

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

## COMMUNIST THEORY ON THE USE OF VIOLENCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. General attitude. In Communist doctrine, the use of violence for political objectives is entirely legitimate, practically unavoidable, and indeed, although Communists usually seek to put another face upon it, desirable. Lenin was fond of quoting the popular version of the Clausewitz dictum that war is politics continued by other means and said of it that "rightly, the Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation for their understanding of the meaning of every war."\*

2. Legitimacy of violence. The same position is taken about violence in wars of "national liberation" and in situations that are not definable as war between nations: in struggles short of insurrection, in the revolutionary seizure of power, and in the consolidation of the revolution by destruction of the counter-revolutionaries. Every form of struggle is legitimate. The Communist movement, Lenin said, "does not tie its hands, . . . it recognizes all methods of political struggle, as long as they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the party and facilitate the achievement of the greatest results possible under the given conditions."\*\* Explicitly, terrorism is considered perfectly legitimate:

"We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied, or may even be essential in certain moments of the battle, under certain conditions, and when the troops are in a certain condition. . ." (Lenin)\*\*\*

3. Necessity for violence. Lenin repeatedly stressed the use of violence in the seizure of power. This was both a practical political

\* "Socialism and war," 1915.

\*\* "Urgent tasks of the movement," 1900.

\*\*\* "Where to begin," 1901.

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN

consideration, based upon his conviction that the "class enemy" will not surrender without a fight but rather "will, at the decisive moment, resort to force in defense of its privileges,"\* and it was a psychological matter, dictated by Lenin's desire to intensify class hostility. The "bourgeois state," he said,

"cannot be superseded by the proletarian state through the process of 'withering away,' but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution... The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with this and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of all the teachings of Marx and Engels."\*\*

4. Exploitation of legitimacy of violence by Communist movement.

In this way, Lenin posed the illegitimacy of violence in resistance to the legitimate use of violence by Communists. Since his day, the Communist movement has continued to base its judgments on the criterion of which "class" benefits and which one loses by any given political action, whether violent or non-violent. Thus, the movement both rationalizes and covers its preparations for violence and aggressive action by imputing aggressive intentions to their chosen enemy, purposefully blurring in its own interest the distinction between legitimate defense and aggression. It also uses this device to deprive its victims and enemies of any right to claim legitimacy for defensive measures they may take. Until at least 1954, the CPSU used the thesis of "capitalist encirclement" to this end throughout the world, placing upon free world Communists the obligation to be prepared to use violence in defense of the USSR and the socialist camp. This obligation, although no longer emphasized or even stated, still exists. The 6 December 1960 Statement of eighty-one Communist parties declared that the imperialists are preparing for war.

\* "A retrograde direction in Russian Social Democracy", 1899.

\*\* "The state and revolution", 1917.

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN

and particularly for war against the Communist bloc. This provides a different but equally characteristic doctrinal premise with which free world CP's can justify to their own members the build-up of their capabilities for violence and guerrilla warfare, even if their true motive is to prepare for local aggressive struggle.

5. Expediency of violence. Lenin viewed the question of the use of violence as one of expediency. "There are conditions in which violence is both necessary and useful, and there are conditions in which violence cannot produce any results."\* Whether violence should be used is thus not a matter of principle but a problem of tactical leadership, taking into account forces, objectives, and timing. Lenin explicitly said that the Bolsheviks had "rejected individual terror only out of considerations of expediency"\*\*-in other words, "individual terror" was poor politics.

6. Revolution as an art. This attitude derives from Lenin's conviction--and teaching--that uprising is an art, that is, a matter of technique, which the Communist party had to master. In making this point, he described the necessary conditions for an uprising. He stated that it had to have a broad class base, that the people had to be convinced of the need for revolutionary measures (including violence), and that the uprising had to take place at a crucial point in the development of the revolutionary situation.\*\*\* This statement is of great theoretical importance because it establishes that the function of the party and of conspiratorial work by the Communist movement before an uprising is to bring these conditions about

\* "Successes and difficulties of the Soviet power", 1919.

\*\* "'Left-wing' Communism, an infantile disorder", 1920.

\*\*\* "Marxism and uprising", Collected Works, Vol. XXI, Bk 1., pg. 224-229.

~~SECRET~~

when they do not develop spontaneously. Dependence upon spontaneity has, of course, been systematically denounced by Lenin and the Communist movement as opportunism and treason to the revolution.\* Decisions on the utility and necessity of violence in the build-up and seizure of power in specific situations obviously are to be made in these terms. Up to the moment when power is seized, violence, like other forms of struggle, is useful if it can help build the mass base, promote the revolutionary unurge, and assist the Communist movement in predicting and, if possible, controlling the development of the required critical situation.

7. Condemnation of indiscriminating use of violence. Since the preparation and conduct of a revolution is an art, it follows that the indiscriminate, unintelligent, or mechanical recourse to violence by Communist parties has since Lenin's time logically been condemned as "left adventurism." This concept still remains valid. The Communist Party of Iraq, for example, was obliged in late 1959 to criticize its own left adventurist tendencies after the Kirkuk massacre of July 1959, which occurred as a result of the party's recourse to violence to exert pressure on the Qasim regime. As of the end of 1960, both the CPSU and the Chinese party condemned left adventurism, although the targets of their criticisms were different.

8. Violence in Communist seizure of power. Lenin emphasized violence in the socialist revolution. He held that the possibility of "peaceful development of the revolution" was "extremely rare in history""\*\* "By way of exception, in some small country, for instance, after the social revolution had been accomplished in a neighboring big country, peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is possible, if it is convinced that resistance is hopeless and it it prefers to save its skin."\*\*\*

\* Selected Works, Vol. II, Bk. 1, pp 224-29.

\*\* "On compromises", 1917.

\*\*\* "A caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism' ", 1916.

9. Refinement of doctrine on the role of violence: the "force in being."

Since the middle of World War II the CPSU has tried to refine the doctrine on the role of violence in seizures of power by developing new concepts, which the Soviets embody in treatment of the "peaceful" road to socialism. They have maintained since 1948 that the military and political power of the USSR (and now of the whole bloc) constitutes what we would call a "force in being," committed as a matter of principle to the defense of any Communist regime once established. This, in theory, makes it possible for some Communist parties to seize power without actual recourse to armed struggle, provided the party itself succeeds in organizing sufficient armed force under its own control to inhibit local counterrevolutionary recourse to violence. This "force in being," effective without even being committed to conflict, was represented by workers militias in Czechoslovakia and by Communist-controlled regular forces built up in Poland, Hungary, and the Balkans prior to 1948. Events of 1949-1951 (Korea, Berlin) and of 1953-1954 (in Southeast Asia) notwithstanding, this doctrine is again embodied in the December 1960 Statement of eighty-one Communist parties. (Characteristically, such situations during the 1950's are now used to "prove" that imperialist aggressions and efforts to precipitate a general war have been and can be defeated!) Since at least 1955, there has been strong pressure upon the free world Communist parties--particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America--to master these doctrines and to work out new ways of building reliable armed strength, particularly by creating a para-military capability. This does not entail any abandonment of their long-standing efforts at the subversion of the existing armed forces.

10. Current doctrinal specifications for "peaceful revolution". A doctrinal reformulation of the specific prerequisites for achieving power by "peaceful" means, based upon the principle of the force in being, has

~~NOFORN~~

been hammered out in recent years. The CPSU adopted a thesis at its 20th Congress in 1956 that in "present day conditions the working class in many capitalist countries" may be able to carry out revolutions without violence. The premise--that the enemy must be convinced that it is hopeless to resist--is the same as Lenin's. But the CPSU's elaboration of the thesis and derivative Soviet policies became of an issue in the dispute between the CPSU and the Chinese Communists. The thesis was incorporated into the statement adopted by eighty-one Communist parties in Moscow and published on 6 December 1960. The formulation in the statement, with its qualifiers and provisos, needs quoting in full.

"Today in a number of capitalist countries the working class, headed by its vanguard, has the opportunity, given a united working-class and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and political co-operation between the different parties and public organisations, to unite a majority of the people, win state power without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people. Relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch an extra-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realisation of the socialist revolution. All this will be possible only by broad and ceaseless development of the class struggle of the workers, peasant masses and the urban middle strata against big monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace and socialism.

"In the event of the exploiting classes resorting to violence against the people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on these circles using force at one or other stage of the struggle for socialism.

"The actual possibility of the one or the other way of transition to socialism in each individual country depends on the concrete historical conditions."

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET  
NOFORN~~

11. Significance of this reformulation. The first paragraph validates the selective use of violence, where it is necessary to bring about the conditions and actions prescribed for "peaceful" revolution. The last two paragraphs reaffirm the legitimacy both of armed struggle and of all measures to force the enemy to capitulate. There has in fact been no doctrinal change since Lenin on the use of violence in non-revolutionary situations or in "national liberation." The 6 December Statement takes no explicit doctrinal position on the use of violence in non-revolutionary (or pre-revolutionary) situations, but it cites, among other promising developments, the recent occurrence of "big working class strikes" and the "powerful movement of the people [in Japan] against the Japanese-U.S. military alliance."

12. Violence in "National Liberation" Struggles. Lenin wrote approvingly of "national wars of the colonies against imperialism." Such wars are "inevitable, they are progressive and revolutionary," Lenin said,\* and they should be supported on condition that such a rebellion "is not a rebellion of a reactionary class."\*\* The 6 December Statement of eighty-one Communist parties explicitly endorses "national liberation wars," as well as struggle "by non-military methods, depending upon the specific conditions in the country concerned." "National liberation wars" are viewed by the Communists as valuable for undermining "imperialism" and for creating conditions favorable for the eventual seizure of power by local Communist movements.

---

\*The pamphlet by Junius, " 1916.

\*\*"Discussion on self-determination summed up," 1916.

~~SECRET  
NOFORN~~

13. The problem of armed forces. As in the Communist seizure of power, so in the preparation and conduct of wars of "national liberation," the question of armed forces is a crucial one. The central theoretical question has been whether the buildup of Communist armed force for a takeover of power in an underdeveloped country should be undertaken in opposition to dominant nationalist forces or within the framework of an alliance with them. The growing number of such independent states, many of which are dominated by anti-Communist nationalists, and the obvious Soviet interest in exploiting to the full diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with nationalist regimes are new facts relating to the problem. The failures of Communist parties during the 1945-1951 period to achieve politically significant results either through armed uprisings against national governments (India, 1948-1950; Indonesia, 1948, Malaya, Philippines, etc.), or through subversion of the armed forces of the regime (Iraq, Iran, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Brazil, etc.), made it apparent that new approaches were required.

14. The 1955 thesis. The theses on the 50th anniversary of the 1905 Russian revolution, propounded by the CPSU's Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute during 1955, made it clear that the Soviet leaders believed the best opportunities lay in full exploitation of alliances for violent and radical national revolutionary struggle. Using the abortive 1905 Russian revolution as the precedent, the institute pointed out that, even when such national revolutions failed, they nevertheless paved the way for Communist seizure of power.

15. Advice on the application of the 1955 thesis. Although authoritative and explicit theoretical material on this questions is virtually unavailable, the CPSU advice given secretly to the CP of Brazil at this time embodies one critical concept. Pointing out the failure of the Brazilian party's revolutionary attempt in the 1930's, it stated that the creation of substantial



~~SECRET~~

and reliable party-controlled armed force would be infinitely easier if the party would help a radical nationalist, anti-imperialist government gain power. Then, the CPSU pointed out, a campaign to "democratize" the state-supported forces for defense against domestic counter-revolution and external intervention, together with the subversion of the nationalist regular forces and the grass-roots infiltration of local peoples' militia units, could, over a period of time, give the party the violent action capability it needed for taking power. Implicit in this strategy is the need for creating and maintaining an atmosphere of national crisis which would be sufficiently intense to override the momentary hesitations and fears of "vacillating" nationalist allies until the final moment of crisis. At this moment, with the Communist seizure of power, the vacillators could be dispensed with. The approach also places a premium on the ability of the Communist party to operate secretly as well as openly within the national revolutionary forces, and both the Soviet and the Chinese parties have directly helped free world CPs in recent years to develop their capacity for secret work.

16. The 1955 thesis as a guideline. The general approach embodied in the 1955 thesis obviously represents a maximum program, whose main value was that it set down terms and limits within which a Communist party could develop its long-range work, no matter how unfavorable its initial position might be. Many such parties have long carried on covert programs to infiltrate national armed forces, notably in Brazil, Egypt, Syria, India, Iran and Indonesia. The emergence of popular resistance organizations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon during real or concocted crises (1956-1959) did in fact show that the Communist parties had the will and capability to apply the 1955 ideas, but in no case except that of Cuba has the party been able to maintain the advantage it initially won. The promotion of alliance with radical nationalist forces can be, and since 1955 has been, undertaken with

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

varying success both where these forces were in opposition to the existing government (Cuba, Iraq, Algeria, Black Africa) and where these forces already dominated a nationalist government (Syria, Indonesia, UAR).

17. Theory and practice in Communist commitment to violence.

In theory, Communist parties should support any violent anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in underdeveloped countries, but in fact many parties have been cautious in committing themselves. When the 26 July Movement launched its guerrilla war in Cuba, the Cuban CP remained in the background and did not commit itself to armed struggle for some time. The Algerian CP, too, refrained from offering its support to the ALN for several months after violence began. The Communist Party of China, however, has consistently maintained that such struggles deserve prompt and full support by Communists. The Chinese have also been more willing than the other bloc parties over the past six years--and particularly since 1958--to commit China to the support of guerrilla struggles on the part of national liberation movements. They maintain that such unqualified support is a responsibility that the Communist parties cannot refuse if Communist takeovers of power are eventually to be achieved. The meager available evidence suggests that the more cautious CPSU has favored a conspiratorial effort during the hazardous initial period of nationalist armed uprising, a program of covert infiltration and manipulation of the top leadership of nationalist forces. The CPSU appears to believe that this is primarily a task for individual local and foreign Communists--frequently secret party members or persons not in contact with the local party--rather than for the Communist party itself. This appears to have been the case in Iraq and Cuba. The technique is not new; it was apparently employed in Indonesia between 1945 and the Madiun uprising in 1948.

18. Infiltration of nationalist forces. The initial conspiratorial effort may be very small, but it assumes additional importance at the moment

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

when the local Communist party commits itself to the support of armed struggle. Its importance again increases when the national revolutionary effort succeeds in overthrowing the existing regime, whether through a coup d'etat or through successful guerrilla warfare. In the stage prior to the overthrow of the existing regime, Communists who have penetrated the leadership of nationalist forces can inject Communist organizational doctrine into the operations of these forces and assist members of the Communist party to acquire positions in them, so that the Communists may be able to exert influence and to protect and assist the CP in its own activities. After the overthrow, these individuals can use their influence to commit the new nationalist regime to radical programs of violence of direct value to the Communist drive for power, such as the operation of military tribunals, the expulsion, discrediting, replacement, and liquidation of the main Communist enemies, and the adoption of radical courses in foreign policy. There is also reason to believe that in some instances they play an important role by providing the leaders of the new government with information--true or false--intended to provoke or justify the adoption of specific violent measures which favor the extension of Communist influence and block any possibilities of reconciliation of the nationalist leaders with erstwhile opponents or the major Western powers.

~~SECRET~~

19. Problem of Communist participation in the nationalist power. As the events in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Cuba since 1957 show, a crucial point occurs in the build-up of Communist capability for armed struggle within a national revolutionary regime when the Communist party demands, as a "democratic" right, recognition, legality, and a share in state power. This first point of crisis has posed theoretical problems for the international Communist movement as far back as 1926-1927, when, in China, the break between the CPC and the Kuomintang developed. Before 1954, it was generally accepted on the basis of post World War II experience that these demands could be made successfully either in the course of a national liberation war, in the final stages of a successful civil war, or with the protection and support of Soviet troops. Actual armed struggle by Communist forces or the open employment of military power was inevitably a key factor in these theories. In the past six years, however, considerable attention has been devoted to theories on peaceful ways to the seizure of power. Theories eschewing recourse to violent struggle have been advanced, but in the Moscow declaration of 1957 and the 1960 Statement they have been generally repudiated as unacceptable revisionism.

20. Solution to the problem--"democratization". Other theories have given priority to more flexible and subtle forms of anti-imperialist struggle, and insisted that anti-imperialist forces deserved support even when the nationalist leaders were anti-Communist in local matters. This line has placed a great premium on secret infiltrations and on the activity of front groups as a means of evading and eventually eliminating local anti-Communism. But since 1957 another doctrine has been advanced, with which the CPSU has now openly identified itself in the 1960 Statement. Communist debates from 1958 through 1960 over the role of bourgeois nationalists have called attention to a new and undesirable development which threatens the validity of the whole Communist approach to winning power through the radical nationalist alliance. As expressed in the 1960 Statement, it is the tendency

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

of "certain nationalists" to use demogogy, radical policies, and regular military forces to strengthen their own domestic power positions to the detriment of the Communist party. Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the UAR, and the Sudan are all obviously referred to. In 1961 the Indonesian and Syrian parties have made explicit criticisms along these lines of certain radical policies adopted in the past by their governments, and the "democratization" of the armed forces has been demanded by several parties. Such a development is obviously undesirable from the Communist point of view and, in consequence, Communist parties are now committed in the 1960 Statement to demand that nationalism be not only radical and anti-imperialist, but also "democratic". That is, nationalist regimes must give Communists and Communist parties the freedom and authority which--short of a seizure of power--they seek. The right to bear arms and command units, whether in the regular or para-military forces, is obviously one of these "democratic" rights the Communists demand.

21. Progressive radicalization. The Communist program for the increasing radicalization of the internal and foreign policies of a nationalist regime has a definite logic. As a Cuban Communist leader said at the Moscow Conference in December, 1960, progressive radicalization of nationalist policies "accelerates" and "deepens" the revolution. In international questions radicalism is essential if nationalism is to lead to increased hostility to Western powers and the eventual "merger of anti-imperialism with socialist revolutions." In many cases national Communist parties have sought to "radicalize" nationalist government foreign policies by agitation and the use of violence (India's 1955 "peaceful" invasion of Goa), by support and pressure for the implementation of particular radical policies (e.g., UAR nationalization of the Suez Canal and of British bases, support of violent colonial liberation struggles in Africa by the UAR, Iraq, Morocco), and by exploiting irredentism (India--Kashmir and Goa;

Indonesia--West Irian). The promotion and exploitation of radical nationalist support in Latin America for Puerto Rican independence and for the nationalization of the Panama Canal are currently both major Communist themes, as the March 1961 Conference on National Independence in Mexico City reveals. The radical international policies of the Cuban regime have full Communist backing; so do those of Guinea.

22. Bloc support. The Communist parties of the Soviet bloc, furthermore, are committed to supplementing the efforts of local Communist parties and supporting violent anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle, as the 6 January 1961 speech of N. S. Khrushchev shows. But like the free world Communist parties at the national level, most bloc parties--particularly the CPSU--seek to do this without sacrifice of their own independence of action, without adopting a course of action which entails a serious risk of becoming directly embroiled in a war. This hazard presented itself in 1956 at the time of the Suez crisis.

23. Consolidation and defense of Communist power. After the Communists have seized power, Lenin taught, violence is still more necessary to destroy all resistance. A ruthless dictatorship is required.

"Firstly, capitalism cannot be defeated and eradicated without the ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who cannot at once be deprived of their wealth, of their advantage of organization and knowledge, and consequently for a fairly long period will inevitably try to overthrow the hated rule of the poor; secondly, every great revolution, and a socialist revolution in particular, even if there were no external war, it inconceivable without internal war, i.e., civil war, which is even more devastating than external war, and involves thousands and millions of cases of wavering and desertion from one side to another, implies a state of extreme indefiniteness, lack of equilibrium and chaos."\*

\* "The immediate tasks of the Soviet government", 1919.

24. Current doctrine on consolidation. Current doctrine also holds that power acquired must never be surrendered. Thus, the suppression of the uprising of 1956 in Hungary was called by the CPSU "the only correct course to take", the fulfillment of "our international duty".\* The dictatorship of the proletariat, once established, is committed to the use of necessary violence, unrestricted by law, in order to destroy the domestic enemy, to make counterrevolution impossible, and to defeat invasion from abroad. In the USSR, the CPSU maintains a plan and a nucleus around which Communist partisan forces can be organized in the event of general war. In early 1957 Soviet doctrine held that modern military technology made the use of guerrilla forces more, rather than less, important in the event of war and that success depended upon the adequacy of preparations made before the outbreak of hostilities. This view was conveyed to some free world Communists receiving training at the CPSU's Higher Party School in Moscow.

25. Discrimination in the use of violence in consolidation. In consolidating power, the use of violence is highly selective. It is directed mainly at the discrediting of opposition political forces, at disrupting those military forces that the CP cannot control, and at the liquidation of the few groups and persons who can provide centers for organizing resistance and counterrevolution. The term "salami tactics" has been applied to describe the successive use of violence against the various sources of potential opposition, beginning with those groups which are both the most serious threats and most easily disposed of. Theoretical arguments have arisen in the bloc parties on this question, particularly after the events in Hungary and Poland. Conservative Communist theoreticians have in the past criticized certain Communist parties (that of Poland, for example) for their failure to be consistent and thorough in liquidating potential opponents of the regime. Examples of the effective use of revolutionary tribunals and security forces to eliminate and completely destroy potential

\* Pravda, 23 November 1956.

~~SECRET~~

nuclei of resistance have been much quoted, and events in Cuba and Iraq show that the advice has been accepted. Differences still exist within the movement, however, over the question of how far the use of such selective violence should be carried. The present Polish and Hungarian party leadership, for example, have been most insistent that such violence should be used sparingly, and that unnecessary continuation of its use can only result in failure in the long run.

26. Violence in an unconquered part of a national state. In certain countries--such as Viet Nam--the Communist regime which has consolidated its control over a portion of national territory maintains and uses an elaborate organization to conduct partisan warfare in the territory that remains unconquered. The role of violence in such situations can vary appreciably with changes in Communist general strategy and the fortunes of war. Para-military mobile forces may be maintained, and committed in periods of aggressive pressure or crisis. In other circumstances, the use of violence may be reduced to local terrorist threats and attacks; clashes with defending free world forces in order to provoke the latter to carry out punitive operations against the local population; and the use of assassination and sabotage to sow defeatism and panic. Even the USSR and other European bloc governments, in spite of their proclaimed belief that the domestic basis for effective counterrevolution no longer exists, continue under present conditions to use violence against leaders of refugee organizations of their nationals abroad.

27. The problem of liquidating a Communist military capability. The experience of the Greek and Malayan civil wars shows that, even in the event of a general defeat of an attempted seizure of power, a Communist revolutionary government, basing itself on bloc soil, will try to continue partisan-guerrilla struggle. Justifying the abandonment of such a struggle poses serious theoretical problems. In its 1960 campaign against "right

~~SECRET~~



opportunism" and Khrushchev, the Chinese CP gave considerable publicity to its conviction that a Communist party must never voluntarily liquidate a capability for armed struggle once it is organized. The Chinese quoted their own experience of 1946-1949 to prove the validity of the doctrine. But Communist parties never accept responsibility for such military disasters. In most such situations specific party leaders are eventually made scapegoats, accused of strategic and tactical errors, and in some cases even accused of collaborating with the enemy. Where the Communist party cannot (or will not) dispense with its existing leaders and fails to win from its enemy the minimum political concessions and general amnesty those leaders demand as a condition for the cessation of irregular warfare, the Communist forces feel obliged to continue violent struggle, if only in a symbolic form. There may be divergent views within the Communist movement of what the necessary minimum conditions for abandoning armed struggle should be in any specific case. This is, for example, a problem in Burma and Malaya. In Laos, the minimum demands advanced in 1954 were raised when the Pathet Lao reverted in 1960 to armed struggle, and that organization now appears determined to persist in armed struggle unless it receives guarantees of the integrity of its forces and recognition of its political role in a "neutral" Laos.