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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC EVENTS  
AT THE  
AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE  
CAIRO  
26 DECEMBER 1957 - 1 JANUARY 1958

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I. DELIBERATIONS OF THE MAIN COMMISSIONS

A. The Political Commission

Under the organizing guidance of Dr. Anup Singh, this commission selected Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru as president (Egyptian nomination), although Dr. Singh himself originally favored an Egyptian president. A Sudanese delegate (nominated by Ethiopia) was then elected first vice president, although the Iraq delegate "saw no need for vice presidents." The squabble that followed suggested that the Egyptian delegate was, in the Communists' view, the proper person to steer the commission's work. Discussion of this question ended when the Chinese delegate suggested that there be two vice presidents, nominated Egypt for the second vice presidency, and proposed that the vice presidents head two subcommittees.\* This proposal was supported by the Japanese, the Ghanians, and Indians. It was accepted as far as the vice presidencies were concerned, but the subcommittee question still caused trouble.

\*There is no firm evidence of the contemplated division of labor between the proposed two subcommittees. However, according to a public statement by Khalid Mukhi al-Din, the aim was to permit separate treatment of the problems of "new" and "old" imperialism. The former was to deal with colonial territories, which he characterized as "survivals of the old form of imperialism"; the latter was to deal with manifestations affecting independent countries, such as the Eisenhower doctrine, etc. He gave credit for this justification to a member of the Jordanian delegation; but it is clear that such a division of labor would have fitted neatly into the Communist plan of campaign.

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As in other commissions, some delegations obviously desired to prevent the creation of many subcommittees. But, on a Tunisian motion, supported by the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and apparently, Egypt, a decision was made to create five subcommittees, with specific attention directed toward dealing with the Algerian and Palestinian questions. Just prior to the vote (which showed only four delegations opposed), Dr. Singh again appealed for the creation of no more than two subcommittees, endorsing the original Chinese suggestion. When the vote went against his proposal, Dr. Singh prevented the recording of the identities of the four delegations which had supported him. It is possible that moderates from Japan, Ethiopia, and Ghana supported India on this vote and were the four involved; but it is equally possible that the Chinese and two of the other four Communist delegations present may have voted with the Indians. In the latter event Dr. Singh's concern over the identification of the minority could be easily understandable, for it would have raised questions concerning the votes of the other two Communist bloc delegations, and perhaps exposed a difference of opinion among Communists over a question of operating tactics.

This breakup into subcommittees, in fact, tended

- (a) to highlight the issues of Algeria and Palestine,
- (b) to dilute possible opposition to such prefabricated reports and resolutions as those presented by the Egyptian delegate in the subcommittee on imperialism, and
- (c) to permit such single-minded pro-Communist delegates as the Japanese YASUI Kaoru to make the maximum impression.

The five subcommittees eventually approved covered

a. Imperialism

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- b. Algeria
- c. Racial discrimination
- d. Nuclear weapons
- e. Palestine

The Conference resolutions which emerged from the Political Commission supported virtually all national liberation and irredentist struggles in Asia and Africa. They also

a. Gave explicit endorsement to the central thesis which the Communist movement is currently propagating throughout the world, that the problems of the colonial areas and newly independent countries as well as the threat to world peace are due solely to "imperialist ambitions."

b. Devoted most attention to the Algerian conflict.

c. Made what appears to be the Conference's most significant statement on the question of Palestine.

Only one major Afro-Asian liberation problem--that of Kashmir--was not discussed.

The most inflammatory statements made at the Conference by self-styled representatives of national liberation organizations were those of the persons

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who spoke in the name of the Chad and of Kenya. Both called for Afro-Asian arming of their peoples and promised that, with arms, the national liberation forces would expel the colonial powers from their territory. Neither of these "spokesmen" is known to have had Communist contacts or to have demonstrated pro-Communist attitudes in the past; both in fact have apparently been resident in Cairo for some time and appear to be Egyptian-sponsored. However, the Kenya delegates were cultivated by the Soviet delegation to the Conference and proceeded to the USSR after the end of the Conference, where they were given very flattering treatment and publicity.

1. The Palestine Subcommittee

The endorsement by the Cairo Conference of a special resolution incorporating a demand for the "recognition of the rights" of Palestinian refugees is of considerable interest. As was pointed out earlier, the proposal that a special subcommittee be created to deal with Palestine caused some trouble in the political committee meeting.

The Arab-Israeli issue was in fact a subject of discussion at the April 1955 New Delhi Conference, where the Asian Solidarity Movement was created; and resolutions were passed there which objected to "pressures exerted through Israel and Turkey to force Arab states to join military blocs" and denounced the "aggressive policy of ruling circles in Israel." These clearcut positions taken in April 1955 are interesting contrasts to the World Peace Council's inability, since the initiation of the Soviet program of military aid to the Arab World, to pass resolutions on Arab-Israeli relations, and suggest that on this critical issue the Solidarity Movement is more responsive to Communist desires than is the World Peace Council.

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The full import of the Cairo resolution can only be recognized, however, when it is viewed against the background of authoritative Communist statements on the Arab-Israeli issue made during the latter half of 1957. The most relevant is a policy declaration by the Congress of the Israeli Communist Party made in mid-1957, which called for "recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs--including the right of self-determination, and if they so desired, their right to secession." The Cairo resolution, proposed by the Palestinian delegation with Egyptian aid and encouragement and with explicit Soviet support, encompasses the first part of this declaration, and reiterates the April 1955 New Delhi condemnation of the Israeli Government as an aggressive imperialist tool. The "moderate" nature of the resolution is, therefore, in fact deceptive; it is better characterized as a cautious step forward by international Communism, in a typically deceptive long-range campaign, to exploit an exceedingly complex and explosive issue to its own ends. R. Palme Dutt, who for many years has been the most accurate and authoritative spokesman of international Communism on the strategy and tactics to be employed in the colonial world, made this clear in an exhaustive article on Israel published in August 1957 in the British Communist magazine, Labour Monthly. Approving the above-quoted policy statement of the Communist Party of Israel, he pointed out that the political conditions for such a settlement "are not yet ripe, but are gathering." The Cairo resolution is a significant step toward the creation of the "ripe political conditions" envisioned by Dutt in this plan, from which only the Soviet bloc and international Communism would derive major benefit.

Resolutions endorsed on 1 February 1958 by the Communist Party of Israel reveal the extent to which the Cairo resolutions are consistent with its domestic program and objectives:

"RESOLUTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ISRAEL  
30 January - 1 February 1958

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel [Maki] held its seventh plenary session at Tel Aviv from 30 January to 1 February. Comrade Meir Wilner, member of the political bureau, outlined the party program for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the state. [Editorial Note: Meir Wilner is also a leading figure in Israeli Peace Committee delegations to the World Peace Council.]

"An agreement of the great powers on the disarmament question and other international problems--among which are those of the

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Middle East--would serve the cause of peace in general and would represent a great contribution towards a relaxation of today's dangerous tensions. It would create more favorable conditions for the solution of the Palestinian problem and the Israel-Arab conflict, which is intentionally aggravated by the imperialists and their servants.

"V. THE AFRO-ASIATIC CONGRESS IN CAIRO

"The Cairo Congress, by manifesting the solidarity of all the peoples of Asia and Africa, has made a great contribution to world peace.

"The resolutions concerning economic, social, and cultural questions, as well as the resolutions relating to the development of the national economies of the Asian and African countries are all part of a general program for the fight against imperialism from abroad and against reaction at home.

"The resolution concerning Palestinian problems declares that Israel serves as an imperialist base which threatens the security and development of the Middle East and represents a danger to world peace. The main reason for this conclusion is chiefly due to Ben Gurion's anti-national and pro-imperialist policies. All patriotic forces of the people who have their hearts set on assuring peace, security, and the future of Israel must redouble their fight for a radical change in Israeli policies in the direction of peace, independence, and neutrality. Such a change would open the way for regularizing peace with the neighbor countries by taking into account the legitimate national interests of the people of Israel as well as those of the Palestinian Arab people.

"VI. ON THE EVENT OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

"Our party, concerned for the fate of the people and the homeland, will issue the following essential demands on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Israel:

"A change of Israel's policies towards neutrality, independence, and peace. Solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa. Improvement of relations with the USSR. Recognition of the national rights

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of the Palestinian Arab people. Equality of democratic rights and liberties for the Arab population of the country. Total suppression of the military government which dishonors Israel. Solicitude for the working people and broadening of democratic liberties."

## 2. The Algeria Subcommittee

Algeria, like Palestine, was given separate treatment and special emphasis in the final resolutions. As has been pointed out earlier, the demand for the creation of this subcommittee on Algeria caused some confusion in the political committee. The Arab delegates were most active in the subcommittee, but a Ceylon delegate served as chairman.

In spite of the fact that the resolution on Algeria fully endorsed the aspirations of the Algerians, its "moderate" proposals for action dealt principally with diplomatic support, humanitarian aid for the people, and assistance to refugees, and agitational expressions of solidarity. It did not, as FLN propaganda had predicted, promise or call for "immediate, massive, and unlimited aid" to the Army of National Liberation.

The emphasis of Soviet bloc and Communist speeches in the subcommittee was on the necessity for cessation of hostilities and negotiation between Algeria and France, based on prior French acknowledgement of the Algerian right to independence. In contrast, Arab bloc speeches, draft resolutions, and the final resolution as well demanded immediate recognition of Algerian independence.

This distinction, which may appear to be little more than hairsplitting in the light of the seriousness of the Algerian struggle, is considered of considerable importance by the CPSU for it seeks primarily to promote an Algerian formula which will enhance its global influence and be useful in both the Afro-Asian and European communities. It seeks to exploit the general "threat to peace in the Mediterranean"--to promote neutralism in Europe and at the same time to use the Algerian hope for Communist bloc diplomatic and material support to strengthen the influence of Algerian Communists vis-a-vis the National Liberation

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movement. Here, as elsewhere, it is reluctant to commit itself openly and unreservedly to one side of such a dispute.

It is noteworthy that the North Korean delegation was the main Soviet bloc voice on Algeria. Their position on other issues at Cairo was completely intransigent; their report on Algeria was noteworthy for its comparison of the much-publicized atrocities attendant upon French actions in Algeria with the accusations long levelled against Japanese and American "imperialism" in Korea (such as the "germ warfare" charges so energetically cultivated during the Korean conflict). It also advanced the thesis that "the colonial war by the French imperialists in Algeria is but part of the aggressive provocations of international reaction led by the U.S. imperialists." But the policy they endorsed was that generally advocated by the USSR and its disciplined adherents throughout the world.

Insofar as the final resolution carried the demand that "the independence of Algeria be recognized without delay," and called for countermeasures against countries supporting the French military effort in Algeria, it would appear that the Conference supported the position of the Arab states rather than the more cautious known Communist position. But the resolution also characterized the Algerian struggle as "a threat to the security of the African people and international peace," and thus contributed effectively to the Communist campaign to tie in the peace movement (particularly in the West and Afro-Asia) with the Arab national liberation movements and Communist efforts to increase their influence therein. This objective is made clear, for example, by a joint statement of the Moroccan and Italian Communist Parties, published in L'Unita of 8 February 1958:

"The Italian Communist Party should consider as its most important task today the struggle for the relaxation of international tensions and peace. It is completely in accord with the Moroccan Communist Party in their judgment that the struggle of the Moroccan people and of all Arab people or their independence constitutes an essential element of world peace. . . . The two Parties declare themselves in conformity with the recent Conference in Cairo."

This same thesis was stated in Pravda (7 January) in an article on unity of action by Shevlyagin, a leading CPSU theoretician:

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"The international duty of all parties of the working class and the interests of peace demand unconditional support of the national liberation movement against old and new forms of colonial domination."

The evidence of lack of complete agreement suggests, nevertheless, that the Communist movement still faces serious problems in its attempts to exploit the Algerian issue.

### 3. The Subcommittee on Imperialism

The subcommittee on imperialism attracted the participation of at least two of the key Communist figures at the Conference--Khalid Mukhi al-Din of Egypt served as chairman of the subcommittee; A. K. Gopalan of India, together with V. K. Dhage of India, served on the resolution drafting committee of the subcommittee.

Little is known about the deliberations of this body, but its draft resolution incorporated the main points of the current Soviet assessment of the aims and objectives of the West in the Afro-Asian area and of the Soviet "struggle for peace" thesis.

#### Resolution on Imperialism

"The Afro-Asian Peoples Conference firmly believes that imperialistic ambitions lead to interference in the affairs of other countries, to military and political pacts and alliances directed against world peace.

"These ambitions lead to conspiracies against national governments; to the creation of continued tension in international relations; to usurping of the natural rights of smaller nations to freedom, sovereignty and independence.

"They lead to incitement of cold war and to bolstering up of the armament race. Such factors may act as a trigger to start a shooting war that will be disastrous to mankind.

"Because of this belief and in the spirit of Bandung, it condemns:

"(a) imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;

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"(b) foreign interference in the affairs of other countries;

"(c) military and political pacts and alliances that create overriding spheres of influence, endanger world peace and suppress the peoples' aspirations;

"(d) military aid to one country or group of countries, which constitutes threat to neighbouring countries and compels them to increase their military budgets, thus retarding their peoples' economic development;

"(e) treaties that encroach upon national sovereignty of nations;

"(f) exploitation of the national economy in other countries for the benefit of imperialistic powers;

"(g) conspiring to overthrow national governments in the interest of the imperialists;

"(h) aids on conditions detrimental to the interests of smaller countries that ultimately jeopardise their sovereignty and independence;

"(i) establishment of foreign military bases and forces on the territories of other countries;

"The Conference sees in the policy embodied in Pancha Shila and the ten principles of Bandung best means to alleviate international tension and to end the cold war.

"Therefore it declares that it gives its full support to the rights of the peoples:

"(a) to freedom, self-determination, sovereignty, and complete independence;

"(b) to settle their internal problems by themselves;

"(c) to choose forms of their governments according to their desires."

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4. The Racial Discrimination Subcommittee

In this subcommittee, discussions centered upon condemnation of alleged discriminatory practices of a political and economic nature in Black Africa. The leading role was played by the Indian delegate, although the delegates of the independent countries in or linked with Black Africa were equally vocal. The policy of apartheid adopted by the Union of South Africa was subjected to particular condemnation.

The resolution drafted in the subcommittee "politicalized" the issue by attributing these practices to the desire of the colonial powers to perpetuate and strengthen their control and exploitation of the native populations and to repress and harass liberation movements.

An attempt was made to introduce a condemnation of racial discrimination in the United States into the resolution, but it was not successful. The allegedly "moderate" action taken to reject this addition merits closer scrutiny, however, in light of the actual objectives of the resolution. Broadening the condemnation of discrimination to include its manifestations in the United States would have diluted and to some extent obscured the particular political interpretation which was of primary interest-- i.e., racial discrimination as a manifestation of colonialism. The campaign subsequently launched in connection with the celebration of the birthday of Paul Robeson appears more effectively designed to generate anti-American sentiment based on alleged racial discrimination.

5. The Nuclear Warfare Subcommittee

In this body the Japanese pro-Communist YASUI Kaoru encountered little opposition to his diatribe against the West, which further propagated the well-known denunciations of Western preparations for launching a nuclear war, accused the Western powers of using Afro-Asian territories by preference for weapons testing at the risk of injuring local populations, and condemned them for their unwillingness to accept Soviet proposals for the banning of tests and nuclear war.

The speech by Mr. YASUI and the supporting remarks by Syrian, Indian, and other World Peace Council regulars were clearly

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intended to support the "atomic blackmail" strategy now being applied by the CPSU in the Free World through the peace campaign. This "struggle for peace," which is an extension of the well-known WPC program, has taken on new features since the publication of the Peace Manifesto signed by sixty-four Communist parties in November 1957 at Moscow. It demands acceptance of Soviet-initiated or supported proposals on many matters, including those on colonial territories, as the only alternative to increased international tension, and ever-increasing possibilities of nuclear war. Subsequent Soviet commentary has emphasized that the Conference "endorsed and supported Soviet policy on nuclear warfare."

It is interesting to note, in connection with the drafting of the nuclear warfare resolutions, that the Soviet delegation flatly refused to permit the inclusion of the USSR as a recipient of the proposed appeal for banning tests. The sensitivity of the USSR on this point becomes understandable when it is realized that the USSR refuses to permit any propagation inside the Soviet bloc of the scare-mongering used by men such as YASUI, a tactic which they enthusiastically endorse and repeat abroad. This posture seems dictated by their concern over the possible impact of such arguments upon the Soviet people. The basis for this concern was made clear as far back as early 1955, when then Premier Malenkov was accused by the CPSU of succumbing to "imperialist atomic blackmail" and contributing to "defeatism" when he stated that nuclear warfare would lead to the destruction of civilization. Malenkov was obliged to restate his position for the Soviet people and to affirm that "in spite of widespread destruction, the Soviet Communist society would emerge victorious from a nuclear war." This remains the official domestic line in the Bloc today.

Yugoslav attempts to criticize the USSR as well as certain Western states for contributing to the heightening of tensions have, since early May 1958, drawn virulent denunciations from the Soviet bloc.

B. The Economic Commission

The organization of the work of this commission was carried out with a speed and incisiveness not encountered elsewhere and control appeared to remain firmly in Communist hands. The problem of subcommittees arose, as in the political commission, but it did

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not seriously affect the course of events. At the first meeting the Egyptian delegation nominated a Syrian Communist, Nazim Mousli, a professor from Damascus who had been a member of the predominantly Communist delegation to New Delhi in April 1955, to head the commission. Having assumed control of the proceedings, Mr. Mousli proposed, as soon as he took the chair

- a. the election of two vice presidents and a secretary;
- b. the nomination of the Japanese delegate as secretary;
- c. the nomination of an Egyptian delegate and the Soviet delegate to the vice presidencies.

These nominations from the chair were accepted. The Egyptian delegate was then recognized and promptly read a series of sixteen recommendations. The Sudanese delegate then proposed that the reports by the USSR and Japan be presented. The chairman, who obviously wished to give the USSR delegate the advantage of making the final presentation and reacting to proposals made by others, stated, "In this meeting we only hear recommendations from all sides," and then called upon the Ceylon delegate to present his recommendations. As the Ceylon delegate himself stated, "My proposals bear very close resemblance to those advanced by Syria and Egypt." He first highlighted as a "basic problem" the question "how can the strangle-hold of economic imperialism be broken?" This question he proceeded to answer promptly by proposing adoption of the concept of regional as contrasted with national industrialization. His recommendations dealt with the central questions of (a) sources of capital; (b) sources of technical knowledge; (c) relationship between consumer and capital goods production; (d) state sponsorship of industry; (e) the need for "political similarity" of participating governments, all of which topics were dealt with in the subsequent Soviet presentation. After a short comment from the Tunisian member, a second Syrian delegate, Maruf Dawalibi (who also was present at the New Delhi meeting in April 1955) then sought to prevent the introduction of other ideas and to steer the organization of the deliberations.

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He proposed a plan of work, suggesting that "the written\* and verbal reports so far presented were quite adequate as a basis for defining the agenda of our committee." He suggested that an agenda subcommittee of the whole be created and also introduced a new topic, calling attention to the need to deal with the case "of the people who are still colonized." The chairman, after having heard and passed over comments by an Egyptian delegate and the Burmese delegate, reiterated the observation of his Syrian colleague concerning the commission's need to consider the problems of peoples still in colonial status, and again recognized his colleague.

Returning again to the question of organizing the committee's work, Mr. Dawalibi repeated his proposal that the committee operate as a unit, thus opposing the Egyptian and Sudanese proposals for the creation of subcommittees. After further inconclusive discussion on whether one, three, or four subcommittees should be organized, the chair finally recognized the Russian delegate, who proposed (a) a general discussion on the following day with the whole committee in attendance; (b) a decision in principle on the creation of subcommittees; and (c) a postponement of the decision of need for and number of subcommittees necessary until after the general discussion. His "suggestions" were promptly supported by the Chinese delegate, Chi Tao Ming, and thereafter by Palestine, the Sudan, and Egypt. In this manner the entire committee was held together (as had been originally proposed by the Syrian delegation) to hear the Soviet report, and an opportunity was created for the real discussion on convening subcommittees to take place outside the formal meeting. Four subcommittees (again a reflection of the Syrian delegate's insistence on a special consideration of the dependent countries) were in fact formed

\*The most elaborate and lengthy reports presented at the Conference were those presented by Egypt and Syria to the Economic Commission. The Egyptian report had been prepared as far back as October by Adel Amin, an Egyptian Communist. The authors of the Syrian report are not known, but its content clearly reflects the close link which the writers must have had to the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Damascus in November. Significant similarity to the Egyptian and Syrian reports have also been noted in detailed and lengthy reports presented by individual members of the Ceylonese and Japanese delegations.

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on the following day: (a) the Commerce Exchange Subcommittee; (b) the Industrial and Agricultural Subcommittee; (c) the Labor and Cooperatives Subcommittee; and (d) the Dependent Countries Subcommittee.

1. Economic Struggle Against Colonialism - The Soviet Program is Presented

On the second day of deliberations, the Soviet delegate, Arzumaniyan, in his speech to the Economic Commission presented a Communist blueprint for economic development in Afro-Asia, repeating the usual Soviet offer of disinterested aid without strings to independent countries in Africa and Asia. Other aspects of his speech merit closer and more immediate priority attention.

First, he spoke in a curiously ambiguous manner. When proposing courses of action, he spoke as an Afro-Asian, exploiting the basic advantage offered by the admittance of the USSR to the Conference as a full and equal participant. At other points, particularly when making offers of assistance, he spoke as a representative of the Soviet bloc addressing Afro-Asian peoples. The significance of this dualism emerged later when the economic commission produced for all Afro-Asian countries resolutions on commerce, labor, and industrial development which were consistent with Mr. Arzumaniyan's recommendations, and a separate group of resolutions directed to the dependent countries, which called for struggle against inclusion of dependent African territories in the European Common Market program, condemned existing colonial development schemes, Colombo Plan, etc., and advocated acceptance only of such aid as was offered without strings.

Second, basing his presentation on the Soviet example, he suggested the essentials of a national economic development program which each Afro-Asian country could profitably adopt. The principal elements of this program were

a. Financing of industrial development through nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise.

b. State control of all foreign trade, with severe restriction of non-essential imports, to ensure direction of profits and benefits to productive purposes.

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c. Central economic planning, with emphasis upon the priority development of productive industrial capacity rather than upon consumer goods.

d. Maximum exploitation of raw materials exports in foreign markets to help defray costs of internal development.

In view of his offer of Soviet aid and technical assistance, "within the capabilities of the Soviet economy," it is interesting to note that he emphasized in this portion of his speech that economic development could be achieved, as he claimed it was in the Soviet Union, without foreign aid, if the proper techniques were employed.

Third, he suggested a cooperative economic program, to be undertaken by all Afro-Asian countries in concert, which would further contribute to economic development of the whole area. This cooperative program would involve the acceptance by the Afro-Asian group of such concepts as complementary national economies, the use of preferential and protective tariffs, and joint pricing of raw materials exports outside the Afro-Asian area to maximize profits. The program, which he related to the need to protect the Afro-Asian countries against unfair pressures of "new colonialism" of the European Common Market and the threat of plans for Eurafrikan development, contained what was in effect an endorsement in principle of the Egyptian call for the creation of an Afro-Asian common market, within which the USSR and its Asian satellites presumably would be included. But it went far beyond those ideas by calling for the integration of national economies in Africa and Asia. It was clear from the proceedings that the USSR was not disposed to commit itself in advance to such enterprises as were envisioned in the detailed Syrian, Egyptian, Japanese, and even Moroccan proposals.

Also, in this section of his speech, the Soviet delegate said that the Afro-Asian countries, "being dedicated to the principles of anti-colonialism naturally could not themselves indulge in the techniques of colonial plunder." This interesting statement, which followed his description of private investment of capital abroad as "the main imperialist device for plundering colonial territories," is a clear indication that in Communist opinion such operations by private capital are unacceptable even

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if carried out by the more advanced independent countries of Asia and Africa, such as India and Japan. Together with a statement of Mr. Sadek,\* it makes clear that Soviet opposition to real Afro-Asian economic cooperation at this time will persist so long as the exclusion of the West from Afro-Asian economic affairs is not complete, and that it does not envision the assignment of any role in such development schemes to private capital.

Both the speech and the final resolutions on economic questions, which the Soviet delegation accepted, laid the groundwork for the piecemeal development of a system of economic cooperation, with the USSR in a position to control the pace and extent of the development.

Against this background, the emphasis placed on regionally integrated industrialization, with its acceptance of the interdependence of the participating states, clearly suggests the line along which Leninist "unity" is to be developed between the Soviet bloc and the free nations of Asia and Africa, as the slogan of "national self-determination" ceases to be valid.

## 2. The Question of Colonial Territories

The denunciation by the commission of the European Common Market and the related Eurafica development plan had also

\*Note: An informative illustration of the Communist capability to deal gracefully with problems which arise in such conferences is provided by a statement made on 28 December by an Egyptian delegate, Abd al Aziz Sadek (a long-time Egyptian Peace Partisan). When it appeared that the question of an Afro-Asian Common Market was getting too much attention, this man issued a statement that Egypt did not favor the creation of a common market because:

"1. The non-recognition of Communist China by certain countries constituted an obstacle to the common market.

"2. There was a possibility that certain Western powers would their control over certain territories in Asia and Africa to 'intrude' on the common market."

He then gently directed discussion into what the USSR considered proper terms at this time, by "proposing" that "African and Asian countries cooperate closely in the economic field through individual bilateral agreements."

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been foreshadowed elsewhere by Communist statements as far back as September 1957, when the World Peace Council publication, Horizons, published an article by Pierre Cot on "The Illusions of the Common Market." Joint declarations issued on 29 November and 5 December by the French Communist Party, together with leading representatives of the Communist parties of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, both incorporated this same attack on the Eurafrika plan. Other Moscow attacks on the Eurafrika plan were also made earlier in 1957. The Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow in fact made a contribution to this campaign at the end of the year by publishing a "Symposium" which contained articles from sixteen countries--all devoted to criticism of the Common Market program.

An important point which gradually emerged during the Cairo deliberations was that the question of the Eurafrika plan was viewed from two different aspects

- a. The unfavorable impact of the Eurafrika plan on the economic development of the independent countries of Afro-Asia, outside the plan area, whose economies would encounter competition from Eurafrika.
- b. The equally unfavorable impact of the plan on the African territories to be directly affected (e.g., North Africa, Black Africa) whose present subjugation to colonial domination would be enhanced by the operation of the plan.

### 3. The Final Resolutions

A comparison of the final proposals of the economic commission with the recommendations submitted by the various participants reveals the following. The Syrian recommendations on the propriety of nationalization, on encouraging governments to work for the development of joint plans and programs for economic development, plus the recommendations for support of colonial peoples struggling for freedom and independence, were incorporated in the final resolutions. The resolutions on economic, agricultural, and industrial cooperation and on action affecting labor and cooperatives reflected primarily the Egyptian submission. The recommendations concerning commercial exchange as finally presented to the Conference reflected the arguments presented by both the

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Egyptians and Syrians and incorporated specific secondary recommendations made by both of them, such as the need for a joint consultative body to deal with economic planning, proposals for exchange of commercial data, and support for a Cairo Conference of Chambers of Commerce (an Egyptian proposal).

However, all specific recommendations for such measures as the creation of a common economic development fund, a common market, a central bank (Moroccan proposal), an Asian-African payments union, etc., simply vanished. These very concrete proposals which had considerable support from members of the Japanese and Indian delegations, among others, appear to have been dropped without any significant discussion after the unenthusiastic Soviet attitude toward these recommendations was made clear in the speech delivered on the second day of the Conference.

Although many of the delegates came to this Conference, in spite of misgivings, because of their hope that one or more of these proposals might be endorsed, their failure to achieve anything tangible appears to have gone unnoticed.

But this was not merely a failure to achieve a desired end. It was, even more importantly, a major victory for the International Communist Movement which is now in a position to exploit for agitational purposes the alluring and generalized resolutions of the Conference, which define aspirations that are universally appealing, and courses of action which appear desirable. The movement can accept this wholeheartedly and yet remain free to maneuver and agitate over methods and specific steps to the advantage of its own cause.

#### C. The Cultural Commission

This commission functioned as a single body with Dr. Taha Hussein of Egypt as presiding officer and an Indian delegate, Professor R. V. Oturkar, as rapporteur. In this coherence it differed from the Political and Economic Commissions, which broke into subcommittees in spite of the desires of some delegations. The heads of the Chinese and Ghanian delegations participated in its deliberations, as did Dr. Louis Awad, the rapporteur of the Egyptian delegation. Proceedings went forward smoothly and consisted mainly of hearing proposals from many delegates. There was virtually no debate.

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The original Egyptian proposals were discussed and minor amendments were offered by the Ceylon, Indian, Japanese, and Burma delegations. These, however, were taken up with the rapporteur rather than in open discussion. The Syrian delegate offered at the second meeting a modifier of the preamble to the Egyptian resolution. This statement which "politicalized" the entire content of the recommendations highlighted "the role played by culture in the development of political, economic, and social solidarity."

The Soviet delegate on the commission extended the invitation to Afro-Asian writers to participate in the second Asian Writers' Conference to be held in Tashkent in October 1958.

The final meeting of the commission adopted the original Egyptian recommendations with the addition of only the Syrian amendment described above and a proposal for the creation of national translation bureaus.

Four additional recommendations were approved--one on teaching of the major languages of Africa and Asia, one on scholarships for Algerian students, one calling for an annual Afro-Asian cultural prize, and one calling on governments to combat illiteracy.

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II. STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT

The Organization Commission of the Conference comprised the heads of all national delegations. However, in a number of instances--as in the USSR delegation, for example--less prominent delegates were present who either directed the actions of delegation leaders or were authorized to speak for them.

Little is known about the deliberations of this commission, but the results of its actions merit close study. The final resolution on organization approved the creation of an Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council and a permanent secretariat. This is the culmination of an organizing effort which began three years ago. These bodies, which have not to date (August 1958) been completely staffed, have not yet begun to function. In the interim the Egyptian committee is operating in their stead and appears to be concentrating on the translation and dissemination of some of the Conference speeches. Preparation of material for the vitriolic "Voice of Free Africa" is also being carried out.

On the basis of data so far received, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and its permanent bodies are, roughly, regional equivalents of the World Peace Movement and its organs, the Executive Bureau and Secretariat.

It is like the WPC in that

- a. It encompasses all kinds of people, as distinguished from the other major fronts, which specialize in appealing to one specific group--trade unionists, youth, lawyers.
- b. It has espoused as one of its primary tasks the same basic program to which the WPC is dedicated, i.e., the campaign for peace--on Soviet terms.
- c. There is no evidence that the Council and Secretariat are constitutionally responsible to the Conference which authorized their creation. (In the WPC the Secretariat is self-perpetuating and not responsible to the World Peace Council; the Executive Bureau of the WPC is nominated by the

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Secretariat; there is no mechanism or procedure for direct nomination by the Council.)

It differs from the World Peace Movement--and avoids a major defect of that organization--in one essential. It has a second positive mission, through which it can reach and influence others who are not Communists. This mission is its support of national liberation movements. In this it can serve as a focus and coordinating center, bringing together all Communist front activity in the Afro-Asian area, whether it be in youth, labor, professional fields, women, etc. The organization of "Algeria Day" programs on 30 March throughout the Afro-Asian area was its main project so far, and at the national level Communist parties have invariably played key roles in these programs.

The organization and charter of the Council is still unclear. All that is known is that every country in the two continents is entitled to have one member of the Council, to be nominated by the national committee. The Council will convene when called by the Secretariat and will meet at least once each year. From this limited information it seems clear, however, that the principal function of the Council will be that of a rubber stamp, to approve in retrospect the actions of the Secretariat. The provision for individual nominations to the Council is also of interest, because it facilitates Communist control of the body (through the close-knit international party mechanism) and inhibits joint action by the free nations of Africa and Asia, which lack any equivalent device.

The Secretariat, composed of a Secretary General and ten secretaries, is given virtual carte blanche so far as its mission and internal structure is concerned. The Egyptian committee was given the right to select the Secretary General (for one year!); the ten other national committees authorized to designate one secretary each were Camerouns, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, the Sudan, Syria, the USSR, and Ghana. There has been an unexplained delay in the selection of secretaries. The Soviet secretary, Abd al Ghaffar Abd al Rashidov, the first to arrive in Cairo, did so in early March. The Chinese member, Yang Shuo, arrived in Cairo 5 May.

Both the method of selection and the specific countries selected are of critical importance in determining the future of Communist control of this strategic body.

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a. A precedent has been established by which, at a second conference, the key post of Secretary General can be handed to a Communist, from either a Bloc country or even a Free World country where CP domination of the national committee is complete.

b. The precedent has been established by which any country not considered a reliable ally by the Soviet Bloc can easily be prevented from gaining a seat on the Secretariat.

Two seats on the Secretariat are already Communist-controlled. For other seats Communists or crypto-Communists are likely to be designated, although the decisions have not as yet been made. The countries to be represented are India, Syria, and the Sudan. In at least one of these, however, there is already evidence that the national committee is deadlocked in making its choice. It is impossible at present to determine whether Communist influence in the national committees of the Cameroons, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and Ghana is sufficiently strong to lead to the designation of an individual who is, overtly or covertly, subject to Communist party discipline or to control by a clandestine arm of a Soviet Bloc government.

The question is not, however, being left completely to chance, if the Secretariat follows a reported plan for the internal division of labor and the specific assignments of the individual country secretaries.

Four main committees have in fact been provided for

- a. Political
- b. Social
- c. Economic
- d. Liaison.

It is reported that within these main committees specific assignments for country secretaries have been distributed as follows:

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- a. Ghana (Social Committee) - Youth and Social Services
- b. India (Economic Committee) - Labor and Cooperatives
- c. Japan (Political Committee) - Nuclear Weapons
- d. Indonesia (Liaison Committee) - Asian States
- e. Iraq (Liaison Committee) - Arab States
- f. Sudan (Liaison Committee) - African States

On the basis of the activities of the Conference itself, and of general knowledge concerning the activities of the national Communist parties of the Afro-Asian area, these assignments cannot be considered fortuitous. Rather, they reflect a particularly apt division of labor from the Communist point of view, in which a particular strength or special function of the respective national Communist party would tend to improve its chances for exerting influence.

a. In Ghana the youth groups are the bodies to which local Communists and pro-Soviet extremists have directed their main efforts.

b. In India, Communist Party mass organization is strongest in both labor and peasant bodies, and major unity campaigns are being conducted in both fields. It is, further, enlightening to note that A. K. Gopalan, the leading Communist in the Indian delegation to Cairo, is a member of the Politburo of the CP, president of the Party's peasant organization, and a formulator and leading spokesman for the current Party policy of aggressive unity campaigns in both the labor and agricultural cooperatives fields. The main points of the Cairo resolutions on these matters followed closely the main lines of a key speech he made in August 1957 to the Conference of the Party's peasant movement--the All-India Kisan Sabha.

c. Again, the Japanese Communist Party has had major success in developing and dominating the front campaigns on the nuclear weapons issue. The speech by YASUI Kaoru

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at Cairo on the topic was the most intemperate address delivered by any Japanese delegate, and it faithfully echoed the Soviet, Chinese, and World Peace Council line on the topic.

d. The designation of Sudan to handle liaison with the African countries is also enlightening. In this regard, the statements made by the Sudanese Communist Izzal Din Amer, quoted elsewhere in this paper, reveal that this function is precisely the one which most closely fits the capabilities of the Sudanese party.

e. The designation of Indonesia and Iraq to equally critical liaison tasks is also significant. The Iraqi delegation to the Conference was drawn from the Left-Nationalist opposition at home and in exile, in a country in which official policy was, at least at that time, contrary to that advocated by the Conference. Such elements, which have heretofore accepted the cooperation of the Iraqi Communist Party, are admirably suited to serve as a bridge to dissident elements in the other Arab states, and at the same time, as a channel through which Iraqi Communists can exert influence by providing clandestine communication links, introductions to Party members in other countries, advice, and other useful services.

In Indonesia the strength, international contacts, and favorable position of the Communist Party, which has succeeded in identifying itself as a leading element in the campaign for recovery of West Irian, again would tend to give it considerable leverage in gaining control of and exploiting this position.

It remains to be determined what functions will be assigned to the secretaries from the USSR and China, the Cameroons, and Syria, all of which are of critical importance to Communist control of the Secretariat. It also remains to be seen what individuals actually are designated to these positions.

On the basis of the events at the Conference it appears likely that either the USSR or the Syrian member would head the Economic Committee, with the other designee taking responsibility for a subcommittee on commercial relations or national economic policy. China is a logical candidate to head the Social Committee. It is impossible to envisage the function likely to be assigned to the Cameroonian secretary.

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III. THE CONFERENCE AND BLACK AFRICA

With the exception of the Ghanaian and Ethiopian delegations, which attended primarily as observers with the approval of their respective governments, and the Cameroon delegation, which represented an undeniably significant (although illegal) political element, the numerous "delegations" which claimed to represent Black Africa at Cairo were largely composed of individuals currently residing in Cairo. These, as well as others such as the representatives of the French Sudan, have at best very dubious bases for their claims to be representative of politically significant groups. Many, such as the Kenya representatives, are in fact students in Cairo whose education is being subsidized by the Egyptian authorities.

Few such "representatives," however, have been repudiated by the groups or countries they claimed to represent; and there is a hazard that they may in course of time be considered "representatives approved by default".

One such self-designated representative who was openly repudiated was Joseph Garang, native of the Southern Sudan. He nevertheless went to Cairo and was officially listed as a member of the Sudanese delegation, as a representative of the Southern Liberal Party. Prior to his departure from Khartoum, however, the secretary general of the Southern Liberal Party had publicly disavowed him and announced that he represented no one except himself--and the Communist Party, of which he has been a member for some time. It is also interesting to note that he was not included in the list of official Sudanese delegates released in Khartoum by the all-Party committee which chose the official Sudanese delegation.

The caliber and character of most of the Black African "representatives" is clearly revealed in the following items based on official transcripts of representative speeches and statements:

a. John Kamwidhi (allegedly a student resident in Cairo), self-styled "leader of the Kenya delegation," delivered a strange parody of the American Declaration of Independence, incorporating praise for such degenerate Mau Mau terrorists as "Marshal" China, "Field Marshal" Kimathi and "Marshal" Mathenye, and repeated denunciations of the British security

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practices. He also described Kenya political organizations, identifying Mr. Arquings Khodek as president of the Nairobi District African National Congress, "the only strong body," and listed as three other "repressed" bodies, the North, Central, and South Nyanza African Associations.

b. A Nigerian delegate (speaking in the subcommittee on imperialism on the question of choosing a president for the committee): "I propose we elect alternatively different presidents from Africa and Asia."

Chairman pro tem: "This is not very clear; if I understand properly, everyone would become president."

c. The spokesman for the Chad delegation aroused considerable apprehension at the Conference when he called for the provision of arms to a "United African Army" which, he said, would then carry out the war to eliminate colonial oppression.

There is, however, evidence which suggests that considerable effort was expended without success by the Egyptians in attempts to bring more competent and impressive delegates from Black Africa to the Conference. Invitations were conveyed to such prominent personalities as Tom Mboya of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, and Diallo Seydou of French West Africa, but all of them failed to attend. It seems likely that their non-appearance resulted either from their own lack of enthusiasm or, more significantly, from the disfavor with which their organizations viewed the gathering. Other figures from East Africa, according to Egyptian broadcasts, allegedly received clandestine invitations and offers of aid for clandestine travel to Cairo via the Sudan. But in spite of such "opportunities" to evade the travel restrictions certain to be imposed by colonial administrations, virtually all East African invitees appeared to find it less compromising and politically more profitable to follow the normal procedures of applying for passports and official permission to travel, knowing full well that permission would be denied. These executive actions they--and the Egyptian radio as well--have since exploited in post-Conference propaganda. This course was adopted by a five-man delegation from Zanzibar, three men from Kenya, and two from Tanganyika.

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Communist participation from Black Africa was in fact very limited; but this fact may have been the outgrowth of local political problems with which these elements are currently concerned.

Perhaps the most interesting and enlightening reaction to the Conference by the Communist-oriented elements in Black Africa was the treatment given the Conference in the 27 December issue of the South African New Age weekly. A factual and generally favorable half-page story concerning the opening of the Conference was published side by side with a reprint of the manifesto issued by the Egyptian Communist Party in July 1957, which was published at that time by Humanite and Unita, the newspapers of the Communist Parties of France and Italy. This manifesto, which states clearly (for a Communist audience, at least) the reservations and limits conditioning Communist endorsement of the Nasser regime, seems likely to have been published in this way to aid the Communist reader to understand the true character and significance of the Conference and the cautious enthusiasm with which the paper treated the event. The 8 December issue of CP India's New Age used precisely the same device, printing the manifesto on one page along with a CP Egypt criticism of Nasser's domestic policy; a report concerning the Cairo Conference was on the adjacent page.

In spite of the existence of significant Communist-oriented elements among the nationalist groups in French Equatorial and West Africa, and the issuance of invitations to local affiliates of the World Peace Council, their participation at Cairo was minimal. Travel difficulties alone cannot be held responsible, for paid passages were made available by the Secretariat of the Conference, and Communist student and trade union personalities from the area have usually managed in the past to overcome this obstacle when the event was considered important. But a number of Black African Communists decided to forego attending even such major activities as the Vith World Youth Festival in Moscow and the WFTU Congress in Leipzig in 1957 to avoid exposing themselves to local denunciation. On the basis of information gleaned earlier in 1957 it is also considered likely that this most mature component of Communism in Black Africa is well-aware of the fact that many non-Communist and anti-Communist nationalists, as a result of their experiences with Arab residents in their own countries, also find Egyptian pan-Arabism and expansionism distasteful. It is also likely that some Communists share this

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attitude and do not yet fully understand and/or enthusiastically accept the Soviet-inspired strategy of collaboration with Nasser-Arab nationalism in advancing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa. This general problem is reflected in the speech delivered by Firmin Joseph Abalo, delegate from Togo, which reflects this attitude of Central African nationalists:

"There is finally a problem which should not escape us, and with which Central Africa will request that the Conference concern itself, to try to find possible solutions. It is the attitude of the Syro-Lebanese.

"You no doubt know (at least the Central African delegations) that Syrian and Lebanese citizens are engaged in commerce in our countries. Their behavior toward the local population is like that of the European colonialists, and they are in general allied with them to exploit our people. On the political level as well they side with the imperialists.

"Our masses have difficulty understanding us when we explain to them that all the countries of Africa and Asia--including the Syrians and Lebanese in consequence--are united in the same struggle for their liberation from imperialist domination. These masses, we say, cannot understand how their Asian friends continue to fight against us in the camp of our aggressors."

There is in fact no reason to believe that in its choice of means of influencing Africa the USSR and International Communism are placing undue emphasis and reliance upon the Afro-Asian Solidarity organization and support for Nasser's aspirations. Trade union and youth groups throughout Africa have long been cultivated directly, and the problems attendant upon simultaneously exploiting African nationalism and strengthening Communism in Black Africa have already been recognized within the International Movement. An article by A. Zusmanovich, published in August 1957 in the second issue of the new Soviet academic publication on Afro-Asia, Contemporary East, sheds light on this aspect of the Soviet attitude toward Africa. While it grants that "at the present stage of development the liberation movement in the African colonies is headed by the national bourgeoisie," the

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main emphasis in the article is on the developing strength of trade unionism and the need to integrate that strength into the anti-colonial effort.

"The African working class must clash with the colonizers because the basic enterprises using hired labor belong to foreign corporations. Therefore the struggle of the working class is becoming an integral part of the all-people, national, anti-imperialist movement."

This "assessment" is clearly not a new one; but in the past it has been largely restricted to trade union circles. From the abundant proof that an intensive campaign has been carried out by the WFTU and its African offshoots since 1955 to involve non-Communist African trade unionists in united front arrangements at the national level two conclusions emerge.

(a) The USSR continues to place high priority on establishing Communist domination of African trade unions as the main instrument for influencing and dominating the national liberation effort in the area.

(b) Because the efforts made between 1946 and 1955 to pull African labor bodies directly into the Communist camp by working through Communist trade union bodies in the mother countries have largely failed, the current intent is to exploit unity of action in economic struggle against colonialism at the local and national level as a different route to the same end.

Communist-dominated African unions have in fact been permitted to disaffiliate from the WFTU, as a tactical measure only, in order to make their unity proposals more palatable locally, and they have been accepted in some national and regional bodies as a result. But their ability to exploit these gains is limited as long as the trade unions do not become (a) involved in violent conflict with local government, (b) identified with the extremist elements of the national liberation movement, and/or (c) combined in broader regional bodies and thus open to Communist exploitation of the opportunity to manipulate their organizational skills, common perspective, and parallel lines of coordination and direction which operate through the International Communist Movement.

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The Afro-Asian solidarity strategy is obviously viewed as a means of encouraging and controlling this rapprochement, while keeping the nature and extent of the Communist influence in the process concealed. But the holding of the Cairo Conference and the establishment of the Council and Secretariat are by no means adequate organizational measures in themselves.

Other measures are being taken. These measures appear likely to involve the assumption by the Communist Party of the Sudan and its cadres of an important task--that of becoming a bridge, intermediary, buffer, and source of support, between the pro-Communist movement in the Arab World and at least some of the national liberation forces of Black Africa. A post-Conference speech by a leading Sudanese Communist broadcast from Cairo to the Sudan deals with this extremely significant question:

Broadcast Interview with Dr. Izzal-Din Amir, Secretary of the Sudanese Delegation to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference - 29 December 1957

"The AASC is an extension of the Bandung Conference of 1955. . . . The present Conference represents a bigger force as it represents the people. . . . The Conference is of greater importance to the African countries whose case has not been considered on an international level. There are several African nations struggling for independence, the peoples of the Camerouns, Tanganyika, Uganda, and others . . . . The leaders of the peoples represented after reaching an understanding can exert pressure upon their governments so as to present a united front in the United Nations, thus forming an international bloc which may save the world from the dangers of war."

Question: "What is the role to be played in the Conference by the Sudanese delegation?"

Answer: "The Sudan by its own geographical and political position constitutes a bridge between the Middle East and the Arab League on the one hand, and the heart of Africa which is still under the yoke of imperialism, on the other. The Sudan should be spokesman of the African nations which are waging a bitter struggle against imperialism. Furthermore, it has its role which it must play in the support of the Arab cause . . ."

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and the Arab liberation trends led by Egypt and Syria. The Sudan as a newly independent and an uncommitted country is more capable of acting than some other Arab or African countries which have joined certain alliances.

"The Sudan did not achieve independence until two years ago. . . . However, in spite of the short period available, the Sudan has made important contacts with the African countries. The latest example is that of the Cameroons. The Sudan was able to reach some liberation movements in Tanganyika and Uganda. It also worked to facilitate the travel of some of these countries' delegations to Cairo to attend the present Conference. . . . There are several close links between the Sudan's cause and that of the African countries. The Sudan had experience with imperialism. The methods used by the imperialists in Tanganyika or in Uganda are very similar to those used in southern Sudan to isolate it, and to keep it in a primitive state. . . . The Afro-Asian countries should take action against this European common market or the alleged free trade area."

Key figures among the Communist-influenced African nationalists, such as Felix Moumie, are now active in Khartoum as well as Cairo. There is evidence of cooperation between Sudanese Communists and Egyptians in attempts to bring people to the Conference clandestinely from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and other central African territories. These factors increase the likelihood that the Sudan will in fact fill the role outlined above. Further, the ability of the Communist movement to coordinate Black African activities of the international fronts with those of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council is enhanced by the introduction of Sudanese nationals into leading positions in the executive bodies and secretariats of most of the major international fronts.

Some post-Conference broadcasts from Cairo to Black Africa strongly suggested that the Egyptians at least were sensitive to the possibility that their appeal to Black Africa was being adversely affected by charges that the Conference was Communist-inspired and dominated. They have tried to refute these charges by pointing out the contradictions between the repressive measures generally taken by Communist governments and the demands for freedom of speech, assembly, etc., for which the Conference called in its resolutions.

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IV. TREATMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WITHIN THE SOVIET BLOC

It was apparent as the Conference convened that the countries of the Soviet bloc were eager to exploit it as a topic for domestic propaganda as well as for foreign output. Such domestic propaganda efforts have in the past been made in connection with the activities of the international Communist fronts, but with the possible exception of the Vth World Youth Festival no single such event has in past years received as extensive and enthusiastic treatment by both the USSR and China.

The processing for Chinese audiences was noteworthy for the following reasons:

a. Delegates upon their return to China inflated the statistics concerning attendance: Kuo Mo-jo on 9 February said to a 1,500-man Peiping rally that 508 delegates representing fifty Afro-Asian countries were present (actual participation was forty-three countries).

b. The Conference was described to Chinese audiences, who were already familiar with the 1955 Bandung Conference, as "a continuation and development of the Bandung Conference," "unity (reached) at a higher level," and as having produced a "common program of action." This line was echoed by the Japanese CP and by Soviet broadcasts in Japanese.

c. The resolutions of the Conference were represented as "a powerful support to the Peace Manifesto of the sixty-four Communist and Workers' Parties at Moscow." This line was again echoed by the Japanese CP and replayed by Moscow in Japanese.

d. The theme most insistently reiterated was that the Conference represented "two-thirds of the people of the earth"; "more than one billion, 600 million people"; the slogan "The Wind Blows From the East" was hammered in press and radio treatments. This thesis the USSR also propagated.

e. To heighten the impression of the strength and determination of the Black African participants, the Chinese also published and broadcast dramatic (but false) stories concerning delegates travelling to Cairo on foot from Black Africa.

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f. China also placed considerable emphasis upon evidence of her close rapprochement with Egypt. New China-Egypt and Egypt-China Friendship Societies launched simultaneously in both countries in January 1958, were linked with the Conference in propaganda output.

In general, the primary Chinese emphasis was directed at demonstrating, even through direct falsification, the strength and vitality of the Afro-Asian response to the Solidarity Conference. Even Free World commentaries which, while generally unfavorable to the Conference, stated that the event had to be taken seriously were quoted extensively to Bloc audiences to prove this thesis. The Chinese also were more ready to acknowledge the relationship of the Conference to the future of Communist parties throughout Africa and Asia, and less interested in highlighting the Moslem-Arab role in the Conference.

#### Treatment for Soviet Audiences

Moscow's treatment of the Conference differed in emphasis from that of the Chinese. Although it too emphasized the weight and size of the forces allegedly represented, and predicted that "the weapon of solidarity will be used even more frequently in the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa" (Leontyev, Soviet Home Service, 2 February 1958), it emphasized even more the following themes:

- a. The peoples of Afro-Asia have become convinced that the USSR is the true friend, mighty ally.
- b. The West was stunned, confused, and alarmed by the Conference.
- c. The "slandering" by the West of the Conference as Communist-inspired and dominated has failed to impress the Afro-Asian countries.
- d. New plots and countermeasures are being drummed up to counter the effects of the Conference.
- e. The "colonialists'" attempts to prevent delegates from attending the Conference failed.

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The Soviet domestic treatment placed emphasis upon the value of the Conference as an aid to the campaign for peace and incorporated the Conference in its ever-growing list of targets for future "imperialist plots." It also showed the higher level of Soviet sensitivity to the exposure of the Communist inspiration and domination of the Conference and its concern over the reactions of Afro-Asian governments which it so assiduously seeks to cultivate. The USSR also publicized the Conference resolutions on the rights of the Palestine Arabs and concentrated, more than China did, upon the extent of Moslem participation in the gathering.

One broadcast on the Soviet Home Service, made during the period of greatest concentration on the Conference, is of particular interest. In this broadcast the speaker, Eugene Gusarov, placed his emphasis upon a description of the extent to which "the young African proletariat has entered the path of the national liberation movement." Statistics on the growth of the trade union movement in Nigeria and French West Africa were presented; Nigeria, the Cameroons, and Kenya were the main territories credited with "significant advances" and described as the scenes of the "severest struggles".

The broadcast strongly suggests that it is to these countries and this proletariat that the USSR looks for the organization and leadership of effective national liberation movements in the area, but it is noteworthy that there was virtually no representation of this "African proletariat" at Cairo.

Perhaps the most interesting fact concerning the propaganda treatment was the virtually complete omission, from both the Soviet and Chinese early domestic output, of any extensive description of the Soviet delegate Arzumaniyan's suggestions to the Afro-Asian countries about the organization of their domestic economic programs. Both treat his description of the extent and disinterested nature of Soviet aid, his description of the evils attendant upon acceptance of Western imperialist aid, and his endorsement of nationalization of foreign enterprise as a source of capital. His blueprint for effective economic development was finally reported at some length in the Soviet journal Contemporary East in March 1958.

Another fact worthy of note was the extent to which the Soviet outlets quoted, as the authoritative voice of the Egyptian hosts

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on key questions, statements and interviews with Khalid Mukhi-al-Din, the leading Egyptian Communist active at the Conference, and other Egyptians closely associated with him, such as the Foreign Editor of his newspaper, Al Masaa, and Yussuf Hilmi of the Egyptian Peace Partisans. Mukhi-al-Din's address on imperialism was reported at length in the Russian language magazine, Contemporary East, in March 1958.

The USSR also insured the widest distribution possible of the resolutions adopted at the Conference by issuing a special supplement containing all the resolutions as an enclosure to issue No. 3 (16 January 1958) of its publication New Times.

Polish output concerning the gathering was limited, but it did contribute two special notes:

a. It acknowledged the existence of "differences separating Afro-Asian countries," and "serious obstacles to the convening of a second official Conference of the countries of Afro-Asia."

b. It characterized the resolutions as "condemnation of the opportunism of some Afro-Asian countries which show a lack of consistency in their statements in the international area."

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