed the conventions when it still had a civilian Government.

The second reason is that pressure groups in the US are now attempting to make both military and economic aid dependent on whether a country has a clean human rights bill of health. Senator Kennedy's Bill cutting off aid to Chile and other violators has already passed through the Senate, while Senator Donald Fraser is one of those urging that economic aid be cut off—except in the neediest cases—for similar violations.

But the State Department has told Congress that it could not adjudge gross violations of human rights because so many countries violate rights in one way or another, while much military aid has been transferred to other aid budgets. The Department is understood to be sitting on comprehensive dossiers on human rights violations in "friendly" countries.

Meanwhile, many countries are becoming increasingly sceptical of the UN Human Rights Commission's ability to regain past prestige and take action which, in Leonard Garment's words, "could command universal respect."

LONDON TIMES
8 March 1976

PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE

Political freedom ought steadily to be growing, yet the evidence of the past decade has been discouraging. To some extent other priorities have seemed more impelling. Nevertheless conscience will everywhere be found alive and responsive as Mr Solzhenitsyn's appeal has shown. Threats to political freedom have always existed. What is new in our era are those systems of government that stake out the future as their own possession, claiming to offer progress and expecting the price in repression to be accepted or overlooked. Governments of other kinds, whether or not they profess any political doctrine, may also care nothing for political freedom and put away those they dislike or fear. The political prisoner may thus be regarded as the symbol of repression, as the first victim of a limitation on political freedom. All political prisoners everywhere must be the concern of those who care for liberty.

The Times publishes today the first in a weekly series that will tell the story of individual political prisoners wherever they are found. Mr Ashok Mehta, a man prominent and generally respected for years past in Indian political life, is one such prisoner held under Mrs Ghandi's emergency. Many of the prisoners chosen will be less well known than he is; some will be entirely obscure. The publicity will not only, we hope, encourage their release; it will mark down all those countries where the first rule of political freedom is being transgressed: that a man should not suffer simply on account of the political opinions he holds, expresses or promotes in any reasonable way. This excludes the guerrilla or the terrorist. Whatever arguments may be advanced for violent revolutionary action of this kind such activists are not in the same category as the political prisoner who is obnoxious to the government solely for advocating a peaceful change of policy or government, or for expressing other opinions unwelcome to those in authority.

The choice of prisoners will be made by *The Times* and the articles to be published on our foreign pages will be written by staff members. The assistance of Amnesty International and other bodies has been sought and any other individuals with knowledge of particular countries will be consulted. Information of such cases is not always easily arrived at. Amnesty's experience has shown how ready governments are either to deny outright that they hold any political prisoners (in fact because they define them as criminals or subversives) or to ignore the pleas made on behalf of such prisoners with the argument that they are no business of outsiders. When such governments have refused to allow inquiries to be made by a representative of Amnesty their excuses can carry no weight.

Governments of all kinds will be found among those who imprison people for their political opinions. They may be communist or anti-communist; democratic or dictatorial; right-wing or left-wing. Often governments that are demonstrably improving living standards for their people thanks to successful economic development will be especially irritated by charges that they hold political prisoners —Singapore and Iran are examples—but means are as important as ends.

Some governments deny charges that they hold political prisoners when they are simply exercising inadequate control over their own security police. In some countries torture has for so long been habitual that no real effort is made to stop it. But all these acts are offences against political freedom and human rights. They must be protested against, always in hope of change, for it is particularly in those countries where better education and living standards are bringing greater political awareness that political freedom should find its proper place in the advance of the society.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
19 MAR 1976

Dubcek's Accuser Shows No Proof

Spy Fails to Back Charge That CIA Paid Former Czech Leader

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Foreign Service

PRAGUE—A Czechoslovak spy's "proof" that Alexander Dubcek is secretly receiving money from the CIA through Radio Free Europe appears to be little more than a batch of emigres' letters containing no clearly identifiable reference to the ousted leader of the 1968 Prague Spring.

In an interview in the Foreign Ministry here, Capt. Pavel Minarik, a Czechoslovak intelligence agent who infiltrated RFE and worked there seven years, repeated his widely publicized charge that Dubcek and his associates were paid by the CIA to make statements critical of the present government in Prague.

The accusation against Dubcek and other charges made by Minarik after he returned to Czechoslovakia in January have been published throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as part of campaign against Radio Free Europe and other Western organizations that broadcast to the East.

But the material that Minarik offered during the two-hour interview as "proof" to substantiate his charges in no way implicated Dubcek or any of his close associates. When this was pointed out, Minarik said he had "some other documents" that he could not show at this time.

Most of the documents he produced were letters written by Czechoslovak emigres to each other or to officials of RFE, a U.S.-operated station in Munich, West Germany, that broadcasts to Eastern Europe.

In the letters, Minarik pointed to obscure phrases such as one asking that funds be "sent in the agreed upon way" and another saying that "money for Sasha has already arrived." Sasha is a nickname for anyone named Alexander but Minarik insisted this was a refernce to Dubcek.

Only last month, in a rare press conference with Western reporters, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Lubimir Strougal, when questioned about Minarik's charge, said he assumed that Minarik "would certainly have proof of this assertion."

Wearing a blue blazer and khaki trousers, the bespectacled, 30-year-old agent appeared calm and relaxed throughout his interview.

He said he was sent by the Czechoslovak intelligence service in September 1968, a month after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, to infiltrate RFE, which was then financed by the CIA.

He hinted, for the first time, that he had provided evidence against a U.S. citizen, Fred Eidlin, who was arrested in Prague in 1970 and convicted on espionage charges.

Minarik said he had a "close personal relationship" with Eidlin who, he said, often discussed CIA matters with him.

Eidlin, according to an RFE spokesman in Munich, worked for the station as a Czechoslovak policy adviser from August 1968 until December 1969 and was not a CIA agent. Eidlin, who was arrested while on a private visit to Czechoslovakia, was freed and left the country after serving one year of a four-year sentence.

Minarik said he had been an actor before going to Munich at the age of 23, and this training enabled him to play the role of a defector, simulating anti-communism despite his loyalty to the Communist Party.

Besides Dubcek, Minarik had accused former Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek and former party leaders Karel Kosik and Frantisek Kriegel of receiving CIA money.

Minarik offered as one of the most important documents a letter written by Pavel Tigrid, an emigre politician who edits the quarterly Svedetsvy, published in Paris.

The letter purports to describe a meeting between emigre representatives and RFE officials in Munich on June 20, 1975.

The letter says the consensus at the meeting was that outside publication of works by dissidents in Czechoslovakia "gives a great impetus to the domestic authors . . . and if this is supported by some remuneration, the better."

Minarik said that emigre groups working with the CIA provide instructions for dissident intellectuals in Czechoslovakia who, in turn, write anti-government material that is then smuggled to the West, where it is distributed to journalists and broadcast by RFE.

None of the documents, however mentioned Dubcek or other senior officials nor are there any indications that they have ever been in contact with the emigres.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
7 March 1976

Solzhenitsyn right or wrong?

By J. W. M. THOMPSON

THAT an event of some significance occurred in England last week I am certain, even though it is not yet possible to be sure of its full extent. But so many people, of such different kinds, have said that what they saw and heard last Monday evening was unforgettable that I must conclude (and gladly) that here was a happening of true importance.

This is strange language to use of a television programme. I nevertheless share the feelings of all those who have spoken of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's haunting presence on the television screen as being in some way climactic, a few profound moments to be stored up and remembered, it may be through very bleak times that are to come.

Why was this so? Others before have tried to sound the alarm about Russia's preparations for war only to meet, as Mrs. Thatcher did, the familiar, effete blend of mockery and indifference. Others, God knows, have tried to shine a light on the dark ways in which our freedom is being restricted and imperilled, and small thanks have been forthcoming for the effort.

Yet this man, saying these things, apparently sent a shudder of realisation through a large part of the nation. Even the scattering of trendy sniggers seemed for once a little abashed. That invincible integrity, shining out of the screen which so often transmits fatuities or lies, overcame all the cosy, self-deluding mental defences which have been erected against the onslaughts of the truth.

Perhaps it will be, like almost everything else, only a nine days' wonder. Already nimble analysts complain that Solzhenitsyn's view of the struggle between Communism and the West is too simple—although, given the way the "free world" works, what else but a grand simplicity can ever unite its people to defend its civilisation? Hardly the artful diplomacy of a Henry Kissinger or the supple pragmatism of a Harold Wilson. In that sense Solzhenitsyn was profoundly right and his critics no less wrong.

But if the event proves *not* to be a nine days' wonder, and I suspect it may not, then it will be because the speaker, and his message, and the hour, were in harmony; because this man who

has walked through the flames and miraculously escaped was able to crystallise the misgivings or fears which today lurk in the corners of many minds.

★

Hence the force of the parallel which he drew between the "social phenomena" which he now witnesses in the West and those which marked the period in Russia before its collapse into Communist tyranny; and in spite of all that he had to say about the military threat, it was his vision of the West defeating itself, not of the West being defeated in battle, which formed the most powerful and disturbing element in his exhortations.

Perhaps he would now agree that there are seeds of optimism to be found in the very fact that his words were so shattering to so many. For us, at least, that fact permits the hope that the tide may be turning, that a sense of the fragility of much that we had thought to be immutable is dawning, that ours may prove to be a civilisation which has not lost the will to defend its values.

We may note also that the gruesome deceptions associated with *détente* are fast losing their lulling, mesmeric spell. "My warnings, the warnings of others, go unheeded." Thus Solzhenitsyn: and yet does he not do himself too little honour? His sense of failure hardly agrees with what the voters of the United States are saying at this moment. It underestimates the strength of the many voices in this country which warn against an ensnaring conspiracy.

There *is* a counter-attack, in short. Better late than never. That much at least can be said in optimistic answer to this elegy for a civilisation. The odds may not be as heavily against us as Solzhenitsyn conveyed. Understanding of the perils may not be as feeble as he fears.

It would be compounding the very crime against which he rails to put it more strongly than that. In our own domestic affairs, even, the retreat from a society dedicated to individual freedom proceeds. We have a Government which seems too often to think freedom to be a necessary casualty in the political struggle of the day. We have an overweening trade union oligarchy which spits on freedom if it seems even slightly to threaten its own power.

Let me cite this week's example of the contraction of liberty. Would you, reader, scanning this newspaper on a Sunday morning in spring, have believed even a few years ago that the freedom of the Press in Britain would so soon be in peril (as it now is) from such forces? That the State regulation of the Press would so abruptly become a real prospect, thanks to politicians' shameful disregard of a fundamental freedom?

I dare say you would not: yet such is the case. I can imagine what Solzhenitsyn would remember, if his attention fell upon this latest example of our progress down the slippery slope. He would remember the day when he was expelled from the closed shop of the Soviet Writers' Union, thus to be gagged, as it was thought, for ever.

The gift which he brought us last week, having almost incredibly survived the tormenting over many years of the overt enemies of freedom, was his reminder of the danger we all stand in—from its covert enemies as well, and from the indifferent and those tempted to surrender.

The other gift he brought us was the inspiration of his own magnificent spirit, which, after sufferings such as few of us can imagine, even after reading those works of his in which they are laid bare, still trusts in God and remains unafraid. Our answer to him must be to heed the message, and to do our poor best to imitate the fortitude of its bearer.

LONDON TIMES
2 March 1976

Bernard Levin

The man who believes that the truth is more important than the consequences

How rarely heroes live up to expectation, and how satisfying when they surpass it! That is what, last week, I felt after meeting Alexander Solzhenitsyn for the first time—that, and the familiar and inexplicable feeling of exhilaration that comes from talking to those who know what it is to live in hell, and who, although they can say only

I tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea, naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet,
And the sea rises higher

nevertheless radiate a kind of invulnerable optimism that comes from within, and is the mark of those who are eternally secure in the knowledge that their tormentors are not only wrong but doomed. This was said some time ago in the form: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it", and it is still true today.

I remember this feeling very vividly from my only visit to South Africa; all the misery and cruelty and despair I could see around me, which were in themselves almost unendurable, were transmuted into a kind of joyous hope by the indomitability of those I talked to who were resisting evil with a serene gaiety and a courage that it is fortunately beyond our necessity to measure. I felt the absence of this feeling more strongly than anything else in my life on my only visit to the Soviet Union, because I was there before either the dissident movement or the emigration movement had broken surface, and the cruelty and misery and despair all around me were unrelieved by anything that might suggest, however irrationally, that there was cause for hope. But I have experienced that uplift of the spirit whenever I have met any of those, from Valentin Prussakov to Viktor Fainberg, who have managed to get out, and I also felt it intensely the night before I met Solzhenitsyn, when I met Garfield Todd. The gentle Rhodesian and the Russian Titan could scarcely be more different, in the experiences they have undergone, the situations in which they find themselves, or the nature of their lifework; yet the same current of delight ran through me as I met them, and the same lightness of heart accompanied me as I left. Good, brave men, it seems, are the same the world over, and their goodness and bravery can no more be hidden than they can be counterfeited.

Alexander Isayevitch Solzhenitsyn came into the room smiling, and that was the first surprise, for he is one of those people whose faces are frozen by the camera, and he is consequently almost always portrayed looking solemn, if not actually seeming to scowl; in fact, he smiles very readily, and laughs a great deal. The next surprise was also physical, and I have not got over it yet. I am a very unobservant man, but we sat side by side on a sofa, our faces only a few inches apart, and I could not have been mistaken; I tell you that this man of 57, who spent eight years in a Siberian concentration-camp in torments that we can hardly even guess at, and then spent something like 20 years doing unceasing battle with the foul thing that has stolen his country from its people, has not a single grey or greying hair on his head or in his beard, and his blue eyes and the skin of his face are as clear and smooth and young as those of an untroubled child. Even as he spoke, in halting English (which broke constantly into torrential Russian, while our interpreter struggled to keep up), of his despair at the folly, nervelessness and lack of imagination and understanding the West now displays in the face of Soviet imperialism (he blames Europe more than America, saying that Europe has not had the excuse of America's thankless and debilitating struggle in Vietnam), his demeanour was that of a man in a state of grace. There was no need to ask him where he gets such inner strength and intensity; this is a man who walks with his God, and makes one understand what "Holy Russia"

once meant.

That was a private occasion. But last night, in an interview for *Panorama*, admirably conducted, with self-effacing tact, by Michael Charlton), Solzhenitsyn mounted a public indictment of the supine inattention of the West that rang like the blows of the hammer with which Luther nailed his manifesto to the doors at Wittemberg. "For nearly all of our lives", he said, "we worshipped the West—note that word worshipped; we did not admire it, we *worshipped* it." (Beneath the simultaneous translation you could hear the stabbing emphasis of the Russian word.) But now?

■ My warnings, the warnings of others, Sakharov's very grave warning directly from the Soviet Union—these warnings go unheeded. . . We realized with bewilderment that the West was . . . separating its freedom from our fate, and before I was exiled I had already strong doubts whether it was realistic to look to the West for help. . . And when I came here unfortunately my doubts increased very rapidly. . . During these two years the West . . . has made so many concessions that now a repetition of the angry campaign which got me out of prison is practically impossible . . . the campaign to get Sakharov to Stockholm was almost as strong, but it didn't help, because . . . Moscow now takes infinitely less note of the West. ■

And then, just as he so often speaks in the accents of Tolstoy, he spoke in the voice of that other Russian giant whose philosophical descendant he is, the man who saw as clearly into the heart of man a century ago as Solzhenitsyn does today. Is this not Dostoievsky writing about Peter Verkhovensky and his wretched father?

One can say that this is what forms the spirit of the age, this current of public opinion, when people in authority, well-known professors, scientists, are reluctant to enter into an argument . . . It is considered embarrassing to put forward one's counter-arguments, lest one becomes involved. And so there is a certain abdication of responsibility, which is typical here where there is complete freedom . . . there is now this universal adulation of revolutionaries, the more so the more extreme they are! Similarly, before the Revolution we had in Russia, if not a cult of terror in society, then a fierce defence of the terrorists. People in good positions, intellectuals, professors, liberals, spent a great deal of effort, anger and indignation in defending terrorists.

Then the hammer ceases to be Luther's, and becomes Thor's:

It would be more appropriate if it were not you asking me which way the Soviet Union will go, but if I were to ask you which way the West is going. Because at the moment the question is not how the Soviet Union will find a way out of totalitarianism, but how the West will be able to avoid the same fate . . . I am surprised that pragmatic philosophy consistently scorns moral considerations . . . one should not consider that the great principles of freedom finish at your own frontiers, that as long as *you* have freedom, let the rest have pragmatism. No, freedom is indivisible and one has to take a moral attitude towards it . . . The West is on the verge of a collapse created by its own hands. This quite naturally makes the question one for you and not for us.

Once only, in the course of the interview, did he become excited; the pencil in his hand became a conductor's baton or a rapier, and his voice rose towards a shout. This was when he told the truth about what "détente" means to those being persecuted in the Soviet Union.

What does the spirit of Helsinki . . . mean for us . . .? The strengthening of totalitarianism. . . . Someone went to visit Sakharov; he went home by train and was killed on the way. No, it wasn't you, *he* was killed. . . . Someone knocks on the door of Nikolai Kriukov; he opens the door. They beat him up nearly to death in his own house because he has defended dissidents and signed protests. . . . They let Plyushch out and they are putting others in lunatic asylums. . . .

What can we do about the presence in our midst of such men as Alexander Solzhenitsyn? Well, first what *do* we do? We turn away in embarrassment—an embarrassment that rises to act as a protection against the pain of admitting both that he is right in his analysis of evil, and that his very existence is a reproach to our society, embedded as it is in the granite of his faith. I do not believe (though presumably he does) that faith has to be a religious faith to be effective; but what is wrong with the West—and one can sense in his condemnation of us that it is this which excites his anger and contempt, more even than the strategic, political and moral retreat in which the West is engaged—is that we do not even have the courage of our secular convictions, we do not seem to care enough about our liberty to be willing to consider that it is under assault and to think about ways of sustaining it, indeed to consider that it *ought* to be sustained. Is it any wonder that a man who has dragged logs all day in a temperature of minus 30 degrees Centigrade has to make an almost visible effort to stop himself spitting in the face of a society that refers to *Oz* as the "underground" press, persuades half a government that the "Shrewsbury Two" are martyrs, and runs howling to the Bar Council and the correspondence columns of *The Times* when Sir Robert Mark says that there are crooked lawyers who are helping crime to flourish?

So what can we do with Solzhenitsyn? Well, if I may conclude with a modest proposal, I suggest that the West, when he has provoked it a little further, should, possibly under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly, formally condemn him to death, and execute him either by obliging him to drink hemlock, or by crucifixion. After all, the two most noted figures in history who respectively experienced those fates were condemned, whatever the ideological niceties involved, principally because they told their own societies truths that made those societies uncomfortable, and since our own society is even more averse to discomfort than those were, it seems only fitting that the man who is, *mutatis mutandis*, doing much the same thing to us should suffer a like fate. Meanwhile, at any rate, I can look at the hand that shook the hand of the man who shook the world, and, if he will allow me, say: "Alexander Isayevitch, do not despair just yet. We understand."

WASHINGTON POST
12 MAR 1976

Bernard Nossiter

'Alexander Solzhenitsyn Has Warned Us . . .'

LONDON — Alexander Solzhenitsyn spent 40 minutes on the BBC the other night describing with passion the imminent collapse of the West and the forthcoming triumph of Soviet tyranny.

It was a powerful performance and had an astonishing impact on the supposedly phlegmatic British, at least those who write and speak.

D. Bernard Hadley wrote from Twyford, Reading, Berkshire to The Times of London:

"How small our national leaders look before the towering figure of Solzhenitsyn . . . I was moved . . . as I have never been moved by any living politician or philosopher."

The Guardian's television critic, the normaly caustic Nancy Banks-Smith wrote:

"He talked like an angel. You could hear the great whoosh of wings that makes great orators seem to hover a foot or two off the floor."

Lord George Brown, once the No. 2 man in the Labor Party, resigned from his party after 45 years, declaring he was shattered by Solzhenitsyn's message that Western leaders had failed in their responsibility to freedom. (Brown's effect was dampened a bit by a familiar weakness; his television interview was a shambles and photographers caught him stumbling in the gutter.)

Nevertheless, the force of Solzhenitsyn's words were undeniable. Almost every national paper wrote a reverential editorial and pundits of all political stripe joined in the chorus of near-unanimous praise.

The exiled novelist's theme was familiar but lost no drama because of that.

"The West has become much weaker in relation to the East. The West has made so many concessions that now a repetition of the angry campaign which got me out of prison is practically impossible . . . over the last two years, terrible things have happened. The West has given up not only four, five or six countries, the West has given everything away so impetuously, has done so much to strengthen the tyranny in our country . . ."

"The speed of your capitulation has so rapidly overtaken the pace of our moral regeneration (that) the question is not how the Soviet Union will find a way out of totalitarianism, but how the West will be able to avoid the same fate."

All this was so potent that Lynda Lee-Potter, who usually writes on

Mr. Nossiter is the London correspondent for The Post.

mothers-in-law and similar problems in the Daily Mail, devoted her column to declaring solemnly:

"Alexander Solzhenitsyn has warned us . . . we are truly threatened by totalitarianism."

Bernard Levin, The Times of London columnist, insisted that the Russian was so transcendentally right, society had better administer hemlock to him as the Athenians did to Socrates. Levin also compared the novelist to Martin Luther, the Norse god Thor and Dostoyevsky.

In the Observer, Michael Davie topped this. He likened Solzhenitsyn to Charlton Heston playing Moses, the Marquess of Salisbury and the Julia Cameron portrait of Alfred Lord Tennyson.

All this in the land of understatement.

The episode probably says more about the state of Britain, or at least its literate middle class, than it does about the West. Despite a shrinking inflation, those who write feel sharply diminished in income and morale. An uncongenial Labor government is seen as the tool of a crass trades union movement held in thrall to Moscow. Prophets of gloom like Solzhenitsyn light up this apocalyptic mood.

By the end of the week, however, another perspective began to edge into the public discussion.

Peter Jenkins, the Guardian columnist, was openly saying that Solzhenitsyn is an impressive figure but a dubious political guide. Angola may now be a Soviet satellite, but can this compare with the striking Western gains in influence all through the Middle East? Jenkins might have added the equally important Soviet defeats in Portugal and within the Communist parties of Spain, France and Italy.

Perhaps the best-balanced appreciation came from Richard A. Peace of the Department of Russian Studies at Hull University. He wrote the Times:

"Solzhenitsyn is a courageous and noble figure (who) falls into a well-established pattern: the Russian intellectual caught in the inverted trap of an excessive veneration for the West which has turned into strong criticism. In the 19th century we have seen this in Herzen, in Dostoyevsky, in Mikhavlovsky and others. In fact, it is an old story and the strong apocalyptic note is always present."

"In spite of Solzhenitsyn's championship of the freedom and pluralism of the West it is precisely these aspects which defeat him. The West is not monolithic: its variety of institutions and cultural attitudes is easily interpreted by the Russian mind as anarch, and there is a love of order and discipline in Solzhenitsyn."

Jenkins makes a similar point, although whether it will rally the shattered middle class here is another question. The Guardian columnist wrote:

"Solzhenitsyn is unduly gloomy about the state of the West . . . He underestimates the resilience of the Western democracies as they come through the worst socio-economic crisis since the thirties. 'My warnings,' he laments, 'go unheeded.' That is not true either. His prophetic warnings, with the impact of their totality, have been in no small measure translated into the pluralistic polities of Western societies."

LONDON OBSERVER
7 March 1976

Why the prophet was wrong

by EDWARD CRANKSHAW

I HESITATE to take issue with one of the outstandingly great men of the age, a writer of genius, tremendous in vision, heroic in spirit, unimaginably enduring. It is impossible to be in his company without being all but overwhelmed by a sense of his superiority, to use a term now (to our loss) out of fashion. This does not make him infallible.

Very well, Solzhenitsyn is superior. Besides being a hero and a genius, he is also a prophet. Prophets, when they bring the sort of credentials Solzhenitsyn carries with him, must be listened to. They are too often right, in the spirit if not in the letter. But they are not necessarily the best people to go to for a cure. The improvement of society calls, as we all rather drearily know, for the arts of the possible, and it is the very soul of a prophet to have no truck with the possible, and to fix himself on the ideal.

Of course, Solzhenitsyn is right about many things. He is right about the present demoralisation of the West, above all of this country and America, in their different ways. He is right about the military might and the malign hostility of Russia. But I think the conclusions he draws from both perceptions are, in important particulars, wrong.

There is no need for me to go on about the West. At the moment we are pretty far gone. I could fill this page with a catalogue of last week's public ineptitudes, sillinesses, hypocrisies, funks, muddles, greedinesses and betrayals. *So, now, could almost everybody else.* And this it seems to me is critical. More and more of us are feeling ashamed and resolving to do better. For the West changes. It changes constantly. Time and time again in this country, or altogether, we seem to be on the edge of final ruin, and time and time again we pull back. This present moral collapse is so radical and universal that it surely must presage some very great change, unless the whole development of Western history has broken off. We shall emerge, battered, but at least partly purged, on the approaches to a new sort of society. I think the change is taking place even as Solzhenitsyn speaks. And parts of his speech will accelerate the process by making us look more closely at ourselves.

Change of this kind is alien to a Russian. Russia, when it is not engaged in blowing itself up, changes with such glacial slowness that it is hard for any Russian to grasp our chronic condition of instability and flux. Nor does Solzhenitsyn really like the West. He thinks he is disliking the shabbier, tawdrier aspects of it—drug culture, porn shops, a Parliament, guardian of our liberties, that listens with respect to Mr Michael Foot. He thinks that what most of us regard as a passing phase of unusual squalor is permanent and irreversible decline.

But I believe that, with so many of his countrymen now and in the past, he does not like our basic ways. He says he used to worship the West, and seems to think it has only recently betrayed itself. But he would have felt the same, coming from Russia, at any time in centuries past. Alexander Herzen in the 1830s also worshipped the West, and was sustained in adversity by his faith. When he came here he was filled with immediate revulsion and spat in our faces. What he had worshipped was not the West, but his image of it. So it is, I believe, with Solzhenitsyn.

Deeply imbued with the quasi-religious, quasi-mystical tradition of Russian patriotism, he is not democratic by nature and cannot really understand how any society can allow the inferior to obstruct the improving activities of the superior. The way we go on seems to him anarchy, not freedom. Contrast him with his friend and admirer,

that other hero, Sakharov, who is so remarkably free from Russian preconceptions. He could write from the pit: 'Only in democratic conditions can a people develop a character fitted for sensible existence in an ever more complicated world.'

This may prove to be impossible even in democratic conditions, but certainly character of the kind required cannot be developed in any other way—only corrupt servility. So many excellent nineteenth-century Russians steadfastly opposed the very idea of a representative assembly because, they said, the people were not ready to participate in government. How were they supposed ever to learn without practice? They were given no practice—and we know what happened.

The high and the mighty

It was ironic that on the day when Solzhenitsyn in London was urging us to contemplate the invincible might of Russia, the terrible power of the official ideology and the growing hold of the Government over the people, Messrs Brezhnev and Kosygin and the assembled high and mighty of the Soviet Union were beating their chests and droning on about the very same thing, in what turned out to be a very changeless way indeed, on the occasion of their 25th Party Congress in Moscow.

I do not believe in the Soviet Union as a dynamic Power. Patient readers of this paper over the last 30 years will know that I have never believed in it, and why. Certainly Angola has not made me change my mind. Anybody reading the total output of speeches at this Party Congress (or any preceding one) would, I am sure, feel the same. They are the speeches of men without vision or real drive, even the drive or vision of conquest. They are frightened men, greedy for power, desperate for security.

They preside over a deliberately crippled country, vaster and richer in resources than any other in the world, which still cannot feed itself after 60 years of the new regime, which still finds itself unable to maintain what it considers to be an appropriate military establishment as well as a decent standard of living, a country in which initiative and independence of mind, though not erased at sight as under Stalin, are still officially discouraged and kept down by a monstrous police force. Men without an idea in their heads, other than parrot cries from Lenin and deep cunning in ways and means of clinging to power, they hang like a blight over a richly gifted people who are not allowed to think.

Solzhenitsyn, it seems to me (and in this sense Sakharov has also spoken very commandingly), thinks far too much in terms of Marxist ideology as the key to Russian actions, far too little in terms of conventional but extremely cautious imperialism. He also says that the Soviet military establishment is now such that the Politburo cannot avoid war even if it wants to. He says that the nuclear deterrent of the West is unimportant. Why should Soviet Russia need nuclear war to conquer you, he asks. It can take you with its bare hands.

I wonder.... Why then does the Soviet Union spend all its riches to the point of exhausting its people, on 'the nuclear deterrent'? Why, if it wants to, doesn't Russia take us with its bare hands instead of spending the substance of its people on making expensive trouble in the Middle East and elsewhere? What does Solzhenitsyn's statement mean? That Russia will overrun first Europe, then America, and colonise us? How? What for? Russia can do very little with its bare hands when it cannot tell for certain that America will not counter intolerable aggression with the atom bomb. Russia can never be sure that this won't happen. And if it comes to bare hand against bare hand, where does Russia stand against China? A little reflection indicates that the last thing Russia can want at the moment is the collapse of the West, for obvious reasons. This remains true even if we deserve to collapse.

Angola has come at a critical moment in African history. Russia, after centuries of trying, has at last, a hundred years too late, broken out into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and is feeling its oats. After the shock and humiliation of its Cuban defeat (far deeper than most of us here realise) Russia is getting its own delicious revenge in Africa—though doubtless rather wryly asking (the more sensible ones among the Politburo) how much this luxury is going to cost.

Adventurers in Moscow

We have to remember that Mr Brezhnev is in fact what he looks—three-quarters of a century behind the times. It will take some years for the intoxication of free naval movement to wear off. In Russian eyes it stands for that long-deserved, long-denied parity with the Great Powers of the West. Of course there are voices in Moscow urging adventurism: there were always such voices under the Tsars. Traditionally, the voices of caution, pulling the other way, usually won. It is possible that the adventurists will overreach themselves and go a little too far. But unlikely. Provided the West does not continue to appear too naked and too uncertain for too long.

Meanwhile, if Solzhenitsyn helps the Americans to get over their Vietnam guilt and come to life again, that will be good. If he could, improbably, persuade Britain to make at least a show of the will to defend itself, that would be good. If he can make us all stop chattering about détente, that will be excellent. But already, even as he was speaking, President Ford was announcing the burial of that idiotic and deceptive word. (This is an example of what I mean by change.) But it will not be good if he encourages the adventurists and the panic-mongers on our side to embark on further Vietnams.

With intermittent lunacies, we have managed to keep our heads for the 30 years since the war. We have lost them lately. But it is about time that we came back to our senses. This sort of thing happens quite often. Meanwhile, Russia appears always the same, but it is indeed slowly changing. We should forego quick profits for businessmen, or even our own treasuries, if this is necessary to keep up the pressure for change. Change must come, however slowly. It is impossible even for Russians to continue for ever under the sort of leadership exhibited at this last Congress. Sooner or later younger men will come up who are sufficiently detached from the past to modify present rigidities.

It is possible, indeed, that among the new names now coming forward there may be some of these. May Solzhenitsyn live to see the beginning of this change. I hope and believe that this splendid figure will have the satisfaction of seeing himself proved as wrong in his political diagnosis as he is unerring in matters of the spirit.

SUNDAY TIMES, London
7 March 1976

Solzhenitsyn heroine at work

By William Shawcross and Reuben Ainsztein

LAST Monday, Alexander Solzhenitsyn accused the western Press of playing down the importance of dissidents in the Soviet Union, and in particular of ignoring the case of Malva Landa. She is one of thousands of people whose courage allows the Russian human rights movement to exist, and through her we have news of the deteriorating condition of a Londoner who has been imprisoned in the USSR since 1967 and is now in poor health.

Malva Landa, a 57-year-old geologist, lives in Krasnagorsk, 10 miles beyond the Moscow suburbs. She started working for the human rights movement in 1970, and has had several articles and essays published in the movement's samizdat (underground) Chronicle of Current Events.

She was arrested in 1971. "The examining magistrate then told me that a criminal case had been instituted against me at the Moscow City Court. At my interrogation I was aked whether I was receiving psychiatric treatment. I replied that I was not in need of it."

Other Russians have been locked into mental hospitals for less; Malva Landa was lucky and was freed. She has since written frequently for the Chronicle and campaigned for prisoners. Last summer she took up the case of Nicolai Budulak Scharygin, who was born in the Ukraine but made his home in London after the war. In 1967, when he had requested but not received British citizenship, he was arrested in Moscow while on a business trip. He was sentenced to 10 years for betraying his country—because he had been a forced labourer in a German camp during the war.

He was sent first to Mordovia prison camp and then, as punishment for protesting, to Vladimir prison, one of the harshest in the USSR. His wife says the British Government has washed its hands of him: the Foreign Office replies there is not much it can do because he is a stateless person. His only friend seems to be Malva Landa.

She often writes to political prisoners and sends them postcards "so that the dark conditions in which they live can be brightened up a little." Last summer she wrote to Scharygin and in September received a reply. He said poor food rations and the lack of exercise had severely strained his heart, and last spring he was told he could move to the prison hospital. He declined because conditions there are even worse than in the hospital.

Scharygin wrote: "I have fallen ill and although I trust the saying that a strong spirit can save a weak body I find it hard to collect my thoughts. My fingers will not hold the pen. I simply do not know how to express on paper my gratitude and joy for your letter. Regretfully I cannot promise to answer you frequently. But we do not forget and shall never forget those who write to us, those who sympathise with us and remember us."

For sympathising and remembering, and for distributing the Chronicle (which she regards as a duty), Malva Landa was briefly detained last December. "Under the very eyes of passers-by, they shoved her into a car and took her to prison" said Solzhenitsyn. After Solzenitsyn's interview we telephoned Andrei Sakharov, the dissident physicist; despite KGB interruptions he confirmed she was now free. She has been given two chances, and will no doubt risk the third. She hopes to see the British public exerting pressure on behalf of Nicolai Scharygin "who has not committed any crime. In order to save his life no time must be wasted."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 7, 1976

Gloomsayer or Doomsayer?

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—One astonishing aspect of the Soviet system is the way it turns against itself so many of its brilliant members by seeking to fetter their minds and punish their hearts. One has but to think of the musician Rostropovich or the scientist Sakharov to see how much the U.S.S.R. is consequently deprived.

Outstanding among men of genius who have suffered is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. After years in concentration camps and prisons, he survived by enormous courage and durability—and was deported. He now lives in Europe and never ceases to write and speak for human liberty and against the dictatorship he considers Marxism's inevitable concomitant.

He insisted in a lengthy conversation that it is Karl Marx's doctrine as applied by Lenin's strategy which combined to produce existing Soviet society; there is not the faintest heritage of earlier Russian autocracy involved.

He urges the West to recognize this and erase any assumption that, since its own past was non-Russian, it can escape totalitarianism if its own brand of Communism takes over.

Solzhenitsyn says Lenin spent years in Europe preparing his revolutionary actions purely on the basis of Marxism and unaffected by Russia's own history. He adds: "What the Soviets produced is entirely due to Marx and Lenin. Bolshevism had conceived every one of its doctrinal decisions before the revolution."

The famous author stresses this because, much as he detests the Soviet system which made him suffer, he is proud of his "Russianism." He contends Lenin was "infiltrated" into Russia by the Germans, who provided him with ample funds, and started off by promising civic rights, free press, peasant ownership of land, workers' control of industry and, above all, a prompt peace with the Kaiser's Germany.

But, he says, Lenin applied the iron fist of his Bolshevik Party to start violating all these pledges as soon as he gained power by halting the war. Workers were placed under disciplined party control, their factories taken over by the state. Peasants only theoretically held their land from the start because its production was "grabbed by the state." In 1922 even fictional ownership ended.

The revolution banned non-Bolshevik publications and parties, established a massive secret police plus concentration camps, and finally installed total, absolute dictatorship. He argues there was never a chance of any other result: "Communism developed from the original philosophy of Marx. It was inevitable that it should develop in the direction it took. Leninism is Marxism's logical

Solzhenitsyn is a unyielding anti-Marxist. The great suffering he experienced—and witnessed—turned this wartime combat officer and creative genius into an ardent champion. And he warns the West to make no mistake about the truth, as revealed to him; not to be deceived by catchwords.

He complains that the Helsinki accord merely weakened Western support of dissident opinion in the U.S.S.R.; that not even the concept of *embourgeoisement* could occur to any Soviet citizen.

He would never recommend curbing food exports to the Soviets "because that is a humane question." Yet, "if Moscow gets nice gift packages of African and Asian countries, that certainly doesn't fill people's stomachs. If a state is unable to feed its own people and at the same time manages to capture outpost after outpost abroad, the problem isn't being solved. The U.S.S.R. has not had to give up an inch of territory it controls, and wages ideological war remorselessly during the so-called détente, which is a one-sided capitulation by the West." He condemns eastward sales of advanced technology, recalling Lenin's quip that the capitalist nations would compete to sell Moscow rope to hang them with. "When the Soviets intend to bury you," he asks, "why send them excavators?"

When I remarked that the ultimate conclusion of his viewpoint seemed global war, he insisted: "It is moral determination that counts. Don't forget I was released from prison largely because of Western firmness. Moscow retreated before this moral toughness, not military threats. But such resolution seems to have disappeared. Moscow is justifiably convinced the West has lost its will.

"I suspect that at its closed meetings Soviet leaders simply laugh at what's going on and wonder what new kind of rope the West is getting ready to sell. All that is needed is for the Soviet radio to announce the moment has come to liberate the world from the aggressive powers of the West. This is what détente means."

Western Europe

TIME, MARCH 15, 1976

Red Star over Europe: Threat or Chimera?

Communism has sometimes succeeded as a scavenger, but never as a leader. It has never come to power in any country that was not disrupted by war, internal repression or both.
—John F. Kennedy, July 2, 1963

It is doubtful that an American President could confidently make that kind of statement today. In a handful of European countries, Communist parties are approaching the threshold of political power—not at the barrel of a Soviet cannon but in open and free elections. As a result, the specter of a Communist presence in Western Europe is stirring more concern and debate than at any time since the early years of the cold war, when the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Atlantic Alliance blocked Moscow's attempts to suborn democracy in France, Italy and Germany. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger broods about this new Red menace in background talks with newsmen and in conferences with aides and U.S. ambassadors, at which he has called the Communists the Trojan horses of totalitarianism and NATO officials meet secretly to discuss the Communist threat. The focus of the debate: How dangerous would it be if the Communists came to power and what should and could be done to prevent it.

The country most likely to vote Communists into office is Italy. Such an occurrence would greatly encourage the French Communists, who for almost four years have been closely allied with the Socialists. In Portugal, the Communists have been in the government since the 1974 coup, and Spain's Communists (though still underground) have formed a coalition with left and center groups.

The Communist gains are, to some extent, the result of local conditions. In Italy, for example, there is dissatisfaction with the flabby, scandal-ridden 30-year dominance of the Christian Democrats. Western Europe's Communist parties, though, have also benefited from the policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Just as the Russians are now said to be less threatening to peace, local Communists—who were long suspected by many voters because of their tie-in with the Kremlin—similarly seem less dangerous. Moreover, a new generation in the West is too young to remember the militantly Stalinist attitudes and often violent actions of Communist parties in both Western and Eastern Europe in the post–World War II years.

The Communists have deliberately tried to make themselves appealing to a wider spectrum of voters. The Italian and French parties have explicitly disavowed the old Marxian dogma of a dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the need for violent revolution. Instead, they claim to be committed to such democratic principles as political pluralism and freedom of speech and religion. Italian Party Boss Enrico Berlinguer—perhaps Western Europe's most articulate advocate of "socialism with a human face"—has often proclaimed his commitment to "a pluralistic and democratic system." He most recently and dramatically reaffirmed this in Moscow, at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Is the "new look" of Communism genuine? Some political observers think it could be and argue that bringing Communists into Western governments might speed their conversion from revolutionary, potentially disruptive outsiders to evolutionary insiders. It might also widen the gap between the local parties and Moscow. The Soviets, in fact, do not conceal their irritation with the independence shown by some of their Western comrades. Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev recently complained that "some have begun to interpret [proletarian internationalism] in such a way that little is left to internationalism."

Some political analysts have argued that the Communist parties would allow themselves to be voted out of office if and when the electorate rejected their programs. According to this argument, the Communists in Europe have clung to power illegally only when the Soviet army was at the border, ready to enforce a coup with armed might. But there is always the possibility that a Communist government in Western Europe might not need Russian help if it had firm control of the country's police and internal security forces and key segments of the armed forces.

The strongest argument in favor of allowing Communists to participate in Western governments is that neither the U.S. nor any other country has the right to block from office a party freely elected by the voters. This argument would have more validity if the Communists differed from other leftist parties merely in their programs. Yet history advises skepticism where Communists are concerned. Unlike Socialists, they have not sought the democratic evolution of a Marxian society; instead, until very recently they have always stressed the radical transformation of a society by authoritarian means.

For all their talk about democracy, the Communist parties themselves are closed and often conspiratorial societies. The Italian party, widely regarded as the paradigm of humanistic Communism, does not permit dissent to grow within the ranks. Decisions are imposed from above, and a political control commission enforces the orthodoxy of the moment. French Party Leader Georges Marchais has stated his belief in a democratic multiparty political system. Exactly what he has in mind, however, may not be reassuring; in 1974, for example, a French party congress praised the "democratic achievements" of the near-totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe. No wonder Harvard Sovietologist Adam Ulam concludes: "Communist parties have always tried to maximize their power to the point where they would eventually achieve a one-party state." If progressive party leaders like Berlinguer are sincere, they still may not be able to deliver on their promises that their parties would observe the rules of democracy. Irving Howe, editor of the socialist quarterly *Dissent*, warns that in a moment of crisis "the old Stalinists and younger neo-Stalinists . . . could become a serious force pressing for an authoritarian 'solution.' "

The coming of Communists to power in Western Europe would have serious consequences for the Atlantic Alliance. If they do not force their countries to quit NATO, the Communists would probably fashion a foreign policy that favored the Soviet Union and undermined the alliance. To be sure, Western Europe's Communists are no longer under the Kremlin's thumb as they were in Stalin's days, but even Italy's Berlinguer, one of the West's most independent Communists, has repeatedly emphasized his party's historical "unbreakable ties of solidarity with Soviet Russia." Thus there is at least some danger that a Communist Cabinet member, for example, might take orders from Moscow and deliver up NATO secrets. A more likely prospect is that the presence of Communist party members in a NATO government would result in their country being kicked out of the alliance. There is no guarantee, moreover, that a Western Communist party currently independent of Moscow will always remain so. A change in leadership could push that party—and the country it ruled—into the Soviet orbit.

If Communist ministers did not take direct orders from Moscow or deliberately try to undermine NATO, they nonetheless would probably be unsympathetic to the alliance and would try to slash defense budgets even in the face of mounting threats of a Soviet buildup. In the long run, this could affect the East-West military balance upon which coexistence rests. The disparity of military might between the democracies and the East bloc might then lead to the "Finlandization" of Western Europe, producing a kind of neutrality that would be responsive to pressure from Moscow. In addition, the gains of Communism within the ever shrinking community of democratic nations would represent an ideological setback for the West.

A weakened NATO and a less credible American defense commitment to the alliance might prompt Bonn to reassess its security needs. One possible result: a more heavily rearmed West Germany, perhaps even with a nuclear deterrent. This would unsettle all of Germany's neighbors and might re-create the tensions that twice in this century

sparked a general war. Short of this "worst case" scenario, the strategic balance still would probably shift decisively toward Moscow, since the Soviets could start drawing —undoubtedly, at favorable terms —on Western Europe's advanced technology and industry.

A strong case can be made that there are unacceptable risks to the West in allowing the Communists to come to power. But what, if anything, can be done about it? Washington has been pursuing a kind of quarantine policy, to deny the Communists any claim to legitimacy; American diplomats in Europe maintain only minimal contact with local Communist politicians. Current U.S. policy seems to be that the most hard-lining ruling Communist parties represent the least threat to the strategic balance. At a closed-door meeting in London last December, a top Kissinger aide told European-based U.S. ambassadors that "overzealous" attempts to woo the East bloc countries away from Moscow might be counterproductive. The reason: pluralistic ferment there, like the 1968 Alexander Dubček experiment in Czechoslovakia, could lend respectability to Communists in the West.

■

Washington could provide sizable economic aid to European countries with growing Communist movements, to bolster existing regimes and help create strong economies that would lessen the Communists' appeal. Beyond this, however, there seems little the U.S. can do. Military intervention is out of the question so long as the Communists act legally. Any excessively muscular U.S. action runs the risk of a backlash, arousing popular sympathy for the Communists, because they would appear to be bullied by the Americans.

Action by Common Market states might be far more effective. Christoph Bertram, director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, suggests that tough political conditions could be attached to continued EEC support for the Italian economy—with an understanding that the present government, which excludes the Communists, stay in office until the next elections. Because of the vital importance of the Common Market to Italy's future, Bertram feels the impact of such conditions would be much more effective than any U.S. threats to read Italy out of NATO. Bertram's policy might also be applied to Greece and Spain, both of which hope eventually to gain full membership in the Market.

Beyond that, the established socialist parties of northern Europe could provide moral and financial help for their relatively weak ideological allies in the south—as they have, to some extent, with Mário Soares' Portuguese Socialists. Above all, the ruling non-Communist parties could and should undertake internal reforms to become more appealing to the millions who vote Communist not because of ideology but as protest. These moderates must again demonstrate—as they did after World War II—that they are capable of responding to the aspirations of dissatisfied voters.

If diplomatic, political and economic measures failed to keep Communists out of a Western government, the U.S., and the rest of the West, could isolate that country by cutting off all but minimal economic and diplomatic relations. This, however, might lead to the kind of chaos that would justify the Communists in taking strong authoritarian measures.

A more advisable policy, at least initially, would be one of vigilant tolerance. Risky though it may be, the major Western countries should perhaps not interfere with Communist participation in Western Cabinets, if it comes, but instead give the party a chance to prove that its democratic protestations are genuine. At the same time, however, the West should make it unmistakably clear to the Communist party involved, and to Moscow as well, that any move to establish an authoritarian or pro-Soviet regime would not be tolerated. Appropriately tough action would then follow.

Burton Pines

WASHINGTON POST
7 MAR 1976

French Communists Create Stir

By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, March 6—The French Communist Party's declaration of independence from Moscow has boosted its standing in public opinion polls at home, spurred sharp reactions from both Washington and the Kremlin, and given rise to at least one insightful political joke.

The major step in the French party's accelerating campaign to establish a new image as a nationalist force independent of Moscow has has to be seized and wielded by "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

According to a current joke, wages and working conditions have improved so much in modern France that the exploited working class -- the proletariat consists largely of Algerians, Portuguese and women. "Even as a Communist," goes the punchline, "would you want to be ruled by a dictatorship of Algerians, Portuguese and women?"

Underlying this jest is the reality that the once-Stalinist French Communist Party has decided that it has to broaden its appeal to survive in a more affluent France where foreign workers have taken over many of the menial jobs.

Communist Party figures show that only 32 per cent of its 500,000 members are laborers. White-collar workers account for 29 per cent of the membership and teachers, engineers and civil servants hold a quarter of the total membership. Only 3 per cent of the members are peasant farmers.

French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais has underscored his decision to follow the lead of the independent-minded Italian Communist Party by criticizing the Soviet Union in recent weeks on labor camps and the internment of political dissidents in mental asylums and by staying away from this month's Soviet Communist Party congress in Moscow.

This has angered the Soviets, who see Marchais as an opportunist seeking domestic political gain by attacking them and thereby seriously weakening the international Communist movement, according to well-informed Communist bloc sources, who leave no doubt that the split between the Kremlin and Marchais is genuine.

Washington has also been disturbed by the new French Communist "opening to democracy," but for the opposite reason.

While the Kremlin fears it could be genuine, the United States has been warning Western Europeans that the changes made by the French and Italian Communist parties are superficial tactical moves in a continuing bid for power.

The French party has not significantly changed its foreign policy. It still stands against bringing France back into NATO and is against the Common Market. Marchais is now echoing the Italians, however, in calling for the disbanding of NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the same time.

Gen. Alexander Haig, now the NATO commander-in-chief and once Richard M. Nixon's chief of staff at the White House, made the new American concern explicit in a speech two weeks ago to a study group in Munich.

As disturbed as the United States was about the growing strength of the Communists in poor southern European countries like Italy and Portugal, it would react even more negatively to the prospect of Communists participating in the government of the industrialized countries of northern Europe, Haig indicated.

Like it or not, the attrac-

tiveness of the Marxist system has grown over the past decade among the people of the Western world — [the problem] is far more sophisticated and far more consequential in terms of Western industrialized society per se . . . death can be as fatal from within as from across existing borders," Haig said in part.

The French Communist Party polled 21 per cent of the vote in National Assembly elections in 1973. It has gained four to five percentage points in opinion polls since the beginning of the year.

This new strength is deeply troubling the government of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and France's Socialist Party, which is in nominal national alliance with the Communists but which still strongly distrusts them.

"At this point, the important thing is not whether the change is genuine or tactical," one of Giscard's advisers observed this week. "In a party dominated by ideology and language, the change in words has to have an important effect in itself, whatever Mr. Marchais may intend."

Like Haig, Giscard's advisers seem to be concerned that the continuing economic recession and high unemployment figures in Europe and a general lack of confidence in Western leadership will produce a swing to the left. The Communists are evidently making the same diagnosis.

There are about 1,000 Communist mayors in France's 36,000 municipalities. The Communists hope to translate their new standing in the public opinion polls into an increase of their representation in cantonal elections that begin Sunday. Since the regional offices are largely honorific and the races are usually decided on local issues and personalities. The elections can hold national significance only in a psychological sense.

The Communists are also launching a longer-term public relations campaign to sell their new liberal image to French voters. They are printing and distributing a million copies of the report on their party conference last month and Marchais has been pushing the new line in television and radio interviews.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 6, 1976

Giscard: II — European

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS

FRANCE makes no secret of the fact that it is seriously concerned about a growing appearance of paralysis in United States foreign policy, as recently displayed in Africa and even Europe. This is not a matter of conflict between Paris and Washington, only of preoccupation here.

Certainly in the Elysée Palace, there is reluctance to discuss this delicate subject. Yet the mere fact that its existence is known not only to diplomats but also to leaders of other European states, above all West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who reviewed it last month in a meeting with President Giscard d'Estaing, makes the matter moot.

Even Mr. Giscard d'Estaing is said by his friends to feel it is wrong for Washington to advertise so openly its inability—for reasons of internal political debate—to react to threats abroad. At the highest level this is considered very serious. It should not be forgotten that the French Government, since de Gaulle, has consistently endorsed strong executive authority, which it now finds lacking across the Atlantic.

While France feels that its own policy during the Angolan crisis was logical and ultimately led Paris to take an initiative in recognizing the Popular Movement's Government once it had clearly won, the French point out there was little chance of an alternative because of U.S. flabbiness.

Had the United States given explicit indication that it would counterbalance any external intrusion in the contested area—like that of Cuban troops and Soviet equipment; or had it threatened to break off key negotiations with Moscow unless a halt was called, it is felt the result might have been less immutable. The course of Russian intervention could have been changed. But the necessary opposition never occurred.

This is a realistic nation and it would seem that Giscard has decided on two basic courses of action. To start with, he appears to feel that the European Community must make a greater defensive effort because of the apparent irresolution and political weakness of its superpower partner.

There are only two countries in West Europe that can seriously attempt this, France and Germany. Britain is again reducing its military budget. The other allies can make scant additional effort. Therefore, both Paris and Bonn agree to step up defense, with the West Germans working directly within the NATO setup, the French continuing tangentially.

Giscard apparently feels France should concentrate on two aspects of the problem. The small nuclear deterrent force should not be allowed to remain static but should be subjected to continuing technological improvement. And, over the next five years, France's conventional forces must be reorganized and strengthened.

It is often felt that General de Gaulle believed France should always work for international equilibrium and that while the United States was militarily much stronger than the Soviet Union, it was sensible to give Moscow more sympathy and support than might normally have been expected.

The Giscardien theory is complex. It insists that foreigners tend too often to analyze French policy in terms of past appearances. Each Paris Government pursues its own calculations. Anyway, it is clear today that Paris is less concerned with a precise world balance than a search for détente and the means of avoiding East-West confrontation.

One may add to this analysis that Giscard is not as convinced as some others that the world strategic balance has been upset. Rather than a military "reversal," perhaps there is only creation of overall equality, he feels; but that alone, meaning an end to previous U.S. advantages, makes it necessary for Europe to increase its effort. France never opted out of the Atlantic alliance although it did quit NATO's integrated "organization."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The greatest concern here now is not over the degree of shift in relative armed strength but in the political weakness of the West, both the United States and the European Community. America's paralysis is seen as political; Europe's as structural.

Paris can only hope the U.S. debilitation will be corrected after this year's Presidential election. But for Europe the Giscardien solution seems to be basic reform. This envisions initial creation of a de facto "directorate" of France, Germany and Britain to get things moving.

Then, ultimately, a formal directorate could be negotiated once a method has been worked out to convince the lesser E.E.C. nations. They must first realize they aren't going to be ignored and that their full participation is needed. In all events, a new sense of guidance and leadership is rendered urgent in this changing world.

Near East

BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1976

What the Americans Did to the Kurds

By LINDA FISH COMPTON

Publication of excerpts from the Pike Committee's report has raised serious questions about the American government's role in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy in Iraq.

After former President Nixon's visit with the Shah of Iran in 1972, a plan was endorsed to use the Kurds as pawns in a game of power politics to stir up trouble for Iraq, which was overly committed to the Soviet Union at the time. Millions of dollars were spent to equip the Kurds for a suicidal no-win war.

Who master-minded this cruel maneuver?

The men who made this clandestine agreement should have known better. If the Kurdish question were new, perhaps ignorance would be an excuse. But the Kurds have existed for centuries as a distinct, non-Arab ethnic group with its own culture and a large measure of freedom.

Their most famous ruler, Saladin, was known for courage and chivalry when he reconquered Jerusalem for Islam and defeated European crusaders in Palestine in the 12th century. Today most of the 10 million Kurds are orthodox Sunni Muslims.

After the fall of the Ottoman empire at the end of World War I, the Kurds hoped to establish a country of their own, as stipulated in the Treaty of Sevres.

Kurdistan never became a reality, and the rugged region was subsequently divided between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The Turks suppressed the Kurds' bid for self-determination and now call them "mountain Turks" in an effort to minimize the differences.

Iranian Kurds may feel more at home because their language and culture is related to Persian, but hopes of independence there were dashed years ago. In fact, a successful rebellion by the Iraqi Kurds would have been a threat to Iran's status quo, for Iran's Kurds expressed great sympathy for their kinsmen fighting in Iraq.

Iraq's 2½ million Kurds, continuing their struggle for autonomy were encouraged to fight a devastating war they were never meant to win, the Pike report says.

To supply the Kurds with captured Soviet arms that fit in with their arsenal, Israel was used as a conduit. Most material was routed overland via Iran.

When the Soviet Defense Minister, Andrei Grechko, tried to work out an agreement between the Ba'ath government of Iraq and the Kurds in 1974, the Kurds were advised by Iran and the U.S. to resist.

So they kept on fighting. This would not have happened without U.S. support. Although their leader, Gen. Mustafa Barzani, did not trust the Shah, he had faith in America and believed that it would guarantee Iran's pledge of support. Without U.S. backing the Kurds undoubtedly would have made a peaceful compromise with Iraq.

It seems evil that no one realized how difficult it would be to fulfill a commitment to those landlocked tribes if the Shah ever decided to close the borders and withdraw his support. Why was this cynical policy so willingly carried out?

Thousands of Kurds have died from bullets, bombs, hunger and cold. "We should have realized what was going on when no one provided adequate anti-aircraft weapons to shoot down planes which bombed our villages or antitank artillery to use on the plains," a Kurd explained. "An attack on the oil fields would have resulted in retaliatory raids against Iran's oil-producing area, so it was safer to confine us to the mountains." Radicals who disagreed with Barzani's alliance now say, "I told you so."

Apparently the Kurds were only supposed to be a thorn in Iraq's side. By March, 1975, enough pressure had been applied. Iraq was willing to negotiate a settlement with Iran.

This lessened Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union and opened the country to Western commerce. The border dispute between the two countries was also resolved. But at whose expense?

Right after the settlement, Iraqi forces launched a search-and-destroy operation, closing in on the Kurds, who suddenly found themselves abandoned by their allies.

Despite the fact that refugees were given asylum in Iran and a period of amnesty was granted by Iraq, the Kurds are worse off than before. Why, at the least, didn't the U.S. offer humanitarian aid?

The rebellious Kurds now suffer from inevitable recriminations and reprisals which follow in the wake of armed insurrection.

According to the Kurdistan Democratic Party, many uprooted families haven't been allowed to return to their villages, especially in the oil-rich areas like Kirkuk. Other Kurds have been moved to Arab-dominated provinces in the south, and it is claimed that approximately 25,000 Kurds who defected to join their people's *Pesh Merga* ("we who face death") forces are in prison camps.

The KDP also reported that Kurdish cultural institutions, newspapers, and educational facilities have lost former government support and that refugees returning from Iran are forbidden to join political parties or professional organizations through which they might seek redress.

Kurds who did not join the revolt have fared better, but the atmosphere is understandably more hostile for them as well.

The Iraqi government also has reason to be bitter, for the point of the deal was to weaken its regime. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers were killed.

Lives were needlessly lost on both sides, and the rifts between Arabs and Kurds were widened when they might otherwise have started to mend.

The State Department maintains that there are inaccuracies in the Pike report yet will not point them out. Why does our government remain inscrutably silent when it could make a disclosure of its own to account for these actions?

The Kurdish people have received a trauma, and so has the reputation of the United States. Kurds still believe in their cause, but trust in American commitments is gone.

Mrs. Compton teaches Middle East courses at the Johns Hopkins U[illegible]

TIME, MARCH 22, 1976 ARMAMENTS

A Deadly Race That No One Can Win

"We are grown men playing with dangerous toys." So said one veteran Israeli officer last week, referring to the race for arms in the Middle East, which is now outdistancing the search for peace. Hardly a week passes without the announcement of a new weapons deal somewhere in the region. Initially, the goal of the race was the replacement by Israel and the Arabs of weapons lost during the 1973 October War. But this seems to have triggered a cycle of action and reaction in which each side now strives to better the arsenal of the other. As a result, both sides are not only stronger than before the October War but are also acquiring some of the world's most sophisticated weaponry *(see chart)*. Thus they have raised the potential destructiveness of another Middle East war to chilling new heights.

The Arab arms buildup is particularly worrisome to Israel and its American Jewish supporters. With predictable grumbling from Jerusalem, the U.S. has sold arms to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states that played minor roles in the 1973 war. This month, though, Washington announced that it intends to sell six C-130 Hercules military transport planes to Egypt (total cost: $50 million). Fearing that this may merely foreshadow future large-scale arms shipments to the Egyptians, leaders of American Jewish organizations last week warned President Ford they were "strenuously opposed" to the deal, and that any further sales to Cairo might alienate Jewish voters. The Administration, which anticipated the "calculated outrage" of the Jewish community, argues that the sale helps Cairo preserve its independence from the Soviets. It also enables Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to demonstrate to his radical critics that his willingness to make some accommodation with Jerusalem can pay dividends. This is in Israel's interest as much as in America's.

Whether or not war breaks out, the participants—with the possible excep-

tion of Egypt—are better prepared than ever. Items:

ISRAEL now has more tanks, armored vehicles and long-range artillery than ever, most of it from the U.S. Next year the Israeli air force will take delivery of the first of 25 F-15 Eagles, the newest, fastest (top speed: Mach 2.5) and most agile U.S. fighter. Israel's other combat planes (principally F-4 Phantoms and the Israeli-designed Kfirs) are being outfitted with the latest electronic gadgets to aid in night flying missions and foil antiaircraft missiles. The Shrike air-to-surface missile has been deployed to knock out the radars on which antiaircraft batteries depend. In addition, Israel is receiving "smart" bombs, which can be guided onto targets. Still on Jerusalem's shopping list are American RPVs (remotely piloted vehicles), which can counter the Arabs' Russian-built SAMs by drawing antiaircraft fire. To bolster its ground forces, Jerusalem is acquiring the TOW antitank missiles, the Cobra helicopter gunship and the most lethal version of the M-60 tank.

SYRIA has replaced and upgraded all the equipment it lost in 1973, thanks to the Soviet Union. Damascus has received hundreds of top-of-the-line T-62 battle tanks, 45 MIG-23 fighter-bombers, unpiloted drone planes and hundreds of antiaircraft missiles. Its 50 Scud surface-to-surface missiles can reach virtually all of Israel's populated areas. To enable Damascus to operate properly all its new, ultrasophisticated military hardware, there are now more than 2,000 Soviet advisers with the Syrian armed forces, while Cubans serve in Syrian tanks and North Koreans and Pakistanis fly some of the MIGs.

JORDAN, which committed only two brigades to the 1973 war and suffered small losses, will get 14 Hawk antiaircraft batteries from the U.S. in 1977. It has also obtained 42 secondhand American-made F-5A jet fighters from Iran and 36 of the newest version of that plane—the F-5E—from Washington. In addition, Amman is busily improving its vintage M-48 Patton tanks by installing diesel engines and more powerful guns.

EGYPT is perhaps the only Middle East nation that has not fully replenished its arsenal since 1973. Reason: the chilly Cairo-Moscow relations led to a near cessation of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union. With cash provided by Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states, President Anwar Sadat has been turning to Western sources of supply: to France for as many as 150 Mirage 5 fighter jets, Britain for up to 80 Jaguar fighter-bombers and 20 Westland Lynx helicopters, and Italy for electronic equipment. With French and British help, Egypt soon hopes to start constructing its own arms-manufacturing plants. If Congress approves the sale of the C-130s to Cairo, it is likely that Washington will then offer Egypt a range of such combat support items as communication equipment and mine detectors.

Middle East states not on the front line in the Arab-Israeli dispute have also expanded their arsenals. Saudi Arabia has bought 300 tanks from the U.S. and Britain, and has an additional 500 on order; it will also soon receive 128 fighter jets from the U.S. and France. Iraq is beefing up its arsenal with orders to the Soviets for 40 MIG-23s, in addition to the 30 they already have. Libya last year signed a $2 billion arms deal with the Soviets that includes 24 MIG-23s, 1,100 tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers and 50 batteries of antiaircraft missiles. Since these enormous quantities are well beyond Libya's defense needs, Israeli officials view them as a kind of "Arab weapons-supply depot" accessible to any nation willing to fight Israel. The huge Saudi and Iraqi arsenals could be put to the same use. Compounding Jerusalem's worries about the Arab arms buildup was the creation last year of a joint Syrian-Jordanian military command on Israel's eastern front.



Although the arms balance is heavily stacked numerically in favor of the Arab states, most Western experts still feel that Israel could defeat any combination of its enemies' forces. What gives the Israelis this edge is their superiority in such areas as targeting missiles, electronic countermeasures, helicopter support and the ability to mobilize rapidly 400,000 superbly trained reserves. Israeli military officials agree with this assessment, but they also fear that by 1980 the sheer quantity of the Arabs' arms could cancel Israel's advantage. Privately, some Israeli politicians warn that if the military balance tips against them, they may have no alternative but to develop a nuclear strike force, for which they already possess the materials and technical capability.

Even if that did not happen, another war in the next year or so would be far more costly to both sides than the last one. For Israel alone, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, the next round, if it involved the same combination of states that fought in 1973, might leave 8,000 Israelis dead and 36,000 wounded, compared with 2,527 killed and 6,027 wounded during the October War. Using the same ratio, Arab losses could soar from 22,000 dead in 1973 to 72,000; the number of wounded could increase from 54,000 to 325,000.

BALTIMORE SUN
21 Feb. 1976

You Can't Buy Friendship

Washington's decision to cut off development-aid talks with India will hardly induce Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to be more circumspect about her charges that the CIA is plotting against her government. The CIA's track record elsewhere makes it a handy rhetorical tool for a Prime Minister much in need of reasons to offer for dismantling her country's freedoms. A dictator could hardly have bought such a public relations theme at any price, and Mrs. Gandhi is unlikely to trade it for a $75-million-a-year development program. She is more likely to flaunt the all-too-public American threat as "evidence" to back the very charges for which Washington seeks to punish her.

If the United States government was prepared to resume development aid to India at a rate of some $75 million a year, that aid should have been in expectation that it would serve a long-term American interest in economic stability in the Indian Subcontinent. Any such expectation is neither enhanced nor diminished by Mrs. Gandhi's rhetoric, however much Americans may be saddened by her dismantling of democracy and defamation of America to justify her dictatorship. But American officials managed both to deny that the suspension was caused by any one act and to describe it as "a measured response to the totally unjustified charges of Mrs. Gandhi."

"You can't buy friendship," American critics of the massive foreign-aid budgets of the last two decades long argued. It might have been expected that when one of those critics became President, he would accept the slogan's implication and be satisfied if the development-aid dollar bought what its name implies—development in areas where poverty can be a source of chronic political instability. Instead, the new Ford administration policy is, according to one unnamed State Department official, "not to let any nation get away scot-free with using us as a whipping boy in its domestic politics or in the United Nations." The use of aid to reward friendly governments and punish those hostile to the United States is a dangerous and delicate business. If it is to be done at all it should be done with great subtlety and in a manner that holds American interference in the affairs of other countries to a minimum. Governments come and governments go, but the needs of Third World peoples remain an obligation that the United States cannot ignore if it is to have any hope of securing a more peaceful world.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES
10 MAR 1976

U.S. Aides Tell of Covert European Help to Angolans

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 9 — France and Britain, as well as the United States, provided covert aid to the Angolan factions that were defeated in the Angolan civil war, according to Ford Administration officials.

The officials reported that the French aid was substantial but less than the $30 million supplied by the United States. They described Britain's aid as modest.

Another official related that these actions were part of an effort by a number of western European allies, including West Germany and Belgium to stem the erosion of Western influence in Africa by the Soviet Union.

All the officials said that there was no joint planning or direction among the Europeans or with the United States. One official said, however, that "intelligence operatives in the field knew in a general way what each other was doing, and of course, we and the British kept each other informed."

Embassies Deny Report

Asked for comment, both the British and French Embassies denied that their Governments had aided the Angolan factions.

The Administration officials said that they did not know exactly when the French and Bri sh aid ended, but that it was either before or around the time that United States aid began to dwindle in December.

Beginning markedly in January, the French and British Governments made frequent public condemnations of intervention by outsiders in Angola. In mid-February, they came to the conclusion that the civil war was about over and recognized the Soviet-supported faction, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which had established a government in Luanda. The United States has not recognized the Luanda Government.

The Administration officials said that French aid was mostly in the form of cash and was used to pay the salaries of mercenaries and regualr forces, and to buy small arms and ammunition.

They said that to the best of their knowledge the French started their effort late last summer and that it was directed almost entirely to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola; led by Holden Roberto.

Like covert aid provided by the Ford Administration, French aid was primarily funneled through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

The officials said that British aid went exclusively to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, based in southern Angola and led by Jonas Savimbi. They said they bei ieved that ft began last spring and included some communications equipment.

"The Brftfsh dfd the absolute minimum just to keep their hands in, one offfcfal said.

Covert operations by the United States in Angola, broken off about 1969, resumed in January 1975 with $300,000 in cash, then leaped to $28 mfilfon in the late spring after heavy soviet aid began pouring into Angola. Early this year, Congress prohibited the Admfnistration from sending $30 million more in covert aid after direct intervention in Angola by Cuban and South African forces.

The one official who maintained that the West Germans and Belgians had also been involved said that West Germany had promised some communications equipment to Mr. Savimbi and that Belgium had provided some cash.

Asked for comment, Richard Samuel, a spokesman for the British Embassy here, said: "Her Majesty's Government have never given financial assistance of any kind. Our policy has been consistently one of impartiality as between the liberation movements. To have given the aid would have amounted to interference in Angola's internal affairs."

Renaud Vignal, the spokesman of the French Embassy, translated from a statement by Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues: "Some arms have been given to Angolan factions, and I don't know by whom, but they were not given by the French Government."

He also provided a statement that President Valery Giscard d'Estaing made on Jan. 7: "The French Government denounces the massive shipment of war material and even more the dispatch of foreign soldiers that have been publicly observed in Angola over the past few weeks. It asks that these be stopped. To continue such intervention would create a situation of permanent tension and division in Africa, destroying the climate of peace which had until now accompanied independence, and would distract this continent from its priorities for development."

One Ford Administration official said, in explainging French involvement: "The French are the only European Government with an African policy, and they have big plans for Zaire."

He pointed out that to emphasize the French-Zaire relationship, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing visited Mr. Mobutu in Zaire in late August 1975.

The French have extensive investments in Zaire, a country rich in raw materials, and are particularly interested in Cabinda, the oil-producing province of Angola bordering Zaire. The Gulf Oil Corporation had been drilling in Cabinda until last winter and is now negotiating with the Luanda Government to resume drilling.

Another official said: "It should be remembered that when the Organization of African Unity voted a couple of months ago on which Angolan faction, if any, to recognize, most of the former French colonies voted not to recognize the Soviet-backed group."

These two officials maintained that many European governments were as concerned about Soviet and Cuban penetration in Africa as the Ford Administration, but that given their domestic political situations, they are not in a position to do or say much about it.

Christian Science Monitor
15 March 1976

U.S. policy mistakes in Africa?

By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Is the United States, which backed the losing side in Angola, making similar policy mistakes in southern Africa?

A number of African-affairs specialists in and out of the government here believe it is. They fear that the Ford administration's policies, most particularly the warning to Cuba to keep its troops out of southern Africa, if continued will result in the United States alienating moderate black African leaders — and ending up on the losing side, as the United States did in Angola.

This deep concern emerges from talks with a number of Washington sources in recent days. Many say American strategy is fluid in dealing with the approaching crisis in Rhodesia and Namibia, and that there remains little time for the United States to alter its policies regarding these nations if it is not to alienate moderate black African leaders.

What is needed, in this view, is renewed public recognition by the United States of the rights of black Africans to majority participation in both governments, flat U.S. refusal to support militarily either white government, and public support of moderate black African leaders.

They add that the United States also must provide economic aid to African nations led by moderate black leaders, such as Mozambique and Zambia — both of which have been sustaining difficult economic times as a direct result of the current turmoil.

But these sources also acknowledge that taking such steps would be difficult for the U.S. Government. They say it would require a major shift in the Ford administration's position; and would be difficult — if not

impossible — to convince a majority in Congress to support.

They believe, however, the alternative is for the United States to invite almost certain rejection from moderate black African leaders who still would like to have good relations with Washington, if only in order to lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance.

In this view, several sources say, the United States has only five or six months in which to alter its African policy. By then, they believe black African nations may begin moving against white-dominated Rhodesia. Once that occurs, sources here believe, moderate black African leaders will be unable to prevent their people from wiping out the white rule.

It is known here that there were sharp divisions within the Ford administration last year over its Angola policy. Publicly, President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were urging that $28 million in American military equipment be provided to two Angolan factions; when Congress refused to go along, the administration blamed Congress for causing the two factions to lose.

At the same time, many officials in the government's intelligence-gathering areas were reporting that the Angolan war already was lost; that the two Western-backed factions, especially the one in northern Angola, had no chance of winning. The United States's only chance of influence, they were telling top administration officials, was to stay out of the internal conflict and work diplomatically with the pro-Marxist faction — which, as they forecast, ultimately won.

Some of these same officials — as well as nongovernment specialists testifying before the Senate subcommittee on African affairs — now see the Ford administration as moving to repeat that Angolan mistake.

WASHINGTON POST
11 MAR 1976

Kissinger's Rhodesia Remark Hit

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Foreign Service

SALISBURY, March 10— An African nationalist leader involved in the current negotiations with Prime Minister Ian Smith for a settlement to the Rhodesian constitutional dispute said today that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's recent statement about the situation here was "very badly timed" and could serve to stiffen white resistance to black-majority rule.

Willie Musarurwa, a member of the African negotiating team, said that the effect of Kissinger's comments "is to create intransigence at a time when things were going very well" in the negotiations.

Kissinger warned Cuba that the United States might react in a different manner than in the case of Angola if the Soviets and Cubans become directly involved in the nationalist struggle to overthrow the white-minority government here.

"I don't expect Kissinger to make such blunders," Musarurwa said. He compared the Kissinger warning to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's statement just before the whites declared their independence from Britain in 1965 that the British government would not use military force to crush a possible white rebellion in Rhodesia.

Musarurwa said that Kissinger was totally misreading the situation here and asserted that there is no parallel between Angola, where the Soviets and Cubans had been "invited" in, and Rhodesia, where he said they had not been asked to intervene.

"There is no such thing (Soviet and Cuban presence) involved here," he said, adding that Angola and Rhodesia "are not similar situations."

Negotiations between the Smith government and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the internal faction of the African National Council negotiation on behalf of the six million blacks of Rhodesia, have now reached a delicate stage where either a breakdown or a breakthrough is possible.

Musarurwa also dismissed Smith's denial, in an interview published here today, that his government had offered parity in the white-dominated Parliament to the country's black majority during last week's negotiation session.

The official African National Council line seems to be that what Smith says publicly to calm his white electorate does not reflect what is actually being said or negotiated in the constitutional talks.

The African negotiators express concern that statements like the one Kissinger made could harden the attitude of the country's 270,000 whites and lead to failure of the talks. The feeling seems to be that Kissinger, perhaps unwittingly, may have complicated the talks by giving the whites here the hope that the United States might eventually intervene on their side.

Like Musarurwa, a top aide to Prime Minister Smith also denied yesterday that there was any indication so far of Cuban or Soviet involvement in the stepped-up guerrilla war along Rhodesia's eastern border with Mozambique.

The denial by Musarurwa is all the more significant since his faction of the African National Council has long been considered Soviet-backed while its external faction, led by Rev. Ndabiningi Sithole, is regarded as Chinese-supported.

East Asia

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Monday, March 15, 1976

Erwin D. Canham

In new East Asia—I

Just returned from a State Department mission in the Far East (it was a study of certain foundation-handled activities funded by government) I can report the obvious: that the friendliest nations in the Pacific part of the world are filled with uncertainty about the United States.

They are, of course, puzzled by the complexities and ambiguities of the American presidential election process. Who wouldn't be? But, far more fundamentally, they wonder whether the American sense of purpose in the world is still strong and clear. They ask whether U.S. public thinking is lapsing into isolationism. They do not know what kind of nation the United States is at this time in history. Do we?

Attitudes in the six nations we visited — the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Pakistan — were concerned but not appalled by the American withdrawal from Vietnam, now nearly a year ago. I gathered that most thoughtful people felt withdrawal to be inevitable, delayed longer than might have been the case, leaving problems but not insurmountable ones in its wake.

In Thailand, where the pressures from nearby Communist-controlled Indo-China are strongest, the government continues its pressures on the Americans to complete their withdrawal of obvious and compromising military forces. The Thais have bowed to the storm before, as during Japanese domination in World War II. They expect the winds to blow severely from Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, but they expect compensating forces from the People's Republic of China. Thailand is the most exposed nation but it is aware that it will be saved mainly by itself. It is internally turbulent, with political assassinations of useful and respected people taking place frequently. It is uncertain about the planned election in early April. There are scores of so-called political parties.

There are varying versions of one-man rule in all six countries. Some democratic forms are observed. Elections are scheduled and held. But the executives are authoritarian. In Thailand another military coup is always a possibility. But in places like the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan the strong arm of the leader is not only felt but, I believe, extensively accepted and welcomed. The disorders of less authoritarian rule are regarded as worse than the infringements of civil liberties imposed by the present executives.

It is against this pattern of domestic firmness that one contemplates the Asians' uncertainties about the United States. They see a weak executive, a beleaguered Secretary of State, an always unpredictable but powerful Congress. They would like to see the tangles of American government straighten out, and a sense of clear purpose return.

With all this concern, however, there remain vast friendliness and respect for the United States. The good things of the past are remembered, as well as the mistakes and blunders. An egregious American know-it-all attitude from the days of U.S. domination has not been lived down.

Even the present political floundering inside the United States is viewed sympathetically, since Asians shiver at the concentrated power and purpose of the divided Communist giants.

Somehow, I think the Asians we visited believe U.S. Gulliver will pull through. While they yearn to be told the United States is not becoming isolationist, and they accept a vast amount of U.S. and international aid, nevertheless they know they will be saved primarily by their own efforts.

Considerable economic progress is being made in all six countries we visited. This goes even more for four places our colleagues visited: Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong. Really fabulous growth has taken place in the great cities of East Asia. The people have poured into the urban areas with mixed benefit, but the cities glitter with skyscrapers and are clogged with traffic jams. It is a new world in East Asia, and the United States plays a different role there than it has for three decades.

WASHINGTON POST
12 MAR 1976

Victor Zorza

China Debates the American Connection

The Peking radicals are sharpening their knives for Hua Kuo-feng, the new acting prime minister, on the grounds that he wants to develop China's links with the United States and to acquire U.S. military technology. Both his own position and Peking's pro-American policy are seriously threatened. The radicals, who tasted blood last month when they got rid of deputy prime minister Teng Hsiao-ping, just as he was about to take over formally the country's management on the death of prime minister Chou En-lai, are not going to give up easily.

The evidence between the lines of the Chinese press which leads to these conclusions also makes it clear that Hua has powerful allies, and that he is fighting back. The army, which would stand to gain from a policy designed to secure modern Western weapons, has not so far joined in the attacks on Hua. But the military commanders also favored his predecessor, Teng, who restored the centralized military system. Yet they could not save him, even though he too was anxious to give them the military technology they wanted.

The attacks on Hua are disguised in several ways, but politically the most significant is the press campaign which blames him for imparting the wrong direction to China's science and technology program. Hua, who is not named in the press attacks, has been in charge of the science and technology program for about a year, and it may therefore be deduced that he is the target of the campaign. He has never been publicly named to this post, but a number of signs—such as his meetings with foreign scientists

visiting China—clearly identify him as holding it.

The press campaign makes it clear that the unnamed man in charge of the program has been saying that Chinese science "is now in a state of crisis"—"stagnant, confused, paralyzed." He complained that Chinese technology had tried to rely on its own resources instead of getting help from abroad. He argued that the crisis "could be resolved only by relying on foreign experts."

The radicals answer that to do so would be to act "as if China's destiny is tied to the waist-belt of foreigners." If China gave up the policy of self-reliance, they maintain, it could neither attain economic independence nor assert its "political independence." They hint at the defense aspects of the debate by decrying China's space satellite program.

China, they argue, succeeded in launching its satellite, but only at the cost of a modernization program which diverted the country from the leftist path of Maoist-communist virtue. "The satellites going up to the sky are but a sham," they say, "while the Red Flag falling to the ground is the reality." The satellite effort is, of course closely linked to China's ballistic missile program, which is several years in arrears, and to its space reconnaissance program.

Without a spy satellite, China would be in no position to anticipate a Soviet attack. But Chinese purchasing enquiries in the West suggest that, without foreign help, it may be another 10 years before Peking develops an efficient spy satellite of its own. Those who want Western scientific aid, says the Peking People's Daily, claim that this would provide "the only way to avoid being blind."

The Washington debate on whether China should be given military-technological aid came to the surface last September with an article in Foreign Policy by Michael Pillsbury, a Rand analyst whose passionate advocacy of this course is said by some of his opponents to spring from ulterior motives. They point to Rand's connection with the Pentagon, which believes that a China armed with modern weapons could draw off some of the Russian heat from the United States, without presenting a serious threat to the West.

Dr. Kissinger's main concern is that to give such aid to China would upset the Russians and could deal yet another blow to detente. Although he must be well aware of Chinese needs, he argues that Peking has not asked for U.S. aid, and that it is not for Washington to raise the matter with them. No doubt he would prefer them to come to him with a request, for this would put the United States in a position to name its own price.

Yet this is precisely why the Peking leaders who want to develop the links with the United States cannot ask directly for U.S. aid. They have already been accused by the radicals of selling out to the United States for a mess of potage. Any formal request for U.S. aid from acting prime minister Hua would lay him open to the charge that he is indeed willing to abandon China's "political independence"—as the People's Daily hinted—in exchange for arms.

In today's climate in Peking, with Hua's own political survival at stake, he is hardly likely to take such risks. In today's climate in Washington, with the administration and Congress at odds over the use—or misuse—of arms aid, any request made by Peking would become involved in the political struggles of an American election year. The outlook is bleak—yet the question is probably more important than any other issue in the Soviet-Chinese-American triangle.

Its importance derives from the central place which it occupies in the Chinese internal debate. The debate is about the pace and direction of China's modernization and the means to be used in achieving it. A faster pace, favored by the moderates represented by Teng and to some extent by Hua, would entail a departure from the Maoist model. Instead of giving priority to agriculture and to the preservation of the peasant society which forms the base of the Maoist model, the new five year plan—which was due to begin in January—would in effect have given priority to industry.

The Chinese press has hinted that this was one of the major issues. But industrialization too could have been carried out only with aid from the West.

Once again the issue is the same as it has been in every one of the Peking power struggles of recent years. Should China pull itself up by its own bootstraps, however long it may take, and at whatever cost it may entail, while maintaining its isolation from the rest of the world? Or should it open its gates to the West, speed up the development of industry, accept the West's technology and modern weapons—at the risk, as the radicals maintain, of losing its national character, its unique Maoist individuality.

There is a third way, to restore the alliance with Russia, and there are strong hints that some Chinese leaders have been contemplating even this possibility. Perhaps offering China some of the arms it wants may help the pro-Western faction in Peking buy the time it needs. It could also discourage the Kremlin from trying to follow up its Angola adventure elsewhere.

WASHINGTON POST
18 MAR 1976

Harassment by Korean CIA Alleged

By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer

South Korean intelligence agents are waging a campaign of harassment against Koreans living in the United States who oppose the Seoul government, a House subcommittee was told yesterday.

Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents have disrupted demonstrations in U.S. cities, brought pressure to close an anti-Seoul government newspaper in Los Angeles and ignored warnings from the State Department about their activities, according to testimony by an American university professor, a former State Department officer and a Korean-language newspaper editor.

Questioned by a reporter, a spokesman for the South Korean embassy attending the hearing before the International Organizations subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations said he did not believe the allegations.

He said he had no knowledge of any KCIA harassment activities in the United States.

Kim Hyung Il, president of a Korean residents association in Los Angeles, told the subcommittee he knew of no cases of KCIA intimidations in his community.

However, Donald L. Ranard, who retired in 1974 after four years as director of the State Department Office of Korean Affairs, testified he asked the FBI to investigate KCIA agents' activities in 1973 but got few results.

"An investigation began but for reasons which I never quite understood, it never really got off the ground," Ranard said. "When it finally petered out several months later it had produced little more than mere confirmation of the basic information I had submitted initially."

"Much . . . seemed to be made of an explanation that to proceed properly, the FBI would need to talk directly to KCIA personnel at the Korean Embassy which obviously the State Department had no power to direct because of their diplomatic immunity," Ranard said.

But Ranard said he knew, based on U.S. intelligence reports, that the KCIA "has organized demonstrations in support of the [President Park Chung Hee] government, and at other times attempted to break up demonstrations against that government."

He offered to provide more specific testimony in closed session, which a subcommittee staff member said would probably be scheduled soon.

Kim Woon Ha, editor of New Korea, a Korean-language newspaper published in Los Angeles, said the KCIA tried for months to close his paper or end his criticism of the Park government by pressuring businessmen to cancel advertisements, offering him money, free tickets to Korea or a government job, and spreading rumors he was a Communist.

He said that when two staff members quit he could find no one willing to replace them and now puts out his newspaper with the help of his wife.

A fourth witness before the sub committee, chaired by Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.), was Prof. Gregory Henderson of Case Western Reserve University. Henderson, a Korean expert, called the KCIA "a vast, shadowy world of an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 bureaucrats, intellectuals, agents and thugs," and said he knew at least 18 agents were stationed in the United States.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
13 MAR 1976

Jagan Says Cubans Should Defend Guyana

By Terri Shaw
Washington Post Staff Writer

Cheddi Jagan, leader of Guyana's main opposition party, says Cuban troops should be invited to defend the South American country if it is threatened by neighboring countries with territorial claims.

"If there's any threat of foreign intervention, I would welcome Cuban troops," Jagan said in an interview Thursday night. "If I were premier I would invite them in."

Jagan was ousted as premier in 1964 following disturbances widely acknowledged to have been covertly encouraged by the British and U.S. governments. His Peoples Progressive Party "joined the international Communist movement" five years later, Jagan said, adding: "We can thank the CIA for that."

The Guyanese politican is visiting Washington on his way home from Moscow where he attended the Soviet Communist Party Congress.

Jagan said there are no Cuban troops "that I am aware of" in Guyana now.

In the interview and in a speech at Howard University, Jagan said reports published by the Venezuelan and American press alleging that there are Cuban troops in Guyana were part of an effort to "destablize" the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, which has recently moved to the left in its foreign and domestic policies.

"If you move against imperialism," Jagan said, "you have to anticipate that you will be attacked."

Jagan attributed the Burnham government's change of policy to "pragmatism which is akin to opportunism." He said his party would support the government's "progressive steps" while "criticizing the government for its shortcomings."

Jagan said he had been meeting with Burnham to negotiate the terms under which the opposition party would end its boycott of Parliament.

He said the government should set up a "popular militia," because the "army is deliberately organized to exclude our supporters." In a case of military intervention from Brazil or Venezuela, Jagan said, "the army and police couldn't last 24 hours."

Neighboring Venezuela and Surinam have made claims on part of Guyana's territory, and Brazil's government is strongly anti-Communist.

In foreign policy, Jagan said the Burnham government should seek closer ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Thursday, March 11, 1976

Guyana blasts Cuban troop rumors

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Guyana's vehement denial that Cuban troops are now or ever have been stationed on Guyanese soil raises questions about the origin of the reports.

There are, however, no ready answers. The reports first began circulating in Brazil and Venezuela — and then cropped up in newspapers in the United States and Britain.

Some Guyanese commentators are convinced the reports are part of an anti-Guyana campaign in both Brazil and Venezuela. They express concern that the campaign could lead to ugly border incidents and note that Venezuela claims well over half of Guyana's territory.

Guyanese officials, meanwhile, clearly are incensed over the whole affair. Foreign Minister Fred Wills used extremely sharp diplomatic language to deny that Cuban soldiers were in Guyana.

"I will state categorically and emphatically that there are no Cuban troops in Guyana and there have never been such troops," he declared, adding:

"The repetition of the reports leads one to the conclusion that the lying is deliberate, wicked, and malicious."

The Guyanese anger extends to the United States — with commentators wondering about Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's stand in the affair. He was quoted in Guyana as saying that while Washington has no evidence that Cuban troops are in Guyana, the U.S. is checking it out.

"He knows there is no truth in the charges," a Guyanese spokesman said.

The charges of a Cuban military presence in Guyana began circulating in late December after the Barbados Government stopped allowing Cuban troop aircraft the right to use that island for a refueling stop on the way to Africa.

There was widespread suspicion at the time that the government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro would seek to use Guyana for refueling purposes.

But Guyana also refused Cuba permission to refuel, and Cuba began using longer-range Soviet planes that could cross the Atlantic without refueling.

Several incidents in January might have lent substance to the already-circulating reports. But a careful study of the incidents would have dispelled any suspicion of a Cuban troop presence, Guyanese officials state.

In the first, Cubana de Aviacion planes on regular Caribbean service land at Timehri international airport near Georgetown, the Guyanese capital. This service is once a week, and Georgetown is used as the turnaround point.

There were two unscheduled landings of Cubana planes at Timehri in January. In one, a plane returning from Africa made an emergency landing at Timehri. The other reportedly brought material from Havana to the Cuban Embassy in Georgetown. Neither flight carried any Cuban soldiers.

Another incident in late January may have supported the suspicion of a Cuban troop presence in Guyana.

A small band of Cuban engineers spent several days at Timehri installing an emergency fuel storage tank for Cubana's use. Such tanks occasionally are put in by airlines at airports with limited fuel facilities such as Timehri.

In commenting on the tank, Cubana claimed that it has experienced difficulties from time to time in getting United States oil companies, which run fuel concessions at many airports, to service Cubana aircraft and wanted a reserve supply of fuel. The U.S. firm, Texaco, handles the concession at Timehri.

One Guyanese source termed the reports of this incident as "little more than a tempest in an oil drum."

And for his part, a high Guyanese Government official said: "There simply is not one shred of evidence, even with these isolated incidents, to support the Cuban troop presence charge."