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COMMUNIST AGRARIAN TACTICS

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International Communism is today pressing hard in order to spread and consolidate its influence within the so-called "backward" areas of the world. Communist successes to date attest to the Communist use of tactics and techniques designed to take full advantage of conditions existing within these areas and to organize and control "mass power" sufficient to propel Communist leadership to the front. The Free World's success in keeping such areas from falling eventually under complete Communist domination depends upon its full understanding of the tactics and techniques employed by the Communists, as well as upon its vigorous presentation of counter-attractions to take the place of the panaceas and leadership offered by the Communists. For in these areas, just as in other countries of the free world, Communists are seeking popular support and power not through pushing Communist platforms but by espousing non-Communist ideas. They are promising to abolish those things which are irritating a nation and are appealing to those sentiments within a country which offer the greatest opportunity for a "united front" movement susceptible of Communist control and manipulation.

Throughout these underdeveloped areas of the world where the Communists are now so active, there are several common factors which are present in almost all countries. There is a revulsion against poverty and hunger as a normal mode of existence. There is also a reaction against colonial dependency or foreign domination of any kind. In some countries one factor is stronger than the other. National movements engendered by these factors, however, can seldom be started without leadership. In some areas this has come from within, such as by Gandhi in India. But where native leadership has been lacking, the Communists have furnished native leaders trained in Moscow. And when nationalistic movements have been started without Communist participation, the Communists have attempted to take over these movements by one method or another. Non-Communist leaders, confronted with the explosive problems of a critical transitory period in their country, have been harassed by the necessity of keeping Communism from diverting nationalistic aspirations. Into this battle, international Communism has brought proven organizing techniques, trained cadres, a world-wide propaganda machine, material aid, and, above all, a determined program looking toward a definite goal.

In countries whose economy and culture are predominantly agrarian, the Communists, in order to gain power, have turned from traditional

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emphasis on the "urban proletariat" toward increased organizational work among the peasantry. This has been particularly apparent within the colonial and semi-colonial areas which generally lack an active or strong urban proletariat. This politically dictated shift of emphasis to the agrarian peasant was initially followed by the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung, and its successful application in China forecast many of Communism's present agrarian tactics in the Free World. China served as the testing ground for Asiatic Communism and the agrarian tactics and techniques evolved there spread to surrounding countries and later to other countries where Communist leaders perceived that exploitation of peasant grievances could furnish "mass power." That this may have constituted a departure from Communism's theoretical concepts concerning the role of the urban proletariat was overshadowed by the Communists' appreciation of political realities.

Communist efforts to exploit peasant discontents are particularly apparent in the Far and Middle East. But similar Communist tactics are also being followed in many Latin American countries and are being used to increase agrarian agitation in Western Europe as well. In addition to the local attention being given to organizational work among the peasantry in many countries, a measure of the international importance which Communism now attaches to agrarian tactics was demonstrated by the Third Congress of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) held in October, 1953. This Congress clearly emphasized the Communist desire for increased attention to the underdeveloped countries of the world and pointed up the important role which agrarian organizations can play in support of international Communism's push for power. The World Conference of Agricultural and Forestry Workers, held shortly after the WFTU Congress, followed the general policies laid down by the WFTU, confirmed the emphasis on the "backward" areas, and specifically sparked fresh Communist activities looking to the organization of peasant movements and actions and the penetration of existing agrarian organizations.

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II. The Role of the Peasantry

Communist successes among the peasantry in the underdeveloped areas do not stem from an acceptance or an understanding of Communist ideology by these peasant masses. Communist successes stem largely from the effective application of operational techniques while true Communist ideology is disguised. Nevertheless, Communism as an ideology is the creed of the small militant and power-hungry groups who direct the mass operations. For this reason, it is pertinent to understand something of the doctrines concerning the peasantry which are held by those who direct Communism's attack. Although Communism theoretically operates as a result of doctrines which are held to be based on an infallible historic science, new rationalizations are devised to fit new experiences. Behind a facade of unerring consistency and unflinching foresight, Communism adjusts itself to political realities. Such flexibility is demonstrated in Communism's present emphasis on the role of the peasantry. An understanding of this role will assist in an understanding of the actual agrarian tactics utilized by the Communists.

A. Pre-Mao

In its early form, Marxism did not regard the peasantry as an independent creative force in human history. The early Marxist movement believed that the central drama of Communism would be enacted in capitalism's original home and not in the backward areas. Before Lenin, there was not even a hint that a small proletariat, well organized and led by professional revolutionaries, could initiate the world revolution in a "backward area". Although the peasantry was considered to be a victim of feudal society, it was not considered to be the real agent for the overthrow of feudalism. This role belonged to the urban bourgeoisie. In the transition from a capitalist society to a socialist society, the creative role was expected to fall to the urban proletariat.

With Lenin, the role of the peasantry became somewhat more problematic. After peasant uprisings in Russia in 1905, Lenin became intent on harnessing the peasant force to the revolutionary wagon. This resulted in his theory of the "democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry", according to which the peasantry was capable of certain limited creativity in Russia. But Lenin never for a moment meant to imply that the peasantry would play a central role in the revolution. He meant that only by allying itself with the proletariat could the peasantry hope to realize the agrarian revolution. Lenin was also appreciative of the dynamic potentialities of the backward areas and at an early date had perceived that the nascent nationalism within these areas could itself be utilized as a force in realizing the world revolution. This perception resulted in the Leninist theory of imperialism whereby almost the entire onus for the wretchedness of the backward areas was laid at the door of international finance capital.

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Yet Lenin sharply distinguished between Russia, where capitalism had made some inroads and where a small but vigorous proletariat existed, and the colonial and semi-colonial areas which were victims of imperialism and where a modern industrial proletariat hardly existed, if at all. Although he flirted with the theory that a capitalist phase of evolution might not be necessary in the backward areas, Lenin discarded this in the face of the strategic needs of the Soviet Union and re-emphasized that the natural leader of a revolution was the proletariat which should place itself at the forefront of the masses.

Furthermore, the Leninist concept of the "Party" insisted on an organic relation between the Communist Party and the proletariat. According to Lenin, political parties could be nothing more than political superstructures concentrating the political power of given economic classes. In Russia, the Bolsheviks claimed the proletariat monopoly and Lenin always believed that the Communist Party was nothing more or less than the political organ of the industrial proletariat. It was only because of its organic relation to the proletariat that the Communist Party could act as the oracle of history. Thus, within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, there arose the dogma that some actual relationship between the proletariat and the Communist Party was essential to a Party's continued existence. Yet Lenin had at least made the important point that the peasantry could serve as a revolutionary supporting force.

The strategy of international Communism was refined under Stalin as he shifted emphasis from promoting Communism on the basis of a world-wide revolutionary effort to making Russia into the bulwark of Communism for the whole world. While Stalin interpreted many of Lenin's theories in the light of prevailing practical politics, there was no apparent realization of the peasantry's inherent revolutionary force and no abandonment of the doctrine of the "vanguard of the proletariat". It remained for Mao Tse-tung in China to demonstrate the great significance of the peasantry to a national revolutionary movement in backward areas of the world. In so doing, he actually put in doubt the Communist Party's claim to representation of the industrial proletariat.

E. Under Mao

While Lenin was concluding that the peasantry could serve as a revolutionary supporting force, certain leaders within the young Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were realizing that the peasantry "constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people and is, of course, a great force in the national revolution. If the Chinese revolution does not enlist the peasants, it will be most difficult for it to succeed as a great national revolution". By 1927, Mao Tse-tung appeared to be the chief exponent of this attitude. Impressed with the unexpected revolutionary dynamism displayed by the Chinese peasantry in opposing

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Japanese imperialism in 1925, Mao turned away from work with the proletariat and labor unions and devoted himself to peasant organizations. His experiences convinced him that the peasantry itself would be the main force of the Chinese revolution; that the peasantry could furnish all the motive power necessary, at least for the completion of the "democratic revolution". He appreciated the Leninist formula of a professional revolutionary elite basing itself on the motive power of the masses, but there was no echo of the Leninist insistence on the necessity of an industrial proletariat base. Mao was ready to turn his back on the proletariat and take full advantage of the elemental forces which he found in the villages.

Events in China hastened the general acceptance of Mao's political strategy. Initially, there was no ready acquiescence by other Party leaders and no abandonment of emphasis on the Party's tasks among the urban proletariat. But the CCP was soon confronted by an "uneven development of proletarian and peasant struggles". The Chinese urban proletariat, subjected to Communist propaganda about its transcendental missions which were never realized, turned away from the Party and lost interest in the revolutionary upsurge; it became immersed again in its own private tribulations. The peasantry, on the other hand, was still ready for action against landlords, militarists, etc., whether this action was led by the CCP or some other group. The appeal to the peasant had been on the basis of elemental demands and he retained a desperate readiness to rise against his miserable conditions. Furthermore, other conditions were more favorable for Communist activity in the countryside than in the urban centers. Despite the centralization of power achieved by the Kuomintang, the vast regions of the hinterland were still controlled largely by semi-independent warlords and the government did not have as firm control as in the cities. Because Mao's theory about the peasantry fitted neatly into prevailing conditions, his strategy and leadership within the Chinese Communist movement won out by 1932-33.

The CCP became an elite corps of politically articulate leaders organized along Marxist lines but drawn, in its top levels, from various strata of Chinese society. Under Mao, this elite group realized that the peasantry could itself provide the mass basis and the motive power for a revolutionary transformation. The aspirations and intentions of the Party leaders were not necessarily determined by their peasant background or by the interests of the peasantry. They simply rose to power by basing themselves on the dynamic force of peasant discontent. During this rise to power, the almost total severance of the CCP from a supposed urban proletarian base did not impair the belief of the Chinese Communist leaders that they were unwavering Marxist-Leninists. They continued to believe in a redemptive historic process and held that the Communist Party was itself the sole agent of historic redemption. The Leninist doctrine of imperialism, including the theory that imperialism is a phenomenon peculiar to a

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certain stage of capitalism, played a vital role in Chinese Communism. The Leninist concept of elitism was expressed in the form of a highly-disciplined highly-organized party leadership, perpetuated by the absorption of "positive elements" discovered and trained during the agrarian reform and other mass movements.

The path to power of this elite group followed the Leninist formula of using the dynamism engendered by the immediate needs and discontents of the masses. The experience of the Chinese Communist movement under Mao simply demonstrated that a mass basis could be provided by the peasantry and other strata of society and that the industrial proletariat need play no part in the rise to power of an elite group organized on Leninist lines. As such, this experience enhanced the Communist potential in underdeveloped areas of the world and stimulated the spread of Communist agrarian tactics.

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From the Chinese Communist Agrarian tactics, used and perfected during the rise of Communist power and the early period of Communist control, have come many of the operational techniques followed by Communists today in underdeveloped areas of the Free World. Mao Tse-tung once listed three elements which were responsible for the success of the Communist movement in China. These were: (a) a "disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin"; (b) an army led by such a Party; and (c) a "united front of all revolutionary strata and all revolutionary parties and groups, led by such a Party."

Knowledge of these elements as well as of the application of Chinese organizational and operational techniques among the peasantry is a lesson in the understanding of Communist agrarian tactics in colonial and semi-colonial areas of the world today. A disciplined elite of professional revolutionaries organized on Leninist-Stalinist lines continues to be a necessary ingredient of Communist success. The "united front", a favorite Communist psychological as well as political technique, plays an important part in rallying "anti-imperialist forces" under Communist leadership in the underdeveloped areas. An army, so successful for the CCP, has been duplicated in Viet Nam and, to a lesser degree, in a few other areas, but, by and large, has not been created in most underdeveloped countries. In a sense, however, it may be argued that Communist substitutions for this element have been found which are more adapted to current political realities. These substitutions are in the form of the Communist network of international organizations and other movements designed to achieve and support local efforts with the weight and comfort of international unity and aid.

In considering Chinese agrarian tactics, certain general observations are pertinent. The Communist creation of a militant peasant movement was facilitated by the poverty and economic bondage of the vast masses of the peasantry, by the failure of the Kuomintang government to concern itself sufficiently with the alleviation of these conditions, and by the new approach to their problems which the CCP offered the peasants. The complex national economic and political situation in China permitted the CCP to establish areas under its control where it could demonstrate to the peasants that the Communists alone had their best interests at heart and where, in effect, the Communists could test out various measures designed to enlist supporters for the Communist cause. Peasant support was won initially by a program of land reform designed to satisfy the bulk of the peasantry within the area under CCP control. In addition, Mao realized that for other Chinese and for other areas of the country, the Communist movement had a limited future as a great national movement unless it de-emphasized the usual Communist revolutionary doctrines and concentrated on the theme of anti-imperialism. Almost all Chinese could agree on this issue even if all could not agree on land confiscations, reductions of rent, etc. The Chinese Communists were successful in stirring up class hatred through their land reform program and in building up a hatred of foreigners through the anti-imperialism campaign. To the

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Chinese masses, confronted with varying forms of government from which to choose, Communism offered a fixed doctrine with specific steps to be taken to achieve established goals.

To a marked degree, the Communist's agrarian tactics were similar during both the period of their rise to power and the period immediately following the withdrawal of Kuomintang forces from the mainland. During the first period, the Communists required mass peasant support in order to win the civil war. During the latter, the Communists were intent on retaining and increasing mass peasant support sufficient to solidify their political dominance of the entire country; to enable them to launch land reform as the first step in Communism's transformation of China; and to encourage a badly needed increase in agricultural production. It should be remembered that the original intent of the Chinese Communists was to achieve agrarian collectivization through several gradual steps rather than through immediate implementation by force as took place in the Soviet Union and to some extent in Eastern Europe.

During the early Comintern-sanctioned Kuomintang-Communist coalition, Mao had been head of the Training Center for the Peasant Movement and, as such, had been in charge of training political cadres to go into the villages and put into practice agreed coalition policies of land redistribution. The Communists thus managed to become associated with the alleviation of peasant discontents at an early date—a psychological advantage they subsequently exploited to the fullest. At the same time, Mao and other Communist leaders acquired an early experience in developing political cadres for work with the peasantry. These political cadres were recruited from among Party members and received careful training. Later, during the civil war, such cadres, backed up by CCP armed support, incited the poor to riot against landlords and the rich in the country, and to redistribute their land and wealth. In areas where CCP armed support was not yet established, the cadres followed somewhat different tactics. A typical technique was to emphasize to the peasants within a given village that their taxes were too high under the Kuomintang government and to urge them to refuse to pay any more. The cadres advised the peasants to drive away the tax collectors and promised that the Communists would come and help them if the police tried to enforce the tax law. When the peasants then drove away the tax collectors and were faced with police action, Communist forces arrived and fought the police on behalf of the peasants. The peasants thus found themselves lined up with the Communists against the law, and the CCP had little difficulty recruiting followers from among them. These techniques, as well as the land reform within the CCP areas, had the effect of identifying the peasants and their interests with CCP aims and actions.

But it was through the technique of "land reform" that the Communists perfected the tactics by which they came to organize and control

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China's great peasant mass after the civil war had ended. "Land reform" became a weapon of far-reaching political control and was generally the beginning of Communist activities within an area. Mention has already been made of the political cadres developed for work with the peasantry. Chou En-lai has said..."The most important preparation for land reform is the preparation of cadres." Between the new government's decision to effect a "land reform" program in an area and the actual realization of that program, weeks or even months were sometimes required to recruit and train the cadre workers and to discuss the problems. The Party exercised its control and influence from the very beginning of the program. This can be shown by tracing the progress of a land reform program in a Chinese village not previously exposed to Communist activities or organization. The progress of this program will also point up many of the tactics and techniques which have since been adapted to peasant or agrarian movements by Communists in other areas.

The first manifestation that a village had been selected for the land reform program was the arrival of the "land reform cadres", or the "work team" groups. These groups, usually under the leadership of veteran cadres experienced in working among peasants, were generally drawn from CCP organs, political workers in the army, students, government staff workers, and the CCP's "Cultural Work Corps" (composed of specialists in all kinds of propaganda work). Frequently, the work teams came to a village shortly before or after harvest time so that the cadres could help the peasants harvest and could learn in detail about conditions in the district. The cadres attempted to adopt the peasants' mode of life, to live among them, and to offer various services—all the while gathering data on the village. The investigation work by the cadres relied heavily on personal interviews and group discussions. Simultaneously, the village was bombarded with intensive propaganda (including personal "explanations", colorful posters, plays, ballads, etc.). Propaganda was carried out not only in interviews and group discussions, but also through "welfare programs", such as night classes on various aspects of improving farming conditions, post control, etc.

Through group activities, individual talks, and meticulous investigation, the cadres systematically rallied around them the "positive elements" among the poor peasants and farm laborers. The basic work of the cadres was to select these "active elements" among the peasants to serve as the core for the organization of a peasants' association and the new "people's militia". Within the villages, the peasants' associations were to serve as the center of the new political power and were to administer the land reform. Sometimes the "elements" were selected in a village because they were already active in village affairs, but this appeared to be a deviation from the official policy of using only elements from poor peasants and agricultural laborers as the core of the new village leadership. At any rate, the first step of the

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"land reform program" was completed when the "positive elements" were rallied together and indoctrinated, the peasants "awakened" by propaganda and agitation, and information collected on the district.

The next step centered on the breaking down of the traditional power-structure in the village and the power-image in the minds of the peasants. More specifically, this next step was to "set the masses in motion" so as to develop a situation of "class struggle". During this step, the key features were mass meetings to accuse and punish the "local despots" and mass meetings to differentiate class status. The general strategy was to unite the poor peasants, agricultural laborers and middle peasants and to neutralize the stand of the rich peasants so as to isolate the landlords as a group target for immediate attack. The initial means to arouse class enmity against the landlords and to generate a fighting spirit among the poor peasants and agricultural laborers included getting them to talk of their plight and bad treatment received from landlords and rich people, to contrast their living conditions with the rich landowners, and to see "who supported whom". After one individual was convinced of the cause, and the right of the CCP to support the cause, he was encouraged to contact other peasants and convince them. When a large enough number had seen the light, a fighting group was considered to have been established and the most active elements among them selected to become the core for the struggle. With reference to the actual land reform program, the stage was also set, under the leadership of the cadres and supported by the aroused portion of the poor peasants, for the demand for refunds of rent deposits and the excessive portions of rents. The reduction of rent and the refund of rent and rent deposits were the initial material enticements to the peasants for the further development of the class struggle.

In putting on the meetings to accuse and punish the "local despots", the cadres carefully picked one or several local despots who were genuinely unpopular because of exorbitant rents, etc., or former local officials notorious for their bribery, etc. The cadres collected "data" on their atrocities. Mass propaganda (loud speakers, black boards, etc.) propagated the accusations. Mass meetings were scheduled and the peasants were invited to air their grievances. At the climax of peasant agitation, the chairman of the meeting would announce that justice would be done. The peasants were then told how in this way they were powerful as a collective force, and powerful enough to prevent their "feudal oppressors from regaining their former authority". Thus, although the charges against the accused might well be true, the key function of these "condemnation" meetings was psychological. The peasant was being strengthened in his confidence in the new power and was being prepared for further aggressive action against those classes identified by the Communists as enemies.

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These meetings also served to indoctrinate new cadres by reinforcing their hatred of the "enemy" and enriching their techniques in handling the masses. This was also true of those meetings held for the purpose of differentiating the class status of the village adults—i.e., landlords whose properties would be confiscated, rich or middle peasants whose property would be protected, or poor peasants who would be given land and other property. It was important to have public identification of the class status of the individuals in the village. After the meetings held to determine this, celebrations were often held which were utilized as another opportunity for propaganda and indoctrination. Communist tactics relied heavily upon "drawing a demarcation line between friends and foe" in order to create a feeling of solidarity.

The next step in the land reform program was the formation of the new village power structure, the Peasants' Association. The CCP has defined this as "a mass organization formed by the voluntary will of the peasants" and it was known officially as "the legal executive organ for the reform of the agrarian system in the rural areas". The key points for the cadres in the organizing of a Peasants' Association in a village were: great care had to be taken in selecting the first group of "positive elements" who formed the backbone of the Association; the middle peasants had to be won over so that the poor peasants would not be isolated; and practical programs had to be implemented to suit specific local needs. The setting up of an Association often included a variety of propaganda trappings, such as drums and gongs, portraits, slogans, speeches, firecrackers, and even plays.

It has been mentioned previously that the CCP exercised its control and influence from the very beginning of the land reform. The work teams or land reform cadres dispatched to initiate land reform were, as a rule, Party cadres. Their experience, hard work and zeal gave them additional prestige. After the "land reform" was under way, the Party's control was further strengthened by the systematic absorption of the most active, capable and popular elements among the peasants into the Party and the Youth League. By indoctrination and training, by controlling the mass organizations, by serving the villagers as a source of help and comfort, by personal exemplary deeds, and by integrating the best elements among the peasants into the Party, the CCP acquired a firm and effective control at the grass roots level for agrarian and other programs.

Although the core of leadership among the peasants when the new order came to a village were the cadres sent in from outside, the CCP realized that when these were withdrawn it was necessary that they be replaced by local leadership. For this reason, efforts were made to absorb some peasant leaders within a village into the Party. The most likely elements were those poor peasants who had actually engaged in the "land reform struggle" for these were the elements who were

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most dissatisfied with the past economic system and who looked to the new order as a solution. For these, the Communist authorities conducted indoctrination courses where they were taught the standard qualifications of Party members and how to attain them. Should one of these become a candidate acceptable to the Party, he would then be required to work and show good results in various political and production campaigns. If successful, he would then be elevated to cadre level and participate in the leadership of local organizations. By this general process, native leadership was fostered and integrated into the Party system to create the core of a stable political order. The Peasants' Association was naturally one of the most important, if not the most important, of the local organizations where the CCP maintained a firm control.

There were other organizations which the CCP utilized to further its land reform program as well as to achieve political and psychological control of the peasants. In addition to the Peasants' Association, the peasants were channeled into a number of group activities, notably the mutual-aid teams, rural cooperatives, the women's leagues, the youth corps, the people's militia, as well as various cultural and educational organizations such as reading classes and drama groups. The mutual-aid team, which involved the pooling together on a voluntary basis of man-power, animals, implements and other rural resources, was used by the Communists not only for its economic advantages but also as an instrument to accustom the individualistic peasants to cooperative farming. In organizing such teams, the Communists demonstrated the advantages of such teams to the standard of living of the peasant, and in the early days of CCP power peasants could join or withdraw freely. The "land reform program" also paid great attention to the peasant woman who was usually over-worked and under-privileged. The cadres undertook special efforts to teach the peasant women that their sufferings were not the result of fate, but of exploitation by landlords and of the backwardness of the social system. Women shared in the land redistribution, in the opportunities for self-government in the village, and in other CCP-directed political changes. Great weight was assigned by the Communists to the youth in the rural areas because it was usually the young peasants who served as village cadres, initiated the forming of the Peasants' Association and other mass activities, and supported zealously the social reforms. The rural cooperatives were generally developed after the peasants were mobilized during the land reform, but sometimes were started at the very beginning of the program. In the early days of CCP power, these cooperatives supplied the peasants with necessities at lower rates, granted loans at lower interest, etc., and served as an effective weapon in the mass persuasion program of the Communists during the agrarian reform.

From the foregoing picture, it is evident that the Chinese Communists regarded "psychological mobilization" as of "equal importance with the redistribution of land." Their methods of psychological mobilization fell into the two categories of persuasion and coercion.

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The CCP evolved the following techniques to persuade the peasants that it was both desirable and necessary to support the agrarian reform:

a. The presentation of rational justification. In addition to Marxist theory on agrarian revolution, etc., landlordism was branded as the major source of all China's ills. The peasants were told that they had both the right and duty to shoulder responsibility for electing the village government which would increase production. They were told that "the laboring masses are now the masters of New China", and with their "honors" also come new "duties". The psychological mobilization served to increase peasant enthusiasm by offering incentives and definite objectives, to create group consciousness through class differentiation and collective activities, to reduce discontent and antagonism by imposing "moral obligations", and to present long-range and immediate compensations.

b. Rewards and compensations. Among the long-term rewards and compensations held out to the peasants were security, prosperity, peace, national honor and personal prestige. Security and prestige were offered in the form of land ownership. Economic betterment as a result of land reform was propagandized through all media, and such reports, circulated relentlessly in areas of the land reform, had an effective psychological impact. "Peace" and "stability" were promised and reinforced by the discipline and friendliness of the People's Army during the early days of CCP power. The peasants were told that the only way to gain and keep peace was through the liquidation of the landlords. The Communists also made use of the strong desire for nationalism and personal prestige. The peasants were taught that land reform would make China independent and strong. Land reform was presented as making the peasants, together with the workers, "masters of China". Labor heroes selected from among the peasants were showered with honors and recognition.

c. Utilization of traditional values. A number of traditional cultural values prevailing in Chinese rural society were skillfully exploited by the Communists. It was claimed that the people's government had great popular moral support and that the puritan mode of living of the Communist cadres befitted the Confucianist standard of good government. Use of the "family council" was made to aid in the increase of production through collective planning and activities, to secure more rights for women and youth, to provide incentives for greater efficiency, and to utilize the patriarchal family system.

d. Catharsis. An integral part of the land reform procedure was the "speak bitterness" meetings which provided an emotional release for the peasants. Accusations and punishment of landlord-

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despots resulted from such meetings, and the Communist cadres, sympathetic and helpful, provided a source of advice.

In addition to the persuasion methods, coercion techniques were also utilized in the psychological mobilization. Mao announced in 1949 that... "The army, police, and courts of any state are instruments for classes to oppress classes." And... "To hostile classes, the State apparatus is an instrument of oppression." During the initial stages of the land reform, the landlord class was made the target of attacks and the cadres were told that "a peaceful surrender of the landlord class is not possible without struggle." Later, there was an increased demand for "the punishment of unlawful landlords and other counter-revolutionary elements" and punishments were imposed on those found "guilty of sabotage and espionage" in the land reform. These served as a warning to other villagers. The Chinese Communists also utilized social pressure as well as physical punishment. This social pressure was intensified by propaganda and indoctrination and varied in direct proportion to the consolidation and intensity of the Communist organizational and indoctrination work in the rural area. When highly successful, the CCP could count on this work to prompt wives to denounce husbands, children to report on their parents, etc.

The Chinese Communists effectively utilized traditional forms of media in propagandizing the land reform program and in effecting the desired psychological mobilization. Such media were selected because of peasant familiarity with them. Musical forms included the singing of ballads to simple tunes praising labor heroes and various agrarian programs. There was the singing of stories to "spread new ideas among the masses." The traditional Yango ("planting song") was used extensively because it could be performed by few or many and presented as a dance, song, drama or a combination. The Communists also encouraged the villagers to organize drama groups and to produce plays with new themes about labor heroes or the success of a certain land reform program. Drama teams from neighboring districts were used to dramatize a line of activity desired by the Communists in a given village and to push the local peasants into action—such as a fight against the landlords. Besides the books, newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets published for the "masses", some of the most common visual media used by the Communists in rural China were comic books, "blackboards", and posters. The comic books contained stories in pictures with explanatory phrases in simple language; they were used to teach the rewards and joys of land reform, etc. The "blackboard" newspapers contained news bulletins posted in a public place and were not only a source of information regarding government programs and village activities, but served too as an outlet for public opinion since the peasants were encouraged to write comments, criticism, etc. Posters, traditionally popular with the peasants, were used by the Communists in old designs but with new themes. For instance, the God Earth was sometimes represented by a picture of Mao in the new posters. Lantern slides were also shown

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to peasants and soldiers by circuit teams and were closely coordinated with current agrarian reform programs.

These were some of the Chinese agrarian tactics developed during the earlier period of CCP power and control. Later tactics, which could develop under an assured Communist regime, were not as adaptable to conditions in colonial and semi-colonial areas of the free world. Today, in China, collectivization is apparently being speeded up and, with an increased concentration on industrial development in China, the CCP is now pushing the "alliance between worker and peasant." Nevertheless, it is also apparent that the Chinese Communists have remained appreciative of the lessons of their earlier period. A careful psychological mobilization continues to be an important factor of all CCP programs, agrarian or otherwise, and the peasant is evidently still recognized as the "mass power" which propelled the professional revolutionaries into political power.

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IV. Communist Agrarian Tactics in India

A. The New Course

Whereas the Chinese Communist movement shifted to an agrarian base as early as 1930, Indian Communism developed more closely along orthodox Leninist lines. Indeed, agrarian India harbored a Communist movement which for many years virtually ignored the peasant masses and concentrated its efforts on the industrial working class in the cities. But with the consummation of the Chinese revolution and the lessons of an agrarian base, Communist tactics in India began to undergo a significant change.

During the period of 1948-1950, Communism in India made a premature start along the path of violent revolution. During this period, the Communists did in fact create a militant peasant force. But this revolutionary movement withered on the vine and Indian Communists had to seek a new policy. The strategy subsequently arrived at was one which sought to avoid the pitfalls of a policy which concentrated either on the industrial proletariat or on the agrarian peasant, and was directed instead at creating a "base" among all segments of the population in a country where partisan warfare was not the order of the day. This course was the "United Front", one of Mao's ingredients for success. Communist agrarian tactics in India since 1950 must thus be viewed as a part of the larger concept of the United Front. An important psychological lesson of the "revolutionary period", however, was that the peasants were shown that they could in fact successfully oppose Government attempts to suppress them if they were "on the march".

The Communist Party of India (CPI) did not arrive at this new policy without a decisive push from Soviet Communists. Confusion and friction had been rampant within the Party over the roles of proletariat and peasant, and the exact stage of the Indian revolution. Then in January 1950, the Cominform Journal addressed an editorial to Indian Communists which seemed to call the tune. This editorial noted that... "The path taken by the Chinese people... is the path that must be taken by the people of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and People's Democracy". This was a decided slap at the anti-Mao faction within the CPI. Referring specifically to India, the editorial stated... "The mass movement of the peoples in colonies, the movement that unfolded after the war and developed into an armed struggle, forced the British imperialists to make a tactical retreat... but British imperialism remains, and octopus-like grips India in its bloody tentacles. In these conditions the task of Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of national liberation movement in China and other countries is naturally, to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of urgently needed agrarian reforms—on

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the basis of the common struggle for freedom and national independence of their country...to unite all classes, parties, groups and organizations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India." Here was the Cominform directive, and CPI leaders hastened to formulate a new policy and strategy to meet the demand for a broad mass base under conditions when armed insurrection was "not on the agenda."

There were, of course, practical reasons why the CPI should follow such a policy. In China the Communist revolution had been shifted to a rural base largely because the KMT had driven the Communists out of the cities; in India the cities were open to Communist agitation. In China the possibilities of a parliamentary opposition were nonexistent; in India the CPI had access to the ballot and to the legislatures. In China a Communist liberation army could profit from the interference of Japan and the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union; these conditions did not exist in India, although it should be noted that the CPI had stepped up activities in areas contiguous to Communist-controlled border areas. The CPI itself put forth some very good reasons why all of Mao's tactics were not applicable to India. In its Policy Statement of 1951, the CPI declared..."We cannot fail to take note of the fact that when the Chinese Party began to lead the peasantry in the liberation struggle, it had already an army which it inherited from the split in the Revolution of 1925...We cannot fail to note the fact that China had no unified and good communication, which prevented the enemy from carrying out concentrated and swift attacks on the liberation forces. India is different in this respect from China, in that it has a comparatively more unified, well-organized and far-flung system of communications...India has a far bigger working class than China had during her march to freedom...Further, we cannot fail to note the fact that the Chinese Red Army was surrounded and threatened with annihilation again and again until it reached Manchuria." At the same time, the CPI acknowledged that the "revolutionary" role of the peasantry had been enhanced as a result of the Chinese revolution and must be given increased attention by the CPI. The Policy Statement had this to say..."This does not mean that there is nothing in common between us and China...On the contrary, like China, India is of vast expanse. Like China, India has a vast peasant population. Our revolution, therefore, will have many features in common with the Chinese Revolution... We are essentially a colonial country, with a vast majority of our people living on agriculture. Most of our workers also are directly connected with the peasantry and interested in the problem of land... That makes the struggle of the peasantry of prime importance."

The CPI then pledged itself to the United Front strategy, professing abhorrence of any practices which meant "ignoring the task of building the alliance of the working class and the peasantry as the basis of the United National Front, ignoring the task of building the United National Front, ignoring the task of putting the working class at the head of this Front in the liberation struggle..." It announced that..."the working class, relying on agricultural workers and poor peasants, in firm alliance with the peasantry, together with

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the whole people, leads the battles in towns and rural areas to liberation..." Even while greatly elevating the importance of the peasant's role, the CPI has continued to place the proletariat at the head of the Front. But remembering that even Mao, after the Chinese revolution had succeeded, worked hard to preserve the myth of a proletarian-based revolution, it is difficult to know whether Indian Communist statements on the proletarian base of the Party are merely a meaningless tribute to dogma. At any rate, the CPI embarked for the first time on a course which included efforts to build a strong peasant movement.

B. The United Front and Agrarian Strategy

In general terms, the Communist United Front strategy, of which the peasant movement is a part, defines the principal enemies to be fought as the feudalists and the imperialists and advocates the necessity of uniting all classes into a broadbased United Front against the common enemies. In India, the two principal enemies are specifically identified as British and American imperialism. A fight against British imperialism is synonymous with a fight against colonial suppression; for although India is no longer a colony, the Communists maintain that feudalism exists there as a result of the tie-in of Indian and British monopolists. And the fight against American imperialism is treated as synonymous with a fight for "Peace". Under a United Front course, the basic strategy for overthrowing a regime is the formation of a united front of all groups opposed to the regime. Through the formation of a United Front the way will be paved for the formation of a government of People's Democracy, and the necessary and essential step to this ultimate creation is the establishment of a "Government of Democratic Unity". All this will be accomplished through mass mobilization and mass struggle. But it is vitally important to the Communists that the United Front does not become an end in itself or that the Party is swallowed up in it. The Communist Party must remain intact and "pure"—a lesson the CPI learned from the dilution which overtook the Hyderabad Party within a United Front.

To accomplish its ends, the CPI recognized that its tasks must be: (a) to build the Party; (b) to build the mass organizations; and (c) to build the Democratic Front. According to the CPI, the United Democratic Front could only be a front of political parties, groups and individuals arriving at agreements from place to place and time to time, even widening the scope of these agreements. The Party's conception of the United Front is that it is basically a front of classes. It stated..."Although these classes may have mutually conflicting interests, nonetheless the fact remains that imperialism and feudalism constitute the common enemies of all.. Our concept of United Front arises from this common interest between these various classes." More specifically, the CPI has noted... "Under the existing conditions therefore it is only the coming together of the various groups, parties and individuals on whatever issues and in whatever place they can and

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leading the masses in their day-to-day struggles that will help in the process of the development of the United Front. As a result of the coming together and leading the struggle of the masses common understanding grows between the parties which helps in the process of the crystallization of the common program. The agreement on such a program itself will become wider and wider as a result of the struggling together and leading the masses in their struggles."

Communist agrarian tactics in India thus constitute an attempt to weld the peasant masses into an organization which can be an effective "transmission belt" between the Party and this large segment of the people and, at the same time, channel the political and economic demands of these peasant masses against anti-Communist forces and toward the creation of a United Front in which the CPI would play the predominant part. As such, Communist agrarian tactics become similar to those which the CPI follows with respect to trade unionists, women, students, intellectuals, etc. In some respects, the peasants as a group constitute one of the greatest challenges to CPI organizational talents because of the economic differences existing in various geographic areas of the country and because of the complexities inherent in the many religions, castes and languages of India. On the other hand, CPI activities among the peasants represent an important Party undertaking because the peasants represent approximately two-thirds of the population and because the Communists' road to power in India may well be the agrarian road. There is an intensity of discontent about agrarian matters in India, and in areas where agrarian tension has most acute, the Communist organization and agitation has been at its best. Initiative in the matter of land reform—at least in some sections of the country—passed into Communist hands rather than the Government's. Sections of the peasant population are acquiring positive faith in the agrarian program promised by the Communists for the immediate future. That the CPI has not been even more successful to date among the peasants seems to result in many instances from the Party's own inertia or preoccupation with other mass movements.

The problems of creating and controlling a peasant movement in India, particularly one that sought to be an "All India" movement, were recognized by the CPI. It acknowledged that..."It must be understood that because of the vast expanse of our country, because of the uneven development of the agrarian crisis and of the working class and peasant movement, and the uneven state of organization and consciousness of the peasant masses and the influence of the Party, the peasant movement will not develop at the same tempo everywhere and different forms of organization and struggle will have to be adopted, depending on the maturity of the crisis, the degree of unification of the peasant masses and their mood, the strength and the influence of the Party and other factors..." Within the various provinces of India and even in various districts of the same province, Communist agrarian tactics have indeed developed at different tempos and in

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different forms, but the overall Communist front umbrella for agrarian tactics is the All India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association). This is the national mass organization through which the CPI seeks to create one united Kisan Sabha, encompassing all the lower units of peasant organizations in provinces and districts throughout the country. The CPI hopes to do this through systematic organizational work among the peasantry and agricultural workers. As a CPI document pointed out in 1953...."It is the job of the Party to see that the appeal of All India Kisan Sabha, to all other champions of Kisans and Kisan organizations which are today outside the Kisan Sabha to come into the fold of the All India Kisan Sabha, is implemented. This can be done, as the All India Kisan Sabha points out, by first forming unity in action (to wage joint struggles against evictions, new taxes, rent reductions, etc.) and to form joint committees of struggle. Kisan Sabha's appeal to all its lower units to make a concerted drive to form Joint Committees of all the existing Kisan organizations to fight Kisan struggles on specific issues has to be carried out. It is then only that the whole mass of Kisans can be rallied behind a united organization."

C. Some General Tactics

The strategy followed by the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) is to bring the peasants, despite affiliation to various political parties, into unity of action on specific issues. Some issues may vary in different parts of the country, for the CPI seeks to develop issues built around local demands. Should the peasants themselves fail to voice any demands, it becomes the task of the AIKS to draw the Kisan masses into discussions where their immediate demands can be "formulated" and recognized and thereby become subject to agitation. The AIKS poses as the champion to raise the social, economic and cultural level of the peasants and agricultural laborers and, in addition to its land reform program, tries to become an inevitable part of the peasant's life from which he can get constant advice and help. It sponsors literacy classes, sports and cultural activities, relief and self-help movements. In general, however, the AIKS seeks to unite the peasants against "landlord-imperialist exploitation", to popularize the victories which the Kisan movement is achieving, and also to stress to the peasants "the achievements of the USSR, China and other People's Democracies so that this will create new confidence in their own strength to achieve similar objectives." (This last point is also utilized to consolidate "the feelings of international solidarity which would help to bring them against all the plots of American and British imperialists."). The AIKS sponsors general Kisan demands which are readily understandable to the peasant masses (e.g., abolition of landlordism, reduction of rents, availability of long-term credit, adequate wages and living conditions) and, at the same time, it pushes immediate fighting demands which sustain the movement, maintain the "level of consciousness and the preparedness and organization of the masses of a particular locality," and serve as "stepping stones for the realization of our general agrarian demands".

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Like the Chinese Communists, the Indian Communists recognize different groups within the agrarian population—poor peasants, agricultural laborers, middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords. In both countries the target of immediate attack is the landlord. But unlike the CCP, the CPI does not attempt to "neutralize" the rich peasants. CPI tactics are directed so thoroughly toward the creation of a united peasant movement that the Party desires that even the rich peasants become supporters and participants in the movement. As a CPI document set forth in 1953... "the problem of unity of the peasantry is mainly a problem of uniting the agricultural laborer and the peasants, including the rich peasants, against imperialist, feudal and Indian monopoly exploitation." And some landed peasants are being attracted to the Party. A notable issue which the CPI has utilized in this regard is the opposition by the landed peasants to the requirement forcing them to sell their grain directly to the Government, and thereby to receive less than they would by selling on the open market. The CPI has supported the rich peasants in this stand and has loudly condemned such "plundering tactics" by the Government.

There are several reasons why neither the Party nor the AIKS want to champion demands which would adversely affect the interests of the landed and rich peasants. The Party reasons that this would "aggravate the conflict within the peasant masses and would temporarily upset peasant unity." Actually, the Party is probably also trying to hide the ultimate goals of a true Communist program because it desires to capitalize on the desires of poor peasants to achieve the material wealth of rich peasants. This particular situation sometimes causes conflicts, and in sections of India where there are small and medium landowners instead of "peasant masses", the CPI has faced the problem of how to work for rent reductions and at the same time maintain and strengthen peasant unity. According to a Party document, the solution proposed in one province was as follows: in the big landlord areas the goal will be to organize the struggle against landlords and to enforce rent reduction; in other specific areas, the strategy will be to organize maximum pressure through the united kisan movement on the big landowners for reduction of rent but without coming into a clash with the petty and small landowners. The big landowners will try to safeguard their position by rallying the petty owners to their support. In such cases, the CPI suggests that a compromise with the petty owners be worked out in order to organize united pressure against the big landowners.

The CPI recognizes that the agricultural laborer is different from the peasant. Agricultural laborers are those rural laborers who hire out to perform chores for those responsible for working the land; also included are rural wage earners such as blacksmiths, carpenters, etc. According to official Party documents, the agricultural laborers are to be organized separately in independent class organizations apart from the peasant organizations because... "firstly, they have their

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own separate demands of wages, hours of work, holidays, etc. Secondly, most of these agricultural laborers are from socially backward or even so-called 'untouchable' castes and it will be difficult to draw them and activate them in Kisan Sabhas directly or, even when we succeed in drawing them in, the other peasants may not join the Kisan Sabha in large numbers. Thirdly, agricultural laborers will become the leading force if they are organized separately and at the same time brought into the Kisan Sabha." The Party acknowledges, however, that wherever agricultural laborers are not or cannot be organized separately, they must then be organized into the Kisan Sabha directly. The CPI considers the agricultural laborer to be the most militant and revolutionary member of the agrarian population and therefore it becomes essential to organize and link him closely with the peasants. The Party thus seeks separate organizations for the agricultural workers and for the peasant, but both to be affiliated with the over-all AIKS organization wherein the agricultural laborer would become the leading militant force. And when the CPI succeeds in establishing both organizations within an area, "immediate steps should be taken to evolve coordinating mechanism at every level—drawing both organizations to closer and closer functioning..." As to the task of organizing the agricultural laborer, the CPI notes "It is to be remembered that only when we start taking up and championing the special demands of agricultural labor and fighting for them, the need of their separate organization also becomes evident."

D. The Mass Organization and the Party

The AIKS is, of course, the national umbrella organization under which Communist Party agrarian tactics fall. The structure of the AIKS provides for:

- Primary Kisan Sabhas (All members must be organized into this unit)
- District Kisan Sabhas
- Provincial Kisan Sabhas (These direct day-to-day activities)
- All India Kisan Committee and the Central Kisan Council (The council is the executive organ of the All India Kisan Committee and the Sabha)
- The delegates' conference of the AIKS
- Affiliated unions

But within the kisan movement, considerable flexibility and autonomy are evident with respect to the Provincial Kisan Sabhas. The CPI has stated..."The problems facing the provinces are varied and can be tackled only by the provinces. No day-to-day directions and guidance can be given from the Center. Every effort should be made to strengthen the Provincial Kisan Sabhas and Agricultural Labor Unions. They should be the real guiding and leading bodies of the agrarian movement in the province. The function of the AIKS should be realistic and limited..."

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it should pool the experiences of the various provinces, exchange it, give assistance to weaker provinces in building organizations and studying problems, and so on. It is again the job of Provincial Kisan Sabhas to organize special kisan schools for training and educating the large number of kisan cadres that are newly coming up." And there seems little doubt that the Provincial Kisan Sabhas do indeed exercise an authority and control of tactics which point up the extreme importance of the provincial approach in India. Furthermore, the CPI, in giving the Provincial Kisan Sabhas the guiding role in day-to-day agrarian tactics, has also allowed them to have considerable freedom in adopting the necessary organizational forms suitable for particular Indian provinces. Of some interest is the fact that at the Third CPI Congress, held in December 1953, a greater centralization for the overall CPI was urged. Efforts have been made to make the heads of the national fractions of mass organizations spend a much greater portion of their time in New Delhi at Party headquarters. Yet the kisan movement headquarters remains in Bengal, more accessible to peasant areas. It would seem that decentralization seems to be encouraged in this one sphere of CPI activities.

The entire AIKS structure functions as the agrarian arm of the CPI. One of the tasks of the Party is to popularize its agrarian program and policies in order to show its "stand in the service of the people". Party propaganda supports the aims of the AIKS as expressing the goals of the CPI; AIKS propaganda stresses the fact that the CPI also champions the programs, legislature, etc., which the AIKS demands for the kisan movement. The CPI follows a systematic campaign of sending Party cadres from working, middle and intelligentsia classes to work among the peasant masses and develop the kisan movement. At the same time, the Party seeks the systematic recruitment into the CPI of kisan and agricultural labor militants and their education as Party members. The CPI has noted..."It is absolutely essential that we make a determined effort to get capable peasants and agricultural laborers, who are actively engaged in their occupation, to be on various committees at all levels, and to make them function in them, so that Kisan Sabhas may develop as real mass organizations..."And it is the aim of the CPI to "strengthen the ideological-political and organizational ties of the Party with the millions of peasants and agricultural laborers." The AIKS serves the Party in this aim and also as a funnel to bring India's peasant millions into a broad united front where they may be joined by other segments of the population similarly herded through the machinations of other mass organizations.

Party control of the AIKS structure rests basically on interlocking membership, but there are also firm organizational links throughout the hierarchy of the Party. The CPI appoints a Central Committee (CC) member to be responsible to the CC for Party activities within a province. This brings Provincial Kisan Sabhas, the guiding bodies of the Kisan movement, under the direct scrutiny of the CC. Similarly, the Provincial

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Committees of the CPI are the real centers of Party power in the provinces, and in these Committees there are very definite organizational provisions affecting mass organizations such as the Kisan Sabhas. While there may be some variation from province to province (to the CPI, provincial divisions follow linguistic lines and do not correspond with the Government administrative areas in all cases), the organizational provisions within one province will be illustrative:

All Party members who are in the Provincial executive body of various mass organizations constitute the Provincial Frontisms of the respective fronts. The members of the Provincial Fraction elect from among themselves a Provincial Fraction Committee, which is confirmed by the Provincial Committee of the Party. Problems of mass organizations and of mass movements should be, when they are of a basic nature, decided by the Provincial Committee in consultation with the Provincial Fraction Committee concerned; other problems should be tackled by the Fraction Committee in consultation with the Provincial Secretariat.

There will be a meeting of the Provincial Fraction immediately before and one meeting immediately after every meeting of the Provincial Executive of the mass organization involved. The Fraction Committee must meet at least once in two months. The secretaries of the Fraction Committees must submit monthly reports to the Provincial Secretariat; copies of these reports should be sent to the All India Fraction concerned.

The secretaries of the Fraction Committees should devote their entire time to the work of the Fractions and the mass organizations to which they belong and should not take up other responsibilities.

There will be a District Secretariat in every district with a Party membership of 50 and more. District mass front frontisms and fraction committees should be set up and similar procedure should be followed as in the case of provincial fractions.

There can be little doubt that the CPI controls its mass organizations, including the AIKS, from the top echelon to the grass-roots level.

E. Some Specific Tactics

Tactics employed by the AIKS range from country-wide propaganda campaigns to efforts by individual workers within small villages. As one tactic, the CPI has successfully exploited existing laws—that is, every piece of legislation that has been enacted to aid the kisans. The Party popularizes any such law as a victory of the Kisan movement and claims that the law represents a concession which the Party and

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the movement have been able to wrench from the Government. The Party has also helped to create organized resistance to some specific law that was generally unpopular, and has helped to take the case to court; the Kisan Sabha had naturally been agitating for abolition of the law. In one important district, the CPI was the first and the only political party to take up militantly the real economic grievances of both tenant farmers and casual agricultural workers. Communist success in achieving popular support thus came by default of the Congress Party which had not entered the agricultural organizational field. The enactment by the Government of land reform legislation in this district came only after the Communists had already become firmly entrenched and did nothing to detract from the CPI popular standing. The Party decried the reforms made as piecemeal and too little, while it claimed the credit of even this benefit because of its kisan agitation. This was one factor actually contributing to the success of the CPI in organizing a kisan sabha in the district.

The above situation points up a general factor favoring Communist agrarian tactics in India—that is, a frequent lack of any organized competition. Other Indian parties have failed to move effectively into the agrarian sphere. Where rival kisan organizations do exist, they have shown in some instances an ability to draw members away from the Communist organizations. But even in one area where Communist popularity is known to have suffered as a result of intimidation and coercion tactics which were used to bring agrarian workers into Communist kisan sabhas, no important anti-Communist group moved to take advantage of the ebbing Communist popularity and to build up non-Communist, if not non-political, counter agrarian organizations. And more than any other political party, the CPI has shown a particularly astute appreciation of the political potential of minority groups. The CPI has achieved perhaps its greatest success as the champion of the cause of linguistic provinces. Linguistic regionalism has been an important policy of the CPI, and linguistic agitation has been successfully applied to the formation of kisan sabhas as well. In general, the very nature of Communist agrarian proposals—coupled with silence, the wrong answers or ineffective competition on the part of other political parties—strengthens the Communist position. The CPI is the only major Indian party, for instance, which advocates the abolition of zamindari (landlordism) without any compensation to the non-tilling proprietor whose land is taken away. And because non-landowning peasants in India pay high rents and are plagued by fragmented farms, low productivity and hard-to-get credit, the CPI program which promises to correct these conditions has a tremendous appeal in rural areas where reform is long overdue. Since many of the land reform measures enacted by the Government have fallen far short of convincing the peasant that his conditions are really being improved or that the Government is interested in improving them further, the Communist program has actually been enhanced instead of countered by the Government reforms.

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Another tactic being employed by the CPI is a tie-in of trade union and kisan operations. This is, of course, a tactic which follows the united front strategy and it is not an alliance that is pushed by other political parties. Actually, the CPI emphasis on a peasant-industrial labor front has been most noticeable since the CPI Third Congress in late 1953. In one area, the CPI has recently moved the District kisan sabha and the District trade union council, previously located in different places, into one building; this location also happens to be the headquarters of the CPI District Committee. Since this move followed on the footsteps of reports of increasing agrarian unrest in this area because of a wave of tenant evictions, it is indicative of the alertness of the CPI to recognize and exploit situations favorable to its growth. The Party expects that the coordination of trade union and kisan activities within Districts will result in a closer alliance of peasant and proletariat, with an increased awareness by each of the problems of the other and a greater readiness on the part of one to support the demands of the other. All this would enhance the overall ability of the CPI to organize mass agitation and struggle and would contribute greatly to the creation of a United Front.

In many respects, CPI agrarian tactics recall those employed by the Chinese Communists. The CPI selects and trains cadres to go out into the villages and work with the peasants. Wherever possible, of course, villagers themselves replace the Party cadres sent in from the outside. Within one provincial district, it has been reported that IS "full time" CPI workers were assigned to make up a team responsible for building a village-level propaganda organization aimed at popularizing Communism. The channels for this propaganda program are reported to be certain village headmen. The Indian village council, or panchayat, is a group of 5 elders who are responsible for passing judgment on practically all civil cases arising from village affairs. This is a traditional village method for settling disputes. A CPI penetration of the panchayats tends to permit the Communist Party to influence panchayat decisions to the advantage of Party propaganda. There is considerable evidence of CPI efforts to penetrate panchayats, and, in a few cases, CPI followers are known to have become members.

In areas where the situation lends itself to a kisan campaign, a standard pattern of activity is followed. Generally, such areas have considerable agricultural lands, a large peasant population working the land, and big landlords, CPI cadres and local AIKS units, if any, will agitate for public meetings and mass demonstrations in connection with some local trouble. Petitions will be circulated and the signatures will be obtained of those victims of the proposed evictions, or whatever the local trouble may be. More public meetings and demonstrations will follow. Finally, a march by the peasants to the District or Provincial capital might be organized, especially if this can be joined in by some other left-wing political group which has collaborated with the CPI in the formation of a "united front" within the area. Similarly,

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before any provincial kisan conference, CPI workers are always active in neighboring villages creating enthusiasm for the forthcoming conference and whipping up peasant hopes that the conference will help solve their problems. In collecting money in the rural areas, the Party may approach people directly and explain to them the policy of the Party and the necessity of contributing to the Party fund. The CPI explains how it is serving and fighting for the interests of the various classes of people. The Party simply seizes upon the most pressing demands of the masses and poses as the champion of these particular demands.

A Party document has discussed some of the tactics to be followed in creating a separate organization of agricultural workers within the kisan movement in one province. According to this document, the District Committees will meet and decide where a separate organization of agricultural workers has to be set up; this would be the case where they are in large numbers, wherever they have developed as one class, and wherever their class consciousness has developed. In places where a separate organization has to be set up, a public meeting should be called and in that meeting a temporary committee of 7 should be elected. Only those in whom the agricultural workers have faith should be elected to the committee. Kisan Sabha workers can also be elected to these committees provided agricultural workers have confidence in them and elect them. The document points out that within the Party there are comrades "who have gained the confidence of both kisans and agricultural workers by their sacrifices, hard work, etc." While these comrades can work in both kisan and agricultural laborer organizations, the Party wants most of them to work in the agricultural workers' organization. As a movement begins to be built up for the agricultural workers, the question of a constitution for an agricultural workers' organization should become part of the movement. All the problems which arise in connection with creating an organization should be, according to the CPI, "taken up in public meetings and then temporary committees should be elected." In this way, the CPI can create the kind of organization it desires and one which it will control.

As has been indicated, Indian Communist agrarian tactics vary from area to area. This may be the result of different economic conditions, degrees of agrarian tension, or the attitudes of various provincial governments which, in some instances, have forced the Party into a virtual underground existence. It may also be the result of the degree of literacy of the population, for the CPI, like the CCP, seeks to utilize propaganda media which are suited to the particular local inhabitants. In the northern provinces, for instance, the CPI has reportedly been carrying on an intensive propaganda program throughout the villages extending from the Tibet border as far south as Almora, Uttar Pradesh. According to reports, Communist workers in the area are constantly on the watch for potential Party workers among the local inhabitants. Visiting Communist organizers indoctrinate recruits in simple Communist dogma and organizing tactics for a period of about

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2 or 3 days. They then reportedly return 15 or 20 days later to assess the trainee's progress, discuss problems encountered and revise unsuccessful methods. Subsequently, the Party organizer will make return visits on the average of once a month. Local organizers, who receive monthly salaries, will go in turn from village to village, visiting individually the houses of the poorer families, often supplementing their approach by giving money for foodstuffs and medicines. These Communist workers rely mainly on individual evangelism rather than on the use of literature as a means to propagate Communist ideas, since the illiteracy rate in this section is very high.

Among the over-all CPI instruments for success, the most powerful single weapon has been the printing press. This conclusion is based on the fact that India is a country where special reverence is attached to the printed word and where verbiage is a high virtue. The CPI has been extremely prolific. Observers have pointed out that if Communism triumphs in India, it will be to a large extent the result of the intensive propaganda campaign which the Party has carried on. Pamphlets, magazines and other publications of all sorts are issued continuously by the CPI. At the same time, however, the long-tested Communist techniques of personal agitation have by no means been abandoned. The Party is reported to have elaborate educational programs which include teachers' training schools and schools for advanced worker cadres. It puts on series of popular lectures, assists in self-education programs, utilizes magic lantern slides, films and posters for the education of illiterate and semi-literate comrades. In general, it would appear that the Communists in India have developed programs of agitation and propaganda that are superior to those as yet developed by other political parties--and this development is certainly apparent in the Communists' agrarian tactics. In addition, India's agrarian population, like other segments of the population, has proved susceptible to the Communist effort to instill a sense of international brotherhood among the Party's adherents which has proved to be important to dark-skinned people who once smarted under the white man's domination. But the most encouraging factor favoring Communist agrarian tactics in India continues to be the lack of opposition to Communist organizational work among the peasants--particularly by the Government of India. As long as the Government remains outside the sphere of peasant activities, the CPI will continue to exploit skillfully the problems of the agrarian population and will achieve success.

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Communist agrarian tactics generally follow a united front strategy (as described in India) or the more extreme path of partisan warfare (as described in China). Even in countries where the Party is illegal but where it is not in favorable position to undertake partisan warfare, the illegal Party follows the united front strategy. Some further examples of Communist agrarian tactics are discussed briefly in the following cases.

A. Indo-China

In Vietnam, as in China, agrarian tactics employed prior to consolidation of the Communist regime are most pertinent to this survey. These Viet Minh agrarian tactics have borne a striking similarity to those practiced earlier by the Chinese Communists. To the Viet Minh forces engaged in partisan warfare, "land reform" measures were designed to achieve the greatest possible support from a population made up largely of peasants. Indeed, throughout the agrarian reform program practiced by the Viet Minh leaders, it was evident that the Communists realized that the success of their revolution depended on the success of the agrarian reform program to organize peasant support.

The Viet Minh technique—whether in the village or the city—was to find a group of persons who might be rallied; to create a mass movement by defending their interests; and finally to induce these persons to follow Communist policies and to serve as agents. "Land reform" was the instrument for reaching, rallying and leading the peasants. In Viet Nam, as in China, agrarian reform and the mobilization of the masses has gone hand-in-hand. A Viet Minh document has stated.... "to mobilize the masses is to educate the masses by propaganda so as to make the masses conscious of their strength and to encourage them to rise up and fight for their rights." A Party document has also put the program in this way:.... "Objectives of the mass mobilization are not only to give land and rice to peasants but also to include to weaken as much as possible the political and economic influence of the reactionaries, to take the first step toward bringing political power to the working peasants and to meet a few of their economic needs, to raise the political standard a step and to wake the class consciousness of the peasants to take the first step toward improving the village organizations and the Peasants' Association, consolidating the local administrative authority, consolidating and enlarging the Popular Front in the villages, boosting production and giving impetus to the Resistance."

Agrarian tactics, in a country with a predominantly peasant population, have clearly formed an important phase in the evolution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) regime along lines prescribed by Communist, and particularly Chinese Communist, theory for

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the development of "colonial and semi-colonial" areas. Mass mobilization for land rent reductions became the first step for "smashing the political preponderance" of the landlords. It also was the first step in reforming various Party organizations, the legal power, the social structure in rural areas, and in strongly promoting the resistance. It channeled foodstuffs for use by the Viet Minh forces. In addition to rent reductions, the Communists' initial agrarian reform program also called for abolition of usurious interest rates and the "temporary" distribution to landless peasants of certain absentee-owned and waste lands. Only after the mass mobilization had proceeded in a satisfactory manner and the Viet Minh forces obtained control over certain zones of the country, could the Communists issue new agrarian reform decrees which provided for confiscation, requisition, or purchase for redistribution by the "state" of all privately-held land, cattle, and agricultural implements in excess of a certain amount. The manner in which the land was to be appropriated—outright confiscation or compensated expropriation—depended on the political attitude and performance of the "landlords."

Thus, the Viet Minh Communists eventually set up the familiar Chinese Communist trappings such as the "special people's tribunals" where "enemies" were recognized and dealt with and where the Party's psychological hold over the peasants was enhanced. There were also the "speak bitterness" meetings for denunciations and building class hatred. In carrying out the "land reform program", as well as in recruiting members for the Party, the Viet Minh leaders required intimate knowledge of the various social classes in the villages and the determination of an individual's classification. As one Party document put it...."It is of the greatest importance to know who are our true friends, who are our allies, and which classes to use in order to achieve national union." The National Committee of the Party suggested various tests for determining the proper classification of each individual, but, in general, the Viet Nam procedures followed those used in China. The landlords became the target of immediate attack and later other "enemies, such as reactionary traitors" could be isolated and dealt with.

The fullest development of this program was possible only in areas under DRV control and only as a result of a gradual implementation. Viet Minh leaders initially followed programs designed to induce the peasants, who were benefitting from the Communist land policy, to join the Viet Minh armed forces to fight the enemy, to participate in civilian labor groups to help the soldiers, to work for increased production, and to pay willingly the DRV agricultural taxes. Once the political (or military) situation in an area was solidified, the Party's hold on the village authorities could be consolidated and the "people's united fronts" could be enlarged and reinforced along the same lines as took place in the Chinese villages. In areas not under DRV control, the Party depended on special cadres and on propaganda about land reform

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to win over peasant support. In newly reconquered regions or in areas where the DRV controlled about 80% of the villages during the night, the three organizations which were the most important to the Communists were those of the peasants, the young men and the young women. Depending on conditions, these organizations could be clandestine, semi-overt or overt. They aided in the collection of "taxes" for the DRV and in the enrollment of young people to assist in propaganda work among the peasants. When a region was occupied by the French or Vietnamese forces, these organizations, while furnishing information to the Viet Minh forces, also worked to progressively transform the villages into "patriotic villages", then into "resistance villages", and finally into "guerrilla nets." Not only did Communist propaganda about "land reform" find a ready audience among the peasantry, but "landlords" became synonymous with "imperialists" or "foreign domination".

One of the most important aspects of the mass mobilization program was the development of new cadres for the Party which would increase Party leadership, strengthen the leading Party organs, and tighten the relations between the masses and the Party. This development was essential to Viet Minh activities whether in DRV zones or in areas held by French and Vietnamese. Within the larger Communist effort to create a United National Front, the Peasants' Association became an essential organ, utilized to solidify Party domination of the peasantry, and to bring to the fore new peasant cadres for the Party. The Peasants' Association became an important instrument for the purging of "the feudalistic and corrupt elements in the various regions which have been taking advantage of the name of the Front to fight against the resistance and against the policy of the Front." Peasant cadres were developed in study sessions held in the villages under the auspices of the Peasants' Association. In these sessions, the peasants, through the study and enunciation of crimes, were able to see that "the crimes were indiscriminately committed by the landowners against all the ethnic minorities", and they could "clearly realize the maneuvers of division of which they had been the victims."

B. Indonesia

Communist agrarian strategy in Indonesia is, to date, similar to that in India. While there are elements in the Indonesian picture which might lend themselves to partisan warfare at some future date, there is no present indication that the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) desires to pursue such a deliberate policy in the near future. The PKI Secretary-General has noted that the Party should do nothing precipitous unless the peasantry and the situation were ripe for action, that to go too far too quickly would be adventurism. The Secretary-General has further noted that only after the "peasants had won and were in control could the PKI lead on to a full revolution." Meanwhile, the PKI actively participates in the government (and has also penetrated it), deriving considerable political advantage from the "mutual cooperation"

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it enjoys with the National Party which controls the government as a result of its cooperation with the Communists.

The PKI utilizes what it calls the National United Front, and it considers this to be the necessary ingredient for the formation of a People's Democracy in Indonesia. The Party preaches that imperialists, feudalists and collaborators attack all efforts to resist colonialism and feudalism in the country, and that the only way to bring in a progressive government is to change the balance between the imperialists, the landlords and the collaborators on the one side, and the power of the people on the other. The PKI proposes to do this by arousing the masses, especially the workers and the peasants. Like the CPI, the PKI is aware that the Party must guard against any weakening of its purity as a result of its participation in a Front; PKI leaders stress the fact that the Party must guide the National Front but must also preserve its independence and not allow itself to be absorbed by other parties or otherwise lose its identity.

According to the PKI, the National Front means an alliance of peasants and industrial workers. Party documents stress the theory that the National Front must be led by the proletariat and that "the proletariat in conjunction with its political party, the Communist Party, should be the architect and leader of the revolution and be the leader of the peasants." There is thus the familiar dogma of the proletariat, and the PKI has not neglected its work among industrial workers. At the same time, the PKI lays great emphasis on the need for intensified work with the peasantry. The official Party program recognizes that Indonesia is an agrarian country and that the Party must work extensively and thoroughly in the villages. In 1953, the PKI Secretary General pointed out that the basic tasks of the National Front were to work in the ranks of the peasantry, since 70% of the population were peasants, and to cooperate with other parties and groups in the cities. He emphasized that the National Front was the result of the constant working by the PKI within these parties and other groups, but that the Front would be ineffectual unless supported by the 70% who are peasants.

Communist agrarian tactics are chiefly directed at the creation of one peasant front, or united peasant movement, for all of Indonesia. The Party has stated that the formation of this one peasant front must be undertaken in a way that can be understood, and therefore adhered to, by groups of different ideology. The strategy that the PKI is following—and one which has already resulted in the creation of a PKI-controlled peasant front of some strength—is the penetration and absorption of various existing peasant organizations. The PKI has achieved the fusion of at least two important peasant organizations into one main peasant group under PKI control, and it has effected serious penetration of other peasant organizations. PKI tactics are presently directed at the penetration of peasant organi-

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nations not yet under its control. Through the activities and influence of the peasant organizations which it dominates, the PKI is concentrating on the organization of the peasants at the village level.

In addition to the more usual peasant organizations, the PKI has also succeeded in penetrating the Association of Village Administrators in some sections of the country. This penetration holds potential rewards for the Party not only because of the opportunity it affords for pushing Party propaganda and otherwise influencing village councils, but also because any distribution of arms to village Home Guard units might come under PKI direction in local areas where penetration of the Village Administrators has been effected. In view of PKI pressure on the government to empower the peasants to defend themselves against "terrorist gangs" in the countryside, this situation holds certain potentialities for eventual PKI-directed partisan activity.

As in India, the Communist Party in Indonesia pushes general peasant demands as well as more specific, immediate and local demands. Among the PKI general demands calculated to appeal to peasants of varying ideologies are: the safety of the peasant to pursue his occupation; the necessity of overcoming the economic problems of the peasant; the need for the education of the peasants' children; the need for improvement in the peasants' health conditions; the necessity for greater availability of farm credit; and the importance of the movement for world peace to each and every individual. Other demands include: the need for landlords to reduce rent; the prohibition of the expropriation of land from peasants who have long cultivated it when it had been the property of foreign estates; the distribution of free land to poor peasants and peasants without land; the revoking of the Government ordinance on land rent and the fixing of land rent by the peasants or peasants' organizations, with such rent to be approved afterwards by the Government. In some sections of the country, one technique designed to build up a strong peasant following has been the promotion by the local Communist-controlled peasant organization of "squatting" on foreign-leased estates and, at the same time, calling on the Government to rescind its order requiring all squatters to leave such land. This technique has had some success and is expected to spread to other areas. While agrarian problems are a recognized concern of the Indonesian Government and of other political groups, it is obvious that it is the PKI which is making the most strenuous effort to capitalize on peasant demands and discontent and to build a strong, closely organized peasant movement under its domination.

Although the PKI's recognition of the importance of the peasantry has come only in recent years, now that it controls the main Indonesian peasant organization it is in a stronger position to influence this segment of the population. The Party is currently pointing out to its members that they must not reach the erroneous conclusion that in their district there is no objective or motive around which a peasant

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movement can be built. The PKI insists that there is always some issue, however small, which can be utilized in this respect—whether it concerns improvements of drainage and irrigation, agricultural tools, or whatever. Although Party functionaries, cadres and members are expected to spark the organizational work among the peasants, PKI tactics call for the prompt creation of cadres to be formed from among the peasants themselves as soon as they react favorably to Communist propaganda. With the assistance of the Party, the major PKI-controlled peasant organizations become the organs which set up cadre courses for the peasant groups. The stronger a national peasant organization and the more active its branches, the better the chances for the Party to build up a grass-roots organization at the village level through the use of this organization. A Secretary for Peasants' Affairs is found on some levels of the PKI, and this functionary undoubtedly coordinates Party and peasant organization activities within a given area. An interlocking membership also ties the peasant organizations with the Party.

According to Party documents, whenever peasants react favorably during a membership drive among them, a friend must be ready to step in and provide leadership in order to make the peasants even more aware of the PKI's policies. The Party stresses the necessity of constantly propagandizing its program and activity, pointing out that to maintain and increase its influence, its sympathizers must always notice the steps the Party is taking "to resist the cruelties of the reactionaries" and improve the lot of the peasant. Despite the PKI's cordial relations with the government party, the individual PKI approach to peasant matters can be seen in the propaganda twist it gave to the government's pronouncements on nationalization of land. Instead of endorsing this as a good Communist program, the PKI Secretary-General has recommended to other Party leaders that no peasant likes a slogan which calls for giving land to the State. Since the basic problem of the PKI is to bring about a peasants' revolution, the Secretary General has noted that a PKI slogan might better be "land for the peasants." Even a slogan such as "land for the man who works it" is too vague and might be misunderstood in cases where a capitalist is working the land. The Secretary General concluded that a good slogan for the PKI to use would be "distribute the land to the peasants and let each enjoy the produce of his own land."

C. Iran

Whereas in Indonesia the Communists enjoy a favorable legal position, in Iran the Tudeh Party of the Communists has been subjected to periodic harassment and suppression by the Government. Yet the Tudeh's solid organization and discipline is unique among political groups in Iran and its discipline and loyalty has not been countered by continuity in government or by any pro-sectarian opposition. Although the Tudeh Party and its affiliated organizations are all illegal,

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the Iranian situation shows what a Party that is illegal can nevertheless accomplish. The Tudeh remains the best organized Party in the country and the possibility still exists that it might eventually come to power without the need for resorting to force. Despite its proscription, the Tudeh Party has succeeded in setting up an efficient clandestine organization in Tehran and in most of the provinces, in giving instructions to its members, in distributing its propaganda, in severely penetrating various government, including security, establishments, and in spreading its influence among both workers and peasants.

The Tudeh's basic strategy for overthrowing the present government regime appears to be the formation of a united front of all groups opposed to that regime. To this end, it is evident that the Party feels that it must muster support from all possible segments of Iranian society. Since the coup of 1953, Tudeh has stepped up its propaganda appeals to "workers, peasants, and patriotic capitalists" to form a united front with the Tudeh. It has taken pains to allay the fears of the "patriotic capitalists" by contending that the Tudeh does not oppose private ownership of property, but that it is concerned with the well-being of all classes of the people, including the capitalists, as against foreign imperialism. It has announced its willingness to cooperate with all other "anti-imperialist societies" in overthrowing the present government and in forming a new government which would check all "interference" by British and American imperialists, preserve "all democratic freedoms" for political societies and the press, and conduct free elections. To allay fears that it would control such a new government, the Tudeh has even categorically stated that it would "give full support to a united front government without demanding a position within the government." Tudeh Party documents stress the need to form a United Front comprised of all anti-imperialist forces regardless of their political opinion, and to make use of the individual groups' inclinations in Party propaganda. The Party must therefore "separately detail the anti-imperialist wishes and inclinations of every class and group and make the Party's basic views understandable to them all."

The Tudeh began its organizational work initially among industrial workers, and then sought followers among women, youth, students and intellectuals. The next problem was how to obtain the support of the peasants. Although the Party began its campaign when conditions were more favorable, owing to the greater freedom the Party enjoyed at that time, it was not until after a Party Congress in 1944 that serious attention was directed at the peasants. The Party's peasant movement reached a peak in 1946-47, after the formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, where some landowners were dispossessed of their land which was divided among the peasants. The Tudeh's peasant activists were prosecuted by the government in 1946, and the Party's peasant organization had to be disbanded. Resuming activities in 1948, it had some success on the outskirts of Tehran but with the proscription

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of the Tudeh Party and its affiliated organizations in 1949, the Tudeh's peasant organization was once more very limited in its activities. Although a Tudeh Congress in 1945 had decided to set up a Tudeh Peasants' Organization (TPO) under the direct leadership of the Party itself, this decision was apparently not implemented prior to October 1951. At this time temporary regulations of the TPO were formulated because circumstances had prevented the full execution of the TPO constitution. Party members, in addition to normal duties, were to form peasant cells. Instructions for this work were to be dispatched through the Party network. The Party's "responsible member" in every rural area was to be responsible for directing and organizing the peasants in the area. In every provincial and local committee one Party member was to be elected to be responsible for the TPO. Finances were to be controlled by the Party.

It thus became increasingly obvious that the Tudeh had discovered the importance of the peasantry. A Party educational instruction in early 1951 had already pointed this up: "...Our Party...looks upon the peasant as the most crucial in internal politics...The more we can attract the peasants, the more quickly will the structure of society be changed." In 1953, Party documents were still proclaiming...."The peasants are not yet fully awake. If the nation is to achieve final victory this important problem must be solved because the peasants must play an effective role in the revolution." The fact that the TPO, like its parent organization the Tudeh Party, was illegal did not discourage the Iranian Communists. In the peasant sphere, as in many other spheres, the Tudeh Party policy called for corresponding overt organizations to be set up beside the clandestine ones. In 1951, the Party set up a legal cover organization behind which the TPO could operate more effectively. This was called the Society for Aid to Peasants. Of the fifteen or so cover societies set up by the Party in addition to its own clandestine branches, the three which have become the most important, both in Tehran and in the provinces, are: the League of Partisans of Peace; the National Society for the Struggle Against Imperialism; and the Society for Aid to Peasants. The activities and influence of the Society for Aid to Peasants have steadily increased, emphasizing the importance and special effort given to peasant work by the Tudeh Party.

Exploitation of peasant grievances is the familiar Communist strategy followed in Iran. Even without Tudeh agitation, an increasing awareness of their oppression has been growing among the peasantry. Tudeh propaganda is therefore assured of a good reception. The Society for Aid to Peasants has established a widely-spread network, and it attempts to satisfy the peasants' health, agricultural and educational needs. In addition to its own cadres and propaganda media, the Society is joined in its peasant campaign by various other Tudeh organizational assets. For instance, the Party has made the struggle against illiteracy an important part of its propaganda campaign among the peasants, and

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its cover society for this work, the Society for Struggle Against Illiteracy, became practically integrated with the Society for Aid to Peasants. The several branches of the Society in the provinces became additional avenues through which the Tudeh could work on the peasants, and Tudeh members have been constantly encouraged to participate in anti-illiteracy campaigns. Similarly, in some areas of the country the Tudeh may operate largely through its front society, the Partisans of Peace, and this society would then become the focal point for peasant work in the area.

But the Tudeh Youth Organization (TYO) has probably been the most useful adjunct to the Society for Aid to Peasants. The TYO has been used to recruit sympathizers among workers, peasants and youth and has made the peasant campaign one of its principal activities. Recent reports have described a TYO program for dispatching groups of young Tudeh cyclists to farming villages in the neighborhood of Tehran. These proselytizers spend the day in the villages, spreading Tudeh propaganda and explaining to the people the shortcomings of the present Government and the "transgressions" of the Americans and British in Iran. They also assist the peasants in planting and harvesting and in doing other work around the village. This program has proved to be highly effective in gaining village support for the Tudeh Party and has demonstratively fostered anti-American sentiments.

Tudeh Party propaganda is widely distributed among the peasants, and its activities in the countryside have been less hampered than in the urban areas, where imposition of martial law has occurred. Although the Tudeh must necessarily be cautious in its printing activities, numerous newspapers, leaflets, instructions, announcements, etc. have been available for distribution among the peasants; such propaganda contains appeals focused directly on the peasants. Tudeh propaganda appeals are not only aimed at agricultural problems of the peasant, but they also try to arouse among the peasantry a consciousness of their right to participate more fully in national affairs and to demand more consideration from the Government. The Shah's land distribution program is attacked while the position of rural populations in Communist countries is described in glowing terms. Peasants are warned that the ruling classes wish to train and turn them into "imperialist armies", and they are called upon to work for peace and for the "resurrection and the mobilization" of their immense potential strength for the cause of peace. The Party has always stressed the need for trained and experienced members to go into the rural areas to carry on propaganda activity, either by speeches, individual talks or distribution of propaganda media.

Tudeh documents show that members who undertake Party work with the peasants are told to give particular consideration to the local situation. For instance, in villages where there are small landowners, no slogans against such people should be used. In villages

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around Tehran, Party members are told to concentrate on the question of water supply in their speeches since the land question has no particular significance for villages in this area. Party activists are warned to couch their speeches in very simple language, and to acquaint the villagers with political problems by preparing simple talks and to urge them to cooperate with "revolutionary workers" if and when they take action. Strong protests should constantly be made against feudalists and landowners. Party members who try to organize the villagers should work not only to arouse them but to get them into direct contact with the Party as soon as possible. Village headmen, in particular, should be encouraged to join the "movement". Members who go out to villages must distribute copies of the organ of the Peasant Society and point up its support of the peasantry. The Tudeh Party repeatedly calls on members to make full use of their energies for extensive work among the peasants. Sometimes Party documents have instructed members living in the towns to help to further the campaign "by voluntarily undertaking official duties among the peasants." Other times, the Party is more emphatic, such as...."On Friday members of your cell must go out to a village to contact peasants."

In general, Tudeh propaganda among the peasants follows the Marxist line in its attacks on the landlord class. Heavy emphasis is placed on the surplus labor theory of value, on the rights of peasants vis-a-vis landlords, on the exploitation and oppression by landlords, and on the wretchedness of the peasants' lives. The Communists proclaim that the only avenue open to the peasants to better their living conditions is to unite among themselves, follow the leadership of the TPC and the Tudeh Party, and struggle against the landlords and their agents on the farms. The Communists tell the peasants that they have been exploited and oppressed all these years because they have not yet made the landlords fear the power of a unified peasantry demanding that their "rights" be recognized. The product of the peasant struggle will be the end of exploitation and oppression, the winning of land, freedom and (by implication) a healthier life and opportunities for education which are now denied them.

D. JAPAN

The legal Japanese Communist Party (JCP) advocates a united front, or "unification front" as it is referred to. In pushing this front, the JCP has been giving increased emphasis to broadening the Party's base of popular support and, in particular, has undertaken new efforts to influence Japan's rural population—a primary JCP target heretofore most resistant to Party efforts.

The JCP is utilizing both general and specific tactics to secure roots for the "unification front" among the farmers. Some general appeals pushed by the JCP were described in the Cominform journal of 15 January 1954: "the peasants are demanding that they be

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given land and oppose the low purchasing prices for rice which have been fixed by the US and Japanese monopolists; they oppose the system of obligatory rice deliveries and insist that the government should help the peasants who suffered during the devastating floods in 1953. They are also fighting for the removal of US war bases, for an end to the foreign occupation and for trade relations with the Soviet Union and People's China. The peasant movement against the anti-national policy of the Yoshida government is gaining momentum....everywhere poor, middle and even the well-to-do peasants are taking part." This description of success, however, was somewhat optimistic, for the JCP has been traditionally weak in rural areas. Nevertheless, 1954 did mark an intensified JCP effort toward political action designed to increase its mass support, and both overt and covert activities became increasingly apparent in the agrarian sphere.

The infiltration of existing farm organizations became a major Communist tactic. Previous JCP success in infiltrating the labor movement appears to have encouraged a greater emphasis on overt activity in the countryside as well. Communist efforts have thus been directed at influencing existing farm organizations through exploitation of the hardships resulting from the government's adoption of a program of economic austerity. At the same time, there are reports of a JCP "cultural program" for farm villages, which covers all the cultural demands of the farmers and which is especially designed to reach village youths and women. The "program" consists of surveys on farm villages, the dispatching of cultural action corps, various types of club activity, the organization of choruses, etc. Playing an important role in this program is the Farm Cultural Association (FCA) which functions as a front for the JCP's Farm Communities Over-all Guidance Department. It has been reported that about 20 to 30 action corpsmen with "org" duties are dispatched by the Party to each Japanese prefecture. Their assignments include visits to individual farmers and to the prefectural government or agricultural cooperative unions in order to explain the need of forming an FCA. These cultural action corpsmen also carry out work belonging typically to the Propaganda Action Corps of the Party, and they give picture slides, movies, theatricals, etc.

The JCP has emphasized that the FCA movement should expand as rapidly as possible in order to help establish a "unified farmer front".. This is to be done through careful Party work. In working in a given village, for instance, cadres should try to consolidate opinion on the status and political significance of the farm cultural movement. They should choose, through discussion, a responsible person for a given organization. A meeting should be called to discuss the movement and Party and non-Party members should together select persons suitable to take part in the movement. Within a given locale, a suitable organization should be selected to support the FCA. Aid should be requested from organizations and individuals that advocate and carry out cultural movements. Appeals should be directed to individual

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students, men of culture, entertainers, technicians, persons influential in agricultural cooperative unions, farm movement leaders, politicians and all businessmen concerned with the culture of farm villages. Appeals should be made to men who are popular in their respective fields. After the advocates are decided upon, appeals for the formation of an FCA should be made under joint signatures, and in as many fields of interest as possible. The JCP considers that the "cultural program" includes entertainment, health and hygiene, cultural improvement, better living standards and agricultural techniques—virtually the entire range of farm village demands.

Currently, the popularization of the "Michurin" method—a Soviet-discovered process of pre-treating seeds to ensure early germination and rapid growth—is also being employed by the JCP as a major vehicle for promoting its popular appeal in rural areas, reforming the ideologies dominant among Japanese farmers, and establishing a unified farmer front. Overt and covert Party propaganda publications and directives have been plugging this method. Michurin Study Clubs have been formed throughout Japan; in May 1954, it was reported that the national Michurin Society had branches in 39 of Japan's 46 prefectures. Actually, the Japanese Communists have been utilizing the Michurin theory since 1951 as a device for spreading Communist propaganda during ostensibly non-political discussions of new farming methods. But current attempts to increase the numerical strength of the Michurin study clubs point to a greatly accelerated drive among the rural population. Although the Michurin process may not be as effective as some other methods developed for the same purpose, it apparently is initially less expensive and more practicable for individual farmers. These advantages to the Japanese farmer, quite apart from whatever political implications surround its propagation, may lend considerable popular support to this particular effort of the JCP. In May 1954, one rural Japanese school had instituted a compulsory course in Michurin theory, although local authorities denied any propaganda intent and maintained that it was purely a lab course consisting of experiments with flowers, berries, and rice. Nevertheless, it would seem that the JCP had found a potent lever whereby it can set up a network of front agricultural organizations and achieve a measure of leadership among the agrarian population.

JCP propaganda has also given attention to Communism's international agrarian strategy. The three Japanese delegates to the World Agricultural and Forestry Workers Conference in October 1953 were widely quoted as to how the Conference "had opened their eyes to the greater advances made by the democratic forces" and that they were "particularly impressed by the sharp rise in production realized primarily around the Kolhols". The three delegates were members of the pro-Communist "unification faction" of the Japan Farmers Union, presently a target of JCP infiltration tactics.

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E. Italy

Communist agrarian tactics in modern western countries having great numbers of industrial workers appear to owe much to the experience of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI). Actually, this experience has also been applied to the "backward" areas of the world having few members of the industrial proletariat class. But to western Communist Parties, the principal lesson of the Italian experience was the demonstration of certain agrarian tactics which could be used to build a significant agrarian movement in a country where there already existed a large and vigorous industrial movement functioning under Communist control. Although these agrarian tactics may thus be very similar to those already mentioned in the various countries of the Far and Middle East, specific reference to the Italian experience should point up the tactical program to be expected from Communist Parties in their efforts to increase agrarian tension in areas of the West. It was as a result of efforts to redress its earlier failures among rural populations that the PCI evolved certain general principles of agrarian policy.

The PCI found that it was necessary to apply different tactics in various parts of the country according to the local agricultural structure. PCI directives emphasized the need for a much greater tactical flexibility and diversity in the Party's agrarian program than that required of its policy for industrial areas. Its methods of organization had to take into account the scattered and widely distributed nature of the agricultural labor force, the seasonal character of an important part of agricultural work, and the different classes existing within the agrarian population. Its appeals could be of a permanent or temporary nature, in response to a particular need.

The PCI also learned that it was preferable to organize the agricultural proletariat (rural wage earner) and semi-proletariat (a wage earner who also owns a small piece of land) on a normal trade union basis and, at the same time, to separate such organizations from those created for the peasant. There was sufficient similarity between the industrial proletariat and the agricultural worker to permit the latter to follow the more rigid trade union pattern. But the economic and social demands of the peasants as a class were recognized to differ from those of the wage workers, and the PCI concluded that their forms of organization must therefore be different. For the peasants there could be leagues, committees, associations and cooperative societies—but the title was less important than their objectives and methods. The important aspect perceived by the PCI was that there should be associations designed specifically for the peasants and adopted to local requirements, and that these should be separated from the trade union pattern which was suitable for the agrarian worker.

This did not mean, however, that the PCI deviated from the established Communist doctrine concerning an alliance between the

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proletariat and peasant. The PCI merely sought to establish this link on a firm basis. Its tactics were designed to create an alliance of "agricultural proletariat" and "peasant", and then to forge the over-all "alliance of proletariat and peasant". It offered the Party itself as a link, and buttressed this by a variety of other issues which transcended class lines—such as peace, prosperity, etc. Specialized front organizations as well as mass organizations were utilized to further both "alliances".

Thus in Italy there grew up the following organizational structure affecting the agrarian population. The National Confederation of Land Workers is a Communist-controlled organization, but one which is nominally independent from the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), also Communist-controlled. Yet under the Land Workers there are subsidiaries, of which the two principal agricultural unions—those of the Farm Laborer and the Share-cropper—belong also to CGIL. To emphasize further the organizational distinction between agricultural proletariat and peasant, the Italian agricultural proletariat and semi-proletariat belong to the Agricultural and Forestry Workers Trade Union International and also to the WFTU by virtue of their membership in the CGIL, a WFTU affiliate. Membership in the TUI is also open to peasant associations which join the Land Workers, but this is on a separate voluntary basis since the Land Workers Confederation is not affiliated with the CGIL or the WFTU. The peasant organizations thus continue to be separate from those of the agricultural proletariat, although they are components of a common structure. The PCI also pushes the alliance of agricultural worker and peasant through social societies, sports associations, and other less formal organizations.

While the peasants were organized in a loose and varying fashion and on the basis of issues largely involving possession of land, the agricultural proletariat was organized as wage-earners. The PCI realized that its main effort should be directed at the wage earners who were, according to the Communists, the backbone of the class movement in the countryside. Yet while rural agitation could be more easily fomented among the agrarian wage-earners, the PCI realized that militant organizations among the peasants were necessary to support the agrarian wage-earners and build a solid agrarian front. Such a front could then merge with the over-all "united front" and be more effectively utilized to support other PCI campaigns, such as those of the industrial workers.

On the Central Commission of the PCI, there is the Central Agrarian Commission which is responsible for Party policy regarding agricultural affairs. The Party has made vigorous efforts to improve its organization and increase its strength in agricultural districts. The Central Committee long emphasized the need to form more cells in order to strengthen the Party. Originally, the Party sought to overcome its lack of cadres in the countryside by sending experienced Party

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members from the North to lead the Party organization in the South; this did not work out as the Northerners were not welcomed. Then the Party adopted the expedient of sending members from the South to training courses in the North where they could study Party work for 6 months to a year. In 1951, however, the PCI called for new methods and reversed its usual tactics. Instead of recruiting members for itself, it began to build up from the base the simpler forms of mass organizations, recruited trade unionists, set up cooperatives, encouraged youth groups, etc. in an effort to create a broad agrarian front swayed by PCI propaganda. At this time, it also clearly emphasized the need for different approaches to the different categories of the agrarian population. At the international conference of the Agricultural and Forestry Workers in October 1953, the membership was urged to study this experience of the PCI and its agrarian tactics.

A measure of the PCI's successful organizational work among the rural population was demonstrated in the summer of 1954. During this time, the CGIL farm unions—*Federterra* and *Federbraccianti*—began fomenting strikes and agitation among agricultural workers in Northern and Central Italy. These strikes were generally short and sporadic but demonstrated a definite pattern of CGIL policy. In the province of Ferrara, this pattern was extended and the Communists really demonstrated the extent of their power. A Communist-called strike or agricultural laborers virtually paralyzed the entire economic life of the whole province; Communist strength was such that non-Communist farm unions could not make their voices and influence felt even on issues which they supported in common with the Communists. To back up the strike, the CGIL had activists ready to follow guerrilla-like tactics when necessary. It had a legal committee set up to free those arrested. In some areas, it had an organization for collecting grain from small land owners who, either through fear or desire, made contributions to the strikers.

There is little doubt that agricultural workers form an important block of CGIL strength. In Italy, the agricultural labor group is the most depressed economically, most subject to social injustice, and most neglected in terms of education. Unable to solve their own problems, rural workers are often susceptible to the appeals of authoritarian agencies of either the right or the left which promise a ready answer. But strikes and agitations among them are usually not of the dramatic nature of similar action among industrial workers, and perhaps this is why the Communists have not used their agricultural organizations more frequently in mass actions. Yet the strike in Ferrara was evidence of this power under the control of the Communist Party in this and other areas of the country. Although CGIL strength is not spread universally throughout Italy, present indications are that intensive effort is being made to capture the loyalty of the vast farm population in the South which still has far less Communist influence than does the North. During the Ferrara strike, Communist

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propaganda was careful to proclaim that...."in this struggle, (the agricultural workers) are given moral and material support not only by the laborers who have already been successful in their struggle but also by the middle sections of the peasantry."

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