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The Illegal Apparat of the Communist Party of Germany

1. The clandestine or "illegal" organizations established by the Communist Parties of the world at the express direction of the Executive Committee of the Communist International appear to have generally eluded effective police and counterintelligence observation.

These illegal parallels were apparently developed, in one form or another, beside most of the fairly well organized legal Parties before the war, and sufficient indications already exist to attest to their continued or renewed existence today. They represent a powerful arm of the Communist movement, not only as the indispensable factor in organizing paramilitary activities in a revolutionary situation, but also in carrying out such espionage, penetration, and subversion tasks which cannot be securely or effectively managed by legal Party personnel.

The degree to which such "illegal" or clandestine organizations have been developed in individual countries has unquestionably varied with the strength and capabilities of the Party concerned, and with the political, social, and police situation in each country--and an even superficial analysis of the quite limited evidence available clearly illustrates a great diversity in their extent, structure, and types of activity.

2. An overall analysis of the information available on the illegal Apparats of the world is in process and will be issued in the near future. In the interim it is felt that a description of the growth, structure, and activities of the apparently most developed and efficient of these clandestine organizations--that of the German Communist Party before 1933--will provide a concrete illustration of what Communist intentions and capabilities are in this field and permit a somewhat more informed approach to this aspect of Communist Party coverage.

3. This study is based principally on captured Gestapo records, and on the interrogations of surviving Gestapo and Illegal Apparat personnel, supplemented by the published accounts of individual Communist defecters. These records, for the most part second hand, cannot of course be considered conclusive, but they do permit what is probably a fairly accurate reconstruction of the German Illegal Apparat. Many of the statements made are presented with distinct reservations and may have to be revised or reversed on the basis of new evidence, but the declarative form is used throughout in order to present a simpler and clearer narrative.

THE ILLEGAL APPARAT OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY

-1-

Terminology

The word "Apparat" is a direct English transliteration of the German and Russian "Apparat" which in its political sense carries the general meaning of "machine" (Kelly-Nash machine) or organizational mechanism. It is accordingly employed to refer to the structural elements of any political party or organization or to particular segments thereof. The word "apparat" without qualification is therefore normally applicable to the structure of any "legal" or overt Communist Party, though European intelligence usage frequently applies it to the "illegal" or clandestine Party organization. This latter sense is more correctly given by "Illegal Apparat" the term normally employed in this paper, though the elliptical form is sometimes used for convenience.

Both the <u>Conditions for Admission</u> to the Cormunist International (1920) and the <u>Comintern Statutes</u> (1920) called for the establishment of secret or "illegal" organizations by each of the national sections in order both to guarantee their continued existence when and if they were forced to go underground (<u>underground apparat</u>) and to carry on such prerevolutionary activities as could not safely be performed by the Legal Party (<u>parallel apparat</u>). The Illegal Apparat of the German Communist Party described in the following pages falls into this latter class; it worked "parallel" to the legal Party up to 1933 and to the underground Party after it had been outlawed by the Nazis. Set up almost as early as the legal Party itself, the illegal CPG apparat with few exceptions functioned quite separately from it at all echelons. Some "illegal" personnel occupied Legal Party positions for cover, but the great majority of functionaries and routine workers dissociated themselves completely from public Party membership and activity.

Historical Development of the Illegal Apparat

Since the Illegal Apparat is simply the undercover arm of the "legal" Party, its evolution can hardly be considered outside the context of the developments of the latter. The development both of the Communist Party of Germany (CPG) and of the Illegal Apparat can be conveniently considered in four stages, roughly the Putsch period (1919-23), the pre-Nazi period (1924-32), the underground period (1933-1944), and the post-war years.

During the first period of Party development, characterized by violent Communist putsches in Hamburg, Munich, Central Germany, and the Ruhr, the Illegal Apparat first took shape. It began as a secret pass office where documents necessary to personnel living or travelling illegally could be counterfeited.

As early as 1918 the Spartacus League, out of which the Party grew, had been engaged in producing and disseminating pamphlets and leaflets in a propaganda campaign aimed at the subversion of the police and the army. When the CPG was formally founded on 1 January 1919, it at once set up a special subversive section (Zersetzungsdienst) on strictly clandestine principles in order more safely and efficiently to conduct this campaign, a campaign considered by the Party of cardinal importance in preparation for the optimistically anticipated revolution. Somewhat later (by 1923), as the program of putschism developed, a section was set up to administer the Party's stocks of arms and ammunition, and the first steps were taken to develop a Counterintelligence Section at least as early as 1922, Thus in its first four years all the basic functions of the Illegal Apparat were given organizational shape: subversion, and its attendant intelligence work, counterintelligence, munitions supply, and a counterfeiting service, Kippenberger, apparently appointed Chief of the Illegal Apparat in 1921 (at the age of 23) and destined to remain its leader for the greater part of its active existence, was already in 1921 giving thought to the overall problems of organization and administration connected with Illegal Apparat work.



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- 2 -

The following eight years saw the legal Party gradually coming under the complete control of the CPG Politburo, with Ernst Thaelmann effective chief of the Party throughout the entire period, and working under the ruling slogans of "centralization of control" and "national bolshevism". In 1928 the end of the period of the stabilization of capitalism was announced by the Comintern, and the Party actively began preparations to exploit the revolutionary situation which was then declared in existence.

The abortive and, on the whole, stupidly mismanaged Communist uprisings of 1920-23 had given clear proof of the emphatic need for better organization and intelligence work. Kippenberger, the Apparat Chief, was accordingly summoned to Moscow where he put in a period of intensive study and returned to Germany in 1925 carefully briefed to organize and develop the Party's Illegal Apparat. His first step was to separate the already existing clandestine units of the Party into two main divisions: the AM Apparat and the House Department. Kippenberger himself took over personal direction of the AM (Military-political) Apparat, and turned the second division over to Leo Flieg, the founder of the Party Secretariat. The latter was known as the House Department (Haus-abteilung) because, as opposed to the AM Apparat, it was directed from Party Headquarters itself, the Karl Liebknecht Haus in Berlin. These two divisions, which were to last until 1932, were constituted as follows:

AM-Apparat:

Counterintelligence Section "E" Section "ZER" Section Army Section NSDAP Section "BB" Section

House Department:

Counterfeiting Section Weapons Section Quarters Section

Kippenberger's public career carried him to the Reichstag, but inside the Party his name came to be synonymous with "intelligence" work and the AM-Apparat was often referred to as the Kippenberger Apparat. Under his capable management the AM-Apparat reached a high degree of organization, with a national chief for each section ("AM-Mann I"?), separate staffs at the district level, and numerous sub-district functionaries and workers, though on the local level several functions were often filled by one man. At the district and sub-district (Bezirk and Unterbezirk) level the AM-Apparat leaders were given the title "AM-Mann II".

In mid-1932 a reorganization of the Illegal Apparat placed the House Department directly under Kippenberger--thereby eliminating Leo Flieg--consolidated the ZER (Police) Section and the Army Section, and added an Emigrants Section.

During its period of exile and illegality (1933-44), the CPG Central Committee moved to Paris, and later to Moscow, with Wilhelm Pieck roplacing Thaelmann at the helm. The Party strove to maintain the framework of its underground organization inside Germany by establishing (in 1936) a regional system of controls, each of the eight regions (Abschnitte) being responsible to a control point in a nearby country, e.g., Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, and Holland. The Illegal Apparat also continued to function during part of this period, though many of its personnel were identified and imprisoned by the Gestapo. Kippenberger reportedly fled first to Prague, and then transferred to Paris whence he continued to direct Apparat

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activities. It appears from the available evidence that the Apparat as such was formally abolished in 1937 as no longer suited to the requirements of the situation.*

In post-war Germany, although there is in principle no national headquarters of the CPG, the leading Communist members of the Central Secretariat of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), Russian Zone, are virtually identical with the leading figures of the CPG Central Committee as constituted in Paris in 1937 and clearly provide central control to CPG elements in all zones. It has also gradually become clear that some form of Illegal Apparat is again functioning in the western zones of Germany, controlled from Berlin, and engaged not only in gathering political, military, and economic intelligence, but also in carrying out certain Party security and counterintelligence functions. The exact form of the current organization and the degree to which it operates independently of the legal Party Apparat are not as yet clear, but the principle of parallel illegal activity is clearly again at work.

Top Command Channels

It is only natural that the evidence for the top controls and highlevel liaisons of the Illegal Apparat is extremely meager. There can be little question that the extensive and yet elastic functions of the illegal organization were of direct value to the legal Party (particularly to the underground Party after 1933), to the field representatives of the Comintern, and to the intelligence agencies of the Soviet government.

It may safely be assumed that the chief of the Illegal Apparat normally received some degree of direction from the CPG Politburo and in turn reported to it--the Apparat fulfilled so many functions of purely national Party interest that any other system of control would have been organizationally unthinkable. It is a plausible assumption, but nothing more, that the coordination of Apparat action with the legal Party was managed within the CPG Central Committee by Ernst Wollweber (Chief of the Organization Section up to 1933) who later headed a large-scale Committer sabotage organization in Northwest Europe.

The evidence is fairly clear that Soviet intelligence representatives in Germany were directly connected with at least some phases of Apparat intelligence work. The "BB" Section, for example, developed close ties with official Soviet representatives in Berlin, who were thus able to exploit the Party's intelligence-gathering machinery in the vital sector of industrial information.

Kippenberger, himself, was for many years in close contact with General Putna, the Soviet Military Attaché in Berlin, and was apparently considered by the German General Staff as a useful unofficial link in the chain of Russo-German military collaboration based on the secret treaty of 1921. The implications of this liaison for Apparet work are, however, unknown.

*The nature of <u>underground</u> Party work, as distinguished from Illegal Apparat work is illustrated by the career of one Paul Helms. Helms who joined the CPG in 1920, was never in the Illegal Apparat, devoting his entire career to actual Party work up to 1941 when he was arrested by the Gestapo. Until 1932 he was engaged exclusively in factory cell work. Imprisoned by the Germans from 1933 to 1935, he immediately made contact with the underground party upon his release, and was summoned to Copenhagen to participate in the councils of the exiled Party. From Denmark he dispatched suitable representatives to the Hamburg area, briefing them on the propaganda line of the CPG, the locations of the most vital factories, and the identity of the CPG group leaders resident in Hamburg. On the basis of the political situation reports smuggled out of Hamburg by these representatives, Helms drew up articles for the CPG press and radio. Helms had nothing to do with intelligence proper, however, and stated categorically that he refused to have anything to do with this field.

Principal Sections of the Apparat

The Illegal Apparat of the German Communist Party, generally known in the pre-war period as the AM-Apparat ("AM" apparently for <u>Abteilung Fuer</u> <u>Militaerpolitik</u>, "Military-Political Department"), was at its largest extension divided into ten sections or <u>Ressorts</u>:

- 4 -

1. The "A" Section ("A" for Abwehr, "counterintelligence"). The "A" Section comprised two sub-sections devoted respectively to general counterintelligence and to defensive counterintelligence work.

The General Counterintelligence (Allgemeine Abwehr) Section carried on five broad types of activity:

a. It carried out surveillance on Party members and reported instances of breaches of discipline, deviations from the current Party line, etc.*

b. It drew up blacklists of persons known or suspected to be dangerous to the Party. A photostatic reproduction of part of one such list, entitled "<u>Spitzel-Almanach</u>, or <u>Spy Almanac</u>, is available. Marked "Not for sale, property of the organization", it contains names and photographs of persons dangerous to the Party, and was obviously of great value to all echelons of the legal and illegal organizations. Members of this sub-section systematically gathered material for these lists by keeping the Government's political police under surveillance and by entering into friendly contact with those police officials who were specifically charged with controlling Communist activities. They also kept a close watch on persons suspected of acting as informers for the police by, for example, maintaining surveillance on police stations and adjacent restaurants.

One, Lothar Hofmann, for example, who became a member of the AM-Apparat in 1930, was assigned (by Kippenberger in Paris in July 1934) to Saarbrucken to screen Communist refugees who were entering France from Germany. After several months of this activity, Hofmann was recalled to Paris and ordered to Copenhagen, where he was to determine whether Albert Fleischer, an AM*Apparat man in Hamburg, had become an informer for the German police--Fleischer was cleared on the basis of Hofmann's investigations. Hofmann then proceeded to Moscow to attend the "M" School for training Apparat members, but was not accepted as an Apparat worker, and eventually returned to Copenhagen to work in the circle of CPG refugees.

c. It was responsible, apparently on the basis of its knowledge of police methods, for assuring the security of couriers, and it gave advice on the safest means for holding rendezvous.

d. It collected and evaluated the intelligence procured by other sections, and was thus enabled to maintain a constant check on the reliability of all Apparat intelligence agents.

e. It served, finally, as message center (Poststelle) for the district Party offices (Bezirksleitungen).

*In the post-war Party there is an "<u>Abwehrmann</u>" at each Party echelon who has the function of keeping a card file on all Party members in his area.

Approved For Release 1210 JRD P78-00915R000100040002-4

- 5 -

The Preventive Counterintelligence (<u>Vorbeugende Abwehr</u>) Sub-section focussed more narrowly on the defensive or security aspects of illegal activity:

a. It studied and analyzed the damage resulting to the Party from hostile police activities and from the non-observance of clandestine security principles. The results of these inquiries were evaluated and applied to the task of protecting the organization from future errors. On the action-level, this sub-section had the duty of neutralizing suspicious and unsuitable Party personnel detected as the result of these investigations. This would involve, for example, transferring a loyal but insecure Party member to other more innocuous duties, arresting and punishing guilty Party members, etc. The sub-section also had the duty of disposing of hostile elements outside the Party by a variety of methods which included murder.

The assassination of two police officers in Berlin on 9 August 1931 illustrates this latter function. The two officers, Anlauf and Lenk, had been working against subversive activities in Berlin, particularly those which were Communist-inspired, and clearly threatened Party interests in the Berlin area. The plans for their elimination were drawn up in detail by Kippenberger himself, and the murders were carried out by two members of the <u>Ordnerdienst</u>, the secret Communist military formation. After the mission had been successfully accomplished, the two executants, Ziemer and Mielke by name, escaped via Party channels to the USSR.*

Another example of this sub-section's work is provided by the career of one POPALL. A Party member since 1924, Popall was taken on in the counterintelligence section in 1932, and became section chief (Abwehrleiter) for Hamburg-Altona in 1933. He fled to Copenhagen when the Nazis came in to power but returned the following year to Germany to become counterintelligence chief for Berlin. It appears that shortly before his arrest by the Germans in 1935 he had been specifically ordered to investigate and report on the reasons for the recent series of arrests of some of the Apparat's leading counterintelligence functionaries

b. The sub-section also controlled the finances of the Illegal Apparat.

c. It acted as the executive arm of the Party court system.

So much for the functions of the "A" Section. Formed in the early 1920's and successively referred to as the Party Police (<u>Parteipolizei</u>) as the Intelligence Service (Nachrichtendienst or "ND"), and finally as the counterintelligence (Abwohr) service, this section clearly formed the professional and operational core of the Illegal Apparat, since it controlled its funds, provided security for the legal and illegal organization, and processed the intelligence output of the other sections. There is, in fact, some evidence that in the period after 1933 the section's authority became synonymous with that of the entire AM Apparat, all the other sections being grouped under two offices, called respectively offensive and defensive counterintelligence--as represented in the following chart:

*It is of interest to observe that Mielke has returned to Germany since the end of the war and is now Vice-President of the Central Administration of the Interior for the Russian Zone of Germany. Approved For Release <u>SECAPTIP78</u>-00915R000100040002-4



The career of one Walter Nuding has some interest as illustrating various phases of a varying legal and illegal career:

Organization Chief (<u>Orgleiter</u>) of the Party's Berlin-Brandenburg district about 1932, Nuding was later placed in charge of the Party's Central Control Commission which reportedly took over the CI functions of the AM Apparat in 1935--although this probably represented a shift of functions for Nuding rather than an assumption of Apparat direction by the underground Party. Nuding apparently worked in Paris as "A" Chief until 1937 when he was replaced by Paul Beitz. Nuding has now turned up as a member of the Party directorate for the American zone of Germany and also a member of the directorate of the Central Sanitaire Suisse, an international cover organization originally established to supply Communist forces fighting in Spain during the Civil War.

The post-war equivalent of the pre-war Organization-Section is now called the Cadre Section (<u>Kaderabteilung</u>), and contains a CI officer (<u>Abwehrmann</u>). The existence of these CI officers in present day Germany does not appear to be a particularly secret matter, and it is tentatively assumed that the Abwehrmann is an overt Party official.

The Socialist Unity Party in the Russian Zone is employing undercover "instructors" who travel about and report on all leading Party members, political conditions, government personalities, etc. Such agents travel under a variety of covers and generally employ a network of informants to aid them in their task*.

2. <u>The "ZER" (for Zersetzung "subversion") Section</u>. The "ZER" Section, one of the first of the ressorts to be formed and originally called the "Prop" (for propaganda) Apparat, also went under the name of the "S" (for <u>Schutzpolizei</u> "police") Section, and focussed on the neutralization and subversion of the police. It carried on a steady propaganda campaign among the police by written and oral means. It made detailed intelligence studies of their organization, personnel, equipment, physical installations and morale, paying special attention to the police intelligence system, personnel, codes and ciphers, etc. It established secret Communist cells within the police forces and constantly sought to recruit new policemen for the Party.

*One such agent is stated to be a former Nazi SS officer who went over to the Russians and received special training in this work. One SED district chief, in a recent conversation with a Marxist comrade, complained, "One can't even drink a glass of Schnapps without this SS informant's blood-hounds reporting it immediately".



Approved For Release SECRET 00915R000100040002-4

- 7 -

The "ZER" Section was organized at the local level into activist groups of from three to six persons, each group being assigned to work exclusively on a single limited target—a specific police station or dormitory. These groups worked under strict discipline, and on a clandestine basis, all their members being normally removed from Party membership on their entrance into this work. It was apparently a rule that an activist group should be set up for every physical installation normally used by the police.

Police officials were ordinarily first approached through suitable intermediaries, persons with whom the officials were known to associate. Having inconspicuously obtained an introduction to the target official, the agent then planned his recruitment on the basis of the personality and political complexion of the official. Sometimes plain talk, sometimes a slow program of social activity and political discussion, would be needed to convert the prospect. Other members of the same activist group could be brought in to join in the discussions of politics and communist theory, and appropriate "literature" would be supplied to assist the prospect's political thinking. At times, an Apparat functionary from the district level would join the discussion group at the appropriate time and persuade the police official to draw up a general report on conditions in the police for his use. Amenable officials were guaranteed Party support if they should be discharged or encounter any difficulties as a result of their new activities, but at the same time they were firmly warned of the consequences of betraying their mission to the police. As a further precaution, such converted police officers were usually required to divulge classified police information of some sort in order to tighten the Party's control over them, and the cultivation of dissipation via drink or prostitutes often provided the Party with another source of control through threat of blackmail.

Female comrades often formed members of these activist groups, and were apparently found most useful in the initiation of contacts with target officials and in eliciting information from unwitting police informants.

"ZER" propaganda activity revealed a great deal of ingenuity in the production and distribution of subversive literature. The normal practices of clandestine printing were applied, the text usually being set up in parts in different shops and no one man possessing a complete picture of the operation except the organizer. The printed material was distributed in numerous ways--slipped into the daily newspapers before they were delivered to the police station, put into match boxes destined for the police, attached to dogs introduced into the barracks, etc. Leaflets were sometimes camouflaged to look like official publications ("The Police Official, Newspaper of the Revolutionary Police Officials of Prussia - 2 April 1932"), and often bore misleading ("To the Mothers, Wives and Fiancees of Police Officials") or puzzling ("Whether Young or Old, Man or Woman, Pegola Attracts Them All") headlines.

Some indication that the Party is continuing "ZER" activities today is provided by the career of Camillo Scariot, an Essen chimmy-builder who joined the Party in 1928. He attended the M School in the USSR in 1990/31, and in 1932 became Orgleiter (Organization Chief) of the Party for the Ruhr district. Scariot was engaged in work for the "ZER" Section before the war, and was arrested by the Germans in 1937 for illegal activities. In the summer of 1945, he arrived in Essen from Berlin and under Party instructions began a police career with a view to obtaining intelligence on the police and to increasing Party influence in the police force. Scariot reported directly to Heinrich Gost, an alleged Apparat official at the Ruhr-Westphalia district level.

3. <u>Army Section</u>. Originally independent, the Army Section was merged with the "ZER" Section in 1932. Its methods were naturally similar to those of the police section and comprised propaganda, subversion, and intelligence work, and clandestine recruiting.

The Chief of the Army Section from 1929 to 1933 was one Langowski (<u>Reichsleiter des Ressorts fuer Zersetzung in der Reichswehr</u>) who also had the responsibility for recruiting and dispatching candidates to the M School in the USSR. He was arrested by the Germans in December 1933.



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In the same year, the Gestapo uncovered an exceptionally large activist group in Berlin. Sixty-seven members were arrested, and it was established that they had been assigned as a target the regiment garrisoning Berlin-Moabit. The group had been actively spreading camouflaged and open propaganda, and had apparently made good use of women in approaching the soldiers.

4. <u>MSDAP</u> or Nazi Section. The primary political activity of the Apparat was naturally directed against the National Socialists, although the occasional periods of Communist-Nazi cooperation before 1933 probably had some effect on its single-minded application to this task. The Nazi Section had the primary task of reporting in detail on activities within the Nazi Party and its associated organizations. It was further responsible for spreading false rumors in the Party, stirring up dissatisfaction, spreading false stories about Party leaders-in short, sabotaging the Nazi movement in every possible fashion. Its program naturally involved the planting of agents inside the Nazi ranks, but the general consensus of Gestapo and other opinion is that the Apparat and the Party failed signally in this latter program.

An "R" (for <u>Rechts</u> "Right") Section is known to have been set up within the Apparat to combat right-wing parties, but it is not certain that it was identical with the Nazi Section. Heinz Neumann, the famous Comintern agent, was reported head of the "Anti-Nazi Division of the Party" in 1931, but it is not known whether this refers to the Apparat section. Dr. Alfred Kroth, a leading Munich Communist and a member of the Nazi Party during the Hitler regime, appears to be one of the few successful Apparat penetration agents within the Nazi Party who has survived into the post-war period.

5. <u>The "E" Section</u>. This Section ("E" for ?) was set up to work against the Social Democrats, the Center Farty, other democratic parties, and the trade unions. The phrase "Z" Section ("Z" for "Zentrum" or Center Party) has also been applied to the Section, possibly implying a breakdown within it according to the target party.

In the pre-1933 period, the "E" Section carried on subversion work against non-Nazi parties and groups, but after the Nazi assumption of power it concentrated on achieving a common front between the Communists and the Socialists, utilizing, for its out purposes, Social-Democrat functionaries as sources of intelligence, providers of safe houses inside Nazi-Germany, and distributors of illegal political literature. The "E" Section made similar efforts after 1933 to exchange items of intelligence information with officials of the Center Party.

6. The "EB" Section. The "BR" (for <u>Betriebsberichterstattung</u> "industrial reporting") Section was essentially a straight intelligence-procurement agency. Originally called the "U" Section (for <u>Unternehmer</u> "industrialist"), it not only procured industrial intelligence but also reported to the Party on labor-manager relations. The "BB" agent was accordingly required to purloin construction plans, procure data on industrial processes, obtain production and shortage figures, etc., and also to render reports on the political attitude of the workers--whether they were willing to strike, whether they would agitate for pay increases, etc.

This key section had a relatively autonomous organization within the Apparat, thus providing greater security for its operations and speedier transmission of its reports. For "BB" operations Germany was divided into eight large regions--each embracing several of the 26 normal Party districts-which were given such general geographical designations as North Germany, Southwest Germany, etc. Each region was controlled by a chief (<u>Instrukteur</u>) who was directly responsible to the National "BB" Chief; accordingly, the district chiefs were not obliged to turn their reports over to Apparat officials at the district level, but passed them up through their independent line of command. The highest official so far identified in the "BB" Section is Johan Wenzel who was regional Chief for West Germany in 1934.

The chart on the opposite page based on a sketch produced by a relatively informed Gestapo official, illustrates the links in a chain which procured and transmitted industrial and scientific intelligence from five target installations in Berlin to the appropriate intelligence representatives of the USSR. The regional BB Chief has been omitted from this chart for the sake of simplicity--the region concerned was Berlin-Brandenburg. The reference to the Third Section of the Red Army General Staff is confusing, but may be an error for the Second or Intelligence Directorate.



*DEROP (Deutsche Vertriebsgesellschaft fuer Russische Oel-Produkte -"German Distribution Company for Russian (il Products) was utilized by the Apparat as a convenient cover firm for carrving out various clandestine activities---it had district offices in several of the larger German cities and a nation-wide system of filling-stations.

- 10 -

A case of industrial espionage which occurred in 1932 will serve as a characteristic example of "BB" activity. The persons involved were the Regional "BB" Chief for West Germany, Johann WENZEL; the District "BB" Chief for the Ruhr, H. FOMFERRA; a series of cut-outs; the actual agent (Maria Prinzen); and her sub-agent, another woman.

In Essen, in 1932, Fomferra, the Regional Chief, approached Josef Maul, a member of the Red Front-fighter League who was doing guard duty at the Essen offices of the Party, and asked him (he did not know Fomferra) to persuade his sister, Maria Prinzen, to steal certain plans from the Krupp Works--she was in an excellent position to carry out this mission since she was employed in the photostating section. Maul took Fomferra to his sister, and Fomferra briefed her specifically on procuring copies of plans for artillery construction and instructed her to deliver the plans to a certain "FRITZ", later identified as one ADAMEIT. The operation got under way, Adameit turning the plans over to a certain "FRANZ" who in turn delivered them to a certain "KURT", later identified as one GRUBER, the latter finally delivering them to WENZEL. Adameit was replaced by another cut-out, FICHTER, in the summer of 1934 (who also introduced his brotherin-law into the chain as a fourth cut-out) and Haberland replaced Gruber as courier to Wenzel. Maria Prinzen had meanwhile persuaded one Anna auf der Springe to assist her in stealing the plans. The two women together finally delivered the impressive total of 320 designs, including top-secret plans of tanks and artillery pieces, artillery tables, etc. The agent and sub-agent received a total of 65 marks for their work.

This case provides further evidence for Apparat elasticity in transferring personnel from one branch of activity to another. Fichter had been chief of the "E" Section for the Ruhr district from 1931 to 1934, while Haberland was engaged for a time as Apparat Chief for the Ruhr District, and is now in the Regional Party office of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The previous and subsequent activities of Johann Wenzel are of some interest as a typical specimen of an "illegal" Communist career. Bern in 1902 in a town in the county of Danzig, he occupied a leading position in a Communist Youth organization in the early twenties and in 1925/26 attended the M School in the USSR. He returned to Danzig, where he became "BR" Chief, and was soon placed in charge of "BB" work for the district of East and West Prussia, which included Danzig. In 1932 he became "BB" Chief for the Ruhr District, and two years later regional chief for West Germany. In 1935 he was recalled to the USSR and given training in radio and explosives. After his training was completed, he received the command of a battalion in the Thaelmann Brigade, which fought in Spain during the Civil War. Upon the cessation of hostilities in 1937 he was assigned to a Soviet intelligence network in Belgium as technical expert and instructor for radio operators. He continued this work in Belgium, Holland, and France under various identities until 30 June 1942, when he was arrested by the Germans. Six months later he escaped from prison and was later heard of in Holland. His present whereabouts are unknown.

There is no evidence that the "BB" Section has been reconstituted since the war, although there are numerous instances of the procurement or attempted procurement of industrial information through what appears to be normal Party channels.

7. <u>The Counterfeiting Section</u>. This Section, one of the first Apparat units to be set up, produced and delivered all necessary identity documents for fugitives from the police, emigrants, and Party functionaries who were living illegally. It apparently maintained a work-shop equipped with the most modern technical devices and employed the services of highly competent technical personnel. It produced all types of required documents: passports, certificates, testimonials, diplomas, membership cards, etc. The Section became of cardinal importance to the illegal Party after 1933.

8. <u>The Weapons Section (and the Cadres</u>). This Section was generally known as the WUMBO (<u>Waffen-und-Munitions - Beschaffungsstelle</u> "Weapons and Munitions Procurement Office"), sometimes as the WUMBA (with "A" for Apparat). In the Communist uprisings of 1920-1923 the Party had obtained possession of large stores of weapons and ammunition, and the WUMBO was

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- 11 -

set up to take charge of these stores. The national WUMBO Chief (<u>Reichsmaterialienverwalter</u>) supervised the chiefs for each Party district who were responsible for safeguarding and administering the supply dumps hidden in various localities and for the procurement of supplementary stocks when needed. This Section had its own safe-address system for its meetings, correspondence, and financial transactions.

Under WUMBO administration also came the so-called "cadres", groups of men trained in the use of all types of weapons and in the production of bombs. When the Red Front-figuters' League (RFB) was declared illegal, the more reliable members were taken over into these cadres.

The Party's two paramilitary organizations, the Ordnerdienst ("service for maintaining order") and the RFB had been founded in 1924, but the former was abolished soon after, the latter continuing to function as a training medium for the Party membership and as a paramilitary force in protecting Farty interests. It reportedly came to number 150,000 (!) disciplined men under a central organization, and was grouped into units called "Verbaende" and sub-units called "Stuerme". It had its own munitions organization and a series of staff sections for organization defense, and intelligence, known as the OSNA (Organisation-Schutz-und-Nachrichten Apparat). During 1929 and 1930 the RFB was outlawed by the governments of the various German states, and the Ordnerdienst simultaneously was reconstituted to take over its protective functions. In charge of this reorganization was Hermann Schubert, Vice-President of the Party, Hamburg Party Leader, and one of the leading members of the Illegal Apparat. The name Ordnerdienst was now avoided, however, and the new groups were simply called Cadres (<u>German Kaders</u>). In September 1931, the Cadres were enlarged and renamed the Parteiselbstschutz, "Party self-defense", for reasons of security. These cadres were organized on a regional basis, on clandestine principles, and with most exacting requirements for membership. Cadre personnel were considered candidates for "higher duties" such as surveillance of Party members, general Party counterintelligence work, subversion of the police and army, and courier work. In short, by the early thirties, the cadres had become a recruiting pool for the Illegal Apparat. In 1931 the administration of arms and ammunition dumps was separated from that of the Cadre for security reasons.

Although the main function of the cadres was to protect Party property, to maintain order at Party and Party-sponsored gatherings and to take part in public demonstrations, it was also used to execute acts of terrorism and to carry out assassinations in the interests of the Party. The murder of Lenk and Anlauf (see above) was carried out by the Cadre Unit "<u>Unterbezirk Berlin-Nord</u>", a unit composed of seven groups of nine men each and headed at the time (9 August 1931) by Friedrich Wilhelm Broede. The crew who worked under Broede on this mission was composed of the two men who did the actual shooting, Ziemer and Mielke, five armed men to give them immediate support, and a third group of eight men, unarmed, to create a covering diversion at the time of the shooting. The escape and evacuation of the two assassins were accomplished according to plan, although some of the accomplices were arrested.

9. <u>The Emigrants Section</u>. This Section was set up to accomplish the technical details connected with the sheltering and forwarding of emigrants, both voluntary and forced. It worked in close cooperation with the Red Aid (<u>Rote Hilfe</u>), a Communist relief organization of which Wilhelm Pieck became chairman in 1924. The Section was established only in 1932, presumably to meet the special needs arising out of the growing Nazi power.

10. <u>The Quarters Section</u>. This Section, limited in its activity principally to Berlin, was responsible for providing office space, meeting rooms, conference rooms, apartments, warehouses, etc. for Illegal Apparat purposes.

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In addition to the ten sections outlined above, two other groups were closely allied to, if not actually a part of, the Illegal Apparat. The first was the so-called "I" Apparat which was set up some time previously to 1933 to provide the AM Apparat with radio contact to points outside Germany. One Johannes FIRL was given the task of setting up this organization for all of Germany shortly before the Nazis assumed power, and he successfully activated stations in at least Berlin and Bremen. This organization is not to be confused with the <u>Arbeiter Radio-Bund</u>, or "Workers Radio League", which was set up at the same time to ensure communications for the legal Party.

- 12 -

The second group was the German Sabotage and Terror Organization (<u>Deutsche Sabotage-und Terror-Organization</u>), a post-1933 group headed by one PIETZUCH. This organization planned to engage in partisan action, but was almost immediately crushed by the Gestapo.

The "M" School

Before 1933, the Illegal Apparat ran annual training courses in "illegal" work in Germany, which were attended by one or two students from each Party District. The courses lasted ten days, and the last one given in the pre-war period reportedly took place from 10-20 December 1931, in a Communist home in the Schorfheide, on the German-Czech border--fifty students attended the course.

Apparat members from Germany also participated, both as students and lecturors in the "M" School in the Soviet Union, the highest training center for personnel to be employed in the various national Apparats. Among those who lectured at the school were Hans Kippenberger, Heinz Neumann, and Wilhelm Pieck, all leading German Communists. The head of the "M" School on occasion came to Germany to inspect candidates for the School. Upon approval, they were dispatched, prior to 1933, via Warsaw and Dvinsk, and after 1933, via Prague.

Further details on the "M" School are reserved for a future analysis.

Conclusion

The clandostine operations of the Illegal Apparat obviously contributed much to the organizational security and the political penetration program of the CPG prior to 1933. The extent of the Apparat's contributions to its powerful legal partner cannot, however, be established on the basis of the limited evidence available. It is clear that the Illegal Apparat was able to continue its work after 1933 more successfully than the Party itself which went underground with all the cards stacked against it -- the Gestapo had had little difficulty in establishing the requisite personnel and organizational data of the legal Party before 1933, and the Nazi Party intelligence apparatus had naturally made the CPG one of its prime targets. The dissolution of the Apparat in 1937 was apparently prompted by the fact that there remained very few jobs for it to perform. Its potential contributions during the war would have been primarily confined to intelligence work, since it no longer had an underground Party of any substance to support--and its intelligence production for the same reason could have been of real value only to the Soviet Government. It was, however, not called upon by Moscow to carry on any intelligence or sabotage activities during the war--that task was entrusted by the Soviet political and intelligence agencies to less compromised and more effective organizations than the remnants of the discredited CPG.

Although this fragmentary recapitulation of the German Apparat's history provides a reasonably clear picture of the tasks normally carried cut by the illegal parallel of a strong legal Party, it leaves substantially unanswered the more significant question of the mechanism and chain of command at the top level as between the National Apparat Chief and the legal Party Politburo on the one hand, and the Soviet Intelligence Services, the Comintern's regional field Bureau, and the official foreign representatives of the Soviet Union on the other. The analysis of this broader field of strategic relationships must await the examination of materials on "illegal" Communist activity from other parts of the world revolutionary front.

