

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Wilbur L. Creech to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Morgan to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lt. Gen. William J. Evans to be a general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. George Rhodes to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Devolet Brett, to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lt. Gen. Felix M. Rogers, to be a general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. John F. Gonge to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. George G. Loving, Jr., to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert T. Marsh to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move the Senate return to legislative session, and I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to return to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on the motion of the Senator from West Virginia. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) would vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 84, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 339 Ex.]

YEAS—84

Abourezk	Garn	McGee
Allen	Glenn	McGovern
Bartlett	Gravel	McIntyre
Bayh	Griffin	Metcalf
Beall	Hansen	Mondale
Bentsen	Hart, Gary W.	Montoya
Biden	Hart, Philip A.	Morgan
Brock	Harke	Moss
Brooke	Haskell	Muskie
Bumpers	Hatfield	Nelson
Burdick	Hathaway	Nunn
Byrd	Helms	Packwood
	Harry F., Jr.	Pearson
	Byrd, Robert C.	Percy
	Cannon	Proxmire
	Case	Randolph
	Clark	Roth
	Cranston	Schwelker
	Culver	Scott, Hugh
	Curtis	Scott
	Dole	William L.
	Domenici	Sparkman
	Eagleton	Stafford
	Fannin	Stennis
	Fong	Stevens
	Ford	Stevenson
		McClure

Stone	Thurmond	Weicker
Symington	Tower	Young
Talmadge	Tunney	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—15

Baker	Eastland	Pastore
Bellmon	Goldwater	Pell
Buckley	Javits	Ribicoff
Chiles	Kennedy	Taft
Church	Mathias	Williams

So the motion was agreed to.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUMPERS). The motion having been agreed to, the Senate is once again in legislative session.

DISAPPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two hours having elapsed, the Senate will now resume the consideration of unfinished business, Senate Resolution 160, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 160) disapproving construction projects on the Island of Diego Garcia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on the resolution, any debatable motion, or appeal, is limited to 5 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), with one-half hour each reserved for the Senator from Virginia (Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT), in addition to the 5 hours.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I believe that I am entitled to half the time, because the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from South Carolina are both against the resolution of disapproval. I would hope that the distinguished Republican leader would take that up with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, because there has to be a division of time, and I think I am entitled to it as the author of the resolution.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. The Senator, of course, is making a reasonable request—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Senators will please take their seats or retire to the cloakroom.

Does the Senator from Pennsylvania wish to proceed?

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina is here, and the Senator from Mississippi is temporarily off the floor. Because the Senator from South Carolina is here, he can, of course, speak for himself. But I understand he is willing to agree to a reasonable division of time, if the distinguished majority leader will also work it out that the chairman of the committee—

Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, yes, I know the distinguished chairman of the committee and the distinguished Senator from South Carolina would like to split the time; and I would ask unanimous consent that I be given half of the time and

July 28, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 13925

McGovern	Rackwood	Stennis
McIntyre	Pharson	Stevens
Metcalfe	Pelcy	Stevenson
Mondale	Proxmire	Stone
Montoya	Randolph	Symington
Morgan	Roth	Talmadge
Moss	Schweiker	Thurmond
Muskie	Scott	Tower
Nelson	William L.	Tunney
Nunn	Stafford	Young

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORIS), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RABINOFF), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The first order of business is advising and consenting to the first nomination on the calendar.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, may I respectfully inquire of the distinguished assistant majority leader whether this is a filibuster or not?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Not in the usual sense, in regard to which the distinguished Republican leader and his colleagues have shown themselves to be very adept.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I want the country to know that, in the opinion of the minority leader, this is a filibuster designed to prevent us from having a vote on New Hampshire before the recess. I shall make that point from time to time between now and the recess.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator has had numerous votes already. I think he has had eight votes on the motion to send the matter back to New Hampshire, so he has been given plenty of opportunities to vote.

He was given an opportunity to vote on the Mansfield amendment, but what did he do? He moved to table the amendment and he lost on that motion.

He probably will get other chances this week.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. If we get some other chances this week, I shall feel, I would say, rather moderately better about it. I shall feel best of all if we were to succeed in prevailing. We have a chance of prevailing if we allow the roll to be called, have the Senators stay out of the well, and let the rollcall vote be announced accordingly. One may harbor the thought, as the French say, and in that way, one may march forward with some progress.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The marching, I think, was done not at the request

of the leadership on this side. If there was any marching done, it must have been ordered elsewhere. We know nothing about it.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I thank the distinguished assistant majority leader, and I understand he will now proceed with the filibuster.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Republican leader. The leadership on this side is simply reacting to the actions that were evident, beginning on last Saturday, when the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN), exercising his right under the rules, objected to my unanimous-consent request that there be a 10-minute period for the transaction of routine morning business today with a 2-minute limitation on statements therein. That was a clear signal that the Senate was going to have to operate under rule VII this morning, and so the leadership on this side has just protected itself accordingly.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I would just as soon get on with the nominations but, yes, I will yield.

Mr. JOHNSTON. It just occurred to me, since we were speaking so critically about filibusters, whether it might not be an appropriate time to get a time limitation agreement on the whole question of Durkin-Wyman.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. That is the solution. The leadership on this side has repeatedly made such a proposal to the leadership on the other side and, exercising their rights, they have rejected it repeatedly.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I wonder if the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania would be in a mood to speak about a time limitation on all questions with respect to Durkin-Wyman so we can bring this matter to a close and end the filibuster?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order. However, I will allow the Republican leader to answer to question—

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. We appreciate the chance.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD (continuing). Before I ask for the regular order.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. We do appreciate the chance, as an oppressed minority, one of the leading American minority groups, to be given an opportunity to be heard, in a squeaky sort of way, every now and then.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Well, the distinguished Republican leader knows we are discussing legislative business in an executive session, which is not in order.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. In response to what has been said about a possible time limit, of course, all the 99 Senators need to be consulted on that, and there may be reasons why Senators on both sides of the aisle would prefer an opportunity to send the election back to New Hampshire. But our problem is when our first and strongest, as we view it, our strongest, issue of the 35 issues stated in the resolution, came up, one in which we felt that every aspect of justice would be served if we could only have a tally, that is, just a count, to see how many people

dropped pieces of the paper in the ballot box in 10 precincts, just to count the papers not to count the votes, we were denied that privilege.

That compelled us to conclude we were subject to the tyranny of the majority by 61 to 38, and that we have no hope of prevailing through the process suggested, namely, that we go ahead with a vote on every issue, so that the majority can roll us one by one 34 more times. We just do not like being rolled that much.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The Senator is not being "rolled," and on that first issue the vote was not 61 to 38. A good many Democrats voted with the Republicans, but the Republicans voted solidly.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I will say to the Democrats who voted with us there are some reasonable people on the other side of the aisle, and we welcome this excess of logic, and we anticipate more of it.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Well, there are reasonable people on both sides of the aisle, and I would like to feel that every Senator in this body is a reasonable man.

As to "rolling" the minority, that is pure horseradish.

Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.

U.S. AIR FORCE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is advising and consenting to the nomination.

The Senate resumed consideration of the nomination of Maj. Gen. Kenneth L. Tallman to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lt. Gen. Robert E. Huysler, to be a general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Lt. Gen. Daniel James, Jr., to be a general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. George E. Schafer, to be Surgeon General of the Air Force in the grade of lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. William Y. Smith, to be a lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

NOMINATION PASSED OVER—MAJ. GEN. ALTON D. SLADE TO BE LIEUTENANT GENERAL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next nomination go over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Charles E. Buckingham to be a lieutenant general.

the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, for the Senator from Mississippi, be given the other half.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. To be divided—
Mr. MANSFIELD. Equally.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. The other half of the time to be divided equally, by agreement between the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is all right. That is a matter that the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from South Carolina would have to agree on. But I would like to have the half of the time on this side.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Yes; the Senator from South Carolina advises that that is satisfactory with him if it is with the Senator from Mississippi.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, then, that half of the time would be under my control or whomever I may designate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senate has now proceeded to the consideration of Calendar No. 199, Senate Resolution 160, a resolution disapproving construction projects on the island of Diego Garcia.

As the Senate knows, Diego Garcia is a flyspeck in the Indian Ocean, an atoll, so-called, situated approximately 1,000 miles south of India, if my recollection is correct. The Navy has been endeavoring to establish a base in Diego Garcia since the early 1960's; and, over the opposition of the late, great Senator from Georgia, Richard Brevard Russell and others, it seems to be on the threshold of making further progress, but we shall see.

There is at the present time a resolution of disapproval of the recommendation of the President of the United States, who had advocated that the funds mentioned last year—\$13 million or \$14 million—be used for further construction purposes on that flyspeck in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, to the best of my knowledge, I know of no negotiations which have been conducted between this country and the United Kingdom relative to the use of Diego Garcia. I know of no treaty which has been before the Committee on Foreign Relations, seeking to bring about, openly, an agreement on this particular atoll.

It is my understanding that an amendment was submitted to S. 1517, the omnibus foreign relations authorization bill, on Friday last, expressing the sense of Congress that the President should seek negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve agreement on mutual limitations of naval and other deployments in the Indian Ocean.

It is my understanding that all the nations along the littoral—Asia and Africa—have indicated that they are opposed to what is being undertaken in Diego Garcia. I realize, of course, that we have been assured privately—very privately—that while that is the public attitudes of the nations along the littoral, underneath they really want us to go ahead.

I am in receipt of letters from the Ambassadors of Malagasy—formerly known as Madagascar—off the coast of Africa, and Somalia, expressing their concern over what the United States is attempting to do.

I should mention, also, that in addition to no treaty, to the best of my knowledge, there is no executive agreement—or, if there is, it has not been brought to the attention of Congress—by means of which the United Kingdom grants certain rights to the United States on this uninhabited flyspeck, this atoll, in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, I think there has been too much hanky-panky in the field of foreign policy so far as the military is concerned. I recall, for example, that some years ago, a General Burchinal, I believe—either the commander of the U.S. 8th Air Force in Europe or the deputy commander—carried on negotiations with the Government of Spain. If those negotiations, conducted without the knowledge of Congress, had been put into effect, we would have been involved, in our relationship with Spain, to participate under certain circumstances on the African continent. Fortunately, that was found out in time.

I do not blame General Burchinal, because he was acting under instructions. But I do not like the idea of negotiations being carried on in behalf of this country in that manner; because when they are, the civilians, who are supposed to be supreme in the conduct of the government of this country, under the Constitution, are left out in the cold and are presented with facts when it is too late, usually, to do anything.

So, Mr. President, I know of no treaty with the United Kingdom which gives us rights on Diego Garcia. I know of no executive agreement which gives us rights on Diego Garcia, though I anticipate that there may well be one. I have tried for years to find out about it, and so far I must admit failure.

What the countries bordering the Indian Ocean want is an ocean of peace, a sphere of peace. What our Navy wants is to spread itself halfway around the world, and what I think the significance is is the closeness of Diego Garcia to the oilfields of the Middle East.

The significance also is that this means the start of a three-ocean Navy. If the Senate and Congress and the American people want to do that, they should lay it all out in the open. A three-ocean Navy—we have enough to do looking after the two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, on the east and on the west.

So, Mr. President, I think that this amendment, which was agreed to by the Committee on Foreign Relations and which will be before the Senate shortly, is a critical one because it requests the administration to pursue fully diplomatic channels on this matter before both nations—the United States and the Soviet Union—embark on the path of increased competition in the Indian Ocean region, a competition which would clearly pose high economic costs. The figure projected, and I have the figure at my disposal, is something just under \$200 million. But if we start this program, it is

going to extend into the billions of dollars.

In addition to high economic cost, there is the question of political uncertainties and the danger of heightened tensions. Are we going to put a chip on our shoulder and dare the Soviet Union to build up its naval strength in the Indian Ocean? Are the Russians going to put a chip on their shoulder and dare us to build up our naval strength in the Indian Ocean? Are we going to hear about hobgoblins during the course of this debate? Incidentally, may I say, in reading the conference report on the military authorization bill, it appears to me that, to a large extent, the Pentagon has come out on top in anything, in almost everything, it desires. They are getting the Rickover nuclear missile cruiser—only \$60 million to start with, but the total cost, as of now, will be between \$1.2 and \$1.3 billion.

Do you know, Mr. President, how many of those missile cruisers they want, costing between \$1.2 and \$1.3 billion? Twenty-five to twenty-eight. They have retained the B-1 when the B-52's are capable of still continuing in operation for anywhere from 10 to 20 years.

Where is all this money coming from? When is it going to stop? Have we not learned anything from Vietnam? We have neither the resources nor the manpower to be the policeman of the world. And here, we want to go into the Indian Ocean and, for the time being, spend just tens of millions of dollars, but eventually, down the road, and not too far down the road, billions of dollars. Why? So that we can develop a flyspeck in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, so that we can have a three-ocean navy.

When is Congress going to wake up? When is it going to recognize that it represents all the American people? When is it going to learn the lesson of Vietnam? Or is it ever?

I think, Mr. President, that we ought to give this matter the most serious consideration, because, while perhaps the Soviet Union does intend to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, I think we ought to see if something cannot be worked out by means of which the Indian Ocean can remain a sphere of peace and not be subject to what has been happening in the Pacific Ocean in recent years. It is a time to seek mutual restraint on naval deployments and it is time to do so before those deployments become a fait accompli.

So, Mr. President, as we consider this bill later today, I hope that, despite the recommendation of the President of the United States, enough Senators will have the gumption to stand up and say no to this further expansion of American military power, to this continuation of a "policeman of the world" policy, to this exorbitant cost, which this country can no longer undergo. The stakes are great as far as this particular atoll, this flyspeck in the Pacific Ocean, is concerned.

I hope that the debate—and I am sure it will be—will be spirited, that the facts will be laid out, and I hope, also, that emotions will not supersede responsibilities and a recognition of the facts of life. After all, if we undertake this program,

S 13928

the American people can be prepared to pay and pay and pay; and for what? A flyspeck in the Indian Ocean, which is wanted by none of the littoral states, the states bounding the ocean; a flyspeck which will be very close to the Middle East, where a large portion of the world's oil is in the ground or in production. It will take us half-way around the globe to an area in which we have no business, an area which can bring about a situation which will produce a new spiraling of armaments and the costs attached thereto, an area of possible danger, which I think we should forego while we can still see clearly, before we have the chance, deliberate or otherwise, to send American men into that area and repeat, in the future, another Vietnam.

Mr. President, I am against any Vietnams, anywhere in the world. I hope that, at long last, we have learned the lesson of misadventure, that tragedy, which cost 55,000 American lives, which cost 303,000 American wounded, which cost approximately 150 billion American dollars, and which, before we get through paying for it, is going to cost this Nation at least, at the very least, \$435 billion—and the payment will extend well into the last portion of the first half of the next century.

I urge my colleagues later today to give the most serious consideration to all the implications contained in the Diego Garcia situation and to weigh them most carefully, because we will pay and pay through the nose in the years and in the decades ahead.

I, for one, am sick and tired of sending American men and women to fight or to be placed in a position where they may have to fight in foreign areas of the world, unless—unless—it is necessary for the security of the United States. Vietnam was not, Diego Garcia is not.

Mr. President, I have spent about 20 minutes this morning explaining my position on Diego Garcia, that flyspeck in the Indian Ocean upon which so much money has been spent so far, and tens of millions of dollars of expenditures are contemplated in the immediate future, and in my opinion billions of dollars in the not-too-distant future.

Mr. President, Richard B. Russell, one of the giants of the Senate's past, spent more than half his natural life in the U.S. Senate. His expertise concentrated on military policy and strategy. He left a great imprint on all with whom he served, including the Senator from Montana now speaking. On Vietnam he and I agreed and both of us opposed in the beginning, and that also includes the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS)—all three of us opposed in the beginning—the real beginning going back two decades—direct American involvement; we parted after that decision for direct involvement was made—after the flag was planted—but that divergence was based more on our separate opinions of how best then to serve the honor of our country.

The Senate never really had a crisp decision on the direct involvement in

Southeast Asia. We are afforded today, however, the opportunity to determine whether the American flag will in effect be embedded in the Indian Ocean. The tragic mistake of Southeast Asia—a mistake that touched and must be shared by every administration of the past three decades—a mistake which in addition to the great losses of life and treasure turned son against father and brother against brother to a degree unequaled since the War Between the States—is behind us by a matter of mere weeks—and we are considering a new and dramatic venture into South Asia. This is not simply an issue of \$14 million today or \$175 million in the near future or even the additional \$8 billion that is necessary for the three-ocean Navy; it is also a matter of extending and intruding in dramatic fashion U.S. military presence and might in a relatively untouched area of the globe. The proponents would argue that this is different from Vietnam, from Cambodia, from Laos, from Thailand—that there are no people to alienate on Diego Garcia.

That is correct. There is no people, and there have been no people in Diego Garcia except U.S. military personnel in recent years, and very recent years I may say.

But our ships will be there. Our destroyers and carriers and whatever else will use this base to patrol every inch of water off the 30 countries comprising the littoral of this ocean—maintaining an American presence but with all—

Mr. STENNIS. May we have quiet, Mr. President? We want to hear.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's request is appropriate. Let the Senate and the galleries be in order so that the speaker may be heard.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will repeat:

Our destroyers and carriers and whatever else will use this base to patrol every inch of water off the 30 countries comprising the littoral of this ocean—maintaining an American presence and with all the sophistication of the seventies—a moving rather than a stationary target. What a narrow lesson to have learned from three decades in Southeast Asia, and its cost in 55,000 dead Americans, 330,000 wounded Americans, 150 billion American dollars, and the cost of that war will reach at least, based on prices in 1972 \$435 billion. Think what has happened since inflation. Based on 1972 prices, it will cost this country \$435 billion for that misadventure, that tragedy in Southeast Asia.

Very few of us went to Vietnam but our sons and our brothers did. It is going to be your sons and your grandsons who are going to be paying for Vietnam well into the last quarter of the first half of the next century, the 21st century.

Was our mistake there simply a matter of tactics? Or was it something more profound? Did we not learn that America should have no design on maintaining a modern-day empire by replacing the autonomy of individual nations. Did we not learn that we cannot and should not attempt to make the nations of the world in our own image and our own likeness.

And this is what must be understood as we are permitted today to vote clearly on an issue with its full significant before us this time. We are being warned ahead, not being told after the fact.

On May 19 when this resolution of disapproval was introduced, I asked, "Why, in the face of the fact that all nations bordering on the Indian Ocean have asked the United States and the Soviet Union not to escalate the arms race in the Indian Ocean area, has the administration forwarded this letter of certification?" Again, I ask the question. The 30 nations on the littoral of the Indian Ocean have all publicly asked the United States to refrain from deployment at Diego Garcia. These nations include Australia, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Somalia, Malagasy, and others. Does this opposition mean anything to the administration?

Does it mean anything to this Congress? Does it mean anything to the people of this Nation who sent us here and whose surrogates we are?

I remember most vividly, when the Soviet Union was building a missile base in Cuba that posed a direct threat to our mainland the U.S. military forces were placed in a state of war readiness. What arrogance on our part to ignore the wishes of the littoral nations. Is it that their state of war readiness is so insignificant to us? Oh, the proponents will say, some of the representatives of these nations secretly invite us to go into the Indian Ocean but publicly they cannot admit it. What a familiar ring. Were these not the whispers of our allies around the globe during our tragedy in Southeast Asia?

Have we not heard this refrain year after year after year from our Pentagon and our State Department and previous administrations as well as this? Of course we have. How often are we going to be goaded at appropriate times during the year with these whispers, these insinuations, these innuendoes?

I hope we have matured beyond the point of whispered diplomacy and public policy arrived at in secret. If the public officials of the nations of the littoral insist publicly that we refrain from expanding our presence in the Indian Ocean, who are we attempting to influence by going against that publicly expressed judgment?

The issue is more than just money, but it is time as well that we consider the taxpayer's pocketbook. Navy figures in the possession of the Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee indicate that this base will cost approximately \$175 million. I contend that the money the administration is requesting to start construction of a Navy facility on Diego Garcia is only a downpayment. Oh, yes, you will hear figures that the most it will cost is about \$35 million in construction, but this simply is not so. What about the costs of equipment; costs to pay Seabees to build this base? I have figures that show that it will cost not only \$175 million to build the base and \$8 billion to expand the fleet to operate from that base, but also approximately \$800 million each year for these expanded fleet opera-

July 28, 1975

S 13929

tions. These are all dollars coming out of the American taxpayers' pockets. And those are just the costs for expanded naval operations.

In January 1974, the Air Force, when it appeared that they would be left out of the Diego Garcia program, came in with a request to extend the runway by 4,000 feet and to spend \$3.3 million for Air Force-related operational facilities. The Air Force has admitted that they want to operate C-135 tankers out of Diego Garcia. For what use? The answer is Air Force reconnaissance over the Indian Ocean; but the added capacity extends as well the U.S. strategic air capacity from the western Pacific into the full reaches of the Indian Ocean.

From the beginning, it has been my contention, when the request first was made by the Navy, that the creation of an operational facility at Diego Garcia was only the entering wedge for a three-ocean Navy. I know there are elaborate projections saying that the U.S. Navy will operate only in the Indian Ocean on an interim basis, which amounts to approximately 6 months out of every 12-month period. I am well aware of the fact that the Navy contends that they will be able to operate in the Indian Ocean with a carrier force of 12 in number, a reduction from the present 15-carrier force. But, I say to my colleagues, you can expect in future years that the Navy will come to the Congress saying that because of the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean, we must have additional carriers—an additional buildup.

I beg my colleagues to remember that we started in Vietnam by placing a few hundred advisers to train the Vietnamese Army and not more than a few hundred million dollars. It can be all but assured that if we start a naval base on Diego Garcia, it will be the beginning of an escalation that will lead to an all-out arms race in the Indian Ocean area. And then there is oil. The argument is used over and over again that our presence in the Indian Ocean is vital to keep the sea lanes open for U.S. petroleum interests. I submit that our presence in the Indian Ocean had absolutely no effect on the oil situation during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. The Arabs shut the oil off. The U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. State Department could do nothing about it. The Arabs simply said they would not sell us oil and they can do it again. But the argument is still used that the Navy will insure oil over the transit routes of the Indian Ocean.

In each year that the Navy has had the request before the Congress for an operational base on Diego Garcia, there is always the new threat.

Mr. President, it is difficult for me to understand why Senators cannot see through the Berbera, Somalia, testimony by the Department of Defense. Past history indicates that when DOD wants to get a new appropriation through the Congress that is controversial, we generally hear the words "the threat, the threat—the United States must counter the threat." Now the threat is that the Russians are building a base at Berbera,

in Somalia. Last year it was Socotra and Umm Zahr in Iraq.

The United States has had a limited operating base in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf since 1948. We have communications facilities there; we have a supply ship that stands by; and we operate two destroyers out of Bahrain. At Berbera, Somalia, the Russians have communications facilities; they have a so-called barracks shop there; and they operate submarines and surface ships out of Berbera. There is an airfield being built that the Somalis say will be 4,000 meters in length, and there is a missile-handling facility. However, there is no indication that there are any bunkering facilities for Russian naval ships in the harbor of Berbera. In fact, the Somalis contend that the fueling facilities will hold 130,000 barrels of fuel, which certainly is not much fuel. On the other side of the coin, I must point out that the Navy wants 600,000 barrels on Diego Garcia.

We have an advance communications facility already on Diego Garcia, a communications facility which was put on Diego Garcia only because we were being forced out of a communications facility at Kagaw in Ethiopia; and when we were forced out, our military did not want to get out.

We have an advanced communications facility already on Diego Garcia; already an 8,000-foot runway—so you can see that anything that the Russians have at Berbera, the United States already has at Diego Garcia. We have reached status quo.

Speaking of Berbera, it is interesting to note that the Somalian Government has invited—I believe through Under Secretary of Defense Clements—U.S. Navy ships to visit Berbera. If my information is correct, plans are now under way—perhaps dates have been set—for U.S. Navy ships to visit Berbera in August or September. If I am wrong in that respect, I hope the Department of Defense will correct me.

Perhaps we can find out by going to the office of the Vice President, where there is a task force drumming up support against this resolution of disapproval. So they have their guns all out—the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House—and all we have are 99 Senators, who may or may not exercise good judgment in this instance, who I am sure will vote their convictions.

I do think it is odd for a flyspeck in the Indian Ocean to have this array of heavy artillery, even outside this Chamber, buttonholing Senators and asking them, perhaps telling them—I hope no Senator would ever be told by anybody in the executive branch—how they should vote on a measure which is our responsibility and ours only.

I hope these lobbyists will go away and occupy themselves doing the duties which are theirs under the law. Those duties are not to try to twist arms in the Senate, to try to get us to do something against our will, and I hope the Senate will keep that in mind.

Then, there is the argument that to operate in the Indian Ocean, we must have in Diego Garcia a bunkering facil-

ity to fuel American warships. I believe that the term repeatedly being used is "a filling station." What sarcasm.

According to the information furnished by the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. naval ships have access today to 16 countries around the Indian Ocean littoral—may I repeat, Mr. President: U.S. naval ships have access today to 16 countries around the Indian Ocean littoral—for the specific purpose of fueling and bunkering. In fact, the Soviets are welcome in only 13 of the littoral states. So it is not that we do not have a place to refuel our ships or ports to visit. It is really that the Navy wants a new operating base in Diego Garcia—halfway around the world and on a flyspeck in the Indian Ocean. They have wanted such a facility for many years, well over a decade, to my personal knowledge; I believe two decades, perhaps a little more. Usually Congress, and especially the Senate, especially the Senate, has stood up on its hind legs and opposed this unwarranted expansion.

In fact, a study was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the late 1950's concerning the "strategic island concept." It was decided then—then, in the late fifties—by the Navy that it should have an operating facility on the island of Diego Garcia. The strategic premises for this operating facility go that far back. As my colleagues are well aware, negotiations were started 9 years ago for an operating base at Diego Garcia.

I want to state that regardless of Russians in the Port of Berbera, Somalia, the Navy would still want an operating base at Diego Garcia. Secretary Schlesinger, appearing before the Military Construction Subcommittee in June, was asked the question: If there were no Russian naval operations out of the Port of Berbera, Somalia, would the Navy still want the base on Diego Garcia?

His answer? An emphatic "Yes." The Navy would still want the base on Diego Garcia.

The arguments go beyond raising the strategic threshold in that area of the world. The Alice in Wonderland logic of the "bargaining chip" has returned: Let us build up Diego Garcia and our presence in the Indian Ocean, the whispers in the Senate corridors say, and then we will be able to negotiate it away, probably with great drama, by a future administration in a decade to come, and we all will feel good that another step toward peace has been achieved.

And at what cost? How, Mr. President, can we participate in such a charade, such a perversion of logic and reason? Today, the Indian Ocean, thank God, is not yet an area of superpower confrontation. In fact, it is one of the last areas of the world in which neither of the superpowers has permanent installations. The Soviet Union has received a bunkering and logistics welcome from 13 nations in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. In turn, the United States has a similar welcome in 16 countries. The Somalian facility, investigated by our own colleagues, offers no greater assistance than the present U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf.

The distinguished Senator from Iowa

July 28, 1975

S 13930

(Mr. CULVER), who has demonstrated such insight and attention to this matter during his years in Congress, and especially since he came to the Senate—a most welcome addition—argues for a further period of pause to permit the commencement of talks with the Soviets on preventing a further arms race in the Indian Ocean. Why now must we rush to accelerate the arms race? Why must we now convert a relatively peaceful and stable part of the globe into another area of potential conflict, confrontation, and, yes, even war? This flyspeck is pretty close to Middle East oil.

Just a few weeks ago, the Senate considered the military procurement authorization bill. It was only a matter of days after the Nation's abrupt withdrawal from Southeast Asia. From all sectors, we heard voices of reason, voices calling for a reevaluation of American foreign policy and the strategic and military arms that would complement that policy as we approached the future.

I was one who listened to those voices with fresh hope. For years with many of my colleagues in this body, I have attempted to confront the issues wrought by American military forces who have been stationed abroad for three decades. Almost 25 percent of all our military forces are stationed on foreign soil. Not since the time of the Roman Empire have so many ventured so far from home in peacetime. I have believed that existing American foreign policy can be achieved with far fewer stationed abroad. I still do, and did when the military procurement bill was before us. But, like others, I refrained from raising again that issue at that time. I believed the overwhelming Senate sentiment desired maintenance of the status quo in the context of foreign affairs until the dust of Vietnam and Southeast Asia had settled. Even expanded requests for military hardware, considered necessary for existing commitments, were permitted to pass through awaiting an honest reassessment.

I refer in that instance to the so-called Rickover nuclear cruiser, which was opposed by the Department of Defense, which was opposed by the OMB, which is going to cost \$1.2 to \$1.3 billion at present day prices, and for which they have plans numbering somewhere between 25 and 28. The cost is going to go way up, beyond \$1.2 to \$1.3 billion, even before the first one is built.

The Senate did not approve the Rickover nuclear cruiser and the chairman of the Committee on the Budget, who I hope and expect will speak on this matter when the conference report is before us, had something to say about the President himself busting the budget which he sent down. So I hope we will keep that factor in mind, too.

As a matter of fact, this year, the Pentagon has gotten just about everything it requested and a little more. When are we going to wake up?

Why, then, should not the same attitude, of maintaining the status quo on commitments, on new ventures into new areas, apply? What is our post-Vietnam foreign policy? What are the lessons of

Vietnam and Southeast Asia? How best should we manifest American foreign policy abroad? Can the United States live in harmony with other nations of the world, regardless of their cultural, governmental, or social structures? Is our policy now, "live and let live," rather than "in our image and likeness"?

I think these and many other questions that are basic to a reevaluation of American foreign policy are essential before new ventures are undertaken.

The momentum of a past policy should not foreclose a possible option for restraint in the arms race. To build a base as a bargaining chip to give it away is a logic that might also need reassessment. I hope our final judgment will reflect the maturity of a settled nation entering its third century and not just the bravado of a growing boy.

At the outset of these remarks, I invoked the memory of a great Senator of the past, Richard Russell of Georgia, who chaired the Committee on Armed Services. About a decade ago the Navy had another request before that committee. It was for a new type vessel that could move men and their equipment faster and in greater number than ever before. The vessel in question was the so-called FDL. Senator Russell opposed that Navy request not because the vessel would not do what the Navy said it would do, not because the cost was too high for the mission it would accomplish, but rather for a more basic and sensible reason. Senator Russell said:

If we make it easy for the Navy to go places and do things, you can be assured that they will always be going places and doing things.

Mr. President, that is the issue today. To expand the present Navy facility on Diego Garcia, we will certainly be making it far easier for the Navy to go to the Indian Ocean and to go there en masse. Once there in full force, I am sure that it will find many things to do. Today, the Senate has a unique opportunity. I hope that the Senate will exercise this opportunity so as to create a pause—a pause that might open a positive opportunity toward world peace.

Mr. President, may I say that, in a certain sense, I speak as a veteran. I was an enlisted man in the Navy, discharged honorably with the rank of seaman second class. I was an enlisted man in the Army, discharged honorably with the rank of private. I was an enlisted man in the Marine Corps, discharged honorably with the rank of Pfc. I have given 5 years in the service of my country in uniform. I think I know what I am talking about. I only hope that the Senate will weigh this matter carefully and will be fully aware—as some of us have tried to be—fully aware of just what this means in the future; \$10 million, \$13 million, \$175 million, \$8 billion, and what do you have in this ocean of peace? An arms race; chips on the shoulders of the Soviet Union and the United States. They build, we build. They send ships, we send in ships. We cannot afford a three-ocean Navy. We are stretched to

the limit to take care of a two-ocean Navy to guard us on the Atlantic on our east and the Pacific on our west.

So far there is no indication that Vietnam and Southeast Asia have taught us a lesson. We are spending more than ever, going beyond what the Pentagon wants in some instances. Are we going to be taken for a ride, or are we going to face up to our responsibilities as Senators of the United States?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use.

Now, Mr. President, I think we all agree this is a highly important decision which is to be made. I have dealt with this issue for several years, as one Senator, and I did not readily agree at all to back this expansion. I did agree last year that we approve an amendment making this a special part of the bill so that the Senator from Montana or anyone else could bring it before the Senate at a special matter on the facts. We finally agreed to that in conference and provided that the President of the United States, Mr. Ford, who was then just very recently in office, would have to make a certification—let us get these facts now about where the authorization is, that he would have to make a certification—as President, as to the need for this facility, and then a resolution of disapproval would be in order, within a 60-day period, to be passed on by either the House or the Senate. If the resolution of disapproval passed then the appropriation would be killed, otherwise it would not be.

Let us remember the money has already been authorized, over half of it. It has been authorized this year for a second amount, the second installment, and this will be the last one except a minor one that I will mention.

Mr. President, may we have order—may we have quiet, I mean. There may be some who are looking for the facts.

We agreed in the committees, in the authorization language, that the second sum also would follow the disposition of this matter that is now before us.

So there is no complication about it except that this is an additional proceeding here that gives everyone a chance to be heard. I think this is a policy question. I just mention that I have helped to bring to a conclusion this situation in which we are passing on this matter today.

Now, Mr. President, let us be certain we get the facts on this matter. Talking about a third-ocean Navy with these huge sums of money, no one that I know of in a position of authority, who has dealt with this matter, has given any figures except the figures that are now before us, I mean, based on the realities. Here is a more recent affirmation of the Chief of Naval Operations, a man who, I think—and I am sure all of us think—is a man worthy of belief, Admiral Holloway. Last year I wrote him a letter referring to the sums of money authorized and I asked him whether or not there were any other plans or further expenses to be incurred.

In his response, dated November 26, 1974—that is about the time we had this

July 28, 1975

matter in conference—Admiral Hollo-way, as Chief of Naval Operations, said:

Other than the \$26.8 million from fiscal year 1975 and 1976 proposed for the fleet logistics support function, and so forth, the Navy has no plans for future military construction programs for Diego Garcia.

Now, on June 10, 1975, at a hearing, I referred to the above letter and asked Secretary of Defense Schlesinger—

What is the situation now, Mr. Secretary, as to any further plan for an expansion of this island into a more permanent base?

Secretary Schlesinger said:

The plans are unchanged, Mr. Chairman, the improvement cost and the requested cost amount to about \$37 million. We intend an austere support facility.

Now, that is the direct evidence upon this project. The cost and the plan.

Later, we have had this certification from the President of the United States in response to a law that Congress passed that he must make an evaluation. He must make an evaluation as the Chief of State, as the head of the administration, and we decide the matter finally after he has made his evaluation. He certified here in a solemn declaration that is before us. It is in the report, I am sure, and I do not have it right now where I can reach it.

That covers the point as to the cost, and that covers the point as to the need now.

Mr. President, right today, now, as I am told, we have talk about a third ocean navy. We now have a small task force over there in the Indian Ocean. We are already in there. We have no base; we are not planning a base. We are planning a supply depot, or a filling station, or storage area for fuel, for gasoline and oil. That is all, and we are already there.

Now, where is that? That is in the Indian Ocean.

I am told, Mr. President, that now, day or night, at any given time, of all the oil that is moving on the high seas in the world, at least half of it is right there in that area.

That means something. I am sure it means something to us. It means a lot to me as I, more or less, fumble along in the hearings on the appropriations requested for long-range research and development for new and additional sources of energy.

This is where our present supplies of oil are. They can be cut off. Maybe it does not make any difference, but I believe that it is highly important that we at least have a presence there that is capable of meeting a situation.

We pray to God that no such situation will arise, but if oil to the whole free world is on the move there and it is intercepted for very long, I think we would have to do something. Certainly if it is known that the source of fuel for our ships is 3,500 miles away—and those are the facts—then that makes trouble more likely.

As I say, we have a task force there now. I wish the Indian Ocean could be set up as an area of peace, along with others. They are not going to paint me into a corner as a warmonger during

this debate, either, because the record shows to the contrary.

But I say now, this is a point of preparedness for us, certainly, to this modest extent.

It is 3,500 miles from there to the Philippines, and that is where we have to go and come, back and forth, with these naval vessels that carry those oil supplies.

I brought the map along. I am not strong on having all these maps lined up there, but I thought this was one case where everyone would have a chance to see and understand.

Mr. President, may I wait until I can have the attention of the Senators?

I invite attention to that route now from the Philippines over to Diego Garcia, through a particular strait through which our vessels carry these supplies. This is not really good. It is what is known in naval terms as a torturous route. Whatever fuel we have, except for 60,000 gallons that I will refer to later, we are cut off from it, and there is that 3,500-mile journey from the Philippines.

I say it is just commonsense. We do not have to argue what the foreign policy is going to be in the Mideast, or who is in danger there, or how much Israel may be concerned, or Iran might be concerned, or Saudi Arabia. I mention now that they have not a chance in the world to cope with this problem. They are not going to have any third-ocean navy. They cannot have a one-ocean navy.

If we mean business now about protecting against what might be a danger for the free world nations, and I include ourselves as No. 1, we better at least go this far in preparing for the future.

I said I was slow to move with my actual support for this project. Well, I have no doubt about it now, especially in view of this oil situation.

I do not want to frighten anyone. I just say, look in depth at the facts. Look in depth at the facts as to where we would be, should steps become necessary. What about those we are supposed to be protecting, where would they be? Where would they be should this area there be imperiled?

I am the one that moved to table the amendment here for additional military aid to Israel, that is, when the military authorization bill was up.

I certainly was not running out on whatever promise or obligation we have to Israel or anyone else in that area. But it seemed to me that there was a lack of preparedness out on this highway, where all the oil in the world is moving, in motion every day and every night, and we would be failing to anticipate possibilities and take a reasonable, small step for preparedness.

What is this island? What is Diego Garcia? They are talking about building up a port for a third ocean navy. Diego Garcia is a small island, 1,000 miles away from any continent, an island that has approximately 10 square miles of land—10 square miles. That is a total of only 10 square miles, something like 65 hundred to 67 hundred acres. It is in a half new moon shape, and only

7 feet above the sea level—7 feet. How are you going to build a great port or a base there for the operation of a navy? Such things are just beyond possibility because of the physical limitations of this little dot on the sea.

Some of the things that are said about the possibility of this installation are imaginary.

I say again, Mr. President, there is no doubt about us having a legitimate interest. Beyond that, there is an absolute necessity, for the time being, for us to keep these channels open for control of two-thirds of the world's supply of oil. As I have already said, one-half of the world's oil in transit at any given time is in ships on the Indian Ocean. We will hear debate later from an eyewitness as to what the Soviets are doing over there in Somalia. I do not come here to try to frighten anyone. These are facts of life. I do not go out and try to frighten anyone, or talk about things as I wish they were, or as they ought to be. We have to deal with facts as they are.

I know just a little about the attitudes of those nations around there. They are not in a position to be asking us to come there. I think I am on safe ground in saying that virtually every one of them would be very glad for us to have a little more fuel. I have not heard of any official protest, and I cannot find any protest—official protest. Somebody might have made a speech over there or voted for a resolution, but I mean an official protest about our coming in there, except perhaps by one of these small nations.

I believe that, as a practical matter, it just does not work out or pan out that these other places do not want us to do anything about the situation.

I do not think there is any doubt of what is safer for Israel, also Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others.

I do not think we have heard or will hear any meaningful complaints to influence the President or this Government, those complaints coming from those nations.

I overlooked saying that this island of Diego Garcia is uninhabited. I thought they called them atolls. That is the Pacific term, I am told. But on the side of the world where Diego Garcia is, they call that an island.

I do not see any grounds either—and I would not now favor—building any huge fort there. Of course, for a naval base they cannot and will not do anything without the consent and money from the Congress. The President of the United States cannot do it and the Navy cannot do it. Only the Congress can supply those funds.

We have gone on now for at least 2 years arguing about this matter and the supporting facts have become stronger and stronger and stronger and stronger. We are going to hear from one of the most alert Members of this body as to what the real facts are there at Berbera. This is not what is claimed to be the facts or any self-serving declarations or something of that kind, but the facts as he found them there with his own eyes and

ears and the impressions of his mind, assisted in this problem by a very versatile group of outstanding ability, the men who went with him.

We have been standing by. What about our capabilities? We have not done a thing. Except for 60,000 gallons of fuel and we are still depending upon fuel 3,500 miles away. This proposal would provide for 700,000 barrels of fuel, approximately, and about half of it would be for planes from the carriers, and the other half would be fuel oil—fuel oil for naval vessels.

As I understand, this Navy task force in the Indian Ocean now is oil burning. They are not nuclear ships. That is my point.

As I recall, we have only one operational carrier which is a nuclear powered carrier. We are, and will be for a long time, a Navy that requires this liquid fuel.

I am not for any all nuclear Navy. We never did agree on anything like that in conference. It was the Senate conferees that held this thing down so that ships would not be nuclear wherever the President of the United States would certify that a nuclear type would not serve the interests of the Nation at that particular time and for that purpose.

I will not dwell on this much, but the Soviet Union has been steadily increasing its basic capabilities in this area while we have made no increase. They have started constructing new facilities at Berbera, Somalia, which will significantly increase their ability to operate.

I wish this had not been the case. I can long for agreements as strongly as anyone else. I wish this had not been the case. I wish that international agreements could be worked out to limit naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. But as long as we are showing this weakness by not getting this facility here for the fuel, I think we are just straying that much farther and farther from getting any agreement. Those are realities of the matter. Some individual over there in the Soviet Union may say something to the contrary. They have said those things to me, years ago. But often it does not pan out.

I think we have waited long enough. I think we ought to move forward on this supply question, anyway. I have no doubt, if the Members of this body get all the facts in this case, that the judgment of a sizable majority will say that we had better move, at least to this extent.

One word further about some kind of an agreement. Our committee expressed the hope that an evaluation would include a thorough exploration of the possibility of achieving, with the Soviet Union, mutual military restraints, without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of the Indian Ocean.

I think the United States has done well as a whole, in its negotiations with the Soviet Union in recent years, largely as a result of fine efforts on the part of not only Mr. Kissinger, but also valuable Members of this body and the House of Representatives. I am advised now that the State Department did explore the possibility of negotiating mutual re-

straints in the Indian Ocean, and that the President then elected not to approach the Soviet Union before the Diego Garcia issue was decided. It is bound to have been the President who decided that, because that is the course taken. His recommendation is here. We had written it out into the law that this thing could not move until he had made this review and had certified it to us.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will excuse me, I want to finish these points, and then I will yield to the Senator. I lean toward the idea of yielding, but I believe we are just cutting too much into whatever continuity of thought we have to offer; so, if the Senator from Iowa will excuse me, I will yield later. I think the he understands.

I can fully appreciate, Mr. President, the concern about this matter. I had some concern myself, I repeat for emphasis, when it started. There is nothing that I have ever followed any more thoroughly than I have tried to follow this issue here, this very question.

This resolution today resolves itself right down to the bare bones of supplying fuel—necessary fuel—within a reasonable time for any action that we might have to take. Do not say we will not have to take any. Who would ever have thought that our ship would be attacked over there on the other side of the world, in international waters, but near Cambodia and Thailand? This essential energy, upon which our economy is built and upon which, unfortunately, we are so dependent moves on the highways, the travel lanes, the ship lines of the world moving through this area day and night, and this will continue for years to come.

The idea of our holding back just with a hope or a wait-and-see attitude, holding back the building of a new supply source for this energy, is something I just cannot abide.

I am no pessimist. I hope. But I have seen during all these years that we have had the benefit of the Azores, the benefits that came to our Navy and Air Force, our power, and our strength; and I see that now, of course, in the utmost jeopardy. We can no longer depend on it, really.

In the Indian Ocean area, we have only a little naval facility which is totally inadequate or incapable of giving any large degree of support—Bahrein, I believe it is pronounced—just a little place with room for the berthing of one ship, and no large ship. And then in Spain—I remember I was in Spain when the original agreement was signed about the bases. I read yesterday about the tremendous development of the Spanish economy in those intervening years. But everyone knows that our renegotiation for U.S. bases there is underway, and is proceeding with difficulty.

I have referred to the Philippines several times. That is where we have some fuel supplies. But President Marcos has publicly stated that he intends to take over those U.S. bases within 3 years, and convert them to a joint operation.

I do not think that is a threat. It is the way he feels about it now. Anyway,

it means that we are not getting stronger there. There is something underneath that is uncertain. In Greece, we know the tremendous pressure there against the bases. In Turkey—where are we going from here?

One of the very best presentations I have ever heard on this floor was with reference to giving the President of the United States some continued leeway and negotiating room, some kind of a hand, with reference to the situation there in Turkey-Greece-Cyprus. And we have held up on that, I say respectfully, I think too much and too long.

Now, here is one place where we have a friendly free nation that has given us a lease over here in this vital area. Do not say that it is off over there where it does not matter. It does matter. These Arab diplomats who are interested in this. Their pictures are on the front page, not off on page 22. It is the very opposite of domination for us to be picking up the fuel capacity a little, and to be a little more alert and not so unfortunately unprepared, so far as time is concerned, in having to go 3,500 miles to get a simple little thing like fuel.

Mr. President, I yield briefly to the Senator from Iowa, if he wishes.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I will yield the floor, Mr. President, just as soon as the Senator from Iowa has had a chance to ask his question. I appreciate the fact that he has waited.

Mr. CULVER. I thank the distinguished chairman for his willingness to yield to me for the purpose of a question.

The question, Mr. President, is: Is the distinguished chairman supporting base expansion at Diego Garcia simply for the logistical fuel convenience that it provides?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is the primary reason. There are two different kinds of fuel, of course, as the Senator knows. There is oil for the ships and fuel for the jets, to power the aircraft.

Mr. CULVER. But the support of the distinguished chairman is for that purpose, and he does not envision a more elaborate utilization of that facility or further development of that facility. Is that correct?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. It is presented on those facts, and those are the facts. I know there is speculation to the contrary, and the facts may change. But that is my primary purpose now.

Mr. CULVER. Is the distinguished chairman willing to make the legislative history clear at this point that, if the proposed construction is allowed, it is not intended to approve either further base development in the Indian Ocean area or the costly construction of a new Indian Ocean fleet?

Mr. STENNIS. That is certainly not my purpose now, to try to lay the groundwork for the items that the Senator mentioned, but I have learned by experience that it is better to wait until the facts are in in future years before saying what we are going to do. It was sent up here,

as I understand it, for us to use judgment based on the facts.

Mr. CULVER. The reason for the question is, as the distinguished chairman I am certain appreciates, to try to ascertain his own personal perception of what steps we are taking now and the extent to which he is determined to see, as was described by Secretary Schlesinger, an austere facility here.

Mr. STENNIS. That is right.

Mr. CULVER. If that is the current intent of the Senator, should the legislative history on this occasion make that clear?

Mr. STENNIS. There is no doubt about it, I say to the Senator from Iowa. I have tried to state it, and that is my purpose. But I speak for myself and for the present facts only.

Mr. CULVER. The thing that, of course, concerns me, I say to the Senator from Mississippi, is that he mentioned and made reference to Admiral Holloway's statements and also to statements of Secretary Schlesinger concerning the present intention for that base facility and any subsequent use concerning the growth to a three-ocean navy. It is true that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified on June 10 before our committee that it was:

Not now our intention permanently to deploy ships into the Indian Ocean.

The operative words being "not now our intention to permanently deploy ships in the Indian Ocean."

Mr. President, however, in a March 1974 interview with Seapower magazine, the then Vice President of the United States, Mr. Ford, himself stated, and I quote:

Now, I think also that we've got to actively explore the desirability of having an Indian Ocean fleet.

Of course, the concern that some of us have already expressed is that such a fleet will mean a cost estimated at 5 to 8 billion additional dollars, and annual maintenance and operation costs of an estimated \$800 million for the three carriers, plus the additional planes and ships, and the support ships that would have to accompany such a development.

So these fears, I say to our distinguished chairman of the committee, with all due respect, I do not think can be cavalierly dismissed.

We have heard from military analysts from independent sources, such as the Brookings Institution, we have heard from other naval officers, on this point and we know that the Navy for many years has sought the opportunity to have a three-ocean naval presence and sought that base and other bases in the Indian Ocean area for that purpose.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, without being at fault, the Senator has gone far beyond the idea of asking questions. I yielded on my time only for a question with reasonable additions thereto.

Does the Senator want to use some of his own time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND and Mr. CULVER addressed the Chair.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield for a question only on my time but within limit on that, too, Mr. President.

Mr. CULVER. I think it is useful to have a colloquy on these matters.

Mr. STENNIS. I am merely referring to the time, I say to the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. CULVER. I just want to address a question to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. STENNIS. It will be on my time, if the Senator has just one question.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the chairman has made reference in his statement to the report language of the Committee on Armed Services of a year ago, where it was stated in the committee, the committee that the Senator so ably chairs—

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I hope the Senator will get on with his question. A complaint has been registered with me that I am yielding too much time.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, in view of the concern that repeatedly has been expressed by my distinguished chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time it takes for me to pose my question to him, to express it properly, be attributed to me, the Senator from Iowa. I do not want to encroach upon his valuable time. His side has only 2½ hours, and I can realize the anxiety with which he is watching the clock.

Mr. STENNIS. No.

Mr. CULVER. Just put that aside. We have quibbled back and forth on who has time and who is using time. Put it on my time. I ask unanimous consent for that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa has no time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield sufficient time for that purpose to the distinguished Senator from Iowa.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has the floor?

Mr. CULVER. Who has the time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I make this statement—

Mr. MANSFIELD. But the Senator yielded.

Mr. STENNIS. I understand that.

We all operate under the Senate rules, and other Senators have a right to time in these matters. I am willing to try to answer the questions of the Senator. I know the rules of the Senate. A Senator yields only for a question. If one goes over the line a little, that is all right.

So let me have the Senator's question, briefly put, please, and my answer will be brief. Then I want to yield the floor and let the debate proceed, under the rules of the Senate.

I yield to the Senator now, under those circumstances.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CULVER. Am I being recognized in my own right?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have not yielded the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa has no time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, yes; I yielded him such time as he may desire to pose his question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has as much time as he desires, yielded to him by the Senator from Montana. The Senator from Mississippi now has the floor and has yielded to the Senator from Iowa to pose a question.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate that ruling. I have not yielded the floor. I am trying to accommodate my friend.

Mr. MANSFIELD. This is not on my time, now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not on the time of the Senator from Montana. We are on the time of the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the fear in this situation is that we might have a debate. I hope the greatest deliberative body in the world could risk a momentary debate.

My question to the chairman is this: The Senator properly stated that the Committee on Armed Services express its "hope" that "such" an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of the Indian Ocean."

The wisdom of that request was based on the fact that the United States is proceeding forward here without having exercised any diplomatic option, without having initiated any conversation with the Soviet Union since 1971.

Despite the wise statements by our committee, under the able leadership of the Senator from Mississippi, the administration replies that they have consciously decided not even to attempt negotiations with the Soviet Union. They have arrogantly disregarded the expressed recognition and request of the distinguished chairman's own committee. Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey wrote me a letter in which he said:

It was decided not to approach the Soviets at the present time.

I respectfully ask the Senator from Mississippi, as the able and distinguished chairman of this committee, whether or not, in his judgment, that inadequate, inept, pathetic response from our U.S. Department of State constitutes an adequate exploration with the Soviet Union about the prospects and the possibilities of mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. STENNIS. I think some effort has been made. I have evidence to believe that some effort has been made in that field. It is not a one-way street. Other nations in that part of the world have to be consulted, and have been, to an extent.

The best I can say now is that, in spite of that effort, the conclusion was that it was better to go on with this modest improvement, as I have outlined.

I helped put this provision in the bill, that the President of the United States would have to certify what he thought. He has acted, and he has done the best he could. I think he had grounds for that act. I say to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. How much time did I consume? What time is charged to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 29 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Twenty-nine minutes out of how much?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Out of a total of 75 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thought we had 2½ hours apiece.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. However, this morning, the 2½ hours belonging to the Senator from Mississippi was divided between Senator STENNIS and Senator THURMOND.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all the time, under the usual rule, be accorded to the distinguished chairman of the committee, and he can work out something with the Senator from South Carolina.

I withdraw the request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when I am not in the Chamber, the time on this side be under the control of the distinguished assistant majority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Oklahoma asking for recognition?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. BARTLETT. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Oklahoma.

I ask unanimous consent that my legislative assistant, Sally Horn, have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of Senate Resolution 160.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, in connection with the dialog that took place between the distinguished chairman and the Senator from Iowa concerning whether or not the administration has been interested in evaluating the possibilities of mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, I should like to read a letter which I received from Robert J. McCloskey, Assistance Secretary for Congressional Relations of the Department of State, concerning this matter. It is dated July 17 of this year.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Washington, D.C., July 17, 1975.

HON. DEWEY F. BARTLETT,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR BARTLETT: With respect to the question of arms limitations in the Indian Ocean, which you and Under Secretary Sisco have been discussing telephonically, I hope the following information will be helpful to you.

Before certifying to Congress that the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia was essential to the national interest, the Administration re-evaluated the military and foreign policy implications of the Diego Garcia proposal, including the matter of arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union. On the basis of that review, it was decided not to approach the Soviets at the present time.

A significant factor in this decision was the evident lack of Soviet interest in such talks. As you know, in 1971 we responded officially and favorably to a Soviet suggestion that we explore the possibilities of arms limitations in the Indian Ocean area. We have heard nothing from them since that time, despite several public iterations of our willingness to consider constructive suggestions. Moreover, we need to resolve the issues relating to our proper role in the Indian Ocean. Debate on this began in early 1974, centered around our expansion plan for Diego Garcia. From extensive experience in negotiations on arms control, we believe the chances for any useful talks with the Soviets would be improved were the Diego Garcia matter resolved in such a way as to demonstrate that the U.S. is determined, and has the means, to protect its security interests in the Indian Ocean. As the Secretary has indicated, we would be prepared in these circumstances to explore the possible methods of limitations, which we have been studying within the Government, bearing in mind the need to guard against an imbalance in the area which would adversely affect our security interests.

Our periodic deployments to the Indian Ocean—and our proposed limited expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia to support them more efficiently and effectively—do not, we believe, fuel an arms race in the area. We remain interested in constructive proposals for limitations, but an adequate level of U.S. presence in that important area is essential.

I can assure you that we take seriously the concerns expressed by several Senators, and we have read with interest accounts of their recent discussions in the USSR. As you know, we are pursuing improved relations with the Soviet Union on a broad front. Arms limitations talks with the USSR are a part of that process and, in each case, specific negotiations have been undertaken when we thought mutual interests, timing, and circumstances were most propitious. Experience has shown that this approach is best calculated to produce a successful outcome.

If I can be of further assistance on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Iowa on his time.

Mr. CULVER. I appreciate the Senator's yielding.

Mr. President, the proposed base expansion on Diego Garcia is an issue on which honorable individuals can have a sincere difference of opinion.

This does not concern me.

What does concern me is that some good Americans who saw the mistake of our Government's policies in Vietnam so prophetically and who fought so courageously to change those policies now seem inclined to tolerate this Diego Garcia expansion as just another minor item in a \$100 billion defense budget.

I can well understand a strong pro or con position on this issue based on differing views as to the direction our foreign and defense policies should take in the years ahead.

What I cannot understand, in the light of our recent traumatic experience in Vietnam, is the failure to see the portent of this provocative step of military expansion in a vast area of the world which is comparatively stable and in which our interests are not significantly threatened.

It is true that the island of Diego Garcia is a flyspeck of coral atoll, five miles wide by 13 miles long, in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean, 1,000 miles southwest of India and about the same distance east of Africa. It is also true that most Americans do not know what Diego Garcia is or where it is or how it relates to such urgent, close-at-hand problems as unemployment and the rising cost of living.

But only a few years ago, the Tonkin Gulf was similarly unknown to most of us.

Now it is a household term identified with the fateful escalation of our military intervention in Southeast Asia.

The Tonkin Gulf incident, the Tonkin Gulf resolution and the Vietnam war are now history.

But we have an overriding responsibility to avoid making the same kind of mistake over again.

If we proceed with this expansion in the Indian Ocean at this time—without even trying the peaceful, less costly, no-risk alternatives—then we will indeed be simply replaying the first act of a scenario identical with that which took us into the quagmire of Vietnam.

We have time. We have alternatives. Let us at least try the less costly, peaceful options. If the options do not work, then we can proceed with the proposed base expansion. But, remembering Vietnam, let's take time to look before we leap.

We have, in effect, come to the first major test of our ability and determination to chart a new, more constructive direction in foreign and defense policy that does not rely exclusively on automatic military escalation and gunboat diplomacy.

In the post-Vietnam reassessment dialogue, one point that has been emphasized is the urgent need for closer integration of our foreign and defense policies. Our defense effort and our military spending should be geared to specifically identified foreign policy objectives. Too often, in the past, the Pentagon has gone out ahead, creating its own policies, leaving those responsible for our foreign policy to catch up. The proposed base expansion on Diego Garcia is a classic example of the Pentagon creating foreign policy.

The background of Diego Garcia is as follows:

For nearly 20 years, the Pentagon has pushed for a base expansion on this island which we have leased from the British.

Last year, the Senate turned down the appropriation for this project, specifying that the \$20 million authorized for the project was not to be spent until the President certified that the base was in the national interest. The President has gone through the formality of certifying

this, but no one has made a convincing case that this expansion is needed.

This year, the Pentagon is featuring as the centerpiece for its selling of Diego Garcia to Congress the revelation that the Soviets have constructed some naval support facilities at Berbera in Somalia.

Obviously, we cannot regard any Soviet activity lightly. Recent eyewitness accounts by U.S. congressional delegations report the facilities include an airfield, petroleum storage tanks, barracks, a communications facility, and a building designed for storing and handling missiles.

The implication is that this Soviet activity ipso facto makes it necessary for us to counter with the expansion on Diego Garcia.

The Berbera matter has been spectacularly publicized amid conjecture as to exactly what is there and how major a facility it is that the Russians are building.

Lost in the superficial dramatics are the basic points that are really vital to the decision on Diego Garcia:

One, that the Soviet activity, even if the most exaggerated accounts of its extent are accepted, does not pose sufficient threat to our national interest to warrant the risk of opening up the superpower arms race in a vast new area of the world.

We must remember that the major new Soviet activities at Berbera came after the Pentagon proposal to go ahead with Diego Garcia expansion, and that Secretary Schlesinger has testified that we would want that base even if the Russians shut down their activities at Berbera. In the absence of negotiations and mutual limitations, the Soviets can be expected to increase their naval presence in the Indian Ocean, according to CIA predictions.

Two, that the Diego Garcia move might actually weaken, rather than strengthen our security position in the area by disturbing our present good relations with the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean, who, if they perceive us to be precipitating an arms race in the region, may deny us the access we now have to their ports and facilities.

Three, that there are feasibly, less provocative alternative actions that we can take to counter the Soviet activity and to preserve the strategic balance.

Finally, contrary to the impression many people are getting from this controversy, the present U.S. military position in the Indian Ocean is one of solid strength, not weakness, as compared to that of the Soviet Union, so haste for the go-ahead of the expansion on Diego Garcia is not in any sense imperative.

This means that we have time to consider and try out the no-risk options available to us as alternatives to military escalation.

Mr. President, I am not talking about permanently foreclosing the proposed base expansion. I am asking for time to try less costly, less dangerous initiatives that we have not given a chance, as yet. Admittedly, we have no way of knowing what the U.S.S.R.'s eventual plans are in Berbera, how important their fa-

cility may become and how it will be used. Given that uncertainty, we need to proceed with care and restraint aiming at the protection of our long-range interests and friendly relations with the other nations of the area. The conditioned reflex reversion to military build-up does not always generate strength in the long run.

I want no part of any move that will weaken the strategic position of the United States. I believe the peaceful moves I am proposing for the Indian Ocean will strengthen our overall security position, not weaken it, in the long range. In the short range, exercising these options simply does not risk that much.

Specifically, I have proposed these initiatives:

First, that the expansion of the Diego Garcia base be postponed until next year so that the alternatives can be explored.

Second, that the United States initiate negotiations at once with the Soviet Union for mutual arms restraint in this region.

Third, that the present restrictions on economic and technical aid to Somalia, restrictions imposed in 1971 because ships from other nations bearing the Somali "flag of convenience" were transporting cargoes to Cuba and North Vietnam, should be lifted. If the administration does not see fit to take this action, as it is in its power to do, Congress should proceed with appropriate legislation.

Fourth, that a policy be inaugurated of U.S. ship visits to Somalia leading toward generally improved political relationships. It is my hope, too, that agreement will be reached in the near future for U.S. naval vessels to visit Somali ports. President Siad of Somalia offered to permit this, at the time he visited President Ford, last November.

Fifth, that basic economic aid and technical assistance programs be developed to further a new era of peaceful relations with Somalia.

Mr. President, Barry M. Blechman, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, summarizes in an article recently published in the Washington Post, the overriding reason against proceeding with the Diego Garcia expansion at this time.

"A U.S. base at Diego Garcia," he writes, "would constitute another step toward increased competition with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, a region relatively remote from both superpowers. The fact that the U.S.S.R. already has taken a comparable step does not compel us to follow suit."

Mr. Blechman goes on to point out that increased United States-Soviet rivalry in the Indian Ocean would divert limited U.S. military resources from more pressing needs, such as the Mediterranean, would increase the risk of our getting involved in some future conflict in the region, and would impair relations with friendly nations in the area.

He writes:

And finally, it means another step toward the establishment of a requirement in U.S.

military planning for the maintenance of a permanent U.S. fleet in the region; a move that, in the absence of cuts in U.S. naval deployments elsewhere, could imply incremental defense expenditures on the order of \$5 to \$8 billion for ship and aircraft procurement and \$800 million per year in operating costs.

In this reference, it is interesting to note that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified before the Armed Services Committee that—

It is not now our intention permanently to deploy ships in the Indian Ocean.

However, in a March 1974 interview, Mr. Ford himself stated:

Now I think also that we've got to actively explore the desirability of having an Indian Ocean fleet.

By contrast, Mr. Blechman concluded his article with this statement:

The obvious, if remote, solution to the incipient superpower competition in the Indian Ocean is a formal treaty in which both the United States and the Soviet Union agree to limit their naval deployments there.

Mr. President, I think the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) has put his finger on the single most crucial issue in this entire debate this afternoon. That, simply stated, is why, oh why, is the U.S. Government afraid to initiate diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union toward seeking mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean?

I was interested in the letter that the Senator received from Mr. McCLOSKEY. He may also be interested in the origin of that letter. That letter was eventually written because the Senator from Iowa wrote to our Department of State on June 12. I wrote them, one, to accept the Somalian invitation to have our Ambassador go visit that Port of Berbera. I also wrote them and inquired why the U.S. Department of State has failed, since 1971, even seriously to raise the question of diplomatic negotiations toward achieving some sort of mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

Since 1971, we have had what some people call détente. It may or may not be what a lot of people hope and pray it may be, but the fact of the matter is the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has, in a very significant way, been altered since 1971.

We have been in SALT talks with the Soviet Union, affecting the most sensitive and strategic survival questions in our mutual relationship. We have had every other conceivable initiative across the whole range of our relationships—economic, political, social, and, this week, shaking hands in outer space.

The question is why, in view of that backdrop, has our Department of State refused to negotiate or even offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, particularly when we have all these scares about missile crises, about the Russians are coming, about all these other concerns?

I wrote them and I asked them a question. Does Senator BARTLETT know this? They never even responded to that part

July 28, 1975

of my letter. They answered the first part. They did not even answer that part about negotiations until several weeks later.

The fact of the matter is, the U.S. Government is not interested in negotiations on the Indian Ocean. The fact of the matter is that the Pentagon, once again, is the driving force in American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam period.

I was interested in hearing all this talk today about this being only a tiny atoll; it is 5 miles wide, 10 miles long; it is a rock. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services said it is not even inhabited by anybody.

Let me tell you something, Mr. President: the Gulf of Tonkin did not have a lot of bodies floating in it. Nobody on this floor had heard about the Gulf of Tonkin before that war started, and nobody had heard about places like Khe Sanh, either, and I lost my best friend there. We are at the crossroads.

Have we learned the lessons of Vietnam? We are going to find out in a very significant way this afternoon. We came off the back of Vietnam. People wrung their hands and said, oh, America is going to hunker up in the hole, America is going to retreat to Fortress America, it is going to be a period of neoisolationism. Well, if the alternative to interventionism and acting as global policeman is neoisolationism, then I reject that alternative. There is a middle ground and today, we are going to find out.

Mr. President, the State Department finally answered my letter said that they thought about negotiations with the Soviet Union, but they decided that, because there was a lack of interest, they were not even going to initiate an inquiry. And do you know why? Because the Department of Defense was leaning on them so hard.

We should give that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger double pay, because he is doing two men's jobs. He is Secretary of Defense and of State.

I came to the U.S. Congress 11 years ago, served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for 10, under the naive assumption that the foreign policy of America was set by civilians, by Presidents, by the Department of State, and by the appropriate committees of Congress in the area of foreign affairs and foreign relations. One does not have to be around here long to know how fundamentally false that assumption is.

We have not even talked to the Russians about this question since 1971. All I say to this body is why? What are we afraid of? We are not weak in the Indian Ocean; we are powerful. Any time we dispatch an American carrier task force over to the Indian Ocean, it is like putting a 400-pound man in a washtub; there is not any water left. The fact of the matter is that the French fleet alone—the French fleet alone—equals the Soviet fleet today in the Indian Ocean. Four to 6 out of every 12 months since 1973, we have put American carrier task forces over there.

We put the U.S.S. *Enterprise* in there—with 36 attack airplanes carrying 7.5 tons of ammo under their wings, and 24 F-14

fighters. Do we have to fear interdiction of oil lines? Rubbish.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Navy has one diesel sub over there, one diesel sub in their fleet, and it is only equal to the French fleet. And the British have their own significant capability.

The Director of the CIA, Mr. Colby, has testified that interdiction of oil supplies is not going to come from Soviet subs. It is going to come at the well-head—embargoes. That is where it is going to come from.

We have 29 countries in the littoral area states, 29 friendly nations in large part because right now, we can go into 36 ports in 18 countries for refueling over there. We refueled over there all during the 1973 oil embargo. But not one of those countries favors our expanding in Diego Garcia.

The Australian Prime Minister was here last January, and he said, "Do not go in there." But we are going arrogantly to disregard all the heartfelt opinion of mankind in that area and, in classic, cold war fashion, America is going to stick its big nose under the tent of an arms race.

We are on the slippery slope of military escalation. We are at the crossroads. It is a rock today, but it is going to be a benchmark tomorrow. Mark my words.

Why not look before we leap? If there is one lesson out of Vietnam—I am on my time, Mr. President. If there is one lesson out of Vietnam—

Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senator yield for a second?

The only thing I want to straighten out, without interrupting his remarks, is to make sure this is on his time. I am not sure he has time.

Mr. CULVER. That is right; it is on my time, and I am assured I have ample time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has been given time by the distinguished majority leader. He is now on that time.

Mr. CULVER. We are at the crossroads. When people say, have we learned the lesson of Vietnam, we are going to find out today. They say, "What is that little tiny place? What is it called?" You are going to find out tomorrow.

The chairman talks about just a modest expansion. Well, we have independent military analysts who tell us that it is going to mean a three-ocean Navy, \$5 to \$8 billion, three carriers, all the support ships and airplanes that can go on them.

All I say, Mr. President, is that there is no Senator who will tolerate for one moment America being in an inferior status in a military position of vulnerability in the Indian Ocean or anywhere else.

The hard fact of the matter is that America is not weak today; it is strong. The only people talking about how weak America is are the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States, and I am sick and tired of that poor-mouthing.

We are bristling with power. When you put the U.S.S. *Enterprise* into the Indian Ocean, with all the accompanying slips afloat, and you put the A-6's, A-7's, and the F-14's on these decks, who

cares if they have got all their Styx missiles out there.

Do you know why they have so many in Berbera? The Soviet missiles are so lousy in large part that their navy cannot have the operational sophistication and reliance that our fleet possesses. They are 20-nautical mile range, late 1950 vintage. To hear the Pentagon and hear some of the Members in the Chamber talk you would think they were intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads poised and aimed on Honolulu. Hogwash. Hogwash.

Let us talk facts. All I am saying is this: yes, it is a modest request now. But I am saying before we make this modest request, before we approve it, let us insist in this age of detente, if detente means anything, that we at least initiate a serious overture to the Soviet Union to negotiate. Negotiate what? Mutual naval arms limitations agreement in the Indian Ocean; for example, a limitation on ship-days on both sides. You can verify that. It is enforceable.

What are the advantages in doing that?

Well, the advantages are clearly, first and foremost, that we avoid this costly, dangerous arms race. The chairman talks about the danger of confrontation there with the Soviet Union over the oil lines. That is far more sensitive than the strategic arms limitation talks going on right now. If it is that serious we ought to talk.

Now, second, what else does it do? It achieves the advantage of not flying in the face of the considered opinion of every ally we have got in the area. It is stupid to go ahead and plunge into this when all the countries in the region, including Australia, say, "Do not do it."

It is stupid when we could get resupplied, refueled over there all during the embargo. How many of those countries, Mr. President, that now make available to us some 36 ports, are going to close them down? If we go ahead with this base expansion, arrogantly disregarding the opinion of those countries, how many are going to be inflamed with anti-American judgments? That is a great and burning issue. The Indian Ocean may not mean much to us; Diego Garcia may be a flyspeck, an atoll, somewhere but, my friends, there are some 29 countries which live along the Indian Ocean, and who are we in the post-Vietnam period to start at once again arrogantly to disregard their judgment, their judgment, their opinion, their sensitivities?

If the Soviet Union says, "Nyet, nyet, we do not want to talk," OK, OK, they do not want to talk. We will burn them up in the arms race. They cannot stay with us. They are not even with us today.

When we have to go ahead with Diego Garcia, Mr. President, we will be going forward, sir, with the burden the USSR. The onus, the blame, will be clear. It was America which made the good-faith effort; it was America which tried its best with diplomatic civility, enlightenment, compassion and concern to go forward to work out a rational relationship and understanding and resolution of the problems of the Indian Ocean.

Let the Soviets explain to world opin-

July 28, 1975

ion, Mr. President, why they are not willing to enter into this mutual and humanitarian approach and response.

Now, Mr. President, every year since 1971, every single year, the General Assembly of the United Nations has come forth with a statement called the "zone of peace," begging the superpowers of the world who heretofore had remained out of the Indian Ocean to stay out. "Leave us alone. We do not want to be caught up in these big power politics. We do not want to be put in a situation where we are being muscled under through gunboat diplomacy. Respect our sovereignty. Respect our integrity. Play in your own sandboxes."

Always, they will concede, we have to have rights of navigation, freedom of the seas. That is what the law of the seas is all about, and we should insist to the end on that right.

But, Mr. President, every year since 1971 the General Assembly has said, "Keep the superpowers out." All the littoral area states have said, "Please stay out," including Australia. And yet we go forward and we go in.

Mr. President, it is said there are a few of these countries that will privately say that they want us to come in, they want Diego Garcia. Well, Mr. President, that has an awfully painful familiar ring to me, too. I remember as a new boy in the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1965 going to Vietnam. I remember leaving Vietnam and going to Thailand, and I remember talking to officials in various parts of Southeast Asia, and they said, "You know, we are all for you but we cannot say a word about it publicly."

Let me just tell you something, Mr. President, the day you get politicians saying privately they are all for you and publicly going out into the town square and whipping them up against America so they can get elected, you are on pretty shaky ground. If there is one lesson of Vietnam, that clearly ought to be it.

Mr. President, we are right back into the bargaining chip game. That is what Secretary Kissinger is saying to us, I want it for a bargaining chip.

Why invest hundreds of millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money, money from Dubuque, Iowa, into a theory when we can determine the genuine intentions of the Soviet Union in a matter of minutes?

One of the last big bargaining chips is that white elephant called an ABM that my people are still paying for.

No, Mr. President, if there ever was a time to negotiate, the time is now. I believe that we should talk before we build. I believe that we should build before we fight and, I believe, Mr. President, that we should fight to the death before we surrender. But you have got to get your orders straight. You have got to get it in the regular order, Mr. President, regular order. Talk before we build, build before we fight, and fight before we surrender. We have got the cart before the horse again. We have got the State Department running around with its tail between its legs try-

ing to catch up with foreign policy as it is set by the Defense Department. That is what is happening.

Now, finally, Mr. President, let us make that serious effort. Some of us were in the Soviet Union—one of the co-chairmen was the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY)—and we explored in formal sessions with the Soviets the extent of their willingness seriously to discuss the question of mutual naval arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

As we reported to our Secretary of State immediately upon our return—the following day—and as we worked closely with our own State Department escort officers on the trip, and as we reported in subsequent correspondence to the Secretary of State, we said that although the initial response of the Soviet Union was general and vague, we had subsequent reason to believe that the Soviet Union would respond positively to the initiation of a formal request to enter into negotiations and discussions over the question of mutual naval arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

That is all we said. We gave them chapter and verse on what exact and specific evidence we had to substantiate that hope.

That was just a hope. It may be wrong. It does not take long to find out if it is wrong, or not, but we feel that the signal we had should not be disregarded; it should be explored.

What is lost in that no risk policy? No risk.

We can find out whether they want to be responsible and act in good faith, constructive and substantial. We can find out in a matter of a few months, and what is lost, Mr. President, to delay long enough to find out? Nothing is lost, I submit, and there is everything to gain—the prospects of the outside hope, remote though it may be, that we will not have to go to a three-ocean Navy; \$5 to \$8 billion more money to the taxpayers of America at a time this country is going bankrupt.

We are not going bankrupt as a result of ADC, we are going bankrupt because of this insane arms race and overkill.

We talk about national security interests, as the able Senator from Missouri so frequently has had the opportunity and the good sense to remind us, but we do not listen. When we talk about national security interests, we talk about a three-legged stool: Guns and tanks, arms which we have got so much of that they get in the way; and we talk about the strength and fundamental and basic health of an economy which is the engine and heartbeat of the whole effort; and we talk about the morale and the welfare of the people, their confidence in the political institutions and the intelligence of decision makers to allocate priorities in a compassionate humane, logical and rational way.

Mr. President, I have mentioned the three-legged stool; today it has one good leg and two that are about ready to fall off, and the only good one is the guns and tank leg.

So we have nothing to lose by making

this serious approach to the Soviet Union. What do we have to gain? We might avoid an arms race. We may also salvage a few friends in that area in the critical continent of Africa and the subcontinent of India. We may also keep open some of those refueling opportunities that were open to us all during the 1973 embargo.

What we are talking about here on Diego Garcia—and we have already spent \$63 million for a communications center, is about \$37 million more to dredge the harbor, extend the runways, build some officer barracks, and so forth.

The Navy has wanted this thing since the late 1950's. They not only wanted Diego Garcia, but bases all over the Indian Ocean. The minute the British pulled out, they thought, hot dog, let us pick up those properties.

As the late Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell, once said, make it easy for the Navy to go places and do things, and they will go places and do things. I do not blame them. I do not blame them for wanting every toy in the store. I blame us for having the stupidity to give them that and more.

I do not blame them. That is their job. They are professional military people. I do not think they are acting irresponsibly when they want places for convenience, but it is we who are supposed to represent the larger national interest. It is we who are supposed to have the maturity to give consideration in the calculus of America's best interests, whether or not in fact that national security interest largely defined, is best served by this particularly narrow escalation of military power.

That is our job. That is not their job. Now, we talk here about this Indian Ocean.

Right now the French are here in Reunion Island. They are equal to the Soviet fleet.

We are talking about 30 days in gas and oil for aviation, planes, and to fuel ships.

In view of the fact that the Senator from Mississippi made this argument, I would just like to address it.

When we send a task force, carrier task force of the U.S. Navy, into the Indian Ocean—we have been doing it on a regular basis ever since 1973—it is out there for about 6 months of the year. One of the reasons our Navy costs so much is because they properly have a mission to handle global responsibilities, to get out to sea and stay at sea.

The Soviet Navy is not so designed or constructed; it does not have a mission of comparable magnitude.

When we go out, we can stay at sea 30 days. The American taxpayers pay a lot of money to permit them the capability.

No other country in the world even has such powerful aircraft carriers. We have got 13 right now. The Soviets have a few with helicopters on them. So what?

We sail out the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, a nuclear aircraft carrier. It has got so much stuff on it, so much firepower, it can hardly float. It can hardly float.

We talk about a Styx missile, 20-mile range. It is ludicrous. The Styx missile, late 1950 vintage, has been given to 13

different countries by the Soviet Union already. Egypt has got them. India has them. Everybody has got them.

The incredible irony to me is that we are in one room, all excited about that. We have seen a few crates. So what? The missiles are coming. OK.

They do not have the patrol boats yet. They have got to have a patrol boat to put the missile on to shoot it 20 miles at sea. Big deal.

They are going to Somalia. Our own DOD, our own intelligence, admits they are going to the Somalians. All right, good luck. I hope they can keep them in repair. So what? They are nonnuclear, they are not going anywhere. We have got the A-6 and A-7 flying off that aircraft carrier. We have cruisers, destroyers, we have oilers—oilers—keep that in mind—oilers.

They are out there 30 days without the need for anything. Except it really is a good thing those nations have sandy shores because when you put the U.S. Navy in that little bathtub, they wash people up on the beach.

If they do not know it, we will need some new admirals.

We are not lacking fire power. We are lacking will and intelligence.

Now, they are out 30 days. If they run out of fuel and want to stay on, stay 30 days, what kind of global contingency are we trying to deal with?

Do we face a serious interdiction? Do we mean we have a problem with Soviets coming up, wanting to risk world war III over stopping that oil?

What do we think the French will do then, or the British, what do we think we are going to do then?

I will say that we will be closer to world war III than with SALT talks. Why not have some talks if that is the risk? That is not even the risk.

The Soviet Navy now has one diesel submarine, one diesel submarine in the Indian Ocean. That is all they have got. Big deal. We have got nuclear Russian submarines off the coast of America. Why do we not close down and go pray? What difference does it make? One diesel sub. Is that what we are building this base in Diego Garcia for?

Let us give negotiations a try for a few months, put the ball in the Russians' court, put the burden on their back and say to the Soviet Union, "You talk peace all the time, you talk about détente all the time, put up or shut up."

Mr. President, it is disturbing that they are building at Berbera. It is rather primitive. The able and distinguished Senator from Oklahoma will give us a firsthand account. There has never been any doubt in terms of the character of those potential capabilities. We do know that the Somalian Government has extended naval visitation invitations formally to the U.S. Government. Let us take them up on it. Let that U.S. Navy fleet steam into Berbera. If we are talking about political perceptions of the littoral area States, let them take a look at the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, the nuclear carrier, and then compare any silly thing the Soviet fleet can finally float down there. Let them compare that, if we want to

show the flag, if we want to muscle up for the boys when we go into port.

We have plenty of opportunities to do that.

I think, Mr. President, we should not only exhaust our diplomatic initiatives; we should exhaust our economic initiatives. Here is Somalia, one of the seven poorest countries in the world, with \$70 per year per capita income. We cut them off from foreign aid. We cut them off in 1971. Do the Senators know why? Because those poor, pathetic people happened to have a permitted registry of foreign ships, under a contract negotiated with an earlier government, which made runs to Cuba and North Vietnam. We cut them off and let those people starve.

Somalia went to every country in the Western world. They went to America, to Great Britain, to Italy, and they said, "Give us some help." Nobody would help them. So they got a phone call one day and it was Mr. Khrushchev. He said, "Come to Moscow. We will help you." They have been providing economic and military assistance to them ever since.

But as Mr. BARTLETT can personally attest, they have 3 million people and one-half million of them are in danger of starving to death. They have 1 doctor for every 20,000 people. They want to have the American Navy come and visit; they want to make Berbera an international port. We are the ones who will force that nation into the Soviet bloc with our pigheadedness. We are the ones who will guarantee that. They are yearning for assistance from the West. They are yearning to get back in better shape with their Moslem brothers in the Middle East.

That is another point. We are pouring arms into Iran and Saudi Arabia to build up their own forces in the Persian Gulf. They are having a meeting, Mr. President, of the Persian Gulf States this fall. One of the matters at the top of the agenda is going to be a collective security agreement and a formal insistence that the superpowers get out of the Indian Ocean. We already know that. Yet we persist in the insane step of getting on this slippery slope just a little more.

Mr. President, all I am saying is just take 6 months off. Make a serious shot at negotiations. Say to the Soviets, "Put up or shut up. We are prepared to build this base." I will be the one leading the fight to get it built. I do not think we will need additional help, but I will be here leading the fight to get it built, if the Soviet Union is going to act irresponsibly, not respecting the mutual self-interest we share in having a naval arms limitation agreement for the Indian Ocean.

But, Mr. President, if we have learned anything out of Vietnam, I think it should be that we look before we leap, that we proceed with caution. We, as a matter of fact, have not even exercised the diplomatic option and we are called upon to respond in a cold war way which, Mr. President, in all respects I greatly fear will lead to the three-ocean Navy with all the additional cost of \$5 to \$8 billion on the hard-put American

taxpayer, with all the additional risk of confrontation on the high seas, and the prospects and probability that there will soon follow an escalation into a more serious and potentially disastrous consequence for all mankind.

Finally, Mr. President, if we proceed in arrogant disregard of the opinion of all the littoral states including some of our finest, greatest, and most historic supporters in the region, then, Mr. President, I am afraid the answer is we have not learned much, if anything at all, from Vietnam. We are responding to the tragic misadventure and trauma of Vietnam in a way which shows we did not learn anything but are only hellbent in our madness to reassert our machismo in a reckless fashion which will not serve the long-term interests of America's true national security or the prospects of world peace.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President. I would say that the distinguished Senator from Iowa that that was a lengthy question and it will take a little time to answer.

I would first like to say that the letter that I read, which stimulated the distinguished Senator from Iowa to expound at length on Diego Garcia and other matters, makes it very clear that the administration is interested and has been studying the matter of negotiations; that they are interested, certainly, and should be, in protecting the security interests of this Nation in the Indian Ocean and believe that that can best be done with a modest expansion of Diego Garcia.

The Secretary says:

... [W]e would be prepared in these circumstances to explore the possible methods of limitations, which we have been studying within the Government, bearing in mind the need to guard against the imbalance in the area which would adversely affect our security interests.

The distinguished Senator from Iowa mentioned that foreign policy is dictated by the military in this country. I would like to bring to his attention that there have been several efforts already, discussions, hearings, and debate on this floor on the authorization bill for Diego Garcia and on the bill to provide appropriations. Then there has been the certification process by the President with the debate pending today and the resolution by the distinguished majority leader. So I think we can see that the Congress is playing a very large role in formulating the policy that we will be following in the future in the Indian Ocean.

The distinguished Senator mentioned that the Soviets have one attack submarine, a diesel submarine. His intelligence must be different from mine because the intelligence available to the committee points out that in addition to 1 attack submarine there are 4 major surface combatants, 2 amphibious ships, 2 mine sweepers, 6 logistics ships, and one intelligence collector, for a total of 16 currently dispatched in the Indian Ocean.

The distinguished Senator mentioned on several occasions the three-ocean navy. I think this figure of speech is a matter of semantics to some extent. I

July 28, 1975

think what he is really talking about is numbers of ships. It could very well be that the future requirements that this Nation envisions for its best interests in the Indian Ocean would require additional ships.

Certainly, all indications today are that Soviets are continuing to increase their number in this vital area of the world.

The distinguished Senator knows, and the majority leader who also mentioned this point knows, that expanding Diego Garcia does not, in itself, increase the number of ships that will be deployed on a deployment basis or permanently in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Iowa made a very impassioned plea that we permit just 6 months, just another extension of delay, in order to give us the opportunity for arms reduction negotiations with the Soviets.

I am very surprised that he makes this point so strongly, because delay in itself would force the United States to negotiate from weakness rather than from a position of parity or near parity. This delay that the Senator is recommending could possibly be looked upon by the little nations of the Indian Ocean as a sign of weakness, or even of lack of interest on the part of this country. That would certainly encourage the little nations to tie their stars to the Soviets rather than to the Western nations, and I think that this could be the reason that those countries are unwilling to speak out in public as they do in private to express just how they do feel about the presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean with an expansion of Diego Garcia.

What the Senator is suggesting is adding to the already 1 year of delay of the modest expansion of Diego Garcia, while the Soviets continue to expand their facilities, as they have in the past.

Such a delay is to the advantage of the Russians and to the disadvantage of this country. This delay would require the United States to unilaterally refrain from increasing its narrow capability in the Indian Ocean, the Senator says, for 6 months. He does not know how long the negotiations would take. It obviously would be much longer than that, but he wants us to refrain from increasing the military capability of this country in the Indian Ocean while the Soviets continue to expand their facilities for several years, at least.

I point out to the Senator that this would be another victory for the Soviets, along with the Greece-Turkey controversy, which certainly has had some impetus from the Congress, and which of course is weakening the eastern end of NATO, like the opening of the Suez Canal, the expulsion of U.S. forces from Turkey, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. Though balanced force limitation would increase stability in the region and reduce the danger of conflict, arms control in itself is not useful for security unless the capabilities of all parties are correspondingly diminished.

I would like to point out that agreement with the Soviets on mutual arms

restraint would be a very lengthy process, and would require a lot of time. It would be a mistake to undertake an initiative with the Soviets while the Diego Garcia matter is still pending congressional approval. It could possibly leave the mistaken impression that we would be willing to sacrifice Diego Garcia in the event of an arms limitation agreement.

Any arms control agreement will require land-based aircraft for verification. Diego Garcia has already been invaluable for surveillance of Soviet activities.

Only after Diego Garcia construction is under way should we consider any arms control negotiations with the Soviets in the Indian Ocean area—at least this is my opinion—and only after we have developed a technically feasible arms control approach.

The United States cannot be placed in a position where dilatory Soviet negotiating procedures could deprive us of badly needed facilities on Diego Garcia, at a time when our vital and legitimate interests could soon be jeopardized, and I think this is what the Senator from Iowa is advocating.

Even if we were to assume the Soviets would act in good faith, the very difficult and technical negotiations would likely be protracted.

The President cannot accept any negotiation requiring either a link between Diego Garcia and arms control or a requirement that we proceed to talk to the Soviet Union on this question.

We are, of course, carefully studying the possibilities for arms control measures in the Indian Ocean, and will consider a Soviet approach on its merits should they approach us. There are many special difficulties in developing workable arms control measures for the Indian Ocean, and the United States is actively working to see if solutions can be found.

Multiple asymmetries between the naval needs and structures of the United States and the U.S.S.R. create very serious negotiation difficulties. The fact is that the United States and its Western European allies have an especially vital interest in assuring that sea lanes of communication to the Persian Gulf oil supply are kept open. The Soviets do not have an equal problem of communication, of keeping open sea lanes of communication, for their oil supplies.

Any agreement limiting United States and Soviet deployment must also take into account the large and growing military forces of a number of littoral states. Unconstrained, these forces might become a major source of instability in a generally unstable region.

When considering "nuclear free zones, zones of peace, and mutual withdrawal of naval forces" proposals, it is apparent that the Soviets do not have a realistic quid pro quo to offer. In any agreement which merely limits the forces deployed to a particular region, as Indian Ocean limitations would do, rather than the total inventories of both sides, as SALT does, for example, we must pay particular attention to the relative capabilities of each side to bring in forces from outside the region in the event the agreement breaks down. Soviet geographical advan-

tages result from proximity of land-based aircraft and Black Sea naval forces—with the June-5 reopening of the Suez.

There are many technical difficulties such as measurement difficulties—ship days versus ships versus tonnage; questions about what kinds of forces are included; for example, submarines, minesweepers, auxiliaries, trawlers; questions about the role of land-based airpower in the naval balance; problems about treating forces outside the region versus forces in the Indian Ocean itself; problems arising from the existence of other forces in the region belonging to littoral states as well as other outside powers.

So I think the distinguished Senator from Iowa should know that what he is suggesting is a very complicated series of negotiations that would take many years to culminate, and without any assurances of success.

Mr. President, I would like to comment at this point on the trip that we took to Somalia, Berbera, and Mogadiscio. This was authorized by the Committee on Appropriations and also the Armed Services Committee. There was a group of experts, so that the conclusions that I have reached in the recent report that was released last week are my own, but based on the expertise of many others and the observations of the entire team which spent 6 hours in Berbera.

First, the obvious conclusion to us, as we saw the situation at Berbera, was that the facilities have significant military potential, and second, that the Soviets control or at least have access to all facilities at Berbera.

The facilities at Berbera are still undergoing expansion, and the total scope of the effort planned cannot be accurately determined. However, I shall outline the capabilities of the observed and analyzed facilities.

I would comment on the statements made by the distinguished Senator from Iowa, as well as the distinguished majority leader, because in both instances they downgraded, in comparison, the facilities at Berbera which the Soviets control and have access to, compared to the planned modest expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia.

At the present time, the harbor at Berbera has depths of 50 to 60 feet, whereas at Diego Garcia, inside the atoll, it would be necessary to dredge in order to create a good harbor area for a task force of six ships.

Berbera at the present time has ample depth and ample space for a large task force, much larger than that contemplated at Diego Garcia. There is also adequate berthing space, material handling of equipment, storage space, and access roads to enable the port facility to serve a naval task force which it does do.

The communications facility is a long-range, high-powered facility capable of very long transmissions and receptions completely under the control of the Soviets.

Incidentally, just to show the interest of the Soviets in those transmission facilities, when we approached the gate

from some 100 feet away the Somalian guards drew their rifles on us in the lead car and then later on one particular individual who walked up to the gate to see if he could gain entry.

The same thing happened at the other facility, the receiver facility.

As to the missile handling and storage facility, the Senator from Iowa said that this is just a Styx missile facility. There have been Styx missile crates seen there, and there were some small dollies also seen which would be for handling missiles, probably bigger than the Styx. But there is a great capability there with a 25-ton crane and a capability to handle any of the missiles that the Soviet Navy would be using in surface to surface or any air to surface missiles that would be used by the Air Force. It is capable, according to the experts, of handling any missiles that the Soviet Union has for its Navy.

It is also apparent that the Somalians have no use for this facility. They do not now have even the ships to fire the Styx missile, although they say that they will have them soon. Their officers had no knowledge of and could not respond to routine questions, that were asked of them about the facility.

The airport facility, of course, is under construction at Berbera but will be in the neighborhood of 13,000 to 14,000 feet long. The planned airport at Diego Garcia is for 12,000 feet. Certainly they would be comparable when completed. However, the length of the one at Berbera, is under construction, whereas, the one at Diego Garcia is only planned as an extension of the current 8,000-foot runway.

A number of outbuildings are under construction, and it is impossible to tell just how they would be used, but there were other prefabricated structural members in a storage area that also were designated for additional buildings at the airport facility. There is much construction going on, including housing, a new water supply, and other buildings that they identified as a hospital, which obviously was not a hospital because of its very strong and unique construction.

So the Soviets are there in large numbers, estimated at 1,500, compared to an estimated 600 that would be at Diego Garcia if this expansion is approved.

The fuel storage facility at Berbera is being expanded from 40,000 to 170,000 barrels. I know that the distinguished majority leader was advised by his staff member that there are no bunkering facilities available at the present time at Berbera. We were advised of this by the Somalians. But it does not make any sense to accept this fact as the facts in the case and as the gospel truth because they also said that the expansion of the bunkering facilities is for the purpose of enabling the Berbera port facility to engage in trade and business with the opening of the Suez Canal with the commercial fleets. So if this is the case, they certainly are willing to use the bunkering facilities.

Also, the Soviet Navy does make a great use of oilers in bunkering their ships and have, on many occasions, had the oilers tied up in the harbor filling their ships

as well as filling the storage facilities. The storage facilities will also provide gasoline jet fuel for the airport. There is a pipeline under construction from the POL facility to the airport and also to the significant missile facility.

So I think that the distinguished Senator from Montana and the distinguished Senator from Iowa are being misled if they are of the opinion that this is not a significant naval facility and air facility that the Russians control and to which they have access. I am advised that as a naval facility it exceeds any other facility to which the Soviets have access, including Cuba, outside of the Soviet Union.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator a question?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I will be glad to yield on the Senator's time.

Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the Senator is in opposition to the resolution?

Mr. BARTLETT. Would the Senator like to obtain time from the distinguished majority leader?

Mr. PASTORE. About what?

Mr. BARTLETT. I just asked if the Senator would like to obtain time.

Mr. PASTORE. I may be on the Senator's side for all I know. From whom am I going to ask for time? I am asking a question. If it is a matter of time, I will just sit down.

Mr. STENNIS. No.

Mr. THURMOND. I will grant the distinguished Senator time.

Mr. PASTORE. Now everyone wants to grant me time.

The question I ask is this: My mind is open on this. I have not made up my mind, but a lot of questions have been raised by the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Iowa, my own colleague, and the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

Essentially, why do we have to be in the Indian Ocean? Will the Senator tell me the answer to that question? Why do we have to be there?

Mr. BARTLETT. I will be glad to.

Mr. STENNIS. I will answer.

Mr. PASTORE. I do not care who answers the question. I do not care. I want to make my mind up what the right thing is.

Mr. BARTLETT. I think the answer to that is a very long-winded answer.

Mr. PASTORE. Do not get winded or make it long.

Mr. BARTLETT. It requires an effort to evaluate the proper role of this Nation.

But certainly I think the area of the Indian Ocean is an unstable area and it butts right up to the Mideast. There is not only the oil supply routes that flow out of the Gulf of Suez and into the Indian Ocean, but also the production sites of oil in the Middle East.

Another reason for our interest is that the Navy by its very nature is a great ambassador for this country and has been on many occasions.

Mr. PASTORE. Is it to keep the sea lanes open?

Mr. BARTLETT. It is to keep the sea lanes open. It is a protective area. If the Senator would just let me, I will cover a few other points.

Mr. PASTORE. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. Certainly this facil-

ity is for contingency purposes. It is in support of our friends. We want to see the Indian Ocean remain a stable region and not dominated by one outside power.

I mention just a few things about the fact that naval power is ideal for balance. It is historically acceptable and tends to be flexible. It does not have the provocation of territorial military commitments. It is very valuable in times of disaster to our friends, and it provides local self-sufficiency in needs of defense. It is a visible sign of interest. It can deter harassment and blackmail. It can maintain existing rights and facilities that the United States has. It is a safe means of evacuating civilians, commands respect of our enemies, and so on.

Mr. PASTORE. May I interrupt the Senator for just a moment?

I am a member of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. Frankly, when the military came before our committee—and this is an old chestnut, this matter of Diego Garcia; this is not something that just came up last week—I was quite impressed when they made their presentation. But since then many questions have been asked, and many reasonable people are a little confused about this—why very reasonable people should be on one side and very reasonable people should be on the other side.

I was told that this was strictly a refueling depot, an oil refueling depot. Is that correct?

Mr. BARTLETT. This is a depot for bunkering naval ships for providing additional fuel for aircraft, for surveillance by aircraft. It also would have a dredged outer harbor area accommodating a six-ship task force, and it would have other facilities.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator said this is a sensitive part of the world, and indeed it is. I think many other places are, also. But why are all the countries in the perimeter surrounding the Indian Ocean against our presence there? Why is that so, if we are there to keep peace?

Mr. BARTLETT. I think that one very good reason is that they are afraid of the Soviet presence; they are afraid to express themselves as they really feel. They wonder whether or not our delays are a matter of indecision or lack of interest or whether we really are committed to a presence there.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARTLETT. Has the Senator finished?

I will yield to the Senator in a moment, but first I want to wind up my comments on Berbera.

The Berbera location is extremely valuable. As the Senator knows better than I, it is right on the trade routes going through the Suez and coming out of the Persian Gulf. It is also right across from Aden, where the Soviets have a very significant facility, with access to both naval and air facilities.

Another point I should like to make, which is an area that was mentioned by the Senator from Iowa, is that the Government of Somalia says that they would

July 28, 1975

like to improve relations with the United States. I believe that we very definitely should evaluate this; but as soon as we do—and I am sure we will—it is then going to be up to them to take some steps in the direction of friendly relations or parity relations with us, because they certainly have gone all out to permit the Soviets to have a very significant military facility or series of facilities in the Berbera area.

I recommend that we proceed with the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. I believe that this expansion is justified, notwithstanding the existence of a significant Soviet military capability at Berbera. The results of this trip greatly reinforce the arguments in favor of this proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. I think the President is correct in certifying that it serves a great need to the United States in its overall interests in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will defeat the Mansfield resolution, and we will show the people of this Nation that we do have a concern for the overall interests of the United States, wherever they exist.

I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question, a genuine question?

Mr. BARTLETT. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator went to Berbera. He viewed a missile installation there, as to the size and capability. Much has been said here about the Styx missile. With respect to the capacity and capability of the building that the Senator saw, for possible future use, was it large enough to take care of ship-to-ground missiles?

Mr. BARTLETT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is versed in this field to a considerable degree. Was that his impression, based on the information he received then?

Mr. BARTLETT. This was my impression. Perhaps even more important, our missile expert said that this facility had much greater capability than that required of the Styx missile. In fact, he said that the Styx missile can be disassembled without any elaborate equipment. But this facility does have a 25-ton hoist. It has a clear span of 30 feet. It is a significant facility, capable of handling any missile the Soviet Navy has.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the range of the Styx?

Mr. STENNIS. It is a short range, in the neighborhood of 25 miles.

Mr. BARTLETT. The missile storage and handling capability is far beyond the Styx missile.

Mr. STENNIS. Is it large enough, in the Senator's opinion, to be used for submarine-launched missiles? I mean, to handle those missiles and care for them, keep them in shape, for use by submarines.

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. It has the capability of handling submarine missiles.

Mr. STENNIS. Did the Senator raise that point there with his experts?

Mr. BARTLETT. I was given full as-

surance by our experts, on the trip and on return, that this facility has that capability.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. SYMINGTON. What is the definition of "expert"? Who were the people involved?

Mr. BARTLETT. This gentleman is an Air Force major who was provided to us.

And who has adequate background in the area. He was briefed particularly on this base from aerial photographs prior to our leaving.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARTLETT. I yield. On whose time? I think my time is up.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time does the Senator want?

Mr. CULVER. How much time might be available?

Mr. MANSFIELD. We have 76 minutes available, to be divided among 6 Senators.

I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. CULVER. I thank the distinguished majority leader.

I ask the Senator from Oklahoma whether, in the entire course of the testimony on this issue or as a result of any of the briefings he has had, he has been advised that the present missile capability or potential capability of the facility at Berbera, even if expanded, would result in a Soviet-controlled capability that would affect the tactical or strategic balance of the Indian Ocean region, given the current disposition of forces. Has the Senator been told that by any source?

Mr. BARTLETT. No, I have not been told that. Let me say that that does not mean it is not correct.

Mr. CULVER. It is my understanding, from all the testimony we have had, that in no way has it been implied by the Department of Defense or any other witness that, even given the worst case scenario of Soviet capability in Berbera, in the use of this facility, it is going to have that kind of potential impact.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet ship-to-ship missiles do not exceed a 40- or 50-mile range, anyway, as the chairman mentioned. The Soviets do have some submarines that carry four antiship cruise missiles of 250- to 500-mile range. The hooker is that these missiles require a plane near the target for final guidance. In short, there is no real offensive power there.

The French Navy already has the Exocet missile, with a 20-nautical-mile range, and that is in the French fleet, which equals the Soviet presence now.

The Senator from Rhode Island is properly concerned about the adequacy of American strength in the region vis-a-vis this proposed threat. Take the U.S.S. *Enterprise* alone, which has been steaming around over there this year. As a matter of fact, I say to the Senator from Rhode Island, ever since 1973 we have

spent approximately 4 to 6 months a year over there with carrier task force groups. Take an American aircraft carrier, with all the firepower on it, and put it in, and as I mentioned earlier, it is like putting a 400-pound man in a washtub. There is no other power on Earth that can match our aircraft carriers. We have 13 of them.

What do we have on the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, for example? We talk about the Styx missile craze. That Styx missile has been given to 13 countries all over the globe. In one room in this place, we are talking about the fear of the Styx missile; we are holding hearings next door about the most sophisticated antimissile missile stuff going into the Middle East. By the droves, we are hawking that stuff.

Back to the U.S.S. *Enterprise*. The U.S.S. *Enterprise* alone carries 12 A-6 planes, each of which has a 750-mile radius and can deliver 7.5 tons of ordnance on each one of those planes off the *Enterprise* alone.

In addition, we have 24 A-7's on the *Enterprise*, with a 700-mile radius and a 7.5-ton capacity on each plane.

Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield? I have asked some very simple questions, if I could only get them answered in the RECORD. The trouble here is that the time is being devoured by those who are for it and those who are against it, people who have made up their minds. There are a lot of people in the Senate who have not made up their minds. We would like to have the answers to the questions. We do not get them.

The question I should like to have answered is this: Do we have to be in the Indian Ocean at all?

Mr. CULVER. I think we have to be in the Indian Ocean to the extent that we, in our national interest, have to maintain a global presence. I think it is consistent with the law of the seas, with the right of access to all the oceans. How we are in the Indian Ocean and what form and shape that presence takes is what the debate today is all about.

Mr. PASTORE. I understand. Before we get off on another tangent, my question is, if we have to be in the Indian Ocean, what is wrong with having a fuel depot for the escort ships that have to protect the *Enterprise*, which is nuclear? What is wrong with it?

Mr. CULVER. First of all, the thing I think is wrong with it is that Diego Garcia constitutes a permanent U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. It is a permanent base presence which, in my judgment, is clearly not necessary in terms of our security interests. It is a matter of intervention.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield another minute.

Mr. CULVER. It is not essential to U.S. national security interests.

If we go ahead with that base, we essentially have two concerns. One is that we are going ahead with that base in arrogant disregard of the expressed and formal considered judgment of every-one of the 29 littoral area states, including Australia.

Also, every year since 1971, the U.N. General Assembly has urged a zone of peace for the region.

Finally, we are going ahead without even attempting the most feeble efforts at negotiating with the Soviet Union, on a bilateral basis, for a mutually agreeable naval arms agreement in the region.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 1 additional minute. Then I shall have to parcel out the time to people who have been waiting.

Mr. PASTORE. It is not a matter of who has been waiting all day. The question is that the people who have been talking on the subject have made up their minds, one way or the other. There are a lot of people around here who have not made up their minds at all.

Mr. MANSFIELD. One minute to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. CULVER. I say to Senator PASTORE that one other problem with going forward, in the judgment of some of us, is the very real danger that at the present time, where we have 36 ports, according to DOD, where the United States can refuel already in the littoral region, and where, in part, we were allowed to refuel even during the 1973 oil embargo itself, when we beefed up our presence in the Indian Ocean, we run the risk of many of those ports being closed down to us if we go ahead against their opinion.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY).

Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, the proposed expansion of naval facilities on Diego Garcia not only signals a new escalation of the defense budget but carries with it in my estimation, far-reaching implications for our long-range foreign policy goals.

The \$108 million required for the completion of the facility is relatively small when compared with major weapons systems and the overall military budget. However, it could well be but the opening wedge for the eventual expenditure of billions of dollars.

The fact is that the expansion of the base on Diego Garcia cannot be justified unless the Navy plans to station a carrier task force full-time in the region. This would give the Navy, which is scheduled to reduce from 15 to 12 carriers, the perfect excuse to keep 15 carriers. According to a Brookings Institution report, the eventual deployment of an aircraft carrier task force in the Indian Ocean would cost between \$5 billion and \$8 billion in new ship construction. In addition, taxpayers would be saddled for years to come with an annual increase in Navy operating costs of \$800 million.

Therefore, I think that, from just a dollars-and-cents point of view, it is imperative that the expansion of these facilities be absolutely justified before we embark on such a course. No one doubts that the expansion will indeed add to the capability of the Navy to operate in the Indian Ocean.

But far too little consideration has been given to its impact on our foreign

policy and to its tax implications. The tactical advantages of such a step cannot be considered in a void.

Do we really need this expanded base? Does the increased Soviet presence in the area require an immediate response of this magnitude? These questions cannot really be answered in the absence of any steps by our Government to avoid a naval arms race and a superpower confrontation in the Indian Ocean.

In its 1974 report on the military construction authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee deferred funds for Diego Garcia until the administration could make a "full reevaluation" of the matter, in the hope that this would include a "thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of the Indian Ocean."

The conference report at that time merely called upon the President to advise the Congress that he had evaluated all military and foreign policy implications of the expansion and to advise the Congress in writing that the project is in the national interest.

We asked the President to certify to Congress whether it is necessary, and the administration, in what I thought was a rather arrogant attitude, in curt, two-sentence communication, advised Congress on May 12, 1975, that, yes, it is necessary. Somehow, Congress, which is supposed to have oversight responsibility in this area, is expected to jump at those two sentences and go ahead. The President offered no analysis of his evaluation and offered no explanation of how the expanded base will enhance our defense posture or further our foreign policy goals. There was no attempt whatever to bring Congress into the decision-making process on this issue in any meaningful way. Once again, the Congress is being asked to rubber stamp an administration proposal which can eventually have tremendous effect on the budget and which can signify a major shift in our foreign policy.

Mr. President, the fact is that no meaningful efforts have been made by the administration to extend detente to the Indian Ocean. We have not raised the issue of arms restraint in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union since 1971. It is not a case where diplomacy has failed; it has not even been tried. The Congress and the American people have yet to learn what our foreign policy is that requires a costly military buildup in a relatively unmilitarized area of the world.

We know that each year since 1971 the United Nations General Assembly has urged that the Indian Ocean be made a "zone of peace." We know that none of the 29 nations bordering on the Indian Ocean has given public support for the expansion of our Diego Garcia base. Quite to the contrary, India, the nearest major power to the island, opposes our building the base; and our closest allies in the area, Australia and New Zealand, have publicly expressed their opposition.

Why, then, the haste to proceed with this expansion? Will our national secu-

rity be endangered if this matter is delayed a few months or a year until we have explored all diplomatic prospects?

Let us take a look at the map over there. It is the same kind of map that we have when the Pentagon comes before the Armed Services Committee and asks for anything new. If we look at that map and look at the red stars which indicate where the Soviets have military installations, it would appear that they totally surround the United States. The same maps give the appearance that the United States has extremely few bases. Mr. President, why not just give up? We have all those Soviet red stars around surrounding us, and a couple of little U.S. blue stars to indicate that the United States is somehow valiantly holding on.

Mr. President, it does not mention the fact that we now have over 3,000 military, naval, and air bases scattered throughout the world, and that does not include those in the United States. Of that number, 300 are classified as major installations. More than half a million American servicemen and servicewomen are stationed abroad including 60,000 afloat with our fleets in all the seas of the world. How much more do we need?

The maps certainly show a different picture than if the Pentagon provided maps showing where all our bases are and all our people are—land and air and sea—as compared to the Soviet Union. It would be an entirely different picture.

As the leader of the free world we have a responsibility to use our power to maintain peace and stability. But we do not have a mandate to act as the world's policeman with a military base on every block, so to speak.

No nation on the Indian Ocean littoral is threatened by aggression. For more than 30 years this area of the world has been relatively tranquil without benefit of huge superpower military bases. When Congress approved \$5.4 million in 1970 for an austere naval communications facility on Diego Garcia, it was with the clear understanding from the administration that there were no plans for a larger base.

Why, then, the rush to build a multi-purpose facility without a prior attempt to negotiate an arms free zone? Whose security is suddenly endangered? What changes have there been since 1971? Has the balance of power in the area changed to drastically as to warrant a headlong rush to commit billions of dollars without first pursuing all diplomatic routes available to us? Or did the administration purposely hold back its plans at the time of the initial expenditures.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has raised the specter of a new Soviet base at Berbera, Somalia, as a major reason for immediate action on our part in expanding the Diego Garcia base. While there is considerable evidence that the Soviets are building air and naval facilities at Berbera, there is no evidence to indicate that the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean is being upset by the present level of Soviet construction there. This construction will not make Berbera a major naval base.

July 28, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

From all reports, the facilities there are simply not extensive enough to permit the Soviet Navy to conduct major operations or maintain a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps a major base is planned. We do not know. But the present expansion at Berbera only marginally increases the capabilities of the Soviet Navy and is not indicative that a major base will be built.

The United States has, and will continue to have, the capability of deploying substantial naval forces in the Indian Ocean. We twice sent carrier task forces into the Indian Ocean in 1971, and have sent others on a regular basis since 1973. The administration has not presented any facts to Congress to indicate that the tactical naval balance or the overall strategic balance in the Indian Ocean which now favors the United States and our allies has been seriously affected by the Soviet construction at Berbera.

Mr. President, I grant that this construction signifies an increased Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean, and carries the disturbing possibility of future military expansion. However, I do not believe that this fact by itself is justification enough for our going forward at this time with military and naval expansion in the Indian Ocean.

Essentially, we have two options open to us. We can, as the administration and the Pentagon have requested, match the Russians ship for ship and base for base in another never-ending vicious cycle of escalation. Or, before taking that momentous step, we can seek negotiations with the Soviet Union on naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by trying to maintain the peaceful status of that area of the world. If the Vietnam debacle taught us anything, it taught us the need for caution and restraint before committing our power.

On our recent trip to the Soviet Union as part of the Senate delegation to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Conference, Senator CULVER, Senator GARY W. HART, and I discussed this situation with several Soviet officials. We received indications that their Government might be willing to negotiate a limitation of naval arms in the Indian Ocean. We relayed these impressions to the Secretary of State urging that he further explore the possibility of such negotiations.

To forgo diplomatic initiatives until after we are already on a path of costly competitive military escalation in the area might be to lose the opportunity which exists today for a real test of détente. In order to provide an opportunity for such negotiations, I strongly support the resolution of the distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, to postpone for this year further expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities.

Mr. President, no one denies that the United States has vital interests in the Indian Ocean. However, those interests can best be served by our making every effort to make the area a "zone of peace." Should the attempt to do so fail, we always have the option of proceeding with the expansion at Diego Garcia and with

whatever else might be necessary. But, it is not necessary at this time.

A lesser, but often repeated, rationale for this project is the argument that it is important to the United States and the industrialized free world to keep the sea lanes in the area open and unfettered and that, somehow, an expanded Diego Garcia base would enable us to do so.

The 7th Fleet was present in the Indian Ocean during the oil embargo in the fall of 1973, and failed to alter the course of events. As the proposed expansion on Diego Garcia would only increase the length of time the U.S. Navy could remain on station in the Indian Ocean, it is unclear to me how that expansion would give the Navy the ability to affect another Arab-initiated oil embargo, short of outright military action. I wonder, Mr. President, if that is what the administration is suggesting to us?

Unthinkable as that might be, it would be the height of naivete to think that such action could be limited to a minor conflict or even to the Indian Ocean, much less that Diego Garcia would play much of a role, if any, in its eventual outcome. However, if the administration feels that the expansion at Diego Garcia is necessary to increase our capability to fight a major war in the Indian Ocean, then the Congress should be told now that this is just the first step in what would have to be a long and costly road toward a creation of a three-ocean Navy. It should not be unreasonable to ask for honesty from the administration in discussion of its military policy.

Mr. President, to proceed at this time would run counter to our best national interests. It would be an admission to the world of the failure of our foreign policy to solve international problems without resort to flaunting our military might. It would trigger a serious escalation of the arms race. It would cost taxpayers billions of dollars and weaken our ability to deal with pressing domestic problems. It would show our complete disregard for the views of the nations in that area of the world.

In view of the risks and the potentially enormous costs, I strongly urge that the Diego Garcia expansion be delayed until the administration has shown a serious attempt to negotiate an arms limitation in the area. Let us show the world that with all our immense power we can act with caution and restraint. If such efforts are unsuccessful, and they may well be, then the responsibility for any subsequent events will rest squarely on the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I grow very, very concerned that we are falling into a situation where what Congress does might well be ignored. We might as well simply let the Pentagon decide each year what it wants. Perhaps we are at a point where instead of having a military budget or a military debate we should simply put into law that on July 1 of each year the Pentagon can take two tanks and several large trucks to the Treasury building and just load up with whatever it wants, because it does not seem to make such sense what we do. We are still going to be faced with these kinds of charts which, I think,

are terribly, terribly misleading and make no sense of what we are doing.

Mr. President, we are the leaders of the free world, and especially now, with the post-Vietnam era, this puts a far, far greater responsibility on us than we ever had. I do not think we are carrying out that responsibility by expanding militarily in the Indian Ocean without first trying to negotiate a peaceful zone in that huge area.

I thank the distinguished majority leader for yielding to me, and I yield back my time.

Mr. PELL address the Chair.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island and then, on his own time, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT).

Mr. PELL. I thank the majority leader.

Mr. President, it is difficult to add much that is new to the debate concerning Diego Garcia. For over a decade, the advocates of an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean have favored the development of this small coral island; for just as long, many Members of Congress and other individuals have joined in efforts to oppose this proposed expansion of American commitment abroad. Nevertheless, with this vote on Senator MANSFIELD's Senate Resolution 160, the debate has arrived at a crucial turning point, thus requiring my making some additional comments.

Supporters of the efforts to expand the U.S. naval facilities on Diego Garcia emphasize certain factors. They correctly point out that American dependence upon oil resources in the Middle East and Persian Gulf is growing, while the dependence of our allies in Western Europe and Japan on these supplies is already great. In addition, it has been shown that the Soviet Union, facilitated by the opening of the Suez Canal and new privileges in Somalia's port of Berbera, has steadily increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Asserting that an enlarged American naval presence is required to protect these vital economic interests and balance the Soviet naval activity, these individuals are advocating the expansion of naval facilities on Diego Garcia to improve the United States position in the area.

Where I find myself in disagreement with advocates of the Diego Garcia project is not so much with their observations as with their conclusions. While it is evident that the United States is and will be increasingly dependent upon imported sources of oil, it is not clear how an expanded naval presence in the Indian Ocean will serve to alleviate this problem.

Manipulation of oil supplies and prices has occurred at the wellhead by the local producers exercising their political and economic powers. The threat to the oil trade is not coming from the interdiction of tankers by the Soviet Union or anyone else; as a result, the solution to the oil problem lies not in the deployment of additional naval force, but rather in a sound program of domestic conservation coupled with the development of both

July 28, 1975

new sources of oil and alternative forms of energy.

Much space has been allotted by the media recently to the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and specifically to their status in the Somali port of Berbera. The logic often expressed in that since the Soviets now have a facility in the area the United States must have one as well. But this line of thinking is oversimplified and tends to distort the situation. Not only does the United States already enjoy the use of facilities at Bahrain, Subic Bay, Philippines, and elsewhere around the region, but it is often forgotten that Somalia has offered the United States facilities similar to those provided the Soviet Union at Berbera.

In addition, it is necessary to consider the geographical proximity of the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union. When one recalls the major importance of this ocean to the Soviet economy, a Soviet naval presence in the area—even one larger than the American presence—appears both understandable and justified. The Indian Ocean is to the Soviets what the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea are to the United States—the body of water through which ships move between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

There are other factors which also contribute to the conclusion that it is not in the national interest to go ahead with the Diego Garcia proposal. While the cost of this particular project remains relatively modest, the estimated cost of a major Indian Ocean naval presence is staggering. Diego Garcia is but the wedge of a commitment that will lead to an expansion of our Navy from its present 12-carrier format to a 15-carrier format. According to an estimate provided by the Brookings Institution, the price tag attached to making the United States a 3-ocean navy will entail acquisition costs of \$5 to \$8 billion, and annual operating costs of \$.8 billion.

In addition, possible costs go beyond the realm of economics, as it is all too likely that the Indian Ocean will become the scene of yet another destabilizing arms race between the two great powers. The avoidance of such a competition would not only save the United States considerable money, and perhaps prevent a needless confrontation with the Soviet Union, but would also be welcomed by the littoral states of the region who have been virtually unanimous in voicing opposition to the growing presence of outside parties.

In its vote today, the Senate is considering more than the immediate prospect of expanding the facility on the Island of Diego Garcia. Also being determined is the course of American foreign policy in a part of the world where the United States has traditionally maintained a low profile without having sacrificed any vital interests. Future decisions regarding the American presence in this area will inevitably be based upon the "commitment" established by going ahead with this proposal. Rather than approving Diego Garcia and initiating a new and potentially major commitment in the Indian Ocean at this time, the United States would do far better to postpone any such decision and instead

seek an agreement with the Soviet Union limiting the deployment of military force in the area while the opportunity still exists.

Today's vote bears added significance as well. Not only will the Senate's decision affect the future course of American foreign policy in the Indian Ocean, but it will provide a general indication of the future direction of American foreign policy after the experience in Indochina. For too long the United States has been indiscriminate in its commitments, while at the same time overemphasizing the military dimension of foreign policy. The United States cannot afford simply to react to alleged Soviet intentions, nor can it continue to base its foreign policy on the premise that expanded military commitment provides the best means of safeguarding national interests. By supporting the Mansfield amendment, and opposing the Diego Garcia expansion, the Senate will demonstrate that it has learned from past errors and is prepared to direct American foreign policy on a more sensible course in the future.

Mr. KENNEDY. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Robert Hunter be permitted the privilege of the floor during the present debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LARSEN). Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Kathryn Newman, a member of my staff, be granted the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. President, I have listened to the discussion between various members of the Armed Services Committee and the other Senators, and particularly, the report given by my friend and colleague from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) with regard to his trip to Somalia.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union is using, or intends to use, Somalia as a base of operations, and I know this area includes the path that will be taken by tankers which will be bringing oil from the Middle East to oil-consuming nations throughout the world. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee has said that 75 percent of Western Europe's oil requirements and 85 percent of Japan's requirements must be imported from the Middle East. Yet we have tentatively agreed to construct facilities on British Islands at our expense with joint decisions in case of any controversy regarding our use of the base. I also understand that France has territory within this area and a sizeable naval force which may even exceed the Russian presence. Mainland Australia and a number of Australian Islands are in the general area.

It seems odd to me that only a few weeks ago Britain announced that it planned to quit using the South African naval base at Simonstown, just 30 miles from Capetown. I am told this is the best equipped base between the Persian

Gulf and Norfolk, Va., in the United States. It also seems odd that we have not used this base since 1967. Yet, we plan to spend approximately \$38 million as the initial cost of the Diego Garcia base.

Experience teaches us, moreover, that once we start a project of this nature, there is a tendency to expand its usage, its capabilities, and its cost and, I continue to be concerned about the United States bearing a disproportionate share of the responsibilities and costs within the free world.

It is my understanding that we have docking privileges in the Persian Gulf at Bahrain and although it has limited facilities, a command flagship is homeported there, as well as destroyers at this base. More importantly, however, is that vessels going to and from Europe or the American continent would move around the Cape of Good Hope past the naval facility in South Africa. I know, Mr. President, that we do not approve of the racial policies of South Africa, and I have no brief at all for any apartheid program separating races within a given nation from one another, but we attempt to have détente or to carry on friendly relations with the Soviet Union, with Red China, with other nations within the free world. Now, the activities of the Soviet Union are the cause for consideration of the establishment of a base in the Indian Ocean. We do not approve of either the internal policies of the Soviet Union or its efforts at world domination. Therefore, it seems that for us to fail to use an available base at Simonstown is inconsistent with our efforts to establish the best possible relations with the Soviet Union, and other Communist nations, regardless of what they do.

It is interesting to note here that, according to the Library of Congress, the base at Simonstown is not segregated and discrimination would not be shown American naval personnel should they enter the base.

It is said that we plan on normalizing relations with Cuba, we have been reading about that in the last few days. Yet, an Associated Press story yesterday indicated Fidel Castro said that the Portuguese revolutionary movement can rely on the firmest support from Cuba; that they are brothers in the struggle against capitalism and fascism. We appear willing to seek normal relations with the Communist world regardless of its actions but seem unwilling to use existing facilities of a friendly nation because of its internal policies. This looks like cutting off our nose to spite our face, to me.

Mr. President, I regret having to take a position different from the administration, different from a majority of my colleagues, but believe that this Diego Garcia matter is another indication that the United States is going it alone in an area of apparent importance to Western Europe, Japan, Australia and other oil-consuming nations. We have a major naval base in the Philippines, use of a docking facility in the Persian Gulf, we have a friendly nation with a major base in South Africa, as well as a nuclear task force with ships that can operate up to 13 years without refueling now in use or

July 28, 1975

under construction. When other nations are more dependent on Middle East oil than we are, why should they not provide bases for use by the free world?

There has been much talk of the interdependence of the free world nations and the fact that the United States can no longer be the policeman of the entire world and, yet, once again we apparently are going it alone in this matter without the aid of other free world nations. The United Kingdom, Australia and France have islands in the Indian Ocean and presumably their oil lifelines along with those of other free world nations could be cut by Soviet naval action in the Indian Ocean. It might well be an act of war, but it could happen. If the Soviet naval threat in this area has increased as suggested, why is it that the United States alone must react to this threat? Are the European nations only willing to face a Communist threat in Europe while we face it anywhere it appears in the free world. Why is not Australia interested enough to provide any necessary base on one of its islands in the area?

We have an opportunity today to indicate to other nations that we will no longer be the solitary policeman for the free world. We have been at war or on the brink of war almost constantly for a generation. We have also thrown our economic resources around the world as if they were inexhaustible.

Sharing our resources with almost every other nation, even those well able to care for themselves, may have caused nations able to help themselves and others to assume that the United States would take care of their needs and may have discouraged those nations from assuming their reasonable share of responsibility. It could have the same affect on our military allies. In my opinion, we need to establish a new understanding, a new relationship, a relationship which says, "We will help, if you will do what you can. We will work with you but will not provide either military or economic assistance unless you are doing your best to help yourselves and cooperating with other nations of the free world." It is time to for us to think first about the welfare of our own country and then cooperate with others when it is in our national interest and they are willing to do their fair share to maintain peace and security within the family of nations.

Mr. President, these are some of the reasons why I intend to support the resolution of the distinguished majority leader. I know pressure has been put on all of us but I would hope that Senators will carefully consider this matter on a nonpartisan basis and vote in the best interests of the Nation.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Missouri, and then I would expect the other side to yield some of its time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. President.

Now that the Mansfield resolution, S. Res. 160, which would deny funds for the further expansion of the U.S. naval facility at Diego Garcia, is before the Senate for a final congressional determination of the issue, I would make the following brief observations.

May I say before doing so, this is where I came in on the ABM. We had the charts, we had the same people arguing for it, and we ended up by passing on a tie vote of 50 to 50 the amendment to cut it out. Since that time it has been scrapped, but not before it cost the American taxpayer over \$10 billion.

I commend the able Senator from Iowa for his presentation on this matter. As he talked I could remember the talks that were made on that particular subject which was so costly to all our taxpayers.

The premise of my position has to do with the importance, the equal importance, of a sound economy and a sound dollar as part of our national security.

By its own admission, Mr. President, the administration has made no serious effort to initiate discussions with the Soviet Union on the possibility of mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean.

Last year, the Committee on Armed Services noted that the serious defense and foreign policy questions related to the administration's request for expanding the facility at Diego Garcia required further consideration, and urged the administration to make "a thorough exploration of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean."

This year, at the Armed Services Committee hearing on Diego Garcia on June 10, the administration representative was asked whether any effort had been made to initiate with the Soviet Union a discourse on the possibility of mutual arms restraint. His answer was, "No."

Such lack of initiative would appear absolutely inexcusable. We can always build up militarily in the Indian Ocean, but the opportunity for negotiation, as we continue on the road downward from the standpoint of our monetary and fiscal problems, should not be bypassed.

The nations in the Indian Ocean region have repeatedly urged adoption of the concept that this ocean should be the one ocean that could be called a zone of peace, and several resolutions to that effect have been passed in the United Nations.

Yet the administration has opposed the establishment of such a peace zone in the Indian Ocean on grounds that it would restrict "freedom of the seas."

Mr. President, may we have order? I have listened to other Senators and I would ask that we have order when I am speaking.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT). The Senator is entitled to be heard. The Senators will please take their seats and cease conversation.

The Senator has asked for order. Let the Chair try to obtain it.

The Senator may proceed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Chair for his consideration.

Many of you no doubt heard the Prime Minister of Australia on Meet the Press, one of our most noted media programs, when he stated that not only did Australia oppose this development, but that there was not a single country on the Indian Ocean that supported it. I would have hoped that would have had some influence on the Armed Services Committee and its distinguished chairman, especially as they did nothing whatever to follow the advice that the Senate Armed Services Committee report recommended be done from the standpoint of negotiation a year ago.

President Ford himself stated in his letter to the Congress on May 23, 1975, justifying the Diego Garcia expansion, noted that the project:

Has been criticized by a number of regional states which favor the concept of a special legal regime limiting the presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The administration has opposed the establishment of such a peace zone in the Indian Ocean on grounds that it would restrict "freedom of the seas."

In the same letter, the President observed that U.S. policy has been to oppose such measures because they "would constitute an unacceptable departure from customary international law concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas."

Now, Mr. President, that really takes a lot of semantic interpretation to understand why. We have built submarines that are costing \$1,800,000 apiece, submarines that go 6,000 miles. We can have retrofitted Poseidon submarines that can also go 6,000 miles.

It is a growing mystery to me why we have to extend all of our resources all over the world and at the same time have these tremendous ranges for our other weapons.

This interpretation of American interest in freedom of the seas as precluding negotiations to achieve a "zone of peace," or arms restraint, in the Indian Ocean is difficult indeed to understand. It seems almost unconscionable that our Nation would pass up the opportunity to try to prevent further naval competition in a faraway ocean under this pretext.

It is true that the Soviet Union has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, but this presence is very limited and provides no real military threat of any kind whatever to the United States and allied forces in the area which, collectively, possess greater strength than the Soviets and have access to a larger number of ports.

When it first came up some 8 years ago, the discussion had to do with the importance of having this base in order to get our people out of Ethiopia, especially Eritrea.

Now, because of the development of the energy problem, the argument has

shifted to the importance of protecting oil in that part of the world.

Actually, in this connection, the French alone have more combatant ships permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean than either the Soviet Union or the United States. They also possess more port facilities.

And when the United States brings a carrier task force into the area, the scales of power in the Indian Ocean tip heavily in favor of the United States.

The administration has cited the development of a Soviet base at Berbera as a major reason for expanding our facility at Diego Garcia. But even with a new base at Berbera the Soviet position in the Indian Ocean is still modest; and in the absence of a significant new Soviet threat in this Ocean, it would be not only a waste of money, but also a possible provocation for the United States to expand its presence at Diego Garcia.

Mr. President, the longer I listen to some of these discussions going on, the more convinced I am that there are people who would not object to a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. May I say I hope, based on my limited experience—I have been bombed a good many times—that that never happens, because this time it would not mean the loss of a few blocks in a city, but could well mean the end of civilization as we know it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I ask for 4 more minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield the Senator 3 additional minutes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In this regard, consider CIA Director Colby's testimony in 1974 that:

Should the United States make a substantial increase in its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet buildup, faster and larger . . . would be likely.

It would appear that the prudent course for us to follow at this time, therefore, would be to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union and other powers involved in the Indian Ocean to prevent what could turn out to be a costly naval arms race.

Considering that the administration has thus far not taken this initiative, passage of the Mansfield resolution, S. 160, disapproving the Diego Garcia expansion, might well help achieve such negotiations and would certainly save the taxpayers of America billions of dollars in the long run at no expense to security.

In summary, Mr. President, to all Senators who desire to work for peace and a sound economy, I would respectfully urge them to vote for the Mansfield resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from Texas 5 minutes, if he is ready to speak.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, inherent in the arguments of those who support the Mansfield amendment is the suggestion that if we will simply negotiate from a position of weakness, we will be

more likely to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union on a standdown of our respective presence in the Indian Ocean.

I know of no time in history when we have been able to negotiate successfully with the great powers from a position of weakness.

It seems to also be the suggestion that the United States may be in the role of provocateur, that by being in the Indian Ocean, we will accelerate the state of Soviet preparedness and capability in that area. Again, there is nothing in history to suggest that this is a valid contention.

They also suggest that the French have a sizable naval force in the Indian Ocean. Well, the French are to be commended for recognizing that they have a selfish interest in that area. When have we known, in recent years, the French to do anything for purely altruistic reasons? They do so because of perceptions of their national interest there. Whether those perceptions are right or wrong—and we can criticize French perceptions in terms of their withdrawal from the NATO command structure—Mr. President, I do not think that we can rely on the French—and I mean this without disparagement to our good friends, our oldest allies, the French. I do not think we could rely on the French to look after the American national interests in that area.

For 188 years that area of the world was policed by the British. The British historically, in maintenance of the "egg-and-spoon" doctrine, in their efforts to control czarist Russia, did indeed act in effect as the world's policemen. They did so, not because of any visionary concept about some British moral obligation to the rest of the world, but because they followed the precept that trade follows the flag.

Mr. President, the British are withdrawing from that area of the world because they simply do not have the economic strength to maintain the kind of military establishment necessary to allow them to assume even a fraction of the scope of worldwide responsibility that they assumed so ably for so many years.

It is incumbent on us to recognize our national interest. Most of the oil that courses from the Persian Gulf area to the Western World comes down through the Indian Ocean, indeed, comes through the Mozambique Channel and around the cape. That is another thing that we had better be aware of: the fact that Mozambique, as it is freed by the Marxist regime in Portugal, will itself assume a Marxist configuration, and we can assume that American influence will be a nullity in that country and that Soviet influence will be dominant.

There are maps there. Senators can look at the Mozambique Channel and see that that is the vital passage through which 70 percent of the oil to come from the Persian Gulf area flows in its journey around the cape and thence to the west.

Mr. President, it is naive for us to assume that if we will just be good guys, the Soviets will reduce something. We are talking about the same Soviets that es-

tablished the Berlin blockade shortly after World War II; the same Soviets that, while we were demobilizing our Armed Forces, were remobilizing rehabilitating their own; the same Soviets that swallowed up Eastern Europe in contravention to solemn agreements and pledges of free elections. We are talking about the same Soviets that established the Berlin Wall. We are talking about a Soviet Union that maintains a first-strike capability. We are talking about a Soviet Union that maintains a clandestine infrastructure in practically every country in the world, in efforts to subvert those countries politically. We are talking about a Soviet Union—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield the Senator 5 more minutes.

Mr. TOWER. The fact of the matter is that while they maintain these infrastructures, we do not. We do not have aggressive designs on the rest of the world. We seek only to maintain a climate in this world in which people can aspire to self-determination and have some reasonable hope of realizing that aspiration. There has been no more aggressive and virulent imperialism in the history of the world than Soviet imperialism.

We are naive, if we think they are any more afraid of or concerned with a preemptive attack by the United States. My God. We could have fought a preemptive war against them when they established the Berlin blockade, in the first place, and wiped them off the face of the earth. Even later, during the period of the Korean war, when plainly they were supporting the aggressors, we could have fought a preemptive war and wiped them off the face of the earth. But we did not.

Do not tell me that they have some fear that the United States now, in a period when we are barely militarily in parity with them, is going to mount some major military offensive against them. They are no more concerned about that than they are concerned about the resurgence of German militarism or the resurgence of British colonialism. I am afraid détente has made us a little euphoric.

I support détente. I think that we should maintain a climate in which we can communicate with each other as rational people and try to identify common interests consistent with our respective national perceptions of such.

But we had better understand that, during the course of this period of détente, they continually improve upon their military capability and we carp and crab over the expenditure of money here in the Congress of the United States, about any expansion of our expenditure. We try to keep it at current levels. They keep going up, in terms of their percentage of their budget and their gross national product, and in terms of real ruble value, of what they spend their money for. They continue to improve their military capability.

What kind of fools are we? If we assume that, if we will just do nothing, perhaps they will negotiate with us and

July 28, 1975

S 13947

make the Indian Ocean a great neutral sea, a sea of peace.

We worry about the views of the littoral nations. Since when are the Soviets ever worried about the views of other countries? Since when have they been concerned about the image they project among other nations of the world?

There are those who think that, if we will simply unilaterally disarm the rest of the world, that will bring great moral pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to do the same. What dangerous baloney that is.

Since when have the Soviets ever responded to moral pressure?

The only thing that they understand is strength, and the only way we can negotiate with them is from a position of strength.

We intend to spend only a few million dollars to upgrade this facility that is already there. If it is such a provocation, then let us move everything we have in there out right now. It is there. We simply want to make it more useful.

The fact of the matter is there are going to be periodic American naval deployments into the Indian Ocean.

We are damn fools if we do not deploy in there periodically. From the economic standpoint alone, we would be pennywise and pound-foolish if we did not enhance that facility there which will make it less expensive and less risky to achieve American naval deployments in that area.

No one is going to look out after the vital interests of the United States and no one can be counted on to, except the United States.

With the British retreating steadily from what remains of their global responsibilities or their global presence, it becomes incumbent upon us to look to the protection of our own national interests in that area.

I think that what we propose to do here and what the administration proposes to do, which the Mansfield amendment will wipe out, is minimal. We can do no less.

Let us make no mistake. If we do less, we are ill-serving the national interest of the United States.

Oh, Congress has been so anxious over the past couple of years to assert itself in the field of foreign policy, a field that has traditionally been left to the executive branch, with the acquiescence, the advice, and consent of the Senate. Oh, it has delegated away all our power in the domestic field. We do not seem to be too anxious to retrieve that. We delegated all that away to massive bureaucracy.

I wish we would concentrate more on trying to retrieve lost legislative power in that area than the vital area of foreign policy, because the Senate cannot negotiate on a day-to-day basis, and the Senate cannot formulate and implement foreign policy in a fast-changing world on a flexible basis.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 3 minutes?

Mr. THURMOND. Three minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator from South Carolina yields 3 minutes.

Mr. TOWER. Therefore, Mr. President, I think it is incumbent upon us, particularly in the light of what has happened over the past few weeks, to do this minimal job of enhancing our capability in Diego Garcia.

Look what has happened to us. We have been thrown out of Southeast Asia. We have ourselves, in Congress, grasped to our breast the coordinate power to formulate and implement foreign policy with the executive branch, the responsibility for throwing Turkey out of NATO. Oh, that was really in the national interest. Oh, what a great moral thing we did.

What we did was to appease an ethnic movement in this country that did not even perceive the interests of Greece properly in this instance.

So we have denied ourselves a vital intelligence-gathering capability in Turkey, denied ourselves the capability of verifying Soviet strategic capability and intentions, mainly contrary to the national interests, in order to play up domestic political emotions.

That is the most shallow politics imagined.

We can see what is happening in the southern littoral of NATO.

If we fail here to enhance our capability in the Indian Ocean, we are serving notice on the world that the withdrawal of the United States will be progressive and that ultimately we will withdraw our defense perimeters to our own shores, and, Heaven help us, when we do that and ignore a concept established in the Elizabethian period that, when confronted by powerful adversaries or a potential adversary, it is incumbent on you to maintain your defense perimeter as far from your own shores as possible and as close to that potential possible adversary's shores.

Mr. President, it is vitally incumbent on the Senate to reject the Mansfield resolution.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senate Resolution 160 which would disapprove the expenditure of \$31.9 million proposed by the Department of Defense for construction of facilities at Diego Garcia. I contend this is only a modest and reasonable improvement to existing facilities which will allow our Navy to operate more efficiently in the Indian Ocean.

For several years now we have been observing the growth of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. When this process began nearly 8 years ago, with a small squadron of Soviet ships moving into the area, it was easy to minimize its importance. These ships spent most of their time at anchorages in international waters and were not very active except for occasional port visits. In the last few years, the level of Soviet activity has increased, and the construction of significant support facilities at the port of Berbera in Somalia has cast a new light on their intentions.

Mr. President, in 1972 and 1973, the

Soviet permanent naval presence in the northwest Indian Ocean averaged more than a dozen ships in the area on any given day. In 1974, following the Arab-Israel War, their permanent presence jumped to an average of more than 19 ships, including eight combatants such as missile-armed ships and submarines.

According to Mr. Colby, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who testified on this matter on July 11, 1974:

By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships, one gun-armed cruiser or missile equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a mine sweeper and an amphibious ship. There was also usually a diesel submarine and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker.

He further stated in his testimony that:

Today there are six surface combatants, one submarine, nine mine sweepers, and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in mine sweepers.

In addition, he said:

Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the Indian-Pakistan war, and is apparently monitoring developments in the Persian Gulf area.

That level is being maintained thus far this year.

The U.S. Navy has also increased its presence in this vital area where more than half the world's oil imports are in transit every day, but our permanent presence of two destroyers and a converted landing ship is much less than the permanent Soviet presence. It is necessary for this small permanent U.S. force to be reinforced with major naval units from time to time in order to demonstrate that the United States will not sit idly back while the balance of power shifts in the Soviet favor.

Mr. President, the most recent increases in the Soviet presence have occurred since they began using the facilities which they built for the Somali at Berbera. Over the past year, their development of these facilities has exceeded anything the Somali could use, judging from aerial photography presented at committee hearings on June 10 and judging from the report made by Senator BARTLETT after his visit to Somalia. This installation is beginning to emerge as a significant support facility for the Soviets. The Soviets have constructed barracks and imported a barracks ship which together could accommodate 1,500 personnel; they have expanded the fuel storage capacity; they have installed a high frequency communications station, which, by the way, Senator BARTLETT was not allowed to visit; they are constructing an airfield which will have the longest runway in the entire Indian Ocean area; and they have nearly completed a missile storage and handling facility which will give the U.S.S.R. the capability of storing and assembling missiles to arm their ships, submarines, and aircraft in the area. I might add this particular facility is far more than is required to handle the Styx missile.

These facilities are more extensive than anything we have seen in any of

the other nations which have relied on the Soviets for military support—including those nations which have repaid the Soviets by giving them access to support facilities. And the location of Berbera, dominating the entrance to the Red Sea and the only sea route to the Suez Canal, speaks for itself. Its location also provides easy access to the Arabian Sea, which is the crossroads of the tanker traffic from the Persian Gulf. Recently, during a worldwide naval demonstration by the Soviet Union, their Indian Ocean forces focused their exercise activity in this critical area of the northern Arabian Sea with missile ships and submarines.

Mr. President, I believe the United States must retain the capability to counterbalance this buildup of Soviet force. Only with that capability can we pursue the several reasonable and legitimate American policy objectives relating to the Indian Ocean:

First, to signal the Soviets of our intention to extend American power to the Indian Ocean, if necessary.

Second, to assure our friends of continued American support.

Third, to deter threats to shipping and assure a continued flow of oil to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

Fourth, to remain a stabilizing influence in the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral.

I would like to emphasize that more than a quarter of all U.S. oil imports originate in the Persian Gulf. Those energy supplies should not have to reach us courtesy of the Soviet Navy.

Many will insist that American objectives in the Indian Ocean can be achieved in other ways and that the expansion of Diego Garcia is but one step in a permanently increased military presence which could even end in involvement in distant hostilities. To those who feel this way I say the best assurance of peace is unmistakable readiness to protect it. But the argument deserves more specific examination.

There is, for instance, the so-called zone of peace proposal. This proposal, heard in the U.N. and elsewhere, would bar great power intrusion into the Indian Ocean. Not only is this proposal visionary, but it is contrary to the historic and important principle of freedom of the seas. American naval presence in the Indian Ocean is not, after all, to prepare for war. It is to emphasize our commitment to peaceful use of international waters by all nations. That is why we were satisfied to keep only a very small, token presence in the Indian Ocean until the Soviets began their naval expansion there. But for the already expanded Soviet naval presence and our rightful commitment to freedom of the seas, I would scarcely be advocating the improvement of Diego Garcia, except as a refueling situation.

Mr. President, another alternative which some have advanced is to seek agreement with the Soviet Union each to limit its permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Even if I believed the Soviets would observe an agreement, I point to the testimony of record that the

United States has already sought such an agreement, without success. It was the Soviets who, in 1971, failed to follow up on negotiations aimed at preventing an Indian Ocean arms race. The position of our Government has consistently been one of willingness to consider any constructive position or suggestion on this matter.

Mr. President, the first contact by the Soviet Union with the United States on Diego Garcia was in March 1971, when Ambassador Dobrynin suggested to Secretary Rogers the possibility of a joint declaration of mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean. What happened after that?

In July of 1971, Mr. Beam, our Ambassador at the time, advised Secretary Gromyko of our interest and asked for further clarification. No further clarification has been received. So agreement with the Soviets has also been proved to be a false option.

We are left then with the necessity to be prepared to protect our national interests with the U.S. Navy. It is certainly my expectation that a credible readiness to deploy in the Indian Ocean will be sufficient. If it is not, the Navy will be ready. In either case, we will be glad we have the support facility at Diego Garcia. Thus, we are advocating merely an expansion of Diego Garcia sufficient to support a modest deployment should that deployment become necessary. Diego Garcia will not be a combatant base as a result of this expansion, nor will our deployments in the Indian Ocean necessarily increase. Instead, our readiness and capabilities will be increased. That, in turn, enhances our credibility in that part of the world. It shows that we can act if we choose to act.

The expansion program which has been proposed includes lengthening of the runway, addition of fuel storage for ships and aircraft, construction of a pier, and development of the harbor and shore facilities to provide sufficient support for a normal carrier task group to operate for a month without having to rely on any nation in the area and without relying on a chain of tankers stretching as much as 4,000 miles or even more to the nearest U.S. base in the Philippines. We are talking about more than just tankers. We need an airfield where our planes can land and be serviced while keeping track of military activities in the region. This is particularly important at a time when our access to airbases in Thailand and elsewhere is increasingly in doubt.

With the Suez Canal open once again and the lines of communication for the Soviet Navy shortened by some 9,000 miles, and with U.S. national interests increasingly at stake, we cannot afford to base our own security on the dubious hope—and it is just a dubious hope—that if we just ignore the Soviets, they will go away or that someone else will make them go away. It is always more enlightening to watch what the Soviets do rather than listening to what they say, and their naval expansion in the Indian Ocean indicates that they intend a meaningful naval presence there.

Since I do not believe that we should count on Soviet good will in an area of great importance to our own economic survival, I strongly support the proposed expansion of the facilities at Diego Garcia. In my view, it represents an inexpensive insurance policy in support of our immediate and long-term interests. The only real alternative is wishful thinking, and that often turns out to be more expensive in the end.

Mr. President, the requested modest expansion of facilities is in our best interests and I, therefore, urge that Senate Resolution 160 be defeated.

Mr. President, I want to say that, after all, I do think we have to consider the position of the President of the United States, the Department of Defense, and others who are supposed to be better informed on this than anyone else. What is the position of President Ford on this matter?

In a letter written May 23, 1975, to the Senate by Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf, assistant to the President, Mr. Friedersdorf indicates, the President of the United States, Gerald Ford, supports the construction of U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia as being essential—he did not say desirable, he said it is essential—to the national interest of the United States. That is the position of the President of the United States.

Now, what does Dr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, who is charged with keeping this country prepared and keeping this country free, say? He says:

Our concern is first with the stability of the nations of that area. We would not want them to be overshadowed by the naval presence of the Soviet Union. Second, we are concerned with the very critical dependence of the entire industrialized world on the oil shipments coming out of the Persian Gulf—some 75 percent of Western Europe's requirements comes from the Middle East, and some 85 percent of Japan's requirements. A threat against the security of these lines of communication could be of catastrophic significance for the United States and its allies. That is our primary concern.

Mr. President, he goes on and tells the other advantages. I shall not take time right at this very moment to elaborate upon it. I want to say that I think we have to consider, too, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is their position on this matter? General Brown is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let us see what he says about it. He is the top military man of the United States. He says:

The first point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the Indian Ocean is obviously of tremendous strategic importance. Not only are the lines of communication across the sea that carry oil from the Persian Gulf, as the Secretary mentioned, both around Africa and through the Straits of Malacca to Japan important but also the minerals that move from the coast of Africa to the United States. Also to be remembered are the air routes that cross the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia would serve to help with those lines of communication in support of any air or sea movements that the United States might wish to make into the Indian Ocean.

So, Mr. President, he has brought out the point that we not only need it from

the standpoint of oil, but we need it from the standpoint of minerals.

The second point is that we have important interests in the area in addition to the materials that I mentioned. First, we have friends in the area who look to us for some support, principally Iran and Pakistan with whom we participate in the CENTO organization.

And the third point, in summary, is we seek to demonstrate our interest in the area and our concern that it not be dominated by any single outside power.

After all, the Soviets are an outside power, too.

Diego Garcia will be a modest facility, far less in extent than the Secretary has indicated the Soviets have developed and are developing at Berbera.

It was not intended that we would have any military forces deployed or stationed at Diego Garcia. It is intended only that the support facility be manned by those personnel needed to operate the support activity, communications, servicing of aircraft and ships; in total, about 600 personnel.

Mr. President, that is the statement of General Brown, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, our Committee on Armed Services considered this matter carefully. By a big majority, we have recommended that we go forward with this program. The committee's position on this matter is given in the report on page 13. I shall not take time to go over that, but I ask unanimous consent that that be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the position was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMITTEE POSITION

The Committee agreed that the United States should have the capability to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and that construction of facilities at Diego Garcia would most appropriately provide such a capability. Thus the Committee felt that construction of facilities at Diego Garcia was in the U.S. national interest and should begin immediately.

In reaching this conclusion, the Committee emphasized that the United States has vital national interests in the Indian Ocean and must be prepared to counter the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Construction of the proposed facilities in the Indian Ocean would contribute to both the protection of U.S. interests and the maintenance of stability.

1. The U.S. has vital interests in the Indian Ocean area.

The United States and the other industrialized nations of the world depend heavily on the Indian Ocean sea lanes that lead from the vast natural resources of Africa, India and the Middle East. This reliance can be most readily illustrated by a few facts concerning oil. More than two-thirds of the known reserves of crude oil in the world are found in the Middle East and Africa. Today approximately twenty percent of the crude oil that the United States imports comes from the Middle East; Europe is seventy-five percent dependent on Middle East oil and Japan eighty-five percent dependent. The oil embargo in the Fall of 1973 provided a warning of the consequences that would result from a loss of imported crude oil. At any time, fifty percent of the sea borne oil is in transit on the Indian Ocean sea lanes. The United States and the remainder of the industrialized free world cannot afford to let any nation restrict those Indian Ocean sea lanes.

2. Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has steadily grown.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has gradually increased by one or two ships per year in the past few years. They now maintain a force of 15-20 ships of which half can be classified as combatants. The United States maintains a small task-force on station in the Indian Ocean about one-third of the year and in addition has three ships stationed permanently at Bahrain.

Very recently the Soviet Union has greatly increased its capability to operate in the Indian Ocean. First, the Suez Canal has been reopened, and second, the Soviet Union is nearing the completion of a naval support facility at Berbera, Somalia, that includes a major runway, housing for 1,500 personnel and a missile storage and repair facility. The expansion at Diego Garcia would provide the United States a comparable capability to sustain naval operations in the Indian Ocean area, and the Committee is convinced that it is necessary to counter the increased Soviet capability and to maintain the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

3. The construction of modest logistical facilities at Diego Garcia is a prudent action.

The U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia are strictly support in nature. The Navy has indicated that no further construction of facilities at Diego Garcia beyond those presently requested will be necessary.

The expanded fuel storage requested for Diego Garcia will increase U.S. operating flexibility in the Indian Ocean by providing contingency support for U.S. naval force operating in the area. In the absence of Diego Garcia the nearest independent U.S. fuel supply is now 4,000 miles away at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The relatively limited expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia will be very low political and military profile by virtue of Diego Garcia's location, lack of indigenous population, and its British sovereignty. At the same time it will strengthen our signal to the rest of the world that we do have vested interests in the area of the Indian Ocean and are prepared to protect those interests.

It has been argued that the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia will lead to an arms race in the Indian Ocean; the Committee does not agree. The proposed logistical facilities at Diego Garcia provide merely an improved capability for U.S. deployments in the Indian Ocean. The deployments themselves will depend on developments in the area, particularly the level of Soviet naval activity. Moreover, past experience indicated that Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean will proceed regardless of U.S. restraint. During the last year when the United States suspended all construction of facilities at Diego Garcia, the Soviet Union substantially expanded their "presence" at Berbera.

The Committee is sympathetic to the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. However, the Committee does not believe that a zone of peace can be achieved through unilateral U.S. restraint.

Mr. THURMOND. I shall just mention the three main points that the committee brought out. First, that the United States has vital interests in the Indian Ocean area.

Second, the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has steadily grown.

Third, the construction of modest logistical facilities at Diego Garcia is a prudent action.

That is the position of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which went into this question in great detail. I have quoted to the Senators, too, the opinion of Mr. Colby of the CIA. So, Mr. President, we have the top people in the executive branch of the Government, the

President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, all of whom feel that it is in the best interests of the United States that we go forward with this.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I shall not yield at this time. When I have finished, I shall yield to the distinguished Senator from Iowa on his time if he wishes me to.

Mr. President, in addition to that, there is some question here as to whether or not Somalia is building these facilities over there or the Soviets were building facilities in Somalia, in Berbera. Every Senator here who wanted to go had an opportunity to go over there. The Senate Committee on Armed Services sent the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) there. I am not going to take time to go into all of his conclusions, but here are a few of the points he brought out: No. 1, the Soviets control—listen to this—the Soviets control Somalia, or at least have access to all facilities at Berbera.

Another point: the facilities at Berbera are still undergoing expansion and the total scope of the effort planned cannot be accurately determined.

Then he goes into detail and tells about the port facility, the communications facility, the missile handling and storage facility, the airport facility, the fuel storage facility, and other facilities that are being built there by the Soviets.

Here is a man who sits right in the Senate who went over there and saw this with his own eyes, after Somalia had denied there was any such thing there, after the Soviets have denied it. He went there and he saw these facilities.

Furthermore, Mr. BARTLETT said, "The Soviets are currently in Berbera in substantial numbers." Not only the facility being built, but the Soviets themselves are there, he says, in substantial numbers.

It is impossible to make an accurate estimate, but a range of 500 to 1,500 represents a consensus of team opinion based on observations and the capability of the available housing.

That is the statement of Senator BARTLETT, who went there.

Another point:

The Berbera location is very advantageous from a strategic point of view. The Berbera facilities, combined with the Aden facilities, could control the confluence of the sea lanes from the Suez Canal and the Red Sea into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Then, Mr. President, Senator BARTLETT ends up with this position:

The position of the Department of Defense with regard to the significance of Berbera is valid. The team's conclusions do support the Berbera argument which favors the expansion planned for Diego Garcia. In order for the United States—

There has been talk here about negotiating. The distinguished Senator from Iowa and some others, maybe, said, why not negotiate first? Listen to what Senator BARTLETT says:

In order for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of relative parity regarding mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean, the Diego Garcia expansion is essential and should be approved—

July 28, 1975

S 13950

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

When? Afterwards? No. Now, he says—
should be approved prior to initiating any negotiations.

In other words, if we go forward with Diego Garcia, then we have something to offer the Soviets. Now we have nothing to offer. We are not going to get a mutual agreement unless we have something we can trade with the Soviets.

Then when they trade with you they generally do not keep their agreements. But they certainly are not even going to offer to trade unless you have got something to trade. Senator BARTLETT has brought this out in very fine style.

Then Senator BARTLETT made this statement:

This trip greatly reinforces the arguments in favor of the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia.

Mr. President, I brought out here that the executive branch, the military, the CIA, the Senate Armed Services Committee all favor this construction.

There has been something said here that I want to answer about the great military disparagement and how wrong we are in what we are spending, and all of that. I just want to say that the big spending about which there has been a lot said here today, that we are going to bust this Government with big spending, I agree with that. But who is doing the big spending? It is not the Defense Department. It is the domestic programs rather than defense.

I want to give some figures right here to go in the RECORD on that point. Defense spending is rising less, much less, than other spending.

Let us consider the figures. Total Federal spending is estimated at \$360 billion for fiscal year 1976 under the budget resolution. That is an increase of \$53 billion from fiscal year 1975.

Let us consider where that increase is. Defense spending rises by \$5 billion or 6 percent. Nondefense spending rises by \$48 billion or 21 percent. Now, during this next year, where is the big spending? Is it in defense or is it in nondefense? I say it is nondefense. It is absolutely false when people say that it is the Defense Department that is causing this big spending.

I want to say, Mr. President, that non-defense spending is rising nine times as much, \$48 billion versus \$5 billion, as defense spending and three times as fast, 21 percent versus 6 percent.

The simple facts leave no room for the allegation that defense spending is rising while the other spending is being cut back.

Now, Mr. President, that is 1 year. I want to take the last 20 years. Some people say,

Well, previous years caused this.

Previous years spending by the Defense Department did not cause it. For the past 20 years, 1956 to 1976, defense spending is up \$51 billion or 128 percent. Everything is up, of course, due to inflation.

What did nondefense do? Nondefense spending is up \$246 billion or 800 percent. I want those figures to be known. Defense spending is up \$51 billion com-

pared with \$246 billion or 128 percent for defense and 800 for nondefense.

Mr. President, I will not take more time at the present. I just wanted to bring out those figures to show that people who are making statements here to try to prejudice the public against the Defense Department are not only inaccurate in what they are saying but they are doing a great injustice to this country. If it were not for the Defense Department, the man in uniform, we would have no way to protect ourselves. I applaud the man in uniform. I am proud of him. He fights to defend us. He brought us our freedom and he maintains our freedom.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am happy to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the issue before the Senate is whether the United States ought to proceed with plans to develop a naval base and support facility on the coral atoll of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The issue is not, nor, in my judgment, has it ever been whether such action on our part would result in a contest between ourselves and the Soviets for naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The increasing importance of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area must be clear to everyone who has learned the lesson of the 1973 oil embargo: For the foreseeable future it is vital to our national interests and security that we be in a position to assure a continuing flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This in turn requires that communications by sea must be secure, both for ourselves and our allies. And there can be no such security for the United States without the ability to project our naval forces into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean should it become necessary to protect vital shipping lanes and to assist our friends and allies. Apart from oil, it is important to our foreign policy that the United States should be in a position to provide timely assistance to our friends in the area in the event that their security and our interests are threatened.

It seems to me far too narrow to conceive of our strategic position in the Indian Ocean area solely in terms of what the Soviet Union chooses to do there—although we should be concerned at the Soviet buildup and it would be wise to take step to counter it. Apart from the question of Soviet naval facilities in such places as Somalia—facilities that have turned out on inspection to be as they were described by the Secretary of Defense—there is the overriding geographical fact: The Soviets are able to operate from land and sea in the Indian Ocean area in a way that we, 5,000 miles away, are not. Thus the actual current extent of Soviet Indian Ocean deployments, disturbing as it is, is only one factor in a complex geopolitical situation.

It is a situation in which we are at an inherent disadvantage with respect to the Soviets; and it is a situation marked by the sort of instability that cries out for every effort to keep all of our options open. We face in the Indian Ocean a set of problems that

would continue to exist even if the Soviet Union were not able to bring its influence to bear in such places as the Persian Gulf and the littoral states. In this sense an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union respecting naval deployments in the Indian Ocean would not obviate our naval interests there.

Clearly, however, an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit naval deployments in the Indian Ocean would be of value to both countries and perhaps to the cause of world peace. For this reason an effort should have been made to raise this issue with the Soviets. I am sorry to say that the administration failed to make such an effort, and it did so despite a clear congressional requirement that it do so. The administration's indifference to the sentiments of the Congress on this matter is yet another example of the one-man-show quality from which our foreign policy has suffered. It is difficult to take seriously the administration's call for a bipartisan foreign policy in the face of the obvious contempt with which it has treated the views of the Congress in this matter—and in many others.

Because it is my judgment that a support facility at Diego Garcia is important to our security and would remain important even in the context of an agreement with the Soviets limiting deployments in the Indian Ocean area, I shall vote against the pending resolution. But I must say that I do so with grave reservations about the administration's handling of this whole matter. I simply cannot vote to punish this country and our allies because the administration has behaved badly and short-sightedly in failing to comply with the desire of the Congress for an American-Soviet discussion of security in the Indian Ocean. It is my hope that the administration will initiate such discussions, and that it will not regard today's vote as relieving it of that responsibility.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to find some means other than a vote for the pending resolution to make it plain to the administration that cooperation in matters of foreign policy must become a two-way street.

Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAXALT). The Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield such time as I may use for myself.

Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Washington very highly for pointing out here with force and clarity that the real question we are down to now in this subject that has had all the legislative attention one could have, that is, whether or not we think, on balance, there should be a beefing up of facilities at Diego Garcia. That is the issue here, the only issue.

I am in sympathy with his thought that negotiations are always in order and ought to be pressed.

I would talk further about this, but

July 28, 1975

this issue has come the legislative journey, all the way, and it is not subject to an amendment or anything of that kind. It has nothing to do with the size of our fleet. We already have a presence there and the question is whether or not we are going to properly supply it, that is all.

I think the overwhelming facts are as he said. We have got to stand one ground, and we are going to supply our Navy.

Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. The chairman of the committee will recall that I was the one, of course, who raised the issue of negotiations with the Russians.

Mr. STENNIS. Correctly.

Mr. JACKSON. As a specific condition of the approval of the initial work at Diego Garcia. Subsequently, that was modified and it was contained in report language, and that is why, Mr. President, I regret that the administration did not take seriously our request and I think that every effort should be made to limit naval forces in the area.

As I pointed out in my remarks, however, this does not prevent the building of this facility, so that we will have that option available to us, even if we agree to limit naval forces. That is the key point.

If we are going to have an option available to limit forces, and I think and I would hope we could reach an agreement to lessen tensions in that area, to limit naval forces on both sides, we need to proceed at least this far, Mr. President, on the facility at Diego Garcia.

If we do not go forward, we do not have anything to negotiate, nothing to limit, and I think that is the point where there is so much confusion in the debate and the discussion.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I will yield in time.

Mr. JACKSON. Could I yield to the Senator?

Mr. STENNIS. I want to make a point, too. I have not been on the floor 2 hours.

Mr. President, someone has said that if we go ahead with this relatively small matter, we will be to blame for the consequences. We will be to blame for all the evil consequences that somebody else is making up.

There will be blame attached to us, as I see it, but we will be to blame for not taking a reasonable precaution. We must look forward with a basic step of preparation here for the fleet that we already have and are going to have in this ocean.

I am not going to take more than a few minutes.

So I emphasize, Mr. President, and a great deal has been said about the littoral nations, I have here a memorandum that gives a report about the littoral nations, and this is from responsible sources. This is from the administration.

They say:

The official position taken by many of the same countries who publicly express a desire to keep the Indian Ocean free of major powers is quite different. A State Department survey taken May of this year indicated that of the 29 countries polled, 9 supported the U.S. planned expansion, 7 opposed, and the remaining nations took no position at all.

That result should be expected. Nations of the free world do not want to lose out to communism by default. Every nation will express desires for peace, but peace depends on a balance of power and the Soviet Union is fast becoming a dominant power in the Indian Ocean.

So, Mr. President, I think that again has been totally refuted here by this actual report of a survey taken as late as May of this year.

Mr. President, I have other matters here in the way of documents, but for the time being I am going to yield the floor.

How much time do I have remaining, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 22 minutes remaining on his time.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the floor, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I believe that I have 30 minutes on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the order.

Mr. TAFT. Under the order.

I yield myself 15 minutes out of that time.

Mr. President, I intend to vote against the resolution of disapproval and thereby support the planned construction on Diego Garcia. I give my support both conditionally and reluctantly, and I wish to make both my condition and my reluctance clear.

The condition under which I support the construction of a logistics facility on Diego Garcia is that it is clearly understood that this is all I am supporting. I support no implication that the construction of this facility constitutes a U.S. commitment to become the main counterbalancing power against Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. I support no understanding on the part of anyone, at home or abroad, that we have taken on any new commitments or enlarged any existing commitments by the construction of this base. I have no intention, under the present circumstances in the Indian Ocean, of supporting anything beyond a "gas pump" for what ships we should happen to have, on an off-and-on basis, in that area.

I do support the base as a logistics convenience for the Navy. The distance between the Indian Ocean and our nearest bases, at Yokosuka and Subic Bay, is so great that it is highly inefficient to supply our ships from those bases, by tanker.

Indeed, let me point out, during the recent crisis in the Middle East, there were orders all over the world, which I trust we have now taken care of by other legislative action, by the OPEC countries not to sell to any of our ships anywhere in the world, no matter where those ships might happen to be, whether they were going to the Indian Ocean or not going to the Indian Ocean, those orders were standing orders and they were complied with even by American oil companies.

As I say, this is a situation we could not tolerate and it was a situation that did exist in the recent Middle East crisis and points out, I think, the benefit for at least having a logistics facility, even

though I have expressed the other reservations that I have expressed.

The Diego Garcia facility will, seen as a logistics facility and nothing more, be a cost-effective investment.

Even with the condition that it is nothing more than a logistics facility, I give my support reluctantly, because I believe the whole question of the proper U.S. role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf has not been thought through clearly. There are two possible approaches which apparently have not been attempted. They are interconnected, as will be developed.

The first is to negotiate a naval deployment limitation agreement with the Soviets and other powers for the area in question.

I would like to point out that other powers are vital to such negotiations. We cannot simply be talking with the Russians about it. Otherwise, another nation coming into the area with considerable force—and there are other forces operating in the area today—could upset, I believe, the balance of any agreement that we arrived at with the Soviets.

It is, of course, impossible to say that we could obtain such an agreement. It is possible the Soviets do not want to agree to limit their presence in this area. However, how can we know until we try? And we are advised that we have not tried. We have not made any formal approach to the Soviet Union on this question.

The administration has given some indication that it intends to explore such a possibility, and perhaps it sees a commitment to the facility on Diego Garcia as a possible bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets. On the other hand, perhaps it is the feeling that after developing Diego, the climate for such an agreement might improve. I do not know whether it will be useful for such bargaining or not, but I do hope that negotiations are pursued, whichever way this vote turns out. It would be to the advantage of the United States, the Soviet Union, the states which border on the Indian Ocean, and world peace, if major power naval deployment limitation agreement could be achieved.

There is, however, another approach to understanding the situation in the Indian Ocean and developing an appropriate U.S. policy for that area. This approach—the approach of recognizing that the Indian Ocean is an appropriate area for European and perhaps Japanese—not American leadership—should be adopted even if we are not able to achieve an arms limitation agreement with the Soviets.

I know that the Japanese do not have forces with which to undertake such a responsibility at this time, and we do not see in the near future, at least, the likelihood that such forces will be developed.

But anyhow, I think they have such a vital interest in it from an economic point of view—over 85 percent of their oil coming from this area, as I understand it—that they should be included in a discussion of such a matter.

As I noted in my "Additional Views" in the committee report on this resolution:

The only significant reason for any littoral power to be interested in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean is because of the oil imported from that area. In fact, however, the United States imports comparatively little oil from the Persian Gulf States. In 1974, only 8% of the petroleum products consumed by the United States came from Persian Gulf States. While it would be highly inconvenient if the United States were deprived of the imports from that area, it would not be catastrophic.

As the Department of Defense noted in response to a question of mine, "It is true that the European nations are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than is the United States" in 1972, the Common Market imported 62 percent of its total consumption from the Persian Gulf—again, compared to 8 percent for the United States in 1974. It therefore follows that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are fundamentally European, not American, areas of concern.

The European nations, led by France, recognize this fact very clearly, not merely by what they say but even more by what they do.

Since 1970, French naval ship-days in the Indian Ocean have consistently been in excess of Soviet ship-days; that continued to be the case for the first half of 1975.

I point that out, that that was true even before the Suez Canal was opened.

The French forces at times include an aircraft carrier, a type of ship the Soviets do not yet possess. If British forces deployed in the area are added to the French, their total ship-days outnumber the Soviets heavily.

The Europeans are fully capable, militarily, of balancing the growing Soviet power in the Indian Ocean. France possesses a large, modern, and powerful navy. The French today have two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, 22 destroyers, 52 antisubmarine frigates and corvettes, and 19 attack submarines. French plans call for the construction, by 1985, of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, two nuclear-powered helicopter carriers, 30 frigates and corvettes, and 20 attack submarines, some of which will be nuclear powered.

If you ask what are the French going to do with such ships as nuclear powered carriers or nuclear powered helicopters, very clearly they are going to use them in such areas as the Indian Ocean where the ships' planes are vitally important to their economy because of the terrific dependence they have upon the Middle East oil coming from that area.

Great Britain also possesses a large fleet, consisting of an aircraft carrier, 12 cruisers, 61 frigates, and 29 attack submarines, 7 of which are nuclear powered. Other European nations possess smaller but also modern and useful navies.

The opening of the Suez Canal is as great a help to the Europeans, in terms of deploying ships into the Indian Ocean, as it is to the Soviets. The French are currently rebasing both of their aircraft carriers from Brest, in the Atlantic, to Toulon, in the Mediterranean.

The Europeans also possess an extensive network of naval bases in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The French have bases at Diego Suarez, Dji-

bouti, Reunion Island, and in the Comoro Islands. Britain has bases at Gan Island and on Mauritius.

I would also point out that the Union of South Africa has a considerable navy and has obviously its home base, major port facilities, on the Indian Ocean.

I believe that we should recognize that Europe has a far greater interest in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean than does the United States, and that the European nations have the military capability to defend that interest. Accordingly, we should engage in negotiation with European nations and encourage and welcome European leadership in this area, with particular emphasis on France.

Not only is it a matter of the economic burden that is involved, and it is a considerable one, but I think all of us recognize that in the NATO situation in Europe, while our forces at the present time, unfortunately, seem to be vital there to maintain the balance, in all fairness there should be a taking up of some of that burden over the years by these nations which are no longer struggling, poor nations recovering from a postwar crisis, but are now very strong and self-sufficient nations with economies in a number of cases that are, in their size, proportionately equal in their health and vigor to our own.

We should be fully willing to cooperate with European leadership, recognizing that our interest would be best served by being a "junior partner" to the Europeans in this area. If we move unilaterally to assume the leadership role we discourage our allies and invite charges of imperialistic expansion from the littoral powers. This does not mean we should not indicate our willingness to participate in balancing Soviet influence in this area, not by taking on that burden unilaterally, but by contributing periodically to joint naval squadrons in the Indian Ocean. Such a squadron could, for example, be based alternately on French, British, and American aircraft carriers. I have inquired if the United States has explored the possibility of such a joint squadron. The Department of Defense replied that we have not done so.

As a practical matter, however, I believe we have been cooperating very closely in our cooperation with the British forces and the French forces already in the area. Formalizing and establishing the responsibility for it in those nations it seems to me would be a very easy thing to do, something that would be welcomed, I believe, by our allies, and something which I believe we ought to pursue.

Our policy, in summation, should be to recognize and encourage European leadership in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

We should not take it upon ourselves to be the main Western power in the area.

I would point out that there are small nations and many of these developing nations around the Indian Ocean area as a matter of their own domestic policy, and their foreign policy is connected with domestic policy, which feel it is a great feather in their cap to twist what used to be the lion's tail but now is Uncle Sam's tail.

I think having us as the principal power in an Indian Ocean task force, rather than contributing to the peace of the area and trying to calm down and stabilize the area so that we can assure that the shipping which must necessarily go through the Indian Ocean will be able to proceed without interruption, will take U.S. leadership in preventing the littoral powers from perceiving this to be a cause celebre, which they will seek to make a good deal out of, just as recent events in India which have led to efforts to persuade the Indian people that somehow the United States is trying to do them in, I think, will obviously lead to this kind of reaction on the part of the Indians.

I do think we need logistic space, as I said earlier, but it should be only that, not a basis on which to build our dominance in the Indian Oceans area.

We should recognize that this, too, would require some change in our basic thinking, which has often resisted European, and particularly French, attempts to provide leadership in transatlantic affairs. But this is a clear case where Europe has both the most vital interest at stake and the military capability to defend that interest. We do ourselves no service by attempting to take this burden upon our own shoulders, alone.

I noted with interest a report to the Washington Post datelined Paris, July 24, an article by Bernard Kaplan entitled "Saudi's Visit Seen Widening France's Role," which comments on the recent visit to France by Crown Prince Fahd as widening France's role in the area.

The article reads:

French and Saudi officials here imply that Fahd's discussion with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing dealt with expanding France's political role in the Middle East, specifically through the creation of a "privileged" relationship with Saudi Arabia.

According to sources, the crown prince, who left for London today, conducted himself throughout his talks here not only as the effective political leader of his own country but as spokesman for a number of other Arab governments including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Timed to coincide with the visit was confirmation that the Saudi government has offered more than \$1 billion to finance French industrial projects, including a nuclear power station, in Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab nations. Fahd's visit also produced an announcement that a Franco-Saudi Arabian Intergovernmental Commission will begin meeting on a twice-yearly basis in October to develop "economic, financial, industrial, agricultural and cultural relations."

I note that it does not say, however, national defense relations, though I believe it should do so.

I believe we should welcome rather than be discouraged by such developments as this. It points out, I think, the matters the Senate should have judged in considering this matter. I hope not only that the Senate will give consideration to them, but that those in the executive department, both in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House will take note of these factors and not allow just a sort of growing-like-Topsy attitude in the Diego

July 28, 1975

Garcia matter to lead us into the trap of considering that we are or should be the principal naval power in the area, just because the Soviets appear to be increasing their presence in the area, which they would probably do regardless of what we do. The question should be what is best for the future of the United States in this area.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how stands the time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana has 31 minutes, the Senator from Mississippi 22 minutes, the Senator from Virginia 17 minutes, and the Senator from Ohio 15 minutes.

Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with the permission of the distinguished chairman of the committee and the distinguished Senator from Ohio, and hopefully the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT), I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to be taken equally out of all four sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I want to cooperate with the Senator, I really have control of only half of half the time, equal to a total of one-fourth, and some others that I think may want some time are out. Let us see if we cannot put a cap on that some way.

Mr. MANSFIELD. On my time.

Mr. STENNIS. I am willing to yield some of that, I might say, Mr. President.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I make the proposal that the time for the quorum call not exceed 4 minutes. That takes a minute apiece out of the time.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I am sure that the Senator from South Carolina would be agreeable to that, and I am authorized to speak for him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded, and that I may yield the assistant majority leader and the Senator from Virginia not to exceed 30 seconds each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT—SENATE
RESOLUTION 54

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at such time as it is called up and made the pending question before the Senate, there be a time limitation on Senate Resolution 54, a resolution continuing and authorizing additional expenditures by the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, of 1 hour, to be equally divided between the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN); a time limitation on any amendment thereto of

30 minutes; and a time limitation on any debatable motion, appeal, or point of order if submitted to the Senate of 20 minutes; and that the agreement as to the division and control of time be in the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The text of the unanimous-consent agreement is as follows:

Ordered, That, during the consideration of S. Res. 54 (Order No. 313), a resolution continuing and authorizing additional expenditures by the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, debate on any amendment shall be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the resolution, and debate on any debatable motion, appeal, or point of order which is submitted or on which the Chair entertains debate shall be limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the resolution: *Provided*, That in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such amendment, debatable motion, appeal, or point of order, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the Minority Leader or his designee.

Ordered further, That on the question of agreeing to the said resolution, debate shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN): *Provided*, That the said Senators, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on agreeing to the said resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, debatable motion, appeal, or point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum under the same stipulations, and this will be included in the 4 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. GARY W. HART).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. GARY W. HART. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Montana, the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, I wish to comment on a couple of items that occurred in the debate this afternoon with regard to the resolution regarding Diego Garcia.

First of all, I call the attention of our colleagues to the intelligence estimates regarding our position in the Indian Ocean and call particular attention to the fact that we spend a great deal of money each year to assess intelligence; therefore, I think the estimates that the intelligence community provides to us, particularly those that are unclassified, deserve a great deal of attention in this body.

In testimony before the Committee on

Armed Services on July 11, 1974, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby, said as follows:

... the normal composition of the Soviet force there—

Being the Indian Ocean.

—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—suggests that interdiction of Western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

The implication is, of course, the major objective of the Soviet Union.

I also call our colleagues' attention to a letter directed to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) from Mr. Colby. The letter is dated July 21, 1975. In that letter Mr. Colby says as follows:

The Soviets recognize the importance to the West of Persian Gulf oil, but the normal composition their Indian Ocean force suggests, that interdiction of Western commerce has not been a major objective.

Thus, repeating his remarks of a year earlier.

He also says as follows:

The level of Soviet naval activity—

Which we have heard so much about here today—

in the area has grown slowly but steadily since 1968, and this pattern is expected to continue.

What is that activity?

The Colby letter says:

The regular force usually consists of six surface combat units, a diesel-powered submarine and about seven support ships—

Which I understand some testimony before our committee to be minesweepers and so forth.

This routine presence is occasionally augmented by other units—for example, ships being transferred from the western fleets to the Pacific.

That is the Soviet presence as of July 21, 1975.

Mr. Colby continues:

Increases in the U.S. presence could result in a somewhat more rapid buildup in the Soviet forces. The Soviets have clearly shown a sensitivity to U.S. activity, and this will be one of the factors in their determination of Indian Ocean requirements.

Then, I conclude from Mr. Colby's letter to the chairman of the committee:

The Soviets probably would not be particularly bothered by the mere fact of a modest U.S. base on Diego Garcia, for example, but would be inclined to accelerate the development of their Indian Ocean contingent if we maintain sizable forces in the area.

The suggestion is clear from Mr. Colby's testimony before the committee in 1974, repeated as of this month, 1975, that the Soviets will respond to whatever the United States does in this area.

I also call the attention of the Senate to testimony given our committee—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am sorry, but the time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GARY W. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 1 minute to the Senator.

July 28, 1975

Mr. GARY W. HART. General Brown testified before our committee that the base at Berbera will support and sustain naval combat operations; whereas, the facilities that we hope to put on Diego Garcia are far removed from that. His suggestion is that the Berbera base, on which the Soviets are developing, will rival the Subic operation. I suggest to our colleagues that that is utter nonsense. The Berbera base is a harbor 1 mile long and 2 miles wide, 30 to 60 feet deep. It will not even begin to house the kind of fleet that the Subic Bay area contains—room for 160 ships, 9 piers, 5 of which are a thousand feet long. I think the suggestion by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in this regard is misleading and does not serve the efforts of the Senate of the United States to reach a rational decision on this issue.

The question before the Senate today is whether we are going to negotiate or even attempt to reach some sort of agreement with the Soviet Union on reducing naval presence mutually in this area. I have yet to hear a remark or a comment or a rejection of that argument.

When we were seeking appropriations, any time a question was raised about what the Defense Department wanted, somebody from the Defense Department—the Secretary of Defense or someone else—was on the phone, and somebody was here on the floor of the Senate, saying, "I have just spoken to the Secretary of Defense, and this is what their position is."

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, may we have order? The Senator is making a very important statement on the merits, and I think he should be listened to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STONE). The Senator's time has expired. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield the Senator 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. GARY W. HART. I thank the Senator.

The point is that I have yet to hear any opponent of this resolution who has spoken to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State today state why it is not in our best interest to sit down and discuss this matter with the Soviets.

With the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from Vermont, I happen to be one of those who raised this issue in negotiations and discussions with deputies from the Supreme Soviet, and at that time they were not willing to state their position. However, later they told us that they very much wanted to sit down with this Government to determine whether we could mutually limit naval presence in this area. I have yet to hear anybody in the debate today suggest why the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense is unwilling to do that.

I thank the Senator from Mississippi. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I support the resolution introduced by my good friend from Montana, the majority leader. Ostensibly, the issue is whether we should expand our naval and air facilities at Diego Garcia, a small atoll in the middle of the Indian Ocean. But I believe that Diego Garcia stands for more than that.

Certainly, the nations in that area of the world see Diego Garcia as signifying more.

The Prime Minister of Australia said on "Meet the Press"—

... there is no nation around the Indian Ocean which welcomes the buildup on this uninhabited British group of islands.

When asked if he would like to see the United States withdraw entirely from the Indian Ocean, regardless of what the Russians do, he replied:

No; certainly not. Russia and America are the world's great naval powers—they can sail wherever they choose—that's clear. But we don't want a proliferation of armaments in the Indian Ocean which up till now has been freest of all the world's oceans, of this American-Soviet confrontation.

Not a single one of the 32 nations in that area of the world has supported U.S. plans to beef up Diego Garcia. Some, including allies, have openly opposed it.

If those nations that surround the Indian Ocean, including our allies, are not disturbed by the Russian presence there, then why should we be?

I thought we had learned that we cannot police the whole world, especially where we are not invited.

The Department of Defense contends that Australia's Government for political reasons is publicly denouncing Diego Garcia but in private is urging us to expand the base.

I must say, if the stance against Diego Garcia is a charade, the Australian Government is taking great pains to perform it well.

The Australian Embassy sent me a stack of speeches that the Australian Prime Minister made all over the world in which he urged our Government not to expand Diego Garcia. In the Prime Minister's report to Parliament, in press conferences in Bonn, in The Hague, in Colombo, in Washington, D.C., at the United Nations, in Hansard, and in press releases from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the stance has been consistently against expansion of Diego Garcia.

I think that it is important to note that we can send powerful fleets into the Indian Ocean to respond to crises whether Diego Garcia is improved or not. In the past 18 months we have sent five carrier task forces and two groups of major combat surface ships to the Indian Ocean. In the past year we have had such an augmented presence in the Indian Ocean for one-third of the year. Diego Garcia would merely make deployment in the Indian Ocean more convenient for our Navy and Air Force.

Furthermore, according to William Colby of the CIA, who presented testimony on this subject last year, the Soviets will probably avoid any large navy buildup in the Indian Ocean because such a fleet could be too easily bottled up if the Suez Canal were closed.

Some will say it is not much money—only about \$30 million—at stake here. I think that is \$30 million of the taxpayers' dollars that can be saved. And I do not believe for a moment that we can approve expansion of the harbor, runway, and fuel facilities and not expect eventually to hear appropriation requests for new Navy ships to use Diego Garcia.

To me Diego Garcia is a weathercock issue. Should we expand our military presence in the Indian Ocean at no small cost to our people when the nations there including many friendly nations clearly don't desire this expansion and apparently consider it harmful to their interests? The more basic question is, do we still intend to be the policeman of the world?

I urge my colleagues to support Senate Resolution 160.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), and then the remainder of the time, the full 9 minutes, to the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER)—but after a while.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, the Senate today is again being asked to decide whether or not to proceed with expansion of our military facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. This is not the first time we have considered this matter: The administration first requested funds for these facilities in fiscal year 1970, and the Congress rejected this request. In the following year, Congress approved a "limited communications facility." A renewed request for a fleet support facility was made for fiscal year 1974, and rejected by Congress. The request was repeated for fiscal year 1975. At that time, we stipulated the procedure we are following today. But we have no illusions that this is the end of the debate. Certainly this will not be the last time the Senate will debate the future military role of the United States in the Indian Ocean.

The amount of money involved in this project this year may be relatively small in terms of total appropriations for U.S. defense needs; \$32 million is less than half the cost of a B-1 bomber, or the cost of two F-14s, and it is only a tiny fraction of the cost of a nuclear aircraft carrier. In fact, the Navy argues that, for the capabilities that this money will buy, it is an irresistible bargain.

So far, Congress has consistently acted with studied caution in deciding whether to proceed with Diego Garcia. We have known all along that something more substantial is involved—that larger questions of principle and policy are at stake in this decision. At heart, this debate is not about whether we should extend the runway at Diego Garcia another few thousand feet, or dredge the harbor to accommodate larger ships, or put up some barracks to house several hundred military personnel. This debate is about the role the United States will play in the coming years in the Indian Ocean and in the nations that line its shores. It concerns whether the United States will push ahead and build a three ocean Navy—a decision involving billions of

are the foremost military operation there, and that they could be the front runner for a change instead of our carrying the load?

Mr. STENNIS. I think we have the greatest—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield additional time?

Mr. STENNIS. I am sorry, I am about out. How much time do I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Mississippi and I find ourselves in a difficult position because of the time which is more than we have, allotted to the Senators from Ohio and Virginia.

Mr. President, will the Senator yield some of his time?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I would be happy to yield some time. I would like to make a few remarks before I do. It seems to me we have missed the point here to a great extent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. TAFT. I yield myself 5 minutes.

I do not want to have the Senator or the administration fail to consider the point I made. I feel strongly that this facility should go ahead. I do not want to see the U.S. Navy, if it is in that part of the world—I think parts of it at least are going to be in that part of the world—cut off without any oil, as it was at the time of the Middle East crisis, and I think we have to go ahead with this improvement to assure it does not happen again.

At the same time, I think negotiations should be engaged in, but not bilateral negotiations. This is the thing, I think, that ought to be said, and said clearly. We have been talking all afternoon about negotiating with the Russians, without talking about negotiating with anybody else. The French have more ship-days alone, not counting the British days, in the Indian Ocean, not considering what the Russians are doing. They have a navy building two nuclear carriers, two nuclear helicopter carriers, and are obviously planning to undertake responsibility at this time.

To have the United States take the lead in this picture, I think, is a great mistake. I think it is provocative to the littoral states in a way it would not be if we got our allies to go along.

What I believe, and believe strongly, is we ought to bring into this negotiation our allies.

The distinguished Senator from Iowa said none of the allies are going ahead with their development. That is a lot of nonsense. A lot of the littoral countries, if anybody is going ahead with further activity in the area, obviously they are.

Some of the other nations, however, Great Britain, has made the treaty with us certainly which gives us the right to go ahead with the developments that are planned here. The French certainly have not expressed any opposition to it. While there has been, perhaps, official opposition in the Arab fraternity by Iran, there have been private assurances, as I understand, that there is cer-

tainly no opposition and certainly no—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is not in order, and the galleries are not in order. The Chair requests no conversation except by the Senator who is recognized in the Chamber.

The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I just want to get that point through that these are multilateral negotiations that are called for. We ought to call for a conference with the nations that are concerned with the supply of oil coming through this part of the world.

In my opinion, we also ought to try to include the littoral nations in it, at least have their opinions on it, before we get into such negotiations.

I think it is true, I think there is something to be said for the argument, that the Soviets, having gone ahead with Berbera, that if we go ahead and develop this facility to a degree that it planned now—and it is a limited development, it is not a major naval base in any sense of the word, it is basically a logistics facility with support for that logistics facility—we will be in a better position not only to negotiate with the Soviets but to negotiate with the other nations of the world, and to negotiate with the littoral powers.

I do not believe we ought to run away from the situation. At the same time, I feel very strongly we should not get ourselves into the position of becoming a dominant force in the area and, thereby, invite the opposition of the littoral powers which is more likely, in my opinion, to disturb the peace of that particular area than it is to help bring it about and keep it in a state in which it should be.

What I do not want to see, however, is the U.S. Navy out there operating on its own or in connection with our other purposes without any source of fuel for its oil supply to its ships. I do not want us to be out there in a sea of oil without any oil, and I think that is the basic question we have to decide on here.

As to the future, I hope there will be some understanding on the part of the administration, the State Department and the Defense Department, and members of the legislative branch as to what the realities are in this area. The fact is that we should not take the lead, and others should, but we should participate in it and help others as much as we can in a lesser, a minor-like, role rather than a leading role.

Mr. President, I would be willing now to yield time to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi or the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7 minutes remaining.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I would be glad to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF)

and 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY).

Will the Senator withhold for a minute?

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, if no one has any objection, I believe I have 17 minutes left, and I would like to—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes remaining.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Fifteen minutes.

Mr. President, I have no further remarks to make, and I will yield 5 minutes to the discretion of the distinguished majority leader, 5 minutes to the chairman of the committee, Mr. STENNIS, and 5 minutes to Senator THURMOND.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator. I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF).

Mr. RIBICOFF. I thank the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, I have been dismayed with the innuendoes and the attacks that have been made on three distinguished Members of this body, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. GARY W. HART), and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY).

I was a member of a group of 14 Senators who visited the Soviet Union over the Fourth of July, and I could never be more proud of Members of the U.S. Senate than the 14. But I pay a special tribute to Senators CULVER, GARY HART, and LEAHY.

It has been indicated or said that these three men were pawns of the Soviet parliamentarians. It has also been said they were negotiating on behalf of the United States.

At no time were these men pawns of the Soviet parliamentarians, and at no time did they attempt to negotiate for the United States of America.

When we sat there for 17 hours and really in debate and confrontation with the Soviet parliamentarians, I was filled with pride when the Senator from Iowa presented the position of the United States on the whole problems of SALT, and the problems of disarmament. This was a strong U.S. Senator talking. This was a U.S. Senator who knew his subject. This was a U.S. Senator who loved and was proud of his country.

To think that those in the executive branch, because he took a position contrary to the results they wanted and desired, through their own means sent those innuendoes out through the press and their statements, I, for one—and I think every Member of this body—should be proud of JOHN CULVER, GARY HART, and PATRICK LEAHY.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, following up what the distinguished Senator said, it has come to my attention that there was a leakage of cables which got into the hands of certain people outside the government, which came to the attention of at least one of the Senators concerned. He did not mention it except in passing.

I thought it was outrageous that there are leaks in the executive branch of this government to be used for the purpose

July 28, 1975

of scarifying and attacking a Senator of the United States. I think every Senator in this body, regardless of his political philosophy, is entitled to the same kind of consideration as any other Senator, and I resent the idea of the fact that these leaks were made and that this Senator was faced with them, and that he had to take them in stride and make the best of allegations which were not true.

Mr. RIBICOFF. As all of us know, those who seek to besmirch or change a position have their own ways—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. One more minute.

Mr. RIBICOFF [continuing]. Of casting doubts on a man's integrity or his bona fides.

I watched with dismay because they were contrary to what I know. I was there and it became very obvious what was attempted. They were trying to change in a close position a vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate, and what better way could this be done, by putting a dirty stick against a distinguished Senator. I can assure my colleagues that JOHN CULVER never gave anything away that belonged to the people of the United States of America, or the U.S. position. He was ably assisted at all times by GARY HART and PATRICK LEAHY.

I love these three men and I think they are great U.S. Senators and we do not have the executive branch using their sneaky methods to try to smear a U.S. Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. One more minute, Mr. President.

May I say on my own time that today, we have the Secretary of Defense calling up various Members of the Senate, we have the White House liaison out in force, we have the State Department liaison out in force.

What they are trying to do is tell us how we should vote.

What did the people mean when they elected all of us to the Senate? To exercise our own judgment to vote according to our conscience or to be told how to vote by a Secretary of Defense, minions of the Secretary of State, or people at the White House?

I hope that the Senate is aware of this intensive, high barrage campaign which has been conducted against this bill at the present time.

I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. JAVITS. Would the Senator let me join in this colloquy?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. I shall probably go the other way in this matter from Senator CULVER, and other Senators mentioned, but I, too, was in Moscow in these negotiations.

I do not know anything about the incidents which are being described, but I would like to join Senator RIBICOFF, with whom I sat side by side, in testifying to my pride as an American and U.S. Senator in the magnificent performance of these three Senators led by JOHN CULVER, whom we unanimously, without regard to party, named as chief spokesman on these delicate military matters,

just as we considered others, Senator RIBICOFF and myself, in other respects in these very critical discussions in Moscow. It is a duty I feel as a U.S. Senator.

Senator CULVER and his colleagues are fine, upstanding men of whom we can be very proud as Senators of the United States and to carry the flag of our country with the greatest skill, intelligence, and pride.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President. I shall not take much time to express my great admiration for the Senator from Iowa, the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Vermont, the names mentioned here.

I, too, was present, as this body knows, and I can assure that any comment as to any softness on the part of these Senators relating to the Soviet Union is sheer nonsense and it ought to be dismissed as such.

But that is not the issue here. We know our Senators, we know their sincerity just as we know the sincerity of people who have a different point of view here, and we can dismiss that quickly. Any charge of lack of sincerity can be dismissed.

The central issue is, Is this base necessary now? That is the issue.

It is my judgment, Mr. President, that what this Senate ought to be doing is to lay down an order, which I gather the parliamentary situation will not permit, that would say in substance.

That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds heretofore authorized for the construction of any military facility on the Island of Diego Garcia may be obligated for such purpose—

(1) prior to September 1, 1976, unless the President determines and notifies the Congress in writing that the Soviet Union has, after the date of enactment of this Act, continued to construct and substantially expand military facilities in Somalia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf area.

(2) after September 1, 1976, unless the President is unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union by September 1, 1976, to limit the military presence of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the Indian Ocean area.

I had intended to offer such an amendment. This would not have done away with the authorization, it would have kept the authorization as it is.

But it is my judgment, Mr. President, that the evidence is clear and unequivocal that despite the direction of the Congress of the United States and at least the Senate of the United States, the executive branch has not sought to negotiate some kind of limitation of arms control within the Indian Ocean area. It is not as if tomorrow morning we did not start construction, that our security was going to be threatened. To the contrary, our security is here.

I would hope we would keep in mind the necessity of limiting this arms race wherever we can under mutual agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how lies the time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

ator has 14 minutes; the Senator from Mississippi has 11 minutes; the Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes, and the Senator from Ohio has 3 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what are considering is a new and drastic venture into the area of South Asia. This is not simply an issue of \$13 million or \$14 million today, or \$175 million—according to the Navy figures—or even the additional \$8 billion that is necessary for a three-ocean navy. But what I am concentrating on is the fact that what we are seeing in my opinion, the creation of a three-ocean navy.

Why in Diego Garcia of all places?

We do not own it, I am not sure we have lease rights, but it is close to the oil of the Middle East. It does create a means by which we can push out into a new area and it does mean we are flexing our muscles.

What have we learned from Vietnam? Where is the reassessment in our foreign policy? What does the future portend for us? Have we not learned anything after three decades in Southeast Asia? Was our mistake there simply a matter of tactics? Or was it something more profound? Did we not learn that America should have no design on maintaining a modern-day empire by replacing the autonomy of individual nations?

And the 30 nations around the perimeter of the Indian Ocean have indicated they do not want us disturbing the zone of peace.

Did we not learn that we cannot and should not attempt to make the nations of the world in our own image and in our own likeness?

I hope, Mr. President, that all these facts will be kept in mind because this is a most serious move we are contemplating and I would express the hope that the Senate in its wisdom would step back before it is too late, because if we go so far, it is too late to drop back.

Remember what we did in South Vietnam. A few hundred advisers, first, I believe a telegraph company, then a few hundred more, then a few thousand, and what was the price?

Fifty-five thousand American dead, 303,000 American wounded, 150 billion American dollars spent, and we will be paying for that into the first half of the next century to the tune—at 1972 prices—to the tune of \$435 billion.

Think about it.

We are not in the Indian Ocean to any extent. Look at that map, look at that space. Remember how the nations feel around the perimeter of the Indian Ocean.

All I can say, to use an old railroad phrase, is stop, look, and listen.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President—

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska will be recognized on whose time?

Mr. HRUSKA. The Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes.

Mr. HRUSKA. I do not want to take up his time. He may have some use for that time other than my engaging in remarks. I will withhold my remarks at this time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, perhaps I should proceed.

I will be partly repeating.

I am not going to let anyone outdo me in complimenting our valued Members that we are so proud of, those who went to Russia and other countries. They are fine, intelligent Members of this body, Messrs. CULVER, LEAHY, and HART. I am proud of them. I have not heard anything to the contrary, so if anyone said anything on this side of the Atlantic Ocean or the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, I join in the resentment expressed by fellow Senators as well as fellow committee members.

Mr. President, let us not go astray on other matters.

I would like to have the chance to have the attention of the Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senators please take their seats?

Mr. STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. President.

This matter came up in 1972, Mr. President, and for my part I did not have a chance to get into it enough to be satisfied about it. In 1973 I was not here. I do not know to what extent it was considered. But in calendar year 1974 I voted as a member of the committee because the leader, the Senator from Montana, wanted a chance to get this matter out on the floor in a special way. I understood the committee position was to give him a chance to do it, but something happened that they did not bring it up that way. I voted for the position of the committee to give this a special consideration.

We went to conference. The Senator from Missouri worked hard on this thing. I held out over and over, and we got this into the law. That is why it is up here today.

Let us not say it has not had consideration; that we have not been through it. Certainly, the legislative branch of this Government has been through this thing over and over and over, and has acted already to the extent of authorizing about half the money and appropriating that money, subject to this amendment I have been talking about which required it to come back here.

If this resolution against Diego Garcia is favorably approved by this body, that goes back and kills the prior authorization and kills the appropriation, something that we have already done and have brought here for a special consideration on the merits.

No one has been asleep about it in the Legislative Branch of the Government.

A great deal has been said about other matters, but what has been said about what preparation we have been making in this Indian Ocean. This issue comes alive again on this oil question, it comes alive again on the opening of the Suez Canal? What have we done about it? Not a single blessed thing except talk, talk, talk. And we are still talking.

What have the Soviets done? In addition to talking, they have gone there and built a missile facility. You cannot call it a lot of hogwash when there is a missile facility there with a 25-ton crane, as I understood the Senator from Oklahoma, large enough to take care of the loading, unloading and handling of missiles fired from submarines under the surface, missiles fired from ship to shore, from ship to ship—all kinds of missiles. That is what they have been doing while we have been talking. We have been thorough, so let us not say now we do not have the facts. We have virtually all the facts.

Now some bring up, "Well, let the French protect us" or, "Let the British protect us," if we have interests there. I believe the American people have interests there and they do not want us to stand around waiting to see what the French or the British will do. They want us to be ready.

It is not a question of how much we are going to put out there in the way of naval vessels. Is this just a question of supplies, the vital necessities of life, the food for the men? No, this relates to the fuel for any planes we might see fit to have there and also the oil, the oil that is necessary for these naval vessels. We have only one nuclear carrier at sea now. So we are getting down to the vitals of this matter. We are backing off for what? There are no more facts to be had.

I made the point in conference that the new President of the United States should be brought into this thing. I said let us write it in that he must certify. He had before him the evidence by Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger. I know Mr. Schlesinger joined in it as he told me so.

I want to say another thing. Nobody has called me and told me what to do, what to say, or what not to do. I do what little I can as a Senator with the aid of capable men. I answer the telephone calls. But we will never have an important bill without some interest shown by other branches of the Government. They should show some interest.

Let me read this paragraph from a document made available to the President:

It is significant that the Soviets have failed to combine their criticism of U.S. plans for Diego Garcia with any proposal for a mutual force reduction, despite the obvious appeal for propaganda purposes, nor is there evidence to suggest that they would be prepared to dismantle their own facilities in Somalia in response to any change of U.S. policy regarding Diego Garcia.

Instead, they are building. They are on the move.

As a result, we are not optimistic about the prospects for an effective arms control agreement with the USSR under present circumstances in the Indian Ocean, and we are concerned that a delay in construction of facilities at Diego Garcia during prolonged negotiations could result in an actual or apparent asymmetry in the support available to our respective forces in potential crisis situations. We have on several occasions—most recently to the British Government—expressed our willingness to consider constructive proposals for mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we believe that proposals for limitations of force presence would be hindered rather than helped, by linking them

explicitly to the separate issue of support facilities.

Well, I had a hope when we had the first arms limitation talks that that might mean a new situation. But all the evidence was to the contrary, Mr. President, and from then until now we have not held back on our missiles, our Minuteman III, we have not held back the Trident, we have not held back all the other things that go to make up what we think is our necessary strength to back up a foreign policy.

So, after all, to make this little change over there—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. One minute more.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time of the Senator from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, I am glad to yield 1 minute of my time to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Do I have no time left?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am glad to yield the Senator 1 minute.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. The majority leader yields me 1 minute. I yield it to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I shall be very brief. I just wish to state that after the vote on this matter, regardless of the outcome, I am prepared to introduce a resolution—I believe a number of my colleagues may join in it; we have not had an opportunity to circulate it—directing the President of the United States to open discussions with the Soviet Union with a view to putting forward U.S. proposals for limitations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area affecting naval deployments, facilities, and land-based airpower.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's minute has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. Could I have 30 seconds?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I am glad to yield the distinguished chairman 3 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator yields me 3 minutes. I yield the Senator from Washington 1 minute of my 3.

Mr. JACKSON. I will not take quite all that.

Mr. President, I regret, as I stated earlier in my statement, and I think those supporting the resolution have a very strong point on this question, that the administration has failed to carry out the directive of the committee in connection with the military construction bill; but I would hope that we would proceed, however, in the meantime, with the work on this base. What we all want to limit is not simply bases; it is the totality of air, sea, and naval forces in the area.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional minute has expired.

Mr. JACKSON. I would hope that would be done.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes, to the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first let me commend the able Senator from Connecticut on the remarks he made with respect to Senators CULVER, CLARK, and LEAHY. Having served longer than anyone else except the chairman of the Committee on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I would say these three able men have created a new and pleasant atmosphere on that committee when it comes to any real objective analysis of various military requests.

Let me repeat what I said an hour or so ago because my name was recently mentioned.

Last year, the Committee on Armed Services noted that the serious defense and foreign policy questions related to the administration's request for expanding the facility at Diego Garcia required further consideration, and urged the administration to make "a thorough exploration of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing United States interests in the Indian Ocean."

This year, at the Armed Services Committee hearing on Diego Garcia on June 10, the administration representative was asked whether any effort had been made to initiate with the Soviet Union a discourse on the possibility of mutual arms restraint. His answer was, "No."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes remaining, the Senator from Mississippi has 2 minutes remaining. The Senator from Montana has 7 minutes remaining.

SEVERAL SENATORS: Vote! Vote!

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no one yields time—

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, if the other side is ready to yield back its remaining time, I am ready to yield back mine.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER), and I hope he uses them all.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for yielding me this time, and at the outset I would like also to thank Senator RIBICOFF and the others who have made reference to our trip to the Soviet Union, when the Soviet leaders did express their interest in mutual arms limitation and restraint in the Indian Ocean.

While the initial discussions were vague on that subject, as we reported to Secretary of State Kissinger, we did have subsequent reason to believe that the Soviets would be willing to sit down and discuss the subject. We reported these facts very carefully, and I think very accurately, to the Secretary of State, and I also mentioned them to the President himself, when I had the opportunity to participate in a meeting with him following our visit, that we had explored this subject with the Soviets.

Mr. President, no one knows whether or not the Soviets will respond formally and officially on a constructive, positive basis to this overture, if we ever make one. No one knows because it has never been tried. There has been no effort by the U.S. Government since 1971 to even

formally raise this issue with the Soviet Union.

I listened with interest when the distinguished Senator from Washington spoke of his own initiative in the Armed Services Committee report of a year ago, where the committee expressly directed the administration to explore with the Soviet Union all possible means of achieving a bilateral mutual arms restraint agreement.

They did this at a time that they were considering the Diego Garcia request and, as Senator Jackson says, they viewed that as an essential prerequisite to acting favorably on the subsequent authorization and appropriations for Diego Garcia, because they wisely perceived that we are at the crossroads when it comes to which direction we go with Diego Garcia. We are about to make a decision which is going, in significant part, to determine whether America moves toward a three-ocean Navy, at an estimated cost of \$5 billion to \$8 billion for three new carriers, all the associated aircraft, and the necessary support capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

We are at the crossroads of determining whether America, in the wake of Vietnam, is going to say once again that we are insensitive and indifferent when it comes to respecting the heartfelt opinions of other nations in the world; that we have come off of Vietnam, not in a neo-isolationist mood, but with an obsession to regain our lost machismo, so we do not touch the defense budget, and we pick the first occasion we can to build a new permanent base 10,000 miles from here.

For years I sat in this Congress and listened to people say, "What are we doing 10,000 miles from home? Why can't we just get out of there?"

We no sooner get out of there until we see the first big push to go back.

Diego Garcia? Who has ever heard of Diego Garcia? Whoever heard of the Gulf of Tonkin? Who ever heard of Khe Sanh? Those became bloody, tragic words to America.

I am under no illusion about the necessity for the American power and flag to be prominently positioned in the Indian Ocean.

I say to my fellow Members of the U.S. Senate, we are now prominently positioned in the U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

With all due respect to the distinguished chairman, since 1971, we have not been talking, we have not even raised this question with the Soviet Union; and since 1973, rather than talk, talk, talk, we have been deploying, deploying and deploying.

Nearly 6 months out of the last year we have had a carrier task force steaming around the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy does not even have an aircraft carrier.

I get so sick and tired of everyone poor-mouthing our military.

I believe in our military. I voted to give them sufficient strength.

We have power. We do not have to apologize to anyone in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere.

The facts of the matter, as so ably

articulated by the distinguished Senator from Ohio a few moments ago, are simply these:

The French naval fleet is equal to or exceeds the Soviet Navy tonight in the Indian Ocean. When we put the U.S. carrier *Enterprise* in there with all those 60 airplanes, with 7.5 tons of ordnance under the wings of each plane, it is like putting a 400-pound man in a little bathtub. It overwhelms everyone else there.

Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio has pointed out that the French Navy in the Indian Ocean is equal to or bigger than the Soviet Navy now. When we add the British, we have an advantage without even having the U.S.S. *Enterprise* come by, and it comes by all the time, and if we need to we can send it by more and more.

Our ships can stay 30 days at sea. That is why we have been spending billions, billions, and billions of dollars, American taxpayers' money, so they do not have to run into every port, nook, and cranny, and refuel like that pathetic Soviet Navy does.

We have a different navy. It can stay 30 days at sea. Guess what? If it wants to refuel for 30 more days, which is all we say we want Diego Garcia for, there are two ways we can get it. We can bring two oil tankers along with us to give us all the aviation and ship fuel we need. Of course, the nuclear aircraft carriers do not need any refueling.

Tonight, according to the Department of Defense, we can go into 36 ports in some 18 countries that will now refuel us. We did that during the 1973 embargo. We were refueled at a number of these ports. How many of these ports are going to close down in view of the fact that—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the chairman yield me 2 additional minutes?

Mr. MANSFIELD. How many more minutes do we have left?

There is no time remaining.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will someone yield me an additional minute?

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I do not have any time remaining.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I will do that.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be an additional time period of 4 minutes, to be equally divided between the manager of the bill and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Iowa has 2 additional minutes.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the question before us now is how many of those 36 ports are going to close down to us.

Every year since 1971, the United Nations General Assembly has urged this to be a zone of peace, to keep the two major super powers out. None of the 29 littoral states have publicly officially gone on record in support of this U.S. development in Diego Garcia. Most publicly oppose this base expansion. Ad-

dollars—a decision which the Brookings Institution estimates could require an additional \$800 million per year in operating costs and \$5 to \$8 billion in new ship construction. It is about our view of the world of the late 1970's and 1980's and America's position in that world.

It is about whether the achievements and prospects of détente will be limited primarily to strategic nuclear policy, or will apply to other areas of vital importance in East-West relations.

Are we content to let the Defense Department dictate the evolution of American foreign policy in the Indian Ocean, based on its definition of military convenience and perceived strategic requirements? Are we going to begin another era of over-extended military commitments out of step with our overall political and economic objectives in the decades to come? Or are we going to recognize a most valuable lesson of the last decade: the need to put political objectives and interests first; to think through problems before acting; and to exhaust diplomacy before once again reaching for the instruments of war?

Symbolically, a decision to proceed with construction on Diego Garcia means that the United States has more or less given up hope of getting an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

In this case, however, we are giving up before having really started. Last month the administration testified before the Armed Services Committee that there has not been a diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union on the question of the Indian Ocean since 1971. Yet it has been largely since 1971 that the significant events have taken place which are shaping the Pentagon's perceptions of our strategic needs in that area. The State Department, in a letter from Ambassador McCloskey to our distinguished colleague from Iowa (Mr. CULVER), suggested that the chances for negotiations on mutual limitations of military forces in the Indian Ocean would be improved if we first expand the facility on Diego Garcia.

But this sounds to me like just a tired playback of the old "bargaining chip" argument. "Continue to build up," so the argument goes, "in order to convince the other side of our determination, and to give them incentives to negotiate downward again." But as we have seen in the past, particularly in our strategic arms negotiations, it becomes increasingly difficult to de-escalate a competitive situation. The upward spiralling competition builds a momentum that fulfills its own predictions, and justifies mutual suspicions. Bargaining chips have simply failed to live up to what has been promised for them.

In part, the President has justified the U.S. need for Diego Garcia in terms of maintaining "stability and peace in the area." But the states of the region—the 29 littoral nations surrounding the Indian Ocean—apparently think otherwise. The administration itself made a survey of the littoral nations and, in reporting the results, grudgingly acknowledged that not one state in the region

has expressed support for the project; indeed many have strong objections. Even Australia, a strong American ally, has consistently and publicly voiced its disapproval of taking actions which will lead to the establishment of a major naval arms race in that region. The United Nations, with the support of the littoral states, has every year since 1971, passed resolutions declaring a desire to make the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace," and has appointed an ad hoc committee to implement this resolution. Yet for the relatively minor tactical advantages of "greater maneuverability and flexibility" in the Indian Ocean, we are apparently prepared to ignore the policy objectives of the littoral states, themselves; imperiously dismiss loud protests from many Indian Ocean states; and explain to them that we are taking this action for their own good.

Mr. President, I have no illusions about the reality of increased Soviet naval presence in recent years, in many areas including the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union seems determined to extend the global reach of its Navy. It has indeed upgraded its facilities at Berbera, Somalia. But let us keep a sense of proportion about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Despite the flurry of statistics flowing out of the Pentagon, it is a relatively small and limited force, which presents no major threat to the American, British or French forces deployed there. The French alone have a greater number of combatant ships permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean, as well as a greater number of port facilities, than any other power. And the combined American, British and French forces in the region are clearly superior to Soviet forces. What is important to remember is that in moving to escalate the American presence in the area, we are inviting a strong Soviet response.

Mr. Colby, the Director of the CIA, testified less than a year ago that if the United States significantly increased its presence in the area, the Soviet Union would likely build up its forces faster than would be the case otherwise.

Mr. President, last Friday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, without objection, adopted an amendment which I introduced with my distinguished colleagues Senators CRANSTON and PELL, to the Omnibus Foreign Relations Authorization bill. This amendment would put the Senate firmly on record in urging the President to begin a diplomatic initiative with the Soviet Union, and seek negotiations for mutual limitations of military forces in the Indian Ocean. We are at the crucial turning point on this issue. I am convinced that not enough has been done to explore diplomatic possibilities. In the post-Vietnam era, our policy for new and questionable military commitments in remote regions of the world should be one of extreme caution and prudence.

Mr. President, I was in the Chamber earlier this afternoon and heard, as many of my colleagues did, the very comprehensive, rational, and intelligent presentation of the distinguished Senator from Iowa in his handling of the points that are at difference during this debate. There are just two very small but im-

portant points I wish to make, which I think help substantiate his splendid argument.

First, on Friday the Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously adopted a resolution urging the President of the United States to make a best effort to achieve negotiations with the Soviet Union, and report back to Congress, on the whole question of limiting arms in the Indian Ocean. So we have a very clear expression by the full membership of the Committee on Foreign Relations, indicating that we want to talk with the Russians, rather than take what I think would be an unfortunate step in the escalation of the arms race.

Second, the Committee on Armed Services, in its report on page 4, last year urge the administration to move ahead into discussions with their Soviet counterparts, to find whether we can reach some limitation in the arms race, with respect to the Indian Ocean.

Finally, the President of the United States is on his way to Helsinki to have talks with Mr. Brezhnev relating to the European security conference and other matters. We have our own negotiators in Geneva to consider the complex issues at the SALT talks. We have our people in Vienna to consider the issues at the MBFR talks.

We have recognized these as areas in which we are prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union, in an effort to improve not only our security but also the security of people all over the world. Today's resolution is an attempt to recognize that here is an additional area in which we should first bring the best efforts of the United States to try to reach some kind of negotiated solution. Those of us who support the resolution of the distinguished Senator from Montana wish to identify ourselves with his efforts and those of the distinguished Senator from Iowa.

Why are we not prepared to talk about arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, but are prepared to do it at SALT? The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services have recognized the importance of such talks in terms of the peace and security of our country and of the world, let alone the extraordinary escalation not only of the arms race but also of the continued outpouring of American taxpayers' funds, which will do very little to increase our security or the cause of peace.

For these reasons, I hope that the position of the majority leader and the Senator from Iowa will be upheld.

I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 19 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. President, I do not like to repeat, but the membership in attendance varies from time to time.

This is an extremely serious matter. The argument is made that we should let the other forces in the area take care of any situation that might develop for us.

We appreciate our allies; but they are not always been able to come to our rescue in situations such as this.

Mention has been made of the British force. No one knows how long they will be there or what their plans are to stay. Certainly, if this whole area means anything to us, we had better depend on ourselves, to the extent of having a supply of fuel. That is what this is a matter of, fuel for any planes that we might have involved or any oil-burning vessels that we might have involved.

This matter has been gone over with the utmost completeness. This is no idle matter about the President making the request for these funds. He came in as a new President. My position last year, in the conference, was that we should have his judgment on this. He has given it to us here in a very positive and explicit way. I shall not read it now, but I shall later, or I shall show it to anybody. It is in the RECORD.

Let me read briefly from something he had before him from the Department of Defense, concurred in by the Department of State and concurred in by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I quote this communication to the President, and I am taking the liberty of citing this.

It is significant that the Soviets have failed to combine their criticism of United States plans for Diego Garcia with any proposal for a mutual force reduction, despite the obvious appeal for propaganda purposes, nor is there evidence to suggest that they would be prepared to dismantle their own facilities in Somalia in response to any change of United States policy regarding Diego Garcia.

This is dated sometime in May of this year. Since then we have had eyewitness proof, by Senator BARTLETT, as well as others, of that amazing, large, missile facility they are building there, while we are doing nothing but talk.

As a result, we are not optimistic about the prospects for an effective arms control agreement with the USSR under present circumstances in the Indian Ocean, and we are concerned that a delay in construction of facilities at Diego Garcia during prolonged negotiations could result in an actual or apparent asymmetry in the support available to our respective forces in potential crisis situations. We have on several occasions—most recently to the British Government—expressed our willingness to consider constructive—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 5 minutes of the Senator is up.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 more minute.

To consider constructive proposals for mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we believe that proposals for limitations of force presence would be hindered rather than helped by linking them explicitly to the separate issue of support facilities. This matter is discussed in greater detail in the Inter-agency response to NSSM 199, "Indian Ocean Strategy."

For years, since the start of these arms limitation talks, we have, over and over, appropriated money for more missiles, more armaments, everything of that kind, on the belief that to show a weakness would lessen our negotiating chances. So this is just another case.

I yield to the Senator from Arkansas. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.

I am concerned about one aspect of this. I have not yet determined definitely that I shall support appropriations for this item. I am concerned that the action proposed here today is tantamount to repealing all existing authorizations for this improvement. Am I correct?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator's concern is well placed. If the position of those opposed to Diego Garcia prevails here today that kills all the prior authorizations, it kills the prior partial appropriation, and it kills any current authorizations that are in progress now and any prospective appropriations, because there would be no authorization for any more money.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is up.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Then we have made some appropriations and we have made some improvement on this island.

Mr. STENNIS. There has been some improvement, dredging and so forth. Some of this money I am referring to has been appropriated but not spent.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Do we have improvements on this island now?

Mr. STENNIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. This is an expansion or an addition to those facilities, improvement of what we already have?

Mr. STENNIS. That is what the argument is about.

Mr. McCLELLAN. This action would repeal all authority for that expansion?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. This has been authorized subject to the President's certification.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. He has so certified. Now we would retreat from the authorization that we made and the President's certification of the need for it.

Mr. STENNIS. Absolutely. That is exactly what the resolution will do, if it prevails.

The House, I am just told, has just voted down the proposal to strike down money that is in their current military construction bill, or the military construction appropriation.

Mr. McCLELLAN. What I want to say to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi is whether we make this appropriation or not is something that as yet, we can decide. But I think we are signalling today a retreat and I do not think that is very definitely in the interest of our country. We can signal this retreat. We can do this and it signals a retreat, because somebody is afraid that maybe we are going to provoke another aspect of an arms race.

Well, Mr. President. I think we should remember that what action Russia takes, she takes and does not announce it to the world, as we do. We have to find it out by other means. We have discovered the expansion she is making in this area.

I am not ready to vote for an appropriation today, but I do not want to vote to repeal this authorization and the President's certification of the need for it.

Mr. FORD. Will the Senator from Mississippi yield for a question?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I will.

May I yield for a request already in? I yield to the Senator from New Jersey 2 minutes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi. I shall be surprised if I have to take very much longer than a minute to state my position.

The Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the other day offered, in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the committee approved, an amendment to the State Department authorization bill stating that it was the sense of the committee—and if adopted as law—that this bill will provide that it is essential to the President that this country make an exploration, with the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean, of the possibility of an arms agreement in that whole area, the ocean and the littoral, of naval and air and all military installations. It seems to me, Mr. President, that that is the way this matter ought to be left, and that we should not, on a unilateral basis now, on this bill, reject the possibility of an agreement based upon bilateral and multilateral concessions and agreements on the part of all the parties at interest. Therefore, as much as I regret to disagree with the majority leader on any matter of importance, I feel that it is up to us not to prejudice the possibility of a broad agreement which could come from the action that I have referred to.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. President. I yield myself 1 minute to answer a question.

Mr. FORD. The Senator from Mississippi made a statement a few minutes ago that the House had just voted down the funds for Diego Garcia. Did I understand the Senator correctly?

Mr. STENNIS. That is what I was told, that on a voice vote, they refused to strike out the funds that are in a bill over there for Diego Garcia. I think that was a new military construction bill, I say to the Senator, for fiscal 1976. That is my information.

Mr. FORD. Can the Senator tell me what percentage of funds is spent by the United States so far as NATO is concerned? What is the amount of money in percentages that are carried by this country?

Mr. STENNIS. By their country, you can estimate those amounts in various different ways, I will say to the Senator from Kentucky. There is no way to approach it unless you lay down the ground rules.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield time?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield a half-minute to myself. In other words, do you charge all the long-range bombers part to NATO and part to us? How much of the fleet do you charge?

Mr. FORD. It is true that the United States carries the biggest burdens.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; we carry a considerable part of those. We have been trying to reduce the amount.

Mr. FORD. Is it not true the French and the British have an overwhelming presence in the Indian Ocean; that they

mittedly, some have gone privately and whispered in the corridors and said:

Listen, don't listen to my public speeches to my people. We are all for it.

There have been a few who have apparently said that.

Is that not one other painful lesson that I had hoped we had learned from Vietnam? Is that not one other painful lesson?

So, Mr. President, when they talk about the French and they disparage their capability, who doubts that the French are going to look out for their own strategic interest? What do they have the navy for?

They have known, Mr. President, for a lot longer than the U.S. Senate how critically important that lifeline is to them, and that is why they are there. Make no mistake about that.

But they are certainly going to be sympathetic and supportive of any significant opposition to Soviet moves in those areas.

Finally, Mr. President, this is all we are really saying here. When the distinguished Senator from Washington says we want the administration to look at this, that we want those in the administration to explore all these diplomatic opportunities, the fact of the matter is they have not. They have not done one single thing, and they want another bargaining chip. That is all they want—one more bargaining chip.

I want to tell the Senators here is one U.S. Senator who refuses to impose upon the back of the taxpayers of his State one more foolish bargaining chip theory when in a matter of a few months we can determine the good faith interest of the Soviet Union in negotiations, and if they prove to be unresponsive then we can go ahead with Diego Garcia and all the nations of the area will know that we made a good faith effort at restraint.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CULVER. If there is an unwilling response, then there is ample opportunity to do what we must do in America's interest.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 30 seconds?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, the only justification for the expansion of the support facilities on Diego Garcia is that this project will protect the legitimate security interests of the United States. This is the basic issue. We are a major world power. There is no way we can renounce the responsibilities that go with that position. If we do not look after our own interests, no one is going to do it for us. And it is this fundamental reality of international politics which is missing from any of the arguments being advanced in favor of Senate Resolution 160. I believe the establishment of reliable support facilities in the third largest ocean of the world and in an area where U.S. interests are grow-

ing rapidly is both reasonable and prudent. What are the arguments raised against this measure?

First, we are told that this project will jeopardize our good relations with the nations of that area. What nations are we talking about? There are indeed a small number of states in the Indian Ocean which are extremely vocal in their opposition to a U.S. presence. The leader of this faction is—and has always been—the government of Mrs. Gandhi in India. Mrs. Gandhi has never hesitated to offer us advice on almost any subject, but there is some question about her qualifications to preach to others in view of the events which are being reported in India today.

Against this faction at one end of the spectrum, there is another group of Indian Ocean states which recognizes the value of a U.S. presence to counterbalance the growing Soviet naval expansion. In an ideal world, these nations would prefer to see no major power presence in the area—and I think we can all agree that would be desirable. But this is not an ideal world, and nations must still be concerned about their security. Pakistan, Iran, and Singapore have indicated publicly their belief that a U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean contributes to the security and stability of the area, and other nations have made the same point privately.

However, the large majority of nations in the area have never found it necessary to comment on the subject at all, beyond the annual ritual of voting for the Indian Ocean Peace Zone in the U.N. General Assembly. If one goes beyond the voting record and examines the regional reaction to the recent revelation of Soviet construction activities in Somalia, the inevitable conclusion would be that U.S. relations with most of the states in the Indian Ocean would not be jeopardized by the maintenance of an effective U.S. presence.

We are told that construction on Diego Garcia will lead to a Soviet military reaction and a possible arms race. In making this argument, it is conveniently forgotten that the planning and construction of a major missile support facility by the Soviet Union was already underway in Somalia before the United States ever began its policy of periodic naval deployments to the area. That construction is now largely complete, and the largest airfield in Africa is being built next door to it, while we are here debating whether to spend \$37 million for the modest expansion of support facilities on Diego Garcia. The only Soviet response to the documented evidence of their activities in the area has been either to claim that it was merely a desert mirage or to insist that it was a very large meat packing plant. In the concern for our own interests, are we going to accept the word of Tass or the first hand report of those Members of Congress who undertook a grueling trip to see for themselves?

We are told that this proposed construction is only the beginning of the expenses, that we will have to spend billions more in establishing a new fleet for that area. In contrast, we have the pub-

lic statements of the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States that these very limited fuel storage and other logistical installations are intended to support the periodic deployment of U.S. forces into the area. The facilities are not intended for the permanent basing of operational forces and do not imply an increase in the present level of forces deployed to the region. One has only to examine the extremely modest nature of the proposed construction project to realize that Diego Garcia is not planned to be another San Diego or Subic Bay. On the contrary, the proposed construction would appear to be entirely consistent with its projected role of providing limited support for occasional deployments. Those who claim otherwise should be able to offer us more than their own hypothetical calculations.

Finally, we are told that we should delay any action on this measure while we wait to see if the Russians are willing to consider mutual arms limitations. In my view, the surest way to insure that the Russians will not talk seriously about arms limitations is to open discussions at a time when there is a perceived imbalance in available support facilities and to make our own plans hostage to Soviet delaying tactics. We do not need any further delay to demonstrate Soviet intransigence on this issue. They have already given ample evidence of this by their actions since 1972 in building a significant new facility in Berbera. The evidence is there and fully documented for those who wish to see it. Those who do not, I submit, will not be convinced by yet another delay in a proposal which has now been under consideration in Congress for 19 months.

On the contrary, if we want to have an effective arms control arrangement in the Indian Ocean, let us first get our own house in order. Let us indicate to the U.S.S.R. that we take our interests in this area—where half the world's seaborne oil is in transit at any given moment—very seriously. If we expect the Soviets to take seriously our concern, we must take it seriously ourselves and give them some tangible evidence of a firm and united U.S. policy.

The proposal to expand the facilities at Diego Garcia is carefully designed to permit a degree of flexibility and independence to U.S. forces operating far from any reliable sources of logistical support. That flexibility is a necessary ingredient of an American policy which is concerned over the continued peace and stability of an area which is directly related to the economic well-being of our own Nation and much of the industrialized world. I urge the Senate to examine this issue in terms of the hard facts, not wishful thinking.

I urge the Senate to look at America's real interests and responsibilities at a time of rapid change and great uncertainty. And I urge Senators to join me in opposing Senate Resolution 160.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. Go ahead.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-

July 28, 1975

ator from Mississippi and the Senator from South Carolina each has 4 minutes. That is the sole time remaining.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield some time to me?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I will just take 2 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator desire 2 minutes?

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Two minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to him.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator yielding me 2 minutes.

I spoke at some length earlier today. There were very few Senators in the Chamber at that time.

But I speak in favor of the resolution of the distinguished majority leader.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, indicated to us that 75 percent of the Western European oil came from the Middle East, that 85 percent of the Japanese oil came from the Middle East.

It is my recollection, and I may be wrong, but somewhere near 7 percent of the U.S. supply comes from the Middle East.

Their need is far greater than ours. This is a long way from home. We can use the base at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. We have a flagship there and a couple of destroyers. This is right where the oil is. We can use the South African base, perhaps the best base between the Persian Gulf and the base in Norfolk, Va.

But it just seems unreasonable to me for us to try to protect the interests of the entire world when they can do this for themselves.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 additional minute?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. President, we have two nuclear carriers. We have the *Enterprise* and the *Nimitz*. The *Nimitz* is not fully available. But I have visited on that carrier. It has nuclear power, and it can go 13 years without refueling. I think the same is true of the *Enterprise*.

We are well able to protect the American interests without this base, and I think it is time there is a sharing of global responsibility, that we do not see it this time, and I am going to support this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND address the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. How much time do I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes remaining.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in fact, I have just 2 minutes. I just want to remind the Senate that—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Senators will take their seats.

Mr. THURMOND. I just want to remind the Senate that the President of the United States has taken the position that the construction of the facilities in Diego Garcia are essential to the national interests of the United States. I am sure that we all have information, but he may have more information than we do on that point.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I do not yield. My time is limited.

I also remind the Senate that Dr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, feels exceedingly strongly about this matter to protect our national interests.

I remind the Senate that General Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made a very strong statement on this matter, as found on page 23 of the Committee on Armed Services hearings on this subject.

I remind the Senate that the Committee on Armed Services went into this matter carefully, and their conclusions are found in the report of the committee. They mention mainly three points: First, the United States has vital interests in the Indian Ocean; second, the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has grown steadily; third, the construction of modest logistical facilities at Diego Garcia is a prudent action. That is a result of hearings about which I have told the Senate.

Senator BARTLETT went over there and saw the situation. He came back and recommended strongly that we go forward on Diego Garcia.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. I will not use all of it. My intention is just to review two points.

First, if this resolution of disapproval is agreed to, it will kill and cancel money, heretofore authorized and appropriated—the first half of these funds—and that will be all for this year.

Second, I have here the evaluation of the President of the United States. He has reviewed all the military and foreign policy implications and certifies that the construction there is essential to the national interests of the United States.

Mr. President, we now have there in Diego Garcia just 60,000 barrels of fuel for aircraft. How much do we have for vessels? Not one barrel. Where are they going to get it if they need it? Should they have to go around and buy it wherever they can? Does that make sense?

What is the other choice? Go 3,500 miles. I have been saying 3,500; it is 3,560 miles. They would have to go to Subic Bay, in the Philippine Islands. It would take 8 days for the oil tanker to get to Diego Garcia.

We have talked about it, the President has considered it, and time has passed. Things are moving on the other side.

What are we going to do? Do we think the President can turn around in 3 weeks or something like that and get any kind of agreement with respect to the Indian Ocean? For years, we have had these arms reduction talks and have made just a little headway. We need not think we are going to get something out of them quickly in this Indian Ocean matter.

Time has run out for us—and my time, too, Mr. President.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON SENATE
RESOLUTION 160

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, today we are debating another major issue regarding this country's defense policy. The decision we make today will have a profound impact upon the future of our foreign policy and the size of defense expenditures in years to come.

I am heartened by the depth of discussion on this issue as I was heartened by the wide-ranging debate we had on the whole spectrum of defense and foreign policy issue this past June. Regardless, of what decisions have been and will be made, it is encouraging that the attention of this body and of the public has been focused on the difficult choices which confront the Nation. If there was any lesson in our experience in Southeast Asia, it was that such choices must be made critically and thoughtfully for they can carry immense consequences.

Mr. President, I believe that we should make every effort to keep the Indian Ocean free from the dangers of United States-Soviet military competition which expansion of our facilities at Diego Garcia would guarantee. Each year since 1971, the United Nations General Assembly has urged that the Indian Ocean be a "zone of peace." The littoral nations of that area, including such steadfast allies as Australia and New Zealand, have opposed the establishment of foreign military bases and great power rivalry in the region. It would be most unfortunate if we were to upset the balance which now exists.

At present, the United States has the capability of showing the flag and deploying large naval forces in the Indian Ocean. We have access to the ports of 18 Indian Ocean nations. There is at this time no real danger to U.S. interests in the area due to Soviet deployments. France has a greater number of ships permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean than any other nation.

Much talk in recent weeks has centered around Soviet activities in Somalia. Unfortunately, these activities have not been put in proper perspective. Construction at the present level does not, as some have stated, upset the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. They indicate, rather, a greater Soviet interest in the area and a disquieting potential for growth.

The question before us is whether we should now seek to match the Soviet move as quickly as possible and add fuel to Indian Ocean arms race. In my judgment, we should not.

The Director of the CIA, William Colby testified last year that Soviet actions in the Indian Ocean have been "highly responsive" to U.S. activity in that area.

July 28, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 13965

would be increased from 60 days to about 6 months. The longer operating cycle would reduce time lost in transit, permit maintenance of a continuing carrier presence and would mean far less down time for 7th Fleet ships operating in the western Pacific.

The logic, therefore, of upgrading Diego Garcia seems plain to me in terms of increasing our effectiveness in the Indian Ocean and cutting our costs in the process. But there is another consideration which, I am sure, my colleagues can appreciate and which they have no doubt considered. That consideration, frankly, has to do with changing world conditions and how we shall adjust to them.

We no longer automatically call the tune in the western Pacific or Southeast Asia. Our holdings and our interests there no longer are automatically assured. Vietnam and Cambodia are lost to American influence. Thailand has invited us to leave. There are rumblings that we may even have to give up our large base at Subic Bay. There is no hope that Indonesia will allow us to develop a large naval base there.

I think this consideration makes an upgrading on Diego Garcia imperative. We know that our national interests will dictate the operation of naval forces in the Indian Ocean, in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. Logic indicates we will continue to send naval forces to the Indian Ocean whenever necessary, whether we have facilities on Diego Garcia or not. I would think that prudent planning dictates that we be able to support these forces in the most rational and economic manner possible. The requested facilities for Diego Garcia will serve this purpose.

I know all about the arguments against Diego Garcia. There are those who say the United States has no business being in the Indian Ocean. I counter that argument by saying that America cannot neglect that area of the world any more than it can ignore any other place on the globe. Our interests in the Indian Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia, with our interest in uninterrupted energy imports and with our fundamental interest in maintaining worldwide stability.

In April 1974, Admiral Zumwalt, then chief of naval operations, had this to say about our role in the Indian Ocean:

In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean has become an area with the potential to produce major shifts in global power balance over the next decade. It follows that we must have the ability to influence events in that area and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence. That, in my judgment, is the crux of the rationale for what we are planning to do at Diego Garcia.

What, exactly, are we planning to do at Diego Garcia? We are not, as some claim, establishing, for the first time, a U.S. naval facility in the Indian Ocean. We have been operating, in a small way, at Diego Garcia for some time. What we propose to do now is upgrade our facilities there. Specifically, the Navy wants to enlarge the anchorage area of the lagoon in order that ships can anchor in

safety. Fuel storage capacity will be increased. The existing 8,000-foot runway will be lengthened to 12,000 feet. The airfield ramp area will be increased, additional personnel quarters will be built and our existing communications facilities will be improved.

These improvements do not imply a new role for our naval forces in the Indian Ocean, nor do they mean that additional naval forces will be required or stationed there. But they will give us the capability for this, and they will save us money in the process.

Mr. President, I support the efforts to make necessary improvements to the facilities on Diego Garcia in order that our ships operating in the Indian Ocean will be able to receive fuel and supplies in an economical manner. The building of these facilities is a matter of saving money and of "keeping our powder dry."

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I am sure everyone in the Senate favors a strong defense establishment for this country. There is overwhelming support for every program necessary to insure the defense of this Nation and to give credibility to our worldwide responsibilities. But this does not mean that we are so concerned about defense that we are ready to sanction each and every new opportunity to spend the taxpayers' dollars on new military and naval programs.

The proposed Diego Garcia naval base in the Indian Ocean is an example of a step which has implications going far beyond those appearing on the surface. This is no small step made to shorten refueling lines. It is, without doubt, the beginning of a struggle for naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

Is this new stage of the arms race really necessary? Or is it possible that through talks with the Soviet Union our two nations might come to an understanding that it is in the interest of neither to get into yet another contest involving perhaps \$5 to \$8 billion in procurement funds and something approaching a billion dollars a year in operating costs?

However remote a treaty covering the Indian Ocean might seem at this moment, there have been developments involving our two countries in recent years which also seemed unlikely only a short time before.

But whether a treaty can be reached or not, the case here and now for a naval base in the Indian Ocean is not convincing. The arguments for it appear to be far more those of convenience than necessity.

Should American defense policy be based on convenience?

Is it really in our best interests to risk an expensive new round in the arms race simply to make it easier and cheaper to operate our naval forces in that area?

And what saving is there if having a base there will produce new demands from the Navy for more carriers, more escort ships and all the rest?

Mr. President, in place of this new investment in naval stalemate I believe we must bend our best efforts to invest in more constructive ways in the future of this part of the world. The little nation

of Somalia, which finds itself suddenly a pawn in a power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, needs help in finding a future for itself outside the Soviet orbit. The die is not yet cast there or anywhere else in the south of Africa. With wisdom and foresight the United States can yet win that fight. But building naval bases and getting caught up in a struggle for naval supremacy will contribute little toward this kind of goal.

Eventually, I concede we may have to do this. There may be reasons why we cannot escape such a struggle. Yet the burden of proof rests with the Navy and its proponents in the Congress. I have yet to see such proof.

Until a real effort has been made to negotiate with the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean deployments and until a convincing case can be made that the Diego Garcia naval base is a necessity and not just a convenience I shall continue to oppose this new adventure in brinkmanship.

I intend to vote in favor of Senate Resolution 160 disapproving construction of the proposed naval base. I commend our distinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, for introducing it. I intend to vote for the resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the proposed expansion of our military facilities on Diego Garcia.

This small island—located in the Indian Ocean, near both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, about midway between Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia—may indeed be one of the most strategically situated of all our military facilities throughout the world. The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean are critically important to the United States. Mr. President, not only because of Middle East oil but also because of the key air and sea lanes running through it. And the United States is not alone in having a critical interest in the Persian Gulf; our allies in NATO and Japan have an interest that goes just as deep.

It is evident, Mr. President that the Soviet Union too has a deep interest in the region and intends to undertake a sizeable buildup of its naval forces there. The recent reopening of the Suez Canal will substantially enhance the ability of Russia to support and reinforce its units in the Indian Ocean. At present the Soviets have at least fourteen naval facilities in the West Indian Ocean, the most important being at Berbera, Somalia. The United States has no facility comparable to these bases in this entire region, the closest similar base being at Subic Bay in the Philippines, 4,000 miles away.

Clearly then, Mr. President, we must demonstrate our resolve that no outside power will be permitted to dominate the Persian Gulf. We must take steps to insure that our interests, and those of our allies, are fully protected. Failure by the United States to counter Soviet encroachment in the Indian Ocean would threaten our national security, thereby threatening world peace and world

stability. Mr. President, the proposal to expand and strengthen the U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia has my support and I urge my colleagues to approve this proposal.

DIEGO GARCIA? WE STILL HAVE TIME

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on May 19, 1975, Senator MANSFIELD introduced Senate Resolution 160, disapproving Department of Defense construction on the island of Diego Garcia. After a thorough examination of the issue, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported that resolution adversely. The vote, as we all know, was not unanimous in committee. That, in my opinion, is as it often is on an issue as complex and important as this one, which involves not only military but also diplomatic factors.

Today, on the floor of the Senate, our distinguished colleague from Iowa, Senator JOHN CULVER, presented one of the most lucid and well-reasoned expositions of the various issues involved in Senate Resolution 160. I think that all of us on the floor of the Senate at the time of his presentation will agree that he is one of our most articulate spokesmen on national security issues, and is to be commended for his thoughtfulness and insight into these issues.

As chairman of the Senate delegation to the Soviet Union from June 28 to July 2, I also would like at this point to thank the junior Senator from Iowa, Mr. CULVER, for his contribution to our delegation. I can attest personally to his ability to forcefully and effectively discuss national security issues with foreign officials from the perspective of the U.S. Senate and U.S. national security interests.

My decision to support the Mansfield resolution was made after a thorough examination of the background of the Defense request to expand facilities on Diego Garcia. In reaching this decision, I reviewed the arguments for and against the request and the findings of the Senate delegation to Somalia, and discussed the Diego Garcia project with Department of Defense officials. Had it been possible to offer an amendment to the resolution of disapproval, I would have done so, in order to make clear that the intent of the Senate was not to scuttle the project, but to give us time to enter negotiations and try to prevent an arms race in the Indian Ocean area. I will speak more of this later, but first let me share with you some of the thinking which went into my final decision.

BACKGROUND ON DIEGO GARCIA

Diego Garcia is an atoll in the Indian Ocean over which the United Kingdom exercises sovereignty. Per two agreements with the British Government—1966 and 1972—the United States is authorized to use Diego Garcia "to meet the needs of both Governments for defense" and for "a limited naval communications facility."

Currently, the United States maintains a limited communications facility on Diego Garcia. It also has a 8,000 foot runway and a dredged turning basin in the lagoon for ships. The latter is used by ships which provide logistical support of

the communications station. About 430 U.S. personnel and 20 British military personnel are based in Diego Garcia.

The improvements proposed by Department of Defense would upgrade the runway and lagoon, develop an ammunition and fuel storage complex, and develop support facilities for the personnel assigned to Diego Garcia—for example, chapel, club, recreational facilities, hobby shop, theater, library. As a result of these improvements, C-5A's and, in emergencies, B-52's would be able to land on Diego Garcia and aircraft carriers could dock in the port. The U.S. permanent presence on the atoll would be increased to 600. Total cost of this construction is \$37,802,000.

And an referendum agreement to permit this construction has been reached with the British. The British will not sign the agreement until Congress approves the construction.

ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

Three arguments for improving U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia were offered by DOD, and those in the Senate who supported DOD's request. These were that the expanded facilities are necessary:

First. To enable the United States to counter the increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area;

Second. To enable the United States to protect its vital interests in the Indian Ocean area—access to crude oil and freedom of the seas; and

Third. To provide secure support, at a reasonable cost, to the U.S. forces in the event of contingencies.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSTRUCTION

Nine arguments were advanced by opponents of the expansion. They were:

First. Prior to embarking on construction, we should try negotiation. Despite congressional interest in negotiation—expressed in the Armed Services Committee report at the time that the Congress voted to require Presidential certification of the essential need—no attempt to engage the Soviets in discussions or negotiations for mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean area were made. Most, if not all, the nations of the area would support mutual restraint.

Second. The publicly stated opinions of the littoral nations should be respected. To disregard the public statements of leaders in the area could create ill will toward the United States.

Third. The Soviet presence in the area, including the reported facility at Berbera, is limited. It provides no major challenge to the American, French, and British forces in the area which collectively are much stronger than Soviet forces in the area and have access to a greater number of ports. The French alone have a great number of port facilities and a greater number of ships permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean than any other power.

Fourth. The Soviet facilities at Berbera are not as ominous as DOD claims. The Soviet presence in Somalia represents a potential threat in the future, but not a current risk to U.S. interests. The tactical and strategic balance in the Indian Ocean still favors the United States and its allies.

Fifth. The United States has no treaty obligations in the area. Since we have no obligation to consider deployment of forces into the countries of the region, there is no need to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia in order to adequately support a larger contingent of forces in the area. Our interests in maintaining freedom of the seas and safe transit for oil supplies can be served by working in concert with other nations.

Sixth. While stability in the Indian Ocean area is important to us, it is less essential to our security than to the security of some of our allies.

We should act in concert with them, rather than attempt to unilaterally police the area. It is reasonable to assume that France and Britain, which are far more dependent than the United States on Persian Gulf oil and which retain facilities in the area, would act to protect their access to oil supplies and freedom of navigation.

Seventh. The primary threat to United States, French, and British interests is a cutoff of oil supplies. This is a threat posed by Persian Gulf nations, not the Soviet Union.

Eighth. There is no firm agreement with the British on usage of the facilities on Diego Garcia. The ad referendum agreement reached provides for use of the facility for routine operations. The British have publicly stated that use of the facilities other than for routine purposes would "be a matter of joint decision of the two governments."

Ninth. Expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia would not provide us with sufficient capabilities to conduct major military operations in the Indian Ocean area. The expansion of facilities on the island is not necessary if our only goal is to show the flag. If our goal is greater, this and the associated costs of a three-ocean Navy—\$5 to \$8 billion operating costs—should be acknowledged.

OTHER FINDINGS

In addition to considering these arguments, I considered the findings of the Senate delegation, led by Senator BARTLETT, which visited Somalia during the July 4 recess.

The members of the group agreed that the Soviets do have some facilities in Somalia—missile storage and communications. The latter are definitely under Soviet control; the former may be. The group also agreed that the Soviets have access to other facilities—an airfield and port facilities. But, the group members differed in their interpretations of the military capabilities and significance of the facilities they saw. Some felt that the Soviet military potential in Somalia is significant and helps justify construction on Diego Garcia—others considered the Soviet potential less substantial.

I also discussed the need for Diego Garcia with DOD officials. They indicated that a decision to permit the construction would not affect the U.S. capability to deploy forces to the area so much as it would the cost of deploying the forces. This I took as a clear signal that it is not vital that we go ahead now with the expansion on Diego Garcia—the expansion may be important to our

July 28, 1975

interests, but it is not an urgent priority which should override all other considerations.

We discussed the possibilities of limiting superpower military presence in the Indian Ocean area. The DOD officials argued that, if we were to enter negotiations to limit superpower military presence now, without having first decided to expand our facilities at Diego Garcia, we would be at a disadvantage—the Soviets could tie us up for years in negotiations while they expanded their facilities in Berbera. This argument has some merit.

MY DECISION

I reached my decision to support the Mansfield resolution only after carefully weighing all of the above arguments, pro and con.

Quite frankly, I share my colleagues' concern about the potential impact which a decision to go ahead with the construction may have on the possibilities for preventing an arms race in the Indian Ocean area. I would have greatly preferred the administration first attempting to negotiate an agreement to limit Soviet and United States military presence in the area. At the same time, I sympathize with the argument that to approve the Mansfield resolution might encourage the Soviet Union to string out negotiations. I would have preferred, in this situation, to amend the Mansfield resolution to delay for 1 year the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia unless during this period of time the Soviets significantly expanded their presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area or the President was able to reach an arms limitation agreement.

In the first case, we would go ahead immediately with the construction. In the second, we would forgo expansion. Since I was unable to offer a bill to do this because of the parliamentary situation, I decided to support the Mansfield resolution as the approach more likely to encourage effective negotiation and discourage another arms race.

While I was unable to offer my bill during the debate, I would like to share it with the Senate now, as an expression of my sentiments on this issue. I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the copy of the proposed bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. —

A bill to delay the use of funds for military construction on the island of Diego Garcia

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds heretofore authorized for the construction of any military facility on the Island of Diego Garcia may be obligated for such purpose—

(1) prior to September 1, 1976, unless the President determines and notifies the Congress in writing that the Soviet Union has, after the date of enactment of this Act, continued to construct and substantially expand military facilities in Somalia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area.

(2) after September 1, 1976, unless the President is unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union by Sep-

tember 1, 1976 to limit the military presence of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the Indian Ocean area.

Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. President, the resolution (S. Res. 160) to disapprove military construction on Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean involves both budgetary and foreign policy questions.

Construction of the proposed naval facility and improvements to the air base facility on Diego Garcia will cost \$118 million over a 2-year period. Included in these costs are military construction of \$37.8 million, operations and maintenance of \$25.3 million, procurement of \$19.7 million and military personnel costs of \$53.2 million.

The naval facility would support a carrier task force operating in the Indian Ocean for approximately 30 days, while the air base improvements would allow the operations of fighter aircraft, large transports and aerial refueling tankers. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger said:

This \$118 million base expansion is a small insurance investment with regard to logistical capability.

Said Schlesinger:

We are dealing with \$100 million, rather than vast expenditures.

I must correct the impression that this is an inconsiderable sum of money, and hence not a budget issue. Recently, I joined the Senate in rejecting an amendment to the child nutrition bill (H.R. 4222) proposed by Senator McGovern and others to offer reduced price meals under the school lunch program to students from families in certain income brackets just as free meals are now provided to the neediest students. That amendment would have cost only \$200 million this year. Although I was in sympathy with its purposes, I opposed the amendment for one reason only: It was above the budget targets we agreed to in May, and would have increased the deficit. It is my firm view that we must apply the same standards of austerity to all Federal programs. In this regard, military programs must stand on the same footing as school children.

Mr. President, as matters stand today, we face the very real prospect that the defense authorization and appropriations bills now making their way through the legislative process will exceed the budget targets which we all agreed to in May, not by \$100 million or \$200 million, but by \$1 billion or \$2 billion or more. In this situation, it would be the height of irresponsibility to dismiss a \$118 million project as of no budgetary significance.

The proposed construction on Diego Garcia should meet the strictest test of necessity if it is to win our approval in this time of painful budget choices. I believe that the proposal fails that test, and I intend to vote for Senate Resolution 160, in order to disapprove the proposed naval facility.

The foreign policy issue is whether the United States should establish a permanent naval base in the Indian Ocean at this time, as a prelude to greater un-

lateral military involvement in that region of the world.

The interest of the free world in maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean cannot be doubted, and for this reason the political stability of the nations in that part of the world should concern us.

The question is whether building a naval facility at Diego Garcia is the right step to take at this time in order to protect these interests.

The present military balance is not unfavorable to the free world. It is true that the Soviet Union has gradually expanded its naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and presently maintains a small force of about nine warships in the area.

The Soviet Union is also building a naval facility at Berbera, in Somalia. But collectively the American and French forces in the area are stronger and have access to a greater number of ports. And the United States periodically deploys large additional forces to the area for extended cruises.

The nations of the Indian Ocean littoral—which includes some of our closest allies—are not enthusiastic about the proposed U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia. Even Australia has publicly expressed its opposition to the proposed construction. The United Nations General Assembly, on several occasions since 1971, has urged that the Indian Ocean be a "zone of peace." In view of these attitudes, it is hard to see how our general interests in the area will be served by the proposed construction.

Moreover, according to testimony last year by CIA Director William Colby before the Senate Armed Services Committee, there is a very real prospect that the Soviet Union will match any increase in the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. It does not require much imagination to see that this could lead to a United States-Soviet naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, requiring large permanent fleet deployments in that area. The Brookings Institution has made a conservative estimate that an Indian Ocean fleet, if added to our present naval deployments, would require \$5 to \$8 billion in new ship construction and \$800 million per year in direct operating costs.

Defense Secretary Schlesinger recently testified that the Navy has no present plans for expanded operations in the Indian Ocean. But as my colleagues are aware, these positions have a way of changing over time. I have no doubt that if the Diego Garcia facility is approved, it will not be long before the need to sustain Indian Ocean operations will be used to justify an increase in the number of Navy warships.

Should the Soviets make a serious move to establish military dominance in the Indian Ocean, we would have no choice but to respond. But in view of the current absence of any serious threat, it is my judgment that there is ample time for diplomatic initiatives to avoid a naval arms race in the region.

Last year the Senate agreed that we should not approve construction on Diego Garcia until the President certified in writing to the Congress that he had fully reevaluated the military and

foreign policy implications of the proposed lease. In its report on the fiscal 1975 military construction authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee stipulated that the reevaluation should include "a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving, with the Soviet Union, mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of the Indian Ocean."

But in a letter to Senator CULVER dated July 15, the State Department reports that the administration has decided not to approach the Soviets at the present time. In fact, the administration has not sought a Soviet response to any proposal for arms limitations in the Indian Ocean since 1971.

In view of the administration's utter lack of initiative in this question, and in view of the large stakes involved, I have joined as cosponsor of an amendment proposed by Senators KENNEDY, PELL, and CRANSTON to S. 1517, the omnibus foreign relations authorization bill. This amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that the President should seek negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve mutual limitations of naval and other military deployments in the Indian Ocean.

It is, of-course, possible that the Soviets have no interest in such a proposal. But we should first make the effort to establish this fact. If this diplomatic initiative should fail despite a good faith effort by the administration to establish naval limits in the Indian Ocean, I still do not believe the only response open to the United States is a unilateral expansion of our own military involvement. One avenue which would be worth exploration in that event has been suggested by Senator TAFT.

He has wisely noted that our European allies have a far greater interest in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean than does the United States, and that the Europeans have naval forces capable of defending that interest. If efforts to avoid an arms race in the Indian Ocean should fail, I believe we then should encourage our allies to take the appropriate steps to defend their interests.

I would like to add that I also support another important diplomatic initiative recently recommended by Senator BARTLETT of Oklahoma following his visit to Somalia to examine the Soviet naval base and missile facility at Berbera. Senator BARTLETT's report indicates to me a serious interest on the part of the Somali Government in establishing better relations with the United States, possibly as a counterweight to Soviet influence in that country. I strongly endorse the Senator's recommendations that the President explore every opportunity to exploit this diplomatic opening.

In sum, I shall support S. 160, to disapprove military construction on Diego Garcia. I believe the expenditure of \$118 million to construct this naval facility is not justified at this time by the national interest. To undertake this marginal project before exploring all diplomatic opportunities to limit our naval involvement in the Indian Ocean and prevent a destabilizing arms race would be the wrong thing to do, both in terms

of our budget priorities and in terms of our foreign policy objectives.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 160 appears to overlook entirely the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to the Free World. The Indian Ocean constitutes 28 million square miles. It is bordered by 40 countries containing the world's richest known supplies of minerals and fuels.

The continent of Africa, which borders this vast body of water, contains all of the world's 53 most important minerals, including 34 percent of its bauxite, 23 percent of its uranium, 60 percent of its gold, and 96 percent of the world's diamonds. Many of these natural resources are located in southern Africa, and are vitally significant to the United States. Zambia and Zaire, for example, provide the United States with 47 percent of its cobalt requirements; South Africa supplies 24 percent of our chrome requirements; and Madagascar provides 22 percent of our graphite.

Soviet penetration of the Indian Ocean creates a clear and present danger to the economic and military interests not only of the African states, but to those of every country in the Free World. Since 1968, the Soviets have been quietly building up their naval presence in the Ocean. In addition to its facilities along the Mediterranean in North Africa, the Soviet Navy has established naval facilities in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, Jordan, North and South Yemen, Aden, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Singapore. More facilities may soon be built in Madagascar and even Mozambique.

Some of these facilities are quite extensive, as seen in Somalia. In Aden, the Soviets have both port and air facilities at two former British bases. According to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, the Soviets also maintain several permanent mooring buoys in the Indian Ocean and fleet anchorages in several locations near the island of Socotra and near the Chagos Archipelago.

What is more, the Soviet Union has also been actively engaged in a program of expanding many of its facilities in the host countries. It has constructed a communications station near Berbera; it has assisted in the enlargement of facilities at the Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr and at the Indian naval base at Visakhapatnam. Most important, it has built a very significant deep water port at Berbera in Somalia.

The increased activity of the Soviet Navy in this area of the world can also be seen when we examine the number of ship days accumulated by the Soviet Navy in recent years. In 1968, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the number was a mere 529. In 1970 it climbed to 1,670. In 1972, the Soviet Navy logged 2,387 ship days in the Ocean, and in 1973 rose to 2,487. These figures, I might add, involve only combatant ships and do not include auxiliary and support vessels. In contrast to Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the highest number of ship days recorded by the U.S. Navy during this period was 1,410 in 1973.

Mr. President, there is no doubt in my

mind that the Indian Ocean is rapidly becoming a Soviet lake. The implications if this are far reaching when we stop to consider not only the tremendous natural wealth of Africa, but the political instability and Communist activity that is presently plaguing so many of the African countries. At this very moment, the situation is critical in Angola; and in Mozambique there is the possibility of Soviet control of that Nation's harbors, the most important of which is the vital deep water port of Nacala. If the Soviets were to control Nacal and Diego Suarez, the important military base that the French are evacuating, they could effectively block the narrow Mozambique channel between Madagascar and Mozambique and thus interdict the oil traffic from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and the North American Continent.

Through control of these strategic areas, the Soviet Union would be in a position to cripple the West economically; and it would also allow the Soviets to exploit any revolutionary situations that might develop—and are likely to develop—in the future.

The conclusion is inescapable, Mr. President, that even the development of Diego Garcia is an inadequate response to the Soviet build-up in the Indian Ocean. To prohibit the construction of military facilities at Diego Garcia is therefore tantamount to giving the Soviets domination of the Indian Ocean. In the words of Mr. J. A. Parker, a very knowledgeable American black leader who has studied Africa extensively:

The combined U.S.S.R. strategy of political influencing onshore and naval penetration offshore in the Indian Ocean is likely, in the absence of decisive countering by the Western alliance, to be intensified in the event of a Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and, in particular, Mozambique.

Mr. President, I think Senators will be interested in a fine commentary on the general subject of our security interests in the Persian Gulf and the Western Indian Ocean. This commentary was written by the distinguished author, Anthony Harrigan.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Harrigan's commentary be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the commentary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

(By Anthony Harrigan)

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Since the opening of the twentieth century, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have

July 28, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 13969

been the primary theatres of history for the people of the United States. Two world wars and lesser conflicts have been fought on those oceans and on the continents they separate. As we approach the final quarter of the twentieth century, however, it is increasingly clear that the Indian Ocean is becoming the new arena of political conflict. More particularly, one of the arms of that ocean—the 500-mile long Persian Gulf—has become a focus of our strategic concerns.

The vastness of this ocean region is little comprehended by the U.S. public. The entire Indian Ocean is 4,000 miles wide by 4,000 miles long. One statistic indicates the scope of the naval security problems involved in this region. From Durban, South Africa to Aden, at the entrance to the Red Sea, is a distance of 3,275 miles. The sea frontier from Aden on the Arabian Peninsula to the Gulf of Oman is more than 1,200 miles. The Western Indian Ocean, the area of special concern to the United States and the NATO countries, embraces the Arabian Sea—the waters between Arabia and India—and a vast stretch of ocean to the south in which are located several major island groups. It has been an ocean of destiny since the dawn of history, with Indians, Chinese, Romans, Arabs and many other peoples trading and waging war on its reaches.

The source of the conflict today can be encapsulated in a single word: oil. The energy needs of the industrialized Northern Hemisphere countries dictate a profound concern with access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf (more than sixty per cent of the world's proven reserves) and with the security of the tanker routes through the Gulf and across the Western Indian Ocean in time of war or political crisis.

Widespread concern with the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean dates from comparatively recent times in the United States and in the NATO countries. In 1967, when Great Britain began to withdraw from its bastions east of Suez, the Persian Gulf was virtually a British lake. Britain maintained key control points in the Indian Ocean from Aden in the west to Singapore in the east. But within a year of the British withdrawal, which created a power vacuum, the Soviet Union began to dispatch strong naval forces into the Indian Ocean. Iraq, at the head of the Persian Gulf, is not a Soviet client state. The Soviets have facilities at Indian ports. As the results of various agreements, they have access to ports in Aden, Somalia and Mauritius. Indeed almost all the control points in the Western Indian Ocean—Zanzibar on the East African coast, Socotra at the entrance to the Red Sea, Madagascar, Ceylon (Sri Lanka)—are in the hands of powers hostile to the West. Of these extensive British strong points, only the Cape of Good Hope—the "Bastion of the South"—remains under anti-Communist Western control.

It was from these shore and island positions that Great Britain dominated the Indian Ocean world. The Soviet Union is well on its way to controlling or influencing the nations that hold the majority of these key points. The only recent gain by the West—and it is a very modest gain—is the development of a U.S. Navy communications station on the British island of Diego Garcia south of the Indian subcontinent. This small station helps close a gap in America's worldwide communications system. But in no sense is it a major naval base. The 8,000-foot runway on Diego Garcia is an element—but only a single element—in the network of airfields the West needs in order to deploy aerial might in the region in the event of a crisis. Satellites provide intelligence data, but any lengthy interruption of surface shipping or other hostile action would require deployment of tactical aircraft appropriate to the situation.

OUR DEPENDENCE ON OIL

It is the danger of interrupted oil movements that gives concern in the United States, Europe and Japan. The most vulnerable country is Japan. Almost ninety per cent of its energy comes from the Persian Gulf. An oil embargo or interruption of tanker traffic would shut down Japanese industrial production and plunge the world's third strongest economy into crisis. While the Japanese seek new oil sources in Indochina and Australia and are pushing ahead with nuclear power plant construction, their dependence on the Persian Gulf will continue well into the 1980s.

Europe's dependence is almost as great. Japan and Europe together import more than 700 million gallons of oil per day from the Persian Gulf. European imports from the Gulf are expected to increase 450 per cent over the next decade, despite development of the North Sea oil and gas fields and French advances in nuclear technology. The figures are revealing. Britain obtains 66.1 per cent of her oil from the Gulf states, Italy 84.5 per cent, France 51.1 per cent and West Germany 62 per cent. Australia, which gets 69 per cent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, also has a tremendous security stake in the area.

Until recently, the Persian Gulf was not a significant source of energy for the United States, with only three per cent coming from that source. Over the next five years, however, imports from the Gulf may account for twenty-five per cent of U.S. oil supplies despite the U.S. goal of energy sufficiency. The dollar drain for these Persian Gulf oil purchases already is enormous. A total of \$2.1 billion was spent for Middle East oil in 1970. The Petroleum Council estimates of costs range from \$9 billion to \$13 billion in 1985. This is not surprising, however, in view of the fact that the United States is the largest consumer of petroleum in the world.

Given the projected size and cost of the Persian Gulf oil imports, it is no wonder that the Gulf and the Western Indian Ocean suddenly have become very significant areas to the United States. Drew Middleton, Military Editor of the *New York Times*, has said that "Military planners expect that the strategic interests of the United States and global strategy in general will pivot on the Persian Gulf late in this decade as a result of competition for the area's oil."

It already has been a shock to many Americans to realize the extent of their growing dependency on energy from this remote, unstable, and often hostile part of the world. Before long, the American government and people are likely to find this dependency intolerable. The United States, as a result, should move ahead on a crash basis to develop its domestic energy sources—to expand coal production, to institute new coal gasification methods, to open Arctic and offshore oil fields, to extract oil from shale and sands, which exist in vast quantities in North America, and to accelerate progress toward fast breeder nuclear reactors and the fusion process. Faced by great challenges, the United States has shown the capacity to work scientific, engineering and economic miracles. In all likelihood, however, it will take the United States a decade to augment its domestic energy sources to the point where it need not be vastly concerned about oil imports. In the meantime, the United States will be dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf that is moved by tanker across the Western Indian Ocean.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note the danger of proposals that the United States should by its own investment policy become dependent upon imports of Soviet fuels, as the Federal Republic of Germany is doing. Such action would give hostage to an enemy for our future behaviour.

William F. Case, an oil expert with the U.S. Department of Transportation, has drawn the conclusion that "if events are allowed to follow a natural course, the United States will almost certainly face an eight to ten year period beginning in 1975-77 of critical dependence on Middle East oil."

For Western Europe, the dependence may last considerably longer—until the atomic fission process is perfected and working on a large scale. Few Western states are free of major worries with respect to energy. Ironically, one of these is an Indian Ocean country without any oil. As the *South African Financial Gazette* has pointed out:

"South Africa, with its vast, readily available coal reserves, is in the vanguard of countries determined to be self-sufficient in its energy resources, and can regard the present situation with a degree of equanimity . . . In the case of South Africa, its oil from coal production know-how and huge coal and uranium reserves render it much less vulnerable than most Western nations to the inevitable fuel price increase of the near future."

SHAPING A STRATEGY

The United States and the NATO countries are not in this happy situation, however, and must develop an overall strategy for maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil. And although the United States played the major role in developing oil in Saudi Arabia, it is at a severe disadvantage in shaping a politico-military strategy for the period ahead, in which it must have access to oil from the Gulf.

First, there is the problem of distance. The only U.S. facilities in the area are the communications stations at Diego Garcia and at Northwest Cape in Australia. Indeed the U.S. position in Australia may be insecure in view of the increasingly pacifist policy of the current Australian government.

America's overseas base structure was designed for conflicts in the Atlantic and Pacific, not for the remote Indian Ocean. The well-equipped naval base at Simonstown at the Cape of Good Hope is a useful facility for American warships, but the Johnson Administration ordered a halt to U.S. ship visits to South African ports and ended the joint naval exercises that had been standard procedure during the Eisenhower Administration. This policy of snubbing a vital, technologically advanced ally in the Indian Ocean remains in force.

It is doubtful that the United States could maintain adequate naval and air contingents in the Western Indian Ocean without recourse to Simonstown. Deployment of ships and aircraft from the United States to the Indian Ocean requires a huge investment in dollars and manpower. Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell, Director of Research for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, has noted:

"Some people talk about a modest increase of two U.S. ships at Bahrein (in the Persian Gulf), which would be possible under the established ceiling. But to put two more ships there, we would need a total of twelve ships. Sending them all the way from the East Coast of the United States a requirement of 3:1 in terms of ships on station to ships en route and being readied."

Some observers may question whether a limited U.S. commitment of ships would so alter the power balance in the Western Indian Ocean as to add significantly to U.S. security in the area or to enhance the protection of the oil traffic in which the United States is vitally interested. Time and again throughout the post-World War period the Soviets have been checked in their ambitions by a limited U.S. presence. Certainly, the U.S. Berlin garrison could not stop a serious Soviet assault. The embarked battalion of U.S. Marines in the Mediterranean is a token

force compared to what the Soviets could quickly muster in the area. In practice, the Soviets have been unwilling to risk a major confrontation involving U.S. armed forces, whatever their size, whereas they might be tempted to risk a *fait accompli* in the Western Indian Ocean in the absence of any U.S. naval forces. Moreover, the deployment of a limited U.S. force would be essential to inducing other Western nations to make commitments of forces to a greater allied presence.

Recognizing that the great powers will be drawn more and more into the Indian Ocean, it is necessary to consider also the respective possibilities for the deployment of Free World and Communist airpower. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. facility on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean provides only a very limited capability for handling aircraft, though a small number of reconnaissance flights could be made from the island. What would be needed in a crisis situation, however, would be airfields closer to the major sea lanes. The airfields in Western Australia, though available, are far removed from the danger points. The airfield of Perth, for example, is approximately 5,000 miles from Aden.

Fortunately, the Iranians have pushed airfield construction. At present, they have military jet fields at Bushire, Kish and Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf of Oman near the Pakistan border. This base will be ideally situated to provide air cover for ships operating in the Arabian Sea.

The French have important airfields at Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden and on Reunion Island 400 miles east of Madagascar. Djibouti is especially important because (given French cooperation with the United States and other Western countries) aircraft based there could monitor ocean areas around the Horn of Africa and south along the coast of Somalia. Diego Suarez, the former French naval base on Madagascar, would be of tremendous value to the West in any naval confrontation or oil movement crisis in the Indian Ocean. At this time, however, access to naval bases and airfields in the Malagasy Republic is not available. Obtaining access to these facilities should be a priority political objective for the oil consuming nations of the West.

The decision of the Portuguese to withdraw from Mozambique is a very serious setback to Western interests. Up to early 1974 there was some reason to hope that ports and airfields in Mozambique might become available to the West in time of crisis in the Indian Ocean. But the radically altered political situation in that territory eliminates that possibility.

Given the revolutionary change in Mozambique, the United States will have to take a new look at the possibility of defence co-ordination with the Republic of South Africa.

Indeed, co-ordination with Portugal's successors and the Republic of South Africa is imperative if the tanker traffic is to be safeguarded on both the Indian Ocean approaches to the Cape of Good Hope and in the adjacent South Atlantic area. South Africa has a significant navy, equipped with modern French submarines, British-built frigates and a variety of other ships and weapons. It possesses a truly modern communications headquarters at Simonstown, capable of monitoring ship movements through a large area of the Western Indian Ocean. It has a network of fully modern airbases, plus supporting aircraft facilities, throughout its coastal zones. Its air force is equipped with French Mirage fighters and other superlative equipment, lacking only long-range maritime aircraft. All elements of the South African defense forces are in a high state of combat readiness. They could play a key role in any situation involving a threat to oil lifelines of the Western countries.

In the event of a major crisis, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union could execute a forward deployment of its own involving dispatch of aircraft to Aden, India and Somalia. Tanzania is oriented towards Peking rather than Moscow, and the Chinese Communists have been building a military airfield near Dar-es-Salaam; but Soviet access to that airfield cannot be ruled out in view of Tanzania's stance against the Western powers.

The deployment of U.S. naval vessels and/or squadrons is not a substitute for a national strategy covering the Western Indian Ocean. The situation has changed completely since the days when the British were dominant in the area. Aside from the Soviet naval presence, which consists of a substantial task force of approximately a dozen or more modern ships, there are the rapidly expanding military capabilities of several littoral nations plus the problem of serious subversion and insurgency in others. Thus, the Western Indian Ocean area equation gets more complicated year by year.

CONFLICT SITUATIONS

In the Gulf itself—the immediate, vital zone—there are numerous tensions and deeply rooted problems: disputes over undersea boundaries, the Iranian claim to Bahrain, Iraq's threatening actions toward Kuwait, a subversive miniwar in Dhofar, Saudi handlings after parts of Abu Dhabi and Oman. Each of these disputes could have a trigger effect on a conflict involving external powers.

The major conflict situation, however, involves Iraq and Iran. On April 9, 1972, Iraq entered into a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, which provides for military cooperation. Iran, on the other hand, is linked to the United States and is currently in the midst of a significant military buildup. The Iranian armed forces are being equipped with the latest United States and British weapons, including F-4 Phantom jets and Hovercraft assault vehicles. The Shah has evidenced strong determination to make Iran the leading Persian Gulf power and to control ship traffic through the Straits of Hormuz. In addition, he envisages Iran's security perimeter extending beyond the straits into the Indian Ocean.

A complication has been added in the form of an Indian training mission to Iraq that trains Iraqi pilots to fly Soviet-supplied MIG fighters. The participation of the Indians in the training scheme is another indication of India's close collaboration with the Soviet Union in trying to eliminate all Western influence from the Indian Ocean.

The Indian government denies that it has given facilities to the Soviet Navy on India's coasts or outlying islands. But the denial fails to convince many observers who note the presence of numerous Soviet naval advisers and the transfer of Soviet ships to India. Hanson W. Baldwin wrote in his book, "Strategy for Tomorrow," regarding the common features of Soviet and Indian military and naval planning. He noted that the first steps had been taken for the "integration" of the Indian military establishment with the Soviet.

In another decade, given conditions of peace, Iran will have attained a very considerable degree of industrialization. Reforms introduced by the Shah are designed to bring Iran fully into the modern world. But the next decade will be fraught with difficulties and dangers because of the weakness and vulnerability of the small states on the Arabian peninsula and because of Communist-inspired insurgency. The Union of Arab Emirates, composed of seven small states, is very weak. It is subject to subversive pressure from both Soviet and Chinese Communist elements in the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and

the Arab Gulf. This type of subversive activity can be found almost anywhere along the rim of the western Indian Ocean—from the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia to the FRELIMO terrorist organization in Mozambique, an organization dominated by pro-Peking elements, which today appears to have inherited the Portuguese mantle.

Current American concern with respect to the western Indian Ocean is almost completely related to the need for adequate oil supplies. But no appraisal of the area would be complete without mention of the Chinese Communist penetration of Tanzania on the East African coast and the operation of terrorists against Mozambique and Rhodesia. These terrorist groups, with their parallel sanctuaries in Tanzania and Zambia, look to the Chinese Communist construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad as an instrument for creating a Red belt across Central Africa from Tanzania on the Indian Ocean to Zaire's window on the South Atlantic.

While the primary U.S. emphasis on the Indian Ocean has to do with oil, strategic planners cannot ignore the fact that the United States depends on Indian Ocean routes for access to strategic minerals and materials in Africa, including beryl, chrome, ore, antimony, asbestos, copper, columbium, lead, nickel and uranium. The United States is not only facing an energy crisis in the mid and late 1970s but a minerals crisis as well. Access to strategic minerals will be an increasingly serious national concern in the latter part of this decade. The same situation applies to the NATO countries, of course. Africa has been a source of essential minerals for Europe. The security of the Indian Ocean route is of prime importance to Europe, especially with respect to the movement of copper.

On top of all the national rivalries and confusion of states and political movements on the rim of the western Indian Ocean there is the problem of the Arab-Israeli contest. Emotional and religious issues have become involved in the struggle over oil, for example as the Arab nations debate the curtailment of oil supply as a means of altering American and West European policies on the Arab-Israeli confrontation. No more complicated problem has confronted U.S. statesmen and military planners than that of devising an overall policy designed to protect America's vital interests in the western Indian Ocean world.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR

A further complication—and it is one that the U.S. public must recognize—is that the threatened loss of energy sources in a remote region comes at a time when a mood of withdrawal is dominant in the United States and when Congress and many citizens oppose foreign involvements of any sort. Add to this the intensity of the anti-defence campaign conducted by some elements of the media and one gets an outline of the restrictions inhibiting U.S. policy planners in devising an appropriate response to the dangers emerging in the western Indian Ocean.

The threat, of course, is real and clear—politically ordained cut-offs of oil that the U.S., Europe and Japan must have and/or a combination of insurgency and Soviet naval support for revolutionary elements bent on overthrowing Persian Gulf governments that are reasonably friendly to the United States. Faced with threats in the Atlantic and Pacific in recent years (Dominican Republic, Taiwan, etc.), the United States has had ready forces to intervene or to bar enemy intervention. But the U.S. is without effective forces in the western Indian Ocean. It has only a token, show-the-flag contingent of two ships in the Persian Gulf.

This would not be the first time that the mood of the American public and Congress has deterred the U.S. from taking measures

July 28, 1975

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 13971

necessary to provide for national security. The isolationism that followed World War I effectively prevented the United States from opposing Japan's militarization of the former German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. This American passivity resulted in a shift in the strategic balance and encouraged Imperial Japan to strike at the United States in 1941.

This experience is applicable to developing conditions in the Persian Gulf and western Indian Ocean. The U.S. has a tremendous strategic interest in the oil-production and resulting maritime commerce, but it may lack the means and the public will to interpose strong forces that would fully stabilize the area.

SOME SECURITY IMPERATIVE

Some additions to U.S. strength in the western Indian Ocean are imperative, however, if America is to maintain any degree of credibility as a power that can translate its words into deeds. Logically, the naval units assigned to the western Indian Ocean would be homeported at Simonstown. But considerations of politics in the United States would seem to rule out the adoption of this logical, pragmatic solution. The U.S. government would not be likely to order such homeporting in view of the certainty of an outcry from elements willing to sacrifice the nation's strategic interests for considerations of domestic politics and ideology.

Nevertheless, there is a possibility that a new formula could be devised that would permit a valuable coordination of air and naval operations involving surveillance of tanker traffic and Soviet warships. Practical ways might be found to combine U.S. and South African naval strengths in keeping the sea lanes open. American military military aircraft do visit South African airfields from time to time. Joint naval manoeuvres were held to devise arrangements that would give U.S. forces the benefit of communications and technical facilities at Simonstown while affording South Africa new opportunities for coordination and receipt of maritime intelligence data.

The augmentation of forces in the Indian Ocean would necessarily be modest, however, in view of the costs and the lack of public policy. In the main, therefore, the U.S. in order to protect its interests, will have to rely on assistance to and cooperation with friendly powers in the area. It also will be vital for the U.S. to enter into cooperative arrangements with the principal West European powers which share our strategic stake in unrestricted access to and movement of the Persian Gulf oil.

The most important U.S. relationship in the area is with Iran, which is the premier power of the Gulf region and which has long standing ties with the United States. As the Iranians make ever-greater use of American defense equipment and long-term commitments for training, spare parts and replacements, the bonds of alliance will be strengthened. These arrangements are eased in that Iran is not involved in a military confrontation with Israel. The historic Iranian strategic concern is with Soviet pressure from the north, now gaining a new dimension because of Soviet seapower in the Indian Ocean.

The other major Gulf power with which the United States needs to develop improved relations is Saudi Arabia. This task poses a greater problem for the United States because of the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia to pressure from more militant Arab countries. Saudi Arabia's great wealth makes it an object of envy in the Arab world. It is virtually forced to give financial aid to other Arab states as a device to buy peace. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that the revolutionary Arab states are ideologically opposed to the traditional system of government in

Saudi Arabia. The vastness and relative emptiness of this desert country are an invitation to attack. Saudi Arabia has a population of about seven million scattered over a huge territory—833,000 square miles, or a region about three times the size of Texas. Thus, Saudi Arabia has legitimate cause for anxiety about its security.

In these circumstances, the United States has done well to agree to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and adjacent Kuwait. The latter state, very small and enormously rich in oil revenues, is a prime target for revolutionary forces in the Arab world.

In selling arms to certain Arab nations and Israel, the United States government has emphasized what it calls a policy of even-handedness. The goal—and it is a sound one—is a policy towards Saudi Arabia and Israel that combines friendliness with restraint. Pragmatic policy planners in the United States know that even if a sharp tilt toward the Arab countries were desirable right now, the realities of domestic politics, as seen and accepted by successive administrations, render such a drastic change of course exceedingly unlikely.

Thus, the U.S. approach must be one of modest adjustments, coupled with provision to Saudi Arabia of modern defence systems capable of coping with the offensive weapons that the Soviet Union furnishes to the revolutionary Arab nations. Anything less than this almost certainly would result in a future takeover of Saudi Arabia by revolutionary, anti-Western elements.

THE EUROPEAN INTEREST

In devising plans to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf and western Indian Ocean, the United States also has to calculate the future role of the NATO countries. Three of these countries—Britain, France, and Portugal—have a history of activity in the Indian Ocean. All retain interests in this oceanic theatre. France, for example, controls the small, highly strategic Afars and Issas territory at the mouth of the Red Sea and Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean. Britain continues to maintain limited naval forces between Cape Town and Singapore. Ships of the Royal Navy make regular calls at Simonstown naval base under terms of the 1955 Simonstown Agreement which provides joint naval security measures with South Africa. Together, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization account for fifty-six per cent of the shipping (25,000 ships a year) that go around the Cape of Good Hope.

In summary, the NATO countries are dependent on the Cape Route and tanker traffic to the Persian Gulf. Yet there are no substantial or coordinated efforts by the West European nations to protect their interests in this crucial region. Patrick Wall, M.P., writing in NATO's *Fifteen Nation (The Hague)*, has commented:

"This is of course absurd, but because of Western politicians' fears of becoming embroiled in the politics of Southern Africa, NATO is not allowed to plan for the South Atlantic or South Indian Ocean... What is sorely needed is official NATO recognition of the Simonstown Agreement—and the provision of adequate communications and joint planning facilities... Surely it is near lunacy not to make adequate provisions now.

Major Wall wrote those words a year or so prior to the West's sudden burst of concern about access to Persian Gulf oil. Today, the urgency of West European commitment to defence planning in the Western Indian Ocean is vastly greater. It is unlikely, however, that the needs of the situation will be met by NATO's ponderous consultative machinery. The commitment of ships to the Indian Ocean—and that's what is needed—most probably will have to be sought on a nation-by-nation basis. The West European nations which want to be

sure they have access to Persian Gulf oil in the mid-seventies must be made to understand that the United States will not furnish security for their sea communications between the Cape of Good Hope and the Gulf.

No doubt it will be a shock to many West European nations to realize that they have a strategic requirement for deploying forces "East of Suez." These nations have come to depend on the United States to assume all the defence burdens in remote regions. But the financial cost of involvement in the Indian Ocean is nothing as compared to the shock that West European nations would experience if they found their customary oil supplies from the Gulf suddenly interrupted or terminated. In pressing for naval commitments from the West European nations, the United States will have to utilize stern diplomacy, linking the naval commitments in the new danger region to American force levels in Europe. In turn, the European nations undoubtedly would find that deployment of fleet units to the tanker routes and to the waters of the oil-producing countries would give their diplomatic efforts a new credibility.

This independent deployment of warships and supporting sea-based aircraft by several European nations may seem to be a rejection of alliance after two decades of the NATO experience. It is important, therefore, to remember that the warships of several West European countries operate in North European and Mediterranean waters without NATO control. France has been going her own way for some years.

And in the Baltic, Danish, German and Swedish units operate independently, although all are concerned about the Soviet naval threat in those waters. In the Indian Ocean, U.S., British, French, Australian, South African and other Western countries maintain naval units wholly independent of one another. Independent operation can continue in the future. The real need is for immediate augmentation of Western naval forces and for coordination in time of crisis.

These proposed political and military measures constitute a feasible, albeit limited, initiative on the part of the United States and other Western nations. Compared to some of the actions the United States has taken in the past in Europe and South East Asia, the steps outlined here may seem overly cautious and restricted in scope. It would be desirable to develop at least one base under American control, and to deploy U.S. Air Force units in the area, but major undertakings of this sort don't appear feasible in the immediate, post-Vietnam era. Any suggestion of large-scale action wouldn't be a practical contribution to solving a serious, developing security problem. At this point in American history, only minimum commitments have a chance of winning congressional and public approval. Even the proposals for a limited commitment will probably be strenuously opposed. One can only hope that as the nation gains a clearer understanding of the dimensions of the threat to its energy sources, responsible leaders will be enabled to take prudent security measures.

"WAIT-AND-SEE" WON'T DO

The shift of the global danger point from the great ocean basins of the Atlantic and Pacific was foreseen over a decade ago by two president American admirals, Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, and John S. McCain, Jr., former Commander-in-Chief Pacific. They warned numerous times of the need to establish a U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

The requirements of the Vietnam War put creation of an Indian Ocean task force temporarily beyond U.S. capabilities. Even as the war wound down, however, and the West began to get an inkling of the emerging energy crisis, American policy planners accorded the Indian Ocean a low priority. As

S 13972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 28, 1975

late as 1971, Ronald Spiers, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "there appear to be no requirements at this time for us to feel compelled to control or even decisively influence any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral." This statement was made at a time when the Soviet Union was sharply stepping up its deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

The "wait-and-see" policy of the U.S. with respect to the Indian Ocean has been overtaken by events. Political change in Madagascar has resulted in the removal of French influence. Tanzania has permitted the Chinese Communists to build a naval base that could be used by small missile-firing craft capable of interdicting tanker traffic. Elsewhere the situation has deteriorated drastically.

For the moment, the Persian Gulf nations possess an Aladdin's lamp of riches and international political leverage. By the end of this century, after the advanced Western nations have developed new energy processes on their territories, the oil-producing countries will cease to have a central position in world affairs. But, for the time being, the West cannot ignore the powerful genie in the oil wells of the Middle East. The United States and its allies in Western Europe must make certain that their political and military policies assure them access to the vital energy resources represented by Persian Gulf oil.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question on agreeing to the resolution.

Mr. STENNIS. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is not the rollcall automatic?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The rollcall is not automatic.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I ask—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Mississippi wish the resolution stated?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12, 1975.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) is necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 43, nays 53, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 340 Leg.]

YEAS—43

Abourezk	Hartke	Mondale
Bayh	Haskell	Montoya
Biden	Hatfield	Moss
Brooke	Hathaway	Muskie
Bumpers	Huddleston	Nelson
Burdick	Humphrey	Pell
Church	Inouye	Proxmire
Clark	Kennedy	Randolph
Cranston	Leahy	Ribicoff
Culver	Long	Scott,
Eagleton	Mansfield	William L.
Ford	Mathias	Symington
Gravel	McGovern	Tunney
Hart, Gary W.	McIntyre	Williams
Hart, Philip A.	Metcalf	

NAYS—53

Allen	Garn	Pastore
Baker	Glenn	Pearson
Bartlett	Griffin	Percy
Beall	Hansen	Roth
Bentsen	Helms	Schweiker
Brock	Hollings	Scott, Hugh
Buckley	Hruska	Sparkman
Byrd,	Jackson	Stafford
Harry F., Jr.	Javits	Stennis
Byrd, Robert C.	Johnston	Stevens
Cannon	Laxalt	Stevenson
Case	Magnuson	Stone
Chiles	McClellan	Taft
Curtis	McClure	Talmadge
Dole	McGee	Thurmond
Domenici	Morgan	Tower
Fannin	Nunn	Weicker
Fong	Packwood	Young

NOT VOTING—3

Bellmon	Eastland	Goldwater
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So the resolution (S. Res. 160) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

DISAPPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO DECONTROL OLD OIL PRICES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 279, Senate Resolution 145.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will report.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—

The VICE PRESIDENT. First the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Calendar No. 279, S. Res. 145, a resolution to express the disapproval of the Senate of the President's proposed amendment to the regulations promulgated under Sec. 4(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 to remove price controls from domestic crude oil, residual oil, propane, and refined petroleum products.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is to proceed to the consideration of the resolution.

Mr. FANNIN. I object.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 145 by Mr. JACKSON, and others.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to that motion.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I send a cloture motion to the desk.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The cloture motion having been filed the Chair, without objection, directs the—

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, there was an objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I moved though.

The VICE PRESIDENT. There is objection. The Chair will have to hear the motion. Is there objection?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Reserving the right to object, what is the resolution?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It is a cloture motion which the clerk will read unless there is objection. If there is, the chair will have to state the motion.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, pursuant to the provisions of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate do hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 145, a Resolution to express the disapproval of the Senate of the President's proposed amendment to the regulations promulgated under sec. 4(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 to remove price controls from domestic crude oil, residual oil, propane, and refined petroleum products.

Henry M. Jackson, Claiborne Pell, Alan Cranston, Walter D. Huddleston, Frank E. Moss, William Proxmire, Edward M. Kennedy, William D. Hathaway, John C. Culver, Thomas F. Eagleton, Dick Clark, Hubert H. Humphrey, Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Ernest F. Hollings, Walter F. Mondale, Gary W. Hart, Philip A. Hart.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. PASTORE. May we have order, please.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Order in the Chamber, please.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not at all certain that the original request was fully understood, and just to avoid any confusion, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Senate Resolution 145.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is the motion before the Senate.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona did voice objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That was the reason I moved, but I thought I might have been mistaken.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That motion can be made without a unanimous-consent request, and it is now the pending question.

POSTAL SERVICE COMPLIANCE WITH THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside and that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 325, H.R. 2559, which is a bill having to do with various matters within the Postal Service, but also has to do

agreement from the then Deputy Attorney General, Mr. William P. Rogers, later Secretary of State, that would permit the CIA to withhold information about known crimes of its employees if the prosecution of such crimes would involve the revelation of information which would be embarrassing to the CIA. In a memo of February 23, 1954, Mr. Houston reports on his two conversations with Mr. Rogers and records the generally unilateral assertion of the CIA that it would continue its practice of not reporting for prosecution crimes by its own employees.

In August, 1954 the following language, now in 28 U.S. Code 535, became the law:

Any information, allegation, or complaint received in a department or agency of the Executive Branch of the government relating to violations of Title 18 involving government officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department or agency, unless, as to any department or agency of the government, the Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a specified class of information, allegation or complaint.

It is not known whether the CIA or any other agency prompted the inclusion of the language in this statute following the word "unless." It is, however, astonishing that on July 23, 1975, John S. Warner, General Counsel of the CIA, testifying before a House subcommittee, could claim that he considered the CIA-Justice Department agreement of 1954 "consistent" with the exemption that follows the word "unless" in the statute noted above. Mr. Warner makes this startling claim, even though he himself is the author of a memo on January 31, 1975 revealing that on January 30 the Acting Attorney General—Mr. Lawrence Silberman—ruled that the CIA should comply with the law and not rely upon the 1954 non-prosecution agreement. Mr. Warner revealed in the same memo, however, that Associate Deputy Attorney General James A. Wilderotter ruled that the report that could be given by the CIA concerning a crime could be "a summary of the situation and not an investigatory report." The CIA summary should also clearly state the security problems likely to arise in a prosecution and thus, in Mr. Warner's words, "certifying" that there could be no prosecution.

Mr. Richard Helms undoubtedly knew of this 20-year-old pact with the Justice Department and undoubtedly felt that he could rely upon its provisions. The fact is that the incredible arrangement between two Federal agencies to cover up the crimes of CIA employees in the name of national security has not really been repealed despite the protestations of Mr. William Colby, the present CIA Director, that the 1954 agreement has been rescinded. On January 31, 1975 the General Counsel of the CIA set forth in a "memorandum for the record" the deceptive way by which CIA officials can evade the law binding on all other Federal officials and make certain that they cover up crimes by CIA employees by elaborating on the "security problems likely to arise in a prosecution." This nullification of the law is so erroneous and appalling on its face that Mr. Warner on July 23, 1975 felt constrained to justify the 1954

agreement by claiming that the statute allows the Attorney General to delegate the prosecution of wrongdoing if it belongs to a "specified class of information, allegation or complaint."

The awful fact is that present and past officials of the CIA have deliberately confused the law and misstated the facts seeking to pretend that they will be law abiding while simultaneously claiming that they have an exemption from existing law.

The General Counsel of the CIA on July 21, 1975 wrote to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Kevin Maroney, Esq., that the files of the CIA have revealed some 20 cases during the years 1954 to 1974 in which violations of criminal statutes were reported to the Department of Justice. These cases involved instances of CIA employees embezzling several thousand dollars of Government funds or pocketing \$15,000 more than a person was entitled to for alleged medical expenses. Mr. Warner pretends that the 1954 agreement was solely to relieve the CIA of its obligation under the law to report the personal crimes of its employees. The fact is, of course, that the 1954 agreement was negotiated in order to continue the immunity which the CIA had always claimed up to that time of not reporting any crimes associated with the covert activities of the CIA.

The duplicity and the deception manifest in the memos and statements of the present General Counsel of the CIA demonstrate with virtual certainty that no present or former official of the CIA is likely to prosecute Mr. Richard Helms or any other present or former employee of the CIA. The CIA can claim, without being required to prove, that such prosecution would require the revelation of facts affecting the national security, all of which in most cases are merely facts which would be embarrassing to the CIA.

If, therefore, it is virtually impossible for Mr. Richard Helms, or any other former official of the CIA to be prosecuted by the Department of Justice, is there any way by which the Congress and the country can insist that justice be done?

The one instrumentality available in such circumstances is the sword of impeachment. The framers of the Constitution did not intend that the American people would be required to allow public officials to continue in office so long as they did not violate the criminal law. The weapon of impeachment allows the Congress and the country to protect the public from conduct by high officials that undermines public confidence. It is a tool which enables the people to remove from public office individuals who are undeserving of high public trust. It is overwhelmingly clear from all of the precedents of 200 years that impeachment will lie for conduct not indictable nor even criminal in nature. It should be remembered, for example, that Judge Archbald was removed from office for conduct which, in at least the view of some legal commentators, would have been harmless if done by a private citizen.

IS AMBASSADOR HELMS SUBJECT TO IMPEACHMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED DURING HIS TENURE AT THE CIA?

The essential thrust of impeachment is not punishment, but removal from public office. Impeachment also brings under the Constitution the "disqualification to hold and enjoy any office under the United States."

Neither the Constitution itself nor the logic of impeachment requires that the demonstration of unfitness occur during tenure in the same office from which removal is sought. In the case of the impeachment in 1912 of Judge Robert W. Archbald, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted 13 articles of impeachment, 6 of which referred to abuses committed by Archbald in a prior judicial position on a lower court. The Senate voted to convict Archbald, sustaining at least one of the charges dealing in part with offenses in his prior office. It may be, as will be noted later, that in addition to offenses committed by Mr. Helms while serving as Director of the CIA, he may also have committed an offense of an impeachable character in possible perjury during the hearings on his confirmation as Ambassador to Iran.

Although there is no direct precedent for the impeachment of an ambassador, Mr. Helms is clearly subject to impeachment as a civil officer within the meaning of the Constitution. I have received a written confirmation of that interpretation from the American Law Division of the Library of Congress.

OFFENSES OF MR. HELMS THAT COULD BE IMPEACHABLE

In the following material I do not in any way state or imply that Mr. Richard Helms is guilty of any of the offenses suggested. It is contended merely that Mr. Helms has the duty of explaining his conduct and his statements and that, in the absence of any believable explanation, the House of Representatives has the right and duty to investigate the conduct of Mr. Helms during the years when he was the director of the CIA to determine whether impeachable offenses have been committed.

I will set forth very briefly some of the salient facts about first, operation CHAOS, second, Mr. Helms' involvement in the politics of Chile, and third, Mr. Helms' conduct in response to White House Watergate requests.

1. OPERATION CHAOS

The Rockefeller Commission Report on CIA activities within the United States makes clear the horrifying details of an operation initiated by Mr. Helms in August 1967 designed to collect information on foreign contacts with American dissidents. This is an operation which in some 5 years collected documents which include the names of more than 300,000 persons and organizations.

This unit, entitled "Operation CHAOS," prepared 3,000 memorandums for dissemination to the FBI, did extensive surveillance on the peace movements and furnished 26 reports to the Kerner Commission, some of which related almost exclusively to domestic dissident activities.

From even the 20 pages on Operation CHAOS in the Rockefeller Report on the

July 29, 1975

CIA it seems clear that Richard Helms was induced into this activity by Presidential pressure. On November 15, 1967, for example, Helms delivered personally to President Johnson the CIA study on the U.S. peace movement requested by the President. Although the studies of the CIA showed that there was virtually no evidence of foreign involvement and no evidence of any foreign financial support for the peace activities within the United States, Mr. Helms continued to do surveillance on those who protested the war.

On February 18, 1969, Mr. Helms confessed in a note to Henry Kissinger, then assistant to President Nixon, the illegalities of the CIA of which he was the director. His memo to Dr. Kissinger noted that the CIA-prepared document "Restless Youth" included a section of American students. Mr. Helms said bluntly:

This is an area not within the charter of this agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. (Emphasis supplied)

The excessive secrecy surrounding Operation CHAOS and its isolation within the CIA demonstrate once again that Director Helms knew that it was improper and beyond the scope of the authorized powers of the CIA.

The Rockefeller Report notes the growing opposition of CIA employees and officials toward Operation CHAOS. Although the Rockefeller Report soft-pedals the internal dissension over Operation CHAOS, it quotes an internal memo of Director Helms on December 5, 1972 in which he insisted that Operation CHAOS "cannot be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity."

Operation CHAOS, which ultimately had a staff of 52, was directly under the supervision of Mr. Helms. There is no way in which he can claim that his subordinates operated this unit without his knowledge and consent. The abuses of power and the countless violations of the privacy of American citizens might well be impeachable offenses imputable to Mr. Richard Helms. An impeachment inquiry is the only available method by which Mr. Helms can be made accountable for a long series of intrusions into the lives of American citizens.

Equally damaging to the privacy of American citizens was the CIA program to open first class mail. Mr. Helms might well have known from the very beginning about these programs which ran from 1953 to 1973. They were possibly the largest and the most clearly illegal programs conducted by the CIA. Certainly this mail-tampering operation was under the direct control and supervision of Mr. Helms during the 7 years he served as Director of the agency. In addition, it appears that Richard Helms deliberately deceived postal authorities into thinking that the operation was limited to the copying of information off envelopes.

2. MR. HELMS' INVOLVEMENT IN CHILE

About the only evidence that has emerged in the recent past indicating that the CIA might make its employees accountable to the law was the revelation in July 1975 that the CIA last year informed the Justice Department that Richard Helms might have committed

perjury in testimony before a Senate Committee. In the testimony at issue Mr. Helms told the Senate Committee that the CIA had played a limited role in undermining the Allende government in Chile.

A conversation occurred during the confirmation proceedings of Mr. Helms in the U.S. Senate on February 7, 1973. The dialog was as follows:

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the government of Chile?

Mr. HELMS. No, Sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

Mr. HELMS. No, Sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the stories you were involved in that war are wrong?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, Sir. I said to Senator Fulbright many months ago that if the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth the election might have come out differently.

Mr. Helms undoubtedly knew about the covert \$8 million campaign conducted by the CIA to bring about Dr. Allende's downfall.

The foregoing conversation might or might not be perjury. Reading the entire transcript of the 3 days of hearings on the ambassadorship of Mr. Helms, it is difficult, however, to conclude that one is reading "the whole truth and nothing but the truth."

A report in the New York Times of July 27, 1965, claims that Richard Helms, while Director of the CIA, prepared a memorandum in the fall of 1970 informing Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell that the agency had supplied machineguns and tear gas grenades to men plotting to overthrow the Chilean Government.

If the Department of Justice ever did in fact bring perjury or other proceedings against Richard Helms, the officials of the CIA would undoubtedly claim that reasons of national security preclude their giving to the Government for its prosecution or to Mr. Helms for his defense a good deal of evidence which would be indispensable for a trial. That particular excuse is not likely to have much effect or force in an impeachment inquiry, as a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision made clear in a case involving Richard Nixon.

3. MR. HELMS AND THE POST-WATERGATE WHITE HOUSE

On February 1, 1975, the hearings on the alleged involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters were declassified and published. These hearings conducted before the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Committee on Armed Services demonstrate that Richard Helms in the first 6 weeks after the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972, apparently ordered a high official of the Agency to withhold Watergate information and to deny the Justice Department access to a key witness. I am not stating categorically that the 1,131 pages of those hearings demonstrate that Mr. Helms committed impeachable offenses.

But the evidence that is available here and elsewhere clearly suggests that Mr. Helms was all too ready to subvert the

purpose of the CIA for the objectives sought by personnel of the White House.

OTHER POTENTIAL OFFENSES

During the years in which Mr. Helms was the Chief Executive Officer of the CIA, that agency has been accused of conducting break-ins and wiretaps in the United States without a warrant, using local police credentials to gather information on anti-war groups, supplying surveillance to local police, using local police to conduct a break-in, contributing \$38,635.58 to the White House in 1970 to defray the cost of replying to people who wrote to President Nixon following the Cambodian invasion, and administering powerful drugs to unsuspecting individuals. I make no conclusion here as to the truth of these accusations or the extent to which Mr. Helms should be held accountable for these activities, but clearly Mr. Helms should be given the opportunity to vindicate himself if that is possible. It seems more and more clear to me that an impeachment inquiry is the only way that the American people can obtain the full truth and judge whether Richard Helms is fit to serve in a position of high public trust.

The American people have a right to know about those deeds of Mr. Helms in the years 1966 to 1973 which may have violated the fundamental principles by which Americans live together as a people. Mr. Helms also has the right to a forum where he can vindicate himself against all of the accusations which day after day continue to increase and multiply. An impeachment inquiry is the only instrumentality which the American Government has to bring out the truth of this dark era in American history.

The American people have a right to know whether Richard Helms is a worthy representative of the people of this country in Iran. The American people have the right to know whether the CIA, under his direction, engaged in a pattern of deception, law-breaking, and abuse of power. Because neither the CIA nor the Justice Department has done anything to vindicate the rights of the American people in this respect, the Congress, with regret and reluctance, must initiate impeachment proceedings against Richard M. Helms.

ON CORRUPTION IN OUR SOCIETY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. KOCH) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KOCH: Mr. Speaker, we live in a country that has no peer in terms of political freedom and the ability of its citizens to develop their individual capabilities. Yet there is one aspect of contemporary American culture that deeply troubles me, which I fear may be our Achilles heel, and that relates to corruption.

Corruption appears to be pervasive in our society. I am thinking not simply of the public officeholder who betrays his trust—a corrupt former President, a convicted Attorney General, police officers who extort bribes, building inspectors who exact illegal commissions.

July 25, 1975.

East European territory, including all three independent Baltic states plus large chunks of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

What the West gets out of the C.S.C.E. declaration is a reference to the possibility of border changes by peaceful agreement—meaningless except to protect the West German Government from its domestic critics—and some vague Soviet pledges to permit freer movement of persons and information.

The only military item in what originally was to be an all-European security treaty is a promise by the Russians (and everyone else) to give three weeks notice, and to admit observers, for military maneuvers that involve more than 25,000 men within some 150 miles of their frontiers. But it does not cover other military movements such as a reinforcing move or an actual invasion of Eastern or Western Europe!

If this document now were to be signed by the diplomats who negotiated it, or even by foreign ministers, and then consigned to history as an effort to humor a Soviet propaganda exercise, the damage might be modest. The problem is that Soviet leader Lenoid Brezhnev has maneuvered all the major leaders of the Western world one by one into the commitment to sign the C.S.C.E. declaration at a euphoric 35-nation summit conference in Helsinki, now tentatively scheduled for July 30, less than ten days away.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include therein extraneous material on the subject of the special order today by the gentlewoman from Maryland, Mrs. Holt.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING STAFF DIRECTOR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the Select Committee on Aging I reported to the House recently concerning the progress made in the establishment of quarters for the permanent Select Committee on Aging. I recited the difficulties in obtaining adequate space to house the committee staff. On Wednesday of this week I announced that at long last the staff is together in offices in the House Office Building Annex No. 1, which may be better known as the old Congressional Hotel at the southeast corner of New Jersey and C Streets.

I am pleased to report to the House today that I have appointed a staff director for the Select Committee on Aging. He will accelerate our work. We now have someone to coordinate the activities of the subcommittees.

Bob Horner comes to the Select Committee with a background as staff director of the House Committee on Internal Security where he worked under the supervision of my good friend and colleague from Missouri, Dick ICHORN. His 6 years experience in administrative work

with that committee has provided him with the expertise to work rapidly and effectively in his new position.

Mr. Horner had previously served with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, and held supervisory positions during all of his years with the Department. Those who worked under the direction of the late J. Edgar Hoover learned well the necessity for economy and efficiency on the part of Federal employees. I am confident that the Select Committee will reap the benefit of Mr. Horner's many years of supervisory experience.

Mr. Horner is 58 years old. He is at the stage in life which we who are becoming expert in gerontology refer to as "advancing maturity." He therefore has some practical experience in the field.

Mr. Horner is a native of California. He is a graduate of the University of San Francisco. He has made his home for the past 25 years in the northern Virginia area. His wife, Mavis, is a native of south Georgia and he has three children, the oldest of whom is employed as news director of WTWO-TV in Casper, Wyo.

I am confident that Bob Horner will give leadership to the staff of the committee, and cause it to function effectively. Moreover, he stands ready to provide prompt service to any congressional office or any of my colleagues who have a problem within the subject matter of our Select Committee.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. KEMP addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

SELECTIVE EMBARGO OF TURKEY IS A MISTAKE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. TALCOTT) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the House made several very serious mistakes at one time when we refused to lift the embargo of military sales to our friend and ally, Turkey.

We subverted our own national security because we jeopardized our tactical, strategic, and intelligence capability in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Europe. We have numerous national interests in all these areas. Friendly nations and allies of the United States have national security interests in these areas also.

The areas are fraught with hostilities, turbulence, and decreasing stability. We could, probably alone, greatly assist in stabilizing conditions, alleviating hostilities, reducing suffering, and promoting peace with freedom. Almost certainly we will be called upon, even beseeched, to help. We will probably respond. But now it will be infinitely more dangerous and costly to Americans.

So our mistake is not only damaging

now; but it could cause a future catastrophe which we will be forced to either disdain and turn our backs or which we will become embroiled to our terrible sorrow.

We made a mistake because we deigned to punish Turkey selectively. Admittedly, Turkey, after being caught on the horns of a dilemma, violated our arms assistance agreement by using some of those arms to invade Cyprus. Certainly we should correct such violations. But those violations are rife. Greece, Israel, and some Arab countries have violated the same agreement—just to mention a few in the same geographical area. Let us stop the violations; but let us stop all violations; let us not be selective in our retribution. Let us be honorable, fair, and just in our enforcement of our agreements.

We made a mistake by permitting ourselves to be lobbied by special interest groups who put their parochial, heritage, and political interests above the national security interests of the United States.

This predicate for national legislation can destroy several aspects of America. Our national security and alliances are frightfully weakened. Our friend Turkey is exposed to hostile forces. Our friend Israel is seriously, if not fatally, jeopardized. Our friend Greece is left impotent. She is likely to lose all of her present interests in Cyprus and the important Aegean Islands. We will lose allies; NATO will be further weakened. We can lose free access to and safe passage upon the Mediterranean.

The immediate losers are the Cypriots—especially the Greek Cypriot refugees. There is no way the Greeks can force the Turks off Cyprus. There is no way we can use military force to get the Turks off Cyprus. We can, however, do so by negotiation—free and open negotiation. Embargos are a form of force, of war; we cannot force Turk soldiers off Cyprus by embargo, unless we want to invite a war which no one can win, and everyone can lose.

A superpower ought to lead the way. If we consider ourselves capable and willing to effectuate peace and stability in that area of our planet, we made another mistake. A superpower should understand the situation and conditions, should evaluate objectively, should appreciate the principles of all the principal parties, and should put aside petty historical events and emphasize the future.

Ever since our embargo, conditions and relationships have deteriorated among all the parties, including Greece, Turkey, NATO, the United States, and Cyprus, but especially Cyprus and the United States. It is a mistake for any nation to permit a situation to deteriorate if it can avoid it. We could, but did not.

It seems a shame and a pity that we could cast a vote which insures that everybody will be a loser rather than cast a vote that enables everybody to become a winner and a problem solver.

The situation is now certain to deteriorate further. Any deterioration is certain to hurt the weakest and most helpless most. The condition of the refugees ought

to concern us most at this moment, even if we care to ignore the future—which we should not.

Under any diplomatic practice or principle, Turkey can do nothing under the continuance of this selective embargo against her. No nation, including our own, should buckle under to a selective embargo. We should not continue an embargo except as an act of war. We should not engage in acts of war against allies or friends unless we intend to wage war. So until we get out of our war posture, and get back to negotiation, Turkey can do nothing positive. She can only protect herself and her interests and her citizens as best she can. The protection of her citizens and her interests can seriously adversely affect our interests and our citizens in various ways.

We made a mistake by interjecting the Congress in the execution of our foreign policy. Congress ought to play a larger role in the development of foreign policy, but a committee of 535, which is widely fragmented and diverse, should not be injecting itself *ex parte* into the implementation or execution of foreign policy.

The Congress has the right, the constitutional right, to declare war, or commit an act tantamount to war such as selective embargo, but it is a mistake to do that when the executive department is trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Congress, like other national leaders, can be very tyrannical and despotic, but it should not be. It is a mistake for the Congress to continue a selective embargo against a friend and ally.

For the Congress to single out one Nation for retaliation is unwise and unjust for many reasons. We should not pounce on a minority. Sometime all of us will be in a minority, and if a minority's rights are not protected while we enjoy a majority status, we, too, may be sowing seeds of distrust and destruction for the principle of protecting minority rights.

We made a mistake which can only hurt Greece and its citizens.

Nationalistic emotion is one thing and I expect every nationality to indulge. But Greek survival is more essential. Without our bases in Turkey, the security of Greece is paper-thin. Without our bases in Turkey, it is impossible, and therefore foolhardy, to try to defend Israel.

Our protective umbrella once extended over both Greece and Turkey. If we cut off Turkey, Greece is exposed, and vulnerable. So we are making a mistake which especially damages Greece.

I have read newspaper reports, which must be accurate, that Turkey could close certain U.S. intelligence gathering bases within Turkey. The closure of these facilities could totally preclude our monitoring of Russian compliance with SALT agreements. Loss of this facility, even for a week, could wholly subvert our national security within the boundaries of the United States. Another intelligence gathering facility in Turkey permits us to monitor the transit of the Straits of Bosphorus by Russian submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. Loss of this capability for only a week could loose numerous missiles into the Atlantic

Ocean without detection. This directly jeopardizes the security of citizens living in the coastal areas of the Continental United States as well as our fleet and NATO forces.

It is one thing to vote for continuance of a selective embargo, but we should thoroughly understand the damage and jeopardy to the security of the United States and its citizens of national origin, including Greek Americans.

Clearly this was a vote involving our national security. I shall watch the American Security Council for their interpretation.

It is also a mistake to continue a selective embargo to "stick it to Henry." This may be good domestic politics, but it is a dangerous foreign policy tactic.

We probably made more mistakes than I have time to mention now.

Maybe some of our mistakes can be rectified, before it is too late for the national security of the United States to be repaired.

If local heritage, parochial and special interests, or matters of lesser moment, are placed above our national security, we are certain to lose what national security we have left.

This is a mistake that first generation immigrants can abide or may even relish, but the mistake may haunt their grandchildren.

I have just learned from a colleague on the floor that, according to a wine service report which and hope is not correct, but fear it could be, Turkey, perhaps their parliament, has ordered all U.S. bases in Turkey closed within 24 hours, except for one facility at Incirlic which is also a NATO facility.

No one with any military or diplomatic knowledge should be surprised. What else could we expect from Turkish officials? What would any of us do if we held responsible positions in the Government of Turkey now? I have some hope and confidence that Turkey will use some restraint and even demonstrate more diplomatic skill than we, and that diplomatic negotiation can get back on track.

I hope the House reaches for an opportunity to redeem itself before it is too late.

THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO REFORM SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS (OASDI)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HEINZ) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. Speaker, there is urgent need for legislative remedy that will simplify or eliminate the unfair and inhumane administrative and bureaucratic barriers placed in the way of the aged, blind, and disabled in the implementation of the SSI and related programs. Already almost 150 bills directly concerned with these problems have been introduced by my colleagues, reflecting both the strong need for immediate correction of unjust provisions made obvious by the effects of the July 1 increase in social security benefits, and long-range

reform of SSI as it affects, and is affected by, other State and Federal programs. In addition to these bills, formal reviews of SSI have been undertaken by the Public Assistance Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the SSI Study Group appointed by Secretary Weinberger.

There is a lot of congressional concern, but there is yet no congressional commitment to solving these problems. It is time now for Congress to get itself together.

Today, I would like to speak to those problems which can and should be solved by Congress now, while the various study groups are engaged in developing long-term solutions. Many of these problems have been brought to my attention by my constituents, but I know that the situation as it exists in Pennsylvania is typical of what is happening across the Nation as recent adjustments to SSI are implemented. When the elderly and disabled poor face serious deprivation, as well as possible eviction and institutionalization, because programs designed to meet their needs are rendered ineffective by arbitrary or outdated limitations, restrictions, or regulations, it is time to act.

I would like to concentrate on four areas for immediate congressional action which will restore the focus of SSI to its original objective; namely, to assure an adequate income to aged and disabled Americans. These areas include: First, providing a guarantee that the cost-of-living increase in social security benefits will be passed through to the recipients at the same percentage level as the Federal grant; second, devising an effective emergency assistance program for providing aid to elderly whose checks have been stolen or lost, or who have suffered a disaster such as a fire or theft; third, placing a tight time limit on processing applications for SSI; and fourth, removing the unrealistic and punitive \$25,000 limit on the value of a home which can be owned by an SSI recipient.

I. COST-OF-LIVING INCREASE

The cost-of-living increase, provided by Federal law, is perhaps the most complicated and troublesome aspect of the program. The SSI benefit was increased by \$11.70—8 percent—effective July 1, bringing the Federal floor to \$157.70 per month for a single recipient. The problem is that there is no guarantee that the Federal increase in benefits will be passed along in full measure to the recipients.

Most States supplement the basic Federal benefit; however, some States lower their contributions as the Federal benefits rise. The State governments keep all or a portion of the increase to themselves and deprive the recipients of an expected and needed increase. This is what happened to the July 1974 increase and questions were raised then, and are being raised now, regarding State and individual eligibility.

On the question of State eligibility, six States received no benefit from the July 1974 increase at all. Neither the States, nor the recipients, received a portion of

ME
July 25, 1975

as to violate the Constitutional authority of Congress to regulate Commerce.

The discrepancies in the Environmental Impact Statement drafted by the Federal Aviation Administration lend significant credence to this point of view.

I believe that if there is even the remotest indication that the Separation of Powers has been violated then we must broaden and deepen our investigations into this matter.

The Environmental Defense Fund has already attempted to obtain the Nixon letter citing the Freedom of Information Act and the White House has refused this request. Similarly, I have sent letters to both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration requesting access to any written communication that might indicate executive influence over these agencies. I have not as yet received replies.

Gentlemen, obtaining access to this information alone is not enough. The Testimony of Mr. Strelow before a Committee of this House has already indicated that regardless of what is said in the Nixon letter it was used in a way that indicated to the E.P.A. that executive commitments had been made.

It is imperative that this committee take immediate steps to determine the exact extent of the commitments made by the Executive. This can only be done by directly questioning under oath the individuals such as John Shaffer and Alexander Butterfield who were directly involved in this matter.

The issues at stake here affect the Health and Safety of all Americans. We cannot let the charges that have already been made go unexplored. I implore you to expand these hearings and get to the bottom of this most important matter.

INTRODUCES BILL TO AID TURKEY

HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 25, 1975

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, our vital NATO defense structure in Southern Europe continues to crumble with frightening rapidity. The reported closing of U.S. military installations in Turkey is the sad but predictable result of yesterday's action by the House on H.R. 8454. Now the ratchet has been given another hard twist, locking once firm allies into a relationship of mutual hostility. This situation cannot continue. Common sense demands a reconsideration of yesterday's action—a simple and statesmanlike gesture of a kind that only a truly great and responsible nation can offer.

The bill I am proposing today can be the vehicle for this reconsideration. It is identical to H.R. 8454, except for the deletion of section 3 in its entirety. Section 3 of course hinged on consideration of our military assistance bill later this year and was largely a confusing encumbrance.

This bill draws the lines in a clear and simple way. It allows aid that had already been committed—aid vital to the NATO role—to be released. It allows the President to grant licenses for certain commercial sales. It opens the pipeline ever so slightly, but hopefully enough to redress the terrible policy dislocations that have so far occurred.

Unless we quickly and effectively lance this painful sore, the secondary infections

will be dire indeed: we will have: (1) destroyed the southern flank of NATO; (2) retarded the prospects for peace on Cyprus; (3) disrupted a long-standing bilateral relationship, and (4) given the importance of our monitoring bases in Turkey—decreased the likelihood for any meaningful verification of future strategic arms agreements.

This is a moral issue, as opponents of the bill argued yesterday, but it is clearly not a simple moral issue. The public interest, indeed, morality itself, requires that we look squarely at all of the consequences of our acts, rather than simply looking at a few with one eye closed.

JIM FARLEY AT 87

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 25, 1975

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, the name of Jim Farley is well known to anyone who has even a beginner's acquaintance with America in the 20th century. I am happy to report to you that, at the age of 87, Mr. Farley remains vigorous, and with his Irish eyes still smiling, continues to observe the contemporary scene with lucidity.

Although it is a bit late to join with Mr. Farley in celebrating his birthday, it is never too late to think of him as a living symbol of the past greatness and continuing vitality of the Democratic Party.

The following article, which appeared in Rockland County's Journal News, describes Mr. Farley's annual visit to his birthplace, on the occasion of his 87th birthday:

May 30, 1975 is a somber day—gray, rain threatening.

It is Memorial Day, or was until changed by Congress, but it's still James A. Farley's birthday. Nothing can change that.

Farley, former Postmaster General, celebrating his 87th birthday, returned to Rockland County yesterday on his annual birthday trip to visit his Grassy Point birthplace, rekindle old friendships and pay his respects at his parents' graves in St. Peter's Cemetery, Haverstraw.

Tall, dressed impeccably in a blue vested suit, white handkerchief in his breast pocket, Rockland's famous son hardly looks his years.

This is the man who started his political career in 1909 as Stony Point's town clerk and rose to mastermind Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1932 and 1936 presidential campaigns. He is still working today—two decades after his retirement age and as chairman of the board of Coca-Cola Export Corp.

Jim Farley's roots go deep. "There is not one day that goes by that I don't think of Grassy Point or Stony Point," he said.

Farley's schedule called for a number of personal visits with old friends in the North Rockland area during the morning.

At 11 a.m. he arrived at St. Peter's Cemetery, where he stood, alone with his thoughts at his parents' gravesite for about 20 minutes.

Then he was off on some further visits.

Farley, who has been honored by 24 universities and colleges and received countless awards and honors, admits, "There is no greater pleasure or honor than in the school—James A. Farley Middle School, Stony Point—being named after me."

And the honor seems to be shared by the school too.

Amid exuberant shouts of "happy birthday" Farley was greeted by students and teachers, many of whose families grew up with "Stretch", a nickname from early baseball days. He shows a remarkable memory by recalling them all.

At the school he was serenaded by a music class, then walked the corridors with Principal Al Johnson, winding up the visit with a presentation to the school trophy case of an award given him in 1956 for his contributions to amateur sports. The award had been presented by the Metropolitan Association of Amateur Athletics.

There was then a quick stop at Immaculate Conception School in Stony Point, where he presented Principal Sister Catherine with a medal he had received from Pope Pius XII.

Apparently many Rocklanders remember him also. He recalled meeting many during his world travels, like the waiter from Spring Valley who served him "damn good steak" in Frankfurt, Germany.

Although he has "fond affection" for the county he says he has no desire to leave New York City despite its recent budgetary problems. "Mayor Beame is an honest, intelligent man. Despite the criticism he'll do what's best."

As to the '76 election, he said he'd rather wait until all the bids are in before taking sides, but he does believe Ted Kennedy wouldn't run. Farley said: "He said he wouldn't—I'm a great believer in the truth. I'd never say anything I didn't mean."

While he had no opinion on postal rate fluctuations he does feel the terrible mistake was creating the new agency. "Things were different in my day. Discipline is falling off; the workers aren't as dedicated."

Sidelined by a heart attack three years ago, he does pay attention to the doctor's advice but doesn't pay attention to his age and leads an active life.

When the students in the music class couldn't play an Irish tune for him, Farley gently admonished them, "I hope you learn one for next year like "My Irish Eyes are Smiling."

With his zest for life that class had better get busy.

EMLÉN TUNNELL—PRO FOOTBALL LEGEND—DIES

HON. EDWARD P. BEARD

OF RHODE ISLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 25, 1975

Mr. BEARD of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the former star of the New York Giants professional football team, Emlen Tunnell, died and the legend of his contributions to professional football began. Before his career ended in 1961 with the Green Bay Packers, Mr. Tunnell set 16 Giant records and 4 national football records that still stand. He was named to the All-Pro seven times which reflected his durability and grit.

Professional football paid Emlen Tunnell the supreme accolade by placing him into the Professional Football Hall of Fame at Canton, Ohio, in 1967.

Thousands in Rhode Island will lament his death as he taught dignity, tolerance, and leadership every Sunday afternoon in his football exploits on television.

It is important that we do so. In these times of changing governments and revised standards, the United States is indeed fortunate to have in the Guamanians a people who are proud to be called Americans. During their entire 75-year history under the stars and stripes, they have repeatedly supported their dedication to the principles of freedom and democracy with affirmative action in both war and peace.

The welfare of our fellow Americans on Guam is a concern to me, to my fellow members of the House Interior Committee, and to the total Congress.

We are indeed fortunate to have as a member of our committee our good friend, TONY WON PAT, who has so ably represented his people for many years. The expertise and experience he brings with him has contributed greatly to our ability to understand the needs of Guam and other areas of the Pacific. We shall continue to work with him and to seek his advice as we consider the constitutional development of these areas. Thank you.

SADAT WANTS UNITED STATES TO REPAY EGYPT'S FOREIGN AID DEBT TO RUSSIA

HON. JOE L. EVINS

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 25, 1975

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, things have come to an incredible pass when we are asked by another nation to repay its foreign aid debt to Russia—especially when Russia still owes the United States unpaid World War II debts.

But this is what is happening—President Sadat of Egypt has proposed to the United States that we give him the money to pay off Egypt's debt to Russia.

The Nashville Banner in a recent editorial observed that this "really takes the cake."

Our foreign aid program has reached ludicrous and ridiculous extremes and certainly this request by Sadat should be rejected. The foreign aid program must be revised and foreign aid cut.

Because of the interest of my colleagues and the American people in this matter, I place the editorial from the Nashville Banner in the RECORD herewith:

THE DEBT COMES DUE

We have become accustomed to the United States being asked for money by other countries, but the latest request for financial assistance really takes the cake.

It was from Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, who wants the money to pay off his country's debts to Russia.

The creditors in the Soviet Union are refusing President Sadat any grace period and they want their money for Soviet arms and equipment, as well as for construction of the Aswan Dam.

Now financial aid is one thing. But financial aid from the United States to Russia, via Egypt, is quite another.

It's somewhat surprising to learn that superpowers demand payment. We seldom, if ever do. The practical men who run the

Soviet Union obviously keep a string attached and now they are jerking it.

Maybe we ought to take a leaf from the Soviet book and demand reimbursement for those Russian debts which remain unpaid from World War II.

REGARDING THE CONCORDE, SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

HON. THOMAS J. DOWNEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, July 25, 1975

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I testified before the Subcommittee on Transportation of the House Government Operations Committee regarding the SST, Concorde.

There are many questions which have been raised regarding the manner in which the EPA and FAA have assessed the possibility of allowing SST, Concorde flights into the United States. I would therefore like to bring to the attention of my colleagues my testimony before the subcommittee. The testimony follows:

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. DOWNEY, BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE REGARDING THE CONCORDE, JULY 24, 1975

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members I would like to thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you this morning and express my strong concerns over the manner in which the Concorde S.S.T. has been certified for commercial flights into this country. Mr. Chairman, I believe that a strong case can be made that the actions of the Executive in regard to this aircraft have systematically violated the constitutional authority of the Congress to regulate Commerce and ensure the health and safety of all Americans.

Gentlemen, I would like to call your attention to an article by Mr. Harry Pearson which appeared in the June 4th issue of Newsday that presents a very clear and concise account of the kinds of actions taken by the Nixon and Ford Administrations on behalf of the Concorde and I ask that this article be made a part of the official record of this hearing.

The case made by Mr. Pearson is indeed frightening, for it carefully documents a clear pattern of executive commitment to the SST even in the face of severe and valid environmental and safety hazards.

Ostensibly, this commitment has hinged upon letters sent to the Governments of France and Great Britain from then President Nixon assuring that the Concorde would not be discriminated against by any United States regulatory agency. According to Roger Strelow, an assistant administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in testimony before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, this letter, sent in 1973, was cited by a representative of the National Security Council in advising the E.P.A. of the foreign policy implications of any regulation it might propose on the S.S.T. According to the testimony the N.C.S. "constructed" this letter as "an assurance from Nixon . . . that the plane would be allowed to land in this country".

Gentleman, I am sure that you are aware that the E.P.A. subsequently exempted the Concorde from Federal Aviation Regulation Part 36 which would have required the plane to meet the noise standards that present sub-sonic planes must meet by 1977.

Moreover, the evidence suggests that both

John Shaffer and Alexander Butterfield made similar verbal commitments to France and Great Britain assuring them that the Concorde would indeed be allowed into the United States.

It is patently clear that these commitments, and the kinds of pressure exerted by the Executive through the National Security Council and the Department of State go a long way to explain the deficiencies of the Environmental Impact Statement drafted by the Federal Aviation Administration.

I firmly believe that the F.A.A. gave more weight to Foreign Policy than to the Health and Safety of Americans in drafting this environmental assessment. Let me take just a moment to enumerate some of the most telling of these deficiencies.

For example, in assessing the impact of the S.S.T. on the Ozone Shield the draft E.I.S. written by the F.A.A. states that the operation of 30 S.S.T.'s would cause climatic effects which were so small that they could barely be detected. However, the Statement does not even deal with the effect such "small" climatic changes would have on human health. According to the National Academy of Science, 30 Concorde's would decrease the Ozone Shield enough to increase U.S. skin cancer cases by 1,800 per year!

Furthermore, it is amazing to me that the President's own environmental advisors, the Council on Environmental Quality, in a report released to my Colleague Lester Wolf on June 10th calls the Concorde "at least twice as loud as most present subsonic aircraft, and confirms the N.A.S.'s assessment of the cancer hazards this aircraft would create. Yet the Impact Statement drafted by F.A.A. attempts time and again to cloud these many dangers.

These are but a few of the discrepancies contained in the F.A.A.'s Impact Statement on the Concorde and the full list is very long indeed. For the record I would like at this time to submit the Environmental Defense Fund's criticisms of this Statement. I believe that the evidence contained in this document provides yet another indication of the way in which this matter was handled.

But gentlemen, the issues here today are not the specific merits of the Environmental Impact Statement, hearings have already been conducted on this matter. Nor is the issue the merits or hazards of the aircraft in question. The issue that we must address is the manner in which important decisions affecting the health and safety of the American People were arrived at and whether the authority of Congress was violated by the Executive Branch.

I asked Mr. Morton Rosenberg of the Congressional Research Service to give me a lawyer's opinion as to whether Administrative Influence such as that described in Mr. Pearson's article could serve to invalidate a decision made by an independent agency.

Mr. Rosenberg's response which I would like to include in the record of this hearing indicates that where Congress has established procedures and standards for agency determinations an agency's failure to comply with such directions will subject the determination to strict judicial scrutiny and possible reversal. He goes on to cite the precedent established in D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 459 F2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972) that "extraneous influence" can indeed invalidate agency determinations even if all requisite statutory procedures are complied with.

Moreover, in a letter sent to my colleague Lester Wolf, John Halleger, the Washington Counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund advances the opinion that the influence exercised by the President in this instance may well have intervened with the procedures set out by the National Environmental Policy Act and the Noise Control Act so adversely so