

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL		
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Office of Legislative Counsel		
2	7D 35, Headquarters		
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<p><b>Remarks:</b></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Director of Personnel			28 MAY 1975
5E 58, Headquarters			
UNCLASSIFIED			SECRET

75-1305  
Dec 15-159

28 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : Senate Joint Resolution 69

1. Senate Joint Resolution 69 calls for an insistence "that the United Nations take all necessary and appropriate steps to obtain an accounting of members of the United States Armed Forces missing in action in Southeast Asia" but apparently does not include civilians in this accounting. It would appear that a broadening of this resolution to include civilians would be appropriate, both in the interest of personnel of this Agency and those of other government agencies, as well as U. S. civilians without government employment affiliation.

2. It is therefore suggested that appropriate action be taken to include civilians in the accounting called for by Senate Joint Resolution 69.

[Redacted Signature Box]

F. W. M. Janney  
Director of Personnel

STAT

HRes 496 - House Select Comm.

94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**S. J. RES. 69**

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**JOINT RESOLUTION**

Relating to obtaining a full and accurate accounting for members of the United States Armed Forces missing in action in Southeast Asia and United States contribution to the United Nations.

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By Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BEALL, Mr. BUCKLEY, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. FANNIN, Mr. GARN, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HELMS, Mr. McCLURE, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. STONE, and Mr. THURMOND

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APRIL 9, 1975

Read twice and referred to the Committee on  
Foreign Relations

**SECRET**

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 22 May 1975

[Redacted]

1. [Redacted] Tim Hardy, Presidential Commission staff, called to determine what success we have had in getting released to the Presidential Commission a copy of the 27 June 1947 hearing before the Committee on Expenditures and the Executive Departments on the CIA section of H. R. 2319, unification of the armed forces. This document would be helpful in providing authoritative legislative history on certain of the Agency's authorities.

2. [Redacted] Called Bill Hogan, Counsel, Intelligence Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, regarding the possibility that the hearing of 27 June 1947 before the Committee on Expenditures and the Executive Departments was transferred to the House Armed Services from the Committee on Expenditures and the Executive Departments. Hogan will look into this possibility and will also provide guidance on the general problem of further distribution of an executive session hearing of a congressional committee which is in the possession of a Federal agency.

3. [Redacted] Called Jack Blum, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and suggested Tuesday, 27 May 1975, at 11:00 a. m. for a briefing on the political situation in Korea. [Redacted] OCI, has been identified as the briefer.

4. [Redacted] Talked to Clark McFadden, General Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, who said the Newsweek article on Agency proprietaries is on Chairman John C. Stennis' (D., Miss.) reading list and asked if we could provide an appropriate fact sheet. [Redacted] C/CCS, 25X1 has been alerted.

In another conversation with McFadden, I explained to him that we were prepared to continue the NID at least through the recess and McFadden was relieved at this and said that as a result he will not have to take the matter up with Chairman Stennis at this time.

[Redacted]

**SECRET**

IMPDET CL B [Signature]

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP77M00144R001100190022-9

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP77M00144R001100190022-9

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -- PROCUREMENT AND RDT&E AUTHORIZATION  
(\$ Thousands)

	<u>Budget Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>House Bill Under Budget</u>	<u>Senate Committee Recommendation</u>	<u>Senate Committee Recommendation Under Budget</u>
Fiscal Year 1976	<sup>1/</sup> 29,855,388	26,545,023	- 3,310,365 (- 11.1%)	25,012,535	- 4,842,853 (- 16.2%)
Fiscal Year 1977	5,863,737	5,474,417	- 386,320 (- 6.6%)	5,271,798	- 591,939 (- 10.1%)

<sup>1/</sup> Includes \$1,293,000,000 for Military Assistance, South Vietnam

May 21, 1975

Refer back ?

ITEMS FOR MR. CARY FOR THE DCI 9:00 MEETING ON: 21 May 1975  
Date

FROM: Don  
Name

SUBJECT: H.R. 6674

*outstanding*  
The House further considered the Military Procurement Authorization bill for Fiscal 1976. Four votes were taken on amendments to delete funds from the bill for specific projects. The narrowest vote came on an amendment to delete B-1 bomber funds, and this was defeated by 227-164. The other amendments on which there was a recorded vote were defeated by about 2-1 margins.

Despite the liberal cast of the 94th Congress and all the talk about reducing the defense budget, it appears the votes are still there on defense (and hopefully intelligence) matters.

*Don*  
*Thanks but I don't see it*

ITEMS FOR MR. CARY FOR THE DCI 9:00 MEETING ON: 21 May 1975  
Date

FROM: Don  
Name

SUBJECT: S. Res. 160

Senator Mansfield has introduced S. Res. 160, which would deny funds for the construction of military facilities on Diego Garcia. His statement in the RECORD is attached.

DoD has given us fuelers  
re DCI's position on Soviet  
presence in Indian Ocean

mentioned  
at 9:00  
A



May 19, 1975

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 8651

Vermont (Mr. LEAHY), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG) the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. MORGAN), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) is absent on official business.

On this vote, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) is paired with the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS). If present and voting, the Senator from Wyoming would vote "yea" and the Senator from Utah would vote "nay."

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CLARK), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HASKELL) would each vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) is absent on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 41, nays 40, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 190 Leg.]

YEAS—41

Bartlett	Garn	Muskie
Bellmon	Goldwater	Nunn
Brock	Griffin	Packwood
Buckley	Hansen	Pearson
Bumpers	Hart, Philip A.	Scott, Hugh
Byrd, Robert C.	Hatfield	Sparkman
Cannon	Helms	Stafford
Case	Hruska	Stennis
Chiles	Huddleston	Symington
Curtis	Johnston	Taft
Domenici	Mansfield	Thurmond
Fannin	Mathias	Tower
Fong	McClellan	Young
Ford	McClure	

NAYS—40

Abourezk	Eagleton	Nelson
Allen	Glenn	Pastore
Bayh	Gravel	Pell
Beall	Hart, Gary W.	Percy
Bentsen	Hartke	Proxmire
Biden	Hollings	Ribicoff
Brooke	Jackson	Roth
Burdick	Javits	Schweiker
Byrd,	Kennedy	Scott,
Harry F., Jr.	Laxalt	William L.
Church	Magnuson	Stevenson
Cranston	McGovern	Stone
Culver	McIntyre	Tunney
Dole	Montoya	Weicker

NOT VOTING—18

Baker	Inouye	Morgan
Clark	Leahy	Moss
Eastland	Long	Randolph
Haskell	McGee	Stevens
Hathaway	Metcalf	Talmadge
Humphrey	Mondale	Williams

So the bill (S. 846) was passed, as follows:

S. 846

An act to authorize the further suspension of prohibitions against military assistance to Turkey, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and section 6 of the joint resolution of October 17, 1974 (Public Law 93-448, as amended by Public Law 93-570) are each amended by

striking out "until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time," and inserting in lieu thereof "if during such suspension".

Sec. 2. Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is further amended by designating the present subsection as paragraph (1) and by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the enactment of this paragraph, and at the end of each succeeding thirty-day period, a report on progress made during such period toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict."

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, today I was regrettably forced to cast my vote against the bill to renew American arms assistance to Turkey. I say regrettably because Turkey has been an old and reliable ally, whose friendship and mutual-ity of interest with the United States have been demonstrated many times over the past three decades.

Turkish forces have participated proudly alongside the forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, and other alliance partners in preserving the security of Western Europe and the Mediterranean. With approximately half a million men in arms, Turkey has NATO's second largest and force. In addition, it occupies the strategically vital position between the Middle East and the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that any withdrawal of Turkey from the NATO would seriously damage its effectiveness.

Nevertheless, I feel compelled to object to the restoration of American arms assistance because I feel the requirements set forth when the embargo was first passed that there be "substantial progress" in the negotiations and a partial withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus have not been met. The mandate of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is clear—American arms are not to be used by allies in aggressive actions. The reason for that law was equally obvious—it was meant to encourage self-defense, not the imposition of foreign policy views by military fiat. That reasoning is as vital today as it was 14 years ago. No alliance can long endure if one ally is free to use indiscriminate force to settle its disputes with another ally.

I had hoped that progress on the Cyprus problem would have come more quickly. However, while it is true that today negotiations are again underway, it seems as though we are no closer to a resolution to the problem than we were 6 months ago. The U.S. Government has not even received private assurances that Turkish withdrawal would proceed once aid was renewed. This situation can hardly be described as representing substantial progress.

Under the circumstances, I feel that the arms embargo must be continued until the talks on Cyprus progress or until, as a minimum, we have received assurances from the Turkish Government

that if arms assistance is renewed there will be a new flexibility on the part of Turkey.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I seek recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Montana.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may the Senate be in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators will keep order in the Chamber.

## LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there will be no further votes this evening. We will, of course, take up the supplemental appropriation bill, which will be laid down this evening for tomorrow, plus the Butterfield nomination tomorrow.

## SENATE RESOLUTION 160—RESOLUTION DISAPPROVING CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

(Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on May 12, 1975, the President of the United States, by letter, certified to the Congress that the construction of naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is vital to the national interests of the Government of the United States. The text of the President's letter to the Congress reads as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-552), I have evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia. On the basis of this evaluation and in accordance with section 613(a)(1)(B), I hereby certify that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 12, 1975.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, may we have order? I cannot hear the Senator's remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

The Senate may proceed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Under the provisions of Public Law 93-552, 93d Congress, 2d session, section 613, I am laying before the Senate a resolution of disapproval in accordance with the provisions of section 613. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks section 613 from the public law be printed in order that Senators may have an opportunity to read this section of law and know exactly how this resolution of disapproval will be handled in the Committee of the Armed Services and on the floor of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I was very surprised that the President of the United States would send this resolution to the Congress at this time in view that we have been told by the administration that the President is in the midst of a reappraisal of our foreign policy because of the debacle of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia.

I think in the debate of this resolution, when it is returned from the Armed Services Committee, a number of very important questions should be examined during the debate.

Why, in the face of the fact that all the nations bordering on the Indian Ocean have asked the United States and the Soviet Union not to escalate the arms race in the Indian Ocean area, has the administration forwarded this letter of certification? At a meeting in New Delhi on November 17, 1974, 30 nations issued a policy statement opposing the United States building a naval facility on the island of Diego Garcia.

Why does this administration persist in the face of a staggering deficit in our budget insist on building a naval facility that will cost approximately \$175 million? I contend that the money that the administration is requesting to start building naval facilities on Diego Garcia, amounting to \$14 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force, is only a downpayment. Already in the fiscal year 1976 budget, the Navy is asking for an additional \$13 million for operational facilities on Diego Garcia.

Mr. President, are we going to engage in an adventure of Southeast Asia and Vietnam all over again? Is there an extension of a policy of the United States trying to be policeman for the world in the face of our bitter experience in Vietnam?

Are we not scattered throughout the world enough by having military personnel on all five continents—perhaps, if Antarctica is considered a continent, on all six continents—and naval ships on all the oceans of the world and on a good many seas?

In voting the naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, are we going to vote a three-ocean Navy? The Navy contends that they will be able to operate carriers in the Indian Ocean with only a 12-airplane carrier force. However, will it really have to be 15 carriers to fulfill our commitment in the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Indian Ocean?

I believe that the role of the carrier in sea warfare should be a part of the debate on the island of Diego Garcia. I submit that the aircraft carrier is now obsolete with the technical advancement of the new cruise missiles. I submit that in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets always know exactly within a few hundred yards where our carriers are operating. Can a carrier task force adequately protect itself in its operations in the Indian Ocean?

What are our so-called vital interests in the Indian Ocean? Certainly, having a task force in the Indian Ocean

had no effect on the oil situation during the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. In fact, our naval vessels were completely cut off from Arab oil and the United States could do nothing about the Arab action.

Incidentally, I understand that there is an interesting article in this week's U.S. News & World Report, which once again raises the specter of war in case of another oil embargo. I hope that that does not come to pass.

Mr. President, the question of Diego Garcia and allowing the Navy to build a naval operating facility on this island some 1,200 miles south of the tip of India is a vital policy question. I urge upon my colleagues to take due notice of this action and to study all of the facts that are available. I urge my colleagues to give serious consideration as to whether this Nation should support a naval base thousands of miles from our shores which will amount to nothing more than "showing the flag" in an area of the world where the nations have requested that we not have our Navy there in force.

For the information of my colleagues, on December 5, 1974, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S20742, I delivered a speech setting forth reasons for my opposition to the building of naval operating facilities on the island of Diego Garcia.

I ask unanimous consent that that speech be printed in the RECORD at an appropriate point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, I point out that the Senate has 60 legislative days to act upon this resolution and the Armed Services Committee should report it back to the floor of the Senate within 20 days with its recommendation. I urge the Armed Services Committee to report this resolution of disapproval favorably in order that the United States will not embark upon another adventure in the southern part of Asia.

Mr. President, I send to the desk the resolution of disapproval and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. Res. 160

Resolved, That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12, 1975.

#### EXHIBIT 1

SEC. 613. (a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act with respect to any construction project at Diego Garcia may be obligated unless—

(1) the President has (A) advised the Congress in writing that all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia have been evaluated by him, and (B) certified to the Congress in writing that the construction of any such project is essential to the national interest of the United States;

(2) 60 days of continuous session of the Congress have expired following the date on which certification with respect to such project is received by the Congress, and

(3) neither House of Congress has adopted within such 60-day period, a resolution disapproving such project.

(b) (1) For purposes of this section, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 60-day period.

(2) For purposes of this section, "resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12," the first and second blanks being filled with the name of the resolving House and the third blank being filled with the appropriate date.

(c) Subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section are enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions described by subsection (b) (2) of this section; and they supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to charge such rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(d) A resolution with respect to a proposed construction project of the island of Diego Garcia shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(e) (1) If the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate to which a resolution with respect to a proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia has been referred has not reported such resolution at the end of 20 calendar days after its introduction, not counting any day which is excluded under subsection (b) (1) of this section, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any other resolution introduced with respect to the same proposed construction project which has been referred to the committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in order after the committee has reported a resolution of disapproval with respect to the same proposed construction project.

(2) A motion to discharge under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be made only by a Senator favoring the resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, the time to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(f) (1) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a resolution shall be privileged. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(2) Debate in the Senate on a resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable

May 19, 1975

motion or appeal in connection with a resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.

(4) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a resolution is in order in the Senate.

EXHIBIT 2

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD

Mr. President, I feel compelled to speak out on the issue of Diego Garcia, the projected naval operating facility in the Indian Ocean. As we move toward the final days of this second session of the 93rd Congress, Senators are receiving a great deal of pressure from both the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to approve \$14,802,000 as a down payment on naval facilities that will enable the Navy to operate carrier task forces from the Island of Diego Garcia. In addition, the Air Force is requesting Air Force facilities on Diego Garcia that will enable KC135 tankers to refuel B52's operating out of Thailand over the Indian Ocean. First of all, I would like to briefly give you some background, both historical and legislative, which bear directly upon the Navy's efforts to make the Island of Diego Garcia an operating base.

Diego Garcia is an atoll located within the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles due south of the tip of India. The heavily vegetated island consists of 6,700 acres with average elevations of three to seven feet. It is horseshoe shaped with a 40-mile perimeter. The enclosed lagoon is 5½ miles wide by 13 miles long with average depths of 30 to 100 feet. The annual rainfall is approximately 100 inches. The United States Government became interested in Diego Garcia in the early Sixties, particularly when the British Government announced that it was withdrawing its naval forces from Singapore and indications were made public that Her Majesty's Government intended to greatly reduce its Indian Ocean naval squadron. At about the same time, the Russian navy began operations in the Indian Ocean and making port calls to nations bordering on the Indian Ocean. It must be pointed out that for years the United States Navy has been traversing the Indian Ocean with carriers and other auxiliary combatants when the transfer of aircraft-carriers was made to the Pacific fleet.

Beginning in the early Sixties, as aforementioned, with the announcement that the British were greatly reducing their naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the United States has in a more frequent manner stepped up its operations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which is a part of the Indian Ocean. At the present time, naval presence is maintained at Bahrain consisting of a supply ship and two destroyers. The Russians have not matched this naval strength. However, since 1968, the Russians have greatly increased their presence in the Indian Ocean, sometimes having as many as 30 combatant ships, which include a large number of mine sweepers.

The United States sometime in calendar year 1966 began negotiating with the British Government for a lease to establish a communications station and an operational base on Diego Garcia. This base was to be an

austere logistic support activity which was mainly a refueling stop for naval units operating in the Indian Ocean. In 1965, the British formed the British Indian Ocean Territory which comprises the Chagos Archipelago which, of course, includes Diego Garcia. The United States Navy stated that the selection of these islands was predicated in unquestioned UK sovereignty in the absence of a population. A bilateral agreement was signed in December 1966 between the British Government and the United States which granted base rights for a period of 50 years to the United States Government to the Indian Ocean territory.

The Navy came to the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1970 Military Construction Program with a submission for the first construction increment of a proposed logistic facility on the Island of Diego Garcia. The logistic facility was approved by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee. When presented to the Senate, there was strong opposition from within the Senate Appropriations Committee to the United States becoming committed to another naval operations base within the Indian Ocean. Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time, was very much opposed to the United States committing the Navy to sustained operations within the Indian Ocean and so stated in Committee meetings on a number of occasions. The Military Construction Subcommittee also strenuously opposed the appropriation of money to construct the operating facility and the Military Construction FY 1970 conference committee debated this matter through a number of meetings lasting over a two-week period. Finally, an oral agreement was reached wherein the Navy was to be instructed to come back in FY 1971 for a new appropriation which would support only a communications station, and all of the logistic support facilities were to be deleted from the FY 1971 program. The rationale at that time for the communications station was that, in time, the United States would have to withdraw from the main continent of Africa the large communications facility that the United States Government had at Asmara, Ethiopia. (Kagnew Station Communications Center, Asmara, Ethiopia, is now being phased out and the Navy will centralize its African communications facilities at Diego Garcia).

In support of the FY 1971 appropriations for the communications facilities on Diego Garcia, the Navy stated the following:

"The requirement to close the gap in reliable communication coverage which exists today in the central Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal area was a major consideration in developing the initial concept for a support facility on Diego Garcia. Establishment of a communications support capability in this area is an immediate requirement and is a requirement which exists independent of the modest logistics support facility which was rejected by the Congress. The purely passive role and image of a communications facility should not raise the same concern of active commitment which had apparently been associated with the logistics support aspects of the original concept."

As previously mentioned, the Navy was instructed to come back in the 1971 military construction program with a communications package only and to all intents and purposes the logistic support facility was not to be a part of the package. In fact, it was specifically agreed that there would be no items which could in any way support a carrier task force.

In all of the communications and oral conversations that the subcommittee had with the Navy, it was indicated that the Navy would not use Diego Garcia as an operational base. Members of the subcommittee were re-

assured, when the FY 1971 construction budget for Diego Garcia was approved, that the Navy did not intend to operate fleet surface units from Diego Garcia.

To bring you up to date concerning the FY 1975 Military Construction Authorization Bill, H.R. 16136, which is still in conference, I will explain Section 612 in the Bill. This section precluded the obligation of any funds until the President of the United States has advised the Congress in writing that he had evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction essential to the national interest. Such certification must be submitted to the Congress and approved by both Houses of Congress. This will assure the opportunity for full debate on the policy question of Diego Garcia.

I might say, parenthetically, that I consider this most prudent and realistic action for the Congress to take. I wish to further point out that Section 612 of the Authorization Bill was adopted by a record vote of 83-0 in the Senate.

The position of the House Armed Services Committee is that the Administration should be given the authority to build the facilities in Diego Garcia but that prior to the exercise of that authority the President shall notify Congress of his intention and that Congress shall have 60 days to reject the blanket authority it had previously given to him. This procedure has heretofore been used too often by the Executive and acquiesced in by the Congress. The negative power of the Congress—the power to deny a change in the *status quo*—is turned on the Congress itself. The burden of persuasion shifts away from those who desire action to prove the rightness of their cause. The Congress must insist that the justification for policy must be made *prior* to the grant of authority. It is exactly that insistence that was included in the Military Construction Authorization.

It is my contention, as stated earlier, that the Senate position in the Authorization Bill is realistic and prudent and Diego Garcia, as a policy question, should first of all be thoroughly investigated by the Foreign Relations Committee, then the question should be taken to the floor and the two Houses of the Congress should be allowed to work their will.

On November 17, at a meeting in New Delhi of the 30 nations surrounding the Indian Ocean, a policy statement was issued unambiguously that America and the Soviet Union should not escalate the arms race in the Indian Ocean and the area should be left in peace; particularly, all 30 nations opposed the United States' building a facility on Diego Garcia. The cost of this naval base for both construction and equipment will amount to approximately \$175 million; thus, as you can see, this \$14 million plus \$3.3 million is only a down-payment.

Within the Department of Defense we do have a difference of opinion as to how important the building of this base is to our national interest. The Navy says that it is imperative for the defense of the United States, particularly in keeping the oil routes open in the Indian Ocean. The CIA has stated that the buildup of the Russians, particularly in Somaliland, is certainly not as extensive as outlined by Admirals testifying for this project.

Mr. President, is this Southeast Asia and Vietnam all over again? It appears to me that our Government must have learned something about trying to be policemen for the World during our experience in Vietnam: 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded men must certainly mean something to us. I respectfully submit that the United States cannot go on attempting to be a policeman for the World. And most certainly in my humble opinion, the construction of this operating

base in the Indian Ocean is only a further effort by the Department of Defense to play the role of policeman in the Indian Ocean and to actively involve our military forces in the politics of an area that now wants to be left at peace. Yet in the face of all the nations in the littoral area requesting that we not build up Diego Garcia as a naval base, there are those individuals in high places that contend we should go ahead in our own national interest with the building of this naval base. I ask the question—what really are our vital interests in the Indian Ocean besides gunboat diplomacy and “showing the flag”? Our presence in the Indian Ocean had no effect on the oil situation during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, in fact, our naval vessels were completely cut off from Arab oil and the United States could do nothing about the Arab action.

In closing, there are a few points that I would like to make that I think have a direct bearing in my opinion upon whether or not Diego Garcia funding should be approved to build a naval base on Diego Garcia. In allowing this naval base to be built, I think Senators should be aware that they are actually voting for a 3-ocean Navy. It is my contention that this base on Diego Garcia could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. We already have an admission from the Navy of a cost of \$173 million. Oh yes, the Navy will contend that the base will only cost \$35 million but they are not telling the American people of the cost for salaries of the Seabees that are building the base, nor are they advising the Congress of the complete costs for the communications equipment and other machinery that will go into the making of this base.

I submit that all of the information I have in hand shows that the aircraft carrier is now obsolete with the technical advancement of the new cruise missiles and I might say, by way of explanation, that in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets always know exactly where our carriers are.

I state that for just this one time cannot the United States Government wait and really find out what the intentions of the Soviet Union are in regard to the Indian Ocean. All the reports I have indicate that the Soviet Union's naval activity is of a low order.

In summary, I would like to say that it appears to me that our Department of Defense is advocating a 3-ocean Navy to station sailors 10,500 miles from home and putting obsolete carriers in the Indian Ocean, which are vulnerable and practically defenseless against new weaponry.

Are we building a naval base, a new Wake Island, that is completely, in time of crisis, undefendable?

Mr. President, in closing I am reminded of a very important incident that occurred on the floor of the Senate. Some years back when the Defense Appropriation Bill was on the floor and the Senate was considering appropriating money for the Navy for naval landing craft (FDL's) the late great chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Richard Brevard Russell, said and I quote: “If we make it easy for the Navy to go places and to do things, we will find ourselves always going places and doing things.” I remind the Senate in approving the building of a naval base on Diego Garcia that we will be making it easy for the United States to go to the Indian Ocean and more than likely that we will do things.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a parliamentary inquiry or does he yield the floor?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed. I will yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, the resolution will be referred to the Armed Services Committee; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. I want to assure the Senate we will consider this resolution and do it well within the time that was agreed on last fall when this matter was, in effect, taken over, and we will hear testimony on it and get back with a report in time for us to consider that agreement.

I do not care to go into a discussion of the merits of the matter now, but it is a matter where the money was in the bill last year and was approved at a certain level, \$14 million, I believe it was, but carried over under special consideration here for this resolution.

I just observed that \$13 million now requested in the 1976 budget is the same \$13 million that was deducted last year by agreement more or less and made two installments out of it. So, after all, it is just that part of the 1975 budget that was before us until this year.

I thank the President.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate what the Senator said, I expected nothing less. The Senator has been most cooperative and considerate in this matter in and out of committee.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

#### CHANGE OF VOTE ON S. 846

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on S. 846 which we just voted on, I voted in the affirmative. I ask unanimous consent that I be recorded in the negative. I understand it will not change the result.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The rollcall vote on S. 846 reflects the foregoing unanimous consent request.)

#### ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business with statements limited therein to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TUESDAY AT 11 A.M.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until the hour of 11 a.m. tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION OF SENATOR GOLDWATER AND FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON TUESDAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order tomorrow, Mr. GOLDWATER be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, after which

there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exceed 15 minutes with statements limited therein to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5899 ON TUESDAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of routine morning business tomorrow the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 5899, the supplemental appropriation bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF S. 182 ON TUESDAY

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the disposition of the supplemental appropriations bill tomorrow the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. 182, a bill to authorize the appointment of Alexander P. Butterfield to the retired list of the Regular Air Force.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER DIRECTING THE CHAIR NOT TO ENTERTAIN A UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST TO CHANGE A VOTE ON S. 846

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it not be in order for the Chair to entertain a unanimous-consent request from any Senator to change his vote on rollcall 190, S. 846.

Under rule XII, any Senator who has voted previously may subsequently, after the vote is announced, ask unanimous consent to change his vote, and if such request is not objected to, he is permitted accordingly to change his vote. There has been one such request granted this afternoon. No objection was made in that instance because the outcome of the vote would not have been affected. If I were to be on the floor and other such requests were to subsequently be made, I would be forced to object because the outcome of the final vote might then be changed. I make this request now so that in the event I might not be on the floor, it will not be in order for the Chair to entertain such a request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will

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94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. RES. 160

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 19, 1975

Mr. MANSEFIELD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the  
Committee on Armed Services

## RESOLUTION

Disapproving construction projects on the island of Diego Garcia.

1        *Resolved*, That the Senate does not approve the proposed  
2        construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need  
3        for which was certified to by the President and the certifica-  
4        tion with respect to which was received by the Senate on  
5        May 12, 1975.

v

94TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION  
**S. RES. 160**

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**RESOLUTION**

Disapproving construction projects on the Is-  
land of Diego Garcia.

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By Mr. MANSFIELD

MAY 19, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services