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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

TV GUIDE JANUARY 10, 1976

WHY WE NEED THE CIA

A former Director of the agency puts television coverage of its activities into historical perspective.

By John A. McCone

[The Central Intelligence Agency has been much in the news lately, as television news has covered Congressional investigations of the agency's activities. To add to viewers' understanding of that coverage, we present this article by John A. McCone, who was Director of the CIA during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-65. Before that, he was one of the architects of the Department of Defense, and served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under James Forrestal.]

Any government, including even those which have the most elementary international association, must collect foreign intelligence. This pursuit of a special kind of information—and its refined product, which is knowledge—is an indispensable function.

Vigorous nations depend on their leaders to devise a strategy that will provide both for their security and for their economic and political well-being. History teaches us that leaders cannot meet this responsibility unless they learn the political, economic and military capabilities and intentions of other nations.

Today, great nations are armed as never before. And the leaders of great states must take heed of the risk involved. Furthermore, in their economic life, nations both large and small are interdependent, one with the other—more now than ever before in the past.

On the military side, the maneuvering of possible hostile forces, the deployment of mass-destruction weapons and—what could be of greater importance?—the hidden development of even more advanced weaponry, must

all be discovered in good time and their possible effects measured. On the economic side, the task of intelligence services that provide information to safeguard the well-being of the state has lately been vastly amplified: a consortia has appeared that seeks to get economic advantage by imposing quotas and exorbitant prices on raw materials that heretofore have been in relatively free international flow.

Walter Lippmann once wrote, "Foreign policy is the shield of the Republic"; and Sherman Kent, the distinguished historian, has said, "Strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the shield to the proper place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword."

What these men are saying is merely that sound decisions designed to protect the security interests and the economic and political welfare of our country can only be made against a background of knowledge. Without the knowledge gained from foreign-intelligence gathering methods, and the appraisal of the significance of that knowledge developed through careful and studious analysis of the information, leaders can make no policy decisions with reasonable assurance that the action they plan is a correct one.

All vigorous nations, large and small, support a foreign-intelligence apparatus. Invariably, the organization is clandestine. Even in open societies, practical considerations demand that the organization be kept out of public view and its work made known only to the few who need to know. Usually, the and the control over it are both embedded at the topmost echelon of

power. When you make public disclosure of the intimate details of a foreign-intelligence service you paralyze an otherwise effective operation.

It is no surprise that the so-called superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—both maintain elaborate intelligence systems; but the intelligence efforts of other countries throughout the world, some 40 in all, are also significant. Among them all, the intelligence service of the United States is the only one (except West Germany's) that was initiated and authorized legislatively—in our case, by Congressional action after long and thoughtful consideration by both houses of the Congress and with its operations and budgets reviewed by Congressional committees.

We got into the foreign intelligence business fairly recently. Between the two World Wars, the United States maintained little in the way of an intelligence community. To be sure, the Army and the Navy maintained separate intelligence units of their own, specifically to meet their needs in times of war. The Department of State kept a watchful eye on world happenings, and ambassadors regularly reported their observations. But, we had no organization in existence to analyze the whole flow of information and to study the dangers to American security inherent in the pattern of action reported from abroad. Thus, an inquiry into our surprise at Pearl Harbor, conducted after World War II, disclosed that our various government agencies had in hand—days prior to the actual attack—all essential information concerning Japan's preparations for war, including the assembly and departure of the Japanese fleet. →

The State, War and Navy Departments had each gathered the information, and each had used it for its own special interests, but—disastrously—no branch of government then had the duty to put the information together and alert the President of impending danger.

It was to correct this gaping deficiency in our government machinery that the Central Intelligence Agency was created under the National Security Act of 1947. To ensure that it would remain apart from partisan attachments and parochial interests, the CIA was developed essentially as a civilian organization.

It was then recognized that many departments of government must, in the interests of their departmental responsibilities and to broaden the base of all intelligence appraisals, continue their own intelligence efforts. I am speaking of the intelligence division of the State Department known as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research—a thoughtful organization that assesses information for the State Department; the Defense Intelligence Agency that supports the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinates the work of the three separate service intelligence units and manages the corps of military attaches; the intelligence units of the Army, Navy and Air Force maintained to serve their Chiefs of Service and to provide current technical intelligence information to field commanders; the intelligence units of the Treasury Department, and the Energy Research and Development Agency (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission), both of which contribute important specialized information on foreign developments; and, finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which, in the course of its extensive domestic operations, is constantly unearthing in-

formation either originating abroad or having a significant foreign connection.

At the apex of this large, complex community is the Central Intelligence Agency. Its Director, as the President's principal intelligence officer, is charged by Presidential directive with the responsibility for the general direction of the community as a whole. This function he carries out in his individual role and as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, which is the senior body of the community, and is composed of the directors of several departmental intelligence organizations.

The Central Intelligence Agency's responsibilities, as established by law, range from the collection of overt and covert intelligence by its own considerable establishment to the correlation and assessment of intelligence findings from all sources. In addition, the CIA is charged with protecting intelligence sources and methods and with executing tasks assigned by the President or the National Security Council. Under this latter mandate fall such essential activities as counterintelligence, which means ferreting out, together with the FBI, the covert activities of others. Also, the mandate covers covert political action and covert paramilitary operations—the supporting or training and equipping of third-country nationals who espouse our principles of freedom and who are under attack by Communist forces directed from the center of Communist power.

Unevaluated intelligence—raw, as it is known in the trade—comes in many ways. Through the long sweep of history, human contact, both open and covert, has been the major source of intelligence. Conversations between heads of state, reports from ambassadors and military attaches, and articles in newspapers and other publications all contribute to the inventory of information. But the richest source is usually the secret agent, a well-trained professional, concealed under disarming cover, who usually moves in the highest and most informed circles.

The ethics of clandestine intelligence operations have long been debated and some would do away with them. The fact is that no international covenant forbids clandestine operations, and they go on as they have for centuries. At least 40 nations today support clandestine services—no great state can abandon them.

In the recent past, technology has enormously lengthened the reach and sharpened the penetration of intelligence. High-flying aircraft carrying sophisticated cameras, supplemented by orbital satellites equipped with even more advanced cameras, have been able to look down into fortress societies and record in startling detail what is actually developing.

A correspondingly wide range of electronic sensing and tracking devices makes it quite possible to accurately deduce the yield of nuclear devices, exploded either in the atmosphere or underground, at great distances; and to supply information on the characteristics and performance of military equipment that is being developed and tested beyond otherwise impenetrable frontiers. Indeed, in the event of a surprise attack, we would get our first warning, of the blow being prepared from these intelligence-gathering systems.

Gathering the information is only the start of the intelligence process. The

raw material, once obtained, must be drawn together, analyzed and correlated. And it must be evaluated before it becomes useful knowledge. An estimate of the developing situation emerges, and from this estimate a head of state, consulting with his advisers, can chart a course of action that will best meet the developing situation. Without the intelligence itself and the sophisticated estimate, the head of a government would be groping toward a decision.

All raw intelligence entering the community flows in one form or another to the CIA. From this processing comes a digest of what it all means and an estimate of what its consequences could be. The bits and pieces of information from near and far are studied by men and women of the highest capabilities: political scientists, economists, historians, linguists, engineers, physicists and other experts.

Daily intelligence reports are sent to the President and his principal advisers. Finally, there appears a body of papers known as the National Intelligence Estimates, presenting a continuing analysis of military, political and economic situations that bear directly on our national security and well-being. All are the product of the analytical process and are prepared within the halls of the Central Intelligence Agency, with a substantial oversight by the United States Intelligence Board.

Preparing this body of literature in its various forms is, in my opinion, the most important activity of the agency. It is certainly the least publicized.

In the discharge of its duties, the United States Intelligence Board gathers weekly at CIA headquarters—and often more frequently—to review the national estimates prepared by the CIA analysts. This review is made before the estimates are passed to the President and to others by the Director. It is also within the Board's purview to advise the Director on how best to supply the intelligence needs of the Nation's policymakers, schedule the flights of the reconnaissance satellites and photographic planes, fix the tasks of the National Security Agency, advise the precautions that may be desirable for protecting the Nation's intelligence sources and methods, and maintaining a watch office to be constantly on the alert for surprise hostile developments.

In the tempest—abundantly reported by television and the press—that has been whirling over the heads of the intelligence community and particularly the CIA in recent months, the accusation is frequently sounded that our intelligence community is an unsupervised, free-wheeling body—a law unto itself. This simply is not true. The President, himself, exercises control in a number of ways: through personal contact with his Director; through the Office of Budget and Management and a subcommittee of the National Security Council that oversees covert activities; and also through a civilian advisory board that meets frequently, reviews the community's operations and reports to the President. The House of Representatives and the Senate have special committees to oversee the community's activities and to review its budgets.

For all of this extensive oversight, recent accusations of wrongdoing—some imagined, others grossly overstated, but still a few justified—have

set up a clamor for closer supervision of the intelligence operations and especially the clandestine activities.

In my opinion, the noise has been so great and the image of CIA has become so tarnished that changes must be made to extinguish, as much as possible, criticism, to restore confidence and to provide an on-going dynamic foreign intelligence service. But no changes will be useful unless the Congress, the press and electronic media, and the public can feel assured that the Nation's entire intelligence service, in playing its part to ensure the well-being of our Nation, will always confine its operations to acceptable moral and legal standards.

The remedies involve both legislative and executive action. As we seek change, we must take great care not to damage the effectiveness of the intelligence organization and we must accept the practical truth that a foreign intelligence operation, to be effective at all, must by its very nature remain "in privacy"—its activities must be cloaked in secrecy. In a free society, we find it difficult to accept this concept, but society must accept the "cloak."

The proximity of the Central Intelligence Agency and its Director to the President and the National Security Council should be made more conspicuous. Indeed, it might be advisable to identify the organization as an arm of the National Security Council and identify it that way by name. Its Director would then be the Nation's principal intelligence officer, with statutory authority over all of the activities now conducted by the CIA and with general supervision over the community as a whole. A subcommittee of NSC with high-level representation from State, Defense, Treasury and the White House itself, could provide a watchful eye over all intelligence activities, not merely certain covert operations as now is the case. The President's Civilian Advisory Board should continue to provide him with an informed viewpoint outside of the channels of government.

To strengthen Congressional oversight, I suggest we create a single joint committee on intelligence, with membership drawn from both houses and adequately staffed. Such a committee should function in the same manner as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has functioned for almost 30 years. The confidentiality of all that is provided to this committee that I propose must remain within the committee, as has been the case through the years with our nuclear affairs. In particular, oversight by such a joint committee must be accepted as oversight by the Congress as a whole.

In one way or another, risks of leaks and disclosures of sensitive operations must be lessened or eliminated under severe penalties, authorized by law.

Beyond this, anyone who has been seriously connected with the responsibilities of national security will hope that our prolonged and painful review of the roles and missions of the CIA, and the work of the intelligence community as a whole, will end up by preserving an organization that can serve our security needs and yet rest comfortably within American political philosophy. Our Nation would hardly be safe without such an establishment. (ND)

WASHINGTON STAR
14 JAN 1975

The Charmed Life of Richard Helms

First of five articles

By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer

Dick Helms was waiting for his plane at Dulles, waiting for another 19-hour flight back to Tehran. He had been home again — was it the 14th time? — to testify before Congress.

A friend, there to see him off, thought Helms was somewhat preoccupied. "Well," Helms said as he departed, "if I wind up at Leavenworth, you can send me a CARE package."

He finds himself somewhat oddly poised these days.

Helms has every right to expect, his closest friends feel, that if he came home from Iran, left the government, he could make a fortune in business — quickly.

But he is allowing himself to think, at least in moments of sad humor, that he might be on the way to the penitentiary instead.

ONE OF THE most durable figures in the government for a generation, a man who always seemed to stride easily through the corridors of power, an urbane and polished guest in Washington's most envied salons, as well connected as any professional in town, Richard McGarrath Helms at age 62 can say his life has been charmed.

But, maybe, not anymore.

He has a legion of critics. He is facing damage lawsuits in court. He has been under criminal investigation for a year. And every time he flies back to his duties as U.S. ambassador to Iran, he knows it is a kind of return to exile.

His woe comes mainly out of the years between 1966 and 1973, the six and a half years he was director of the CIA.

That role in that period has been investigated by a half-dozen congressional committees, an "in-house" team at the CIA itself, the Rockefeller Commission, the Justice Department, and now a federal grand jury.

"HELMS IS being absolutely chewed up in this process," one of his closest friends says. "I am very much afraid," says another, "that Dick is being made the sacrificial figure."

In all of the investigations, past or continuing, of the CIA, he certainly has been the most predictable target.

Not surprisingly, there is a strong suspicion among those who have worked with Helms for years that the whole secret intelligence apparatus is as much threatened now as it is the former director, perhaps more so.

But it is Helms himself who personifies what is now happening. "He is there. That makes him vulnerable — like climbing Mt. Everest, you do it just because it's there," comments a CIA colleague. "The Kennedys are gone, Johnson is gone, Nixon is out; that leaves Helms."

It does not seem so fanciful to compare Richard Helms to

presidents. Only a few men in the last 30 years of American history have reached the eminence to which Helms rose — and he did it largely unnoticed in public.

INDEED, THERE are those who believe that Helms is in trouble now precisely because, when he did come out into the open, he seemed so far out of reach, so remote to the average observer in Washington.

"There is a tremendous gap," suggests a diplomat who knows Helms well, "between the power elite — and Helms is part of that — and the little fellow."

But even inside the "power elite," not many have had the respect and trust that Helms could claim among the truly powerful. Helms, for example, could expect to have dinner with a key senator, perhaps at the senator's house, the night before appearing at a crucial committee session. They might even plan how it would go.

Back when he was a fairly junior man at the CIA, an associate recalls, "Helms was exposed much more than the average to the higher levels. He was constantly being consulted."

It seems there has been something special about Helms from the very beginning — at least as he is seen by men and women who frankly confess their bias in his favor.

"If one capsules Dick as an Eastern Establishment product of a modestly well-off family — out of the New

York metropolitan area, and Williams College — that is about right. That produced a kind of person in the Depression years who was a little more sophisticated than the average American."

IT IS QUITE common, in fact, for his associates to stress Helms' breeding. "He is a polished and mature individual; his whole background would indicate that. You wouldn't expect him to be a clumsy man, and he isn't. Compared to the average person, there is a broad depth to his background."

Cultured, disciplined. Those are the qualities that helped Helms move up, and move around, in Washington. There have been, to be sure, some missteps and mishaps along the way. Even some of those, however, add to the image that Helms showed to those around him and in the power centers of the nation's capital.

Because his whole career in government had been in "the clandestine service" — the spy business — and personally quite a private man,

Richard Helms has not been conspicuous to the public.

But Helms always was the man that an intelligence professional could count on back home, almost from the earliest post-war days of the Forties. And he became a man whom even presidents felt free to lean on.

His record in the CIA and earlier intelligence units, and especially his direct service for presidents, is a source of pride to him. "I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the agency served. I still do: without regrets, without qualms, without apology," he has said.

It is a record that is publicly known only in the most general way. The specific revelations and accusations that have emerged from the probes of the CIA show some of his problems; they do not show how Helms got to be a "power elite" figure.

HIS BASIC biography provides the start: He went to private school in Gstaad, Switzerland, with the sons of sheiks and prime ministers, graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams after being chosen "most likely to succeed" in his class, traveled frequently in Germany and became fluent in the language, interviewed Hitler as a United Press reporter in 1936, moved into the Office of Strategic Services as a bright young Navy man during the war, and was recruited into OSS service after the war. He was in intelligence from then on.

His marriage, to Julia Bretzman Shields in 1939, was to make a major difference to his later career, in an unusual way. The collapse of that marriage in 1968 also became a factor in his role in government and in Washington society.

While with the OSS during the war, Helms made contact with a handful of men who would remain influential in U.S. intelligence — whether they were inside or outside the government — for years to come. These included Allen W. Dulles, John McCloy, Lucius Clay, David Bruce, Andrew Berding, Frank Wisner.

When many of those men became civilians again after the war, they left behind a group — including Helms —

that had developed a high sensitivity to Soviet political maneuverings and spy activity in Western Europe. That provided a cohesion which, 30 years later, still holds many of the original OSS men together intellectually and philosophically.

Seeing the OSS dismantled, in what these men thought was President Harry Truman's way of getting rid of OSS chief William Donovan, and worried that Washington was not sufficiently keen on the Soviet threat, the small OSS remnant kept pressuring associates back home to get a continuing organization formed. The Strategic Services Unit was set up, and the group that included Helms was persuaded to stay in Europe to provide a "product" — that is, intelligence information, primarily on the Soviets.

THEN THE Central Intelligence Group was formed, and Helms was brought home to head its "German desk." It was a key move for him: He was in a position in the CIG where he could use his intelligence background, and that would count later in bureaucratic skirmishes.

"In those days," one long-time intelligence man says, "the top leadership was extremely weak. The leadership then was military, with no knowledge of the business."

It was at about that time — perhaps the spring of 1946 — that Helms became a "division chief" handling what is generally referred to as "clandestine" work.

That can mean either gathering intelligence secretly about the other side's threat to the United States or penetrating the other side's spy network ("counter-intelligence"), or trying to prevent penetration of U.S. spying ("counter-espionage").

Helms was in the division post when the CIG became the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. During those years, the sweeping Communist takeover of Eastern Europe and such episodes as the Berlin airlift crisis produced heavy activity in Helms' division.

After the Korean war had begun, in 1950, Helms continued his rise in the CIA's clandestine service.

"**DICK BECAME** the buffer between the professionals and this succession of military officers (who headed the CIG and then the CIA)," a colleague remembers. "This is a role that the professionals have never forgotten. Helms was the one guy who knew how to wander through this labyrinth of above-nuks and

(NOTE: Helms declined, through the State Department, to be interviewed for this series. Former associates agreed to interviews, provided that their names not be used.)

get what you wanted."

But while he was satisfying the professionals, Helms also was keeping his superiors happy, too, and was expanding his contacts beyond the CIA at inter-agency meetings on U.S. foreign crises.

"As he rose in the agency," an associate says, "Helms realized it was important for him that he understand the power, influence and governmental situation in Washington. He couldn't lurch around town clumsily. A lot of people around town were very glad to give him a hand."

He was becoming especially well connected and, at the same time, "sure-footed." But just as important, he was staying in this country. Most of his professional colleagues wanted to be abroad: "That's where the fun was," one of them suggests. But Helms could not go overseas; he has told associates that his wife objected.

Whatever the reason, it kept him in a key spot and largely shaped his future career. "From about 1950 until 1965," says an associate, "the one point of continuity in the entire place was Dick Helms. Every station chief, every senior officer and a lot of the juniors went to him."

IN THE EARLY part of this period, when the agency was still feeling its way in a new field, Helms' superiors also depended upon him, passing to him many of the minor but necessary administrative headaches of the day.

With the Korean war, pressure from U.S. military and diplomatic officials for intelligence "results" increased. Those demands apparently were not limited to gathering spy data on the enemy. They included what intelligence officers call "clandestine operations" — that is, undercover military-type or political action, helping friends or hurting enemies in a regime or country abroad.

"We had all done clandestine operations during the war; we knew how to do it," says a Helms associate from the OSS days and later.

However, a new unit was formed — the Office of Policy Coordination — to do the "operations" jobs. It was not controlled by Helms. It reported to the White House channels.

Disparagingly, one of Helms' colleagues of that time suggests that the OPC "wanted to remake the world with huge sums of money, subsidies, black bags and so forth. There was pretty considerable chaos, for a few years."

THE PROFESSIONALS' dominance, however, began to re-emerge when Allen Dulles, back in the agency, moved up to head CIA in 1953. "This was somebody we all knew," says one of the professionals of that period. "Dulles was very knowledgeable, very intelligent, he had some knowledge of the operations business."

It was a boon to Helms' career, too. "Here was Dulles' favorite younger officer, Mr. Richard Helms, close at hand," an associate relates. "Dick became the focal point between all the guys who were in the operations business."

Most importantly, Dulles tired of having two sections of the agency handling "clandestine" work, so he merged the intelligence-gathering functions with the "operations" activities. This came, Helms' associates say, after "a whole series of embarrassments" by the "operations people."

Helms was the No. 2 man at the top of the clandestine unit, but actually was more than a deputy. His boss, Frank Wisner — an old OSS partner — relied on him heavily.

"For the first time, the professionals had a chance to get at some of these fairly wild schemes," a colleague remembers, suggesting that Helms and his staff brought "operations" back to what was practical and workable.

When Wisner's health broke, Dulles did not put Helms in charge. Instead, he turned to Richard Bissell — a move that hurt Helms' pride, so much that he considered quitting. "This was a rough period for Dick's ego," a close friend remembers.

BUT HIS CAREER actually benefited. Because he was one of their own, CIA professionals continued to work mostly through Helms. But, more decisively, Bissell got into trouble.

The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs — the CIA-managed invasion of Cuba during the John Kennedy administration — cost Bissell as well as Dulles their jobs in 1962. Helms became "deputy director of plans" — that is, chief of all clandestine activity.

"His professional reputation was undamaged, so far as the

professionals were concerned," according to a colleague. When a businessman-engineer, John McCone, became head of CIA after Dulles, "Helms pretty much was left to continue to run the business."

"Pretty soon," an associate says, "John Kennedy was calling Dick Helms."

McCone, close to Kennedy, had done much to help Helms meet the right people around town. He also coached Helms on "the world of Washington," a friend says.

"From the down days under Bissell, until he was brought along by McCone, I have never seen such growth as there was in Helms. Even his mannerisms became more refined."

HE MOVED UP to be deputy director of CIA in 1965, under President Lyndon Johnson's choice as CIA chief after McCone, Adm. William F. (Red) Raborn.

"Here, again," a CIA professional says, "the one person inside the agency on the clandestine side who had had the public exposure at State, Defense, the White House, was Dick." In June 1966, after President Johnson had tired of Raborn's repeated miscues — including a suggestion to the Dutch intelligence chief that the United States should give Germany the atomic bomb — Raborn was fired. Helms became CIA chief.

That pleased the CIA professionals — and the press — immensely. Here was a leader who had come all the way from the beginning, who could sit down with a troubled case officer or station chief and ease his woes, who became "one of the most visible and most popular — probably THE most popular" — director ever, and a man who "knew a lot of people in town."

He ran his office efficiently; the desk was usually clean when he went home at night. Associates describe him as a man who "didn't pontificate with people, who 'didn't put on airs,' who was 'direct, friendly — but tough if he has to be,' who was 'charming but with possibly a little suggestion of iron underneath," who "attracted very deep-rooted personal loyalty."

Socially, Helms was as much a success as he was at the office. However, he never was regarded as "a superficial playboy" or "a social butterfly." He was, an old friend says, "no man to stand up over the last drink."

Helms is said to be a man who needs sleep

more than most men his age. He fails to sleep quickly, sleeps easily and long.

THERE WAS always a measure of semi-anonymity to his social pursuits. At parties, one hostess says, "he sits in the background mostly; he never let you know what he was thinking."

He drinks Scotch, but never more than a couple of drinks. He also is said to be fond of fine wine — a taste he had brought home from Europe.

There is no doubt that Helms became a sought-after guest in Washington. During the time he was separated from his first wife, when Helms lived at the Chevy Chase Club, he was regularly pursued by hostesses. "One society figure here says that "all the women would say, 'Why don't we get Dick Helms for an 'extra'?' He was regarded, she adds, "as very un-creepy; he would strike

you as a Chevy Chase golfer." (Actually, his game is tennis.)

It was during this same time that Helms was rising, in the space of three years, to the top of CIA. And that, some of his old friends think, was a most difficult

and very likely costly experience for him.

"The sudden move from down inside the agency, to deputy and then to director, pitched Dick out into that world of chauffeur-driven cars, club memberships, the social circuit, exposure to Cabinet meetings, the NSC, senators and congressmen," a long-time associate says. Despite his "training" under McCone, "it was the first time Helms was in a world where he was not sure-footed."

THERE ALSO were difficulties at home. He and his wife were separated for a long period, and then divorced. Helms married the woman who had been a so-

cial friend of the family. Mrs. Cynthia McKelvie.

The divorce, all of his friends say, was a heavy financial burden to Helms. "Dick was not a wealthy man. In the divorce, he gave up what he had. He and Cynthia have sailed very close to the wind financially," says a close friend. "They have been remarkably adept at maintaining their position under the circumstances."

The Helmses took an apartment at the Irene, a high-rise on Willard Avenue in Chevy Chase. "It used to be such a surprise; Dick always answered the phone himself," recalls an acquaintance. "He said they couldn't afford any servants, that there was hardly enough money for the furniture."

In fact, some of Helms' friends believe that the financial situation and the difficulties of adjustment kept Helms from leaving government service at that

time.

"I asked him why he agreed to take the ambassadorship," said a friend. "He said he wanted to get Cynthia away where she could live comfortably for a while."

HE APPARENTLY had had several good job offers outside of government. But he agreed to go to Tehran after, apparently, being fired from the CIA job by President Nixon. "He was quite unceremoniously forced out," says an associate.

Called to Camp David, Nixon's Maryland retreat, Helms was given a choice of ambassadorships. He chose Iran, and went.

Afterward, CIA Director William E. Colby is said to have remarked to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger (Helms' immediate successor at CIA) when both of them had been fired by President Ford:

"You know, Dick Helms outlasted us both."

WASHINGTON STAR
15 JAN 1976

The CIA and Its Former Chief Miss Their Powerful Friends

The Charmed Life of Richard Helms — Part 2

By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer

The whole room tells of power, of rank, of prestige; it may be one of the most impressive places in Washington.

On two walls are photographs of many of the figures who have dominated this city since World War II; many of the pictures are signed with a warm, personal note.

On another wall, there is an array of certified honors capable of stirring deep envy.

And on the fourth wall, there is the most enviable collection of all: this man's portrait on a half-dozen front covers of news magazines.

Of course, there is the man himself. If anyone in Washington can claim respect, surely he could — and does. He speaks easily, assuredly, knowingly. Behind an imposing desk, his gaze is fixed in a dominating way.

THIS IS Stuart Symington, U.S. senator from Missouri. A man who has known presidents and has been consulted by them. A man who, it often has been assumed, ought to have been in the White House himself.

He also is one of Richard Helms' best friends in Washington.

It is probable that, time after time, Helms has been in that very office in the Russell Building, sharing with Symington secrets that never will be known publicly.

Symington doesn't reveal them; he does not even allude to them. But he

is ready, even eager, to defend Helms.

"I'm just as sure that that man didn't do anything that wasn't in the national interest as I am that the sun is going to come up tomorrow morning."

It is a testimonial that, at the moment, Helms needs badly. The former director of the CIA is beleaguered, and nowhere is he in more trouble than in Congress. Day after day, accusations of CIA misdeeds come out of congressional committees and Helms gets a good share of the blame.

THE TROUBLE with Symington's support, however, is that it doesn't mean much these days. At another time, even a hint of doubt about what the CIA was up to would have been turned off with a word from a Symington or an Allen Ellender, a John Stennis or a Mendel Rivers.

A little circle of members was the only forum in Congress to which the CIA reported. It was not uncommon, apparently, for those lawmakers to decide that no one else on Capitol Hill needed to know what they had been told.

There were no leaks. There was even, now and then, the pretense or the reality of ignorance: Ellender is remembered for having said that he had not even asked about the CIA running a secret war in Laos. Lately, Symington has repeated often that the Senate's CIA "oversight"

committee sometimes went for a whole year without meeting.

It was within such a small community of the powerful that the CIA and Helms routinely operated — and did so with approval, at least implied approval.

BUT TIMES have changed. Powerful friends like Symington are in no position to stop the process of inquiry that is now going on, or even to shape its course. In fact, they are feeling pressed themselves to come up with some ideas of their own for reform.

The process means, for Helms individually, that his reputation and perhaps his future are very much at stake.

He is described by friends as somewhat stoic about the prospect of personal ruin, perhaps telling himself that it is the price he knew he might have to pay in his kind of profession. He is not going to take on his critics or criticize his old contacts on the Hill, associates say. "I don't think you'll find Helms throwing a lot of mud around," says a former colleague.

But what is happening to Helms and to the CIA seems to be taking on a

wider aspect, too. It may affect the whole future of the secret intelligence system.

Somewhat awkwardly and uncertainly, it seems, Congress has been trying to take over some of the power of foreign policy management. The spy business is, and always has been, directly mixed up in that.

The approval — or, at least, the easy tolerance — of what the CIA was doing was part of a well developed congressional habit of leaving the tough decisions on diplomacy and military strategy to the White House. The lawmakers chose to be very accommodating, and presidents took that to mean indifference.

THAT SYSTEM came close to collapsing with the Vietnam war, in the later stages, anyway. And it then became politic — and politically salable — for Congress to try to assert itself. That was especially true after the Pentagon Papers "leak" and then the Watergate scandals showed how far presidents felt free to go in the name of "national security." The CIA revelations followed, almost predictably.

"I believe," suggests a former colleague of Helms, "that the combination of disgust and fatigue from Vietnam and Watergate are playing an equal role."

It is not yet clear, and won't be for months, how far Congress wants to go now to give itself control over the CIA or to put other kinds of restraints on the agency. So far, Senate and House committees have focused on a variety of CIA "dirty tricks," but it is not yet clear that Congress is prepared to put a stop to all of that.

There are even fewer indications of what Congress wants done about the entire approach to spying and intelligence in general.

Some who have spent their careers in espionage seem prepared to believe that — because of the kind of inquiry Congress is making — the CIA may simply be abolished.

"THE AGENCY," one of these professionals comments, "doesn't deserve a living from the United States. The United States can do anything it wants to the agency. . . . But if you base a decision on what, so far, the country has been given to hear, I see no reason to expect that the agency would not be dismantled."

What is the least clear

about Congress' intentions at this point is whether it wants to do anything at all about the power of presidents to use the CIA.

That is where long-time professionals in U.S. spying see the most serious abuses, and that is where most of them think Helms' problems — and those of other CIA leaders — first arose.

There has been a split, for at least 25 years, in the intelligence community over the value of the so-called "cowboy" approach to espionage. That approach means all the secret techniques of disrupting the enemy, from supporting favored political factions abroad to dreaming up schemes to murder foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro.

Pressure from the very top of the government for "cowboyism" apparently began to develop heavily during the Korean war, when the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination — the "dirty tricks department" — was formed.

"If the government hadn't been so hepped on this in the early Fifties, a lot of these problems wouldn't have arisen," says a CIA leader of that era.

PRESIDENT Dwight Eisenhower probably was the first to show a real interest in that side of the intelligence business, according to the professionals. "He had dealt with intelligence and operations, and with the Resistance, during the war," recalls one.

Within the White House, the National Security Council began working up schemes to make trouble for Communist regimes abroad. There quickly developed a tendency at the agency's OPC to plan major — and very expensive — "covert operations."

Under the pressure, the agency got sloppy about this side of its work, according to career men who were involved. "We were talking about sending 20 people where one would do, spending \$20 million instead of \$1 million," recalls one professional, who adds: "Nothing so concentrates the mind of an intelligence agency as a healthy shortage of funds."

But there was no shortage, and most professionals at the CIA knew the reason: The White House was interested. "It was perfectly clear to me," says a man who was in the "operations" side of CIA then, "that the people who were about those boys over there (at CIA)?" Allen Dulles

policy vacuum."

Another remembers: "Allen Dulles used to come back from the White House with one of these ideas, and he would say: 'Don't tell me it's crazy — we don't have any choice.'"

THE PROCESS apparently stirred deep dissension within CIA ranks. One key source of resentment, apparently, was a departure from the system of having "clandestine operations" plans work their way up from the station chiefs abroad.

"For many years — up to the arrival of the Kennedys, perhaps it was with Eisenhower — nothing had ever been generated and put into motion that didn't originate in the operations area, and then was pushed upward for approval, at the policy area," a CIA leader recounts.

Some who did not like the idea of starting at the top with such schemes protested, and, when that failed, got out. But, one professional says, "some of us used to sit around and rationalize that, if we left, someone else would just be put in to do it. Some of us felt we could keep these things under control." But he adds bluntly, "you accepted these demands or you got out."

Helms did not get out. "His primary loyalty was to the executive," an associate suggests. "That was the tradition in which he was raised as a professional. This is where you basically were going to get your orders. If you got a request from the White House, it was pretty hard to say no. What the hell were you in business for?"

Another CIA professional describes what was happening within the government and CIA:

"Since Kennedy — including Johnson and Nixon — you have had a personalized government; the government of the U.S. is run out of the White House, a strong president relying on one or two individuals.

"A LOT OF the cowboy bent in recent years stemmed from the fact that we've had frustrated presidents. They had problems they couldn't solve through the orthodox machinery of government. And they haven't been willing to use their own powers.

"They have been inclined more to turn to the agency for capabilities they didn't really understand. They would go to State and go to the Pentagon, then someone would say, 'Oh, about those boys over there (at CIA)?" Allen Dulles

would be sent for, and told he's got to save Iran, or save Jordan, or save Italy, or save France. He would say, 'Yes sir!' and then he would come back and say 'Save Italy!'"

It is because of such recollections that CIA professionals angrily dispute the remark of Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho, of the Senate Intelligence Committee that the CIA has acted as "a rogue elephant" and that it treated the presidency "almost as an irrelevancy."

Some of these men also think that one defense made by Helms himself — that presidents have been shielded from knowing embarrassing things, so they could deny them if the United States got caught — has been heavily overdone.

That, one ex-CIA official says, "is a complete red herring." Another, while conceding that there have been times "where the link between policy and carrying it out has become fuzzy over a period of time," adds that "most of these have not been because of a determination of Helms that he was going to run the show."

These professionals are just as sure that Helms, and others, did not operate without telling Congress what they were doing. They dispute Sen. Symington's comment that "the CIA wasn't watched; they could do anything they wanted."

ONE FORMER CIA officer recalls: "You would go up there and brief two or three guys. Then you might be called before the full committee in an open hearing, and there sat those boys who know all about this, looking up at the ceiling."

There is, among the men who served along with Helms, a growing skepticism that Congress and the White House will now do much more than they ever have to provide solutions for the problems now being uncovered.

"The question is," says one of these professionals, "can Congress and the executive arrange their affairs in such a way that the agency can conduct operations with proper guidance?"

Another adds: "This is not so much a problem for the agency. God damn it, the country's faced with the problem. I don't think it's important what happens to the agency. But I would have thought the first thing we would want to do was to study the United States as it is today, and decide what it needs — what an agency like the CIA needs to be and

do."

Helms' former colleagues see a possibility that, after the focus on CIA's misdeeds in secret military or political adventures, Congress may decide to wipe out "the clandestine side of the business." That would include intelligence-gathering and protection of

the U.S. espionage network itself, as well as "dirty tricks" operations.

"IF THE UNITED States is to be asked to forgo any covert means of obtaining intelligence, we certainly would get less intelligence. The amount of hard fact which emerges from

clandestine intelligence is a small part of the total information available at any one time — but it very often is priceless. Very often, it is the missing link."

There appears to be major concern, in fact, that a loss of secret information-gathering

could hamper the process of developing the "intelligence estimates" upon which much U.S. military and diplomatic policy is based.

The future of the "estimates" system has not figured significantly in congressional probes of the CIA.

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On Tape: 'We Protected Helms,' Nixon Told Haldeman

Lyle Denniston

Washington Star Staff Writer

It is somewhat after 10 in the morning, June 23, 1972. In the Oval Office at the White House, presidential assistant H.K. Haldeman is talking — quite excitedly — to President Richard M. Nixon.

"You seem to think the thing to do is to get them to stop?" Haldeman asks, referring to the FBI investigation of the Watergate burglary just six days before.

"Right, fine," Nixon answers.

"They say," Haldeman says, "the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and to — ah, what's his name — ? Walters." He goes on:

"And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say, ah —"

He doesn't finish the scenario. Nixon interrupts: "All right, fine. How do you call him in — I mean you just — well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things."

Haldeman agrees. "That's what Ehrlichman says."

THE "HELMS" they say has been protected is Richard Helms, at the time the director of the CIA.

His name comes up again that day at the White House, a few hours later. Again, Haldeman is talking about the plan to get the FBI to stop the Watergate investigation, relying on Helms to do it.

The President says: "If it gets out that this is all involved, the Cuba thing would be a fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate — both for CIA, and for the country, at this time, and for American foreign policy. Just tell him to lay off. Don't you?"

Haldeman agrees, and seems satisfied with the solution. "Yep. That's the basis to do it on. Just leave it at that."

As that part of the conversation closes, Nixon again mentions Helms in a cryptic way: "Helms is not one to (unintelligible) . . ."

THE REFERENCES to Helms meant little when that day's transcript came out in the late summer of 1974. The mentions of Helms, in fact, were largely passed over then amid the sensational revelations

own early role in the "Watergate cover-up" — the revelation that forced the president to resign.

But the references to Helms may have meant something significant then. If ever explained fully, they may mean something significant in the future.

For the time being, however, they are merely in the record of history, posing still lingering questions about Richard Helms and the Watergate scandals.

Those scandals included, of course, not only the burglary at the Democratic Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex, and the "cover-up" of the White House role in trying to stop the FBI probe, but also the use of the White House "Plumbers" team for a 1971 break-in at a California psychiatrist's office during the White House-led investigation of the Pentagon Papers leak.

It is one of the ironies of Helms' current problems that he and his associates believe that he was fired as CIA chief, and sent off to be ambassador to Iran, solely because he would not cooperate with Nixon and his aides on those scandals.

"The word was passed around at the time," recalls a friend of Helms, "that Helms had not been able to get along with (Henry) Kissinger. That is totally false. The real reason is that Helms had stood up against Nixon on the Watergate cover-up."

PART OF the proof that persuades Helms' associates that he was punished for being "obstructionist" on Watergate is that, on leaving the CIA, he did not get the National Security Medal — something that a retired CIA chief might normally expect. The idea was suggested, but never acted upon at the White House.

Helms' conduct in each of the scandals has been probed by a variety of congressional committees.

Pages upon pages of committee hearings track back and forth over the Plumbers incident, CIA sponsorship of some of former CIA officer E. Howard

ings that Helms attended at the White House as the Watergate case began to unfold, and the variety of ways in which top Nixon aides leaned on the CIA.

Still, it is uncertain that everything there is to be known about any of that has been disclosed. Some of the CIA's own tape recordings have been destroyed. Not all of the White House tape recordings have been disclosed.

There is no indication, though, that Helms faces legal problems because of the scandals beyond the potential difficulty in the Justice Department's year-old perjury investigation of some of his congressional testimony. The whole matter seems largely closed.

WHAT HAS come out publicly has raised, but not answered, at least these questions about Helms and the scandals:

- What did Nixon mean about having "protected" Helms?

- Why was Nixon confident that Helms would go along with the idea of using a "national security" ruse to stop the FBI investigation of Watergate?

- Why did neither Helms nor any other CIA official tell Watergate prosecutors about these pressures or about past associations with Howard Hunt when they first learned he was tied to the Watergate burglary?

- Why didn't they tell the prosecutors about Nixon campaign aide James W. McCord's attempts to warn the CIA that the White House was trying to make Watergate look like a CIA plot in order to protect its secrecy?

- Did anyone at the CIA know, in advance, about the Watergate break-in?

- What does it mean that Howard Hunt, an ex-CIA officer, was involved in both the Plumbers incident and in the Watergate bur-

glary?

- Why did the CIA try to head off FBI inquiries into White House aide John D. Ehrlichman's dealings with the CIA over the Plumbers incident a year before Watergate?
- What is the full story behind Helms' firing as CIA director?

THOSE QUESTIONS, in turn, lead to others, broader in scope and perhaps harder to answer, about Helms and the CIA in the Nixon era.

They involve the degree to which CIA's intelligence duties are carried out here at home, the sensitivity — or lack of it — at the White House about limits on CIA's authority, the nature of CIA-FBI dealings, the controls — or lack of them — on secret escapades by ex-CIA officers, the chain of command within the CIA and above it, the responsibility — if any — of CIA's leaders to filter out the necessary from the frivolous when they get orders from the White House, and obey only the ones that they think are compelling.

One conclusion, bearing on many of these issues, does seem to have emerged already: The CIA was treated in the Nixon administration as virtually an extension of the White House. Perhaps, as some of Helms' colleagues have suggested, that was the approach that presidents have taken for the past 20 years.

Helms' troubles and the current plight of the CIA itself are posing issues that, apparently, no one in government has ever asked seriously.

"You have to define what a president can do under the term 'national security,'" suggests one of Helms' long-time associates.

The Watergate scandals seem almost a classic case study of extreme answers to that. Very early and throughout, the one theory upon which aides — and Nixon himself — sought to justify their actions was "national security." But it is not even clear that officials felt obliged to define what they meant; merely reciting the phrase often seemed to be enough.

IT IS APPARENT, however, that when White House officials turned to the CIA, they did not bother to go into detail about security justifications. Ordering the agency into action was justification enough.

Helms, in 1973 testimony on the scandals, gave some indication of what he felt was expected of him. He

described his reactions at a key White House meeting in 1972 this way:

"Here was Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, the two most senior officials in the White House next to the president himself, giving this instruction. And I really feel like now, as I did then, that it would have been presumptuous to have pressed them any harder as to how they had come up with this, or where they had gotten the idea, or who was behind it."

Helms also has testified that he did not feel free to go around Haldeman and Ehrlichman and talk to Nixon himself about the assignment those aides were giving to the CIA.

It is not clear, yet, just what kind of relationship Helms had with Nixon. His associates say they doubt that the CIA director ever felt he could pick up the telephone and call the president, and they say he was at the White House fewer times than speculation would indicate.

Helms has said that, at that 1972 White House meeting in the week after the Watergate burglary, Haldeman passed him by and spoke directly to his deputy — Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters — about the plan to "limit" the FBI probe. Helms, however, did regard that as "odd," he has testified.

SEN. STUART Symington, D-Mo., a close friend of Helms, has suggested that the Nixon administration put Walters in as Helms' deputy to insure that one of "their men" would be in a controlling spot at CIA. Walters had been an official interpreter for Nixon during some of his foreign trips as vice president in the 1950s.

That is the same Walters, however, whose name Haldeman had trouble remembering when he talked of going to CIA officials about the FBI.

There is one fact: Helms was removed as CIA director at the end of 1972, before the Watergate scandal began to unravel publicly. Beyond that, there is his own testimony that he did fight against misuse of the CIA in the cover-up.

In May 1973, Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the CIA had "totally and 100 percent resisted" attempts to get it involved in any activity inside this country. In August 1973, he told the Senate Watergate Committee he had told Walters to "hang in there" in resisting White House demands that

cover-up by paying Watergate burglars' bail fees.

But there are many gaps between those claims of non-involvement and the specific suggestions, hints and implications that come out of the mass of testimony and evidence gathered in congressional probes of Watergate.

Perhaps the most significant day in the whole period for Helms, then and now, was June 23, 1972 — six days after the Watergate burglary, and the day on which Nixon and Haldeman talked of using Helms to shut off the FBI probe of Watergate.

BETWEEN THE Oval Office sessions of Nixon and Haldeman that are recorded on the June 23 tapes, there was a meeting a little after 1 p.m. elsewhere in the White House: in Ehrlichman's office on the second floor. This was called to put into effect the plan that the president and Haldeman had just agreed to follow.

Haldeman and Ehrlichman were there, and so were Helms and Walters.

When Helms first discussed that meeting at a congressional hearing in May 1973, he said the Watergate burglary was not discussed. However, when he next discussed it, in August 1973, after seeing a memo by Walters on the meeting, Helms said Haldeman did mention the burglary and had said that "the opposition" (presumably, the Democrats) was "capitalizing on it."

He said Haldeman made some "incoherent reference to an investigation in Mexico, or an FBI investigation, running into the Bay of Pigs."

That, as Helms said he learned later, was a reference to the fact that some money from Nixon's campaign organization had been "laundered" through Mexico before it wound up in the bank account of one of the Watergate burglars, a Cuban exile leader.

Haldeman went on to say, Helms said, that the Mexican angle could lead the FBI to discover some "covert" CIA operations, and that Walters should go to Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray and tell him to stay out of that area — that the FBI probe "should be tapered off or reduced, or something."

AS THEY LEFT the meeting, Helms testified, he walked downstairs with Walters to a waiting automobile, and told the general to say only to Gray that "if

agents or operations, it (CIA) should be immediately notified."

Four days later, according to testimony by Gen. Walters, White House aide John W. Dean began pressuring the agency to use "covert action funds" to pay bail and salaries for the Watergate burglars because they "were getting scared and were wobbling."

The general has testified that he felt this approach was wrong, and said he told Dean he "would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign on this issue." Helms said he advised Walters not to "yield an inch" in his resistance.

Thus, within 10 days after the burglary, Helms was aware that the White House was heavily involved with the Watergate incident, and that the CIA was being pressured to take a role.

In fact, however, he knew — two days after the burglary — that the incident was somehow related to Nixon's campaign organization. On Monday, June 19, Helms talked with CIA aides about the involvement of McCord, one of those arrested that Saturday morning. McCord was a former CIA officer and Helms apparently knew right away that McCord was working as chief of Nixon's campaign security staff.

The role of Helms and the CIA in the Watergate affair has been probed at length by Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., who was a member of the Senate Watergate Committee, and his staff aide on that panel, Fred D. Thompson.

THEY HAVE explored the activities of Robert F. Bennett, whose public relations firm had hired Howard Hunt after he retired from the CIA in 1970. Bennett's firm was serving as a CIA "cover" at the time.

Just before the break-in at the Watergate, Bennett had learned that Hunt had been planning to wiretap the telephones at Democratic candidate George McGovern's headquarters here. Two days after the Watergate burglary — before Hunt's name was mentioned by the press as having been tied to that incident — Bennett talked with Hunt and apparently all but confirmed his strong suspicion that Hunt was deeply involved with Watergate.

Bennett told a CIA case officer with whom he had been dealing about his suspicions of Hunt, but not until July 10. A memo on that conversation supposedly was given to Helms.

had learned before then from Bennett himself that he thought Hunt was involved. But the CIA itself reportedly did not relate any of this either to prosecutors or to the FBI.

The agency also did not pass along word that a CIA employe, Lee R. Pennington Jr., had gone to visit McCord's home shortly after the burglary, and may have destroyed some records. That data also was withheld, for a time, from the Senate Watergate Committee.

Much of the testimony and evidence that raises questions about Helms and the whole series of scandals during the Nixon administration bears on the role of Hunt, and CIA officials' awareness of that.

One of Helms' own associates criticizes the Helms-Hunt relationship: "As a personal weakness, Helms tolerated some prima donnas — like E. Howard Hunt — beyond the time he should have."

Aside from the Bennett memo showing his suspicion that Hunt may have been involved in the break-in plot, the Baker-Thompson investigation turned up evidence that in March 1972 — three months before the Watergate burglary — a CIA officer in Miami was told that "Hunt was employed by the White

House." At the time, Hunt was recruiting Cuban exiles, apparently for the burglary.

Helms' associates insist that the White House did not check with the CIA before putting Hunt on its payroll, and that, if it had, a "derogatory" reply would have been given.

ANOTHER ITEM that figured in the Baker-Thompson probe was a transcript of a CIA tape recording of a telephone call that Ehrlichman had made to the CIA on July 7, 1971, asking that help be provided for Hunt for an investigation he was doing.

That call, made to the then-CIA deputy director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., apparently was part of the White House Plumbers investigation of the leak of the secret Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. As part of that probe, a White House team led by Hunt broke into the office of a Beverly Hills, Calif., psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding. He had been treating Daniel Ellsberg, allegedly the source of the leak of the documents.

The Ehrlichman-Cushman transcript about Hunt reportedly was discussed by CIA officials at a meeting June 19, 1972 — two days after the Watergate burglary, and three months after the agency is said to

have learned that Hunt was working for the White House. (Whether it is a coincidence or not, that is the same day on which Helms talked with aides about McCord and the Watergate break-in.)

THE ACTUAL tape recording of the Ehrlichman call in 1971 was destroyed in January 1973. Congressional probes were told this was done on Helms' direct orders. Helms was then in the process of leaving the CIA post. He has testified that everything the agency had on any of the scandals had been turned over to the FBI.

Helms also has said, at various committee hearings, that he was unaware that Hunt was doing anything in this country. In early 1973, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "nobody knew he (Hunt) was going to be involved in any domestic activity." However, the House Judiciary Committee in 1974 published a memo showing that CIA aide Karl Wagner — the one who knew about the Ehrlichman-Hunt tie — had broken off contact with Hunt in 1972 because "his requests appeared to involve the agency in domestic clandestine operations," which are illegal.

The CIA director himself had a part in the decision to go along with the agency's help for Hunt in 1971, as Ehrlichman asked.

"I recall," he has testified, "that Gen. Cushman informed me that he had authorized giving to Howard Hunt a tape recorder and a camera, and I asked for what purpose and he said he wanted to conduct a one-time interview and that he had been properly authenticated by the White House and that he was working at their behest.

Hunt actually was given a wig, hidden camera, tape recorder and other items for use as a physician disguise. The camera, hidden in a tobacco pouch, was used by Hunt to photograph the offices of Dr. Fielding.

IN ANOTHER facet of the Plumbers case, Helms authorized the preparation — at White House request — of a psychological profile on Ellsberg. He testified later that he had "genuine regrets" about that.

Helms has said that he did not believe that the Plumbers incident and the agency's dealings with Hunt had anything to do with the Watergate scandal.

"Nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot," he said in May 1973.

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Home Front Heat on Helms and His Oval Office Fealty

By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer

Dick Helms had a lot on his mind when he got to work on that Friday morning.

In Moscow, the Soviet Union was ousting four British diplomats and a businessman, showing mild displeasure over Britain's decision of two weeks earlier to throw out 105 Soviet spies.

In Paris, negotiations over an agreement to end the Vietnam war were idling along between the United States and North Vietnam.

And in Hanoi, Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny wound up a five-day visit, leaving behind new promises of military aid to North Vietnam.

IT WAS OCT. 8, 1971; Helms was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for watching what America's enemies do.

The most significant matter of the day for Helms was not, however, overseas. It was a summons to the Oval Office at the White House, by the President himself.

Richard Nixon and his aides had wanted to get secret files, held by the CIA, for use against the agency's "enemies" — administration critics,

and Sen. Edward Kennedy in particular since he then seemed likely to become Nixon's Democratic opponent in the 1972 election.

The idea was to leak contents of these files a little at a time, creating embarrassment for Democrats because of the policy *faux pas* disclosed in the files.

Helms, while giving up some files, had refused to let one go: on the fall of the Diem government in South Vietnam.

But that was likely to be quite embarrassing to the Kennedy name, so the White House wanted it. Nixon called in Helms to demand the file, saying he needed it for use in possible negotiations with the Soviet Union.

A CIA MEMO on the meeting says Helms handed over the file, saying he worked "for only one president at a time" and that any papers he had "were at the president's disposal." Nixon took the file and slid it into a desk drawer. Some 10 months later it became evident that the White House political

operatives had found a unique way to translate what they had learned about the fall of Diem.

Copies of phony cables to Saigon, making President John Kennedy's government look even worse, were found in the White House safe of E. Howard Hunt after the Watergate break-in.

The incident over the secret files was described by the Rockefeller Commission after its investigation of the CIA last year as "another serious instance of misuse of the agency by the White House."

It concluded: "The commission recognizes that the director cannot be expected to disobey a direct request or order from the President without being prepared to resign."

HELMS DID NOT resign. He and his agency were drawn into many of the Nixon administration's multi-faceted efforts against domestic "enemies." Many of the efforts have been found to be plainly illegal. It was not until the next president, too, had put the agency to work on

homefront problems.

When congressional committees began probing these, Helms was prepared to take the blame, he said. "You've got to protect the president from the dirty stuff," he told reporters. "Somebody's got to take the heat, so let old Helms take it, and I'm taking it. You can't ask the president to sign off on illegal activity."

Helms grew up in the tradition of working for presidents, and of protecting them when CIA projects of interest to the White House went awry. He has said, repeatedly, that his loyalty was to the president, and he did not regard that as a crime.

The most serious accusations of illegal "domestic spying" by the CIA involve incidents during the years that Helms led the agency. He has insisted that these were limited and selective, not massive, and his friends have said he kept some of the incidents from being worse.

His own explanation of the evolution of many of these efforts, as a matter of government policy, shows why he is now making no apologies.

"IN THE LATE 1950s and early 1960s," he told a Senate committee a year ago, "came the sudden and quite dramatic upsurge of extreme radicalism in this country and abroad, an uprush of violence against authority and institution, and the advocacy of violent change in our system of government.

"By and in itself, this violence, this dissent, this radicalism were of no direct concern to the CIA. It became so only in the degree that the trouble was inspired by, or coordinated with; or funded by, anti-American subversion mechanisms abroad. In such event the CIA had a real, a clear and proper function to perform, but in collaboration with the FBI.

"The agency did perform that function in response to the express concern of the president."

In that sentence, the word "president" means two: Nixon and Lyndon B. Johnson. "Operation CHAOS," the CIA's code-named program to collect data on dissident Americans and the "peace movement" in general, was set up to serve both of those presidents.

"These White House demands," the Rockefeller Commission concluded, "seem to have encouraged top CIA management to stretch and, on some occasions, to exceed (its) legislative restrictions."

By law the CIA is supposed to limit itself to foreign security matters

Helms has testified: "There never has been any question about the intent of the Congress to confine the agency's intelligence function to foreign matters."

PART OF Helms' difficulties now, however, grow out of his assurances to Congress that the agency was not involved in domestic surveillance.

When he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 7, 1973, he was asked by Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J.:

"It has been called to my attention that in 1969 and 1970 the White House asked that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about the anti-war movement, and during this period U.S. Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens. Do you know anything about the activities of the CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?"

Helms replied: "I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was."

There have been other discrepancies.

In testimony last year, Helms said that CIA monitoring of "radicalism" in this country turned up information showing that it "did in fact have some overseas connections."

But the Rockefeller Commission disclosed that, in reporting back to the White House, the agency came to the "repeated conclusion . . . it could find no significant foreign connection with domestic disorder."

EVEN THOUGH a "foreign connection" is necessary to justify CIA actions, the agency has not considered itself confined strictly to what happens outside the United States.

In fact, professionals in intelligence — including Helms — have argued that there is no way to draw a clear line against any CIA activity inside the nation's borders.

"The agency," Helms has testified, "is charged with collecting foreign intelligence domestically from U.S. citizens or residents traveling abroad."

One of his former associates makes the point more colorfully:

"It is simply naive to say that the agency can operate only overseas. Suppose one of our men in this country picks up some foreign intelligence: does he have to go up to the Canadian border and put one foot across be-

fore he can report in?"

In 1974 the CIA did issue orders to its staff to limit collection of foreign intelligence to overseas, when it involved American citizens. That supposedly is done only when the FBI expressly asks the CIA to monitor a citizen's foreign activities. The CIA does not feel free to pick and choose among the FBI requests.

AS ONE HELMS associate remarked: "It is not up to us to decide whether the bureau has a right to be interested."

Although the FBI, like the CIA, has lately gotten into trouble over the matters in which it did get interested, it was assumed for many years that the FBI had almost unlimited responsibility for "domestic security."

There seem to have been many times, however, when frustration with FBI results led high-ranking government officials to turn to the CIA to back up the FBI in its field.

For example, Helms testified in 1973 that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which advises the president, had continually made "feelers" about this. The question was asked repeatedly, Helms said, whether "there isn't somebody else that can take on some of these things if the FBI isn't doing them as well as they should?"

The Rockefeller Commission, in analyzing Operation CHAOS' monitoring of the anti-war movement, said:

"The FBI, unlike the CIA, generally did not produce finished, evaluated intelligence. Apparently for these reasons, the President (Johnson) looked to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to produce a coordinated evaluation upon the question of dissidence."

HELMS AND the CIA did just that. The commission noted that, on Nov. 15, 1967, Helms personally delivered a report to Johnson with a covering note saying "this is the study of the United States Peace Movement you requested."

When Nixon came into the White House, and Operation CHAOS continued, the CIA director at one point showed that he knew the agency had gone out of its bounds.

Helms' covering memorandum with a report to Henry Kissinger on Feb. 18, 1969, said:

"In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students within the charter of this

agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned."

Apparently even Operation CHAOS did not work well enough in gathering data on what were called "restless youth." The Nixon administration promptly got busy on what became the "Huston plan" — a broad-scale campaign (never put into full effect) to monitor domestic activists and dissidents, using wiretaps, burglaries, mail interception and other illegal tactics.

STILL, CHAOS continued in operation until March 15, 1974 — more than a year after Helms had departed. He had been a supporter of it and a leader in it throughout.

On Sept. 6, 1969, Helms sent key officials in the CIA a memo telling them to provide support to Operation

CHAOS. Considerable resistance apparently developed within the CIA. But Helms put that down. The Rockefeller Commission reported that a Dec. 5, 1972, Helms memo said:

"CHAOS is a legitimate counterintelligence function of the agency and cannot be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity."

Although CHAOS apparently put the agency further into domestic activity than it had ever been before, it is not yet clear whether Helms or other CIA officials face any serious criminal charges because of it.

IT HAS BEEN reported that Helms may be prosecuted for his role in approving a CIA break-in of a photo studio in Fairfax, Va., on Feb. 19, 1971. However, it is expected that that will be only a minor charge — a misdemeanor.

But Helms already has serious legal problems because of another CIA activity inside this country: opening mail. The program was begun in 1953, when Allen W. Dulles was CIA director and Helms was one of his key aides.

The mail that was opened generally was that between the U.S. and Communist countries. The operation continued for 20 years and, during that time, more than 200,000 letters and other pieces of mail were opened.

CIA officials, looking back, seek to justify the program on the ground that it was begun and continued during two wars — Korea and Vietnam — when U.S. troops were in the field

and thus contact with U.S. enemies was considered to be dangerous — even criminal.

But whatever the rationale for it, mail-opening, the Rockefeller Commission concluded, was illegal. "U.S. statutes," it said, "specifically forbid opening the mail." It also suggested that the opening may have violated constitutional rights of privacy and free speech and press.

THE MAIL-OPENING project continued for three years after the White House had been told, in a 1970 report signed by Helms and others, that it had been discontinued. He has since testified that he had "no intention to mislead," saying he believed at the time

that the report was referring to a discontinued effort by the FBI.

Helms has been sued in a damage case filed by the American Civil Liberties Union because of the interception of mail to and from the Soviet Union. The Justice Department in December hired private lawyers to represent Helms and other present and former officials in such cases.

Both the damage lawsuit and any criminal cases that may be begun against Helms are likely to raise a basic legal question: whether CIA officials have immunity for their actions even when U.S. law says such actions are illegal.

Already lawyers are working on theories that intelligence operations are

a different form of governmental activity, related to the very survival of the nation, and thus should be judged by different legal standards.

One precept from ancient Roman law is likely to be relied on, according to one Helms associate. It is "salus publica lex suprema" — "The public safety is the highest law."

It may be that some immunity might be gained because of a long-standing arrangement under which the Justice Department let the CIA decide on its own whether any agency officers should be prosecuted if they broke laws while on the job.

THE AGREEMENT, reached in 1954, provided

that if the CIA made up its mind that prosecution of an officer would force the agency to disclose secrets, the CIA could simply tell the Justice Department that, and not refer the case at all.

This ended in January 1975, according to the Rockefeller Commission.

However, some agency officials — perhaps Helms himself — might argue in court now that they relied upon this arrangement, and thus they had no criminal or otherwise unlawful intent in the actions they took.

Moreover, officials might argue that, since many of their actions were not only known to but were ordered by presidents, they gained immunity for what they then did.

WASHINGTON STAR

1 8 JAN 1976

'Track II,' the Anti-Allende Plot, and How It Worked

By Lyle Denniston

Washington Star Staff Writer

A military sedan moves easily down a one-way, residential street in Santiago, Chile. It is morning, a little after 8, on Oct. 22, 1970.

Gen. Rene Schneider, chief of Chile's army, is on his way to the De-

Last of five articles.

fense Ministry downtown, determined to take further steps to insure that the military stays neutral in the political power struggle going on.

Suddenly his sedan is cut off by another car. Two young men jump out of the other auto, one carrying a small sledge-hammer, the other a .45-caliber pistol.

A rear window of Schneider's car is broken, and one of the youths reaches in and fires the pistol repeatedly — at least five times. The general is hit as he tries to draw his own pistol. Wounded in the chest, neck and right hand, Schneider lingers for three days, then dies.

Five men, some of whom are known to be associated with extreme rightist political groups, are the prime suspects.

"ALL THESE people have been trained by the CIA . . . The CIA is the moral author of this crime," a Chilean senator charges. He is Aniceto Rodriguez, secretary-general of the Socialist party — part of the left-wing coalition, including Communists, that put Dr. Salvadore Allende Gossens into the presidency of Chile.

Two days after the shooting of Schneider, the Chilean Congress approves Allende, making him the first Marxist president in Latin America.

Three years later — on Sept. 11, 1973, — Allende himself is dead, shot in a military coup.

Somewhere in all of this — it is not yet clear exactly where and how deeply — the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was, indeed, involved. So was "Track II." And so was Richard Helms.

When Allende came to power, Helms was director of the CIA and thus was a key man in carrying out the anti-Allende plot known as "Track II." By the time Allende died, Helms had left the CIA to be U.S. ambassador to Iran, but "Track II" may still have been in effect, in some form.

IT IS NOT settled, even yet, whether "Track II" worked or failed. Schneider died, but the death of that key opponent of military overthrow did not keep Allende out of office. The seeds of plotting sown in 1970,

nevertheless, may have grown into the coup three years later.

What is settled, and quite clearly now, is that the whole Chile episode is a continuing problem for Helms, maybe his most serious.

If he is charged with the crime of lying to congressional committees, it most likely would be over his testimony on Chile.

The Chilean operation and its aftermath have become symbols in the three years of revelations about the CIA — and about Richard Helms.

Perhaps no secret U.S. intelligence "operation" has been so deeply and frequently probed. For many, it illustrates the lengths to which an American president will go in trying to deal with foreign adversaries. It also shows the degree to which the CIA has been put to work by presidents to get results overseas that no president would try to justify publicly at home.

IN THE CIA's annals, the Chilean operation is not an isolated entry. The agency has done similarly bold things at other times against other adversaries.

None of those plots, however, stands out in Helms' career as does the one involving Chile.

He recalled later that, at a White House meeting Sept. 15, 1970, on the Chile problem, he got as sweeping a mandate as he had ever had. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day."

The CIA had, in fact, been turned loose by the president himself, Richard M. Nixon. Helms' handwritten notes on the meeting in the Oval Office read:

One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!

worth spending

not concerned risks involved

no involvement of Embassy

\$10,000,000 available, more if necessary

full-time job — best men we have

game plan

make the economy scream

48 hours for plan of action.

A CIA memo dated the next day translated those notes, as Helms discussed the mandate with his agency associates:

"The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Al-

lende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized \$10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense."

A CABLE TO THE CIA chief in Santiago went out on Sept. 21, saying: "(Track Two) — This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem."

That, then, was Track II: An out-and-out military coup. Track I had been a many-faceted plan that included \$250,000 for possible use to bribe Chilean congressmen, along with other propaganda and economic pressures.

Track II was a lot more direct: CIA encouragement of a coup, first by Gen. Robert Viaux, then by Gen. Camilo Valenzuela. The plot included the passing of three machine guns and money to the conspirators.

Officials here now have no doubt that the shooting of Schneider was done by Viaux's associates, after Viaux was supposed to have been dissuaded because he was considered to be "a nut."

The Senate Intelligence Committee's study of the Chilean operation, and especially of Track II, leaves unclear whether high Nixon administration officials actually decided to call off a coup attempt.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, then a White House aide, and his deputy at the time, Alexander M. Haig, have insisted that a decision was made on Oct. 15 to stop the coup plan, and that they thus knew nothing about a plot to kidnap Schneider or about the supplying of money or weapons. CIA aides disagreed with that version, saying Valenzuela was not supposed to be turned off — only Viaux — and that they kept the White House fully informed on the whole plan.

MILITARY PLOTTERS in Chile did make two unsuccessful attempts to kidnap Schneider, and U.S. officials were aware of these. Then, Schneider was killed in the third attempt to abduct him.

"American officials," the Senate committee concluded, "did not desire or encourage Schneider's death. Certain high officials did know, however, that the dissidents planned to kidnap Gen. Schneider . . . The possibility of his death should have been recognized as a foreseeable risk of his kidnapping."

One who did know was

Helms. It is unlikely at this stage that he will be charged with violating any law because of his direct role with Track II or other parts of the Chilean operation. His legal problem, rather, arises out of what he has told senators about all of this.

On Feb. 7, 1973, he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on his nomination to be ambassador to Iran. The senators wanted to know about Chile, among other things.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., asked: "Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the government of Chile?"

Helms: "No, sir."

Symington: Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?"

Helms: "No, sir."

On March 16, 1973, he appeared before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating the Chilean operation. The subcommittee chairman, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho (now the Intelligence Committee's chairman), asked Helms: "Up to the time that the Congress of Chile cast its vote installing Allende as the new president, did the CIA attempt in any way to influence that vote?"

Helms: "What vote?"

Church: "The vote of the Congress."

Helms: "No, sir."

IN APRIL 1974, CIA Director William E. Colby secretly informed a House subcommittee that the Nixon administration had had an \$8 million program between 1970 and 1973 to try to undermine the Allende regime.

Some eight months later, on Dec. 19, 1974, Colby paid a visit to then-Acting Atty. Gen. Laurence H. Silberman to inform the Justice Department that Helms may have committed perjury in his 1973 testimony. Colby apparently decided to make that contact voluntarily, after the CIA had finished a probe of its own into past agency activities, including the Chilean episode.

Helms came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee again a month later — Jan. 22, 1975. It was a closed session. He was asked about what he had said in reply to Symington two years before, and he answered:

"As far as the earlier statement is concerned, whether the agency tried to overthrow the government of Chile, I answered, 'No.' I believe that is true. If it has been alleged differently by someone else, I am not precise having it."

He volunteered: "If the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth, the election might have come out differently."

HE ALSO SAID that the idea of bribing members of the Chilean Congress to get them to vote against Allende was considered "quite unworkable" in 1970. He testified: "Allende had this all wrapped up, it was put in the bag, and there was nothing that was going to change it."

In addition, Helms told the senators:

"As best I recall, a very secret probe was made to find out whether there was anything in Chile that looked like a force that would overthrow Allende. The Allende government was not even in at the time the probe was made; just to see if there were any forces there to oppose Allende's advent as president. It was very quickly established there were not and therefore no further effort was made along those lines, to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none."

He did concede to the committee that day that he had withheld information at the 1973 hearings, saying that "at that time, Allende's government was in power in Chile and we did not need any more diplomatic incidents . . . I felt obliged to keep some of this stuff, in other words, not volunteer a good deal of information."

A month later, Justice Department officials acknowledged that they were investigating Helms for possible perjury.

A HELMS associate now offers a simple defense for him: "He had a feeling that these weren't his secrets to give."

There is no indication that Helms is in any other legal trouble because of any of the plots involving possible "elimination" of foreign leaders. There has been some suggestion that a variety of U.S. treaty commitments may have been violated by some of these activities, but it would be rare for the government to prosecute because of that.

Helms, like other CIA officials who had some role with the plots, has been drawing heavy criticism from members of Congress and in the press over the assassination issue. That is the one issue on which Helms has allowed himself to lose his temper in public — a most uncharacteristic blowup that continues to puzzle some of his closest friends.

after Helms had finished a

long session with the Rockefeller Commission during its probe of the CIA. As he walked down a corridor, pursued by reporters, he confronted CBS reporter Daniel Schorr and shouted at him: "Killer Schorr! Killer Schorr!"

Schorr had been reporting that the CIA had been involved in assassination plots, and also had been pursuing Helms somewhat aggressively, trying for an interview on the subject.

HELMS' OUTBURST, whether spontaneous or calculated, did seem to reflect the frustration that he and many former colleagues feel over the assassination question.

Focus on plots to kill leaders such as Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Gen. Schneider, intelligence officers think, misses a key point: any country, including the United States, is going to have an "arsenal" of varied techniques available for use in pursuing its interests beyond its borders.

A Helms colleague comments: "Covert action is a substitute for landing the Marines, or open war."

"If there comes a time," another suggests, "when, after due process, the government decides something is to be done, there ought to be a mechanism to do it. It can't be whistled up at a time something has got to be done. You can't have an organization which doffs its pajamas in the morning and says, 'Today we are going to have a little political action.'"

HAVING A mechanism or capability is distinctly different, many CIA professionals believe, from actually carrying out a clandestine operation.

Thus, they are not prepared to concede that the critics of assassination planning are, in fact, sincere about attacking actual secret operations. These men tend to doubt that senators and other critics really believe that America can get along without any kind of secret operations.

But the professionals firmly deny that "political action" or other "covert" skirmishes, whether assassination or something else, control what the nation does in intelligence. "The clandestine service runs the political action, not the contrary," says one former CIA official.

Helms' associates say they agree that it is healthy for Congress to study "political action" and decide what to do about it. But they are at least frustrated, and often angry,

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at the way this is being done.

"There is a legitimate issue here, but you can look at it without stripping the intelligence capacity naked before its enemies," says a long-time CIA official.

THE SECRET of secret intelligence is now out, and there are many professionals who say they wonder if it can ever be kept again.

"Congress should either relieve us of the responsibility, or give us protection so that we can carry it out. There can be no covert action until Congress organizes itself to deal with the problem of the leak," says a former CIA professional.

Along with the frustration and the anger that now trouble Helms and his old associates, there is sorrow. Part of it seems to be the sense that the old order is passing. The days of the OSS alumni are gone, and Washington seems to feel differently now about patriotism and mobilization for wars.

But another part of the sorrow is a sense of personal rejection. "All of this," says one of Helms' closest friends, "is denigrating all the years that we put in."

No one, apparently, is more sorrowful than Helms. "Dick," says that friend, "has served his country, and now his whole career comes to a sorry end."

NEW YORK TIMES

21 JAN 1976

U.S. DENIES KNOWING WHO KILLED ENVOY

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Reuters)—The State Department today strongly denied that it knew the identity of the persons who assassinated Ambassador Rodger P. Davies in Nicosia, Cyprus, in 1974, or that it had been lax in investigating the killing.

At the same time, a department spokesman, John Trattner, told reporters the United States Government was dissatisfied with the way the Cyprus Government had investigated the murder.

His statements were prompted by reports that United States intelligence officials had learned the identity of the killers within an hour after Mr. Davies was shot and that the killers currently were members of the Cypriot security forces.

Mr. Trattner said that after the killing of Mr. Davies on Aug. 19, 1974, during an anti-American protest, the Cypriot Government assured Washington it would investigate the incident vigorously, but he said: "The Government of Cyprus is aware that we are not satisfied with its actions to date."

11 CIA Agents Passed Off as 'Journalists'

15 Companies Said Involved

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency had 11 full-time clandestine agents working overseas last year posing as journalists for American and foreign news organizations, according to the draft report of the House intelligence committee.

The report says 15 television, radio, newspaper and magazine companies cooperated with the agency in arrangements whereby the CIA agents "wrote nothing at all," although five of them were supposed to be representing organizations of "major general news impact."

The committee report does not list the news organizations involved.

In the introduction to a five-page section entitled "Manipulation of the Media," the report says "the free flow of information, vital to a responsible and credible press, has been threatened as a result of CIA's use of the world media for cover and for clandestine information-gathering."

The committee report also deals with a second CIA-journalist relationship—the payment of reporters who write as free-lancers or stringers for American news organizations. In this case, however, the organization has no knowledge of the journalists' agency ties.

The committee report says "Publishers have been unable, despite strenuous effort, to learn from the agency which, if any, of their employees have had a clandestine intelligence function."

Some paid CIA informers, the report said, "move from one bona fide press position to another without ever making employers aware of their past or present CIA status."

These contrast to the 11 full-time agents whose journalist employers knew them to be agents.

The part-time journalists, the report says, "are often directed to insert agency-composed news articles into

foreign publications and wire services."

Although, according to the report, "CIA does not intentionally propagandize in this country, CIA insensitivity to the possibility of its adulterating news digested by Americans is indicated by its frequent manipulation of Reuter wire service dispatches—which regularly appear in U.S. media."

Reuter is a British international news service whose dispatches are carried in many American newspapers, including The Washington Post.

In London, Gerald Long, managing director of Reuter, said last night: "Reuter has been in the news business for 125 years, largely because we know the difference between truth and lies. . . . I await proof that any Reuter service has been manipulated. Until I see it, I tend to think the agents have manipulated their employers."

The committee report noted that agency employment of

American journalists and use of U.S.-controlled news organizations as cover for CIA "has been tightened somewhat" since 1973, when regulations were changed to require Washington approval for any new arrangements.

The committee pointed out, however, that "foreign nationals" in the journalistic field still can be used without getting Washington approval.

CIA Director William E. Colby, according to the report, said reforms had "reduced risks to an acceptable level" in the journalistic field and that the program had to continue because of the "need for reliable information and the increasing reluctance of private firms and the government to provide cover . . ."

In another development, Sam Jaffe, a former reporter for CBS and ABC, disclosed that he had been in regular contact with the FBI beginning in the mid-1950s, when he was covering the United Nations in New York.

Jaffe said yesterday that because he was often in touch with Russians, he regularly reported those contacts to the FBI "to protect my backside."

At one time, according to Jaffe, FBI agents asked him to undertake a project suggested by a Soviet official that involved handling some visiting Soviet journalists. Jaffe said he refused.

Jaffe said he received no money from the FBI.

TV GUIDE JANUARY 10, 1976

New York Report CIA Disclosures Cause Problems For TV Newsmen

Reports about CIA involvements with foreign correspondents may have produced a chilling effect for some American newsmen overseas. "Part of what we do is based on trust, in terms of sources," said William J. Small, CBS News senior vice president. "If they think you are engaged in honest and serious reporting, they are going to level with you a lot more. They are going to be a good deal more open." However, he said, "when people are suspicious of you, they are much more curtailed in what they will tell you." Recently, links between the CIA and some newsmen were disclosed to Congress. So far, no specifics have surfaced. Last October, two CBS newsmen, one of them a free-lance cameraman, were arrested by Soviet-backed forces in Luanda, Angola, and accused of being CIA agents. The men were later released. Small, who called the current climate for newsmen "unhealthy," added, "I'm sure a lot of American businessmen go into these countries and find the same kind of suspicion."

WASHINGTON POST
2 3 JAN 1976A New Climate
For 'Reform'By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

A drastically altered political climate will greet outgoing Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby when he appears on Capitol Hill today to offer his prescription for reorganizing the intelligence community.

Just a few months ago there were predictions of major legislative surgery for the CIA—talk of ending covert operations, splitting off the analytical and operational branches of the agency, relocating the director to put him in the White House.

Now the forces for maintenance of the status quo are emerging as the Senate Government Operations Committee moves into the law-drafting stage of the intelligence controversy, which has been the liveliest subject of political interest in Washington since the Watergate scandals.

Traditional congressional intramural politics, for

News Analysis

example, are now coming into play on the intelligence reform issue.

Some congressional observers saw this as the underlying reason for the announcement by Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) Wednesday that he opposes formation of a new oversight committee to monitor the intelligence community.

Tower urged instead that the oversight function be left in the custody of the Armed Services committees, which have performed it for more than a quarter of a century in a spirit of clubby toleration. As the second-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Tower enjoys a position of influence on that panel.

The White House and intelligence community would gladly settle for that arrangement in place of the present congeries of six congressional committees that have a consultative role on CIA matters.

In the Senate there is a growing consensus for separate House and Senate oversight committees rather than a single joint panel. The fear among Senate advocates of tighter congressional control is that a joint committee bill might perish in the House or in conference.

The administration favors a joint committee approach to minimize the number of congressional staff persons

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1976

C.I.A. Asked Newsman to Be Informant

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22—The Central Intelligence Agency once approached an American newsman with a request that he keep the agency advised on "anything interesting" he encountered in the course of his reporting, a C.I.A. spokesman said today.

But the spokesman denied an assertion by the newsman, Sam A. Jaffe, that the C.I.A. had offered to arrange for him to be hired by the Columbia Broadcasting System and assigned to Moscow if he would agree to "undertake certain assignments" for the agency there.

The spokesman, who did not want to be identified, maintained that the approach to Mr. Jaffe, by an officer of the C.I.A.'s Domestic Contacts Division, had been made in 1956 or 1957 after the agency learned that he was scheduled to visit Peking.

The message conveyed by the C.I.A. officer, the spokesman said, was that if Mr. Jaffe "saw anything interesting where he was going, he might like to report back to his Government."

He added that the Domestic Contacts Division was a "perfectly overt" side of the agency's operations that, over the years, had "approached a lot of guys," possibly including other reporters, to solicit in advance their impressions of areas they were about to visit.

Official Identified

Mr. Jaffe said in a telephone interview that the C.I.A. man, who he said identified himself as Jerry Rubin, visited him in Atherton, Calif., in late 1955, after he had applied for a job with CBS but before the network accepted his application.

The C.I.A. spokesman confirmed that Mr. Rubin was the agency official who had visited Mr. Jaffe, but insisted that the visit had occurred a year or two later and in connection with the Peking trip.

Mr. Jaffe termed the spokesman's contention "an absolute lie," and said that Mr. Rubin had told him during the Atherton visit that he was "not only going to join CBS, you're going to Moscow if you're will-

ing to undertake certain assignments for us."

He declined Mr. Rubin's offer, he said, and was nevertheless hired by CBS and assigned to the network's New York office, where he worked on the assignment desk and covered the United Nations for the next five years.

In 1956, Mr. Jaffe recalled in the interview today, he and 14 other American journalists were invited to Peking by the Chinese Government, an invitation that he initially accepted and then declined after the Eisenhower Administration publicly urged the 15 journalists not to make the trip.

Mr. Jaffe said that he never saw Mr. Rubin after joining CBS and was not approached by anyone from the C.I.A. in connection with his prospective visit to Peking.

Mr. Jaffe left CBS in 1961 to join the American Broadcasting Company, for which he reported from Moscow and Hong Kong until resigning in 1969. The New York Times reported today that Mr. Jaffe had maintained an informant relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation during that period, voluntarily reporting to the bureau on Soviet activities here and abroad.

Informant for F.B.I.

Mr. Jaffe said that he had been unable to find a full-time job in journalism since then, a difficulty that he attributes to an allegation made by Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the United States in 1964, that Mr. Jaffe had himself been a Soviet intelligence operative.

However, William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intel-

ligence, wrote to Mr. Jaffe late last year with the assurance that the C.I.A. had "no evidence that you have ever been an agent of the Soviet or other foreign intelligence services."

Although Mr. Jaffe has confirmed his previous status as an informant for the F.B.I., an informant for the F.B.I., he has maintained that he never worked for either Soviet or American intelligence while stationed overseas.

He did question, however, whether some of his activities while with ABC in Moscow might have been financed, without his knowledge, by the C.I.A.

Before leaving for Moscow in 1961, Mr. Jaffe recalled, he was asked by ABC to open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City that would be used to transfer expense money from the network to a Soviet bank.

Mr. Jaffe did open the account, and produced a final statement showing that when he was recalled from Moscow in 1965, the account contained a balance of \$1,811.27—funds that, he assumed, had been paid into the account by ABC during the previous three years.

But he said that when he discussed the matter with network auditors in New York, they expressed no knowledge of the account and could find no record of having paid money into it.

William Sheehan, the president of ABC News, said today that he could offer no explanation for the mystery, except to say that the early 1960's were "a very loose period in terms of accounting methods" at ABC.

WASHINGTON STAR
1 7 JAN 1976

Rome Paper Lists 40 as CIA Agents

ROME — A new daily, La Repubblica, has claimed in a front-page article that 40 U.S. Embassy officials in Rome — 10 percent of the embassy staff — are CIA agents. La Repubblica alleged there are "many other agents . . . in military establishments and multinational corporations."

It was in this spirit, perhaps, that Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) asked one of yesterday's witnesses, former CIA official David Phillips, for a full explanation of Britain's Official Secrets Act, which imposes far-ranging official censorship over a wide range of governmental action—not only of a national security nature—and makes disclosure punishable by criminal prosecution.

Colby is supporting a legislative proposal that would impose criminal punishment on government officials on government classified information during

or after their active service.

There are also strong punitive provisions for disclosure of government secrets proposed in the bill known as S.1, which would recodify the U.S. Criminal Code and is awaiting action in the Senate.

One congressional participant in the intelligence "reform" process now under way prophesied that the net effect of the legislative labor on the intelligence issue will be to produce "an American official secrets act and no

WASHINGTON POST
17 JAN 1976

Panel Monitors CIA News 'Plants'

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency maintains a top-secret coordinating committee with the State Department and the United States Information Agency to make certain key policymakers are not taken in by exaggerated or false news stories planted by the CIA's covert propaganda network, according to intelligence sources.

The propaganda coordinating committee meets only when a major CIA covert media project is about to break, and even then, according to intelligence officials, only a handful of officials are informed.

"If too many are told," one former agency official said recently, "the project may not remain secret. And with covert media projects, we are never certain the planted material will surface publicly. We only hope so."

Although the group provides warnings for high government officials, no similar protection exists for the American public—a situation that has drawn the attention of the House and Senate committees investigating the CIA's covert journalistic operation.

CIA Director William E. Colby told the House committee that any pickup of CIA-generated stories by American news organizations "is a purely incidental effect of the activity which is conducted abroad with its objective abroad and with its impact abroad."

According to former top CIA officials, it was just such an "incidental" effect of a covert propaganda operation that led to establishment of the coordinating committee.

In the early 1960s, these officials say, the agency was using its resources in the Far East to create irritations between the Soviet and Chinese governments.

At that time, the two Communist powers were beginning to have disagreements but were far from the open break that subsequently took place.

CIA-sponsored radio stations on Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia broadcast as though they were in China, and would attack a Russian leader. The broadcasts, monitored in Hong Kong, would be replayed in the unwitting world media.

On one occasion, a CIA agent was infiltrated into China with a false story about the Chinese leadership. The

story was picked up by Chinese fleeing the mainland and, according to a former CIA official, passed on as true when the refugees got to Hong Kong.

The story thereafter was carried by international news services and the USIA's Voice of America, which broadcast it round the world.

Only after CIA officials in Washington informed VOA that the story was false was machinery set up to keep key officials informed of the CIA's covert news operations.

"Contamination," the agency word for domestic U.S. distribution of its overseas propaganda efforts, has gone beyond pickup of news stories.

Another Far East covert operation involved reprinting entire issues of mainland Chinese newspapers after first removing one story and replacing it with a false one written by CIA employees.

The real newspapers, held up in cooperating post offices, were then replaced by the doctored ones and mailed to subscribers all over the world.

At a recent Senate intelligence committee hearing, Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.) asked a former CIA official, David Phillips, if there were instances "where we have been the victims of our own (CIA) media efforts within this country."

"That has happened," Phillips replied.

In 1973, after CIA had reviewed its past use of journalists, an operational regulation was drafted to bar covert propaganda operations if they risked influencing American public opinion directly or indirectly. However, according to congressional sources who have read the regulation, it has loopholes that have permitted CIA-generated articles to continue to come into the United States.

After 1973, for example, the CIA continued to subsidize a London-based news feature service called Forum World Features. Begun in 1966, it supplied six articles a week to 150 newspapers in 50 countries, according to the feature service's 1974 promotional material.

The Washington Post and other U.S. newspapers, for example, received the weekly service by mail with the understanding they would pay for anything that was used. Most of Forum's output consisted of legitimate ar-

ticles but a few were on subjects the CIA wanted publicized. One such article distributed in 1974 was "KGB in the Middle East; What are the Soviet spies up to now?"

In April, 1975, Forum abruptly closed down after a London weekly disclosed its CIA connections.

A former top CIA official denied operations such as Forum World Features violated the 1973 regulation. "We try to concentrate on the behavior of (U.S.) enemies in the world," he said. "We're preventing suppression of truth . . . information that doesn't pay off. That's why CIA must do it."

The congressional committees are also concerned about the continued employment of American journalists by the CIA and the possibility they may be used to influence public opinion in this country.

Although the agency in 1973 said it discontinued the employment of full-time staff members of American news gathering organizations, CIA Director Colby told the House intelligence committee in November that about 30 part-time employees and American free-lance writers were still under contract.

Colby said they were used "primarily for intelligence gathering" and also to "make contacts with people that are difficult for an official of an embassy or American mission to get in touch with."

It was only on limited occasions, Colby said, that these journalists would be used for "planting stories," and then only in the foreign press.

The use of part-time American journalists creates a thorny problem for both the CIA and news gathering organizations.

Colby, for example, has consistently refused to tell the Associated Press and United Press International if any of their several hundred part-time reporters (called stringers) around the world also work for the agency.

Both organizations have a policy that forbids their employees from taking funds from an intelligence gathering agency but they are not sure it is effective.

The UPI stringer in Quito,

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Jan. 1976

Church Asks Punishment For Naming C.I.A. Aides

PITTSBURGH, Jan. 17 (AP)—Criminal sanctions should be imposed against former Central Intelligence Agency employees who reveal the names of agency sources or agents active abroad, Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said here today at a news conference.

Mr. Church said he would

Ecuador, for example, who also writes for that city's leading newspaper, was listed in Philip Agee's "CIA Diary" as a person through whom in 1963 Agee, then a CIA agent, occasionally placed propaganda. In a telephone interview, the stringer confirmed he was mentioned in Agee's book but said Agee's "impression" of his role was wrong.

Rod Beaton, president of UPI, said he was unaware of Agee's allegation, and added that the stringer had a "good reputation" and that UPI would "have one of our key people check it out."

It is also possible that stringer-CIA agents are on the payrolls of major newspapers and television networks.

Agency officials were unhappy in 1973 when forced to give up connections with full-time journalists. During the 1950s and 1960s, many reporters undertook full or part-time CIA projects. In the Communist bloc countries and the Soviet Union particularly, journalists were almost the only agents the CIA had.

The CIA, according to one official, now does not want to close out the use of stringers. "How are we going to collect intelligence," he asked recently, "if you have a diminishing permissibility for cover?"

As for the argument that the CIA involvement compromises American news organizations, one former top agency official with experience overseas responded, "Don't tell me about the glory and purity of the press. I'm not impressed."

Last year, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) circulated, among news media executives, a prospective bill that would require government agencies, such as the CIA, to publish in the Federal Register the names of any journalists hired by contract. The aim was to halt the practice by exposure without barring reporters by law from taking such employment. To Kennedy's surprise, most executives who responded opposed the idea.

Colby also told the House committee that two of the CIA's former full-time journalist-agents carried on both roles with the approval of their employers.

a recommendation for sanctions in its final report to the Senate.

Philip Agee, a onetime C.I.A. agent, said in Rome earlier this month that he and other critics of the agency would expose the names of agents in Spain, France, Italy and other countries.

Senator Church said "the C.I.A. needs a stronger means for dealing with the problem of former employees like Philip Agee, who revealed such information."

WASHINGTON POST
17 JAN 1976

CIA Morale Overseas Plummets

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 16—The mushrooming publication of names of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency employees serving abroad has caused a marked decline in the already low morale of agency personnel overseas.

Western intelligence officials in several overseas locations, most of whom were still trying to stiff-upper-lip the CIA's public image problems just a few months ago, now privately acknowledge that there has been a dramatic drop in morale in recent weeks that is not only affecting the agency's ability to gather intelligence but that is causing severe personal strain as well.

"It's like Berlin right after the war," one veteran official said. "You suddenly start driving with one eye on the rear view mirror. The nervous tension slips back into your life and you bring all that home with you to the family at night."

Interviews in recent weeks with a number of officials close to the U.S. intelligence service indicated that the year-long expose of CIA wrong doing by Congress and the press had already created serious problems, not just in the office, but at home for an increasing number of agency workers.

The concern most often mentioned was about teenage children who now questioned how their father made a living and why, even if he wasn't a spy, did he work for the CIA.

That kind of problem, rarely discussed openly, has now been heightened for many families with the publication of names of CIA employees, most of whom are not spies, but who now feel the threat that an assassin or terrorist could strike haphazardly at their family.

Under different circumstances, the publication of employee names or addresses would be viewed with concern but not alarm, sources say. It has, in fact, happened before in some countries.

But the murder of CIA station chief Richard Welch outside his home in Athens on Christmas Eve "has given rather dramatic proportions to this thing. Publishing names is a very, very bad thing to be doing now. It's becoming fashionable and it's going to generate another murder," one senior official said.

The expectation that more murders will follow is widely

shared by other intelligence officers.

"Nobody's panicked," said another veteran officer, "but the thing is gnawing away at us. The impact is beginning to show. The congressional review, the whole hoopla for more than a year now, was having a wearing-down effect. Now, rightly or wrongly, there is the new element of danger due to Welch and the publishing of names. There has been a quantum increase in depression and concern and nobody seems able to help or to stop what is undoubtedly ruining our ability to gather intelligence."

Another source said, "It's like they are using the (congressional) assassination report almost as a backdrop to the attempts against us. The agency has really been shattered. We are going to need a lot of forthright executive support to recover."

Where the CIA's most recent troubles will lead, in terms of its ability to operate overseas, is in doubt. Some officers feel that the widespread disclosure of employee identities will almost certainly serve to drive the agency underground.

"One can only stop it by doing a better job of hiding CIA personnel," says one officer.

The job of providing and keeping up a good cover, or hidden identity, however, takes an enormous amount of time, several sources say. This takes away from the time an agent can spend gathering intelligence and would weaken CIA abilities, they say.

Many of the veteran CIA employees are already known to their counterparts around the world. Officials acknowledge that a "Who's Who in the CIA" published in 1968 in East Germany and compiled by Communist intelligence identified many old timers well before the current rash of disclosures.

But chances are that new officers coming into the field will be given much better cover, it is felt, which will not allow them to be picked so easily out of State Department registers or embassy telephone books.

If there are other murders, some sources feel, people will leave the agency, as some reportedly already are on the brink of doing. But others feel there will be a protective conservative backlash, not only in the United States but even in Western countries where there is little sympathy at the moment for the CIA.

Although many individual disclosures over the past year of CIA domestic surveillance and assassination plotting have been more startling, the impact of the Welch murder and publication of hundreds of names, primarily by British publications, seem to be the

straw that is breaking the back of CIA morale in the field.

In France and England, where more than 70 CIA names have been disclosed in each country, there is little danger felt by CIA people.

The problem is much more serious in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. There are strong anti-American feelings afoot in these areas and political assassination is viewed as possible.

A similar fear exists here in West Germany, where no alleged CIA names have been published but where a troublesome but small band of terrorists operates.

Informants acknowledge that most of the names disclosed are in fact CIA employees, although a number of inaccuracies are said to have appeared on published lists, especially among the 44 names and addresses of alleged CIA agents in France published thus far by the leftist magazine Liberation.

There is concern in several U.S. embassies that in the rush to publish, legitimate diplomatic corps employees are being wrongly identified as CIA agents. There is also frustration at what is viewed as a public failure to understand that only a relatively small percentage of CIA employees are engaged in spying while most serve as analysts or liaison men with allied intelligence services.

Some serious pessimism is surfacing about the future, at least among some intelligence veterans.

One senior officer explained: "There is obviously some cold warrior in us because most of us still believe that the objective of the Soviet Union has not changed in 30 years and that objective is to get the United States out of Europe. Right now, they are getting some help."

"It has surely put a crimp in the plan, the willingness of officers to meet and take advantage of an opportunity at any hour or place. A lot of us have dealt with defectors and even saved some people's lives, and it's been done with the conviction that the information helped maintain the vitality of the Western alliance.

"Now," he went on, "that commitment appears to have worn away, everything the West does is corrupt and wrong in the press. What is that huge Soviet army in East Germany going to do? That's a legitimate question that even the left-wing journalists blowing these names would also be interested in if the Russians ever took off for the West."

CIA men generally say they can do to protect themselves,

other than the extra adrenalin that flows just from being alert in times of tension.

"You can't go to work in a convoy and you can't take three goons with you everytime you have to meet someone," one explains.

Intelligence officials, including non-Americans, are wearying of the contention that what is happening now is part of a civic-minded attempt to curb agency activities that undermine American democracy and the governments of other countries.

Most officials see it as the work of the left wing and their sympathizers among disgruntled former CIA and foreign service employees.

The principal figure is Phillip Agee, formerly of the CIA, whose book "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" was published in Britain last year.

However, according to Phil Kelly, one of the journalists on the British publication Time Out, which has published some 65 alleged CIA names, Agee's assistance was only incidental in their case.

Kelley said Time Out's identification of CIA people in England was based mostly on techniques published by former foreign service officer John Marks in a November, 1974, article in the Washington Monthly called "How to Spot a Spook."

Kelley said Agee helped the Time Out reporters "refine their methods."

In Paris, Liberation claimed it came up with its list through the embassy directory, various identification codes and the help of other journalists in London and Washington who were "fed up with the clandestine activities of their government around the world."

The reference to other journalists was widely assumed to mean the Fifth Estate group in Washington that publishes the magazine Counter-Spy.

In France and England, the disclosures did not create much of a political stir or much reaction in the general press. In both countries, there seems to be a widespread view that the CIA remains an American problem and there is reluctance among politicians to rush to its defense because of its poor image.

England's Manchester Guardian, however, in an editorial this week, called for a distinction between CIA's dirty tricks and "efforts to change other nations' governments for them," which it strongly condemns, and the agency's function as a collector of information, which the newspaper says necessarily must be done.

In Spain, disclosure of alleged agents this month came not from a fringe publication but from the country's most widely read

WASHINGTON POST
16 JAN 1976

Charles B. Seib

Media Manipulation

The power of the press is accepted as a fact of life these days, Watergate and its aftermath being the most concrete evidence.

But that should not obscure another fact of life: The press—print and broadcast—is routinely used by individuals and institutions, from the President and the White House down, to achieve their own ends.

Two cases in point, vastly different but with the common element of manipulation of the press, occurred in recent days.

The first was the use of the brutal murder of Richard S. Welch, the Central Intelligence Agency's No. 1 man in Athens, in a counterattack against those who

Mr. Seib is an associate editor of the Washington Post, serving as an internal ombudsman.

criticize the CIA and try to strip away the secrecy it claims it must have.

Welch's assassination was a despicable act and, as a devoted public servant, he deserved to be honored in death. But the extraordinary fanfare surrounding the return of his body to this country and his ceremonial funeral in Arlington Cemetery with the President in attendance were clearly orchestrated by the administration as a media event.

The strategy was successful. The return of the body and the funeral were covered very heavily on television and less heavily in the newspapers. In the course of the coverage, attention was repeatedly focused on the charge that publication of Welch's name many months ago by an anti-CIA group in this country, and more recently by the Athens press, were to blame for his murder.

Implicit in that charge was the broader one that exposure of CIA operations by Congress and the press endangers not only the operations of the agency but the lives of its employees. So, ironically, the press was used to publicize what in its broad effect was an attack on itself.

That instance could be called an example of official manipulation—the use of the media by the government itself. It was overt in the sense that it was done publicly. The second instance involves less open manipulation.

On Jan. 7, the New York Times and the Washington Post published stories stating that the CIA was embarked on a program of aiding anti-Communist politicians in Italy to the tune of \$6 million.

Neither paper disclosed where they got the information or how they came to get it—whether it was handed to them or they sought it out. The Times quoted "well informed sources," "sources who have a direct knowledge of the administration's covert political operations," "an American official" and, in a very generalized comment, a "high-level State Department official." The Post quoted "sources" and "informed sources."

The stories were picked up by the news

The News Business

services and the broadcast media. Before nightfall, the CIA's new venture into Italian politics was known around the world.

A political upheaval in Italy, apparently unrelated to the CIA aid, obscured whatever effect the stories might have had there. It is safe to assume, though, that the publicity about the CIA aid could only have hurt its recipients. It is also safe to assume that whatever foreign policy purpose the administration had was thwarted.

In this instance, the press was used by unnamed sources who were opposed to the specific aid program or, more likely, to the whole idea of covert CIA aid to foreign political parties.

In an angry reaction to the stories, Ron Nessen, President Ford's press secretary, said they had undermined the conduct of foreign affairs. He voiced a "strong suspicion" that the stories were leaked on Capitol Hill. And he used the occasion to raise questions about the requirement that the CIA must report its secret foreign political activities to congressional committees.

The Post and the Times reported Nessen's suspicion about Congress promptly, but neither gave any hint as to whether Congress was getting a bum rap. They remained true to their sources.

Anonymous sources are part of the news business. Seldom does a day go by without at least one major news story in which they figure. There is no reason to think that situation will change.

But there is a question that can and should be asked: Have reporters and their editors become too comfortable with anonymous sources? And that leads to some other questions:

Does not the public have a right to expect a story like the one on the \$6 million to contain some information on the motivation of those who leaked it?

Why can't such a story indicate at least a generalized source even though confidentiality of the individual is preserved? Did it come from Capitol Hill? Or the State Department? Or the White House? Or several places?

Do reporters try hard enough to get sources to allow their names to be published? If a congressman decides that it is in the public interest to disclose a piece of information, should he be willing to have his name appear with it? And if not, should he give, for publication, an explanation of why not?

The whole business of sourcing is closely related to the subject we started with: manipulation. As long as the press is willing to accept material from anonymous sources and to print it without disclosure of the circumstances under which it was obtained, manipulation will flourish and "scoops" that serve special purposes, laudable or otherwise, will abound.

weekly news magazine,
Cambio 16.

Italian Paper Lists Alleged CIA Names

From News Dispatches

ROME, Jan. 16—La Repubblica, a leftist newspaper that began publication three days ago, today printed what it claimed to be the name of the CIA station chief in Italy and seven of his associates.

The article was signed by Steven Weissman, who identified himself as a former editor of Ramparts magazine.

In Athens, Politika Themata printed the names of 14 Greek-Americans allegedly working for the CIA. The magazine is owned by Yannis Horn, publisher of the Athens News, which earlier identified Richard Welch as CIA chief in Greece.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 Jan. 1976

Katzenbach Urges Government to Halt Its Covert Actions

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 — Former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach told a Senate committee today that the United States should halt all covert operations abroad until there was a "better consensus" on what activities this country should be involved in.

In testimony before the Senate Government Operations Committee, Mr. Katzenbach said that the present situation, where covert activities are reported to Congress and the information later often leaked to news organizations, destroys whatever value the operations had.

Mr. Katzenbach said that he believed a "moratorium" on covert operations, except for gathering intelligence, should be imposed until the people and Congress arrive at consensus on whether the United States Government should conduct such operations.

At today's hearing former Secretary of State Dean Rusk said he had now learned that he was kept in the dark on many Central Intelligence Agency operations while he was in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. He later told newsmen that he did not know, for instance, about plots to kill foreign leaders.

Another witness, David Phillips, president of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, said that 56 percent of some 300 association members he had polled favored Congress being advised beforehand about covert operations.

Mr. Phillips said he believed this vote in a recent survey showed that "intelligence officers want someone else to share some of the heat after the fact, particularly when that heat is applied 15 years later."

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 16, 1976

CIA Funding Journalistic Network Abroad

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency secretly created over 25 years and still finances a vast journalistic network outside the United States that is available to carry out covert propaganda campaigns.

Made up of journalist agents, subsidized newspapers, radio stations and international wire and news services, the network is one of the less-publicized tools in the agency's covert arsenal.

Its purpose, according to a former top CIA official, "is to disseminate data about the foreign world, particularly the Soviet Union, that is being suppressed . . . and to do it in a way favorable to U.S. strategic interests."

A glimpse of how the CIA network operates was contained in a recent report of the Senate intelligence committee.

On Sept. 14, 1970, according to the Senate report, the "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council authorized a covert CIA propaganda operation to focus attention on "the damage that would befall Chile under an Allende government." Salvador Allende, a leftist, was then a candidate for president of Chile.

Less than one week later, an Inter-American Press Association news release was issued in Washington charging that freedom of the press was being jeopardized in Chile by "the Communists and their Marxist allies."

The release, according to the Senate report, was a CIA product "through its covert action resources."

Jim Canel, executive secretary of the association who usually writes such releases, said recently he first learned of the release when he was called about it by the Associated Press.

Canel at the time "assumed" the release was drafted by Agustin Edwards, publisher and owner of El Mercurio, an anti-Allende Santiago newspaper.

In September, 1970, Edwards came to Washington to generate U.S. support for a plan to halt Allende's election. On Sept. 15, the day after the Forty Committee approval of the propaganda campaign, Edwards met with then CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

On Sept. 22, Edwards' El Mercurio carried an editorial arguing that "retention of individual freedom" was the most important matter facing the Chilean people.

Twelve days after the Forty Committee action, the Spanish government-owned wire service, EFE, carried a report throughout Latin America

from Santiago on an anti-Allende rally by a right-wing group called Patria y Libertad which was described in the story as "a growing . . . movement."

The same day, a Santiago radio station carried a political commentary on the Patria rally. The commentator mentioned the rally favorably while criticizing the Christian Democratic party which that day had offered to make an agreement with Allende.

According to the Senate committee report, Patria y Libertad and its rally received some money in an "indirect subsidy" from the CIA. The radio station in Santiago and the commentator also received CIA funds.

EFE, which transmits in Spanish, at the time received a CIA subsidy for its Latin American newswire operations, according to a former intelligence official.

Within a month of the Forty Committee decision, 18 journalists from outside Chile under direct or indirect agency control had arrived in Santiago. Some were paid CIA agents working for newspapers in other countries; a few were anti-Allende and had received their transportation from CIA funds.

Others were journalists who had been ordered to Chile by their bosses who were described by the Senate committee report as "high-level (CIA) agents . . . in managerial capacities in the media field."

One interview with Allende was written by a correspondent of Latin, in 1970 a new Spanish-language wire service. Latin purportedly was established and run by a group of 13 Latin American newspapers which had hired the British news agency Reuters to manage the operation.

According to a former intelligence agent, however, the CIA subsidized Latin through intermediaries in much the same manner as it gave money to El Mercurio.

Francisco Baker, deputy general manager of Latin in Buenos Aires said in a telephone interview that it was "absolutely false" that his service was directly subsidized by the CIA.

A spokesman for Reuters in Washington said he had never heard it alleged that CIA money had gone into Latin. Reuters, he said, had contracted to manage the Spanish-language service, but had nothing to do with its financing.

Despite CIA's covert action efforts, Allende was elected president

of Chile in October, 1970. According to the Senate committee report, the CIA claimed its six-week propaganda blitz resulted in "726 articles, broadcasts, editorials and similar items" in Latin American and European media.

After Allende took office, the CIA covert propaganda operation continued. Some \$1.5 million went directly to El Mercurio.

Material was developed and placed in all newspapers that opposed Allende and radio and television stations as well.

After the 1973 Chilean coup in which Allende was killed, CIA's covert propaganda operations continued, though at a lower level.

The 1970 CIA Chile propaganda operation was an unusual "blitz" according to an agency official who participated in it. "With the White House really leaning on us," he recalled, "you take advantage of every asset you have."

According to a Senate staff presentation, "propaganda and manipulation of the press" were the first covert actions undertaken by the agency when it was organized in 1947.

By 1953, according to the same report, CIA had covert

operations including propaganda campaigns under way in 50 countries.

The Senate Chile report gives examples of media operations during the 1950s and 1960s.

A CIA-subsidized political radio commentator organized a march on the Soviet embassy in 1968 at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A riot took place. It was then covered by a CIA-subsidized wire service which carried the story around the world.

After 1968, a CIA agent at El Mercurio "exerted substantial control over the content of that paper's international news section," according to the Senate committee report.

News "harmful to the United States, particularly about Vietnam" was "suppressed," the report says, while other CIA-paid journalists "wrote articles or editorials favorable to U.S. interests in the world."

Former CIA top officials say similar activities were undertaken in countries throughout the world. Justifying such operations, one former official said recently, "if we give up this program, we lose a network of agents of influence."

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

5 JANUARY 1976

THE CIA FILE.

Edited by Robert Borosage and John D. Monks. Grossman, \$10 ISBN 0-670-22247-X

Beautifully timed to coincide with the Church and Pike committee investigations, this record of a 1974 Washington conference brings together numerous sharply critical reports on the CIA's operations at home and abroad by Victor Marchetti, Morton Halperin, Richard Falk and others. Former agency employees and intelligence experts discuss the CIA generally, present case studies of its interventions in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Laos, Somalia and Zaire, elucidate the role of technology in covert intelligence collection, and assess the implications. Most interesting is a question-and-answer session between William E. Colby, then the director of the CIA, and a skeptical, scornful panel and audience. The questioners pulled no punches, and Mr. Colby's replies have not been edited. Richard Barnet sums up by denouncing the CIA's "dirty-tricks department" as a "criminal enterprise." [February]

NEW YORK TIMES

22 JAN 1976

HOUSE UNIT VOTES TO AIR SPY DATA

Panel's Decision to Publish
Report on Secret Projects
Assailed by Ford Aide

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (AP) — The House Intelligence committee voted today to publish secret information on United States intelligence operations in its final report. A spokesman for President Ford suggested that the committee was breaking an agreement that Mr. Ford would have to approve such disclosures.

The report says intelligence agencies spend \$10 billion a year on operations abroad, according to the sources.

The committee rejected 8 to 4 a motion to strike the classified information out of a 340-page draft of the committee's final report.

At the White House, press secretary Ron Neesen said, "Under the agreement the President should have had a chance to review the classified material in the report before it was leaked to the public. The President views with most serious concern the leak of the alleged contents of the report."

But committee members, including its chairman, Otis Pike, Democrat of New York, took the position that no agreement with Mr. Ford could dictate what the committee disclosed in its official report to the House.

Beyond that, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, contended that it would "be a terrible, terrible precedent" for the committee not to insist that Congress has as much right as the President to decide what information should be public.

The draft report includes details on a number of secret operations—including information on Italian political funding and aid to groups in Angola that Mr. Ford had tried to keep secret.

The agreement was that the committee could publicly disclose secrets under an agreed procedure but would not disclose any that Mr. Ford had personally declared would hurt national security if made public.

The only way the committee could override such a declaration and release information, it agreed, would be to go to court for a ruling that it could do so.

Meanwhile, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee split openly today over the issue of creating a new Congressional panel to oversee the operations of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies.

In testimony before the Senate Government Operations committee, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho,

WASHINGTON POST

13 JAN 1976

CIA Found Penetrating U.S. Groups

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate investigators have gathered evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency has renewed its penetration of educational, religious and cultural groups in the United States as part of its foreign intelligence activities.

The agency's penetration of domestic organizations created a major uproar after exposure of the practice by Ramparts magazine in 1967 and led to the adoption of legislation intended to prevent it from happening again.

However, for the past six months the Senate intelligence committee has been pursuing evidence that the CIA had renewed its connections with domestic organizations. The specific links could not be learned yesterday. In 1967, the agency was discovered to have been funding dozens of labor, farmer, cultural and student organizations through a network of private found-

committee chairman, called for creation of a Senate committee that would have funding and investigation rovers over the intelligence activities of such agencies as the The agency, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, The National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The committee's vice chairman, John Tower, Republican of Texas, opposed a new oversight panel but added that only one or two other members of the intelligence committee shared his view.

Mr. Church's call for a new committee was endorsed by the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, who called past Congressional oversight "inexcusably lax" and added that he would make passage of legislation creating an oversight committee a top priority of the current session of Congress.

Mr. Mansfield noted that he had first introduced legislation to oversee the C.I.A. nearly 20 years ago but that it had been opposed by then the agency's director, Allen Dulles. The agency defeated his attempt because it "had the hierarchs in their pocket," Mr. Mansfield said.

Senator Howard Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee, another member of the intelligence committee, endorsed creation of a new panel but Mr. Baker objected to two provisions in the legislation outlined by Mr. Church. One would provide the oversight committee with prior notification of covert operations. The other would reserve for the Senate the right to

dations.

The committee staff is considering conducting public hearings on the issue although the Feb. 29 deadline for completion of the Senate committee's work may not allow sufficient time. The findings will be included in the final report next month.

Senate committee chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) announced yesterday that he will conduct a joint press conference with staff director William Miller Wednesday to unveil formally proposed legislative solutions to CIA abuses that have been disclosed in congressional hearing rooms and newspapers during the past year.

Church said in a telephone interview that he had initiated a series of contacts between White House staff members and his own committee staff on legislative remedies to reform the intelligence community.

The purpose of the consultation, he said, was to determine the "areas of consensus" on intelligence reform between the Senate committee and the Ford administration. "The committee is reserving all its options and so is the executive," Church said. "No one has been co-opted."

At present, the committee and the administration appear to be headed for confrontation on a variety of issues discussed in the consultations between the White House staff and the Senate committee.

These include: congressional influence over covert operations; congressional access to information; control over intelligence budgets; the authority of Congress to declassify information on a unilateral basis; the degree of congressional authority to expel or otherwise punish its own members for disclosure of classified information.

The version of Senate legislation that Church is expected to make public Wednesday reportedly provides for making public intelligence activities that the Senate, by vote in secret session, decides to be improper.

Church has said that he wants the Senate to have authority to find out what is going on "not after the fact but before the fact—particularly when a new and significant covert operation might be planned. . . ."

One White House official spoke of "fundamental constitutional differences" between the Senate committee and the administration on the reform legislation—particularly as it bears on

take a larger share of authority in intelligence oversight.

Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House intelligence committee, is refraining from any contacts with the White House in drawing up his committee's reform legislation, due to be finished at the end of this month.

Committee staff director Searle Field said the House group had decided to "develop our own proposals uninfluenced by the administration."

Pike and his Democratic colleagues have, on the whole, confronted the administration more aggressively in demanding information than the Church committee, at one point issuing a subpoena to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for information on covert operations and strategic arms negotiating data. Ultimately, the House committee and the administration reconciled their differences and averted a constitutional showdown.

The issue of penetration of domestic organizations by the CIA was the subject of a closed-door seminar under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968—less than a year after the disclosures that such groups as the National Student Association and American Newspaper Guild were conduits for CIA money.

At that meeting former Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell observed that "if the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected. . . . We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs' . . ."

Congress, reacting to the 1967 intelligence scandals, had already barred the use of domestic organizations as conduits for CIA operations abroad.

In another development yesterday Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies have reduced their combined personnel from 142,000 to 80,000 since 1969—a cut of about 43 per cent.

"It's a trend in the right direction," Mansfield said in an interview.

LONDON TIMES
3 Jan. 1976

EXPOSURE WITHOUT SCRUPLE

The murder of Mr Richard Welch, chief of American intelligence operations in Greece, raises serious questions about the campaign against the CIA which is now being waged in the United States. Indirect responsibility for the murder is being attributed to the magazine *Counterspy*, which published Mr Welch's name in a list of CIA agents a year ago and thereby exposed him to increased risk of assassination. The magazine is not the first such informer, but it is engaged in a systematic campaign.

Counterspy has not based its defence on an appeal to the principles of a free press or open government. It has said bluntly and brutally that the CIA had only itself to blame for sending Mr Welch to Greece "to spy and perhaps even to intervene in the affairs of the Greek Government". The aim, in other words, is to sabotage the work of the CIA, even to the extent of adding extra risk to the lives of its agents.

The main issue is not the precise degree of these informers' responsibility for Mr Welch's death but whether their methods of opposing the CIA are legitimate. They are not. One of the most vital attributes of a constitutional democracy is that it provides institutional channels

for the correction of abuses. People who disagree with the policies of the CIA or oppose its entire existence are free to campaign for its abolition in the press and through Congress. They are free to expose its activities to the public eye to the extent that this does not endanger national security. In Congress they can insist on closer scrutiny behind closed doors. They are not entitled to circumvent democratic procedures and institutions and engage in direct action especially when they represent only a small group attacking an agency with direct responsibility for national security.

The CIA is a properly established agency of a democratically elected government. It operates under the authority of the President and is subject to Congressional scrutiny. Regardless how disreputable some of its activities have been and how inadequate some of the controls have proved, anyone who directly sabotages its operations is sabotaging the constitutional system and adopting the same methods and attitudes which he condemns in the CIA.

The CIA has some very dark patches on its record and has done things which no American government ought ever to have authorized. It has frequently been carried away by excess of zeal. Its anomalous role as a

clandestine agency in a system pledged to truth and openness has never been properly worked out. It needs reform and is itself aware of this. An article reflecting an inside view published in *Foreign Affairs* in January last year noted that covert operations had declined steadily since the early 1960s. It proposed handing over paramilitary operations to the Pentagon, discontinuing psychological warfare, and largely transferring espionage and counter-espionage, leaving the CIA to concentrate primarily on collecting and analysing information, functions in which it excels.

These are promising ideas. The intermingling of different functions has contributed greatly to corrupting the agency. The agency is, however, a necessary institution, and this needs to be clearly asserted. Information is necessary and espionage is unavoidable. Attempts to influence the affairs of other countries are fraught with moral, political and practical problems but cannot be wholly abandoned in a very imperfect world. Americans who would abolish or cripple the CIA are either motivated by a rival ideology or are suffering from that touching but dangerous form of American innocence which can do as much damage as the CIA itself.

WASHINGTON STAR
14 JAN 1976

Reports Denied on CIA Moves

Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Frank Church says the CIA has "scrupulously" followed guidelines prohibiting secret efforts to penetrate educational, religious and cultural groups.

The Idaho Democrat said in a statement yesterday that evidence collected by the committee so far suggests the agency has avoided "covert relationships, direct or indirect, with any of our nation's private institutions."

Church said the committee is investigating charges of CIA use of educational and cultural institutions, the press and publishing houses and religious institutions.

He said that although the inquiry was not complete, the committee has not discovered evidence of violations of guidelines issued by then-President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 prohibiting efforts to penetrate domes-

NEW YORK TIMES
14 Jan. 1976

PARIS PAPER LISTS 32 AS U.S. AGENTS

Tabloid Asserts Anti-C.I.A. Group Helped Get Names

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 13—A radical Paris tabloid published today what it said were the names of the 32 top agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Paris.

The article containing the names covered half the front page of the newspaper *Liberation* as well as two inside pages. It said the list was worked up in conjunction with Counter-Spy, an American magazine published by former C.I.A. members now campaigning against the agency's methods.

Liberation, which has the

patronage of the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, said that its article was the fruit of "several weeks of research" done here by its staff and of investigations by two of its reporters, Marc Thomas and Claude Mathieu, in London and Washington.

Raising the question, "Why expose the C.I.A. and not the Soviet Union's K.G.B. as well," *Liberation* said that all Soviet diplomats were suspect while American diplomats were not, and that therefore it was a case of warning the unsuspecting public about the Americans.

The name of the man described as the C.I.A.'s chief of station in Paris was followed by the number on the door of his office in the United States Embassy here, his private address and phone number. The newspaper noted that he was identified in the official French diplomatic list as an attaché.

Liberation's article follows similar ones published in Mex-

ico, Britain, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Spain about C.I.A. activities and personnel in those countries.

U.S. Denounces Publication

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13 (UPI)—The State Department denounced as "contemptible and inflammatory" today the publication by *Liberation* of its list.

"Experience has shown that the printing of such lists is extremely irresponsible," said the department's spokesman, Robert L. Funseth. "It can incite lunatics and fanatics to attack diplomats."

"We view this kind of thing as contemptible and inflammatory," he added. A C.I.A. spokesman said that the agency was "concerned" by the publication.

Mr. Funseth said that the Ford Administration was in touch with the French Government about the matter, but he did not elaborate.

secret agents but said that the Danish secret service was not involved.

Mr Moeller was replying to Mr Gert Peterson, a Socialist People's Party deputy, who asked him to confirm a report by the Washington correspondent of Radio Denmark that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "bugged" the apartment.

Mr Moeller said that the matter only came to the attention of Danish authorities in 1964 and no action was taken because by then the time limit on prosecution had run out.

LONDON TIMES
10 Jan. 1976

Agents 'bugged' Danish deputy's home

Copenhagen, Jan 9.—Mr Orla Moeller, Danish Minister for Justice and Defence, today confirmed that in 1958 foreign secret agents had bugged the Copenhagen flat of a Communist deputy, Mr Alfred Jansen. The minister refused to reveal the nationality of the

tic institutions.

The guidelines were issued after the CIA's infiltration of the National Student Association came to light.

The statement was prompted by a report in the Washington Post yesterday that the committee had gathered evidence of renewed CIA connections with the newspaper said it could not learn specific details.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 Jan. 1976

Eurofun With the C.I.A.

By Russell Baker

The publication by certain European papers of names, home addresses and telephone numbers of resident C.I.A. people in France and England raises very awkward questions of journalistic ethics, quite apart from Washington's charge that it is an invitation to murder.

No one who believes in the First Amendment can argue plausibly against a press's right to publish such data, and consequences be damned. Once it starts publishing these lists, however, elementary fairness demands that it plunge on and give us addresses and phone numbers, not only of C.I.A. people, but of all those others in hundreds of lines of work whom the public would like to hound in the night.

If C.I.A. people are to have phone numbers and addresses in the public domain, why not K.G.B. people? Why not people working for the French and British secret services? Sound journalistic principle insists upon it.

The French newspaper, *Liberation*, which published one of the C.I.A. lists, retreats into sophistry to explain why it did not run a similar list of Soviet K.G.B. agents in Paris. If it knew who they were, it would expose them, it says, but in any case everyone assumes that everybody attached to the Soviet Embassy is suspect.

This is a confession of laziness which no American editor would dare make. If *Liberation* does not know who the K.G.B. men in Paris are, surely the C.I.A. does. It should take little jour-

nalistic guile to pry the information out of the C.I.A. Not for nothing is it known as the world's most public secret agency.

Is it worth publishing such data? Aside from the sport of baiting the spy

OBSERVER

crowd, it seems to have only small nuisance value. A Frenchman can now telephone a C.I.A. man at his home at 3 A.M. and tell him his French is barbaric, but how many Frenchmen have nothing better to do at that time of night?

If the C.I.A. truly thinks its people are endangered, it will presumably pull them all out and replace them with few agents under deeper cover, which is a nuisance but not a calamity.

Imagine a reversed situation in Washington, with the newspapers listing names, telephone numbers and addresses of Soviet agents around town. What service could this possibly do the American reader?

Washington and every other American city is swarming with people whose addresses and phone numbers most readers would much prefer to the addresses and phone numbers of the local spies. Most of these people live under cover just as deep as the average C.I.A. agent in Paris, hiding behind unlisted phone numbers.

A newspaper that tells you how to reach the K.G.B. mart at home on Saturday night has an equal obligation to inform its readers how to get hold of their Senators and Congressmen, Secretary of State and the president of the local electric utility. These people are supposed to be public servants. A press that assumes a duty to promote invasions of privacy can hardly draw the line in their favor simply because they do not happen to be Soviet spies.

I can scarcely conceive of circumstances in which I would want to call up a Soviet spy, or go knocking at his door at dinnertime. There are moments

in the night, however, when I would desperately like to ring up Senator Kennedy or Secretary Kissinger and give each a piece of my mind, or drop by their houses just at bedtime and ask them what in heaven's name they thought they were up to.

And what about newspaper people? The world is filled with people who would like to know where the editor lives so they could throw eggs at his window, like to know his home telephone number so they could ring him just before dawn and tell him what they think of his paper.

Disclosure is acceptable under the First Amendment—which is not widely observed in Europe, unfortunately—but if there is to be any disclosure of this kind of information, there must be full disclosure, or the journalistic obligation is betrayed. If invasion of privacy of public men is to be promoted by the press, it can be justified only by making it as easy to invade the privacy of important public men as it is to barge in on some lower-drawer Russian spy in his off hours.

If the French and British press seriously intend to serve their publics, let them move ahead from encouraging the commission of nuisances against inconsequential secret agents and start telling the British and French some truly helpful information: Prime Minister Wilson's weekend phone number; where to locate Mr. Giscard d'Estaing between midnight and 2 A.M.; where to find the Concorde's creators for a dinnertime confrontation.

Publishing the C.I.A. lists, they have satisfied no urgent public need in Europe, but merely forced the C.I.A. to start moving its people around again, which will cost American taxpayers a sweet piece of money. They indulge themselves in a meaningless but self-satisfying gesture, and we pay the bill. It might be worth it if they now get up their courage to do their countrymen a service with some truly useful disclosures. If not—we pay the bill anyhow.

Thursday, Jan. 15, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

Editor Attacks Post Article on Spies

From News Dispatches

LONDON, Jan. 14—The foreign editor of The London Times said today that Washington Post London correspondent Bernard D. Nossiter had endangered British foreign correspondents by asserting that many of them are spies.

The Times editor, Louis Heren, called the statement "a McCarthyist smear" and "a damning and damnable charge, which can be neither proved nor disproved," and said that publication of Nossiter's article "could put a gun at the head of British reporters abroad."

Nossiter wrote in the Dec. 23 issue of The Post that "A remarkable number of British journalists abroad are reputed to be officers" of the British intelligence service and that

"an unknown number" of British spies "are posing as journalists."

His article continued:

"A contributing editor at one of Britain's most distinguished journals estimates that more than half of that particular paper's fulltime foreign staffers are on the (British intelligence) payroll. There is no evidence, however," Nossiter added, "that this high proportion is found elsewhere in Fleet Street."

The only name Nossiter mentioned as a journalist-spy was that of Kim Philby, who was a double agent for the British and Soviet intelligence services as well as Beirut correspondent for The Observer and the Economist in 1962 before he defected to Moscow.

Heren, in his signed commentary on the Times' editorial page, called Nossiter's article "a sloppy piece of misreporting" and said that his newspaper "does not rely on London or Moscow gold to keep its correspondents in the field. I cannot believe that other reputable British or American newspapers would be foolish enough to take such tainted money."

He said foreign correspondents have "collectively a reputation of integrity and independence," although "Presumably there are one or two black sheep." "I cannot swear," Heren wrote, "that some obscure person masquerading as a correspondent is actually working for the CIA, KGB or SIS," Britain's intelligence

service. "For all I know, B. Nossiter is working for one of them."

"I do not believe that he is," Heren wrote, "but after his McCarthyist smear he might find it difficult to persuade the trigger-happy otherwise—that is, if he worked on those occasionally dangerous frontiers instead of from the safety of Washington, Geneva and London."

Nossiter, who is based in London, was en route to the Angola war.

Ober Linked To CIA 'Hit' At Va. Studio

White House Aide
May Be Charged

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

Richard Ober, National Security Council director for intelligence coordination, is the White House official who may be charged with violating civil rights laws in connection with a 1971 CIA break-in at a Fairfax City photo studio, administration officials have told The Star.

Ober, former CIA Director Richard M. Helms and other officials have been under Justice Department investigation for their alleged roles in the break-in conducted by CIA officials and Fairfax City police at a photo studio owned by a former CIA file clerk and her fiancé, a former middle-level Cuban propaganda official.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen yesterday acknowledged that a Justice Department investigation is under way on the break-in but refused to confirm that a White House official might be involved. That confirmation came from another administration source.

HELMS IS SAID to have personally approved the break-in and Ober is believed to be the person who took the plan, to Helms, sources said.

Should Helms, Ober and others be prosecuted for the Feb. 19, 1971, break-in, they would probably be charged with a misdemeanor for conspiring to violate the civil rights of the studio owners.

A five-year statute of limitations applies to this type of misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of \$1,000 and a year in jail. The break-in occurred in February 1971.

Ober, a CIA employee who has been detailed to the White House since March 1974, once supervised the CIA's Operation Chaos, which involved large-scale surveillance of dissidents in the United States.

Ober also coordinated at least one meeting between Nixon administration officials and local police officials about how to handle peace demonstrators marching in Washington, sources told The Star.

He was questioned in closed session last January by the Rockefeller Commission on CIA domestic activities about his activities in the CIA counterintelligence office. Ober, usually worked under James J.

Angleton, the former CIA chief of counterintelligence, but frequently reported directly to Helms.

OBER ALSO HAS been identified by former White House counsel Charles W. Colson as the CIA official to whom E. Howard Hunt, the Watergate conspirator, frequently passed information regarding operations of the "plumbers" unit at the

White House. Colson said Hunt delivered sealed envelopes and packages to Ober, who relayed them directly to Helms.

Before moving to the NSC to work under Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Ober was a career CIA official, the White House said at the time Ober testified before the Rockefeller Commission.

A 1972 Biographic Registry produced by the State Department says Ober, now 54, holds an BA from Harvard University and an MA from Columbia University.

The registry says he reached the rank of captain in the U.S. Army while

serving abroad from 1943-46. He is listed as a foreign affairs officer for the Army from 1948-58 before joining the State Department as a foreign reserve officer for an assignment in New Delhi.

People who knew him in New Delhi say he was actually a CIA officer on duty there.

THE REGISTRY says he returned to the State Department offices here in September 1961 and stayed on until April 1967, when he became a foreign affairs officer with a GS-15 rating. Around that time, the CIA, under Helms' directorship, began establishing Operation Chaos.

Reached Monday by The Star, Ober said, "From the very beginning, I have maintained a policy of not discussing these matters at all and I am going to continue with that."

Yesterday, Ober added, "I really do not want to make any comment. I don't think it's appropriate."

Nessen said yesterday, "The White House is aware of a Justice Department investigation and if the Justice Department finds any reason to recommend a personnel action involving anybody working at the White House, they will notify the President."

WASHINGTON STAR
16 JAN 1976

Mary McGrory

Morton and Ober:
A Matter of Taste

It may or may not be a matter of law whether Gerald Ford has the right to use public funds to hire Rogers Morton for political aid and comfort in a campaign year.

It is certainly not against the law for him to keep on the White House payroll Richard Ober, the former deputy director of the CIA's "Operation Chaos," which was rightly described by the New York Times as a "massive illegal domestic surveillance program."

It's just a question of taste in both cases.

With Morton, the President probably thought nobody would complain. With Ober, he thought nobody would find out. He was wrong both times.

White House Press Secretary Ronald Nessen tried to calm the waters roiling over the Morton appointment by insisting that Morton's political duties — he's obviously being brought in to straighten out this year's political "Operation Chaos," the President Ford Committee — would be "incidental."

MORTON, WHO WASN'T born yesterday, promptly contradicted him. The former interior secretary went on to Des Moines to say defiantly that "The President is just as much entitled to political advice as he is to natural resources advice." He declares he will also give the President advice on energy and the economy, but few will believe — in the light of the number of people already employed in those areas — that his counsel on those matters will be anything more than "incidental."

The first person to complain was Tom Curtis, chairman of the Federal Elections Commission. Unexpectedly — he has been quite indulgent with the President up to now — he bared his teeth and said that in this new era

of spending limits, Morton's purely political activities should be charged against the President's political account.

Strictly speaking, the law already prohibits public payment to people "for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of any person to federal office."

If it were to be enforced with regard to congressional staff members, who blatantly do everything from speech-writing to baby-sitting for the cause, the entire membership of Congress would be packed off to jail, a problem Curtis recognizes.

WHAT HE IS TRYING to tell Ford, and probably shouldn't have to, is that something called post-Watergate morality requires men in high office to behave with special circumspection. Nobody should have had to tell Ford, on the other hand, that what he needed least, as Ronald Reagan nips at his heels on federal spending, was another issue, which Morton's \$44,800 job has swiftly become.

The other controversial employe, Richard Ober, went to the White House, amid no public notice whatever, in March 1974, after "Operation Chaos" was terminated. He came to be intelligence director of the National Security Council.

Through examination of CIA documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, The Washington Star discovered his presence. It discovered something more: that Ober, along with former CIA Director Richard Helms, is under investigation by the Justice Department for his part in the 1971 break-in of a Fairfax City photo shop, run by a CIA employe and her boyfriend.

When Nessen was asked if Ford would keep Ober on, he replied that the President would, because he subscribes to the principle that a man is innocent until proven guilty. It was a declaration that did much credit to the President as a civil libertarian, but somewhat less to his sense of propriety as an employer.

THE POINT IS NOT whether Ober is innocent or guilty in the break-in which may have been among the lesser offenses committed under "Operation Chaos." The point is whether a man of proven, indeed aggressive, indifference to the constitutional rights of American citizens has the

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As We See It

right to a job in the White House, which most Americans consider to be at least a reward, if not still exactly an honor.

Nessen thinks it reflects well — in contrast, he noted delicately, to the previous administration, that the President is not interfering in the Justice Department investigation. But it reflects less well on him that he thinks it is a matter of no consequence that one of his staff members engaged in activities that are generally considered reprehensible and that Helms acknowledged at the time "would appear to be beyond the agency's jurisdiction."

Keeping Ober on shows that Ford doesn't panic, which is a good thing. It also shows that he is not sensitive to public opinion. Which is a bad thing. It will take a great deal more than the appointment of Rogers Morton, who doesn't seem particularly sensitive himself, to teach him that the public is a little fussy about how he spends its taxes for his help.

Los Angeles Times Thurs., Jan. 8, 1976

FEAR OF SPYING**A Dangerous Game Worsens**

BY ROBERT SIGNER
The Chicago Daily News

WASHINGTON—In the oblique world of international intrigue, euphemisms often reveal what they were intended to conceal, especially with a little help from students of deception.

The youthful editors of Counter-Spy, a quarterly magazine that habitually exposes government secrets, have become specialists in translating euphemisms. For "Army Department analyst" or "Foreign Service reserve," for example, they substitute a single word: Spy.

One such act of translation has made Counter-Spy and its parent organization, Fifth Estate Security Education, the latest center of attention in the ongoing controversy over continued exposure of government secrets or dirty tricks.

Twice in recent issues Counter-Spy published the name of Richard S. Welch and identified him as a Central Intelligence Agency chief of station in Lima, Peru. Subsequently, his name and those of six other reported CIA agents in Greece—where Welch moved earlier this year—were published in an English-language Athens daily.

Welch was shot to death Dec. 23 outside his suburban Athens home, a known residence for CIA officials in Greece.

If there was a connection between Counter-Spy's identification of Welch as a CIA official and the murder, it has not been established. But Counter-Spy's editors, though they express regret that any person's life was lost, do not believe the responsibility was theirs.

"I think it's unfortunate that someone was killed," said Margaret Van Houten, a staff member of the magazine. "But when you function in a job like that, you have to function with the understanding that something like that could happen to you at any time."

Since its first issue in April, 1973, supported by Norman Mailer, the author, and former luminaries of the antiwar movement, Counter-Spy has moved relentlessly ahead in its exposures of CIA spics.

It has identified 225 people in the last two years as CIA agents working in such countries as Egypt, Cambodia, Venezuela, even Laos. This month, which will carry the names of CIA agents in Angola, Paris and Sweden.

□ The Central Intelligence Agency, which obviously cannot function efficiently in the glare of a spotlight, has been very much in the news in recent months. We call your attention to the article by John A. McCone, former Director of the CIA, starting on page 6 of this issue. The article explains, as the news reports have not, why we have a CIA and how vital it is to our national security.

There were, evidently, clear examples of wrongdoing by some members of the Agency in recent years, excesses which went beyond the authority granted the CIA by Congress. These excesses were uncovered by a Senate committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) which, despite pleas from the White House, decided to expose the secret information to the Nation and the world. The purpose of Congressional hearings is to develop information that will prompt legislation. Certainly legislation

to prevent future excesses by the CIA might have been drafted and passed by Congress without publicizing our secrets, exposing America to ridicule and discrediting our intelligence organization.

□ This is an election year. Senator Church is ambitious. His insistence that the American people deserve to know all the facts is an effective one—ordinarily. But this is an extremely sensitive and critical area. The public should know how our Government operates, but must we know everything about everything? Can we maintain relations with other nations under such circumstances? Can American intelligence agencies collect information vital to our security when foreign informants are led to doubt our ability to protect our sources?

A hundred KGB agents working overtime for the Kremlin could hardly have undermined the CIA as effectively as Senator Church's committee did. It was a shocking and immeasurably harmful blow to our national security.

The editors are a youngish crew of men and women who are for the most part veterans of the anti-Vietnam war movement. Their spiritual fathers, identified as an advisory board in the magazine's masthead, include Mark Lane, the Warren Commission critic; Philip Agee, former CIA case officer who wrote an expose of CIA operations; and Victor Marchetti, another former CIA officer who also wrote a book.

The magazine's literary guru is Mailer, who helped get the publication started with a birthday bash in 1973 and who wrote a short critique of the CIA for Counter-Spy's spring-summer issue of 1975.

But the basic work is done by a small group of people led by co-editors Tim Butz, 28, and Doug Porter, 25. They work at home and use a postal box mailing address. Sometimes they can be found in the offices of the Intelligence Document Center, a research organization and library situated in a DuPont Circle building that also is home to a policemen's union, the Jimmy Carter for President campaign headquarters and the Friends of Mother Seton.

Butz, a former journalism student at Kent State University, is somewhat dismayed that the recent attention has focused on the lists of CIA agents. He feels the other articles in Counter-Spy are important for "educational" reasons.

These articles have included features on the politics of data banks, CIA spying on women and "an educational guide to CIA labor operations in Latin America."

"We have a tendency to be prematurely correct in our analyses of intelligence activities," Butz said, adding that it is becoming more difficult to "stay ahead of the news" because of recent national media interest in government spying.

Butz, Porter and Van Houten won't disclose where they get their information, other than to say vaguely that it comes from "sources" or people who bring them information to be verified.

They do deny suggestions that many of the CIA identifications were cribbed from a book, "Who's Who in CIA," which was circulated in Europe in 1967 and has been attributed to the Soviet intelligence network. "We pretty much consider it unreliable," Van Houten said of that book. She said the so-called "Who's Who" lists former Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy and Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) as CIA agents.

Counter-Spy's circulation of just over 3,000 is composed mostly of students, teachers and journalists, Butz said. The editors believe they have a "healthy" and influential circulation, one that will grow steadily.

Despite the recent notoriety, Butz believes Counter-Spy has a continuing muckraking responsibility to fulfill.

"A lot of people who call themselves investigative reporters aren't really investigative reporters," he said. "They just do a few months of an investigation. That's where Counter-Spy is different."

NEW YORK TIMES. MONDAY, JANUARY 19, 1976

Controlling the Central Intelligence Agency

By Ernest Gellhorn

TEMPE, Arizona—A year has now passed since it was charged that the Central Intelligence Agency had spied on American citizens, maintained dossiers on their domestic activities, and engaged in numerous other illegal acts such as wiretaps, physical surveillances and break-ins.

In the meantime, these and other charges have in essence been documented by the report of the Commission on C.I.A. activities within the United States, headed by Vice President Rockefeller; hearings in the House and Senate; and the assassination report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Senator Frank Church.

It is, therefore, time to ask whether things have really changed. Would the C.I.A. do these things again? Could the C.I.A. repeat these mistakes and misdeeds and sometime in the future again turn its focus inward on Americans within the United States?

By any standard, it seems clear that only limited progress has been made in establishing meaningful controls over the C.I.A.

No doubt the experience of the last year has been searing. Those now in charge of the C.I.A. are unlikely to allow it to be misused again. Still, very few steps have been taken to assure that the C.I.A. will not be abused again.

One is the order, first issued by the former Director of Central Intelligence, James R. Schlesinger, that personnel within the agency should report all questionable or illegal activities to the director personally. Another is the tightening of internal controls. All personnel are now instructed in the law's requirements, and procedures have been established for consulting the agency's legal counsel before the C.I.A. engages in activities that might conflict with its charter or other laws.

But these steps do little more than assure that the C.I.A. will not repeat past misdeeds in the current political climate. Public exposure has only a short-term effect. As times and events change, it is legal and administrative controls that can be expected to provide continuing protection that the C.I.A. will not again be used against American citizens or stray beyond its assigned task. And it is here that almost nothing has been done in the last year.

Further steps need to be taken that respond to the symptoms of the C.I.A.'s diseases. While it seems appropriate, as the Rockefeller Commission proposed, that the C.I.A. be directed not to open mail, infiltrate domestic political groups, or use illegal wiretaps, these recommendations are only hortatory and without sustaining effect.

The mail-interception program operated for over twenty years even though "everyone realized from the outset" that it was illegal. Similarly, the C.I.A.'s own memo to Henry A. Kissinger in 1969 acknowledged that the agency's investigation of political dissidents involved it in "an area not

within the charter" of the agency. Specific acts that deserve strong deterrence are normally punished by criminal penalties, and the C.I.A. should be no exception.

The C.I.A.'s problems stem from three causes: the agency's charter is vague and unspecific and therefore can be readily manipulated; Presidents and their staffs have misused the agency for their own ends; and because of the sensitivity of the information with which it deals, the agency has been exempted from both internal bureaucratic checks and external executive and legislative controls.

Sensible steps can and should be taken immediately by the Ford Administration, and where necessary by Congress, which are responsive to each of these causes of misperformance by the C.I.A.

First, the charter should be rewritten. Its mandate was intentionally vague when written because the United States was without experience in operating a peacetime intelligence agency.

Now, almost three decades later, the do's and don'ts can and should be spelled out in the charter. The C.I.A.'s assignment should be limited to "foreign" intelligence, defined as information relating to the activities, intentions and capabilities of foreign governments and their leaders.

The authority to protect sources and methods of intelligence should be transferred from the director of the agency, and this responsibility should be limited in scope. The use of otherwise unlawful investigative methods within the United States should be specifically denied the C.I.A.

And future efforts to rely upon a "national security" exception to justify questionable activities should be anticipated and precluded by specific statutory language.

Second, Presidential abuse of the agency can be avoided by taking note of the Rockefeller commission's conclusion that persons appointed director possess, among other qualities, "the independence to resist improper pressure, whether from the White House, within the Agency or elsewhere." This

recommendation would seem to preclude the appointment of one of the President's political associates, and, in particular, George W. Bush, the director-designate, who so recently served as a national party chairman.

Equally important, a single and exclusive high-level channel through the National Security Council should be used for Presidential staff requests to the C.I.A. And a permanent record of such requests and C.I.A. actions in response should be maintained by the Council (subject to Congressional audit).

Third, Congress and the executive branch need to establish permanent and well-staffed oversight capabilities. No permanent controls exist today. A joint committee on intelligence such as that established for atomic energy seems an obvious need for Congress; this committee's staff and membership could develop sufficient expertise to limit agency activities.

The National Security Council, the President's advisory board on intelligence and the Justice Department should be assigned specific responsibilities for controlling the C.I.A.'s performance. Because of the secrecy that necessarily shrouds the C.I.A.'s activities, effective internal controls are probably even more important.

William E. Colby as Director reduced the staff of the C.I.A.'s inspector general from 14 to five and appointed a person without training or experience in that post. There is an urgent need to increase that staff, upgrade its personnel and widen its authority.

While some of these suggestions require Congressional approval, many do not. Most seem indisputable. One year of study and investigation is sufficient for the Administration and Congress to act. The time to investigate, study and recommend has passed for such basic, rudimentary controls: It is now time for the President to exercise leadership and act.

Ernest Gellhorn, now dean of the College of Law of Arizona State University, was senior counsel on the Commission on C.I.A. Activities Within the United States—the Rockefeller Commission.

WASHINGTON POST
10 JAN 1976

Gandhi Said to Have No Proof on CIA

NEW DELHI, Jan. 9 (AP)—Sen. George McGovern (D-S. D.) said today that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told him she had "circumstantial evidence" but no proof to back up her recent allegation of CIA interference in India.

"She said that she did not

have specific proof of activities of that kind but that one could infer from public revelations that have come from the investigations in the Senate and elsewhere that such activities were likely in India," McGovern said.

"She felt that other countries were involved in arousing dissension in India. She did not want to single out the United States."

TIME
26 JANUARY 1976

THE CIA

Dangerous Wrecking Operation

About the surest way to get your name in the foreign press these days, or so it seems, is to join the CIA.

In the past 15 months, several hundred agents in Stockholm, Athens, Lisbon, Madrid, Mexico City, London and Paris have had their covers blown, mostly by leftist papers. Last week the leftist French daily *Liberation*, founded by philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, disclosed on two successive days the names of 44 CIA people in the Paris embassy, including the home addresses and telephone numbers of the top officers. In London, a trendy weekly social and entertainment guide called *Time Out* named three new CIA employees in the U.S. embassy (in 1975 *Time Out* printed the names of 62 CIA people with a chart of their embassy offices). At week's end a new Italian daily, *la Repubblica*, front-paged the names of seven CIA agents in Rome. Just two weeks ago, the newsweekly *Cambio 16*, one of Spain's leading magazines, fingered seven CIA agents in the American embassy in Madrid. Washington fears that CIA operatives in West Germany will be uncovered next. It has reached the point, a U.S. diplomat at the Paris Embassy sarcastically suggests, where the CIA and the U.S. Information Service swap offices, since "it's the CIA that seems to be generating all the publicity nowadays."

Embarrassing Exposure. American intelligence officials profess not to be concerned that the disclosures will help the Russians since, they suspect, the KGB already knows who most of their CIA agents are anyway—and vice versa. But officials say that CIA contacts with businessmen, journalists and government officials have been damaged by the embarrassment of exposure. Worse, says one White House official, the unmasking makes "agents particularly vulnerable to terrorist acts." Many point to the murder of Station Chief Richard Welch by assassins in Athens in December just a month after his name appeared in the *Athens News*, an Eng-

lish-language daily. As a result, the U.S. has placed round-the-clock bodyguards on high-level officials in Greece. In Paris, CIA staff have reportedly taken to totting guns and traveling in unmarked, rented cars. But in most other capitals, the exposure created little excitement, and special security measures were soon dropped. Nonetheless, said Senator Frank Church, "I don't think former officials of the CIA ought to release the names of current agents of the CIA. I think that is contemptible." Suggests Columnist Anthony Lewis, the "wholesale publication of agents' names [seems] hard to justify—and likely to be a wrecking operation."

The agency lists began appearing after Philip Agee, 40, an ex-CIA spy who now lives in Cambridge, England, published *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* last year. The book identified nearly 250 CIA men and women round the world. Says Agee, who apparently aided the printing of at least several of the lists: "The point of all this is to change the CIA policy of clandestine involvement in the internal affairs of other countries [and] to undermine the agency's work."

Another spur behind the stories has apparently been the Washington magazine *Counter-Spy*, published quarterly by the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, a group of antiwar activists, some of whom are ex-agents. Since its inception in 1973, *Counter-Spy* has named more than 300 CIA agents. One of its co-editors, Tim Butz, 28, a bearded Viet Nam veteran who was a student at Kent State during the antiwar killings in 1970, helped the *Liberation* reporters with their exposé. His reason: to "demystify" the CIA and nail down "personal culpability for war crimes."

Butz says he would give out the names of KGB operatives but "we lack the vehicles for exposing the KGB." *Liberation* adds another rationale. The daily is not printing the names of KGB operatives, said one of its editors, "because with the Soviet embassy, we assume everybody is a secret agent."

WASHINGTON POST
16 JAN 1976

2 Tell CIA List Role

BALTIMORE, Jan. 15 (UPI)—Two editors of the radical newspaper *Counter-Spy* have acknowledged involvement in the publication of the names of alleged Central Intelligence Agency officers by the leftist French newspaper *Liberation*.

The acknowledgement came as the French Government said the publication of the names of 50 alleged agents was masterminded from abroad.

Winslow Peck and Tim Butz, the editors, said they expected other anti-CIA publications to print the names of other agents soon, including operatives in Japan, Italy and Spain.

The editors said they spoke

to *Liberation* officials before the Paris newspaper printed the names of 32 alleged American spies Tuesday. On Wednesday, the French publication printed 12 more names.

Peck and Butz said *Liberation* asked them to verify 50 alleged CIA agents. Peck said he confirmed many but not all of the names.

"We asked them (*Liberation*) not to print the names of those we did not believe were CIA agents," Peck said.

He said the 32 names published Tuesday were taken from the list which he and Butz studied but he would not say if he had verified all 32 names.

WASHINGTON STAR
19 JANUARY 1976

It's KGB's Turn As Paris Paper Lists 2 as Agents

PARIS (UPI) — Two Soviet embassy officials today became the first Russians to be publicly named as intelligence agents since the worldwide scramble to unmask CIA operatives began last year.

The left-wing magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* identified Ivan Petrovitch Kisliak as "the resident" agent in France of the KGB — the Soviet counterpart of the CIA.

It also identified Nicolai Evdokimov as a leading member of the Paris branch of GRU, the intelligence-gathering arm of the Soviet Army general staff.

"FOR ONCE the shoe's on the other foot," said one Western diplomat.

Some 100 Americans around the world have been named as CIA agents by various publications. One of them, Richard Welch, was gunned down outside his home last month after the *Athens News* identified him as the CIA station chief in Greece.

"It's damn nice somebody's putting this thing in perspective," said a Western diplomatic source of the French weekly's identification of the Soviets.

Contacted by telephone, Evdokimov would only say: "I haven't read the article. Thank you for your attention. Goodnight."

Kisliak was not available for comment.

The left-wing newspaper *Liberation* last week named 44 Americans who it said have served or are serving in France as CIA agents. Another French magazine, *Le Point*, said Soviet intelligence agents in Paris outnumber their American counterparts by 10 to 1.

THE MAGAZINE said that one of the rules of secret services is that 10 persons are required to do a good surveillance job on one opposing agent.

Le Point said the glut of allegations about CIA operatives has disrupted day-to-day running of the agency and made open targets of thinly disguised agents.

But undercover agents who don't work out of U.S. embassies have a host of secret identities that remain unaffected, *Le Point* said.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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PROGRAM	The Today Show	STATION	WRC TV NBC Network
DATE	January 8, 1975 7:00 AM	CITY	Washington, D. C.
SUBJECT	An Interview with William Colby		

JIM HARTZ: All of our interview time in this hour this morning will be devoted to the CIA and its activities and its reactions to the extraordinary number of public disclosures made about it since the Watergate scandal. And for this, CIA Director William Colby is in our Washington News Center with Today Washington correspondent Douglas Kiker and NBC News correspondent Ford Rowan, who covers the CIA.

Doug?

DOUGLAS KIKER: Thank you, Jim. Good morning, everybody.

Mr. Colby, the CIA has been under heavy fire from one quarter or another for over a year now. Your defenders say the attacks, the disclosures have served to undermine the CIA's effectiveness. Has the agency's effectiveness been diminished?

DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY: Of course, it's been hurt. You can't possibly go through a year such as this of denunciations all around the world, accusations of all sorts of things, exposures of our operations, exposures of the names of our people without causing foreigners who work with us and foreign intelligence services to draw back and evidence fear of being involved with us and being subject to the kind of exposure and attack that has been going on.

On the other hand, I must say that we still produce the best intelligence in the world.

KIKER: Thank you. As Jim told you, Mr. Colby will be with us for the rest of this hour. But first the news, and for that, here's Lou Wood in New York.

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HARTZ: The Central Intelligence Agency has been the subject of almost continuous investigation this past year by both houses of Congress, investigations that have led to charges that the CIA has, at times, violated both its own charter and the law. Defenders of the CIA says the investigations, along with the various news stories and exposes, have weakened the agency and endangered its agents. To talk about this throughout this hour, CIA Director William Colby is in our Washington News Center with Today Washington correspondent Douglas Kiker and NBC News correspondent Ford Rowan, who covers the CIA. And I should mention that Mr. Colby is the outgoing Director of the CIA and is expected to be replaced soon, possibly within this month, by George Bush. But he is still the active Director, with long experience in the agency.

Doug?

KIKER: Thank you, Jim.

Mr. Colby, a few moments ago you said that the effectiveness of the agency had been diminished because of the exposures and the investigations. Just before Christmas, Richard Welch, who was Station Chief of the CIA in Athens, was gunned down by three masked men. Subsequently people have said that because Mr. Welch was identified in magazines like Counter-Spy, he was identified in the Athens News as a CIA agent, that this endangered his life and it's endangering the lives of other agents.

Do you agree with this?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think any of us in the intelligence business obviously run risks. I've run risks and my associates have run risks over many years. And that's part of the game. But at the same time, there's a question of how much risk we are asked to run. And I particularly find it reprehensible to find a deliberate effort to identify our people by fellow Americans. Those who are opposed to the activities of CIA I think have every right to appeal to the Congress to terminate it, to change its rules, whatever. But I find it particularly startling that an American would deliberate finger a fellow American serving his country in a dangerous post abroad.

KIKER: Would you like to see legislation of some sort which would make it against the law for former CIA agents to write exposes, let's say, or for magazines like Counter-Spy to publish agents' names?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I'm a great believer in the First Amendment, Mr. Kiker. But the fact is that we do need some better protection of our secrets. We have secrets in American society. They're important to our democracy: the secret ballot box, the secrecy of a grand jury proceeding, the secrecy of our income tax returns. All these things are secrets and are protected by law.

I think good intelligence is important to the protection of our democracy and our country. And good intelligence does need some secrets -- not all secrets. And that's perhaps part of our trouble -- is that the old tradition of intelligence was that everything was secret. We've brought that out now and we've made public a great deal of what we can. But there are limits if we are to maintain a good intelligence service.

FORD ROWAN: Mr. Colby, in asking for strengthened laws to prohibit agents and former agents and employees from divulging secrets or the identities of other employees of the intelligence community, will you seek to expand -- will the CIA seek to expand the government's power to obtain injunctions and restrain the publication or broadcast of this information?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I have long advocated a law which would allow me to require an ex-employee to keep the secrecy agreement he made when he came to work with us. We did go to court in one case against one of our ex-employees. We happened to hear that he was going to publish before he actually published. And we got an injunction, and this was reviewed in the courts and this was approved. At the same time, if he had already published, I must say I would have been on very weak grounds to do anything about it.

And I think that we do need a law that imposes the discipline of secrecy on us who go into the intelligence profession. I do not believe it ought to apply to those outside

the intelligence profession.

KIKER: Have you urged President Ford to introduce such legislation?

DIRECTOR COLBY: I have urged. And just recently the Department of Justice has joined with me and agreed that this would be a good thing to do.

KIKER: Let's turn for a minute to Angola. First of all quickly, what's going on there? There're reports of big victories by the Popular Front -- that's the other side, of course -- this past week. And we hear now that three Soviet ships are heading in. Of course, the Soviets have been anchoring in Conakry Harbor for sometime. Are they coming there as a show of force? Is the Popular Front moving ahead? Can you just -- and how will we respond to all this?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think what has happened in Angola over the past year or so has been that the Portuguese determined that they would give the country its independence. And there were three contending groups for that succession to the government. The various African nations on a number of occasions got the three groups together and got them to agree to collaborate. But the communist supported group has insisted on a total domination of the situation. They began receiving military aid from the Soviet Union in October, 1974. They began to build up their strength. Starting last July, they drove the other groups out of the capital by armed force and were driving them into the countryside and, hopefully, to their side, over the edge of the border.

Then the other groups got some help and they came back to some extent. At that point, the Soviet Union substantially escalated its aid in air supply, in tanks, artillery, all this sort of thing. And in the last week or two, the Popular Movement, the Soviet supported group, has made somewhat of an attack, particularly in the north, not so much in the south.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, the covert action of the United States in Angola has come under criticism from Congress, obviously. There're efforts to cut off American aid. I'd like to ask you about the extent of American aid. I have heard figures that our aid to Zaire will jump from three million to nineteen million dollars next year. Is that money being funneled into Angola?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think there're several categories of aid to the neighboring countries. The military aid program is one that is reported to Congress and done publicly. There's no question about that. And there are certain proposals for military aid to Zaire.

Any other aid I really am not at liberty to discuss in detail or even to confirm officially. But the fact is that any effort by the United States, by CIA, other than intelligence gathering, is the subject of a finding by the President that it's important to the national security, and it's been reported to six committees of the Congress.

KIKER: Let me ask you this. Angola would seem to be a perfect example of the dilemma I think we find ourselves in. Congress wants more say-so in CIA covert operations. The American people, I believe, want to know what's going on -- no more invisible governments. Yet you say, and let's say with accuracy, that the CIA's effectiveness is being destroyed by all of these demands and disclosures.

Let's take Angola. What's the answer?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think the answer is that if you take, in this Bicentennial year, a quotation from the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress in 1776, their comment was that we find, by fatal experience, that the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets. I think that's a little advice to us.

Now we have a new law passed last December which requires us to report to six committees. Almost everything that's been reported to those six committees has been exposed in the press. I see in a quotation in the press yesterday that two members of the Congress confirmed, by telephone, that I had given them a briefing on some secret activity. Now this is not a way to protect secrets, particularly when some of the activities that we conduct we conduct with the knowing approval and even, in one situation, the urging of one of the committees of the Congress to conduct a particular activity.

KIKER: Mr. Colby, we're going to have to pause for a few moments. We'll be back with William Colby, Director of the CIA. The Today Show will continue after we pause for this station break.

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KIKER: Good morning again. We are here with Ford Rowan, NBC News correspondent who covers the CIA, and William Colby, who is the Director of the CIA.

And Mr. Colby, we were talking about the dilemma of an intelligence agency that feels it must operate in private, a Congress that wants to know more about covert activities and yet, as you were saying just now, seems not to be able to keep the secrets that you confide in them with. That's good English. Could you go on with that thought?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think the problem is that we have to determine, we Americans, how to conduct a responsible intelligence operation. I think we insist that we in the intelligence profession be responsible and that we operate under the law and under the Constitution. But I think we also have to insist that our members of Congress act in the constitutional frame that they're set up to be -- the representatives of the people. That doesn't mean that they're a conduit for every bit of information they get in secret to immediately display it to the public. They are asked to be responsible, to stand up, to make judgments, and to assume responsibilities for knowing things that they cannot pass on. Otherwise we cannot run an intelligence service.

I think we've had a very hard time this past year. And it reminds me a little bit of the child's fable about Chicken Little. You remember the acorn fell on Chickie Little's head, and Chicken Little ran down the street saying that the sky was falling. Well, I think that in a way this past year, we have had an example of that kind of performance. We did drop on our heads the fact that CIA did some wrong things over the past twenty-eight years. I think those were few and far between. We have corrected them. But I think we have a situation in which we have dominated our discussions with denunciations of the evil deeds of CIA on a very limited base and have totally lost our proportion, sense of proportion about the importance of intelligence, the excellence of intelligence, the few misdeeds that we did conduct, and the fact that we've corrected them.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, I'd like to ask you a question about one of the covert operations that you mentioned now

exposed, and that's the operation in Chile, which they said consisted of propaganda, bribery, economic retaliation, fomenting a coup, and support for right wing terror groups.

Now you're a lawyer, and I'm going to ask you in this context. My reading of the U. N. Charter, Article II, Section IV, the 1965 U. N. General Assembly Declaration on the Impermissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States, the 1970 U. N. General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and one, two, three, four, five, six, seven international treaties that the United States is a party to indicates that that was a violation of international law.

Now I don't blame CIA, because you were doing what President Ford [sic] and Henry Kissinger said. But in all of those meetings about Chile, was there ever once a word, one whisper from the back of the room -- "Maybe it's illegal?"

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think, in the first place, President Ford had nothing to do with Chile.

ROWAN: I'm sorry. President Nixon.

DIRECTOR COLBY: We had....

KIKER: You've got a minute, incidentally, to answer that.

DIRECTOR COLBY: We had a series of Presidents who told us to do things in Chile: President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Nixon. There's no question about it. Any activity we did in Chile was also reported to the Congress at the time in the manner in which it had set itself up at that time.

Now the question of international law -- of course, it's not a law in the same sense that the law that we have in our country applies -- in sovereignty. And I think you have to look for international custom, as well as international law, to see what nations do and are expected to do.

KIKER: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but our time is up for now. Mr. Colby will be spending the rest of this hour with us, William Colby, Director of the CIA. But it's time now for a station break.

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HARTZ: We are devoting this entire hour to an interview with the outgoing Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. William Colby. He is in our Washington News Center with Douglas Kiker and Ford Rowan. And I'd like to ask a question, if I might, here.

Mr. Colby, the defenders of the CIA say that much of the criticism that has been directed against it recently has been unfair, because most of the activities that are carried out by the CIA, those that have been criticized most heavily, have been directives from the President and from the National Security Council.

Could you enlighten us on how decisions are made and how orders are given to the CIA?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think that it is clear that CIA's activities are essentially directed by the President, the National Security Council and follow congressional briefings and

operate on congressionally appropriated funds. There's no question about. There are a few occasions over the past years in which CIA did things that it should not have done. We have corrected that and stopped that. But I believe that the strong emphasis of the attackers of CIA in this past year have been on a very small percentage of its total activities. The covert operations that we hear criticized contain only about something like five percent of so of our budget at the moment. And the vast amount of our effort is devoted to pure intelligence gathering and assessment.

KIKER: Let me continue along that line, Mr. Colby. According to State Department officials who testified before Congress recently, nearly forty secret CIA operations were -- between 1972 and 1974 were approved without a single meeting of the White House group known as the Forty Committee that's supposed to approve such things. The implication is that Secretary of State Kissinger and Mr. Ford and Mr. Nixon said yes or no.

First of all, is this correct? And secondly, when you are ordered to conduct such a covert operation is there any way for you to know, short of going into the White House and knocking on the door and asking directly, whether or not the President was actually informed of the decision to go ahead?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I know that the President is informed of these because we discuss them from time to time. We know very well that he knows about different activities. And under the present, if CIA does anything other than pure intelligence gathering abroad, it must be the subject of a specific finding by the President, with his signature on it.

KIKER: Well, these forty decisions, for example -- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we are told, were conferred with by telephone sometimes, sometimes not; sometimes this person, sometimes that person. It would seem that Mr. Kissinger and the President were saying "Well, let's go ahead with it." Two men. Is that correct?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, essentially, what that report refers to is the fact that we had a procedure by which all of our activities had to be reported each year. There weren't necessarily forty new activities that were approved. But we gave annual round-ups, periodic reports of things that were happening, things that really didn't involve much policy discussion and no particular problems.

During that period, quite frankly, there was very little going on in this field that required that kind of review.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, let me ask you about another decision of the President, Secretary of State and yourself -- the one in Angola. Was the decision, or is there now -- let me ask you that way -- is there now any American personnel, either from the CIA or from the Defense Department, operating in Angola? Are you using any CIA aircraft or Defense Department aircraft to supply friendly forces in Angola?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, the basic answer is that there are no Americans fighting in Angola, period. The early references to Angola as being a new Vietnam really are totally absurd, because the point about CIA's covert operations is that we are able to do things without large commitments of American forces and instead of the commitment, as I've said before, of the United States Marines in a situation which requires some intervention, some activity by us. We have a situation

now where we have a Soviet destroyer, a Soviet cruiser, Soviet LST, Soviet oilers in the neighborhood off West Africa. There's no question about it: the Soviets are expressing their interest in that area.

Now to say that CIA should not give some help to some friends who are trying to struggle against a desire by the Soviets and the Cubans and their group that they're manipulating and supporting I think is the height of absurdity. Sure, Angola is far away. But in the thirties, Abyssinia was far away. And in 1931, Manchuria was far away. And we got into an awful lot of trouble because we ignored those things that were far away.

KIKER: Let me ask you, to change the subject again -- ask you about Italy. The word is out that the CIA funneled nearly six million dollars to noncommunist politicians in Italy. Two questions. First of all, does it do any good? Just yesterday the centrist, quote, "coalition" broke down. Secondly, should we be doing it? What would be the reaction in the United States if we learned here that Italy had funneled six million dollars to American politicians?

DIRECTOR COLBY: We have not spent a nickel in Italy in the past few months, to be specific about it. We have not done so. I cannot discuss what our plans, what our thoughts might be for the future.

Should the United States help its friends in a friendly country to keep that country from coming under communist control and having the Communist Party be the majority party in that country? I think the United States can help its friends. We did help our friends in Western Europe after World War II. We helped them through military force, through NATO. We helped them through economic aid, through the Marshall Plan. And we helped several of the democratic parties and forces throughout Western Europe to sustain themselves against a subversive effort by the communists and their Soviet masters.

ROWAN: You say you haven't spent any money yet. But you do plan to, don't you?

DIRECTOR COLBY: I am not at liberty to discuss the details of our activities. But I think I can say that we have not spent any money, period.

KIKER: Let's talk about the CIA's involvement here at home. Your charter prohibits you from operating in any way in the United States. And yet there was disclosure after disclosure from these hearings.

Let's not really rehash old things. How can we prevent what happened from happening again? Is it possible for the CIA to police itself? Are we going to have a situation five years from now where we hear about other Americans' mail being investigated and opened, and so forth and so forth?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, you're certainly aren't going to hear about any that took place while I've been Director, because in 1973, shortly after I became Director, I issued a set of directives to insure that CIA stayed within its proper legal charter and its proper legal authorities.

It is easy to keep CIA within its rules just by issuing the proper directives and making it clear that we're expected to. I think, yes, in the past twenty-eight years, CIA strayed toward the edge. But the exhaustive investigation conducted by the Rockefeller Commission I think gives a fair statement of what actually happened, that there were some few

cases in which we did step over the line, either at the direct request of a President, because the line was somewhat fuzzy, or, in a very few cases, because there was an excess of enthusiasm or zeal to do the job of following the counterintelligence problem in the United States.

KIKER: Did you get drawn into it gradually, or did you think you'd never get caught? Were you just following orders? I say "you." Not you personally, but the agency.

DIRECTOR COLBY: Yes. I think that the times that various of these things were done, like intercepting mail between the United States and the Soviet Union -- this began in the early fifties. Now in the early fifties there was a great deal of concern in this country about Soviet spies in America. And we caught a number of them, and they existed, and there was a great deal of concern that there were a lot of other ones here. And in the effort to insure that we would not be subject to this kind of activity by the Soviet Union, we opened mail, which we should not have done and which we will not do again.

But I think the framework in which that occurred reflected a consensus of the American people and government that something had to be done.

KIKER: Well, what's to stop you? Excuse me. But what's to stop you? You did it before. What if the next President of the United States tells the next Director of the CIA "open mail"? What's to stop him from doing it?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think this year's investigation is the best answer to that. I think the thing that will really stop it is clear guidelines, which I say we have issued. And if anybody wants to issue it upon us, that's fine.

Secondly, better supervision, because, in the past, there's no question about it: intelligence was told to go and do the job and not to bother people with the details. We have to have good supervision. We have to have, as I said earlier, responsible supervision which doesn't expose everything in the guise of supervising it. But nonetheless, steady, regular, constant supervision by the Congress, by the executive I think will insure that CIA stays within its proper charter in the future.

KIKER: I interrupted you, Ford.

ROWAN: No, that's all right. I wanted to follow up on another area of domestic activity that's frightened a lot of people, and that's the drug testing, specifically about MK ULTRA, the program of testing substances on people. An Inspector-General's report from 1963 said the effectiveness of these drugs on individuals of all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance, and testing's been performed on a variety of individuals, including some that didn't know they were being tested.

Now apparently, according to the Inspector-General's report, the scope of NK [sic] ULTRA was not just drugs. It included radiation, electroshock, various techniques of psychology, psychiatry, graphology, harassment substances and paramilitary devices and materials. Did you do those sort of things on people here or abroad?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Again, let's refer to the time we're talking about. In the early fifties, the mid fifties when we saw Cardinal Mindszenty standing there with those haunting eyes, when

washed, there was a great deal of concern about the possible effects of drugs and other kinds of devices to affect human behavior. And there was some experimentation that went on at that time. And that Inspector-General's report in 1963 is what terminated that kind of experimentation outside of the normal rules of volunteer knowing subjects.

ROWAN: Let me follow up by asking not about MK ULTRA, but about MK DELTA, which was the operational side of the coin. And I don't believe that very much attention's been given to that. But it was reported in this report that the operational aspects were in the hundreds, that these techniques, these substances had been used overseas in the hundreds. Can you confirm that?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, when I was in Norway in World War II and was skiing over the back mountains there, I got up several hills thanks to some good benzedrine that somebody in our chemical business had provided me before I went on that operation.

Yes, there are uses for drugs in intelligence operations, and they did use them on some occasions. But I think the only death that we know of was the unfortunate death of Mr. Olsen, which certainly we have done our best to make amends for.

KIKER: I think Jim Hartz has a question.

Jim?

HARTZ: Yes, one final question, Mr. Colby, sort of pointing in the direction of where the CIA is going. We've seen some changes here. It seems as if you're trying to go on the offensive. You're here on this broadcast. It's almost unheard of in the past for the Director of the agency to appear publicly. The other day I noticed that President Ford had gone to a funeral for the agent who was killed in Athens. That's almost unheard of. Usually presidential appearances at funerals are reserved for heads of state, high elected officials, and so on.

May I ask you about that? Why was he at that funeral? Why are you here now? What are you trying to do?

DIRECTOR COLBY: Well, I think President Ford -- the best answer to that is what he told me when I thanked him for coming to that funeral. He said he felt very strongly about it, and so do we. Mr. Welch was a brave and effective intelligence officer who died in the service of his country. I think that he spent his life for our country, and also he died for it.

KIKER: Well, you won't have a chance to tell us why you came here. But we do want to thank you for coming, Mr. Colby, and it's been very educational. Thank you again.

DIRECTOR COLBY: Thank you.

KIKER: William Colby, Director of the CIA. The Today show will continue right after this message.

WASHINGTON POST
21 JAN 1976

--The Turin newspaper Stampa Sera said it possesses a list of 18 alleged CIA agents in Italy but will not publish it for fear of endangering personal safety.

GENERALDAILY TELEGRAPH, London
31 December 1975**ROBERT MOSS** on the significance of 1975 abroad

Survival calls for self-defence

THE year now passing sounded another chord in the West's slow recession, a further abdication of world power by the United States, and a deeper doubt about whether the affluent but self-centred democracies of Western Europe were willing to bestir themselves to do anything to check the rising tide of Soviet influence beyond their shores.

It was the year that began with the fall of South Vietnam, a country that was so quickly swallowed up into the totalitarian night that the battles that were once fought for it already seem to belong to a different age. The newspapers were full of atrocity stories about other far-flung provinces, ruled by Right-wing dictators, like Chile. But little was heard about the cost of revolution in Vietnam—largely because the new masters of Saigon kept the Press out, but partly, too, because Communist régimes excite less wrath in the United Nations and among the civil rights establishment than pro-Western ones.

But despite the conspiracy of silence, Vietnam cast a long shadow over world politics in 1975. The fear of getting bogged down in another Vietnam—combined with a deep-seated distrust of the Presidency and of intelligence agencies that stemmed from Watergate and the CIA hearings—explains why the Senate voted in December to cut off American support for the anti-Soviet forces in Angola, where the stakes, in economic and strategic terms, are arguably higher than they ever were in Vietnam.

The Senate voted that way despite the evidence of massive involvement by the Soviet bloc, and its Cuban hirelings, in the contest for an immensely rich country that could supply Russia with vital naval and air bases on the Atlantic coast. But before we complain about how post-Vietnam America has become the "lost leader" of the Western world, we should pause to ask: why did no other Western Power try to fill the vacuum in Angola? Why was it left to the South Africans to step into the breach—for doing which, of course, they were promptly execrated as "racist aggressors" by every racist, tyrannical regime in the Soviet bloc and the Third World?

The sad answer is that the Social Democrat Governments of Western Europe—even when conscious of the issues at stake—were oblivious to the connection between force, or the threat of force, and foreign policy. They were increasingly unready to defend their own frontiers, let alone support the allies of freedom in Africa. Even the need to fight a bloody internal war in Northern Ireland did not deter Mr Wilson from backing away at Britain's armed forces on the pretext of curbing public expenditure.

But the roots of this paralysis lay deeper still. There was a greater reluctance than ever, among Europe's Social Democrats, to accept that Soviet-style Communism is irreconcilable with democratic institutions, or that the Soviet Union itself is still embarked on a plan for world domination. This "no-enemies-on-the-Left" psychology was symbolised by two extraordinary events in 1975: the red-carpet reception offered by Britain's TUC to the former KGB boss who was then running the Soviet trade union federation—which, fortunately, provoked the uproar it merited—and the signing of the Helsinki agreements in August.

The Western Heads of Government who assembled at Helsinki signed a piece of paper confirming the enslavement of Europeans living east of the Iron Curtain in return for a few unenforceable pledges about freer movement of people and ideas that the Russians clearly had no intention of keeping. The West explicitly accepted the frontiers that were drawn up as a result of the Soviet land-grabs of 1940 and 1945, and added to the despair of those who have to live behind them. It may well be true that there is nothing we can do to change the state of things in Eastern Europe. But that was no reason for openly endorsing it.

A new offensive

Even for those who were blinkered, the issuing of what later became known as the "Zarodov doctrine" within a week of the Helsinki agreement should have made things plain. It was first stated in an article published in *Pravda* by Konstantin Zarodov, a prominent Soviet ideologue, on Aug 6. He argued that Communist parties abroad should go all-out for proletarian revolution and should not enter into dangerous compromises for the sake of Social Democrat allies. His article, which was personally endorsed by Mr Brezhnev, was part of a stream of public statements which suggested that the Russians had become convinced that the "crisis of capitalism"—and the widespread confusion in the West about the nature of Communist power—provided a favourable climate for a new offensive by Moscow-line Communist parties, especially through the instrument of the political strike.

That this kind of Communist

offensive failed, at least temporarily in Portugal, was one of the few bits of good news in 1975. Even by the end of the year—after the failure of a putsch inspired by the extreme Left in November—Portugal's Communists were still exploiting the gullibility of the Socialists, clinging to a foothold in the Cabinet, so that nothing had been securely resolved.

But the way that the Communists had been beaten back in Portugal held important lessons for some of its West European neighbours. It was the mobilisation of the silent majority, above all in the traditionally conservative north, that spurred hesitant moderates in the Portuguese Army to act before it was too late.

The other good news of 1975 (apart from the things that did not happen, like a new Middle East war, or a decision by OPEC to double oil prices) was the radical swing against the Left-wing consensus in Australia and New Zealand, and the grass-roots stirrings that could be detected in the rest of the Anglo-Saxon world. The important thing about the victory of Mr Malcolm Fraser, Australia's Liberal Party leader, in December, was not that it came about as the result of an idiosyncratic constitution, but that it brought to power a group of *thinking* conservatives who understood something about the monetary causes of inflation and the need to roll back the frontiers of State intervention in the economy.

Others stood up in the course of 1975 to state the obvious things, that have too recently gone unsaid. Mr Daniel Patrick Moynihan, America's splendid envoy to the UN, stood up to point out that the delegates of racist dictators in the General Assembly have no right to condemn Zionism as a "racist doctrine" or to pass judgment on the way other countries conduct their affairs. Western values may have a diminishing appeal in the Third World (witness Mrs Gandhi's dismantling of India's democracy) but that is no reason why the West's own spokesmen should cease to defend them.

Mr George Meany, the doughty old warrior of the AFL-CIO, stood up to point out that East-West trade union contacts subvert the meaning and purpose of free trade unions. Alexander Solzhenitsyn issued more sombre warnings that we had all better wake up to the fact that we have been fighting the Third World War

since 1945, and losing ground from year to year.

The failure of the Russian grain harvest brought it home that the Soviet threat is founded on nothing more than brute military strength and the naked will to power. In every other sense, it again showed itself to be vastly inferior to its Western rivals. The question that

remained open at the end of 1975, was whether the Nato countries, absorbed in their domestic problems, would rediscover the fact that survival depends on self-defence, and that the survival even of far-flung provinces like Angola is bound up with our own.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
3 January 1976

IS AMERICA GOING MAD?

IT IS TIME America's friends spoke out, with some nasty questions to the so-called "liberal" east-coast establishment. By that we mean sections of the Press, sections of Congress, television commentators and comedians, university pundits and a lot of other people who may think there is a dollar to be made out of denigrating their country's institutions and leaders. We all know about the "trauma" of Vietnam and Watergate, but it's getting a bit boring. How long has the rest of the free world got to put up with these tender-minded people recovering from their "trauma"? Indefinitely?

America is accustomed to, and has merited, a good deal of deference from her allies. But deference can be a disservice. The United States should know that her European cousins and allies are appalled and disgusted

by the present open disarray of her public life. The self-criticism and self-destructive tendencies are running mad, with no countervailing force in sight. She has no foreign policy any more, because Congress will not allow it. Her intelligence arm, the CIA, is being gutted and rendered inoperative, the names of its staff being published so that they can be murdered. Her President and Secretary of State are being hounded, not for what they do but simply because they are people there, to be pulled down for the fun of it.

We hope and believe that the vicious antics of the liberal east-coast establishment, which are doing all this untold harm, do not reflect the feelings of the mass of the country. But it is a matter for wonder. Is the country as a whole becoming deranged? Surely not. Perhaps the Presidential election later this year will clear the air. Yet that is still 11 months away, and in the meantime there is all the campaigning to be gone through. Please, America, for God's sake pull yourself together.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 26, 1976

"IS AMERICA GOING MAD?"

BY HOWARD FLIEGER

The *Daily Telegraph* of London used the above question as the heading over its main editorial on January 3.

The editorial began:

"It is time America's friends spoke out with some nasty questions to the so-called 'liberal' east-coast establishment. By that we mean sections of the press, sections of Congress, television commentators and comedians, university pundits and a lot of other people who may think there is a dollar to be made out of denigrating their country's institutions and leaders."

From that takeoff point, the newspaper's comment went on:

"The United States should know that her European cousins and allies are appalled and disgusted by the present open disarray of her public life. The self-criticism and self-destructive tendencies are running mad, with no countervailing force in sight. . . .

"Please, America, for God's sake pull yourself together."

It is instructive, though painful, to see ourselves through the eyes of others.

Of course, this country is not going mad. But we should not ignore the anxiety about our reliability that is being caused abroad by the present frenzy of faultfinding.

Perhaps one way to soften the impression reflected by the *Daily Telegraph* editorial would be for

Committees have been probing into everything under the sun—producing shock headlines by their reports or because of "leaks" of unauthorized and often unsubstantiated bits of information, much of it trivia.

Undoubtedly, the current enthusiasm for investigations springs from Watergate. And there is much to be said for what was accomplished on Capitol Hill in those days.

In spite of what anybody claims, it was Congress and the courts—not the media—that really developed the record of secret and sordid goings-on which culminated in the resignation of Richard M. Nixon. It was the diligence and thoroughness of congressional committees and their staffs during weeks of painstaking work that built the case for impeachment.

Certainly, Congress ought to maintain a watchful oversight on the activities and performance of all the departments and agencies of the Government. The public service must be held accountable to the public it serves, and Congress is the proper place to see to it.

But both the quantity and quality of investigations are beginning to raise doubts in the minds of many, including some of the members of Congress.

For example, there have been half a dozen separate investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency—each often calling the same witnesses for the same testimony and going over the same material in hearing after hearing. One begins to wonder how many times a

bit of evidence needs repeating.

Another point: In the clamor to investigate things it didn't know about, Congress is exposing its own negligence.

It has always had the power—in fact, the duty—to keep a close watch on the CIA. The fact that some things are being discovered for the first time means that special committees to maintain a continuing oversight on the CIA haven't been doing their job.

LONDON TIMES
23 Dec. 1975

Bernard Levin

Cry long and hard your tears of repentance

momentous news: *The Guardian* has discovered sin. And don't jeer: those pure and innocent souls may have been preceded on the road to enlightenment by others, but we all have to start somewhere, and if they are congratulated on their achievement rather than chided for its belatedness they may, thus encouraged go on to more exciting things yet, such as finding out that holding a guinea-pig up by its tail does not cause its eyes to fall out.

The discovery was announced in a story by Antonio de Figueiredo, their expert on matters Portuguese, and there was no preliminary throat-clearing on his part, for this is how it began:

Photographs and other documentary evidence smuggled out of Mozambique seem to show that national independence has become intertwined with revolution and that Frelimo, the freedom fighters of yesterday, are well on the way to becoming a totalitarian regime.

As Bosambo used to say to Sanders of the River: "O ko! This is a bad palaver!" And it gets worse:

Chinese or Albanian-style people's courts, complete with public exposure and criticism of barefoot blacks and whites accused of deviating from the correct party line, are a new feature of Mozambique's judicial system. A recent document containing the guidelines of Frelimo's policy towards religion... provides some insight into the ideological character of the new Mozambique. . . . "The Catholic Church is a reactionary organization which gives rise to counter-revolutionary activities in peoples' democracies. . . . So that peoples' democracies can proceed in the path of Socialism and Communism, it is necessary once and for all to put an end to the influence of this Church. . . ."

The surprise and alarm at Frelimo's anti-religious campaign is likely to have repercussions which are by no means confined to Church people. . . .

Well, that last statement is what is known as a self-fulfilling prophecy, because Mr de Figueiredo's surprise and alarm are plain for all to see. But a man who makes plain that he is surprised, and unpleasantly at that, by the discovery

that Tuesday follows Monday resembles the proverbial thirteenth chime of the clock, which is not only suspect in itself but casts doubt on all that has gone before.

What right has Mr Figueiredo to be surprised at the fact that ruthless totalitarians are behaving like ruthless totalitarians? What does he mean by saying that, in Mozambique, national independence has become intertwined with revolution? And, above all, is not his own breath taken away when he says that: "Frelimo, the freedom fighters of yesterday are well on the way to becoming a totalitarian régime"? For it was, after all, people like Mr Figueiredo and papers like *The Guardian* which told us that the members of Frelimo were "freedom fighters" in the first place. In doing so they poisoned the well of truth: now they are complaining because the water tastes funny. But what form of apology are they proposing to offer the poor devils who have actually got to live under the régime in question and to drink the bitter cup to its dregs? There was never any doubt that Frelimo was a brutal movement of conquest and exploitation, a reflection of the one it was fighting against, and those who told us that its members only got together to exchange knitting patterns and recipes for jam have no right now to tell those who knew all along what it was that the former version is now inoperative and should be replaced by the up-to-date model.

For—and this, after all, is the point—*The Guardian* and its writer on Portuguese affairs are genuine believers in democracy, not in people's democracy. Mr Figueiredo really is distressed that the citizens of "liberated" Mozambique are to be denied freedom of worship and that (as he tells us in the same story) many are now languishing in what he delicately calls "rehabilitation camps" for an attempt to exercise it. *The Guardian* and its correspondent have not failed to note the irony in the fact that a Catholic bishop, expelled from

A fair question: Is it better to spend hours tilling the soil of earlier faults, or to concentrate on ways to help the Agency function in the future? Once bygone errors have been unearthed, it is hard to see what is gained by rehashing them endlessly.

There is a role—a very important one—for investigations by Congress. But if some on Capitol Hill would pay more attention to current operations of Government, they wouldn't have to concern themselves so much with the happenings of the past.

It was not the party faithful who poisoned the minds of an entire generation in this country on the subject of Stalin

regime (itself no less brutal a tyranny than what has replaced it) for being insufficiently enthusiastic about right-wing totalitarian rule there has been forbidden by the left-wing totalitarians to return there.

All these things are true, and they are what you would expect of an honest newspaper and an honest journalist. But if disillusion was inevitable, how did it come about that when the same people, with the same policies, were fighting to establish their totalitarian rule in Mozambique, the doubts were faint and the enthusiasm largely unmuted? (There are many others in the same boat, of course, and some of them more culpable than our well-meaning liberals of the Anti-Corn Law League, Clerical opposition to right-wing tyranny, for instance, has been vigorously expressed in recent years, and those fighting such tyranny clerically encouraged, often with rather too little clerical fastidiousness about the aims and methods of those doing the fighting. So I now look forward to hearing denunciations of the suppression of religious freedom in Mozambique from, say, the Reverends Camara, Illich, Oestreicher, Berrigan and Potter.)

In my song of praise for Mr Daniel Moynihan the other day I endeavoured to draw the vital distinction between the hard-headed liberals like him, who do good, and the soft-headed progressives who do harm. It is a distinction that becomes more important, and for that matter wider, all the time. It was not, after all, the party faithful who poisoned the minds of an entire generation in this country on the subject

of Stalin; it was the entirely well-meaning seekers after good, who swallowed the line whole and came back for more. (But you see, they have abolished the private ownership of the means of production, and thus ended centuries of exploitation of man by man. Why, nobody there accepts a tip—just fancy! And the hydro-electric dam at Dnepropetrovsk—it makes just oodles and oodles of electricity. And the collective farm is such a friendly institution.) And in our day it was not the Vietcong who persuaded the outside world that they were freedom-loving liberals—for one thing they were too busy exterminating those who dared to oppose them in the villages they had overrun—but the Mary McCarthys and the Dr Spocks, and one of the things they have in common is a curious form of paralysis, affecting the vocal cords and the typing fingers, which sets in abruptly on the attainment of power by those they have gushed and cooed over while they were on the way to attaining it.

In this respect, *The Guardian* and Mr Figueiredo are a cut above most, for at any rate they have admitted to being surprised and alarmed on discovering that murderers do commit murder, oppressors tend to oppress, and tyrants frequently tyrannize. Their tears of repentance are genuine and welcome; but they are of little comfort, and still less use, to the murdered, the oppressed and the tyrannized. Perhaps I may be permitted to suggest a New Year's resolution for some of our progressives; that they should in future try to find out what they are doing before they do it rather than after.

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WASHINGTON POST

10 JAN 1976

The Angola Mercenary Caper

Instead of Adventure, Soldiers of Fortune Meet the Press

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

MIAMI, Jan. 9—The scene was a scruffy motel on the fringe of the "little Havana" district, and the cast of characters who showed up there last weekend might have emerged from the mercenary underground of the "Dogs of War."

They were veterans of such capers as the bombing of the president's palace in Port-au-Prince, the attempted kidnaping of Cuban fishing boats, mercenary operations in the Congo and Biafra. Now they were trying to sign up as soldiers of fortune for Angola, the newest of the world's mercenary adventure lands.

The only trouble was that when the prospective recruits turned up to volunteer their services they were met only by a battery of reporters. According to one account, the only traces of the alleged recruiters were a few beer cans and handful of olives in the sink.

The two recruiters, Pedro Martinez Castro and Jose Antonio Prat, did show up fleetingly to give rapid-fire press interviews, pose for television cameras and disappear again. Word of the Miami mercenary recruiting operation for Angola began to spread on national television and wire services.

Calls came pouring in to the Miami bureaus of the news magazines and networks from their New York headquarters, whose interest was fueled by the growing confrontation over Angola between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"A researcher in our New York picture department told me the story had to be true because CBS ran film on Cubans volunteering," sighed one veteran news magazine correspondent.

"I told them I thought the story was phony as hell and that if they wanted me to line some Cubans up and say they were volunteers, I could do it any hour of the day," he said.

Ralph Edens, the Miami correspondent for Soldier of Fortune magazine ("the Journal of Professional Adventure"), began receiving calls from would-be volunteers whom he could not help.

"A lot of our people want to know if there is a genuine connection here or whether it's a hustle," said Edens, a burly and bearded construction worker who lives in Miami when he is not adventuring in the bush.

And despite the inevitable attention given the alleged Angolan recruiting operations in the place that served as the urban staging ground for the Bay of Pigs invasion, there is no evidence that a single

American mercenary or Cuban exile soldier has been signed up here.

"This whole episode has been a media phenomenon," insisted one Miami newspaper executive, who followed the recruiting story with an early sense of skepticism.

"We have asked Washington for authority to investigate the allegations" of mercenary recruiting, said a spokesman for the Miami branch of the FBI in a voice which betrayed no sense of urgency.

"If there's anything to the allegations, which so far have been mostly newspaper stories, then we might be looking into violations of the Foreign Registration Act or the Neutrality Act," he said.

The Miami recruitment story began circulating on New Year's Eve with a story filed by the Associated Press bureau quoting Cuban refugee spokesmen Prat and Martinez as saying that they were recruiting for the U.S.-backed UNITA—the National Union for Total Independence of Angola.

"We want to get as many Cubans and other Latins as possible. We have hundreds of applications," Prat was quoted as saying.

Prat went on to say that after the Angola venture the Cuban exile recruits would fight to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba, according to the AP dispatch.

The two principal Miami newspapers, The Herald and The News, treated the Angola mercenary matter with cool circumspection.

"Because of what was going out on the wires, the heat was on us to produce," said Ray Herndon, city editor of The Miami Herald. "It's pretty hard to knock down a story. You have to say what's not happening."

Last Sunday The New York Times ran an Associated Press dispatch from Miami, keyed from its front page, reporting that Martinez and Prat had 365 men ready to be airlifted to Africa. "We plan to begin moving them out in about a week," Martinez was quoted as saying.

The Times' stringer in Miami, a Cuban exile with excellent connections in the exile community, had warned the newspaper off the story, it was learned. But an editor had not gotten the word.

The previous Friday, Jan. 2, the Christian Science Monitor ran a story, which The Washington Post quoted, saying that 300 American mercenaries were already operating in Angola and an equal

number were waiting to go as soon as funding became available.

The Monitor story quoted unidentified "senior mercenary officers familiar with the situation both in Angola and the United States." Its publication was followed by denials from the CIA, the State Department and the White House of the Monitor's allegation that the United States was financing the training of American mercenaries for Angola.

The Monitor story did not mention the alleged Miami recruitment operation. It did, however, say that guerrilla training operations were being conducted at Fort Benning, Ga., a claim also denied by U.S. government spokesmen. Special forces and paramilitary training has traditionally been conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Despite the barrage of official denials, Monitor senior editors were standing by the story by the newspaper's U.N. correspondent, David Anable.

The author of the original AP story, Ike Flores, said in a telephone interview that he thought Prat and Martinez were "fairly serious" in their recruitment objectives, although he acknowledged that there is widespread skepticism of the report. "All I've reported," he said, "is what they've told me."

According to one Cuban exile editor with widespread contacts in the community, the Miami Angola recruiting caper started in a bar during a conversation between Prat, Martinez and a friend who worked for the Cuban-exile radio station, WFAB, one of five highly competitive Spanish language stations in Miami.

"They decided to put on the air the fact that Cubans were ready to go to Angola. As soon as it was on the air, AP and UPI picked it up as news and the whole story blew up around our heads.

"To tell the truth," the editor continued, "Prat and Martinez never expected that sort of publicity. It wasn't intended to go outside of Dade County."

However thin may be the claims of Prat and Martinez, the furor over Angola has served to awaken the old dreams of both the Yankee mercenaries and the CIA-trained Cuban operatives that trace back to the Bay of Pigs era.

But whether they will add Angola to their catalogue of past exploits in such places as the Congo, Cuba, Biafra, Vietnam seems, at the moment, questionable.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 16, 1976

Wrestling With the Plowshare Problem

By Gerard C. Smith

WASHINGTON—Recent criticism of United States negotiating in the strategic arms limitations talks and of

Gerard C. Smith was the chief of the United States delegation at the strategic arms limitation talks from 1969 to 1972. He now practices law in Wash-

Soviet actions under the 1972 agreements raises important issues for this country's national security and for its conduct of foreign policy. Such criticism, in an election year, may have effects that the United States will have to live with for some time.

The issues posed by these criticisms are fair and important subjects for debate, but full and fair discussion must rest upon substantial understanding of complex matters that may

be shrouded in a somewhat limited historical record or by the tricks that memory plays on us all. In order to contribute to the debate on troublesome issues of Soviet compliance and intentions in the arms talks, I offer the following observations culled from my memory and reaffirmed by recent research.

A principal assertion (involving a subject on which I have some first-

hand knowledge) advanced by critics is that the Soviet Union has violated either the letter or the spirit of the interim freeze agreement of 1972 by deploying land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles of a volume larger than permitted or contemplated by the agreement, which expires next year.

This interim agreement did not purport to limit or freeze missiles. Each side is free to build as many and as large missiles as it chooses. The constraint is on launchers for missiles (concrete silos or submarine tubes in which missiles are deployed).

The agreement, foreshadowed by an accord between President Nixon and Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin in May 1971, was to be a quantitative freeze on numbers of missile launchers. No limits were to be placed on possible modernization or replacement of offensive strategic weapons.

Since the United States in 1972 had no launcher construction programs under way, the agreement as negotiated in 1972 does not affect its programs to modernize its present strategic missile launchers, which are proceeding on or ahead of their original schedules. It does not cover another form of launcher, heavy bombers, in which the United States has a large advantage.

In addition to quantitative controls on numbers of launchers, the United States later tried to negotiate constraints on the number of Soviet land-based launchers for heavy missiles. We wanted to stop the Soviet Union from putting significantly heavier missiles in approximately 1,000 silo launchers for the so-called SS-11 missiles, which we called light and which constituted the largest part of the Soviet Union's ICBM force. In effect, we were trying to get an arrangement that would limit Soviet modernization programs but not our own.

The Soviet Union proposed a provision that launchers for light missiles not be converted into launchers for heavy missiles, and it agreed that the dimensions of silo launchers would not be increased by more than 15 percent. I have not heard any claims that they have been so increased. This silo dimension limitation was designed to assure that the heavier SS-9 missiles not be deployed in SS-11 silo launchers.

Naturally, the United States wanted to get an agreed definition of the term "heavy." We pressed for a number of definitions over a period of many months without success. The Soviet Union said that the earlier Nixon-Kosygin accord, in May 1971, anticipated a freeze only on numbers of launchers and that the United States was trying to add qualitative constraints affecting the volume of missiles.

Our over-all bargaining power in the arms talks was great because of our lead in antiballistic missile technology, in bombers and in warhead numbers, but on this specific point it was not great since we were trying to fix constraints on Soviet programs

that would not affect American programs.

As the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting approached, we studied the question of what to do if the Soviet Union remained adamant. No one in the delegation or Washington proposed that the negotiations be broken off if a definition of a "heavy" missile was not agreed on. Language for a possible unilateral statement of the United States understanding of the term "heavy" was considered by the delegation and in Washington.

At the Moscow summit meeting, President Nixon made another effort to reach agreement on a definition, without success. So, as part of its final instructions from the White House, the delegation was directed to put into the record the following statement:

"The U.S. delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances the U.S. delegation believes it necessary to state the following. The U.S. would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

The head of the Soviet delegation replied that no understanding on this score had been reached.

I do not think that anybody on the United States delegation believed such a unilateral statement to be binding. I thought it might have some slight deterrent effect.

Article IV of the interim agreement reads: "Subject to the provisions of this interim agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this interim agreement may be undertaken."

At Helsinki we had been informally advised that while the Soviet Union would be deploying missiles of larger volume in SS-11 silos, they would not approach the halfway mark between an SS-11 and the admittedly heavy missile, the SS-9. I have seen no claims that the new Soviet missiles in question are greater in volume than this halfway mark. Although their volume is significantly larger than that of an SS-11, no informed persons claim that they will significantly upset the strategic balance.

After signing the agreements, the START—Soviet party chairman Leonid Brezhnev advised President Nixon that the Soviet Union would proceed with its missile modernization programs as permitted by the agreement.

To call this a violation of the letter or the spirit of the agreement seems to me incorrect. Incidentally, it has always been my belief that the United States should not enter into arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union that depend on spirit for their fulfillment.

The United States has proceeded

with its missile modernization programs. The Minuteman III multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) program involves an increase in missile volume, though nothing as large as the Soviet missiles in question. Under the agreement the United States is free to increase its missile throw-weight by approximately three times. It has not chosen to do so. The Department of Defense has not requested such a program.

The real issue is not naiveté or poor drafting or violation of the letter or spirit of the agreement. The real issue is, should the strategic arms limitations talks have been broken off over the failure to get a definition of the term "heavy?" I think not. We had a number of arms-talks aims other than holding down the size of Soviet missiles during the five-year freeze.

Some offensive-launcher limitation had consistently been a condition of our agreement to the antiballistic missile treaty. Would it have been wise because of failure to reach an agreed definition of a heavy missile to scuttle the ABM treaty, which at that point was fully agreed? Keeping Soviet ABM's to the minimal Moscow deployment has substantially advanced United States security.

That President Nixon made the right decision seems confirmed by the fact that no critic of the arms negotiations that I have heard proposes that the United States exercise its right to terminate the interim agreement. It has worked in important respects.

The seemingly endless Soviet program to increase the number of ICBM silo launchers has stopped. This stoppage has resulted in a ceiling on admitted heavy missiles of the SS-9 and a later class. I understand that the Soviet Union is engaged in the ICBM reduction program called for by the agreement as a condition of its continuing to build strategic submarines. This involves decommissioning a substantial number of older ICBM launchers for very large throw-weight missiles deployed on soft launchers.

Even Senator Henry M. Jackson, a major critic of the agreement, is in favor of continuing the negotiation process and gives good advice about how to negotiate the next agreement. As this next agreement presumably will have some constraining effect on the United States as well as on Soviet programs—as did the ABM treaty—it is natural to expect that more precise arrangements will be negotiated.

Strategic forces second to none are essential to our national security. But strategic-arms control also is a very important part of that security. Its prospects and its products should be carefully scrutinized and debated. It is to be hoped, however, that this process will be conducted as objectively as possible. Election year oversimplifications such as the missile gap charges of 1960 should be shunned, lest the case for sensible arms control be set back indefinitely.

WASHINGTON POST
15 JAN 1976WASHINGTON POST
12 JAN 1976*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

Aid Vs. Human Rights

What began as a routine congressional hearing into the humdrum question of human rights violations in Indonesia suddenly erupted into an angry backlash when testimony of the key witness, a former British Communist lobbying against American aid for Jakarta, infuriated two House members.

The immediate and completely unplanned effect of the hearing was to shore up the Ford administration's case for increasing aid to anti-Communist Indonesia, despite new efforts to block U.S. arms for countries charged with a "consistent pattern" of gross violation of human rights.

Thus, the Dec. 18 hearing, unreported until now, ended in a surprising defeat for those in Congress using the human rights issue as another weapon to whittle down the administration's freedom to conduct foreign policy, and to expand congressional power.

The purpose of the hearing held by Democratic Rep. Donald Fraser of Minnesota, chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee, was to spread on the public record a vivid description of what has long been known about Indonesia and many other developing and developed countries: That human rights have been and are being systematically eroded and violated.

Partly due to Fraser's efforts, Congress easily adopted an amendment to the foreign aid bill last year "recommending" that President Ford take account of the human rights balance sheet in parceling out U.S. aid.

Upset that the President, despite that recommendation, is now asking quadrupled arms aid for Indonesia—an obvious result of the American debacle in Vietnam and new Communist pressures in what remains of non-Communist Asia—Fraser started the Dec. 18 hearing by complaining that "these figures (for new aid) suggest that human rights did not have much impact, if any, in the decision-making process."

He then introduced Mrs. Carmel Budiardjo, a British citizen and former member of the British Communist Party. She said her husband, an Indonesian Communist in the regime of former President Sukarno, has been in jail almost the full ten years since the Communist Party in Indonesia (PKI) attempted its coup d'etat in September 1965. The coup was drowned in a bloodbath.

Mrs. Budiardjo was not shy in instructing the U.S. Congress how to treat Indonesia today. "I believe that a clear case exists," she told the subcommittee, "for regarding Indonesia as a country that is grossly and persistently violating human rights. No aid should be allowed to flow until these violations end."

She then proposed that a "congressional mission" go to Indonesia "to make an independent investigation of the problems of political imprisonment."

That infuriated Rep. Leo Ryan, a California Democrat who, although not a subcommittee member, attended the hearing as a member of the full committee. Drawing from Mrs. Budiardjo the admission that before the PKI's effort to take power ten years ago, she had worked for both D.K. Aidet, former head of the now-outlawed Communist Party, and foreign minister Subandrio—the two principal leaders in the attempted coup—Ryan exploded:

"I do believe that adherents of a government and a foreign Communist Party that terrorized their own people and vilified the United States have their guts to appear before this body as defenders of human rights and as accusers of anyone." Ryan made no effort to pretend that human rights aren't still being violated in Indonesia. "I am not going to defend the Indonesian government nor do I wish to imply that I believe that governments' record is without blemish in the field of human rights," he said.

The only other congressman present with Fraser was Rep. Wayne Hays of Ohio, tough, irascible and a Democratic power in the House. Hays, also a full committee member, told Mrs. Budiardjo it was curious she had not complained about human rights violations during her work for Subandrio and Aidet. In those turbulent last days of Sukarno, he said, "Every jail and prison camp in Indonesia (were) full of people."

When the witness replied, "That is absurd," Hays flared. "I resent the fact that you are a British Communist sitting here in front of this committee," he said.

That resentment, widely shared by all who have read the transcript of the Dec. 18 hearing, has now fortified the President's arms aid program for Indonesia.

But the Indonesian case is unique. Mr. Ford's plan to quadruple aid to the pro-Western Asian giant was safeguarded by coincidence: the backlash from testimony of a witness regarded by most congressmen as unfit to instruct the United States on how to handle its foreign policy.

The larger question is very much alive. Stiffer controls over the President's power to use foreign aid to enlarge American influence abroad are now being pushed by Fraser, based on human rights violations. Their probable approval by Congress shows the unmistakable trend of the postwar Vietnam era: setting general rules and standards for foreign policy that slyly imaginative diplomacy and build congressional power.

Field Enterprises, Inc.

U.S. Planning to Sell Arms to Yugoslavia

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, Jan. 11—The Ford administration has decided to resume U.S. arms sales to Yugoslavia after a 15-year gap in bilateral military cooperation, authoritative sources here disclosed today.

The resumption of military cooperation reflects U.S. determination to assist Yugoslavia in reducing its dependence on Soviet arms.

American assurances of arms sales were conveyed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to his Yugoslav counterpart, Milos Minic, during their meeting in Washington two months ago. Two Yugoslav delegations have visited Washington recently to discuss purchases of some routine equipment.

But Yugoslav requests for some sophisticated anti-tank weapons and electronic systems now appear to be stalled in the Pentagon, where military chiefs are said to view with suspicion deliveries of such arms to this independent Communist country.

Yugoslavia is the only Communist country to receive U.S. military assistance. Following President Tito's break with the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia received more than \$750 million in U.S. military aid between 1951 and 1961. Roughly \$1 billion worth of U.S. equipment was sold to Yugoslavia under special credit arrangements in the same period.

When Tito began organizing a Third World movement in 1961, Yugoslavia let its military assistance agreement with the United States lapse. The United States has continued to sell Yugoslavia small amounts of replacement parts and other items needed to maintain U.S. equipment received in the 1950s, but these sales have amounted to well under \$1 million annually.

Now the Yugoslavs want to purchase the TOW wire-guided anti-tank missiles, certain types of sophisticated electronics systems needed for anti-aircraft defenses and more routine items such as

radar and jet trainer planes.

Yugoslavia produces roughly 85 per cent of its military equipment in its own industrial plants, ranging from subsonic jet aircraft to automatically reloadable rocket launchers. But most of the highly sophisticated weapons such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets are purchased by the Yugoslavs in the Soviet Union.

The most sensitive items on the Yugoslav arms shopping list are the TOW missiles and electronics systems. Resistance in the Pentagon to selling this type of equipment to a Communist government is based on Pentagon concern that the secret technology involved could eventually pass into Soviet hands.

But administration officials who favor the resumption of military cooperation have

argued the Russians have already acquired most types of U.S. military equipment used in Vietnam. These officials have argued that Yugoslavia's present reliance on the Soviet Union for sophisticated weaponry has rendered Tito's government vulnerable to Soviet pressures.

U.S. arms sales, according to this argument, would open alternative sources of arms supplies to Yugoslavia and thus strengthen this non-aligned country.

Significantly, Yugoslavia's decision to seek resumption of arms cooperation with the United States came in the wake of a discovery of increased activities of pro-Moscow groups here, including the organization of an illegal Communist party opposing Tito.

There is also substantial evidence that senior Yugoslav military commanders view the potential threat to this country as coming from the East, rather than the West.

In an extraordinarily frank interview with a weekly magazine, three senior Yugoslav military chiefs made it clear they see their potential enemy in the East.

The enemy, they said, would try to mount a major tank and paratrooper attack, quickly "take part of our territory, dream up a Quisling-type government, which would then ask assistance" from abroad.

The reference to the swift tank attack and the need to destroy at least 2,000 enemy tanks unmistakably pointed to the potential enemy. The broad Panonian plain stretching from here to the

Hungarian border is natural tank country and the only area where such an operation could be mounted. Moreover, there are not enough NATO tanks in the area nor could such tank operations be conducted on the mountainous borders with Italy and Greece.

The generals interviewed were Branko Jokovic, Zlatko Rendulic and Milan Krdjich.

The resumption of cooperation between Belgrade and Washington would inevitably lead to increased ties with the Yugoslav military. Such friendly contacts are regarded as desirable since the political role of the armed forces may be pivotal following departure of the 83-year-old Tito from the political scene.

New Statesman 19 December 1975

First Person

Auberon Waugh

What's Wrong With Socialism?

Who wishes to stand up and be counted with Mrs Thatcher or Mr Heath? My friends are nearly all middle class, nearly all fairly intelligent and as selfish as most other people. For as long as any of us have had any political or historical consciousness, we have lived with a suspicion that capitalism was probably doomed in our country. None but the least reflective has ever supposed that a remedy was available inside our political systems, or any likely replacement for it. Of my immediate contemporaries at Oxford, I can think of only one who has gone into Parliament - Young Winston. Enough said. Now, with the failure of Mr Heath's pathetic Industrial Relations Act, the rescue of Leyland and Chrysler and the reign of the social contract the writing on the wall has become a gigantic neon sign which flashes on and off with ever-increasing frequency. Plainly, we have not long to go before it becomes the only light left in our condemned playground.

The most important thing to realise is that there is nothing to be done at this late stage. The unions have proved they are stronger than Parliament; in Ulster, although few people noticed it, they proved they were also stronger than the army. More important, an awareness of this power has finally settled in their heads and nothing on earth will get it out again.

What stares us in the face is the contradiction in liberal capitalism whereby technological investment distributes so much disruptive power among the work-force as to make further investment uneconomic. This workers' power need not herald the end of liberal capitalism or require an imposed system of industrial discipline if it is invariably exercised with intelligent self-interest. However, human nature being what it is, **Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7**

being perhaps even more so, that is not the only influence at work, and it is in the nature of these sophisticated, interdependent manufacturing processes that a small amount of stupidity, greed or malice can bring the whole operation to a grinding halt. Obviously, this is even more the case if a substantial proportion of the work-force can be persuaded to strike for wages, manning agreements or conditions of work which are uneconomic.

My only personal contribution to this gloomy, Institute of Economic Affairs-style analysis is to point out that there is nothing to be done. No leader can arise who will bring the workers to their senses - no Enoch Powell, no Young Winston, no General Horrocks - partly because the necessary senses are to a large extent lacking (or at any rate have not grown in step with growing powers and responsibilities); partly because the Left is too well organised on the shop floor to allow any right-wing or 'moderate' populist to get away with it. True, the Left has no charismatic leader, either, but then it has no need of one. Nobody has ever supposed that the British can be persuaded to *want* a socialist society. The point is that it will be extremely good for them.

But will it? That is the question which idealists seem to ask themselves less and less. Having at some early stage decided that they would prefer to see privilege and deprivation simultaneously abolished, along with exploitation and the profit motive, they put their faith in what a NEW STATESMAN writer has described as 'the alien, 19th-century creed of socialism' and leave it there, concentrating on tactics rather than the goal itself. One can explain to an idealist that such-and-such a course of loss, the drying up of investment, unem-

ployment and consequent impoverishment of all who pursue it, and he will say: 'Ah yes, but we are helping to destroy the rotten old capitalist system and build Jerusalem.'

To which there is no answer except that he really should take a closer look at Jerusalem. It is not the result of some quirk in the Russian character that 22 years after the death of Stalin, after 30 years of peace and 58 of attempted socialism, in one of the most richly endowed countries of the world, Soviet workers have no right to strike: their average wage is £22.50 a month; their housing is abominable; they have little to eat: their pensions, health services and even education operate at a fraction of our level and they are expected to work a number of Saturdays or Sundays every year for nothing.

I wonder how many trade unionists have read Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* or Sakharov's *My Country and the World*.* If they had, they might come to realise that the reason socialism is inevitable in this country is precisely because it is the only system which will successfully destroy the unions and reduce the working class once again to a subservient lump kept in its place by the inertia of fear, ignorance and poverty. All we need in fact is to reduce our living standards a little, limit our propensity to overman our machinery and overpay ourselves by a few points in each case and we would be swimming along with the other social democracies of Europe in no time. A combination of entrenched attitudes and bad government has made this impossible for us.

If workers and unionists had the curiosity to examine this Jerusalem even more closely they might see they are building a prison for themselves where few, if any, of the gross appetites and tastes which they have been encouraged to cultivate under capitalism will be satisfied. But I can't honestly pretend that my first concern is for the workers in the bestial society they are creating for themselves. If my middle-class friends who claim to be socialists with pious expressions on their faces examine this same Jerusalem which they hope to build, or think they do, I do not see how they can escape from the conclusion that socialism, in practice, is bound to be bureaucratic, bound to be inefficient, more likely than not to be corrupt, bound to be totalitarian and bound to be repressive.

Again, it is through no peculiarity of the Russian character that in the length and breadth of the Soviet Union every Roneo duplicator or photocopying machine has to be kept under lock and key, its use licensed by the political police in case anybody tries to duplicate unapproved news or views. I think I can see what they are frightened of. It would be a most unwholesome thing if somebody got hold of such a machine and used it to print over and over again the simple message: The end is nigh, prepare to meet thy doom.

**My Country and The World* ANDREI SAKHAROV *Collins* £2.25

Christian Science Monitor
16 Jan. 1976

Curbing terrorism

Several news stories this week point up the unfortunate fact that terrorism still is all too prevalent in the world and little has been done either by individual countries or the United Nations to curb it:

FBI director Clarence Kelley reports that bombings in the United States linked to terrorists have doubled every year since 1973. Kidnapping by terrorists also has doubled over the past decade, and Mr. Kelley is urging Congress to allow him freer rein in using wiretaps to keep an eye on potential terrorists. Instances of terrorist violence in some other countries (Britain, for instance) are even higher than in the U.S.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering a recommendation that the Army's special forces be given training in how to react should a terrorist group seize a nuclear facility. Plutonium extracted from nuclear waste material could be used to fashion a homemade bomb or lethally contaminate the atmosphere.

And in a disturbing development on the international scene, one of the Western-backed factions in Angola warns that it is prepared to use terrorist tactics to promote its cause and force more help in its struggle against the dominant Soviet-supported group. A spokesman for the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) threatened attacks against airlines, embassies, and places where civilians congregate.

Terrorism has been on the UN agenda every year since 1972, but very little has been done about it. The one area where agreement has been reached — airplane hijacking — has all but disappeared in recent years. The convention passed more than two years ago on the kidnapping and murder of diplomats so far has received only half the necessary votes for the ratification that would put it into force.

Perhaps last month's kidnappings and killings at the Vienna meeting of Arab oil ministers by pro-Palestinians will convince those who have sheltered terrorists in the past that terrorism overlooked can strike anywhere. As with skyjacking, once havens for those who resort to violence in the name of some political cause are eliminated, terrorism surely can be lessened.

Following the kidnapping of two of its oil officials in Vienna, OPEC member Venezuela proposed a special UN session on international terrorism. The United States, both through private urgings and official international forums, has been in the forefront of anti-terrorist activities but with little success.

The House of Representatives now is considering a resolution urging President Ford to take the lead in organizing an international convention on the subject. He should not be discouraged by past failures from vigorously following up on the congressional proposal.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 Jan. 1976

The 'New' Communism...

The controversy over C.I.A. funding of non-Communist political parties in Italy raises fundamental questions about what, if anything, the United States can or should do about recent gains by Communists across much of southern Europe from Portugal to Greece—and particularly in France, Spain and Italy, where a new coordinated Communist strategy has emerged.

Under Enrico Berlinguer this Communist strategy has moved dramatically in Italy toward strong public claims of independence from Moscow and commitment to Western-style democracy. Mr. Berlinguer has pledged his party to preserve democratic liberties, a parliamentary system, a mixed economy, membership in the Common Market and NATO—and to leave office quietly if later defeated at the polls. Despite much skepticism by non-Communists, these claims have paid off with 33 percent of the vote, only two points below the ruling Christian Democrats.

The French Communists, long among the Kremlin's most obedient and militant followers in the West, until recently had not gone nearly so far. In fact, Secretary General Georges Marchais' electoral alliance and common program with the Socialists since 1972 came under attack as a result of Communist losses at the polls while the Socialists doubled their vote to become France's biggest party. But in the last two months, after long internal debate, Mr. Marchais appears to have bested his opponents and committed the French Communist Party definitively to "the Italian way."

A joint Marchais-Berlinguer statement in November pledged the two Communist parties to respect "the liberty of thought and expression, of the press, of meeting and association, the right to demonstrate, the free movement of persons inside and outside their country, the inviolability of private life, of religious liberties, the total freedom of expression of currents of thought and of every philosophical, cultural and artistic opinion." It added:

"The French and Italian Communists favor the plurality of political parties, the right of opposition parties to exist and to act, the free formation of majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating democratically, the lay character and democratic functioning of the state and the independence of justice. . . . Their position is not tactical."

Since then, Mr. Marchais has joined Mr. Berlinguer in resisting Soviet proposals to be adopted at a "unity" meeting of European Communist parties. The French Communists have engaged in polemics with Moscow over Russian detention of a dissident intellectual and the existence of a prison camp in Soviet Latvia. They have adopted a more neutral attitude toward China.

...Kissinger's Nightmare

The alignment of the Western world's two most powerful Communist parties on virtually a Social Democratic approach has bemused many voters in both countries—whether it is meant sincerely or not—and has reinforced the chances both have of entering governing coalitions. Yet the obvious and historically-based possibility exists that, once in office, the Communists might well repudiate their current promises, seize power, leave NATO and unite with Moscow in a Communist alliance from Asia to the Atlantic. Any such trend could move West Europe toward a series of civil wars

and confront the United States with desperate choices. This is Secretary Kissinger's nightmare.

A different prospect has been evoked by Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carillo. Moscow, he said recently, fears that Communist accession to power in the West would lead to "a bloc of European socialist countries" independent of the Soviet Union with Western-style freedoms that would become a pole of attraction for Eastern Europe and "the whole world's working class movement." The survival of the Soviet form of Communism might be endangered ultimately by a schism of this kind, which could even dwarf the breakaway of Yugoslavia and China. Remote as this evolution may now appear, it helps to allay fears in Italy and France of Communist accession to power.

Secretary Kissinger has been warning Europeans for many months that the entrance of Italy's Communists into a coalition government with the Christian Democrats could lead quickly to the dissolution of NATO and American withdrawal from Europe. But perhaps the day has come when the United States no longer has the ability through warnings or other means to harness the political tides in West Europe. It cannot alone revive the fading Christian Democrats of Italy, as Secretary Kissinger himself has noted. Only Italians can do that.

... and American Policy

The chief contribution the United States can make now is that of positive example, moving vigorously to terminate the world recession that has weakened the democracies and set the stage for Communist gains. The kind of assistance provided to Portugal's democratic parties by West European trade unions and allied political groups, with marginal American financial aid, undoubtedly has helped to blunt the Communist power drive there and cannot be excluded elsewhere, particularly when Soviet financing and covert operations invite counter-moves. But the Communist gains in Italy stem from the strains of recession, inflation and unemployment, which strike hammer blows at a political and social structure already crumbling under the incompetent leadership of the geriatric Christian Democratic Party.

Revitalization of the Christian Democrats and their alliance with the Socialists and other smaller parties to their left can best be brought about by economic revival in the industrial world as a whole. A strong recovery in the United States, West Germany and Japan, further liberation of trade and imaginative measures in monetary, energy and raw materials policy—as discussed at the Rambouillet summit conference—could give a new lease on life to the democratic parties of Italy and France more effectively than covert financial aid. The essential prerequisite is agreement between the Ford Administration and the Congress on a coherent policy for the world economy.

There may still be time. Communist accession to power is less likely to come before than after the 1978 elections in France and the 1977 elections in Italy, despite the current Cabinet crisis there.

But if American policy remains confused in this Presidential election year and recession continues in Europe, events in Italy could move more rapidly than that. The alignment of the French Communist Party behind "the Italian way" reinforces such a prospect. The United States can offer a merely negative approach, based on the fears and doctrines of the past—or it can strive positively to provide a better way, as it did in the Marshall Plan years.

Eastern Europe

Wednesday, January 14, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

A sensitive issue since Helsinki

Soviets blast U.S. radio 'intrusion'

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Soviet newspapers and TV have begun a new wave of attacks on American radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

Foreign broadcasting has proved to be an especially sensitive point with Moscow ever since last fall's summit conference at Helsinki promised a freer exchange of people and ideas across national borders. Soviet press and TV criticism of it more than doubled in December and early January and is again on the increase.

Moscow accuses the formerly CIA-financed Radio Liberty of interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, hindering detente, conducting "sabotage and espionage" and "open slander" against the Soviet Union, and lying.

Much more mildly it charges the official American Voice of America (VOA) with not reflecting the pro-detente policy of the American administration or public support for detente (as shown in a year-old Gallup poll).

Both radio stations, along with the British Broadcasting Corporation, provide almost domestic services to their Soviet audiences. They play pop music and, for example, announce the times and places of otherwise unpublicized, unofficial art shows in Moscow.

Their programming has changed drastically from the cold-war days of the 1950s, when Radio Liberty's sister, Radio Free Europe,

which broadcasts to East European countries, urged Hungarians to revolt against the Soviet Union. But dissident Soviet literature and information about political arrests and imprisonment are still featured.

After Soviet-American detente was established, Soviet jamming of the VOA was halted in September, 1973, and some VOA reporters have since been given visas to visit the Soviet Union, along with the American President or Secretary of State.

Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty continues, however. Western radio is popular among Soviet youth, as spontaneous inquiries about VOA to Western travelers in the Soviet Union attest.

In the latest Soviet broadside at American radio, the Communist Party daily Pravda asserted on Jan. 13, in a major spread at the bottom of a page, that Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are trying to change the system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Although it acknowledged that there is no longer "direct subversive instigation" it charged that "the essence remains the same." The "international public," it said, is indignant because "official U.S. institutions direct and finance this subversive activity against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries."

The radio station's activity, Pravda said, is "incompatible with the final act of the pan-European (Helsinki) conference, with the elementary norm of international law, with

the process of lessening of international tensions, and the development of good neighborly peaceful cooperation."

Pravda listed a score of names it identified as CIA agents or, in three cases, "former Gestapo and Hitler reconnaissance agents" working for Radio Liberty. It also charged Radio Liberty with bugging telephone conversations between foreign embassies and missions in West Germany and of sending anti-Soviet literature to the Soviet Union.

CIA funding of Radio Liberty was dropped after it became public knowledge five years ago. The broadcasts are supported by open congressional appropriations and have a governing board appointed by the U.S. President.

The Pravda attack came the day after a fairly sophisticated critique of VOA news appeared in the much-less-authoritative newspaper Soviet Russia. Two days earlier a prime-time TV commentary had denounced foreign broadcasting to Russia as interfering in Soviet internal affairs.

The increase in Soviet criticism of American radio broadcasting after the Helsinki conference followed the American backlash against detente.

The Western media emphasized the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki conference and focused on Moscow's treatment of Soviet citizens. The Soviet media accused the West of ballooning the few Soviet dissidents out of all proportion and of interfering in internal affairs. Each side viewed the other as violating the spirit of Helsinki.

NEW YORK TIMES

6 Jan. 1976

15 Soviet Jews Denounce Ford on Emigration Issue

MOSCOW, Jan. 5 (Reuters)—A group of Soviet Jews said today that President Ford had harmed prospects for a more liberal Soviet emigration policy with his criticism of Congressional efforts to get it eased.

Mr. Ford said in a television interview two days ago that efforts to tie improved trading status for the Soviet Union to freer emigration had damaged the chances of many to emigrate.

In a statement handed to activists said "every such statement is taken in the U.S.S.R. as an encouragement for persecutions and a hardening of the emigration policy." They added:

"Statements like that of the President have done and continue to do great harm. We categorically protest against having our destinies and those of our children sacrificed to the political interests of certain circles."

Western Europe

Tuesday, January 13, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Behind \$6 million in covert political aid

Kissinger refuses to trust Italy's Communists

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
"An error of judgment" by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is the way some liberals, many of them in the intelligence community, are describing covert U.S. aid to anti-communist parties in Italy.

These critics say it would be more useful if American leaders and diplomats started talking to Italian and perhaps other European Communists before they come to power.

The nub of the argument over the Italian subsidy — \$6 million to be used to back Christian Democrats and Socialists — is whether the Italian Communist Party can be trusted in its claims to be independent from Moscow and second and even more important, to be converted to democratic processes.

Kissinger critics insist that communism in Europe is in crisis, and that a new schism, successor to those made by Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, is in the making.

For Secretary Kissinger the Italian operation — news of which was leaked from congressional committees briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) — is all part of the "managing the outward thrust of the Soviet Union," which he sees as the real character of detente. He warned members of NATO council at their last meeting in Brussels, that they must beware of letting communists participate in their governments.

Of about 2 million communists in Western Europe at present, it is estimated that 1.7

million are in Italy. Led by Enrico Berlinguer the Communist Party there won a third of the vote in parliamentary elections last June. Party members now dominate regional and local government in three regions, Tuscany, Umbria, and Amilia Romana, so that 50 percent of all Italians live in communist-controlled areas.

As members of the second-largest party, Italy's Communists participate in parliamentary committees and thereby already play a quasi-governmental role by influencing an estimated 70 percent of legislation.

But the nagging question about the Italian Communists, as far as the U.S. is concerned, is the extent of the party's loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Before 1968, Italian Communists had sought to persuade the electorate that the liberal experiment in Czechoslovakia proved that the Soviet Union would tolerate a pluralist approach to socialism. But when the Russians marched into Prague, the Spanish, Belgian, and British parties were quick to express their dismay. Only the West German and French parties stuck with the Soviet Union.

The opposition the Russians now face by a meeting was dramatized last November between Mr. Berlinguer and the French Communist leader Georges Marchais. The two not only declared that they would seek governmental status only by democratic means but they endorsed freedom of speech, pluralist

political systems, and "alternations" of ruling parties — meaning that if they ever got into the government they would step aside if the electorate voted them out.

In other statements the Italian party has gone further, in asserting that it wants Italy to stay in NATO and the European Economic Community.

Dr. Kissinger's reaction to all this is, in effect: "Beware. It may be all tactical. The Stalinists remain latent. If a West European communist government had to choose between a pro-Soviet and a pro-U.S. policy, they would probably choose the Soviet Union, not because their independence is a fraud but because they agreed with the Russians fundamentally. Their democratic professions are, furthermore, only skin deep. Just wait till they get their hands on power and you will see."

Some of Dr. Kissinger's advisers believe, also, that the rank and file of European communists are more wedded than their leaders to Soviet leadership, thereby setting up a powerful undercurrent for return to orthodoxy.

And they note that deeply imbedded in the psyche of all European communists is the fear of the Soviet Union and the memory of the time, in 1923 when the Third International was new, when the Spanish Communist Party tried an independent course and the Soviet Union managed to expel all the leading cadres except six, with whom they founded a new and obedient party.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 Jan. 1976

Italy's Reds Build Power By Tactics of Moderation

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Jan. 17—The Communist Party, preaching its own brand of moderation and responsibility, is making new inroads into the political and social life of Italy and improving its chances of emerging as the country's largest party.

Time appears on the side of the Italian Communists and many diplomats and others agree that even the present political crisis here could work to their advantage. The standing of the non-Communist parties, led by the dominant Christian Democrats, seem to decline with each crisis and this one arising from the resignation of the Cabinet, is no exception. In bringing down the Govern-

ment last week, the Communist Party confirmed what most Italians believed—that the Communists were playing an increasing role in shaping domestic policies. The Socialists, feeling squeezed out, withdrew their support of the Government because, in effect, they saw the Christian Democrats drawing closer to the Communists out of necessity and relying more on them in quiet dealings in Parliament.

Time for Sharing

"The Communists should benefit from the present troubles," said one non-Communist member of Parliament. "They can stand back and say that nothing works, that no combination of the other parties can hold together, and that they are the only

to let them share power."

It is this possibility of the Communists sharing power that worries Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other Western officials despite the party's declaration of support for continued membership of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Kissinger's efforts and the recently revealed plans for new secret spending by the Central Intelligence Agency here are all designed to bolster the non-Communist forces and to stave off the surging Communists. In the view of Mr. Kissinger, the presence of Communists in the Italian Government would threaten the future of the alliance and weaken Western Europe.

As of now, the Communists are doing quite well in Italy. Their strength and influence as Italy's second largest and best organized party are far greater than generally realized outside and their voices are heard even by those politicians who profess they do not listen.

Control of the North

They control all the major cities north of Rome, including Turin, Milan, Bologna, Genoa, Florence and Venice. There are Communist or Communist-Socialist administrations in five of Italy's 20 regions and in 42 of its 94 provinces. The result is that they locally govern about 48 percent of the population.

Even Christian Democrats, who have dominated politics here since the end of World War II, say privately that it would be impossible to operate without the cooperation of the Communist Party. They still rule out, however, any agreement on Communist demands for the "historical compromise," which means seats in a coalition cabinet of Christian Democrats, Socialists and other non-Communist parties.

"It has reached the point where the Christian Democrats cannot agree to govern with the Communists but cannot say either," said one experienced diplomat.

The leader of the Communists in Parliament, Mario Pochetti, agreed that their views were crucial in pushing through most important laws. But Communist officials insisted that there was nothing new in this, that their deputies were merely acting as a responsible opposition in a democratic society.

Image of Responsibility

It is this image of responsibility that has helped the party grow. For, by most calculations, the Communists have the power to cripple the economy, block all major bills, bring the country to a stop and wreak general chaos.

The Communists use crises, such as the present one, in which the search goes on for a new government, to underscore their moderation. They keep their supporters in the powerful trade unions calm and they say there is no need now for elections because time would be lost in pressing ahead with needed economic and other measures.

They attack the Socialists for having withdrawn parliamentary support for the governing Christian Democrats and Republicans. Then they make a new pitch for the "compromise" that would give them cabinet seats, too.

In the minds of many voters, the substance of declared specific policies by the major parties is secondary to the desire for change, for social justice, for more efficient and less corrupt bureaucracy, for improvements in housing, health, education and the economy.

The Communists, whose slogans include "we have clean hands," have won votes by pointing to their efficient local administrations, by stressing the need for "better management" of Italy's resources and by other themes.

All such rhetoric coupled with increasing public disillusionment in the Christian Democrats and with social and economic tensions, have served the Communists well. In the regional and local elections last June, one of every three voters backed the party and it came within 2 percentage points of overtaking the Christian Democrats as Italy's largest.

In local elections this spring, they are expected to do well again, perhaps winning control of the municipal government of Rome itself, a prospect that particularly dismays the Vatican.

Early Elections Possible

If Aldo Moro, the outgoing Prime Minister now charged with trying to form a new government fails, national elections would follow this spring or summer, a year ahead of schedule. Whenever they are held, the Communists could emerge even stronger and in a position to reinforce demands that the Christian Democrats allow them into the cabinet.

As matters now stand in Italy, cabinet seats are just about all the Communists lack these days. Their strength on the local levels, in regions and cities, and in other areas, is substantial and growing. Their influence on the national scene is also rising, though still limited in the fields of foreign affairs and defense.

"The Government decides on a new economic package so what happens?" said one diplomat. "Ugo La Malfa, the Deputy Prime Minister, calls Luciano Barca, the Communist Party's economic expert, and fills him in. The Communists then make a few suggestions. It's all kind of an unhistorical compromise."

In committee work in the Chamber of Deputies, where the Communists hold 179 of the 630 seats, they also play a vital and quiet role. They joined with the Christian Democrats in an open coalition on a limited abortion bill, angering other political parties that wanted a more liberal law.

Paper Has Great Impact

The Communist newspaper, L'Unita, the third largest in circulation, makes a major impact. The books it criticizes become the books people talk about. The issues it raises are those widely discussed. The decisions it praises are often those many applaud. Most newspapers and magazines veer to the left, including those most respected.

"It's all rather vulgar to be anti-Communist these days," said a university professor. "It's

all become so fashionable, even among those in the middle classes, who drive nice cars, live in pleasant homes, those we sometimes call Gucci Communists."

There are signs that the Communists are picking up middle-class support, adding to their strength among the workers and the young. In universities, according to several professors, it is not a question of whether a student is a Communist but whether he is further left, in the extremist fringes that argue the party is too bourgeois.

All this, however, is not to suggest that the party is without its problems or without dangers ahead. It is well aware, for example, that many are looking closely at the administrations in the cities taken over since the June elections to see whether the Communists can make things work in a country where almost nothing ever seems to operate smoothly, except, perhaps, for waiters.

Moscow Link a Problem

There are also problems for the party in its continuing links to Moscow, despite its insistence on autonomy. And there is the worry among many Italians that once the Communists gain power, or a share of power, they won't give it up.

This, too, deeply worries Mr. Kissinger. In his view, the presence of Communists in the Italian Government would threaten the future of the Alliance and weaken Western Europe. He also believes, despite the pronouncements of the party here, that a member of an anti-Communist alliance forced to defend its members against the Soviet Union cannot share power with Communists ideologically linked to Moscow.

Enrico Berlinguer, the 53-year-old Sardinian and former criminal lawyer who directs the party machine, and his aides, have often stressed how independent the party is of Moscow, how it condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, how it criticized the Portuguese Communists for "revolutionary" attempts to seize power and how it is holding out for guarantees of autonomy.

"Our relationship with all other Communist parties is based on friendship, but we are not tied by the policies of Communist countries," Mr. Berlinguer said recently. "We do not see the Soviet Union as a guide, no Communist Party, not even the Soviet party, has a position of guiding influence."

Still, there are the questions often asked. Are all the leaders and all the rank and file willing to follow the democratic road, yield power if defeated in elections and generally maintain a moderate line? Or, will a radical wing emerge, overthrowing Mr. Berlinguer and those who agree with him?

No one, of course, knows the answer to those questions. At Communist Party headquarters, in downtown Rome, they say that the rank and file is behind the Berlinguer policy, and that it recognizes the fruits of moderation in the success of the party so far.

The reasons for Communist caution in approach here are varied. They realize, for example, that a coalition with the Christian Democrats, rather than a take-over by themselves, would create the least turbulence in Italy and ease the shock when they do assume power.

As the Communists see it, a gradual move toward the reins of power would not touch off the kind of panic that could lead to Italy's collapse economically. But many diplomats and Italian businessmen believe that even a coalition government would be enough to stifle investment, frighten off foreign business, endanger chances for needed economic loans and credits and scare away the tourists.

For the present, there seems to be little chance of eroding the support the Communists now enjoy, with or without C.I.A. money. This week, for example, a senior Christian Democrat leaned back after a long discussion of the Communists and said:

"It seems to me the problem is how to absorb the Communists in coming years, not how to keep them out."

WASHINGTON POST
21 JAN 1976

Phony Greetings From Uncle Sam

Reuter

PARIS, Jan. 20—A hoaxer has been sending fake invitations to French VIPs asking them to accept special United States bicentennial medals here later this week, a U.S. embassy spokesman said yesterday.

He said the invitations were

written on authentic embassy notepaper and sent to at least 15 "very distinguished French citizens who have been active in Franco-American relations."

"Most of them probably should receive a medal," he said. But the spokesman said no such medals were being awarded and he had no idea how the hoaxer had obtained the embassy's stationery.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
10 JAN 1976

U.S. Vexed by India But Avoids Polemics

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's latest anti-American charges have revived the Administration's irritation with her, but have failed to shake its resolve to avoid saying or doing anything that could be interpreted as interference in Indian affairs. Privately, many officials here have voiced annoyance with Mrs. Gandhi. In recent interviews, one high official said he was personally "saddened" by the continuation of the state of emergency in India that has curbed political and press freedoms.

This view was heightened by what the Administration regards as Mrs. Gandhi's free-wheeling attacks on the United States during the Congress Party convention last week. She frequently returned to one of her favorite themes: that discipline and vigilance were needed because of the threat posed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

A Low-Key Response

But in keeping with the Administration's decision to avoid polemics with Mrs. Gandhi, the State Department limited its response to a middle-level telephoned protest to the Indian Embassy, expressing "concern and dismay" at Mrs. Gandhi's remarks.

Ever since the state of emergency was declared on June 26, Washington has refused to comment on the curb on freedoms in India. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has ordered that there be no "gratuitous" criticism. He believes such criticism would accom-

plish no positive results while giving Mrs. Gandhi additional fuel for her charges that the United States has been seeking her overthrow.

In recent interviews, officials here defended this low-key policy as the best suited to the circumstances. They said that the United States could do little to affect short-term events in India, but over the long run could play a part in developing a "mature" relationship.

A prevalent view among American officials is that Mrs. Gandhi has a strong personal distrust of the United States, but that other Indian leaders would like to develop better relations, if only for economic reasons. And despite the periodic attacks on the United States, economic ties with India have been improved, in part because of India's large-scale purchases of American grain in the last two years.

Call for Stronger Ties

The Indian Government said in its policy statement opening the new session of Parliament Monday that "we desire a mature and constructive relationship with the United States."

"A serious effort should be made to understand each other with a view to strengthening peace, stability and cooperation," it said.

American officials said that statement reflected exactly Washington's conception of where relations should go.

"For too many years, the United States looked on India too emotionally," one experienced official said. "We were too generous with our aid, and

became too angry when India began to resent the aid. We probably also overestimated India's importance, and we became trapped in Indian-Pakistan disputes."

Relations with India were severely strained as the result of the Indian-Pakistani war of December 1971, when the United States accused India of aggression against East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and sided with the Pakistanis.

American ties with Pakistan since then have been quite good. Relations with India have followed a more erratic course.

Mr. Kissinger visited the subcontinent in October-November 1974, and told the Indians that the United States regarded India as predominant in size, population and power, and wanted a sounder relationship with New Delhi.

But last February the favorable trend was set back when the United States lifted its arms embargo on the subcontinent. India regarded the move as an effort to rebuild Pakistan's armed forces, and therefore an unfriendly act.

Actually, despite the lifting of the arms embargo, Pakistan has not yet made any significant purchases. One official said today that the Pakistanis had inquired about Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and TOW antitank missiles, but had made no firm requests. All sales have to be in cash, and this has put restraints on the Pakistanis, who can get arms at better terms elsewhere. India has no need for American arms, getting an adequate supply from

the Soviet Union and its own arms industry.

U.S. Proceeds Cautiously

Ironically, the state of emergency in India opened the way to a renewal of the slow trend toward better relations with the United States, because the Indians, who were very sensitive to Western criticism of the suppression of press freedom and the arrest of thousands of political opponents of Mrs. Gandhi, stated that they favored good relations with Washington.

But because of strong opposition by American liberals to the Indian curbs, the Administration has gone very cautiously. The American Ambassador, William B. Saxbe, has deliberately let Indians take the initiative, stressing that good relations were a two-way street.

President Ford had planned to visit India and Pakistan last fall, but put off the trip because of the political situation in India. Mr. Ford, in a September interview, called the state of emergency "a very sad development" for India. This prompted a strong rebuke from the Indian Government.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan visited the United States in October and the first meeting of a joint commission between the two countries was held with little publicity.

The Indians are now trying to increase exports to the United States to redress a trade balance heavily favoring the United States because of the sale of nearly 10 million tons of grain in the last two years.

Africa

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 18, 1976

The Paralysis of Power

By Ernest W. Lefever

WASHINGTON—Taking advantage of American confusion over its peace-keeping role in the third world and its creeping policy paralysis induced by breast-beating on Capitol Hill and in the media, the Soviet Union has launched a massive military effort in Angola, presumably to transform that strategically located and mineral-rich country into a Cuba-style client state.

Moscow's intervention in Angola is far larger and more brazen than any of its earlier and only partially successful attempts to establish beachheads in a dozen other African states, including Nigeria, Zaire, the Congo, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia. The Soviet Union has dispatched a political mercenary force of 7,500 heavily armed Cubans to impose its will on Angola. The 150,000 tons of arms include automatic weapons, armored vehicles, mortars, rockets, antiaircraft guns, MIG jet fighters, and ground-to-air missiles.

The Soviet military action has nothing to do with "national liberation." Angola was liberated from Portugal last Nov. 11. It has a great deal to do with what U.N. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan has aptly called Soviet colonialism.

Moscow has already established military port facilities in Somalia and its navy uses the ports of Conakry on the Atlantic and Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean. Newly independent Mozambique has a Marxist regime. If Angola should fall under Soviet influence, Moscow would be in a position to deny Western military and possibly commercial access to several important seaports in southern Africa.

For their own security and economic reasons, the Presidents of two neighboring states, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, are strongly opposed to Soviet pen-

etration into Angola. At the recent Organization of African Unity summit meeting in Addis Ababa, they advocated that the three Angolan factions be permitted to settle the question of contested sovereignty without external military intervention. This, as it happens, is also the position of the United States and South Africa. The O.A.U. summit adjourned without acting on Angola.

But the Soviets apparently plan to continue their conquest through their Cuban proxies, determined not to repeat the mistakes they made in Chile where they also worked closely with the Cubans in attempting to further radicalize President Salvador Allende's Marxist regime, which came in with 36.5 percent of the vote. In their postmortems on the failure of the unpopular Allende Government, the Leninist logicians condemned it for not taking earlier and more drastic action, including military force, to consolidate its minority position.

Consequently, Angola is not the first hot spot to be further enflamed by Moscow-dispatched mercenaries. Cuban intelligence agents and military men have been used to train, lead, or otherwise support terrorist and other insurgent groups in a dozen countries from Chile to Canada (Quebec Liberation Front) and from the Middle East (the Palestine Liberation Organization) to Zaire. The Cubans are mercenaries because Moscow is subsidizing the Castro regime to the tune of about \$2 million a day.

Responding to the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have said that if it persists it may jeopardize détente, that many splintered concept that so easily lends itself to obfuscation. The Administration has also provided some small material aid to the two Angolan factions seeking to build a moderate

government prepared to have mutually beneficial diplomatic and economic relations with the West. This modest assistance was vetoed last month by the U.S. Senate in a mood of self-castigation, an action labeled by President Ford as "a deep tragedy."

But perhaps the tragedy should not be laid wholly at the door of Congress. Has the President ever made it clear to the American people what is really at stake in Angola? Is Angola not one more testing ground between two radically different ways of organizing society—one emphasizing self-determination and consent and the other elite dictatorship and coercion? What about the mischief-making potential of a Soviet Angola in Africa?

America is not the policeman of the world. We have no mandate to impose our democratic institutions on other peoples. But we do have a responsibility, commensurate with our power and consistent with our interests, to resist the forcible imposition of totalitarian power, as we have done in the past in Europe and Korea.

If détente has any substance, Angola is certainly a test case. No American troops are needed. Why does not Mr. Ford, hopefully with the support of Congress, inform Mr. Brezhnev that U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union will be suspended and the strategic arms limitations talks broken off until Moscow withdraws its Cuban expeditionary force from Angola?

This would take courage in these troubled times when the earlier "illusion of American omnipotence" is giving way to an even more dangerous malady—the paralysis of power.

Ernest W. Lefever, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of "Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa."

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Jan. 23, 1976

Nigerians Divided Over Anti-U.S. Foreign Policy Line

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Staff Writer

Less than six months in power, the government of Nigeria has stirred up internal dissension by taking an anti-American line in its foreign policy and then seeming to back away from that line.

The conflict appears to be between those whose ideology makes them critical of the United States and those with strong economic links to America, which is Nigeria's biggest customer for oil. The military government of Gen. Murtala Mohammed appears to have antagonized both

camp in turn.

The issue was Angola, which Mohammed made the occasion for his first public stand on an international issue—important in a country that, as black Africa's richest and most populous nation, has long sought an image as an international leader.

One of the criticisms of Mohammed's predecessor, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, deposed by a coup last July, was that he seemed to have passed up several chances to solidify such an image.

So two months ago Mohammed's government, taking advantage of the news of South African military involvement in Angola, seized such a chance. It announced its full political and financial support for the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, winning the approval of anti-American elements within Nigeria as well as capitalizing on the unpopularity of racially segregated South Africa.

Then, early this month,

Mohammed went further, vehemently attacking President Ford for his attempt to rally support for the Popular Movement's two rivals and accusing the United States of "crude bullying and insulting logic at the expense of the Angolan people."

At about the same time, it became known that Nigeria had told the United States to close down its Foreign Broadcast Information Service installation at Kaduna, which had attracted criticism

as a CIA base.

Pro-Western Nigerians, acutely aware that U.S. oil purchases finance Nigeria's multibillion-dollar development program, became concerned over how far the economic ties with the United States could be stretched.

Indications from the State Department still suggest, however, that the ties are not at the breaking point yet. Concerned private American businesses, which have close to \$1 billion sunk into Nigeria, have been assured that relations are still proceeding

normally.

Evidence of a Nigerian attempt to respond to the pro-Western faction's concerns came in Mohammed's surprising moderate statement following adjournment of the recent Organization of African Unity summit meeting.

Although Mohammed had pledged to lead pro-Popular Movement forces at that meeting, and denounced the U.S. attempts to influence uncommitted delegates in the opposite direction, he refused to label the stalemate a failure, saying that no one

"could begrudge either view" of the Angolan issue.

One indicator of the direction Mohammed's government may take, observers say, will be arms purchases to outfit Nigeria's quarter-million-man army, the largest in black Africa.

Most of the equipment used by the Nigerian government during the four-year civil war came from the Soviet Union, because the United States refused to supply weapons to fight against the Biafrans.

That Soviet equipment is now wearing out, and the angry ban Nigeria established against American arms at the end of the war in 1970 has been allowed to lapse.

So far, Nigeria's biggest weapons expenditures have been split down the middle: five C-130 transport planes from the United States and a squadron of Soviet Migs. State Department officials say that other purchases of American arms are "in the works."

WASHINGTON POST
15 JAN 1976

The OAU Summit on Angola

THE ANGOLA SUMMIT of the Organization of African Unity must be read as a serious setback for the Soviet Union, which had hoped to see the OAU endorse its client, the Popular Movement, condemn South African intervention, and perhaps even acknowledge Moscow's support for Angolan "liberation." The OAU did none of these things. Finding itself divided right down the middle, it chose to live with its divisions rather than fight the issue out in a way that might have given one side a political victory but thus humiliated the other. The organization refused either to recognize the Popular Movement, as the Movement desired, or to call for a government of national unity, as the Movement's Angolan rivals desired. It further refused to denounce South African intervention alone, taking the position in effect that it would condemn all intervention, including Russia's and Cuba's, or none at all.

The upshot is that the struggle in Angola will go on, but without the great boost to the Popular Movement and its Communist patrons which many had expected to come out of Addis Ababa. The organization has now said, in as clear a voice as its members' circumstances permit, that Angola is for Angolans. As Zaire's president fairly stated, for the first time South Africa and the Soviet Union have been equated in African minds. We think this outcome gives the Popular Movement fresh reason to consider compromising with its Angolan rivals. The Popular Movement has Soviet weapons and advisers and Cuban troops but, though these offer military advantages, more and more they constitute political liabilities. Particularly would this be the case if South Africa were promptly to withdraw all of its own forces and leave Moscow and Havana isolated as the lone non-African interventionists. By the best estimates, moreover, the Popular Movement does not control a

majority of either the land area or the population of Angola. A compromise would ensure the Movement a reduction of the national and regional tensions otherwise bound to plague Angola for years.

The Ford administration had prophesied that the Senate's action in clamping down on further CIA activity in Angola would cripple Africans who oppose Soviet intervention. But this did not happen at Addis Ababa. Those Africans did not and do not need American prompting to know where their own best interests lie. We are aware that the administration's use of the CIA in Angola starting last July was done at the behest, and with the blessing, of various African states. We feel, nonetheless, that by so using the CIA, the administration made easier a South African intervention that otherwise might not have taken place, while undermining its own later attempts starting only in November to denounce the Soviet-Cuban role. The further possibility exists that initial use of the CIA provided some part of the pretext for the far larger Soviet operation that eventually flowered. In any event, by undertaking a CIA operation that controversy had rendered vulnerable to leaks and that could not easily weather disclosure and domestic storm, the administration was inviting a political defeat of potentially greater consequences than any victory it might have won by a quick successful intervention.

The OAU summit has not ended the Angolan affair. But we trust it has ended the period in U.S. Angolan policy when Washington felt it necessary to conduct a test of wills with the Soviet Union. The United States does not have so much political capital these years that it can afford to put it at risk in places like Angola, where the outcome of a local power struggle is difficult to ordain at best, and, in any event, only as important to national security as Americans themselves make it out to be.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1976

Decision Near on Disputed Aid to Zaire

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20—State Department officials are expected to decide in a few days whether to go ahead despite objections from key Congressional leaders with an emergency loan of \$10 million to Zaire, according to Government officials.

The Congressional leaders are concerned that the aid would allow Zaire to

comparable amount of funds to its allies fighting in the Angolan civil war. The Central Intelligence Agency has been funneling covert military aid and cash through Zaire to the two Western-supported Angolan liberation groups fighting the group supported by the Soviet Union.

Administration officials informed several committee chairmen last night the intention of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to give the

aid immediately. The chairmen objected, and high State Department officials suspended the order to execute the loan.

One official said: "We have not gone ahead—yet; we're trying to see if we can meet Congressional objections."

Officials of the Africa bureau of the State Department argue that the \$10 million in industrial credits is urgently needed to meet the deteriorating economic situation in Zaire.

Other officials in the State

Department are less concerned about Zaire than about the danger of a new rupture in relations with Congress if the wishes of the representatives are ignored.

The State Department is legally entitled to provide the aid without specific legislative authority, but Congressional leaders said that they would regard this as a breach of a two-year working relationship.

Congress has not passed a new foreign-aid bill this year. In the absence of new legislation, aid programs are con-

tinued by means of a resolution continuing spending authority based on last year's aid bill.

Aid Can Be Redirected

Operating within these resolutions, the Administration can redirect aid from one country to another or increase aid to a country without Congressional approval. It is merely required to inform Congress 15 days before carrying out its decision.

Under an arrangement in effect for the last two years, however, the State Department has invariably been responsive to objections by committee chairmen, either modifying decisions or reversing them in accordance with the wishes of the chairmen.

Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii and chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, was informed of the

decision to send the aid yesterday afternoon. He immediately registered his objections with Mr. Kissinger.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Inouye said he had assumed that the aid had already been given, but said that he was pleased to hear of the reconsideration, given the fact that "the Administration has honored the working relationship until now."

Assurances Sought

Representative Clement J. Zablocki, Democrat of Wisconsin, and a key member of the House International Relations Committee, said that he might favor certain kinds of aid to Zaire if there were assurances that the aid would not directly or indirectly find its way into Angola.

He added: "But if the State Department does not follow Congressional desires on this matter, we will rewrite the law

to require prior approval" of every decision to redirect or increase aid.

Representative Otto E. Passman, Democrat of Louisiana and chairman of the House appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations, said in an interview today that he gave his approval to the aid yesterday, "But I'm protesting it today; I don't think they've justified it."

Mr. Passman and Mr. Inouye objected to a similar State Department request for Zaire in October. At this time, Mr. Kissinger was seeking \$22.7 million in long-term loans for Zaire, but did not go ahead with the loan because of Congressional objections.

Action Called an Affront

Representative David R. Obey, Democrat of Wisconsin, a member of Mr. Passman's

subcommittee, called yesterday's notification by the Administration "an attempt to slip one by before Congress has a chance to act."

"It's stupid and an affront to the express concerns of Congress," he said.

So far this year, Zaire has received \$15 million in Government-sponsored commercial credits. The State Department is seeking \$19 million additional in military credit sales, and a \$20 million loan by the Export-Import Bank.

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire has been a supporter of United States policy in Africa in recent years. On Monday, following the emergency meeting of the Organization for African Unity, Mr. Mobutu charged Moscow with "intolerable intervention" in Angola.

LONDON TIMES

7 Jan. 1976

Is Russia ready now to pull out of Angola?

Washington, Jan. 6.

President Ford has only one card left to play in the game against Russia for the future of Angola, and he played it again yesterday. He said that continued Soviet intervention in Angola would damage "broader relations" with America, and the Russians do not need to be reminded that the fate of the Salt II talks will be decided in the next few weeks.

Détente has not been going well lately, but it remains the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy, and Mr Ford and Dr Henry Kissinger have repeatedly suggested that Russian intervention in Angola would harm it. They hope to persuade the Russians that persisting in their African adventure would end détente, ruin Salt and that the game is not worth the candle. Involvement in Angola might turn out for the Russians the way Vietnam turned out for the Americans.

The Americans also hope that the Russians will conclude that Africans are not to be relied on, and will remember the collapse of their efforts in Zaire immediately after its independence in 1960 and perhaps also their fluctuating fortunes in Egypt.

There are signs that the Russians might be ready to back out, and the Americans are giving them every help by urging a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. A public departure by the South Africans might allow the Russians and Cubans to withdraw more discreetly.

Meanwhile, the President and Secretary of State have to decide what negotiating position to take on Salt II in the next week or two. Dr Kissinger has postponed his next visit to Moscow several times and if he now goes there before the end of the month, it might be a sign that Salt and Angola are

both coming out the way he wants.

There is much confusion over American and Russian intervention in Angola and the question of which outside power intervened first is hotly debated here. Two basic facts are clearly established, however. The Russians have been supporting the pro-communist popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) at least since 1963, and the crucial event in the civil war was Dr Agostinho Neto's coup last August in which he succeeded in driving the two rival nationalist movements out of Luanda.

Dr Neto, a gynaecologist and a poet, was one of the founders of the MPLA and has led it since 1962. Its chief support has always come from the educated among the Africans and coloured people and the slum-dwellers in Luanda. His military operation was based in Brazzaville, too far away to be a useful base of operations in Angola proper, but well-placed to take over Cabina when the Portuguese left.

Dr Neto has been to Moscow on a number of occasions and the Russians armed and trained his forces in the Congo. They moved into Luanda soon after the Portuguese coup in April, 1974, drove their rivals out last August and took over the port of Luanda when the Portuguese left on November 11.

It is undisputed that immediately afterwards the Russians began delivery of modern equipment, including the 122mm rockets, which have a range of nine miles and which immediately turned the tide of battle against Unita and the NFLA. The question is whether the Russians decided on this massive arms supply because of American and South African intervention during the summer.

The most important of the

liberation movements during the fight against the Portuguese was always the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Its genesis goes back to 1954 when Mr Holden Roberto formed a group of dissidents among the Bakongo tribe in northern Angola. It started fighting in 1961 and soon afterwards was formed into the NFLA.

Throughout the 1960s, the brunt of the fighting was in the north. Mr Roberto has been constantly supported by President Mobutu of Zaire, who is his brother-in-law. When President Mobutu opened relations with China, Mr Roberto followed his example and went to Peking in 1973. The Chinese began to supply him with arms and to train his troops.

The 200 or so Chinese advisers in Zaire training camps were all believed to have left by the end of last year. It is alleged that at various times during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency gave some symbolic assistance to the NFLA, with an eye to the future. Official American policy was to stay out of Africa.

The third Angola liberation movement, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, is led by Mr Joseph Savimbi. He was once one of Mr Roberto's lieutenants, and broke away from the NFLA in 1966 to form Unita.

None of these three movements received large-scale assistance from non-African countries during the fight against the Portuguese or during the period of alternate bickering and fighting between the Portuguese revolution in April, 1974 and Angolan independence in November 1975.

The series of events that led to the present crisis began, according to sources here, in October, 1974 when the Russians started increasing their military aid to the MPLA. Some CIA officials thought that the Russians were taking steps to ensure that Dr Neto, whom they consider a communist, should come out on top when Angola became independent.

Sources in Washington now

say that the CIA first decided that steps must be taken to help the anti-communists among the Angolan nationalists in January, 1975. The Forty Committee, which supervises the CIA, then approved sending \$300,000 to the NFLA.

This was a very small sum and obviously would not itself have provoked the Russians into as dramatic an increase in their help for the MPLA as eventually occurred. On the other hand it was seen by both sides as a token of things to come, and might have worried the Russians for that reason.

At any event, the Russians continued to supply the MPLA and, according to sources here, President Kaunda made a personal appeal to President Ford in April last year to reverse what he considered to be a tide sweeping the MPLA to victory.

Many senior officials in the State Department, including the assistant secretary responsible for Africa, opposed any further American involvement in Angola, on the grounds that the MPLA would probably win anyway and that that would not necessarily be a disaster.

Dr Kissinger disagreed and in July, 1975, the CIA was authorized to spend 14 million dollars on arms for the NFLA and Unita. The equipment went in through Zaire and in due course helped the NFLA to seize the whole country down to a line about 90 miles north of Luanda.

The MPLA seized Luanda, breaking the truce and the coalition, in August, before the NFLA had had a chance to benefit from the CIA's largesse which, in any case, was much less than the Russians were then giving to the MPLA. The CIA's investment paid its first dividends in September and October when the MPLA was driven back to the region around Luanda.

Meanwhile, a much more effective intervention was taking place in the south, where the South Africans came to the help of Unita and mounted an attack up the coast which carried Unita to a point more than 100 miles to the south of

WASHINGTON POST
11 JAN 1976

Report Hits Famine Cover-up

Chicago Sun-Times

A famine that killed 100,000 Ethiopians in 1973 was covered up for months by diplomats and international relief agencies in an effort to protect the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, a report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace charges. The cover-up, in which U.S. officials played a leading role, severely hampered relief efforts throughout that year and well into 1974, the report adds.

Entitled "The Politics of Starvation," the 101-page document details how traditional diplomacy worked to conceal facts about drought, crop failure, pestilence and widespread starvation in order to avoid embarrassing Haile Selassie and his government.

The Ethiopian government, content to allow peasants in the hinterland to die of hunger and disease, put pressure on intergovernmental and

private relief agencies to conceal facts about the disaster long after it had gotten completely out of hand, it says.

Meanwhile, bureaucratic bumbling and official and private corruption inside Ethiopia contributed to the misery of millions and may have pushed that country beyond the point of no return where self-sufficiency is concerned.

Jack Shephard, the report's principal author, and Stephen J. Green, writer of a summary chapter, said that as a result of the events of 1973-74, Ethiopia is probably doomed to be a relief-client state for at least 10 years and perhaps indefinitely.

By the end of 1975, 500,000 persons may have died of starvation and cholera, largely as a result of the calculated inaction by Ethiopia's government and its foreign collaborators, the reports says.

In a bitter passage in his

summary chapter, Green, a former U.N. children's fund officer in Ethiopia, wrote about how diplomats and international civil servants sought to pursue "concepts of peace, children and youth, public health, etc. . . . in an abstract, long-term form."

"The problem in Ethiopia, in 1973 was that many people did not have any long-term interests. They were dying.

"That they were dying was, somewhat curiously, perceived as a political embarrassment to Haile Selassie's government by that government and by virtually all of the foreign officials in that country. So nothing was done.

Luanda in October.

If there is any single event which precipitated the immense increase in Soviet aid to the MPLA it was this South African offensive, not the American subsidy to the FNLA. American aid was increased in the autumn to a total of \$32m.

Congress is firmly opposed to any further aid being sent to the anti-communists in Angola, and passed a Bill just before Christmas cutting it out of the defence budget.

Now Unita and the FNLA have run out of steam, the MPLA has steadied the situation, and it is at last possible that a general withdrawal of foreigners would allow the Angolan factions to continue their civil war from roughly the positions they would have occupied anyway, without the Russians', Americans' and South Africans' intervention.

Patrick Brogan

Christian Science Monitor
13 Jan. 1976

Joseph C. Harsch

Lessons from Angola

The Kissinger-Ford effort to head off the lodgement of Soviet influence in Angola by clandestine action is now in the damage control phase.

There is still a possible propaganda recovery by brandishing Moscow as the sole residual interferer in Angola (after all the other outsiders are out).

A partition of Angola might limit the Soviet foothold to the central area controlled by the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) faction which Moscow has been backing for years.

Dr. Kissinger may even be able to salvage a Soviet withdrawal at the next bargaining round over detente, although Moscow would have to be paid something substantial for giving up the fruits of what is for them a highly successful power politics adventure.

So we do not yet see the sequel to the story. But matters have reached the point where we can see clearly enough that the American resort to clandestine operations in Angola is a failure bordering on fiasco.

The purpose was perfectly proper — to prevent the lodgement of Soviet influence on the west coast of southern Africa. But the methods chosen along the way were either too little and too late, or the wrong ones.

The first mistake was to let Moscow pick the probable winner, the MPLA, as far back as 1957 and do nothing about it for years except to refuse help to the same faction but give a pittance, a few thousand dollars, to an unpromising rival faction, the FNLA. This alienated the strongest faction without building a credible rival when there was still time to have done so.

Then last January (a year ago) a decision was taken to give Holden Alvaro Roberto, leader of the FNLA, the sum of \$10 million

was enough for him to start building a political organization, but nothing like enough to build an army. In April substantial quantities of Soviet arms and supplies arrived in Luanda for the MPLA. They used it successfully to consolidate their hold on the capital. By July they were well-established and their rivals had been pushed away from the capital.

In July the Ford administration decided to do more for Mr. Roberto and his FNLA and authorized \$14 million to be piped to him through the government of neighboring Zaire. But at this point serious disagreement developed inside the government in Washington. Both at the State Department and at CIA much professional opinion disapproved. In effect, Secretary of State Kissinger overruled his experts. One of them, Nathaniel Davis, even resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. No one at CIA resigned, but many disapproved of or distrusted the decision.

Formal independence day in Angola came on Nov. 11. At that time the Ford administration added another \$18 million to the secret funds available to the anti-MPLA factions. This was cleared with the appropriate "watch-dog" committees of Congress. But when the administration then proposed to add another \$28 million (for a total of \$60 million in all) the Senate balked. The story leaked out from dissident senators who felt the chill of a possible second Vietnam. The operation ceased to be clandestine.

So there was the first mistake of letting the Soviets have a monopoly of aiding the MPLA. Then there was the double mistake of picking Mr. Roberto, but giving him only a pittance. Then there was the mistake of overriding

and at CIA — always dangerous because it usually leaks out. On top of that came a surprising failure to realize how gun-shy Congress might prove to be about anything with even a whiff of a similarity to Vietnam about it. Meanwhile the Soviets, unbothered by any Congress or public opinion, shipped in large further amounts of weapons and supplies, and also a lot of Cubans — perhaps as many as 10,000 by now.

This is no national disaster. It's only a minor action on the international skirmish line. It is unlikely that the MPLA will be long grateful to Moscow. They will switch if and when it suits them to do so. But it certainly raises serious doubt about the suitability of clandestine operations within present circumstances. Open diplomacy might have worked better. Dr. Kissinger would be advised to listen more attentively to his experts, and give the CIA a rest. They had enough trouble on their hands already without Angola.

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14 JAN 1976

Scholarships Hit

Reuter

ACCRA, Jan. 13—An international students' meeting today called for the withdrawal of all scholarships to developing countries from foreign agencies such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The students said they believe that award of such scholarships and foundations by foreign agencies to serve imperialist interests.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
11 JAN 1976

Jack Anderson

Respecting the Torturers in Chile

In our swashbuckling days shortly after the turn of the century, a Barbary pirate named Raisouli made the mistake of kidnapping an American citizen named Perdicaris. Teddy Roosevelt immediately fired off a cable from the White House: "Perdicaris alive or Raisouli dead." To lend emphasis to the message, Roosevelt landed a detachment of Marines on the Barbary coast. Perdicaris was hastily released.

There was a time when Americans could count upon the protection of their government when they traveled abroad. Today, any foreign potentate can drag them off to his torture chambers without risk of retaliation.

The State Department clearly is more interested in preserving its cozy relationships with dictators and despots than in upholding the human rights of American citizens. Those unfortunate enough to get caught in the coils of a foreign police can expect little more from the State Department than a polite murmur of protest.

This has been dramatized by two contrasting incidents in the military oligarchy of Chile. The dictatorship last week released Dr. Sheila Cassidy, a British citizen, who had been stripped naked, lashed to a bed and tormented with electric shocks by the official torturers. The moment she was safe on British soil, the British government withdrew its Ambassador from Chile and issued a stinging statement.

"Dr. Cassidy was tortured by the Chilean security police," the statement charged. "In order to obtain information from her, they stripped her and gave her severe electric shocks. No British government can accept such uncivilized, brutal treatment of a British subject at the hands of a foreign government."

A year earlier, an American art teacher, Amy Conger, was abused by the Chilean Air Force. She was hauled through the streets with breasts bared and later slammed on a bed and tortured. She was deprived of water, denied sleep and forced to stand until she almost collapsed. Once she was blindfolded and then catapulted down some steps.

The American consul in Santiago, Fred Purdy, quietly secured her release. The State Department filed no formal protest but, on the contrary, conspired to keep her case quiet. When we finally published her story, Purdy spoke up in support not of a Amy Conger but of the Chilean torturers.

She has pleaded with the State Department to investigate her case. As evidence, she provided a 16-page report describing how she had been treated. But the State Department hasn't even bothered to answer all her correspondence.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger simply doesn't want tortured Americans rocking his diplomatic boat. Rather than offend the torturers, he has even risked antagonizing Congress.

A year ago, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to bar money from countries that consistently violate human rights. The law requires the President to report to Congress on the status of human rights in recipient countries.

In compliance with the law, the State Department cabled more than 60 ambassadors and asked them to file human rights status reports. These were assembled for submission to Congress. But at the last minute, Kissinger classified the information and refused to release it. Instead, he delivered a general report which omitted the sordid details. Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., has been clamoring in vain for the full information, which the law requires Kissinger to divulge.

This American appeasement has merely encouraged the despots to continue their harsh routines. There is no better example than the Chilean military junta, which started out brutalizing communists but is now using the same savagery against anyone who gets in the way.

Our sources in Chile have documented the case, for example, of Pedro Araya Ortiz. He is a former construction worker who got himself elected to the Chilean Congress as a Christian Democrat. He is a

"Secretary of State Henry Kissinger simply doesn't want tortured Americans rocking his diplomatic boat. Rather than offend the torturers, he has even risked antagonizing Congress."

political moderate, an anti-communist, a family man with an 18-month-old son and an aged mother to support.

He provoked the wrath of the junta, apparently, by searching for four union leaders who had mysteriously disappeared. Like himself, they were also moderate Christian Democrats.

Last September, Araya was seized on the streets as he was leaving his mother's home. Four security agents beat him, shoved him into the back of their car and held him down with machine guns at the back of his neck.

They sped with their prisoner to a special torture center near the Air Force base in Antofagasta. We have been provided the details of his detention, down to the street locations of two torture centers where he was held.

At first, he was stripped bare and strapped to a metal table. For 48 hours, the torturers worked him over. They wet down his feet and applied electrical shocks. They beat the soles of his feet. They burned the tender part of his arms with lighted cigarettes. They gave him no food or water.

Eventually, the junta let Araya go. Several friends gathered at the prison gate to greet him, but they saw a white station wagon speed out with Araya inside.

It was later learned that the Congressman was whisked, blindfolded, to a special clinic—located on Santa Lucia Street next to the Chilean-British Cultural Institute—where torture victims are nursed back to health. A doctor treated him for nine arm burns, severe burns on the soles of his feet and a dislocated tendon in his right foot.

Then Araya was dumped on a street near Santiago's athletic stadium and left to hobble to the home of a friend. His friends insisted that he see a doctor. He was examined first at Santiago's Diagnostic Institute, later at the Institute of Neurosurgery at Salvador hospital. He remains today under intensive psychiatric care and is able to walk only with the aid of crutches.

Meanwhile, the United Nations and the Organization of American States have denounced torture in Chile. The Brits have withdrawn their ambassador protest. But the United States remain cordial terms with the tortur

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