

had the scent by now, and it soon came out that Nedzi, as chairman of that Armed Services subcommittee, had been briefed on CIA assassination plots more than a year before and, once again, had done nothing. With this news in hand, the select committee Democrats rebelled, demanding a different chairman. But Speaker Albert balked at dealing with the controversy, advising patience, and the full House later gave Nedzi a resounding vote of confidence by refusing to accept his resignation. This left Nedzi in charge of a committee with which he refused to work, and the investigation came to a halt.

A major reason for that vote and the subsequent select committee stalemate is what was happening back at Armed Services. Curiously that committee's leadership decided to take up the question of my access to its classified files—stemming from the CHITS controversy nine months before—at the very moment when Mr. Nedzi's failure as an overseer of intelligence operations had come to national attention. On June 10, five days after *The New York Times* broke the story of Nedzi's inaction on assassination schemes and at the height of the controversy over his remaining as Select Committee chairman, House Armed Services met in an improperly announced closed session and, without a quorum present, voted unilaterally to bar me from further access to its files. No notice had been given me that this action was being considered—in fact I didn't find out about it until two days later.

I won't dwell on the several ways in which this action, rearmad at a later date by a narrow majority of the total committee, was itself a violation of House rules, except to say that a committee cannot take away the privileges a congressman holds under the rules of the House as a whole—one such privilege being access to all committee records, regardless of committee membership. A more telling point is the action's glaring hypocrisy.

Columnist Jack Anderson, for example, was quick to say that he has received leaks of classified information from many members of House Armed Services on many occasions—"I have no difficulty getting secrets out of that committee when I want them," he said. There are tolerable leaks and intolerable leaks, apparently, and the characterization depends not on the strict dictates of the rules but on the current interests of the committee leadership or the Executive branch.

The Armed Services action was perfectly timed to shift the focus of debate on the handling of classified material from Lucien Nedzi to Michael Harrington. And at least over the short term, the tactic seems to have worked. Certainly it contributed to the outpouring of affection for the harried select committee chairman who just happened to have his resignation considered by the House on the day of the second Armed Services vote against me. From the swirl of publicity over another member's endangering of the nation's defenses, Mr. Nedzi was borne up on wings of angels. The vote was 290 to 64.

If one takes a step back from all of this, what emerges is not a narrow controversy over a chairmanship and a member's prerogatives, but a pattern of congressional acquiescence in the seductive game of shared secrets. It starts with the pleasant feeling of being privy to things unknown to the ordinary citizen, but it works very much like blackmail. The more you know about dubious secret operations, the more you are responsible for hiding, and the more you hide, the tighter the grip of the State Department or the CIA or the Pentagon. A large part of Lucien Nedzi's problem is that he got to know so many and such distasteful secrets that he was effectively bound and gagged by them.

There are only two ways to avoid that position. You can stick your head in the sand and let the administration handle such things, or you can challenge the terms of the game itself, for the game is basically a fraud. Certainly the United States needs a first-rate intelligence gathering system, and maintaining that system will require that we keep some secrets. But the acceptance of a classification system gone wild—the mindless rubber-stamping of every conceivable piece of information with the national security label—has obscured the distinction between legitimate intelligence gathering and manipulation of people and institutions. It has provided the cover for almost every kind of crime and impropriety at home, and it has sanctioned covert adventures overseas that have done tremendous damage to our international standing.

After 10 years of Vietnam and the Watergate affair, the American people understand this. They know that their leaders have lied routinely, cloaking arrogance and bullying and greed in terms of the national interest. They know that a secret agency that can overthrow a foreign government is a threat to democracy here. They know that a Congress that will turn away or masquerade to hide those kinds of actions can also dissemble in its handling of just about anything else. The Congress knows this, too, but refuses to admit it. And that is why the House investigation of US intelligence operations will remain a touchy undertaking no matter who is doing the investigating. In the back of every member's mind is the uncomfortable sense that the biggest scandal in the sordid story of CIA wrongdoing is the failure of effective oversight—the cover-up by the Congress.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. BINGHAM addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

#### HEARING OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON MONOPOLIES AND COMMERCIAL LAW OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON JULY 30, 1975

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. RODINO) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, of which I am chairman, announces that it will hold a hearing on present and past energy investigations by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on Wednesday, July 30, 1975, at 9 a.m. in committee room 2141 of the Rayburn Building.

#### THE WEEK OF WEEKS—CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK '75

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FLOOD) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, the 1975 observance of Captive Nations Week, was, indeed, a week of weeks. Symbolically, accidentally, partially contrived or otherwise, during what week of the year is there packed in one a nationwide observance, the tie-up of a

whenitsyn with the freedom of all the captive peoples, the President's support of the week, Kissinger's declamation of the Russian writer as a threat to peace, Members of Congress receiving the freedom fighter, the orbital détente of Apollo-Soyuz, and the culmination of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? Mr. Speaker, all this interrelated in the week set aside for the captive nations.

With the wonderful response in Congress to the week, I am sure our Members are interested in many examples of the observance as compiled by the National Captive Nations Committee which coordinates its activities both nationally and internationally. I include the following:

First, proclamations by Mayor Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., of Providence, R.I.; Mayor Bartholomew F. Guida of New Haven, Conn.; Mayor Robert B. Doyle, Jr. of Mobile, Ala.; Mayor Jack C. Hunter of Youngstown, Ohio; and Mayor Thomas G. Dunn of Elizabeth, N.J.;

Second, an editorial on "The Specter At The Feast" in the *New York Sunday News*; and

Third, an essay by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University on "The Illusions of Détente" circulated by the Americanism Educational League in California.

The articles follow:

PROCLAMATION FOR THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE BY HIS HONOR MAYOR VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR.

Whereas, the imperialistic politics of Communists have led, through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation and enslavement of the peoples of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, South Vietnam and others; and

Whereas, the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of peoples in these conquered nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to any ambitions of Communist leaders to initiate a major war; and

Whereas, the freedom loving peoples of the captive nations look to the United States as the citadel of human freedom and to the people of the United States as the leaders in bringing about their freedom and independence; and

Whereas, the Congress of the United States by unanimous vote passed Public Law 88-90 establishing the third week in July each year as Captive Nations Week and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate prayer, ceremonies and activities expressing their sympathy with and support for the just aspirations of captive peoples;

Now, therefore, do I, Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., Mayor of the City of Providence, hereby proclaim the week of July 13-19, 1975, as Captive Nations Week in Providence and call upon the citizens to join with others in observing this week by offering prayers and dedicating their efforts for the peaceful liberation of oppressed and subjugated peoples all over the world.

PROCLAMATION OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Whereas: The quest for general relaxation of tension and world peace is the key objective of all freedom-loving peoples and one to which the American Friend of the Cap-

July 23, 1975

Harrington H 7357 HSC

not have jobs; they on unemployment benefits which are at best a fixed income; and they discover that everything they have to buy keeps going up in price.

Consumer prices this June were more than 9 percent above the same prices in June 1974. And another serious aspect of the price increase is that it is across the board. Almost nothing went down.

This can only mean more hardship for the consumer, especially the unemployed worker and his family. It undermines economic stability, and it is another blow to economic recovery.

It is further proof of the bankruptcy of the administration's economic policies.

REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. ABZUG) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, last week, the House voted to reconstitute the Select Committee on Intelligence. This action was taken largely to remove Representative MICHAEL HARRINGTON from the committee. I opposed the removal of Representative HARRINGTON, since it was done in response to a courageous act he took after learning of improper conduct by the administration and others.

Mr. HARRINGTON has outlined the events involved in that episode in a recent article in the New Republic titled "Congress' CIA Coverup—Getting Out the Truth." I would recommend this article to all those interested in an accurate chronicle of the events involved in this congressional action:

CONGRESS' CIA COVERUP GETTING OUT THE TRUTH

(By MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON)

If a President engages in a cover-up of government wrongdoing, as happened in the Nixon White House, he can be challenged through the process of impeachment, which amounts to indictment and trial by the Congress. But what do we do if the Congress engages in a cover-up? Individual members can be censured or expelled, of course, but what if the cover-up is institutional, a product of the most time-honored rules and rituals?

This is precisely the problem that confronts us in the unfolding story of CIA and other intelligence agency misdeeds. To be sure presidential decisions and actions are involved here too, but now we have a situation where members of Congress, in their capacity as overseers of intelligence agency operations, had knowledge of the most blatant crimes and improprieties and nevertheless did nothing. The instance I am most familiar with concerns the CIA's accomplishments on our behalf in Chile in the early 1970s. The reactions to that record by those who came to hear of it are a sobering illustration of the great congressional weakness—the habitual reflex of avoidance and acquiescence, masked by the illusion of activity.

In April of last year, CIA Director William Colby appeared at a closed session of Rep. Lucien Nedzi's Armed Services subcommittee on Intelligence and described his agency's long-term involvement in the political process in Chile, where a bloody coup against Salvador Allende Gossens in September 1973 had led to the installation of a military dictatorship. Mr. Nedzi had called Colby in at my urging, so naturally I wanted to know what the director had to say. Not

make special arrangements to view the classified transcript in the committee offices—the privilege of any House member—and after some initial difficulties with the staff there, I got my first look at the material on June 4. What it said left me appalled.

The authorization of bribery, the funding of political factions and propaganda campaigns, the fomenting of strikes and demonstrations, myriad of destabilizing actions—all directed against the duly elected leader of Latin America's most sophisticated democracy—are now matters of public record. Not only does that record indicate violations of standing treaties and other affronts to Chilean sovereignty; it also shows that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger had lied repeatedly to the American people about our involvement there and that some administration figures had apparently perjured themselves on the matter before certain committees of Congress.

Determined to get some congressional action that would bring these things to light, I approached Mr. Nedzi and asked him what he planned to do with this information. He replied with a philosophical shrug. He had taken the testimony as I asked—what more could one do? This information, after all, was secret.

Knowing full well from my short-term experience as a member of the Armed Services (ending in 1973) that Chairman F. Edward Hebert would be even less inclined to pursue the matter than Mr. Nedzi, I spoke with several subcommittee chairmen of House Foreign Affairs, of which I am now a member, and then with some of my staff. I also sought the advice of Larry Stern of *The Washington Post*, a personal friend who clearly understood that the story was not to be released. But the reactions of the subcommittee chairmen and other Foreign Affairs colleagues, though generally sympathetic in tone were equally lacking in commitment. Yes the Chile story sounded pretty bad, but that was the province of another committee and besides, the information was secret.

I finally wrote to "Doc" Morgan, chairman of the full committee, and to Senator Fulbright. In those two long letters of July 18, I reviewed Colby's April testimony and argued that "the Congress and the American people have a right to know what was done in our name in Chile . . . I urge you to turn this matter to the attention of the Foreign Relations [Affairs] Committee for a complete, public investigation. . . ." I pointed out that the Forty Committee, the Interdepartmental body chaired by the President's national security adviser had authorized the expenditure of about \$11 million between 1962 and 1973 to help block Allende's election and then to "destabilize" his government after he won.

"The agency's activities in Chile were viewed as a prototype, or laboratory experiment," I noted, "to test the techniques of heavy financial involvement in efforts to discredit and bring down a government." I gave a general breakdown of the amounts authorized from 1962 through 1973, and explained to the respective chairmen that since acquiring this information I had tried to persuade well-positioned colleagues to pursue the facts but that nothing seemed to be happening. I said I was writing to them as a last resort. Rep. Morgan did not answer my letter. Sen. Fulbright replied, but not very substantively, suggesting that the real solution to the problem was the establishment of a joint committee on oversight.

I felt ambivalent at this point as to how I ought to proceed—I did want to stick with the congressional process but could see no obvious lines to follow. At any rate the matter was set aside in my preoccupation with the summer's major event: the impeachment proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee. Then on September 6, Sunday, Herch of

me up to inquire about the context in which those letters had been written, saying that he had a copy of one of them. I told him I didn't want the issue raised in this manner and, suspecting he may only have heard a rumor, I said I wouldn't comment on the substance of the letter until I saw his story in print. He assured me I could read it in the *Times* on Sunday, two days later, which I did.

Shortly thereafter Mr. Nedzi asked me to appear before his Armed Services subcommittee to account for the egregious leak. I explained to the group, meeting against my objection in closed session, that the staff had not gotten the story from me or my office. But this was not satisfactory, for the point was raised that House Rule XI, Section 27(o) says that no evidence or testimony taken in secret session may be released or used in a "public session" without the consent of the committee. A further issue was the pledge I had to sign in order to read the Chile material, which said that classified information would not be divulged to any unauthorized person. Unauthorized persons, the ensuing exchange made clear, included other members of Congress.

This meeting did not maintain the highest level of discourse—one member compared me to Benedict Arnold—but I tried to make to the subcommittee a distinction between genuine concern for the national security and the facile use of that label to cover official acts of duplicity and illegality. Suggesting this distinction was one of the principal lessons of Vietnam and Watergate, I maintained that the cover-up of US actions in Chile was yet another case of national security's fraudulent application. My remarks did not set well with the subcommittee.

Nevertheless the storm seemed to pass. The next day I wrote to Mr. Nedzi asking that a transcript of the session we had just completed be made available to me when it was prepared. The letter was never answered, and I concluded that Armed Services had decided to drop the matter. I went off to campaign for reelection.

Meanwhile Mr. Herst had turned over another rock, and in December and January wrote a series of stories alleging that the CIA had conducted a program of massive surveillance of American citizens in direct violation of its charter. Although cynics might have suggested that this only amounted to bureaucratic overlap with the FBI, the revelation jolted Congress in a way that harassment and assassination of foreigners never seemed to—possibly because some reports charged that the agency had snooped on senators and representatives. In any case hard on the heels of the President's establishment of the Rockefeller commission, the Senate voted to set up a select committee to investigate the full range of US intelligence activities. I proposed formation of a similar committee in the House, and after a month-long minut of maneuver and delay, we had a select committee, too. I felt pretty good about it until the Speaker announced his choice for chairman—Lucien Nedzi.

Lucien Nedzi, the man who had sat on his hands as chairman of that permanent subcommittee on intelligence since 1971, who had listened to the agency horror stories about the bludgeoning of a democracy in Latin America without so much as a murmur to his colleagues—this was the man assigned to conduct the special investigation that would logically include his own lack of action as a subject of inquiry. I went to the floor of the House on the day his chairmanship became official and said I thought it was an outrage. This indiscretion, I was told later by horrified staff and colleagues, was not likely to advance my career—I had been given a seat on the committee myself and would therefore have to work with him—but I felt it had to be said.

Other members of the select committee The press really