

15 AUG 1962

## THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

### I. Introduction

The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is the largest Communist party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party and of its youth organization totals 3,250,000.

As a legal party, its members hold positions in government service at all levels, up to cabinet positions just below full ministerial rank. It directs several important mass organizations.

Partai Murba is an avowedly nationalist Communist party, otherwise differing little from the PKI. Not a mass party, a number of its members have political influence due to personal prestige.

Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citizenship Body (BAPERKI).

### II. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Apparatus.

#### Strength:

Claimed	2,000,000
Estimated	1,750,000

#### Distribution:

Central Java	600,000
East Java	650,000

Also strong in plantation and oil centers of Sumatra.

#### Character:

A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological level of the rank and file is low, but an extensive and systematic party training program is having some effect in developing second and third level leaders.

Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the polit-bureau. No open dissension has been observed although some strains

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may be occurring under the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Personal direction by politbureau and central committee members of secretariat and mass organization work ensures central control.

Some secret party members have been identified and there are probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried on covertly but for local, tactical purposes.

### III. Principal Propaganda Media

Harian Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper

Circulation 58,000

Bintang Timur party-line paper, but not formally party-controlled.

Circulation 25,000

Bintang Merah PKI monthly theoretical journal.

### IV. Party Assets in Government

#### Electoral Strength:

1955 general election 6,000,000 votes

1957 municipal election  
(incomplete) 7,200,000 votes

The party in the 1955 election was fourth nationally and third in Java.

#### Cabinet:

No PKI members in inner cabinet.

2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. However, the Party considers the Cabinet reorganization of February 1962 a net setback.

#### Gotong Rojong Parliament:

43 PKI representatives

20 functional representatives who are PKI members.

**Supreme Advisory Council:**

2 PKI representatives  
6 functional representatives who are PKI members.

**National Planning Council:**

16-22 PKI-controlled members out of 77.

**Civil Service:**

30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates of the Communist trade union federation. Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia. (SOBSI)

PKI participation in regional governments is most pronounced in East and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other provinces, particularly in Sumatra.

**Y. Party Assets in Civic Institutions**

The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions within them at both the central and regional levels. Of the important ones only the Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor front, does not have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Politbureau members and other PKI members in the organization's central offices.

**Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI)**

Claimed membership 3,033,000

Affiliate of WFTU

Principal areas of strength

Oil, estate, transportation and communication and public works workers. (Java, Sumatra and Celebes.)

Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and Secretary-general, are PKI members.

SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organizations in Indonesia. It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and disrupting economic life through strikes and demonstrations.

**Youth Organizations**


**PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth)**

Claimed membership 1,250,000

Principal strength in Java

Affiliate of WFDY and has permanent representative

at WFDY headquarters.



**Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to the PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. It is militant and its members have played a leading part in anti-Western demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers, initially 100,000, for the liberation of West Irian. Pemuda Rakjat's membership is drawn principally from youth of the working class.**

**Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, (CGMI)**

**Claimed membership 3,000-5,000**

**Affiliate of IUS**

**Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers through infiltration of larger, non-Communist student organizations.**

**CGMI membership is much more solidly Communist than is the case in most fronts. For example, all but 2 of 22 officers chosen by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members.**

**Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI)**

**Claimed membership (1959) More than 4,000,000**

**Not affiliated with WFTU but has sent delegates to international conferences sponsored by WFTU.**

**Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and North Sumatra.**

**The BTI is the PKI instrument for grass roots organizing and propaganda activity in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself for appointed officials in local administration and was the instigator of some recent peasant disturbances.**

**Indonesian Women's Movement (GERWANI)**

**Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1961)**

**Affiliate of WIDF**

**Principal usefulness to the PKI is as a propaganda instrument. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non-Communist women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National Federation of Women's Organizations.**

**The League for People's Culture (LEKRA)**

**Claimed membership more than 60,000 (February 1962)**

**9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, 1 in Borneo**

**Has close contacts with both IUS and WFDY and works with friendship societies and peace movement.**



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#### **Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC)**

No membership figures available

1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures

1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650,000 signatures

Claims 66 branches of which 55 are in Java.

The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organized peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread support in all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders.

#### **Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)**

The AAPSO, a Communist-directed instrument for fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore enjoys wide support in Indonesia, including the positive endorsement of President Sukarno. A PKI member is the permanent representative of Indonesia on the secretariat in Cairo.

#### **Friendship Societies**

Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for all the countries of the bloc except Albania. PKI members participate in their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba leaders. Most of this activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19 branches in Sumatra and the Indonesian-Soviet society has branches in Sumatra and Bali.

### **VI. International Ties**

The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leaders have spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union, and party policy has generally been consistent with the Soviet line. There are signs that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22nd

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Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy requirements over its own national interests is a key question under debate.

**VII. Partai Murba**

Claimed strength	175,000
Principally in Java	
Electoral strength (1955)	225,000 votes

Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Murba policies are indistinguishable from those of the PKI. It has no significant mass following but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of its leaders and their associations with Sukarno.

**VIII. Overseas Chinese**

Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the PKI. This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion with which the government already regards the Chinese minority.

**Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI)**

Estimated membership 50,000

BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a particular appeal to Chinese youth.

**Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH)**

A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and property rights, CHCTTH accepts direction from the Chinese Communist Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing policy towards the overseas Chinese.

**IX. Objectives and Tactics**

Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the ill-fated Madiun uprising in 1948, the Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building both a mass party and a broad following, emphasizing legal political activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno. This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would bring them increasing influence as their political activities were unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic and foreign, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the cabinet level. To maintain this quasi-alliance, the PKI has brought itself to accept some presidential actions which must have been distasteful; e.g. the decrees severely limiting all political party activity and, more recently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional principles of Pantjasila, which include affirmation of a belief in God.

President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as a means of maintaining his own political position vis-a-vis other potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point where it might endanger his government. To this end the President has accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to approach closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communist exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support. The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti-colonialism is in accord with Communist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and industrialization are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective.

The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting itself to these unexpe

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measures. The party has been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in their implementation. The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicized intentions of the government. To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal by borrowing Marxist programs has only served to give the Communist objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PKI of these key issues for exploitation.

The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure the government into more extreme positions or to hastier actions than it might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Irian may well alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence upon the Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult. Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies and programs of national mobilization the government has felt compelled to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces against the rival claims of the PKI.

The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises by the unauthorized action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled to step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had not planned and for which it was not prepared. The economic dislocation caused by these events has made the government vulnerable to new PKI pressures.

In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of cooperation and competition between the government and the PKI which each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President. The PKI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian affairs is stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily drawn into positions on both the national and international level which are ever closer to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist support, and increasingly estranged from non-Communist forces. The key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption in 1960 of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal representation at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The most recent development in the process was the President's speech at

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
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
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
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Some secret party members have been identified and there are probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried on covertly but for local, tactical purposes.

**III. Principal Propaganda Media**

Harian Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper

Circulation 58,000

Bintang Timur party-line paper, but not formally party-controlled.

Circulation 25,000

Bintang Merah PKI monthly theoretical journal.

**IV. Party Assets in Government**

**Electoral Strength:**

1955 general election 6,000,000 votes

1957 municipal election (incomplete) 7,200,000 votes

The party in the 1955 election was fourth nationally and third in Java.

**Cabinet:**

No PKI members in inner cabinet.

2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. However, the Party considers the Cabinet reorganization of February 1962 a net setback.

**Gotong Rojong Parliament:**

43 PKI representatives

20 functional representatives who are PKI members.



**Supreme Advisory Council:**

2 PKI representatives  
6 functional representatives who are PKI members.

**National Planning Council:**

16-22 PKI-controlled members out of 77.

**Civil Service:**

30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates of the Communist trade union federation. Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia. (SOBSI)

PKI participation in regional governments is most pronounced in East and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other provinces, particularly in Sumatra.

**Y. Party Assets in Civic Institutions**

The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions within them at both the central and regional levels. Of the important ones only the Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor front, does not have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Politbureau members and other PKI members in the organization's central offices.

**Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI)**

Claimed membership 3,033,000

Affiliate of WFTU

Principal areas of strength

Oil, estate, transportation and communication and public works workers. (Java, Sumatra and Celebes.)

Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and Secretary-general, are PKI members.

SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organizations in Indonesia. It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and disrupting economic life through strikes and demonstrations.

**Youth Organizations**


**PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth)**

Claimed membership 1,250,000

Principal strength in Java

Affiliate of WFDY and has permanent representative

at WFDY headquarters.



Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to the PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. It is militant and its members have played a leading part in anti-Western demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers, initially 100,000, for the liberation of West Irian. Pemuda Rakjat's membership is drawn principally from youth of the working class.

**Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, (CGMI)**

Claimed membership 3,000-5,000

Affiliate of IUS

Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers through infiltration of larger, non-Communist student organizations.

CGMI membership is much more solidly Communist than is the case in most fronts. For example, all but 2 of 22 officers chosen by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members.

**Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI)**

Claimed membership (1959) More than 4,000,000

Not affiliated with WFTU but has sent delegates to international conferences sponsored by WFTU.

Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and North Sumatra.

The BTI is the PKI instrument for grass roots organizing and propaganda activity in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself for appointed officials in local administration and was the instigator of some recent peasant disturbances.

**Indonesian Women's Movement (GERWANI)**

Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1961)

Affiliate of WIDE


Principal usefulness to the PKI is as a propaganda instrument. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non-Communist women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National Federation of Women's Organizations.

**The League for People's Culture (LEKRA)**

Claimed membership more than 60,000 (February 1962)

9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, 1 in Borneo

Has close contacts with both IUS and WFDY and works with friendship societies and peace movement.



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LEKRA is the most active cultural organization in Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the Ministry of Education, Training, and Culture. It has given a Marxist coloration to much of Indonesian current writing and promotes attacks against European and U. S. cultural activities. LEKRA sent 8 delegates to the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent in 1958 and participated in a similar conference at Cairo in early 1962.

#### Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC)

No membership figures available

1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures

1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650,000 signatures

Claims 66 branches of which 55 are in Java.

The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organized peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread support in all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders.

#### Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

The AAPSO, a Communist-directed instrument for fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore enjoys wide support in Indonesia, including the positive endorsement of President Sukarno. A PKI member is the permanent representative of Indonesia on the secretariat in Cairo.

#### Friendship Societies


Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for all the countries of the bloc except Albania. PKI members participate in their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba leaders. Most of this activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19 branches in Sumatra and the Indonesian-Soviet society has branches in Sumatra and Bali.

#### VI. International Ties

The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leaders have spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union, and party policy has generally been consistent with the Soviet line. There are signs that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22nd

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Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy requirements over its own national interests is a key question under debate.

### VII. Partai Murba

Claimed strength	175,000
Principally in Java	
Electoral strength (1955)	225,000 votes

Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Murba policies are indistinguishable from those of the PKI. It has no significant mass following but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of its leaders and their associations with Sukarno.

### VIII. Overseas Chinese

Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the PKI. This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion with which the government already regards the Chinese minority.

**Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI)**  
Estimated membership                      50,000

BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a particular appeal to Chinese youth.

#### **Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH)**

A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and property rights, CHCTTH accepts direction from the Chinese Communist Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing policy towards the overseas Chinese.



### IX. Objectives and Tactics

Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the ill-fated Madiun uprising in 1948, the Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building both a mass party and a broad following, emphasizing legal political activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno. This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would bring them increasing influence as their political activities were unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic and foreign, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the cabinet level. To maintain this quasi-alliance, the PKI has brought itself to accept some presidential actions which must have been distasteful; e.g. the decrees severely limiting all political party activity and, more recently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional principles of Pantjasila, which includes affirmation of a belief in God.

President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as a means of maintaining his own political position vis-a-vis other potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point where it might endanger his government. To this end the President has accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to approach closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communist exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support. The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti-colonialism is in accord with Communist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and industrialization are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective.

The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting itself to the unexpected

measures. The party has been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in their implementation. The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicized intentions of the government. To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal by borrowing Marxist programs has only served to give the Communist objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PKI of these key issues for exploitation.

The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure the government into more extreme positions or to hastier actions than it might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Irian may well alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence upon the Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult. Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies and programs of national mobilization the government has felt compelled to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces against the rival claims of the PKI.

The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises by the unauthorized action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled to step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had not planned and for which it was not prepared. The economic dislocation caused by these events has made the government vulnerable to new PKI pressures.

In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of cooperation and competition between the government and the PKI which each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President. The PKI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian affairs is stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily drawn into positions on both the national and international level which are ever closer to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist support, and increasingly estranged from non-Communist forces. The key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption in 1960 of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal representation at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The most recent development in the process was the President's speech at

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the PKI 7th Congress in April 1962 in which he denounced "anti-Communist phobias" and gave the PKI his full endorsement as loyal, patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries. Other hopes, that this process might inspire a nationalist, TITOLIST trend in the Communist party leadership, have also been disappointed, for the PKI is one of the most open advocates of international Communist unity.

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