Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R0008001,30005-8 51841

Т0	: Mr. Cary	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
FROM	: Don		SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJE	CT:		
	Letter to Senate Judiciary on S. 18	341, the polygraph bill	
NOTES			<u> </u>
	When this bill was first introduced	, we wrote to Senator Bayh a	bout
	a meeting on this bill. However, at this point it would seem more a	such a meeting never came at	out and
	Committee. We have not received	a request for comments and r	o action on
	the bill is pending. Representative the House and we can use this mod	ve Koch has introduced similated for letters to the House Ju	diciary
	Committee. I have attached PLC's	letter to Bella on the polygra	ph subject,
	which is quite similar to the one I	have prepared.	over
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DRAKTO DEVEN FOR Relevant 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8

Honorable James O. Eastland, Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

S. 1841, which would bar Federal agencies from administering polygraph or similar examinations to employees or employment applicants, has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. I must strongly this billy oppose any measure preventing such use of the polygraph by the Central Intelligence Agency, as this would seriously impair the ability of the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory charge to "protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" (50 U.S.C. 403). An effective personnel security program is vital to assure this protection. one of the final. The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph testing as a principle of the second second second second second the applicant its security screening process for applicants, as well as for its reinvestigation program. After a judgment has been made that an applicant satisfies a manpower need of the Agency, our Office of Security conducts an investigation osi -to-determine whether the applicant meets security criteria. One of the later--phases of this security investigation is an interview in which the polygraph It is also used in our feindeslighten program, is employed. The reinvestigation, which is conducted at approximately five-year intervals in an employee's career, is a natural corollary to the of the reinvestigation The rigid initial screening. Its purpose is to detect any hostile exploitation or subversion of "in-place" CIA employees. The polygraph examination during the reinvestigation is limited only to counterintelligence questions.

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Tatisfies prove that The polygraph program is an essential element of our security program. During the period 1963 through mid-1974, nearly 1800 applicants for staff or staff-type positions were rejected on security grounds; of this total, of those applicants rejected on security grounds over 60 percent were rejected on the basis of information developed principally or solely during polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records, 52 applicants who had been disapproved on the percent of developed during polygraph interviews had almost y completed all other security screening and been provisionally approved on this basis. Without the polygraph program, the disqualifying information on these cases would to this proved value have remained unknown. In addition, I believe it is reasonable to presume that the program is a significant deterrent to application for employment by unsuitable candidates, and, more importantly, penetration attempts by foreign The prepondencuce o intelligence services. the utility of CIA's polygraph program is not solely a function of its part in contributing information lending to the rejection of unsuitable candidates. The preponderance of polygraph interview reports are favorable. Most of these favorable reports constitute useful and comforting confirmation of other screening procedures; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of put to rest allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in unnecessary defensive measures.

We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse of the polygraph program, and we have procedures in effect to forestall abuses and to protect the rights of those taking the examinations. These include:

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of the application of the intent to use the polygraph, During to the interview. Quellions are revened with the applicant processing the polygraph procedure and examination applicant before testing coverage is fully explained, and the examination is conducted

--each applicant for employment is notified at the time

-only after the applicant consents to the interview.

--advance consultation with the Office of Personnel and the Office of Medical Services ***** determine whether a polygraph is advisable;

--the applicant is notified of the privilege against selfincrimination if a question may pertain to a violation of the criminal law;

--the general content of all applicant polygraph test questions is reviewed before testing to assure that all questions relate directly to security considerations as outlined in Executive Order 10450

affiliation of a non-subversive nature are permitted;

- the applicant is told that the examination may be monitored and possibly recorded to let <u>him know there are no hidden procedures</u>

--there is random monitoring by a specialized supervisor, to insure that no improper questions are asked; and the opplicant is --polygraph records are maintained in separate files with

very strict need-to-know rules governing access;

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t the higher raph examiner makes no recommendation as to security suitability of the person tested; the polygraph report is evaluated as only one element in the total investigative report.

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Spot interviews and occasional surveys have been conducted with applicants who have completed their polygraph tests to insure that the program adheres to established standards. In one such program, several thousand female applicants were interviewed after their polygraph examinations. Feedback from these interviews was utilized to guide polygraph procedures, but the program was finally dropped because the incidence of adverse commentary was too low to justify its continuance.

Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is extremely discriminating as to their qualifications, intelligence, integrity, and high character. They are given a rigorous training program which is a continuing process to keep them abreast of developments in their professional field To support this program, CIA has maintained a vigorous research field. To support this program, CIA has maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into new techniques and equipment to insure that highest standards are maintained.

The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates extremely sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that agency has also found it necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security program. I believe the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully justifiable, but I refer the Committee to NSA for the details of its program.

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In his 2 June 1975 statement accompanying the introduction of S. 1841, Senator Bayh expressed his willingness to consider the need for a limited use of the polygraph in the intelligence field. Former Senator Sam Ervin, a strong advocate of individual rights, recognized this need. In his proposed legislation to protect the personal privacy of Government employees, introduced during several Congresses prior to his retirement from public office, Senator Ervin expressly excepted the CIA and National Security Agency from the provisions barring the use of the polygraph in Government. Senator Ervin's last Sillwas S. 1688, which passed the Senate on 7 March 1974. If S. 1841 is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the Committee to add the following amendment to proposed section 246 of Title 18:

"(d) This section shall not apply to Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency."

The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

George Bush Director

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