

~~SECRET~~

# WEEKLY SUMMARY



Number 44

1 APR 1949

Document No. [scribble]

NO CHANGE in Class.

DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S I C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 2/2/78 By: 011

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*f-23*

*235020/1*

~~SECRET~~

1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

**WARNING**

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**SECRET**

**C O N T E N T S**

	Page
<b>HIGHLIGHTS</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>UNITED NATIONS</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>WESTERN EUROPE</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>NEAR EAST - AFRICA</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>FAR EAST</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</b> .....	<b>15</b>
 <b>ARTICLE</b>	
<b>The Italian Colonies Question</b> .....	<b>17</b>

**SECRET**

**SECRET****H I G H L I G H T S**

The USSR will probably endeavor to make its attack upon the Atlantic Pact the principal theme of the forthcoming UN General Assembly sessions which begin at Lake Success on 5 April. The Italian colonies question will be the only problem of major substantive importance to confront the delegates; its solution will depend primarily upon the ability of the non-Soviet bloc to reach solid agreement (see page 3). Meanwhile, the mildness of the Soviet reaction to the western Berlin currency changeover continues to contrast with the vigor of the Soviet opposition to the Atlantic Pact (see page 5).

The steady trend toward stabilization of the military situation in Palestine may be checked momentarily by the army coup in Syria, through delaying indefinitely the scheduled negotiations between Syria and Israel, but the over-all military situation in Palestine will not be materially affected by this delay (see page 9). The Syrian coup will probably not appreciably damage US-Syrian relations but it may set off disturbances in other Arab states, particularly Iraq and Egypt, whose governments probably could not survive a serious outbreak.

A "peace conference" between representatives of the Chinese Communists and the National Government began in Peiping on 1 April. The Communist plan to present the Nationalists with a set of "eight demands," which Acting President Li obviously is not capable of meeting in full, will enable the Communists to retain the initiative throughout the conference (see page 11).

- 1 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****UNITED NATIONS**

The forthcoming session of the General Assembly will focus on the disposition of the Italian colonies, the Spanish issue, and probably on a Soviet attack on the Atlantic Pact. The Italian colonies question is the only important substantive matter, and its solution will depend primarily upon the ability of the non-Soviet world to reach agreement. However, both the Atlantic Pact and the Spanish case will offer fertile ground for Soviet propaganda attacks. Soviet obstructionism during the forthcoming session will thus be most prominent in the propaganda field. Minor issues to be discussed include Israeli membership in the UN, the Mindszenty trial, and South African discrimination against Indians in that country.

**Atlantic Pact** The USSR may well introduce a resolution condemning the Atlantic Pact as threatening world peace and undermining the UN. Although the Soviet case is weak, the USSR will use the Assembly as a sounding board for the Soviet propaganda "peace" theme. Through this propaganda approach, the USSR will attempt to pose (especially for home consumption) as a defender of the UN and will try to weaken popular support for the Pact by stimulating the doubts of those western elements who still believe the UN should be the sole bulwark of world peace.

**Spain** If the Spanish case comes up in the Assembly, the subsequent discussion will resolve itself primarily into a propaganda battle which may link Spain to the Atlantic Pact and prove embarrassing to the US. Although Poland has announced that it will seek to withdraw its proposal for strengthening the 1946 GA resolution (which provided for the recall of chiefs of mission to Spain and a ban on Spanish

- 2 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

participation in UN specialized agencies), certain Latin American nations may seize the initiative and propose that these prohibitions be eased. The USSR would interpret such a Latin American move as US-inspired and could accuse the West of having taken the initiative in aiding the Franco regime. Moreover, the USSR could attack any pro-Spanish moves as preliminary western steps toward admitting Spain to the Atlantic Pact. Liberal opinion in the US and Western Europe may prove particularly susceptible to these charges. Although most Western European nations prefer to postpone discussion on the Spanish issue, introduction of a Latin American resolution would probably result in liberalization of the 1946 ban.

**Italian Colonies** The outcome of GA voting on the disposition of the Italian colonies, particularly Tripolitania, is impossible to predict at this time because of the many conflicting interests and alternative solutions (see Article, page 17). The return of Somaliland to Italy and the US-UK proposal for ceding most of Eritrea to Ethiopia will probably be approved, however, although the vote on the latter proposal may be very close. Approval of UK trusteeship over Cyrenaica is a strong possibility, but an effort will be made to make it conditional upon return of Tripolitania to Italy. With regard to Tripolitania, one of the following solutions appears most probable: (1) Italian trusteeship, which is favored by most Latin American nations and some Western European countries, notably France; (2) US trusteeship, as proposed by the UK, which would undoubtedly appeal to the local Arab population; or (3) multi-power trusteeship which, although administratively cumbersome, might have the most universal appeal. Any trusteeship will most likely be accompanied by guarantees of gradual local self-government and eventual independence.

- 3 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Italy's prospects for Tripolitanian trusteeship are improved because of Italian participation in the Atlantic Pact and in other European unity projects; however, without US-UK support, this solution could not be carried. US trusteeship would certainly meet with opposition from the USSR and probably from France, which fears the effect on its North African colonies. If a stalemate develops on Tripolitania, the GA may vote to postpone this issue until the next session. It is even possible that certain Latin American states, in an attempt to use Cyrenaica as a bargaining point for obtaining Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania, may insist that the disposition of all Libya be postponed. As an alternative, they may seek to have all of Libya included in any multilateral trusteeship.

- 4 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****WESTERN EUROPE****GERMANY**

**Berlin Currency** The mildness of the initial Soviet reaction to the western sector currency change-over in Berlin is probably the result of its gradual nature and the Soviet desire to await further developments. Under the currency directive issued by the western military governors: (1) certain time limits will be imposed upon continued use of the east mark in the western sectors; (2) western sector residents will be permitted to exchange 15 east marks for an equal number of west marks; and (3) the number of west marks in circulation in western Berlin has been increased. Because the east mark is still legal and can be used during the next few weeks for paying rents, taxes, and rations and because western sector residents working in the Soviet sector will, for the present at least, continue to be able to exchange part of their east marks for west marks, no reason exists for immediate Soviet retaliation. The Soviet Military Administration (SMA) has already promised that western sector residents will not be restrained from spending east marks for unrationed, luxury goods in "free shops" of the Soviet sector. Although the USSR can take retaliatory action at any time, it now appears that such action may be postponed until the effects of the currency reform become more apparent. Such counteraction may be timed to coincide with increasing restrictions against the east mark in western Berlin. The USSR may decide to institute an east mark currency reform which would invalidate the 300-400 million east marks now estimated to be in western sector banks. Current Soviet tactics in Berlin may reflect the reported recommendation of Soviet Political Adviser Semenov for a milder over-all Soviet German policy. In addition, the USSR may wish to avoid drastic retaliatory measures lest these measures: (1) boomerang against the USSR by further reducing economic activity in the Soviet zone and decreasing Communist popularity there; and (2) detract from present Soviet efforts to convince the world of the USSR's peaceful intentions.

**- 5 -****SECRET**



**SECRET****UNITED KINGDOM**

**Commonwealth Conference** The hurriedly summoned conference of Commonwealth prime ministers, which convenes in London on 21 April, will concern itself primarily with the constitutional problem raised by India's announced intention of becoming a republic. Some formula will be sought which: (1) will enable India, as a republic, to retain membership in a Commonwealth whose only formal tie is the crown; and (2) will not conflict with the desire of some older dominions (notably Australia) that nothing be done to impair the prestige of the crown. A principal reason for making concessions to India on this issue, and for speed in so doing, is the need of the UK (and Australia) to obtain Indian assistance in combatting the growing pressure of Communism in Southeast Asia. India's constitutional status must be clarified first, however, because Indian assistance in combatting Communism would probably be most effective if India joined Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Ceylon under Commonwealth auspices in some such "regional association" as that suggested by UK Foreign Secretary Bevin at the 1948 Commonwealth Conference. The "regional association" idea is likely to be further explored in informal discussions at the April conference.

**Jet Aircraft** The approaching necessity for decisions on military aid commitments under the North Atlantic Pact is forcing the UK to review the British jet aircraft program. At present the UK must allocate its limited jet production to: (1) meeting existing export commitments to foreign countries; (2) aiding Benelux nations under the Brussels treaty; (3) doubling the jet fighter strength of the Royal Air Force; and (4) continuing token aid to friendly countries, whether Pact members or not. Jet equipment is now a profitable item on the British export list. If strategic planning following ratification of the Atlantic Pact leads to a redirection of jet exports, thus reducing foreign exchange earnings, the British will probably ask the US to underwrite the loss.

- 6 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****IRELAND**

**Foreign Policy** Although the Irish Government has rejected membership in the North Atlantic Pact, opposition within the country to this isolationist stand is steadily increasing. The Government refused to join the Pact because the Irish feel that the partition issue makes a military alliance with the UK impossible. The Church and those who opposed severance of the Commonwealth link, however, are putting pressure on the Government to consider a more cooperative attitude toward the Atlantic Pact nations. Although there is no likelihood of a sudden modification of policy, it is possible that the Government may eventually be willing to negotiate individual pacts with North Atlantic countries other than the UK or will seek to appease advocates for Irish participation in the Pact by emphasizing that Ireland will do its duty as "a christian nation" in the event of war.

**BELGIUM**

**Belgian Elections** Rapidly deteriorating relations between the two coalition parties (Catholic and Socialist) may result in a decision to advance the date of the general elections now scheduled for the autumn of 1949. Socialist-Catholic disagreement over methods of financing unemployment compensation, intensified by pre-electoral campaigning, is preventing constructive government action on other matters. Any electoral action before late May or June, however, is unlikely because: (1) most importantly, Premier Spaak is determined not to allow the dissolution of Parliament to interfere with ratification of the Atlantic Pact; and (2) the necessity exists for a prior decision by Parliament on the advancement of the date of the women's franchise and the reapportionment of parliamentary seats on the basis of the new census.

**SECRET**

### **FRENCH NORTH AFRICA**

**Anti-French Forces** More effective opposition to French authority in North Africa will emerge if growing collaboration between the Communist and Nationalist parties results in the formation of a new political organization combining dissident and extremist elements from both groups. Both Communists and Nationalists are apparently inclined to look more favorably on a united approach: the Communists, because of the steady decline in their electoral strength; the Nationalists, because of their continued failure to achieve independence by persuasion. If the merger should take place, it would probably be guided by the able and intelligent Farhat Hached, Secretary General of the Tunisian nationalist labor union.

### **SPAIN**

**Monarchy Rumors** Belief that he has failed to get a US loan may force Franco in the near future to make a decision on a royal successor. Franco's position is being threatened by the growing lack of confidence among his followers, as a result of the grave economic situation. (During recent weeks there has been a notable increase in the number of rumors concerning Franco's intention to relinquish his job as chief of state; some of these rumors may have been deliberately planted to test foreign and domestic reaction.) If Franco does decide that some move is necessary, he will most probably establish an interim regency in order to be able to name his successor while he is still in a position to dictate the terms.

- 8 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****NEAR EAST - AFRICA****PALESTINE**

**Military Stabilization** Military stabilization in Palestine appears closer than ever. Israel and Lebanon have signed an armistice which provides not only for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese soil but for maintenance by each side of only 1,500 troops as defensive forces in the border zone, thus allaying Lebanese fears of a new Israeli advance. Meanwhile, Israel and Transjordan have initialed a secret agreement providing for Transjordan's assumption of responsibility for the Iraqi front in north-central Palestine, and an armistice between the two governments may emerge soon. Although the recent coup in Syria may delay indefinitely the negotiations between Israel and Syria (the last of the Arab states in contact with Israeli forces), this delay will not materially affect the over-all military situation in Palestine.

Progress toward military stabilization has focused attention on boundaries which will be delineated in a final peace settlement. By its recent foray into the Negeb, Israel, which had already seized substantial amounts of territory over and above the UN partition boundaries, completed its control of the lands allocated to it under partition; in its agreement with Transjordan, Israel is forcing Abdullah to yield additional ground in central Palestine. Under these circumstances, it is highly improbable that the Israelis will willingly cede enough territory now held by them to permit implementation of the US formula. This formula calls upon Israel to make territorial compensation for lands they wish to keep outside the original UN partition boundaries.

**- 9 -****SECRET**

**SECRET****SYRIA**

**Military Coup** Although the military coup in Syria by Colonel Husni Zaim, Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, and his ultra-nationalist followers is not expected to cause an appreciable deterioration in US-Syrian relations, the coup will have adverse effects on matters in which the US has an interest. Zaim, who is personally friendly toward the West, will probably be able to consolidate his control over the Government and by ruling with a strong hand may be able to solve many of Syria's internal difficulties. Zaim's coming to power, however, will check the scheduled Syrian-Israeli armistice talks. There will also be delays in the ratification of the agreement for the trans-Arabian petroleum pipeline and the French-Syrian financial agreement. Moreover, the danger exists that the Syrian coup may provoke disturbances in other Arab states, particularly Iraq and Egypt. The governments in these two countries are not sufficiently stable to insure their surviving a serious local outbreak.

**TURKEY**

**Security Fears** Announcement of the North Atlantic Pact has stimulated Turkey's desire to clarify its own security position, and, during his forthcoming visit to the US as head of the Turkish UN delegation, Foreign Minister Sadak will undoubtedly be shopping for additional US assurances. The Turks have warmly welcomed the Pact itself, but their exclusion from it has caused them concern lest the participating states be strengthened at the eventual expense of Turkey. Although Sadak may not press for membership in the North Atlantic group--even if the formation of another regional security agreement is ruled out--he will be under great pressure to obtain stronger US assurances than those already provided.

- 10 -

**SECRET**

SECRET

F A R E A S T

CHINA

**Peace Prospects** Both the Communists and the National Government completed their preparations during the past week for the "peace conference" scheduled to begin in Peiping on 1 April. The Chinese Communist Party provided a troublesome overtone to the preparations by announcing that its Central Committee had formally approved Chairman Mao Tse-tung's "eight demands" as the basis for the peace discussions and by notifying the National Government that its delegates should bring with them all data necessary for implementation of these eight points. The "eight points" formulated by Mao Tse-tung are: (1) abrogation of the Chinese constitution; (2) relinquishment of the Kuomintang's prerogatives; (3) endorsement of Communist "agrarian reform"; (4) cancellation of "traitorous treaties"; (5) convocation of a political consultative conference to transfer power to a "coalition" government; (6) surrender of "war criminals"; (7) confiscation of bureaucratic capital; and (8) "reorganization" of Nationalist armies. If Li desires, the Government can comply with the first five demands; it can comply, in part, with the demands for surrender of war criminals and confiscation of bureaucratic capital. But Li's Government cannot possibly comply with the crucial demand for full surrender of the Nationalist armies, because it does not have control over all the remaining Nationalist military forces. Therefore, the Communists can either: (1) accept partial compliance from Li's Government and later move their armies south in the name of the new "coalition" government; or (2) force a breakdown in negotiations by insisting upon full compliance with their terms and then resume full-scale military operations to the south. In view of their lack of trained administrators and their already tremendous task of consolidating occupied territories, the Communists may accept Li's terms provided they believe that Li has complied with Communist demands to the full extent.

- 11 -

SECRET

**SECRET****JAPAN**

**Japanese Resistance** The procrastinatory maneuvers of the Japanese Government, which enabled the Government to shift to SCAP the onus for an unpopular budget, reflects a growing Japanese tendency to resist direction from the occupying authorities. The Yoshida Cabinet was committed by campaign promises to economic reforms favoring the vested conservative interests who supported the Democratic Liberal Party. Prominent among these reforms were loosening of economic controls, discontinuance of the transaction tax, and government assistance for business recovery. SCAP's budget "suggestions," however, recommended strengthened economic controls and aroused a storm of protest among the more conservative leaders of the Democratic Liberal Party. By resorting to delaying tactics, the party finally forced SCAP to "direct" the Japanese Government to incorporate economic control measures in the new budget. Thus the Democratic Liberals escaped the embarrassment of being directly responsible for advocating an "unpopular" budget.

**INDOCHINA**

**Military Drive** French military forces in north Indochina are apparently being so hard-pressed by a concerted Viet Minh drive that they may be forced to evacuate the state of Tonkin. The general commanding French forces in Tonkin has stated that, without supplies and reinforcements, his troops will be "driven into the sea." The resumption of extensive military operations along the China-Tonkin frontier has probably been timed in part to coincide with Bao Dai's expected return in late April, because the reinforcements required in the north are being held in southern garrisons to assure the ex-Emperor a favorable reception there.

**SECRET****SIAM**

**Possible Coup** Further public disorders or a coup may be precipitated in Siam by the general dissatisfaction with the recently promulgated "royalist" constitution and the continuation of repressive measures designed to maintain the present Phibul Government in power. In addition, tension between the armed services is growing because of Premier Phibul's apparent failure to carry out his part of an understanding presumably reached with the navy for eliminating General Kach, army "strong man" and deputy commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief of the navy, having carried out his part of the agreement, is embarrassed before his subordinates, some of whom are reportedly considering supporting the followers of former-Premier Pridi in any future attempt to overthrow the government. The probability of a forceful change in government has also been increased by the new "royalist" constitution, which limits the influence and profiteering opportunities of present political and military leaders as well as the means of effecting peaceful changes in the government through political maneuvering.

**INDONESIA**

**Peace Progress** Despite modification of the Dutch position toward restoring the Republicans to authority at Jogjakarta, there is little indication that the Dutch are any less opposed to granting the Republic a dominant position in the projected Indonesian federation. Some progress has been made, however, toward the renewal of negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans as a result of conditional Dutch acceptance of the invitation by the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCFI) to discuss with Republican leaders the restoration of Republican authority in Jogjakarta. Although the Republic has not yet accepted



**SECRET**

**INDONESIA**

**the UN invitation, they will probably do so. If the Dutch and Republicans can reach agreement on Republican restoration, the way will be paved for convocation of the Dutch-proposed conference at The Hague, where the disputants can once again attempt to reach agreement on the transfer of Dutch sovereignty to a federated Indonesian government.**

- 14 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

**Communist Activity** In an effort to offset their declining power and numerical strength, Communists in Latin America are now concentrating primarily on organizational activity. In Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, non-militant and ineffective Party members are being purged. Party reorganizations are under way in Ecuador and Mexico; in the latter country, moreover, Communist organizers are attempting to regain influence with labor by urging Party members to join local labor unions. Reports that special lists of militants are being prepared in Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay suggest planning for underground activities. A Cuban Communist-front group for youths is reportedly driving for new members. Although these Communist activities may improve the Party's position in a few countries where police repression is absent or counter-propaganda ineffective, there is as yet no indication of a reversal in the general trend of declining Communist strength.

**ARGENTINA**

**US Relations** Recent Argentine overtures to the US for financial assistance, which have been dictated by economic necessity, will afford the US only a limited period in which to obtain Argentine concessions. The Peron regime is taking a much firmer stand against Communism and has arrested and jailed as Communists many strikers who sought wage increases considered inflationary by the government. The administration's need for US goodwill, coupled with the current government drive against inflation, is already forcing a revision in Argentine foreign policy favorable to the US. For example, Peron has made some modification in his "third

- 15 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**ARGENTINA**

position" foreign policy which, though ostensibly anti-Communist and anti-capitalist, has been used principally to oppose US influence in Latin America. Peron's apparent willingness to make concessions to the US will probably last only as long as the new economic policies are successful and remain dependent on US aid. If economic stability is restored--with or without US aid--Argentine political and economic independence will revive, and Argentina can be expected to revert to its normal policy of combatting US influence in Latin America. An economic debacle in the absence of effective US assistance, however, would intensify customary Argentine opposition to the US and make cooperative action difficult even on matters not usually subject to rivalry between the two countries.

- 16 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET****THE ITALIAN COLONIES QUESTION**

Of the numerous possible solutions open to the UN General Assembly on the Italian colonies question (see page 2), only those solutions involving Italy's participation in the control of its former colonies have evoked any appreciable controversy. The persistence of Italy's claims for control over its former colonies is matched by bitter Arab opposition to the re-establishment of Italian colonial rule in any form. Because a large measure of agreement has been reached on the disposition of Cyrenaica, Eritrea, and Somaliland, the major remaining controversy centers on the disposition of Tripolitania.

The Italian Government alleges that its prestige would be seriously undermined if it were not awarded at least part of its former colonies. Italy bases its claims for trusteeship of its pre-Fascist colony of Tripolitania on assertions that the area would aid the Italian economy, especially with respect to future Italian emigration. If convinced that Italian trusteeship is not now or later feasible, the Italian Government, although it would protest non-participation, would probably prefer US trusteeship to the establishment by the UN of a multi-power administration, particularly one which might include the USSR. The advantages of the US as a security force in North Africa and the Mediterranean would appeal to the Italians, especially as they might expect a friendly US to encourage Italian emigration to the area and US aid could be expected to contribute materially to the area's economic development.

Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania would be unacceptable throughout the Arab world and might cause sporadic violence in Tripolitania and neighboring Tunisia. A force considerably larger than the present British garrison in Tripolitania would be needed to maintain order. Even then, occasional outbreaks might occur and spread to Tunisia where sympathy is strong for the Tripolitanian desire for independence.

- 17 -

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**The danger of widespread disorder, however, may be lessened by the reported willingness of some Arab leaders in Tripolitania to come to terms with the Italians once Italian trusteeship has become a fact. Experienced observers also emphasize that in view of Tripolitania's rapidly increasing population rate and limited economic resources, it could contribute little to the solution of Italy's emigration problem. Even if Italy could implement the ambitious prewar plan to settle about 100,000 Italians in Tripolitania, the situation would scarcely be alleviated in Italy, where there are 2,000,000 unemployed and an annual population increase of 400,000. Moreover, the expense of the large military force needed to maintain order in the area would reduce the Italian capability to develop the area's economy.**

**Of the other solutions most likely to be considered by the General Assembly, Tripolitanian Arabs generally would prefer US trusteeship as guaranteeing the best opportunity for early independence and economic development. A five-power trusteeship, with Egyptian participation, would be less distasteful than Italian trusteeship, but would still be opposed by: (1) the Tripolitanians, who resent French and Italian colonial policy and believe five-power administration would be cumbersome; and (2) the Cyrenaicans, who fear that Egyptian participation would aid Egypt to press its territorial claims in Cyrenaica.**

**- 18 -**

**SECRET**

**SECRET****DISTRIBUTION**

1. . . . . The President
- 2,64. . . . . Secretary of State
3. . . . . Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
4. . . . . Secretary of Defense
5. . . . . Secretary of the Army
6. . . . . Secretary of the Navy
7. . . . . Secretary of the Air Force
- 8,70. . . . . Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9. . . . . Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10. . . . . Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
- 11,69. . . . . Chief of Staff, U.S.Army
- 12,13,14. . . . . Chief of Naval Operations
- 15,16,17. . . . . Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18. . . . . Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, U.S.Army
19. . . . . Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S.Air Force
20. . . . . Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21. . . . . Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
- 22,23,24. . . . . Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research  
and Intelligence
- 25,26,27,28,29, 30,31,32,33,34. . . . . Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
- 35,36,37,38,39, 40,41,42,43,44. . . . . Chief of Naval Intelligence
- 45,46,47,48,49. . . . . Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
50. . . . . Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
51. . . . . Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,  
Atomic Energy Commission
- 52,53,54,55,56. . . . . Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Division, OCD, Dept. State
57. . . . . Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
58. . . . . Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
59. . . . . Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
60. . . . . Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
61. . . . . Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
- 62,63. . . . . Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
65. . . . . US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic  
Survey Committee
- 66,67. . . . . Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
68. . . . . Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~