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C. T. I. I. I.

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2 March 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Although Finland will probably conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR in compliance with Stalin's request, this action will not foreshadow an imminent Communist comp in Finland. Stalin's letter of 23 February does, however, represent the first overt step in a long-range campaign to reduce Finland from semi-independence to total subservience to the Soviet Union.

The recent Soviet demand on Finland was planned independently of the Communist coup in Casehoslovakia. Since November 1947, the USSR has been laying the groundwork for a mutual assistance past with Finland as part of its overall plan for the conclusion of such pacts with all European border states. The timing of the soup in Caschoslovakia was forced upon the Kremlin when the non-Communists took action endangering Communist control of the police. A Csechoslovak Communist victory in the Kay elections would have been impossible without such control. In Finland, however, elections are not scheduled until July, and the non-Communists have not been actively threatening the Communist position. The coup in Caschoslovakia, however, has been useful to the Kremlin because it has created in Finland a widespread fear that failure to grant Stalin's request would precipitate similar action in Finland. The USSE will seek to capitalise upon this reaction by making maximum demands upon the Finns in the negotiations on the mutual assistance pust. In addition, therefore, to the usual previsions of a mutual defense treaty, the USSR will probably also desend the integration of the Finnish defense system with its own. Even though the Finns will probably reject this extreme request, the concessions Finland will eventually have to make will undoubtedly permit the Kremlin to gain control of the Finnish Army.

Present indications are that the Kremlin's strategy for eastern Europe now calls for an intensification of the "cold" war. Not only is the USSR faced with the probability that the European recovery program will soon be implemented, but the Soviet strategists are apparently convinced by the events preceding the Caschoslovak computate even three-quarter control over a bordsring nation is insufficient. Consequently, the USSR will now intensify its efforts to obtain eventual Soviet domination of Finland.


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A Communist coup in Finland, however, is unlikely at present because of the relative weakness of the Communist pecition. Communist membership in the present Cabinet includes the Hinister of Interior (who controls the state police), the Hinister of Labor, and the Deputy Minister of Supply. The Premier, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and the Minister of Justice are left-wing socialists who have joined the Communist bloc but are not, from the Soviet point of view, wholly reliable. The remaining 12 Cobinet posts are held by Social Democrate and representatives of the rightist parties. The Communists exert only 15% control over the labor unions and have 25% of the seats in the Dist. Moreover, they are in the minority in all but a few of the city and village governing bodies and do not control the ray or the local police.

Despite this relative weakness of the Finnish Communist Party, the USSs would be able within a matter of months to impose a Communist police state in Finland. By an intensification of economic and political pressure, the USSR can strengthen the Communist Party and weaken the non-Communiste. After the mutual assistance pact has been signed, the Soviet Union can increase its control over the Finnish Army. Finally, under the terms of the Finnish peace treaty, the USSR can exercise a direct influence over the Finnish Covernment in both internal and external matters.

The nature and the extent of Finnish resistance to the intensified Soviet program will determine how long Finland can retain its
present status. The USSR will retaliate vigorously if: (1) the Finns
refuse to sign the mutual assistance pact; (2) the Communists are
eliminated from the Finnish Government; or (3) the Finns appear increasingly dependent upon the western powers. Under these circumstances,
the Kremlin will undoubtedly either force a Communist victory in the
July elections or seize control of the Finnish Government prior to July.
If the Finns do not resist in such a memor, the Eremlin will probably
proceed more alewly in the hope of gaining eventual domination through
parliamentary means.

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