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IA-12

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COMMUNISM

COMMUNIST PARTY CAPABILITIES UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

INTERIM REPORT

ON

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA,
CUBA, ECUADOR, PANAMA, VENEZUELA

APRIL 1952

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

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25X1A6a 1. The following survey of capabilities of certain Communist Parties in Latin America under assumed wartime conditions was prepared by the issuing office from replies to questionnaires sent to its [redacted] Like its predecessor, [redacted] on Communist wartime capabilities in several African and Middle Eastern countries, the present survey is an interim effort, subject to further revision.

2. The summary was prepared in the spring of 1952.

3. As in the previous summary, the emphasis here is on the organized assets and facilities of the Communist Parties which would enable the Parties to maintain themselves under conditions of probable wartime suppression, and to assist the USSR by organized sabotage, espionage, military action, or disruptive propaganda.

25X1A6a 4. The estimates and views contained herein are primarily those of the issuing office's [redacted] A certain amount of editing and interpolation has been performed, but it has been kept to a minimum, except in the cases of Cuba and Brazil, and has not substantially altered the conclusions contained in the responses to the questionnaire, with the exceptions noted.

5. In view of the tentative nature of this report, recipients are requested to forward criticisms, additional information, estimates and/or any data which could serve to improve this report. The final version of the report is to present firm assumptions on Communist security (not political) threats and problems to arise under assumed wartime conditions.

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ARGENTINA

General

The Partido Comunista de Argentina (PCA)* is a well organized CP which has maintained itself under conditions of partial suppression for several years.

The Party's main value to the USSR in the event of an East-West War would be the popular support it could rally in favor of Argentine neutrality. If the Argentine Government followed a policy of full or partial support to the West, the Party would be able to carry out only a small amount of propaganda and agitation to embarrass the Government, and small-scale sabotage of food and raw materials shipments to the Western Allies.

Unless economic, social, and political conditions deteriorated badly, the Communists could not expect to rally substantial popular support for a definite anti-Government policy, nor to foment an uprising.

Underground Organization

The PCA has had experience in operating clandestinely and could probably maintain itself underground in the event of more repression than it is now experiencing. There is no evidence that it has stepped up its preparations for going underground.

Communications

The PCA could maintain secure courier communications.

Propaganda Equipment

The Party would have great difficulty in obtaining equipment and materials to publish any quantity of clandestine literature: Argentine authorities closely control printing plants and the supply of newsprint.

Safe Space for Underground Operations

Living conditions in Buenos Aires would make it fairly easy for the Party to obtain secure space for small meetings and hide-outs

* Note: The following observations do not reflect on the relations of the "Dissidents" to the PCA, nor on their capabilities.

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sufficient for minimum operations.

Wartime Solvency

The PCA is short of money now and would probably have trouble financing itself in wartime.

Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core

Party membership is about 30,000. It is not known what percentage would remain loyal and active in the face of vigorous repression.

Strength is concentrated in Buenos Aires, and Rosario and Cordoba provinces. Wartime propaganda and sabotage activities would be concentrated in the same areas. Argentine authorities have fairly complete lists of Argentine and foreign Communists, and could probably round up large numbers in an emergency.

Resistance Operations

The PCA is not prepared to engage in military action. It might carry out political assassinations and small-scale acts of violence. However, the topography of the country and the fact that the interior is sparsely settled would make it extremely difficult to carry on guerrilla warfare.

Potential leaders for military action number at the most 2,000 men -- veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Italian resistance, and a few French and Slavs.

Maximum manpower available to the Party for military operations is estimated at 4,000.

The Party is believed to have no substantial quantity of weapons and could probably not obtain any by raiding police stations or army dumps.

Sabotage

The Party has no secret sabotage organization. Some leaders have given lectures on sabotage to small groups of Communists, but it is not known that a systematic program has been undertaken.

Probable sabotage targets would be: the railroads; the frigorificos; port areas of Rosario, San Lorenzo, Buenos Aires, Comodoro Rivadavia, Bahia Blanca, and Necochea. San Lorenzo, La Plata, and Comodoro Rivadavia would be most profitable to the Communists because they are the petroleum ports. Several Slav Communist cells exist in these areas and might be able to interfere with petroleum shipping by sabotage and labor agitation.

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Subversion of Armed and Security Services

Communist influence in the Armed Services is negligible. It was believed at one time to be greater in the police, but the present degree of penetration is not known.

Wartime Propaganda

Communist propaganda in the event of an East-West war would be aimed at maintaining the neutrality of Argentina.

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BRAZIL

General

The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) has been semi-illegal since May 1947. Not until recently, however, has the Government made serious efforts to suppress it.

The Party has retained most of its members during the period from 1946, but has lately been losing sympathizers.

In the event of an East-West War, the Party could maintain itself underground, could carry out propaganda against Brazilian support to the U.S., could carry out a certain amount of sabotage and generate labor trouble sufficient to hinder Brazilian economic support of the U.S. The ability of the Party to raise a successful revolution is not known and would depend largely upon future events.

Underground Organization


It is not clear to what extent PCB structure is being reorganized to meet increasing government pressure. The organization was not changed greatly when the Party was outlawed in 1947. A striking feature of the period of semi-legality was a remarkable proliferation of all kinds of fronts behind which the Communists were able to carry out political work in relative freedom.

There have been scattered reports lately that Party organizations have been destroying their files in some places. Also a pamphlet has been circulated instructing Communists how to behave in case of arrest.

The PCB has had enough experience in operating underground to enable it to go underground again with reasonable efficiency and speed in case of war.

Communications

The PCB already has secure courier service. Operating personnel on the airlines and railroads have been identified as Party couriers.



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Propaganda Equipment

The Party already has an underground press network. Mimeographed publications are distributed in factories, and small newspapers have appeared even in sparsely settled areas.

Estimates of the Party's supply of newsprint are conflicting. One report stated that it had a "good reserve." Another report, however, said that the Party was running short of paper and had had to cut the size of its editions of Voz Operaria from 60,000 to 8,000. A number of publishing houses and importing firms are supposed to be contributing to the Party's supply of paper.

In the event of war, the PCB could probably continue to issue clandestine propaganda, but the Government could also interfere with the Party's ability to get more than minimum supplies of paper and other materials.

Safe Space for Underground Operations

The Party has been able to find adequate secure places for meeting and for housing "wanted" functionaries. There is no reason to believe that it would not have adequate housing in wartime.

Replacement of Cadre

The PCB has enough experienced cadres to replace at least the "front line" leaders, should they be arrested. In 1947, when many of the best-known functionaries went underground, their places were taken by cadres who were not well known to the authorities.

Wartime Solvency

There are a number of wealthy sympathizers and secret Party members who would enable the party to remain solvent and to manage its financial transactions securely in event of war.

Brazilian authorities believe that the Party has received funds from abroad through Soviet and Satellite diplomatic and trade establishments.

Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core

Party membership seems to have remained fairly constant at about 150,000 since 1946. An increasing number of sympathizers has

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been falling away from the Party since 1947. No firm estimate of the number of Party members who would remain loyal in case of war has been received.

There have recently been a number of defections and expulsions of Party members for nationalistic tendencies. How seriously nationalism would cut into the Party in the crisis of an East-West War is not known. The most prominent of the expellees, Jose Maria Crispim, has been trying to organize a National CP not tied to the USSR, but appears thus far to have met with little success.

Popular Appeal

The political influence of the Party has been several times its membership (1945 elections, 600,000 votes for the Communist Presidential candidate: 10% of the total electorate).

Pacifism and isolationism are powerful political forces in Brazil and might be capitalized upon by the Communists. However, the Communist "Peace" campaign has become more and more bogged down.

The ability of the Party to capture the support of the "masses" in wartime depends too much upon events and economic-social-political conditions in the future to make a realistic estimate possible.

Resistance Operations

The PCB would probably undertake guerrilla operations in the event of war. It has put out numerous pamphlets on tactics, organizations, and weapons-procurement. The Party has been responsible for many acts of violence. Communists have been arrested and found to be in possession of weapons stolen from Army warehouses.

In addition, there have been many reports to the effect that the Party has been holding courses in guerrilla warfare and street-fighting; that "paramilitary" formations have been organized, and that weapons have been smuggled into Brazil from abroad.

It is not possible to estimate how far the Party has actually gone in planning for military action, or how successful it would be in a serious military effort against the Government. The principle which would probably be followed was given in a document captured in June 1950 which outlined an armed uprising based upon the countryside (the Chinese

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model). Coupled with this would be an attempt to raise a mutiny in the Army and general strike action in the cities. The present increasing action by the Government against Communists in the armed services could wreck the Party's scheme in that direction.

Sabotage

Communists have been committing acts of sabotage for some time. During July 1950, Brazilian authorities attributed to the Party 134 acts of sabotage on the Central Railroad in the State of Minas Gerais alone. Methods employed were: removal of spikes and jamming of switch controls.

The railroads are very vulnerable to sabotage and at the end of 1950 it was reported that the Party was making special efforts to recruit railroad workers.

It was also suggested in 1950 that the Air Force bases at Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, and Porto Alegre were likely targets for Communist sabotage because of the strength of the Party in those areas.

Only a few industrial plants have undertaken steps to guard against sabotage.

One source reports that Party pamphlets on the techniques of sabotage have been seized by the police. Another source says that the Party has sabotage training schools.

It is not known whether any kind of an organized sabotage plan or system actually exists. Neither has there been any reasoned estimate of the Party's ability to disrupt Brazilian economy in the event of war.

Subversion of Armed and Security Services

The PCB has a long history of successful penetration of the Armed Services. The main element of the abortive 1935 uprising was the Alianca Nacional Libertadora (ANL), which was a Communist front organization set up to penetrate the Army.

The Party is believed to have a secret military committee and a structure of secret and "insulated" cells within the Army.

Most spectacular, however, has been the exposure of strong Communist influence within the army officers' organization called the

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Clube Militar. The organization's publication followed the Communist line on the Korean war, and a number of its members (up to rank of major) have been classified as Communists and arrested.

Party influence has been strongest among the enlisted ranks of the armed services. The Sergeants' Club, the Airforce Petty Officers' and Sergeants' Club, and the Brazilian Ex-Combattants Association are believed to have been heavily infiltrated by Party members and sympathizers. A number of Communists connected with the Sergeants' Club have recently been arrested. The Sergeants' Club in Sao Paulo was closed by the police in the summer of 1951.

Vigorous action taken by the Government in the services in the past few months may spoil the chances for the Party to cause serious trouble in the event of war.

It has been estimated that the Party has not penetrated the criminal investigation police or the military police, which is the force employed against the Communists. The extent of penetration of the traffic police is not known, although the Party's chances are better here, because of the very low pay-scale.

Espionage

The PCB could probably perform industrial, military and political espionage for the Soviets in the event of war.

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CHILE

General

The CP has been operating underground since 1948. It could probably maintain a skeleton organization in the event of an East-West War, despite probable increasing repression by a Government friendly to the U.S. It would lose most of its mass following, however. The Party could not overthrow the government. It could carry on industrial espionage for the Soviets. It could achieve a limited amount of physical and economic sabotage. The government would be able to round up most of the leaders of the Party and could quickly counter its sabotage efforts.

Underground Organization

The CP Chile was made illegal in 1948. However, Government suppressive measures have been far from severe. The Party has had a taste of semi-underground existence. The experience gained should enable it to carry on clandestinely in the event of war without radical readjustment of its organizational and security practices.

The CP has developed a secure communications system, with a net of mail-drop, safe-houses and couriers.

Propaganda Equipment

There is no evidence that the Party has provided for the production of clandestine propaganda by caching equipment. It has had difficulty in its semi-underground period in finding secure presses and supplies.

Replacement of Cadres

Party leaders lived for a time clandestinely. It is believed that a "second-string" leadership is also being trained to take over in case the present cadre is knocked out. It has recently been reported that whenever a group meets, at least one of its leaders stays away, so that at least a skeleton of leaders would escape if the Government should raid the meeting.

Finances

The Party is even now chronically short of money. Declining membership contributions would hamper the Party's operations in wartime, but not enough to put it out of business entirely.

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There was evidence some time ago that funds had been sent in from abroad and that the Party has a cushion in dummy firms set up by foreign capital, but nothing further in this regard has been received recently.

Strength and Capabilities of the "Hard Core"

Wartime restrictions are expected to prune the Party's membership and its mass-following considerably. An estimated 2-5,000 people of an estimated current membership of 40,000 would remain loyal and active. They would be concentrated in economically important areas: the industrial and coal mining areas near Concepcion, the Santiago industrial area, and the northern nitrate and copper regions and ports.

Popular Appeal

It is expected that left-wingers who now sympathize with the Communists would retreat in the event of a war and vigorous repressive measures. Only the small leftist parties that are most strongly infiltrated by Communists ("Democrato del Pueblo," the Authentic Socialist Party, and the Doctrinary Radical Party) could be counted on for much support by the CP. Depending on events prior to a war, the two important Socialist Parties might support the Communists.

Resistance Operations

It is unlikely that the CP would attempt military operations, but would rather develop sabotage and political propaganda against Chile's support of the U.S. as a more profitable activity. The Party probably has no substantial quantity of arms. Unconfirmed reports have been received to the effect that the Party is attempting to form "Comando" groups in each commune, but even as a plan, current evidence is that it has not been implemented.

Sabotage

The Party has done no systematic sabotage planning other than to indicate to its militants that it expects local and individual initiative in calling and supporting small strikes and striking at industrial targets of opportunity. Thus, no general strike is expected, but rather, a series of local actions wherever the Communists are in a position to call them.

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Sabotage Targets

Interference in nitrate and copper production and with the shipping ports for these commodities would be the most serious threat the Communists could offer the U.S. in case of war. The Government plans to round up Communist leaders in an emergency and believes that it will be able to assure normal production of strategic minerals. Most vulnerable, owing to Communist strength are: the Huachipato steel-producing plant near Concepcion; coal production at Lota and Coronel, near Concepcion; the power plant at Tacopilla, which supplies power to Chile's largest copper mine at Chuquicamata, is reportedly extremely vulnerable to sabotage from within, or to possible attack by enemy submarine because of its exposed position on the coast.

The Party has instructed its militants to encourage labor troubles at the nitrate and copper shipping ports.

Subversion of Armed and Security Service

The CP probably has no substantial organization in Chile's defense forces. The Juventud Comunista, however, has reportedly been charged with a stepped-up infiltration program. Two retired Army Generals (Guillermo PORTALES and Osvaldo VALECIA Zapata) are believed to be Communist sympathizers. It is believed, however, that Communist penetration of the Armed Forces or the Investigaciones could not become dangerous within the foreseeable future.

Espionage

Unless Chile should engage directly in military hostilities, which seems unlikely, the Communists are not expected to be particularly interested in military intelligence. Probably, an informal type of information-collecting service would be organized to cover industrial production and shipping.

Wartime Propaganda

The Party would intensify its propaganda efforts to weaken the Government's position. A major element of the campaign would be aimed at arousing hostility to a Government that cooperated closely with the U.S. Neither racial disturbances nor peace riots are expected. The most the Communists could hope for would be harassment.

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Security Problems

The Government is trying to make plans for mass arrests and internment of Communists, for plant protection in strategic industries, and for preventing CP propaganda. It has a list of about 21,000 known and suspected Communists and the list is kept current. By taking action against these people, the Government could seriously interfere with the Party's wartime ability to assist the USSR.

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COLOMBIA

General

It is estimated that the Communists could do very little to assist the USSR in the event of an East-West war. The Party would be reduced to a small "hard core" without political influence. It could, and probably would, attempt to carry out sabotage of the petroleum industry. It would probably try to raise labor strikes. Unless the Liberals also produced labor difficulties, however, the Communists would not be able to raise a general strike. Party leaders are identified and could be picked up, but only if the Police raised their efficiency.

Underground Organization

The CP Colombia has already gone underground to a certain extent. Basic organizations have been reduced in size to no more than five members. All but a small part of the Party's archives were destroyed in December 1950 to prevent seizure by the police. Security preparations have been increased, particularly since the naming of Luis Ignacio ANDRADE as Minister of Government. The Party has been considering the creation of a secret committee to be headed by Father Enrique PEREZ Arbelaez to take over in case of emergency.

Communications

Party communications have been through the regular mails and occasional use of couriers. It is believed that no well-organized, secure communications system has been created; however, it is believed that the Communists would have no difficulty in organizing one if necessary.

Propaganda Equipment

The Party disposed of most of its printing equipment because it could not afford to operate a regular press. Its literature is now mimeographed. Two or three clandestine leaflets are being published in Bogota, Medellin, and Cali. In the event of war, the Party would find it harder to put out written propaganda, but could probably continue to distribute mimeographed material clandestinely.

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Space for Underground Operations

The Communists would probably always be able to find places where small groups could meet in safety. No information is available as to whether safe-houses have been obtained for hiding Party leaders or for housing headquarters offices.

Replacement of Cadre

It is believed that the Party could replace current leaders without much difficulty. A Communist source estimates that there is a group of about fifty persons from which new leaders could be recruited. It was not estimated whether these persons were experienced or would be efficient leaders.

Wartime Solvency

The Party has difficulty raising adequate funds now, and would undoubtedly be hard pressed in wartime.

Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core

Severe repression would seriously reduce Party membership, which has been falling off since 1945. Present membership is about 2,500, but a large number of these would desert in wartime. Hundreds of persons quit the Party in the emergency following the April 1948 riots. The remaining "hard core" would be incapable of carrying out major propaganda activities; would probably devote itself to physical sabotage, attempts to raise strikes, and to commit espionage.

Popular Appeal

The declining popular attraction of the Party is reflected in declining elections voting for Party candidates (18,000 in 1945; less than 5,000 in 1951). All sources agree that the Party's appeal would decline still further in the event of an East-West War.

Resistance Operations

It is extremely doubtful that the Party would attempt to organize a resistance organization. It has no militarily experienced leaders. There is a going arms traffic, and weapons would be available easily

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to Communists. However, prices are high, and most people would not be able to buy a weapon without financial assistance.

It is probable that the Communists would support the anti-Government guerrilla groups that are currently operating in Colombia in the event of war. It is not known whether large numbers of Communists would join the existing bands or whether they would be in a position to get control of any significant section of the guerrilla movement.

Sabotage

The Communists have not organized a sabotage network, nor is there evidence that they have made any plans to do so. It is believed that the Party does not have any trained saboteurs who could give training to others.

The main sabotage target would be the refinery at Barrancabermeja. A secondary target would be the power plant at El Centro. Sabotage of these two would effectively stop oil production and processing. The oil companies have emergency plant-protection plans, and the producing company, which is run by the Government, could call in troops for protection.

Communists in the ports at Barranquilla and Cartagena, and in the smaller ports of Buenaventura and Santa Marta could undertake to sabotage port installations by burning. Fire is a serious problem in Colombia: fire preventive measures are inadequate and fire-fighting is usually ineffective.

Colombian railroads are not adequately protected and are therefore vulnerable to sabotage. Bridges are guarded and in the event of war, the guard would be improved. The National Police are responsible for protection of the Bogota water supply.

Among other industrial plants, those that are run by Americans are better protected than the rest.

The Communist objective in sabotage would be to embarrass the Government and to disrupt the economy. Colombia is not a direct source of war materials.

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Subversion of Armed and Security Services

There is no evidence of Communist penetration of the armed services. A Communist source agrees that there is none of any importance.

The Police, likewise, seem to be free from Communist infiltration. There have been cases of the Party's having been forewarned of raids, but this is believed to be the result of poor security in the Police, rather than the presence of Communist informants.

Espionage

It is doubted that the Party could produce significant military, scientific, or industrial information for the Soviets in the event of war. If the targets in Colombia warranted, the Soviets would probably try to set up their own networks independent of the Party. They would have difficulty in recruiting by ideological persuasion agents and informants in position to obtain information; would probably have to depend upon buying information. There are a number of leftist professional men (mostly lawyers; some, former Communists) who might provide general information for the USSR; however, many of these could be arrested and convicted.

Economic Warfare

The basis of Colombia's economy is coffee, and since the crop could not be effectively sabotaged, and since coffee would continue to be in demand abroad, it is unlikely that the Communists could seriously disrupt the domestic economy.

Wartime Propaganda

Communist propaganda would probably be aimed at exploiting the difference between Colombia's two traditional political parties (Liberals and Conservatives) and at increasing the friction within the Government. The present Conservative Government has control of the Army but it is unpopular.

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COSTA RICA

General

The Communist Vanguardia Popular is believed to be incapable of rendering assistance to the USSR in the event of an East-West War. It is small, poorly led, and currently underground. It has no political power. Government agencies have identified most Communists and would be able to arrest them in an emergency. The country is too small to permit significant underground organization or operations.

Underground Organization

The Vanguardia Popular was outlawed in 1948 and was almost totally destroyed. Under continuous suppression it has slowly created a weak, clandestine organization. Secret activities are very difficult because the country is so small and the people inclined to gossip.

Communications

The Party has no regular communications system. It uses Party travellers as couriers and has a number of cover addresses.

Propaganda Equipment

Attempts to establish a clandestine press have failed, partly owing to lack of money and partly, to the impossibility of maintaining a printing establishment secretly. There are three mimeograph establishments currently in operation. Their locations are known to the Government, which has not raided them for political reasons.

The Party has made no plans for the acquisition and storage of printing equipment and supplies.

Space for Underground Operations

It is believed that the Communists would have the greatest difficulty in obtaining and maintaining hideouts in the event of war.

Replacement of Cadre

The Party has always suffered acutely from personnel shortages. In case of war, it would not be able to replace any of its cadre with any type of personnel, known or unknown to the authorities.

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Wartime Solvency

The Party is now "in the red," and would probably be unable to set up any kind of a secret money administrating organization (secret accounts, dummy firms, etc.).

Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core

Severe underground hardship is expected to totally paralyze attendance at meetings, participation in literature dissemination, and general activities. The "hard core" consists of about four persons.

Popular Appeal

Nil.

Resistance Operations

No capability.

Sabotage

Sabotage capabilities of the Party are practically nil.

Targets of remotely possible sabotage attempts would be dock facilities at Limon and Puntarenas; railroad bridges, San Jose-Limon and San Jose-Puntarenas; airport at San Jose; banana company installations, U. S. petroleum interests.

On the other hand, it would be quite possible for foreign sabotage agents to operate in Costa Rica, either against targets there, or using it as a base for operations against the Panama Canal. Border controls are inadequate and local law enforcement agencies are not equipped to handle professional saboteurs or other types of agent. Persons have often moved about the country for several years without any documentation at all.

Subversion of Armed and Security Forces

Nil. Infiltration might result if the Calderon Guardia party returned to power. The Armed services are fully capable of preventing penetration.

Espionage

No capability.

Economic Warfare

No capability. Labor is anti-Communist.

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CUBA

General

How the Communists in Cuba, in their party called the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), will make out as the Batista regime develops is not yet clear. Upon this, of course, depends their ability to assist the Soviets in some future East-West War.

In the past, the PSP has had reasonably good leadership, by Latin American Communist standards. It succeeded in greatly expanding its political power after 1933, and Communists entered the Governments of Batista in 1940 and of Grau San Martin in 1944 as the result of political deals.

Recently, however, the Party has been declining, politically, financially, and psychologically. It is believed capable of maintaining itself in the event of war and probable suppression by the pro-U. S. Government. It could not, barring substantial changes in the political and economic climate, hope to overthrow the Government, either by peaceful political means or by force. Serious military action would also be unlikely. On the other hand, the sugar industry offers many targets for sabotage, and the result of a strong sabotage program could be very serious to the U. S. and also to the internal economy of Cuba. In general, a program of sabotage of the sugar industry, coupled with anti-U. S. propaganda is the direction PSP wartime effort would most logically take.

Underground Organization

A number of sources reported that the Party was reorganizing, or had made plans to reorganize, against the possibility of suppression in 1951. Details of the reorganization scheme as reported varied somewhat, but had in common the principles of decentralization (smaller cells, more responsibility put on local direction organs) restrictions on lateral contacts between organs, and the imposition of standard organizational and personal security measures.

According to one fairly reliable source, no reorganization would actually take place until suppression had begun, in order that the Party might continue to exercise maximum political influence.

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As early as the summer of 1950, it was reported that the Party was destroying some of its records, and in November, statements were made in Party publications calling for an increase in "revolutionary vigilance" to prevent the infiltration of unstable and hostile persons into Party organs.

Despite the fact that Batista cooperated with the Party during his previous administration to the extent of permitting it to carry out open political activities, it is probable that he will take a firmer stand against Communism during his present rule. One Communist leader has already written to a contact abroad that Batista had begun to put pressure on the Party and that some leaders might soon have to take refuge abroad, in Guatemala, preferably.

If, as seems likely, the pressure continues, the Party will be forced to go completely underground. Having had previous experience in clandestine existence, and plenty of opportunity to prepare for it again, the Communists should be able to maintain at least a skeleton organization, and could continue to operate in the event of an East-West War.

Communications

It is believed that a secure courier system is already in operation, utilizing women and boys in the cities, and bus drivers and conductors going into the interior of the country.

Prior to the Batista Coup, it was also reported that a number of Party members in public communications facilities were expediting secure transmittal of Party messages. They could be expected to continue this until weeded out by the Government.

It has also been reported in the past that a number of Cuban "ham" radio operators were Communists. It is possible that a radio net could be maintained for some time.

There have been Party members on the staffs of standard broadcast stations. It is not inconceivable that such personnel could be used to transmit disguised messages in wartime until they were identified and arrested.

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Propaganda Equipment

The Party should be able to maintain a clandestine press in wartime. When the Party newspaper, Hoy, was banned in 1950, enough equipment and supplies were removed to a private print shop to put out an illegal paper. During this period, a small paper, Mediodia, was published fairly regularly.

In wartime, the Party would not be able to issue a substitute paper with impunity as it did in 1950, when America Deportiva simply took the place of Hoy and was distributed openly. America Deportiva is believed to have been printed in a secret shop.

It has been reported that the Party has cached away newsprint and distributed mimeograph machines to trusted individuals in small towns. One source (rated "F") stated that "technical departments" would be organized at national and provincial levels to prepare for and carry out the work of clandestine printing and distribution of underground propaganda.

Safe Space for Underground Operations

Party meetings have been held for some time in houses of secret Party members and sympathizers, and the Communists are expected to be able to obtain and maintain a sufficient number of safe-houses for meetings and the housing of important, hunted leaders in wartime.

One report that has not been confirmed and that is "unusual" to say the least, held that in 1948 a Communist "spelunker" made a tour of mountainous areas to locate caves which might be used as hide-outs and headquarters in case the Party ever undertook guerrilla warfare.

The question of safe space depends largely on the main role the Party would undertake in wartime. If emphasis were put upon sabotage of the sugar industry, or guerrilla operations, then safe quarters would be sought in the country-side. If emphasis were put on political agitation in Habana, then safe houses would have to be found in or near the city.

Replacement of Cadre

On the one hand, it is probable that the Party has enough trained cadres to replace the "first-string" in case it were rounded up, and there have been reports to the effect that little-known individuals have already been designated to take over in an emergency. On the other

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hand, Cuban authorities are believed capable of identifying any replacements soon after they begin to work. The Party does not have so many efficient cadres that it could support a series of replacements if the government kept up a campaign of large-scale arrests and intensive investigation.

Wartime Solvency

It has been estimated that the Party would be able in wartime to maintain secret bank accounts in the name of trusted secret Party members and sympathizers. That it has been following this practice for some time was demonstrated by the exposure in January 1952 of such a trusted individual who had embezzled over \$13,000 of Party funds kept to his account in the Royal Bank of Canada.

There have been indications that the Party is having financial difficulties. These would undoubtedly increase in wartime, and problems of handling them, also. However, it is believed that the Party could finance the restricted activities of which it would be capable in wartime.

Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core

The Party claimed that it had 19,000 "militants" in February 1950. It is difficult to estimate how many of these would remain both loyal and active in conditions of wartime suppression: 10,000 would be a generous estimate. Cuban authorities have an automatic arrest list which contains about 1,000 names.

Popular Appeal

In the partial elections of June 1951, PSP candidates received about 151,000 votes - 7.4% of the total ballot. This was about 24,000 more than the officially registered Communist voters in 1949. In the registrations of autumn 1951, only 59,000 registered as Communist voters. Whether these figures reflect a proportionate decline in the present popular appeal of Communism, or simply a decline in the number of persons willing to register as Communist, is impossible to say.

It is also impossible to foretell the mass political effects of the new Batista regime.

In the event of war, the sugar economy would depend entirely on the Western market, and military circumstances would dictate economic conditions in Cuba to a large extent. It is unlikely that disruption of the economy could be used to raise pro-Soviet sympathies directly, but

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the Communists could capitalize upon it indirectly, through front organizations and labor agitation.

The left wings of the PAU (Partido Accion Unitaria) and of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), both of which were infiltrated by the Communists, might side with the PSP in the event of war, if the Government permitted them to function, which is not likely.

Resistance Operations

Estimates of the ability of the Communists to carry out military activity in wartime are conflicting. On the one hand, the capability was reported to be great, and the Party to have a large number of militarily trained cadres. On the other hand, a responsible desk officer has estimated that a military effort would succeed in recruiting no more than a few hundred men.

Sabotage

There is only one industry in Cuba that is of importance to the U. S. --the production and shipping of sugar.

The producing industry is greatly decentralized, offering many targets for sabotage. Each "central" has its own railroad lines from mills to warehouses and to the main railroad lines; most mills have their own power plants; molasses and alcohol plants are usually separate from the mills.

It is of interest to note that the probable effect on PSP organization, if the Party chose and were capable of concentrating on sabotage of the sugar producing industry, would be a considerable decentralization, with wide freedom being given to local organizations to act on their own initiative.

It is difficult to estimate how strong a hold the PSP has in the labor that operates the producing end of the industry. In general, the rural populations, which grow the cane, are anti-Communist. Some of the mill unions are to some extent connected with the Party. The syndicates in the following establishments are the most important of those which are opposed to the anti-Communist Sugar Workers' Federation (FNTA). Whether they are actually pro-Communist or are simply opposed to the current leadership of the anti-Communist FNTA is not known.

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Gomey-Mema Mill, San Nicolas, Habana Province
Central Hormiguero Mill, San Fernando de Camerones, Las Villas
Central Narcisa, Yuguajay, Las Villas
Central Santa Maria, Ranchuelo, Las Villas.

So far as shipment of sugar to the U.S. is concerned, there appears to be little chance that the Communists could seriously interfere with it by sabotage. The Communist maritime union, which like other Communist unions parallels the anti-Communist unions and has the same name, has been reported to be largely a paper organization without any following. The bulk of Cuban maritime workers belongs to the anti-Communist union.

Subversion of Armed and Security Services

A very small number of Communist sympathizers are in the Army. They have been identified and are being watched.

Espionage

No substantial information is available on Party plans or organization, if any exist, to carry out espionage in wartime.

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ECUADOR

General

By itself, the CP Ecuador (PCE) is believed incapable of rendering important assistance to the USSR directly in the event of an East-West War. It could carry out a certain amount of sabotage, propaganda, and espionage. It could not mount a serious military operation. Of more concern is the possibility that the Party could exert enough pressure on the Government to nullify Ecuador's political and economic support of the United States. At present, the Government appears to be not sufficiently aware of the threat of Communism to undertake steps to control it. Nor has it given any evidence of becoming aware of this danger in the foreseeable future.

Underground Organization

The Party has been reported to have been making plans for underground operations several times in the past few years, whenever it feared that the Government might declare it illegal. There is no evidence that anything concrete was ever done, however.

Communications

It is not known whether a secure internal communications system has been organized or prepared. Ever since 1948, unconfirmed reports have indicated that the Communists have organized a courier service for overseas communications within the Flota Mercante Grancolombiana. The number of couriers, mail drops, etc., of this service has not been determined to date.

Also reported, but unconfirmed, have been a courier service organized by the Guayquil Port Cell and another within the Granje y Hijos Line which carries bananas between Puerto Bolivar and the U.S.

Propaganda Equipment

The Party is not known to have made definite plans for obtaining and hiding printing equipment and supplies. However, it should have no difficulty in doing so at any time: it already owns presses and other duplicating equipment; a Communist-owned printing shop in Quito recently acquired some new equipment. Nor should supplies be an insurmountable problem: the brother of the owner of one of the largest newspapers in Guayaquil is an active Communist.

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Safe Space for Underground Operations

The Party would have no difficulty in establishing bases for operations. However, owing to the small size and population of Ecuador, it would probably not be able to operate undetected for any time. Reports to the effect that the Party was choosing safe-houses for headquarters if outlawed have not been confirmed.

Replacement of Cadre

The PCE would have difficulty replacing its current leadership on all levels. It has only a few capable cadres. Capable personnel who have escaped identification thus far are probably very few.

Wartime Solvency

The PCE is believed to be capable of raising and administering funds to a certain extent in the underground. Wealthy Party sympathizers could be expected to contribute funds and to manage them through secret accounts and dummy firms.

Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core

Estimated PCE membership is about 5,000. The rank and file is believed opportunist, and if the Party were suppressed, no more than 1,000 members would remain loyal and active.

Popular Appeal

Communist doctrine is not expected to exert a strong appeal if war comes. The Party has thus far failed to command the prestige of the lower classes largely because Party leaders have lacked "political personality" and because of the influence of the Catholic Church. Despite the limited appeal of the Party itself, however, there is a possibility that it could muster considerable support for anti-American political actions through the Socialist Party, which has cooperated closely with the PCE in the past. The Socialist Party would probably not support the USSR directly in case of a war, but it would probably also fail to give real support to the U.S. Furthermore, there is a left-wing of the Socialist Party that would probably support the Communist program in the event of war. Two small parties, the PRL and the VRSE, are also close to the PCE in some respects and might support it in wartime. These factors, added to the fact that the Government

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party, the MCDN, depends partially on Communist votes, make it unlikely that the Government would act vigorously against the PCE in the event of a war. The Party might be able to develop indirect support for its political policies in wartime far beyond what it can directly command in membership or at the polls.

Resistance Operations

The PCE is believed incapable of raising a military resistance force. It lacks militarily experienced personnel, and it is thought not to have any significant stores of arms or ammunition. Neither is it believed capable of seizing weapons from Government stores in the event of conflict.

Sabotage

It is not known if the PCE has organized any sabotage network or made concrete plans for sabotage in wartime. The organization of "sabotage committees" to make plans was reported in September 1950. Targets for sabotage would be Guayaquil port facilities, oil production at Ancon, the Guayaquil-Quito railroad; factories in Guayaquil, Ambato, and Quito; and, possibly, the rice fields.

It should be noted that at present, no plans or organization exist for plant protection against sabotage in Ecuador.

Subversion of Armed and Security Services

The extent of Communist infiltration of the Services is not known. It has been reported that penetrations do exist. The Director General of the Seguridad Nacional, in fact, is considered a radical Socialist who has demonstrated sympathy for the Communists. Local armed and security services appear to be quite apathetic to the problem of the Communist penetration.

In the event of an East-West War, the extent of penetration would depend upon the relationship of the Socialist Party to the Government at that time, and the Government's stand towards the PCE. The Army is believed capable of countering Communist penetration if permitted to do so by the Government.

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Espionage

It is not known if the Party has made plans for espionage in the event of war, or if a Party intelligence network exists at this time. The Party's ability to collect information for the USSR will depend upon the relationships between Government, the Socialist Party and the PCE. At this time, the PCE is believed able to obtain almost any type of military, scientific and industrial information it desires from the Government. One of the Functional Senators, Pedro Saad, is the most important labor leader of the PCE, and can legally demand all such information in the possession of Government ministries.

Economic Warfare

Again, the ability of the Communists to interfere with Ecuador-U. S. trade and financial relations in wartime will depend upon the position of the Government vis-a-vis the Socialist Party and the PCE. Undoubtedly, PCE political power could seriously influence the country's economic policies.

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~~SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~PANAMAGeneral

The People's Party (Communist) is believed incapable of serious action against either the Government of the Republic or the United States in the event of war. Existing social, economic, and political conditions are bad; the Government is weak; nevertheless, the Communists have not been able to muster public support of any consequence. The Party has a membership of only about 700, but even of these, only about 200 are active. It has a small youth organization. The most important labor federation, the FSTRP, claims a membership of over 20,000, but has actually no more than 400 active members. The FSTRP is an affiliate of the Communist-dominated Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). The Party has no money. If war came, the Communists in the Republic would probably maintain a small clandestine organization for anti-American propaganda; and could produce a small amount of intelligence for the Soviets, particularly in the field of Canal defenses and traffic. However, the National Police in the Republic and U.S. Services in the Canal Zone would reduce Communist effectiveness to a minimum and might well be able to destroy the Party altogether. The Party has no capacity for conducting military action against the Government. The Government is friendly to the U.S. and is expected to continue so. The Police are believed capable of suppressing sabotage and subversive activities in Panama, surveilling airfields and coastal areas, guarding vital routes of communication in the Republic and enforcing travel control measures.

Underground Organization

The Party was outlawed by Presidential Decree of President Arias in April 1950. During the Arosemena Administration the ban was not executed. There is no evidence that the Party has made systematic plans or concrete preparations for operating clandestinely.

Communications

It has occasionally been rumored that the Party was thinking about setting up safe-houses and secret communications systems, but the stories have never been confirmed by reliable sources.

Propaganda

The Party newspaper, El Patriota, suffers from chronic shortage of money and supplies. In wartime, a serious effort to suppress the

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Party would probably reduce it to mimeographing and hand-lettering publication.

Personnel

The Party is believed incapable of replacing arrested cadres. An estimated 75% of its membership would drop out as a result of the risks and hardships of underground existence. Automatic arrest lists now kept current, if used, would result in the arrest of about 1,500 Communists and Soviet and Satellite people.

Resistance Capabilities

The Party is believed incapable of raising or operating a military resistance force. It lacks militarily experienced personnel. It lacks both the means and the money to obtain arms.

Sabotage

Aside from the Canal, Panama has no industries offering profitable targets for sabotage. U.S. forces in the Canal Zone could prevent sabotage to the Canal itself. It is possible, however, that a small-scale program of sabotage against public utilities, coupled with a strike effort, could interfere with local food supply and the shipment of food products to the United States to some extent, and thereby result in some annoyance to this country.

The merchant fleet, although fourth largest in the world, could not be touched by the Panamanian Communists, for the ships are foreign-owned, are manned by non-Panamanian crews, and seldom dock in Panama.

Espionage

The only significant espionage targets in Panama are Canal Defenses and shipping. It is believed that security measures in the Canal Zone could be increased sufficiently to scotch any important espionage program mounted by either the Soviets or the People's Party.

Subversion of Armed and Security Services

Panama has no military force. It is not known to what degree, if any, the Communists have infiltrated the ranks of the National Police. Leadership of the police is definitely anti-Communist.

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Wartime Propaganda

Although lacking equipment for propaganda, the Communists might be able to play upon existing social and economic inequalities to engender friction between the Republic and the U. S. Exploitable issues are:

Higher wages paid to American workers in the Canal Zone as compared to Panamanian workers.

Lack of social security for Panamanians in the Zone.

Failure of the Government of Panama to solve problems of high prices, unemployment, and racial discrimination.

Patriotic resentment of the U. S. power in Panama -- particularly, the granting of bases to the U. S.

The Communists have already infiltrated the important (7,500 followers) Partido Frente Patriotico. They do not control it, but in a crisis, they might be able to use it as a lever to push through legislation harmful to the U. S.

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VENEZUELA

General

Communist capabilities in Venezuela in the event of an East-West War would be very limited. The Government would be pro-U.S. It would bear down hard on the Communists, who are divided between two opposing parties, the PCV (Partido Comunista de Venezuela) and the PRP (Partido Revolucionario del Proletariado Comunista). The PCV is itself internally divided into factions. Communist strength has been declining and is expected to continue to do so. The Parties are short of efficient cadres. The only real danger to U.S. interests would be sabotage of Venezuelan petroleum production, and the Communists by themselves are believed to be incapable of interfering seriously in this. More dangerous would be joint Communist-Accion Democratica (AD) operations. There have been rumors of Communist-AD cooperation, but thus far, no confirmation.

Underground Organization

The PCV is already underground, having been outlawed on 13 May 1950. Little is known about its underground organization or what plans, if any, have been made for clandestine operations in the event of an East-West War. The dissident PRPc is still legal, and has been trying to increase its strength in labor unions.

Communications

No information is available on the existing internal communications system.

Propaganda Equipment

The PCV has a clandestine press and distributing apparatus. Its current clandestine publications are irregular and of poor quality. There are enough Communists in the printing trade to ensure a supply of equipment and paper in wartime, but it would probably not be enough for a sustained, voluminous coverage.

Safe Space for Underground Operations

The PCV seems to have safe space for operations in its current underground existence.

Replacement of Cadre

The Communists would have considerable difficulty in replacing current leadership with unknown, but efficient, personnel. The present leadership is believed to be inefficient and internally divided. Several important functionaries have been jailed or exiled. On the other hand, Government Security Services are not sufficiently effective to spot possible cadre replacements. In the event of war, this failure would be somewhat overcome by information provided by Communists defecting for patriotic reasons.

Wartime Solvency

Both the PCV and the PRPc have been short of money even when legal. Some of the wealthier Communists, many of whom sit on the fence between the PCV and the PRPc, might furnish the movement with some funds. It is believed that the Communists would not be able to establish and maintain secret accounts, deposits, or dummy firms.

Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core

The "hard core" expected to remain loyal to the Party in adverse conditions would consist of labor leaders and intellectuals. The effectiveness of the latter would probably be slight, because they are well-known and would either be arrested or put under close surveillance. Most of the rank and file would drift away from the Party in the event of an East-West War.

Popular Appeal

Communism has been lately losing its attraction for the Venezuelan people. Its political pulling power would be extremely small in the event of war. It is believed that no other existing political groups would side with the Communists in wartime.

Resistance Operations

Communist capability of creating a military organization is believed to be very slight. The Party has neither trained personnel nor substantial stores of arms and ammunition. Government services would be able to destroy any armed groups that appeared.

Sabotage

The prime target in the event of an East-West War would be the oil industry. The industry is now, and will always be, vulnerable to sabotage. However, the petroleum companies have made considerable progress in developing security against sabotage, and the Government security services are also raising their effectiveness in this respect. No information is available on any Communist plans or preparations for organized sabotage in the event of war.

Subversion of Armed and Security Services

No information is available on the extent to which the Communists have infiltrated the armed and security services. It is assumed to be small. The Government has probably not identified Communists in the services. A factor limiting Communist penetration in the event of expansion of Venezuelan forces would be that most conscripts would come from small towns and farming communities, where the Communists have not developed as much of a following as they have in the cities.

Espionage

It is believed that security measures imposed in the event of war would make it extremely difficult for the Communists to create and operate an espionage network. Prime target for Communist espionage would be the petroleum industry, not only for production figures, but also for singling out vulnerable targets for sabotage.

Economic Warfare

The Communists (mostly those in the PRPc) are capable of effecting small strikes and slow-downs, but nothing important enough to seriously disrupt the Venezuelan economy.

Wartime Propaganda

Propaganda would be aimed at cutting off oil exports to the U.S. and her allies. Suppression of the Communist press would make a strong anti-U.S. propaganda campaign difficult.

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