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# SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

## Organization and Functions of the Ministry of State Security (M G B)

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 THE MGB

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CHARTS

MGB

INU Agent Dispatch Channels

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MGB

I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Ministry of State Security (Ministertvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) is the fulfillment of thirty years' development since the establishment in 1917 of the Cheka to protect the infant Bolshevik party and to combat counterrevolution, speculation and sabotage. From this relatively defensive, protective position a growth through years of intricate changes has resulted in the present MGB which not only combats counterrevolution, foreign espionage and political deviations inside the Soviet Union, but also carries on a program of positive espionage, sabotage and assassinations throughout the world. The primary emphasis on discovering politically unreliable elements in all spheres of Soviet life can only be understood in the light of the aims of the Soviet state which insists on insulating its peoples and institutions from ideas foreign to Communist principles; fearing a politically opposed and malcontent populace that might one day aid in the overthrow of the system which Bolshevism has erected and maintains by force.

In considering the functions and the operations of the MGB, it should be remembered that, from their earliest conception, the Soviet organs of State Security have been primarily Party agencies subject only to formalistic control within the extant structure of the Soviet Government. Until the reorganization in July 1934, when the OGPU was incorporated into the newly created NKVD, little pretense was made that State Security was other than a Party function, taking its authority and control from the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and, of course, actually from the Politburo. At the present time, in theory, the MGB is responsible to the Council of Ministers, formerly the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Soviet Union. In fact, the MGB is responsible only to Josef Stalin and to the Politburo.

It is impossible to evaluate adequately the scope and components of the MGB without considering also the functions and jurisdiction of the MVD, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. Both ministries, of course, spring from the same origins and while they are technically separate today, it must be remembered that actually in many fields they still operate jointly and, upon occasion, almost as a single agency. Both the MGB and the MVD

are subject to the same ultimate control, and the operations of each are closely integrated with those of the other.

There have been some indications of frequent interchange of personnel between the two ministries and it is known that, wherever necessary, units of the MVD are controlled operationally by the MGB. There are also indications that, at least in occupied territories, certain functions which, within the Soviet Union, definitely tend to be functions of MGB have been carried out, probably for purposes of convenience, by MVD units. There are many signs, too, that MVD installations have been used as cover by MGB personnel, although such use has been denied by at least one apparently well-informed defector.

No effort is made in this study to delineate the structure, jurisdiction, and functions of the MVD, as such. Since March 15, 1946, when the use of the term "Peoples' Commissariat" was dropped and the term "Ministry" substituted, an extensive reorganization of MVD and MGB has apparently been under way. Authentic information on this reorganization is too fragmentary for complete evaluation of its significance. It appears, however, that the ultimate purpose of this reorganization, which is still continuing, is:

- (1) the complete integration within the MGB of all of the intelligence functions formerly performed by either ministry; and
- (2) the integration within the MGB of many, if not all, of the security functions which have long been considered primarily the province of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Indications of this concentration of intelligence and security within the MGB appear particularly evident in several reports stating that within the past year the MGB has assumed the direction of certain uniformed troops which previously were under the unquestioned control of MVD. Apparently the first of these troops to be absorbed were units of the MVD internal troops, including transport and communications units. It has been reported also that there now exists within the MGB a directorate, probably called the Guards Directorate, responsible for the administration and control of MGB troops which were formerly MVD units. While we do not yet have sufficient information upon which to base an accurate determination of the significance of this trend, it is at least possible that a logical conclusion might be the centralization of all intelligence and security within the MGB,

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leaving the MVD primarily concerned with administrative control of the Soviet population and with the utilization of the tremendous labor pool provided by the millions of individuals confined in the MVD forced-labor camps. In this regard it is known, of course, that the MVD has in recent years become increasingly active in the administration and direction of large industrial and construction projects throughout the Soviet Union, and that through its various industrial combines the ministry has assumed increasing control over industrial expansion and construction within the USSR. So tremendous in scope are the functions and the powers of these two ministries that together they resemble a state superimposed upon a state.

The complicated process of evolution which has produced the present MGB cannot yet be fully and clearly described, primarily because of the unavailability of sufficient current, authentic sources. Even factors in the development which have remained relatively constant, such as the overall planning of intelligence and counterintelligence functions and the high degree of collaboration among the MGB organs and between the MGB and other organizations of the Soviet state, cannot be presented in the proper perspective and detail. This preliminary study, therefore, is an examination of the organization and functions of the MGB based on information obtained from many sources, which information refers frequently to its predecessor organizations.

It should be noted that recent reports have alleged the existence of numerous directorates, sections, and subdivisions under various names, numerals, and letters. As a large number of these reports are in disagreement, only such organizational units of the MGB reliably reported upon from more than one source, and whose existence can be considered at least fairly well established, have been included in this study.

## II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Russian people have lived under the despotic power of the Boyars, the Czars, and the Bolsheviks. State oppression has been a traditional and constant force only now reaching its fullest and most refined development.

The first steps toward a central agency for the protection of the state were taken by Ivan the Terrible in his struggle with the Boyars when

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circa 1564 he created the Oprichnina, the first Russian State Police. The Oprichnina was almost a state apart; it possessed its own special court, its own army and its own police. Members of the agency, the Oprichniki, swore to allow neither God nor man to come between themselves and Ivan's commands.

Despite the efforts of the Oprichniki and of later state security forces, Russian history has been flecked with plots, assassinations, and rebellions. Under Peter the Great the system of policing Russia, with emphasis on state security, became firmly established. During the reign of Nicholas I the 3rd Section of Nicholas' Court Chancery bore the responsibility for state security. Apparently the 3rd Section was unable to cope successfully with the increase of revolutionary activity in the 19th century, and in the 1880's the notorious Okhrana was founded. Among Okhrana sections, one had the task of spying on separatist movements among the various nationalities in Russia, another employed agents to carry out surveillance of foreign diplomats in Russia, and a third was responsible for counterespionage within the country. An OO (Osoby Otdel) or Special Section undertook the surveillance of Russian political refugees abroad, a duty which has devolved upon the successors to the Okhrana down to the present time.

CHEKA

*Fr. - originally quasi-spontaneously, consisting (each commission) of 2 to 3 members & Troika*

When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, KERENSKI was considering a revival of the Okhrana, which had been permitted to deteriorate after the March revolt. Shortly after the October revolution, LENIN and the Council of Peoples' Commissars decided that, without a similar organization, the new government could not cope successfully with the rise of counterrevolution soon supported by invading armies and foreign aid.

The first step toward creating such an organization was the issuance of a decree by LENIN on 11 December 1917, declaring the Cadets or Constitutional Democrats a party of enemies of the people and making the directing members of the Cadet Party liable to trial by revolutionary tribunals. LENIN then wrote, on 20 December 1917, a memorandum to Felix Edmondovich DZERZHINSKI, an old Bolshevik and trusted Party functionary, containing the draft of a general decree for combatting counterrevolution and sabotage. He suggested that the Commissariat of the Interior should,

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with the aid of house committees, assume supervision of all the members of the bourgeoisie, the landowners and the wealthier classes. Such persons, and employees of banks, investment firms and other institutions as well, were required to submit to the house committees information concerning their incomes and occupations. In January 1918, the Sovnarkom willingly accepted the recommendation of DZERZHINSKI that the irregular activities of the inchoate force of secret police, which had sprung up almost immediately after the seizure of power, should be definitely organized under an "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage" (Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychnaya Komissiya po Borbe s Kontr-Revolyutsiei, Sabotazhem i Spekulatsiei, or Cheka), with the primary purpose of protecting the infant Bolshevik regime. In the first months of its existence Cheka headquarters were moved from Leningrad to Moscow. Its first director, at least in Leningrad, appears to have been Moses URITSKI, who was assassinated in August 1918 by a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Leonid KANNENGISSER.

According to an apparently reliable source, a certain YOSILEVICH was adjutant to URITSKI in Leningrad; one of the earliest chiefs of the Cheka in Moscow was MESSING and other important early leaders of the Cheka were UNSCHLICHT, MOGILEVSKI, <sup>A.C</sup>ARTUSOV, MATSNELSON, TRILLISER, KOGAN, BRESLAU, SACHS, GOLOSEKIN, ZHUROVSKI, SAFAROV, KUN, SEMLIACHIKO, LANDER, WEINBERG, SVARTS, FINKELSTEIN, EHLENKRIEG, GRUENSTEIN, MEISEL and KEDROV. Another source lists YAGODA together with MENZHINSKI as deputies to DZERZHINSKI under the Cheka and the following as chiefs of sections of the Cheka: SOSNOVSKI, LITVIN, MIRONOV, GAI, AGRANOV, KURSKI, TSESARSKI, PETROVSKI, KAGAN and BERMAN.

By a decree of 7 November 1918, DZERZHINSKI was made president of the Cheka which by this time had adopted much the same methods of spying, oral examinations and secret trials as had been used by the Okhrana.

The Cheka was even less subject to control than the Okhrana, which had been directly subordinated to the Imperial Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, the Cheka, from the first, assumed the power to punish even by death those counterrevolutionaries whom it discovered, while the Okhrana had no such legal power. Gradually DZERZHINSKI built the Cheka into a firmly established state security organization.

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OGPU

In 1922, when the civil wars had ended and order was substantially restored, the Cheka was ostensibly abolished in an attempt to dispel the public fear and anxiety which it had engendered. Together with the announcement of the New Economic Policy, a new organization was created, the "State Political Directorate" ( Gosudarstvonnoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye, or GPU) which, in everything but name, absorbed the Cheka. When, in the following year, the Soviet republics were federated, the GPU became the OGPU or Union State Political Directorate (Obodinyonnoye GPU), at the all-union level, with local branches retaining the title GPU. The OGPU, responsible directly to the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), merged in a single federal secret administration the primary duties of "maintaining the revolution." It took over from the Cheka the following subordinate organs:

- (1) Operational (or general)
- (2) Foreign (INO - Inostranny Otdel)
- (3) Economic (EKU - Ekonomicheskoye Upravloniye), dealing with industrial offences, especially sabotage, bribery, counterfeiting and smuggling
- (4) Transport
- (5) Counterintelligence in the Red Army
- (6) Secret Service (SO-Sekretny Otdel), responsible for detecting counterrevolutionary tendencies in the USSR.

DZERZHINSKI personally controlled the OGPU until his death in 1926, although nominally he was but one member of a collegium of 14 or possibly 15 commissioners sharing the administration of the OGPU. While the first Constitution of the Soviet Union had failed to mention a state security organization, the second Constitution proclaimed the structure and the tasks of the OGPU in a special decree of 15 November 1923, promulgated by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Party. Provision was made for the appointment of the director or president of the OGPU and his deputies by the Central Committee and the tasks of the organization were defined as follows:

- (1) Direction of the GPU offices of the Soviet Republics and the special departments of military districts, as well as principal divisions subordinate to the GPU.
- (2) Direction and administration of the special departments at the front and in the Army.
- (3) Political protection of the Soviet frontiers.
- (4) Operational work in the territory of the Soviet Union.

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The functions of the OGPU, according to the same decree, also have been listed as:

- (1) The suppression of counterrevolutionary acts, including banditry.
- (2) The taking of measures to prevent espionage.
- (3) The guarding of railways and waterways.
- (4) The political protection of the Soviet frontiers.
- (5) The prevention of smuggling and of illicit frontier crossings.
- (6) The execution of special duties assigned to it by the Central Executive Committee or by the Sovnarkom.

An unverified report lists the following "departments" of the OGPU as of 1923:

- (1) Secret Department under KSENOFANTOV
- (2) Information Department under ANTIPOV
- (3) General Department under MOROS
- (4) Foreign Department under MESCHTSCHERJSKOV
- (5) Finance Department under DEITZ
- (6) Registration Department under FOMIN
- (7) Propaganda Department under KATZ

Supreme authority over the OGPU was actually in the hands of the then Secretary General of the Communist Party, Josef STALIN, with the executive authority vested in the chief of the OGPU with full power to handle routine state security matters. The OGPU chief and his two deputy chiefs formed the Troika which acted in cases of emergency, discussed summary reports prepared by the two deputy chiefs of OGPU, and formulated instructions and orders for departmental chiefs. The Troika also prepared all agenda for the sessions of the Collegium of the OGPU and was responsible for the execution of decisions made by the Collegium, which, in principle, had both executive and judicial powers. Actually, however, the Collegium was only an advisory council, final decisions being made either by the Troika or directly by the chief. All cases where capital punishment was mandatory were, however, brought before the Collegium. It apparently consisted of fourteen members: the chief of the OGPU, two deputy chiefs, ten departmental chiefs and one administrative chief.

Below the Collegium was the so-called Osoboye Soveshchaniye - Special Advisory and Arbitration Council or Special Commission as it was called - with no permanent membership; it was a loosely bound group made up of departmental chiefs with a deputy chief of OGPU as chairman. This commission, aside from its administrative duties, also handled minor political cases where the maximum punishments were prison sentences and deportation to forced-labor camps under the administration of USLON

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(Upravleniye Sovietskikh Lageroi Osobovo Naznacheniya) - Administration of Soviet Special Assignment (forced-labor) Camps.

Vyacheslav Rudolfovich MENZHINSKI, who succeeded DZERZHINSKI in 1926, had been a leader of the Cheka and a deputy director of OGPU since 1923. His ill health allegedly threw the actual power within the OGPU into the hands of his two deputies, Genrich Grigorevich YAGODA, who had held his post since 1924, and Mikhail TRILISSER, long-time chief of INO, the Foreign Department. YAGODA is said to have been devoted to STALIN, to whom, however, his policy of mass deportations and staged trials was to become an extreme embarrassment. In 1931 STALIN attempted to restrain YAGODA by reducing him from 1st deputy to 2nd deputy and by superimposing MENZHINSKI's former chief assistant, Ivan Alexandrovich AKULOV. The latter reportedly was unable to hold his own against YAGODA's intrigues and after a year was sent to an inferior post in the Donbas. Upon the National Socialist ascension to power in Germany in 1933, STALIN saw that the Soviet Government would for a time increasingly have to ally itself, at least verbally, with the Western European countries and that the publicity which the OGPU was receiving under YAGODA's direction constituted a serious obstacle. He therefore recalled AKULOV, appointed him to the new office of State Prosecutor and, in December 1933, conferred upon him special powers "to strengthen the law" which, at least in theory, enabled him to override the judicial decisions of the OGPU. He seems to have received the specific duty of "supervision of the legality and regularity of the actions of the OGPU."

#### NKVD

Dissatisfaction with the work of the OGPU reportedly had been growing over a period of years and, apparently as a step toward its liquidation, the Republic Commissariats of the Interior had been abolished in 1931. To take the OGPU's place STALIN resorted to the reestablishment, on an all-union basis, of the NKVD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del) or Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs which had existed until 1922 in the RSFSR.

The NKVD was established by a special decree of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshhevik) in July 1934 in which the functions of the new All-Union Commissariat were defined as follows

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- (1) The protection of the revolutionary order and of state security.
- (2) The protection of socialist property.
- (3) National registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces.
- (4) The protection of the frontiers.

By virtue of this decree, the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the OGPU became the Central Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD. Other functions of the OGPU were placed under other NKVD directorates, as noted below. This decree implied an increasing centralization of authority and administration, but the new organization appears to have changed little from its predecessor in personnel, methods or scope; we can, therefore, judge the extent of the development of the OGPU, for the NKVD at the time of its organization is known to have been divided into a number of directorates, among which the following were the most important:

- GUPV (Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranychnykh Voisk) - Central Directorate of Frontier Troops. Responsible for frontier control; had espionage and counterespionage functions.
- GURKM (Glavnoye Upravleniye Raboche-Krestyanskoi Milititsii) - Central Directorate of Workers and Peasants Militia
- GULAG (Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerei) - Central Directorate of Camps.
- GPU (Glavnoye Tyuremnoye Upravleniye) - Central Prison Directorate.
- GUGB (Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) - Central Directorate of State Security; also referred to as Gugbez and Gosbez.

From these directorates it is obvious that, as constituted, the new NKVD represented primarily only the OGPU under a new name. One exception, however, is found in the transfer of the judicial organs of the OGPU to the normal Soviet judicial agencies rather than to the NKVD.

The first Commissar of NKVD was YAGODA, who replaced MENZHINSKI after *reported in 10 May by a Russk. in Sweden* his death in 1934, and who controlled all NKVD directorates, the powers of which were increased, especially in the case of the GUGB, as a result of the murder, in December 1934, of STALIN's close personal friend Sergei Mikhailovich KIROV, Secretary of the Leningrad Communist Party.

In 1936 YAGODA was dismissed by STALIN and replaced by Nikolai Ivanovich YEZHOV, who had been president of the Party Control Commission since 1935. *see Central Com. of CP or Swedish source* YEZHOV proceeded to carry out a purge of GUGB in April 1937, which was followed by other purges, notably those of the "Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" of March 1938, in which YAGODA, RYKOV, and BUKHARIN were liquidated, and the purge of the high command of the Red Army, which included Marshals TUKHACHEVSKI and YEGAROV, two months later.

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YEZHOV maintained his position only until 1938, when he disappeared, according to many reports, having been either shot or poisoned for "political reasons." On 8 December 1938 he was replaced by Lavrenti Pavlovich BERIYA, who had been a Chkrist in 1921 and who, in 1931, had become Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Georgia. By his strongly pro-Stalinist and historically perverted History of Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, written in 1937, BERIYA may well have strengthened his friendship with Stalin and helped pave the road to his appointment to YEZHOV's post.

NKGB

In March 1941 the GUGB/NKVD had grown so important that it was made an independent Commissariat: the Peoples' Commissariat of State Security (Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) or NKGB. Its first commissar was Vsevolod Nikolayevich MERKULOV, who had been first Deputy Commissar of the NKVD in 1938 and had been associated with BERIYA in the early Bolshevik days in Tiflis. The new Commissariat had a short life at this time for on 20 July of the same year it was incorporated into the NKVD. This reversion was almost certainly due to the German attack on the USSR which had taken place a few weeks earlier and had raised problems with which a Commissariat so recently established could scarcely have been competent to deal. In May 1943, however, with the lessening of German pressure, the GUGB again was given independent status as the NKGB, and MERKULOV was once more appointed its head.

MGB

On 15 March 1946, apparently for political and propaganda reasons, all Peoples' Commissariats were renamed ministries and the NKGB became the MGB. MERKULOV remained as its head until replaced as Minister of the MGB on 15 August 1946 by Viktor Semeonovich ABAKUMOV, wartime chief of counterintelligence in the Armed Forces (SMERSH). According to some unverified reports MERKULOV was purged, although he also reportedly was placed in charge of Soviet atomic research under BERIYA. Very recently it was officially announced in Moscow that MERKULOV had been placed at the head of a newly created "Chief Directorate for the Administration of Soviet Property Abroad." The exact functions and purpose of the new

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agency are as yet unknown, but it is interesting to note that one of MERKULOV's deputies in the directorate is Vladimir G. DEKANOZOV, former Deputy Minister of the MID. DEKANOZOV for many years was a high official of the NKVD and is known to have had at least some authority in intelligence matters as late as 1945 while assigned to the NKVD.

Since 11 November 1941 BERIYA had been Deputy President of the Sovnarkom (Soviet Narodnykh Komissarov - the Council of Peoples' Commissars, later the Council of Ministers). The ten Deputy Presidents of the Sovnarkom, at the time, each exercised a general supervision over one or more Commissariats in addition to his own. The NKGB was allotted to BERIYA and thus he controlled, between 1941 and 1946, both Commissariats, the NKVD as its Peoples' Commissar and the NKGB through the authority vested in him by the Sovnarkom. On 10 July 1945 BERIYA received the rank of Marshal, and in 1946 he became a member of the Politburo. It appears that at the present time he has extensive co-ordination and control functions in respect to the activities of both the MGB and the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), although he has not officially headed either agency since 15 January 1946 when he was replaced as Peoples' Commissar of NKVD by Colonel General Sergei Nikiforovich KRUGLOV who had been Deputy Peoples' Commissar of the NKVD since 1939.

### III. CENTRAL MGB HEADQUARTERS

#### A. Structure

Known reorganizations in occupied territories, as well as other factors are the basis for the belief that since early 1946 the MGB has been undergoing extensive reorganization, the exact ultimate purpose of which is not yet completely clear. Similarly, the exact present structure of central MGB headquarters is not known with finality, but it is undoubtedly an outgrowth of the trials and errors of the Cheka, the OGPU, the GUGB/NKVD and the NKGB. Some directorates and sections of the MGB have, in the course of these years, remained relatively unchanged, especially the 1st Special Section which maintains files and archives, while others have undergone radical changes in organization and functions; for example, the EKV which developed from a purely administrative organization. It is fairly certain that MGB directorates at USSR level exercise strict control over their subordinate organizations on republic.

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province and district levels. In addition to the directorates on the USSR level, certain sections and directorates which carry out executive and administrative functions for the INU, KRU, etc., are also organized on USSR level and are independent, as far as their own administration is concerned, of the directorates to which they are attached. Such service organizations are also set up on USSR level in a Moscow directorate or center, and subordinate sections are subject to strict control from USSR level down through republic and province level, if not necessarily through district level. Thus a section of the 1st Special Section, with the task of maintaining card files and indices, services KRU on USSR level, and sub-sections of the 1st Special Section service KRO's on lower planes. Administratively these 1st Special Sections and subsections are directly responsible to the 1st Special Section Center on USSR level in Moscow.

At the present time, the central MGB headquarters on USSR level in Moscow comprises an unknown number of directorates (Upravleniya) and sections (Otdely). In order to clarify those that are known, OGPU and GUGB organizations which preceded the MGB are listed below. The statements explaining the functions of these organizations have been left as reported by sources, for the reason that not enough material is available on the background of the OGPU and the GUGB to permit a thorough analysis of them.

While some of the subordinate organs of State Security agencies which preceded the MGB into the present MGB structure have not been traced, it should be noted that most of these sections, with little question, exist at the present time in one form or another. The bulk of the available reliable information concerning Soviet State Security organs reflects that the major functions, purposes, and objectives of these organs have continued, with minor variations, unchanged since 1917.

The following subordinate organizations of the OGPU have been reported as constituting its central Moscow setup in the first years after its establishment:

1. Personnel Section
2. Eastern Section
3. TR (Tainaya Razvedka) - Secret Section. Supervised the life of the Communist officials; maintained liaison with the various GPU posts in the USSR; kept files on suspects and agents; controlled such expressions of public life as the theaters, meetings, etc.; and combatted the activity of the church.
4. Central Registry. Kept information in dossiers against all suspects.
5. INO (Inostranny Otdel) - Foreign Affairs Section. In charge of political, military and economic intelligence outside the Soviet borders.

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5. OO (Osoby Otdel) - Important Affairs Section. Listening post for dissatisfaction in the Red Army and Navy and in government offices; protected and assisted the New Economic Policy; in charge of economic counterespionage.
6. KRO (Kontra-Razvedyvatelny Otdel) - Counterespionage Section. In charge of overall counterespionage in the USSR, in the armed forces, and abroad.
7. EKO (Ekonomicheski Otdel) - Economic Section. In charge of protection and assistance to the New Economic Policy; of combatting sabotage and dissatisfaction among the workers and of economic counterespionage.
8. OPEROD (Operatsionny Otdel) - Operations Section. Organized and planned punitive expeditions, made arrests, shadowed suspects and was in charge of physical security of GPU property, supervising of prisons; executive arm of the KRO.
9. SPEKO (Spetsialny Otdel) - Technical Matters Section. Supervised radio programs, and telegrams leaving the USSR; was in charge of codes, ciphers, invisible ink, etc.
10. POLITOTDEL (Politicheski Otdel) - Political Section. In control of newspapers, periodicals and books; monitored the telephone calls, censored mail leaving the USSR.
11. TO (Transportny Otdel) - Transport Section. Supervised the employees of the rail and water transport systems and surveilled tourists in the USSR.
12. FO (Feldyegerski Otdel) - Courier Service Section. In charge of the secret mails service, diplomatic correspondence and transmittal of money.
13. GUPOV (Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogran-Okhrany Voisk OGPU) - Border Patrol and OGPU Troops Headquarters Section. In charge of border control service.
14. INFO (Informatsionny Statisticheski Otdel) - Information and Statistics Section. Responsible for the collection of statistics on the work done by all OGPU sections.

An undated report, based on sources whose reliability cannot be estimated, lists the following so-called departments of OGPU with their subordinated sections. The terminology used is that of the report; no attempt has been made to comment on the accuracy of the material presented. Only in the case of the Foreign Department has material received from this source been used in the body of the present study, and it is incorporated in the chapter on INU.

1. Special Task Department (Osoby Otdel). Charged with supervising OGPU staff activities and conduct; carried on surveillance of Communist Party members, state functionaries, Foreign Service staff and special assignments made by the chief of OGPU or the Secretary General of the Party. This OO was the most influential department, feared by all Soviet officials and Party members; it was divided into the following sections (otdeloniya):
  - a. State and Party Functionaries Section (O Kadrov) - In charge of screening all newly appointed officials. Without its approval, no applicant could be appointed either for a Party post or a government position.
  - b. Special Duty Section (O Spetsialnoi Sluzhby) - Handled all its own agent provocateurs, saboteurs, forgers, diversants, actions against enemy agents, and liquidated its own "unworthy" agents.
  - c. Liaison Section (O Svyazi) - In charge of all liaison between provincial or foreign OGPU units and headquarters in Moscow.

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- d. Museum and Laboratory Section (O Muzeya i Laboratori) - Collected and preserved samples of various documents, stamps, seals, codes, chemicals, photographs, forged and real currency, and maintained a complete library in many foreign languages.
- e. Medical Service Sections (O Meditsinskoi Sluzhby) - Handled all medical tasks of the OGPU.
2. Counter-Espionage Department (Kontr-Razvedyvatelny Otdel). Contained similar sections to those of the General Staff of the Red Army, the work of which was duplicated by this parallel system. This section's primary task was the control and evaluation of reports of CE and intelligence agents of the General Staff.
3. Internal Secret Department (Vnutrenny Otdel). Directly connected with the Control and Inspection Commission of the USSR (Kontrolnaya i Inspektionnaya Kommissiya CK CPSU), and was charged with direct control and inspection and purging of all Party members and state institutions and their employees both at home and abroad. In charge also of headquarters buildings, prisons and special assignment armed OGPU units known as CHON, the best-equipped armed force in the USSR. Handled all secretarial work of the OGPU, the Criminal Section of OGPU and the Law Section of OGPU. The Internal Department was divided into:
- Kommandatura Section (O Kommandatury) - Headquarters.
  - Secretariat and Political Section (Sekretariat i Politicheskoye O).
  - Operative Section (Operativnoye O).
  - Out-of-City Section (Inogorodnoye O) - Controlled the activities of provincial branches of OGPU.
  - Criminal Section (Ugolovnoye O) - Charged with recruiting "criminal" elements for work with OGPU, in addition to regular routine work.
  - Legal Section (Yuridicheskoye O) - Accused of framing many cases of unwanted persons which normally would not stand before the law.
  - Counterrevolution Section (O po Borbe so Spekulatsiei: sic).
  - Anti-Speculation Section (O po Borbe so Spekulatsiei).
  - Special Task Section (Osoboye O) - Authorized to supervise all activities of this department and handle assignments which could not be handled by other departments.
  - Military OGPU Units' Section (O Voisk OGPU or O CHON).\*
4. Special Department (Spetsialny Otdel). Performed all assignments received from various Party and state authorities, dealing with government industrial and agricultural activities. It had sections such as:
- Operative.
  - Secretariat.
  - Industrial
  - Agricultural
  - Special Task (Osoby O).
5. Economic and Financial Department (EKFO). The fiscal agent of OGPU. It handled all OGPU finances which were based on an unlimited credit from the USSR government and its various enterprises such as building, highway, railroad, industrial and other constructions where compulsory labor was supervised. Financial transactions abroad were handled through various credit bureaus, etc., and agents called Commersants (brokers) who conducted business in countries of their residence. Business included aiding Soviet "returnees" to liquidate their properties abroad, purchasing strategic materials, acquiring foreign currencies, distributing counterfeit money and selling or dumping Soviet products to fight foreign competition or to provide money needed by the Comintern or other Soviet agencies for clandestine operations.

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6. Information Department (Informatsionny Otdel). Collected and disseminated information both at home and abroad. Tass News Agency was under its control.
7. Foreign Department (Vneshny or Inostranny Otdel).
8. Operative Department (Operativny Otdel). Handled all routine work of the OGPU not assigned to other departments. It was also a service department for other departments, inasmuch as it prepared action later performed by respective sections of a given department. Also in charge of the so-called Militsiya (militia or police at home and guards of Soviet foreign missions abroad).
9. Eastern Department (Vostochny Otdel). Its assignments were operations in Eastern countries (Asiatic). Agents of the Eastern Department collaborated with Far Eastern Comintern agents who were setting up Comintern-patterned agents' nets, employing specially trained native personnel. This department was also very closely associated with the Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions), Asiatic section, under Secretary LAZOVSKY. Almost all Far Eastern Trade Unions were deeply penetrated, controlled and financed by agents (Soviet and native) of this department.
10. Border Patrol and Defence Department (Otdel Pogranichnoi Okhrany). This department's duties comprised border patrol, contraband control and defense against White Russian raids. Border patrol units were called Pogranichnaya Okhrana and its members were called "Pogranichniki." The Border Patrol Department collaborated very closely with the Political Department of the Red Army and its commanders in all border zones.
11. Administration and Organization Office (AIOU). Having the status and functions of a department, this office was charged with the administration matters, preparation of plans for the improvement of the services, establishment of liaison facilities, administrative control of temporary personnel, etc.

By the time the GUGB of the NKVD was set up in 1934 the following subordinate organs were reportedly administered by it; the majority, it will be noted, had previously existed under OGPU;

1. Organization and Administration - Handled the organization of subordinate offices in the republics, provinces and cities.
2. Secretariat - Handled the most important correspondence of the Administration.
3. INO; Foreign Department - In charge of the activity of the foreign organs of the Gosbez and also in charge of the Foreign Operations Center (SOZ) created in 1937.
4. Economic Department - Observation of morale among the workers and the activity of economic undertakings.
5. Frontier Department - Handled frontier control, customs offices and transportation of agents into foreign countries.
6. Railroads - Supervised railroads and their highways, as well as railway workers and their activities.
7. Information Department - In charge of secret agents who were assigned to collect intelligence concerning the political and economic situation within the Soviet Union.

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8. Secret Department - In charge of lists of secret agents (Seksoty), the equivalent of German V-Men and also correspondence with Branch offices.
9. Registry - Compiled the black lists of the names of the enemies of the USSR.
10. Counterespionage.
11. Commandant Office - In charge of prisons; supervised highly placed personalities and executed death sentences.
12. Finance.
13. Operations Department - In charge of the planning and execution of various operations, such as the liquidation of revolutionary bands and the suppression of the counterrevolution.
14. Political Control - In charge of censorship within and at the borders of the USSR.
15. Religious Department - In charge of lists of ministers and priests and supervised churches.
16. Special Department - In charge of the Secret Intelligence Service within the Army and the Navy.
17. Oriental Division - In charge of secret deputies of the NKVD in Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and India.
18. Dispatch Corps - In charge of the expedition and transmission of most secret papers within the USSR, as well as through diplomatic couriers outside of the country.

According to a source whose reliability cannot be checked, the principal sections of GUGB in 1939 are listed, with their respective chiefs, as follows:

- 1st Section GUGB - Protection of the Government (Okhrana pravitelstva) - VLASIK
- 2nd Section GUGB - Secret Political Section (SPO) - FEDOTOV
- 3rd Section GUGB - Counterintelligence (KRO) - KORNIENKO
- 4th Section GUGB - Special Sections (Osobyie Otdely) - BOGKOV
- 5th Section GUGB - Intelligence (Razvedyvatelny) - Lt. Gen. FITIN, P.M.

It is of interest to note that GUGB sections were numbered since there is no reason to doubt that the system of numbering has been adhered to and the directorates of the MGB today are also numbered. The numbering of sections and directorates of the predecessor organizations of MGB has been confirmed by several reliable sources. Between 1939 and 1941, possibly at the time of the first establishment of the NKGB, the 5th Section of GUGB, mentioned above, became the 1st Directorate of the NKGB, and probably of GUGB/NKVD, when the NKGB reverted to its former status. Lt. Gen. FITIN is believed to have remained as chief of this directorate and FEDOTOV as chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate.

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It seems to have become customary to refer to the subordinate organs of the State Security service by numbers instead of by various groupings of the letters of their Russian names. In the following list of State Security organs, both the initial and number designations will be given wherever possible. It should be noted that it is difficult to tell whether any organizational branch is a department, a directorate, a section, a branch or a subsection. In this paper the following nomenclature will be used: Upravleniye for Directorate, Otdel for Section and Otdeleniye for Subsection. A number of directorates or sections have been reported which may no longer exist, possibly having been dropped in reorganizations; however, the present list has been made up from sources of some trustworthiness with the aim of including all possible State Security organs as well as all organs which have possibly served State Security during the past eight years. It is probable that most of these listed organizations existed under NKGB, but it is extremely unlikely that they were carried over in the form outlined in this study when the NKGB was replaced by the MGB, at which time a thorough reorganization of the State Security service is believed to have taken place.

- INU - (Inostrannoye Upravleniye) - Foreign Directorate. Also referred to as the Intelligence (Razvedyvatelnoye) Directorate, 1st Directorate and 5th Directorate. In charge principally of espionage and counterintelligence abroad.
- SPU - (Sekretno-Politicheskoye Upravleniye) - Secret Political Directorate. Also known as the 2nd Directorate. Its principal task was counterintelligence against anti-Soviet elements in the USSR.
- KRU - (Kontr-Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) - Counterintelligence Directorate. Also known as the 3rd Directorate. Principal task protection of Soviet institutions from foreign espionage.
- EKU - (Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye or GEU - Glavnoye Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye) - Economic or Central Economic Directorate. Was in charge of counterintelligence and anti-sabotage work in industry and agriculture; may have been discontinued.
- DTU - (Dorozhno-Transportnoye Upravleniye) - Transport Directorate. Counterintelligence in the transport systems of the USSR.
- Directorate for the Security of Government Leaders (Russian name unknown). At one time referred to as the 1st Directorate. Protection of all important leaders.
- Directorate of the OO's (Osobyie Otdely) or Special Sections of NKGB. In charge of counterintelligence in the partisan troops.

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Central Directorate for CI in the Armed Forces (formerly SMERSH, from "Smert Shpionam - Death to Spies"). The reincorporation of SMERSH into MGB in the summer or fall of 1946 is believed to have been one of the first steps taken in the reorganization of MGB in order to further centralize intelligence and security functions within that ministry. It should be noted, however, that while formal control of SMERSH had, since 1943, rested in theory with the armed forces, actually SMERSH was controlled by the NKGB and MGB, inasmuch as the directing personnel apparently was completely drawn from officers of State Security, owing their primary loyalty and allegiance not to the Red Army but to the organs of State Security. It will be recalled in this regard, for example, that the present Minister of State Security, Viktor Semenovich ABAKUMOV, was the wartime head of SMERSH.

Partisan Directorate. Referred to constantly as the 4th Directorate. Responsible for the organization, in cooperation with the CP of the Partisan Movement, of espionage, sabotage and terrorism in the enemy's rear.

Directorate of Intelligence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Functions unclarified.

Central Directorate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Functions unclarified.

Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Trade. Functions unclarified.

Central Directorate for the Control of the Maintenance of State and Military Secrets. Functions unclarified.

Central Directorate for the Control of the Purity of the Communist Party. Functions unclarified.

Central Directorates in Industrial Ministries and in Industries. (For example: the Ministry of Heavy Machine Construction and the Armaments Industry). Functions unclarified.

Operational Directorate. In charge, prior to 1941, of the operational work of the GUGB directorates.

Investigation Directorate. Responsible for the investigation of MGB cases and the interrogation of suspects.

7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD. Believed to have been responsible for certain code and cipher procedures and still to exist in MGB in an unknown form.

1st Special Section. Maintenance of files and card-indices for all MGB organizations.

2nd Special Section. Responsible for providing technical equipment, monitoring, etc.

3rd Special Section. Provides agents for surveillance and search.

4th Special Section. Censorship.

5th Special Section. Codes.

Information Section. Responsible for the publication of information bulletins.

AKhU (Administrativno-Khozyaistvennoye Upravleniye) - Administrative-Economic Directorate. In charge of administrative work for all MGB organizations.

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GUK (Glavnoye Upravleniye Kadrov) - Central Personnel Directorate.  
Responsible for the administration of personnel for all  
MGB organizations.

FO (Finotdel or Finantsovy Otdel) - Finance Section or Office.  
Controls the financial resources of MGB organizations.

B. Co-ordination of the MGB Espionage and Counterespionage Agencies

Before analyzing the functions and structure of specific MGB headquarters directorates, the importance of counterespionage to the Soviet Union should be emphasized and an effort made to clarify as far as possible the headquarters control, co-ordination and planning of MGB operations.

In a general sense, counterespionage within the USSR encompasses the prevention of all counterrevolutionary and anti-state activities on the part of the entire Soviet population. The principal MGB directorates charged with this responsibility are the SPU, the EKV, and the DTU. The duties of KRU, on the other hand, are direct counterespionage, to protect Soviet citizens inside and outside the USSR and non-military Soviet institutions from penetration by foreign intelligence services. The INU, in addition to carrying out all of the MGB espionage work abroad, also appears to have counterespionage functions regarding anti-Soviet organizations, groups and persons abroad which are similar to those of the SPU within the Soviet Union.

It appears possible that a planning committee for counterespionage, with emphasis on counterespionage within the Soviet Union, is established in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) where all reports concerning disturbances and efforts directed against the interests of the state or against the policies of Party leaders are collected. These reports are believed to come from the State Information Bureau and the Central Office of the Secret Information Service in the Council of Ministers as well as from the Party organization itself through the Commission for Party Control within the Central Committee. It is also possible that this last-mentioned commission determines the points of emphasis for counterespionage within the USSR and that the Politburo determines the policies of counterespionage against foreign countries. Advice from these offices is believed to form the basis for the orders given by BERIYA's co-ordinating Central Office in the Council of Ministers, where the basic co-ordination of the work of the military and non-military

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branches of counterespionage is believed to be planned in regard to defining jurisdiction, objectives, use of personnel, and administrative expenses. In this office opinions and experience may be exchanged between the positive intelligence and the counterintelligence directors. This possibility, however, has not been verified.

Regarding high policy positive intelligence planning, a single report indicates that BERIYA heads an intelligence subcommittee of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) which has the authority and responsibility to determine the missions, strength and organization of all intelligence and counterintelligence agencies; to control the selection, appointment, rotation and dismissal of all intelligence and counterintelligence personnel; to maintain surveillance over all personnel; to control the flow of information between intelligence agencies and from them to other governmental and Party organs; and to operate extra-governmental intelligence, counterintelligence and sabotage through Communist Party channels in the USSR and abroad. An important, but as yet not completely clarified, part in these functions is played by Georgi Maksimilianovich MALENKOV, Chief of the Orgburo and member of the Secretariat of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik). Since MALENKOV is also Chief of the Administration of Personnel of the Communist Party, it is presumed that he is primarily concerned with approval of all Soviet Intelligence personnel, including the staff personnel of the MGB.

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[REDACTED] in addition to his other functions, Georgi Maksimilianovich MALENKOV also occupied, directly under Stalin, a position as "intelligence co-ordinator," channeling instructions to and information from the intelligence agencies and settling such conflicts as jurisdictional disputes and arguments over utilization of particular agents or concentration on particular objectives. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] MALENKOV was the head of a so-called "political section" of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which section was responsible for the control of all CPSU members abroad and for certain policy liaison with foreign Communist Parties; a function which, for many years, was exercised by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. [REDACTED] sources reported the existence within, or attached to, the Politburo, of an

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extremely secret control organ known as the TPK (Tainy Partiny Kontrol or Secret Party Control). These sources described the TPK as a committee, the members of which are STALIN, MALENKOV and BERIYA, and stated that it was responsible for, among other things, a complete co-ordination of all intelligence efforts within and outside the Soviet Union, as well as the co-ordination of foreign Communist Parties. If this group does exist as described, it could, of course, logically be composed of the three individuals named.

Obviously, in order to effectuate the decisions of any such organ, some bureaucratic apparatus would be necessary and there is a possibility that at least a portion of such necessary bureaucracy may have been the political section referred to by [REDACTED]

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#### IV. MGB DIRECTORATES

Consideration of the principal MGB directorates is naturally hampered by the high security surrounding them. As a result, it has been extremely difficult to compile full and detailed information concerning them; especially the exact headquarters organization of such directorates as the INU and the KRU. It appears that the directorates and sections of the MGB at the present time are consistently designated by numbers; and possibly in some instances by letters. However, the numerical order of the headquarters directorates of the MGB has not been completely determined as available sources disagree. For example, while the INU has been described most frequently as the 5th directorate, at least two recent sources have referred to it as the 1st directorate.

##### 1. INU (Inostrannoye Upravleniye): Foreign Directorate

The INU has extremely broad jurisdiction, both within and outside of the Soviet Union. It was founded as the INO, or Foreign Section, of the Cheka in 1921<sup>\*</sup> by one DAVTYAN. It is known that Mikhail TRILLISSER directed its activities for a number of years, exercising powerful and apparently able influence on its growth. Originally, the principal purpose of the INO was to gain military, naval, political and economic intelligence concerning foreign countries. By the time the Cheka had become the OGPU, the main functions of the INO, in addition to "regular routine work," were reported [REDACTED] to include the following:

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\* Fr. Founded as KRO in 1922-3. INO created out of KRU in 1924

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- a. Preparation of favorable conditions for the subsequent work of diplomats.
- b. Co-operation in the Comintern's underground work.
- c. Active participation in the elimination, often called "extermination," of enemies of the USSR, both internal and external.

According to the same sources, INO under OGPU was subdivided administratively into sections much as were other directorates of OGPU. In addition to a secretariat, a special task section, an operative section and finance and economic sections, INO also had the following sections assigned:

- a. Special Intelligence Section (Spetsialno-Razvedyvatelny Otdel).
- b. Political and Propaganda Section (Politicheski i Propagatsionny Otdel).
- c. Press Section (Otdel Pressi).
- d. Liaison and Courier Section (Otdel Svyazi).
- e. Deception Section (Diffamatsionny Otdel).
- f. Recruiting Section (Verbovochny Otdel).

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██████████ the INO-OGPU in Manchuria, some years ago, had the following functions: to carry on all underground work among Russian emigrants; to propagandize Communism among the Chinese; to organize plots and strikes; and to form underground units and Chinese Communist bands. Both this and other sources agree that there was a close co-ordination between INO and the work of the Comintern throughout the world; in fact, the rather sweeping statement is made that "Comintern activities' network throughout the world was patterned according to the INO-OGPU setup, especially security, travel and liaison matters." Units of INO-OGPU sections are claimed to have been attached to every Soviet foreign representation abroad, and the INO "worked in co-operation with" the Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Finance, and Heavy Industry. In addition, ██████████

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██████████ underground work of the Comintern and of Red Army Intelligence was carried on under the direction of INO-OGPU.

The only available information on how the INO was represented abroad in the early years was received from a source which listed eight special districts of INO in 1923; these districts, referred to as "residence places," were located in the following areas: Germany, Sweden, England, Turkestan, Bulgaria, America, Finland and China. The districts had so-called subdivisions under the areas as follows:

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<u>Germany:</u>	Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland.
<u>Sweden:</u>	Denmark and Norway.
<u>England:</u>	France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and apparently their colonies.
<u>Turkestan:</u>	India, Hindustan, Persia and certain British and Dutch colonies.
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Rumania, Turkey, Greece.
<u>America:</u>	Australia.
<u>Finland:</u>	Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.
<u>China:</u>	Japan

The abolition of the OGPU and the establishment of the NKVD saw a change in the functions of INO, which became the INU under the GUGB/NKVD, only in that they were broadened and deepened. The primary INU espionage functions of gathering political, economic, technical, naval and military intelligence in foreign countries remained, but the part played by the INU in the active struggle against non-Soviet organizations of all types was expanded greatly and the directorate assumed extensive surveillance functions. In this respect it will be noted that INU and KRU seem to overlap in their work outside the Soviet Union. No full clarification of the exact relationship of these two directorates is available, nor can it be definitely stated that all operational intelligence outside the Soviet Union is controlled by INU, or that KRU, for example, maintains its own channels and its own operations. On the basis of the data available, it appears most probable that KRU operations abroad are conducted either by INU or through INU channels; it is interesting to note that a number of cases have been reported where operations, tentatively established as being under the control of INU, were concerned with counterintelligence objectives. These would appear to be within the province of KRU, at least if we are to accept the various delineations of KRU functions and jurisdictions which are available.

The INU is reported to have carried out the following functions during its history and may well be responsible for them today.

- a. Attempts to control and keep under surveillance all Russian emigre organizations and all anti-Soviet organizations outside of the USSR, including Menshevik and Trotskyite groups.
- b. The surveillance of all Soviet citizens abroad, especially members of the Soviet diplomatic and trade missions.
- c. The dissemination of secret political propaganda throughout the world in order to create conditions favorable to the growth of Communism, especially by inciting discontent and dissatisfaction.
- d. The support of Communist parties under persocution abroad.

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- o. The direction of subversive and sabotage activities outside of the USSR and the organizing of strikes and revolts.
- f. The recruiting of foreign government officials for agent work, propaganda, etc; instigating through such recruits changes in government staffs and agencies for the advantage of the Soviet Union.
- g. Attempts to subordinate the Greek Orthodox churches abroad to the Patriarch of the Soviet State church and to penetrate the Roman Catholic church throughout the world for purposes of positive and counter intelligence.
- h. The execution of reprisals, including assassination, against members of Russian emigre organizations, against members of anti-Soviet political groups and against outstanding anti-Soviet personages.

The INU has been very successful in preserving the security of its operations. Seldom has it been possible to prove definitely that a specific Soviet espionage operation abroad was under the direction of INU; in such instances where it has been possible to establish this, it has been proved by a defection or penetration. INU operations abroad are characterized not only by maximum security, but by careful planning, tenacity, and extreme patience. It is not unusual for high quality INU operations to be prepared and built up very carefully over a period of years, with no immediate results for long periods of time. Characteristic of INU operations also appears to be a policy of using one country as a base for operations against another; for example, the frequent use of France and Switzerland during the 1930's as bases for intelligence operations into Germany and the consistent use of the West Coast of the United States as a staging base from which to mount intelligence operations against the Orient. Usually in such INU operations the personnel concerned are not in any way implicated in operations against the base country.

For the carrying out of the responsibilities outlined above, the INU, [REDACTED] operated

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through the following sections:

Operational Section: Planned and directed the work of the INU, including, in conjunction with the Special Section described below, all espionage organs.

Special Section: Believed to have worked in collaboration with the Operational Section in directing and controlling espionage networks from headquarters set up in all parts of the world; possibly collaborating with an Agent Section situated in Moscow.

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Communications Section: Responsible for all INU communications, chiefly maintaining contact with all espionage organizations and all agents of importance.

Records Section: Maintained all the records and card-indices of INU. A card-index of every INU agent network was kept, including a file for all the permanent agents of each network. It is believed that a card-index of potential agents and informants was maintained also.

Personnel Training Section: Responsible for the training of all UNU officials, staff, and for most of its agent personnel. The latter were trained either individually or in special study groups. Personnel training section controlled the INU Study Center and personnel were trained in special faculties by certain schools and institutes, such as the Higher Diplomatic School of the Soviet Union, the 1st Moscow Medical Institute, the Soviet Industrial Academy. Training in special short courses was also given when necessary. For example, a silkworm breeding exhibition was to be held in Paris in 1937 or 1938. Allegedly INU decided to use the exhibition as a cover for agents, and personnel therefore underwent an intensive short course in silkworm breeding prior to leaving for Paris.

Information Section: Issued intelligence bulletins on the work of the INU. No information is available as to the frequency of these bulletins, their exact content or the distribution list.

Press Section: Carried out a systematic examination of the press of all nations.

Radio Section: Studied foreign radio broadcasts.

Collation of Information Group: Received, checked, collated and filed by countries and departments all material obtained by the various espionage networks. Translation, photographic, drafting, deciphering and other offices serviced this group.

Consular Section: Made use of Soviet diplomatic channels for the acquisition of intelligence and either carried out CE work for KRU or provided cover for KRU agents. Members of the Consular Section of INU are said to be active in every Soviet embassy. It is possible agents of this section supervised the work of diplomatic representatives quite apart from any connection with KRU.

Military Attaches Section: Allegedly supervised the work of Soviet Military Attaches.

Foreign Trade Section: Reportedly checked on the work of all Soviet Trade Missions abroad, using them also to screen espionage and propaganda activity.

Finance Section: Reportedly conducted all INU financial matters and controlled large bank deposits in foreign countries. Deposits were credited to trustworthy "dummies" and built up by the following methods: In purchasing goods abroad, the USSR would offer to pay a sum in excess of the price asked, providing a portion of the excess sum be credited a specified account in a specified bank; ie, the dummy account. Operating through the NKID, the INU would direct the buyer of goods exported from the USSR to pay a portion of the price to a specified individual.

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Administrative and Economic Section: Responsible for all ordinary INU administrative functions.

Personnel Section: In charge of personnel administration, the maintenance of records and the recruitment of personnel.

In addition to the above, geographically divided sections referred to by this source as "sections for various countries" controlled networks of independent agents operating in various countries. Headquarters were believed to be established either in the country in which espionage was carried on or in the Soviet Union near the country concerned. For example, the section dealing with Turkey was believed to have had one headquarters in Odessa, another in Batum and still another within Turkey. The section dealing with the Far East was believed to have headquarters in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

Available information indicates the existence of two additional offices charged with procurement: the Special Supplies Office and the Material and Technical Supply Office. Inadequate information on the first indicates it may have provided material essential for the carrying out of secret espionage work and served only INU. The second, which apparently provided for both MGB and MVD material and technical supplies, is believed to have had depots in all cities where there were INU headquarters.

We are not able at the present time to delineate authentically and in detail all of the information objectives of the INU. It is known that the INU is almost completely omnivorous in its search for information. Generally, it is interested in all information which by any conceivable stretch of the imagination affects the security of the Soviet Union or which concerns the military, economic, sociological, or political potential of any other country. Fr: Chief in 1946: IVANOV

2. SPU (Sekretno Politicheskoye Upravleniye): Secret Political Directorate

The SPU, believed to be the 2nd Directorate of MGB, has been called the direct heir of the earliest Bolshevnik secret police; of all MGB directorates the SPU comes closest to the original primary purpose of the Cheka: the combatting of counterrevolution and sabotage within the Soviet state. SPU was originally created to guarantee completely the political solidarity of the Communist Party, and its purpose was to seek out and eliminate within

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the Party any signs of opposition constituting a threat to the regime. In cases where these signs were no more than tendencies of schools of thought, it was the responsibility of SPU to study them closely and to be able to report on their potential danger; most of SPU's attention was therefore focused on the Party. In addition, the SPU had the subsidiary task of keeping a close watch on religious activities in the USSR; this was deemed necessary because the Communist Party feared and distrusted the development of any political, social or spiritual body which it could not directly control.

It may be said that the SPU today is concerned with crushing all elements within the USSR which are hostile to or presumed likely to become hostile to the regime. This may be contrasted sharply with the purpose of KRU, the Counterintelligence Directorate of MGB, which is to protect Soviet institutions from penetration by foreign powers. In cases where there were signs of only hostile tendencies in certain groups, it was the responsibility of SPU to keep close tabs and report on them. In all, the SPU maintains a dense net of agents to keep under surveillance and to combat not only all elements of the population suspected of being anti-Soviet, but also to watch illegal parties or groups, national minorities, the clergy, the intelligentsia, all cultural institutions of the USSR, and the agricultural communities. The SPU represents the Communist Party authority in the government for the supervision of political attitudes; in other words, supervision down to the level of the private life of every Soviet citizen.

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The structure of the SPU at the USSR level is reported [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to have included the following sections:

Operational  
Section:

Directly responsible under GUGB to the chief of SPU, or to his deputies. The Operational Section organized and directed all the activities of the SPU, working with the political sections described below, which were in a position to give expert advice. The Operational Section issued its orders after studying reports prepared by the operational sections of lower formations of SPU. There were five types of such reports:

- a. Periodical reports (when the situation demanded)
- b. Ten-day bulletins.
- c. Monthly reports.
- d. Quarterly reports.
- e. Yearly reports.

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All reports from provincial operations sections of the RSPSR were sent directly to the Operational Section, SPU. Reports from provincial operational sections of ordinary republics would first of all be sent to the Operational Section at Republic level, and from there, if of sufficient importance, would be forwarded to the Operational Section, SPU, Moscow.

Investigation Section:

When the Operational Section ordered the arrest of a person reported as a potential threat to state security, he would be imprisoned pending investigation of his case by the Investigation Section, or, at lower levels, by the investigation sections of republics or provinces. No information on how this section conducted its investigations was available to source.

Secret Section:

The task of this section was to spy on all the activities of the various party organizations, committees, offices, etc., down to and including province level. This work was done by secret agents who maintained surveillance of the members of the Central Committees for republics, provinces, etc., as well as of the members of all organizations and branches under the Party Central Committees. Agents reported on individual "recalcitrants" as well as on the general political tenor within the Party. When necessary, the Secret Section passed this information directly to the Operational Section, which, advised by the Political Section, decided on necessary action. Although no further information is available on this section, a directorate of the MGB has been mentioned - the Central Directorate for the Control of the Purity of the Communist Party - which may conceivably have developed from the Secret Section.

Records Section:

Maintained all records and files of the various sections of SPU. The chief card-indices were as follows: (a) Card-index for all Party members who at any time had been members of other parties, which was divided into two groups: an active group containing particulars of people under observation by SPU, and a passive group containing those who were not actually being watched by SPU; (b) a card-index of all religious officials, both of the Orthodox Church and of any other religious organizations.

Communications Section:

Responsible for all communications.

Personnel Section:

Maintained the files of all SPU employees and dealt with administrative personnel problems. On questions relating to important members of the staff and to training of personnel, the section maintained liaison with the Personnel Directorate at the Center; it is possible that the Personnel Section trained SPU employees in special subjects within the limits of SPU work.

Political Sections:

These sections made an exhaustive and detailed study of all political movements and schools of thought within the Party which tended to deviate from the central policy. Each section carried out research into a separate movement and estimated in what measure it constituted a threat to the regime. The political danger of any movement or of any reactionary group was then discussed with the Operational

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Section and a plan of action mutually evolved. The plan had to be approved by the Central Committee, but its elaboration and execution were the responsibility of the Operational Section. As specialists in this field, the Political Sections of SPU had to keep the Politburo and the Central Party Committee continually informed as to the exact position and the potential threat of each movement under study. In addition to the Political Sections above mentioned, other sections existed which had the task of studying and reporting on religious movements within the Orthodox Church and other sects.

Files on surveillance of individuals in the USSR are maintained in co-operation with the 1st Special Section (Spetsotdel) described below. A notebook or registry of supervision is kept on every suspect person. If the suspect moves, his registry book follows and is maintained by the 1st Special Sections in the new district. This activity is called "preparation" of the suspected person and it has been estimated that between two and three per cent of all persons in the Soviet Union are at all times under "preparation." The 1st Special Sections maintain, in general card files, all data on anti-Soviet and enemy elements brought to light during the existence of the Soviet organs of State Security; included are full factual information about the persons, the dispositions made of them and the whereabouts of the records concerning them.

It is known that several categories of groups have been of particular interest to the SPU and thus subject to intensive surveillance and study. These groups have included national, social, and religious groups, political factions of all types, and cultural organizations. In fact, the general surveillance of all elements representing a threat or even a potential threat to the security of or the policies effectuated by the regime is one of the primary functions of the SPU. It appears that the SPU particularly concerned itself with deviation from the Stalinist line and successively surveilled and prosecuted the members of various dissident units within the CPSU. It appears probable that the purges and the trials which followed the alleged assassination of Sergei M. KIROV in Leningrad in 1934 were conducted and staged under the supervision and control of the SPU.

SPU has long carried on surveillance of the Russian nationalist minorities, the Georgians and other peoples of the Caucasus and

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particularly the Ukrainians. In the religious category, not only the Orthodox Church but also all Russian religious sects are under the continuous surveillance of SPU. [REDACTED] the SPU directed the campaign against religion which reached its height in the late twenties; this campaign died down in the thirties as, perhaps, it was found to be defeating its purpose. The SPU undoubtedly maintains surveillance over the activities of all cultural groups and institutions, including educational, and of the so-called intelligentsia, primarily artists, writers, actors, etc. It is believed that SPU agent networks are established in the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes in order to obtain information on the attitude of the peasants. It may be presumed that the program of liquidation and exile of the kulaks was carried out under the direction of SPU.

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It is difficult to delineate exactly the respective jurisdiction of SPU and KRU. Both directorates, of course, are primarily concerned with counterintelligence. It appears that the greatest distinction between them is that the SPU is mainly concerned with elements, groups, or categories of persons believed inimical or possibly inimical to the regime, while KRU is mainly concerned with specific operational counterintelligence and counterespionage problems.

3. KRU (Kontr Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye): Counterintelligence Directorate *Fr: created early in OLS PU, changed with CE interview*

The KRU, also referred to by several sources as the 3rd Directorate, is primarily concerned with operational counterintelligence and has had the following responsibilities:

- a. Protection of the Soviet population and of all non-military institutions in the USSR against the activities of foreign agents.
- b. Protection of Soviet diplomatic missions in foreign countries from the activities of foreign agents.
- c. Counterespionage abroad; that is, to combat foreign intelligence services at their source and to attempt to identify foreign targets and agents before the start of actual operations.
- d. Surveillance of other Soviet intelligence services' personnel. Such personnel reportedly are under KRU surveillance within the USSR and abroad and are screened by KRU upon their return from abroad.

The KRU and its subordinate offices are set up on all levels of the MGB structure. It is believed that the designation "3rd Directorate" is applied to KRU only at USSR level - that is, at the Center in Moscow -

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as its responsibility is for the entire territory of the USSR. It is probable that in the various republics, provinces and districts the terms KRU and KRO are in use. All these KRU offices have the common responsibility of doing CE work within the Soviet Union; CE activities abroad reportedly are almost exclusively directed by the KRU on USSR level. In isolated cases, KRU's subordinate sections in republics and provinces have reportedly sent agents into adjoining countries, but such agents seem to have been restricted to the border zones. One source states flatly that no district state security organization ever becomes concerned with counterespionage work. The same source infers, from the directorate's main responsibilities, that there are two major divisions within KRU. One division is believed to be for counterintelligence in the interior of the USSR, and the other, subdivided by countries, for counterespionage abroad. This information is substantiated to some extent by [REDACTED] who, while unable to give any information on CE activities outside of the Soviet Union, explained the KRU of GUGB as consisting of operational, investigation, records, communications, personnel and administration sections plus a Special Section for KRU. This Special Section was believed to maintain close liaison with the Operational Section and to supply it with whatever operational resources it required. It reportedly was divided into special equipment sections, operational groups and a reserve or pool of NN or external surveillance agents for any KRU section handling field observation of suspects. In addition to agents supplied by the Special Section mentioned above, an Agent Section was responsible for directing the work of CE resident agents in the USSR down through province level; information received from the Agent Section's networks being passed to the operational sections.

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Whether KRU operations abroad are separate and distinct from INU; whether they are conducted through INU channels; whether they are conducted by INU personnel; or whether they are carried out by KRU personnel assigned to serve INU installations abroad, we are unable to say, although efforts have been made to clarify this question through [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] available sources. As noted above in the section on INU, it is considered most probable that the majority of KRU operations abroad are run

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through INU channels, although there are some indications that in certain instances State Security personnel engaged in extremely secret counter-intelligence operations abroad may have had no connection with any other Soviet intelligence efforts in the same area.

It must be emphasized that KRU enjoys the greatest co-operation in its work from all other Soviet intelligence agencies and government offices, whether in CE work within the USSR or CE activity abroad. German documents state that KRU, in preventing espionage and counterespionage within foreign missions in the Soviet Union, used the following means:

- a. A broad agent net among the foreigners resident in the USSR who have any sort of connection with their country's diplomatic corps.
- b. A net of agents among the employees of consulates, embassies, commercial delegations, etc.
- c. Use as informants of persons who have connections with employees of consulates, etc.
- d. Special informers, both foreigners and Soviet citizens, supplied with "legends", try to penetrate missions.
- e. Agents of the 3rd Special Section, co-operating with KRU, carry on a watch over all foreign agency buildings and the visitors to these buildings.
- f. Agents of the 3rd Special Section, co-operating with KRU, also keep a watch over any persons identified as or suspected of collaborating with the staffs of foreign missions.
- g. Use of listening devices within the foreign agency's buildings. This work is carried on by members of the 2nd Special Section who supply and operate the necessary technical equipment.
- h. Censorship and control over correspondence of foreign agencies and decoding of coded messages. The censorship functions were the province of agents of the 4th Special Section. A 5th Special Section has been mentioned as responsible for code work, although this function has also been attributed to a 7th Directorate of GUGB.

In carrying out its foreign activities the KRU apparently maintains a much broader liaison than even the excellent liaison with special sections indicated within the USSR. KRU maintains liaison with INU, SMERSH, MVD, MID (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Soviet organizations with international connections, such as repatriation committees, staffs of Soviet liaison offices, etc.

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██████ experiences gained before and during World War II indicate that important KRU objectives abroad are to gather information on foreign intelligence services, to attempt the subversion of those whose work is directed against the Soviet Union and to gather information on all foreign CE services, with particular emphasis on their methods of preventing Soviet penetration. The groundwork of the CE missions of the KRU is laid

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through systematic evaluation of all facts regarding foreign intelligence and CE services, extracted from the statements of Soviet foreign agents, from documents and from all other sources. According to one source the primary Soviet aim in this regard is subversion; i.e., a greater interest in the personnel of foreign intelligence services than in their organizations. Special investigation files are made up on each individual subject and are kept by the 1st Special Section, probably on USSR level. Reports are received not only from principal agents but also from masses of secondary agents in foreign countries who try to ascertain the existence and location of intelligence units, agent schools, etc. For example a method of gaining information which supposedly has proved effective and which is known to be widely practiced is for an agent to provoke by intentionally suspicious behavior his arrest and interrogation by a foreign intelligence service. Thus the agent contrives to learn which agency interrogates suspected agents, the methods used and the identity of interrogating personnel. By his subsequent conduct, which is part of a previously devised plan, the agent can frequently effect his release.

Soviet counterintelligence activity in foreign countries is known to have been consistently concerned with groups actually or potentially anti-Soviet, as well as with elements active in the political life of the countries involved. Considerable information is available reflecting the use of various minority organizations, as well as the utilization of all official Soviet representation for counterintelligence purposes. For example, the Society of Friends of the Soviet Union in Munich recently was reported to have received, through a camouflaged outpost of the MGB in Weimar, instructions to determine the residences, financial circumstances, and contacts of all Soviet citizens in the area. KRU agent nets reportedly permeate the organization of the CPSU, as well as all official Soviet missions abroad. Characteristic of KRU working methods, allegedly, is the planned penetration of all anti-Soviet organizations abroad. For example, penetration of the Vlassov Army reportedly was a special objective of the KRU,

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The assumption has been made by one source that at the end of the recent war, the emphasis in KRU counterespionage activities was re-directed against the "United States area" and the British Empire. The chief aim is said to be the elimination of all forces which could be made useful to the intelligence services of these nations and which would strengthen the United States and Great Britain. This, of course, would be in perfect agreement with other known Soviet policy changes after 1945. Fr: Chief in '46 DANENKO.

4. EKU (Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye): Economic Directorate

Fr: Founded in 1924,  
stemming from KRO

The EKU or GEU, as late as 1940 was definitely a directorate of the NKVD; at that time it was charged with anti-sabotage work, counter-intelligence supervision and, possibly, efficiency control of all industrial and commercial undertakings in the USSR, as well as all such undertakings by foreign nations on Soviet territory. It is possible that EKU exists today under the MGB, but it is more probable that, as a development from the EKU branches for various industries, economic directorates for these industries have been set up under MGB. This development is probable inasmuch as EKU branches existed to carry out the work of the directorate in the Armaments Industry, the Heavy Machine Construction Industry, the Oil Industry, the Food Industry and others, and the headquarters of the MGB at the present time appears to contain separate directorates concerned with major industrial fields. It is also probable that many of the functions of supervision over industry, which at one time were exercised by this directorate, may at the present time be within the province of the MVD rather than the MGB.

Our [redacted] source of information on EKU of the NKVD, [redacted] has given the following explanation of the formation of the EKU: a lack of fully qualified technicians who were also convinced Communists compelled the Soviets to resort to employing politically unreliable specialists. Such persons, as well as the general run of managers of factories, industrial projects and agricultural communities, had, from the Soviet point of view, to be watched closely. It was also necessary to make absolutely certain that the industrial and agricultural policies of the government were strictly observed and that there were no deviations whatever. During

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the 1930's, at the time of the expansion of the Soviet war industries, it was considered essential to have an organization capable of safeguarding the secrecy of the Soviet military preparations and to check leakage of information concerning the type, quantity and potential of armaments and munitions being manufactured.

The same source has provided the following summary of the tasks of EKU. The Directorate was responsible for leading the struggle against economic counterrevolution, circumventing economic reactionaries, preventing sabotage, and surveilling all personnel in industrial plants. It also safeguarded the security of all military and defensive branches of industry, controlled the execution of government policy in all branches of industry and agriculture and directed operationally all troops guarding important munitions factories.

The central apparatus or headquarters of EKU consisted of a series of departments and branches, which, under the direction of the operational department or section, organized all work of EKU and administered its subordinate bodies. The central headquarters were split into two divisions: (a) The Operational and Administrative Division which was concerned with the top-level organization of EKU as a whole, and (b) The branch departments and sections, each of which was responsible for a separate industry, its work in each case confined to a single sphere.

The Operational Section was responsible for the planning and direction of the work of all branches and departments of EKU. It received all returns and reports from industrial branches, sections of the central headquarters and operational sections of the lower level organs of EKU (at republic and province levels - EKO, except in the case of the Ukrainian SSR, which was an EKU).

All material thus received was studied by the Operational Section and suitable action was taken in the form of directives to other organs. In especially important questions the Operational Section would submit proposals, for approval, to the Industrial Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Operational Section issued orders for all sections on republic, province and district levels, and it was, in addition, responsible for the operational direction of the NKVD (now MVD) troops guarding factories, although administratively these troops were

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subordinated to GUMPVO NKVD (Glavnoye Upravleniye Mostnoi Protivo-Vozdushnoi Oborony - Local Air Raid Defense).

There were four categories of industrial concerns guarded by these troops: armament, defense industry, heavy industry and experimental factories, and workshops and laboratories working on military research. The chief of the Operations Section was senior to chiefs of all other sections in EKU. Investigation, records, communications, personnel and other service sections were set up under EKU in a manner similar to the organization of other directorates.

Of especial interest in EKU was the Technical Consultation Board which consisted of highly qualified representatives of different spheres of industry. This board made rulings on all types of special technical problems arising from trials of cases under investigation and could be consulted by all the organs of EKU. A local EKU-EKO office which required a decision of experts on any matter would refer it to the Technical Consultation Board which had its headquarters in Moscow. If necessary, an expert would be sent to deal with the matter on the spot.

Departments or sections of EKU dealing with specific industries are listed below. Each department dealt solely with its own industry; for example, the EKU Department for the Aircraft Industry dealt only with factories and organizations forming parts of the NKAP (Peoples' Commissariat for the Aircraft Industry). ████████████████████ EKU departments for the following industries in 1940-1941:

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- a. Department for Ferrous Metallurgy.
- b. Department for Non-Ferrous Metallurgy.
- c. Section for the Electrical Industry.
- d. Department for Electric Power Stations.
- e. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat of War Supplies.
- f. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat for Munitions.
- g. Department for the Machine Building Industry (dealt with the Peoples' Commissariats for Heavy, Medium and Light Machine Building).
- h. Department for the Peoples' Commissariat for the Building Industry.
- i. Section for the Celluloid and Cotton Industry.
- j. Department for the Home (Household goods?) Industry.
- k. Department for the Food Industry (Food, Fish, Meat and Dairy Industries).
- l. Department for Light Industry (including the Textile Industry).
- m. Section for the Timber Industry.
- n. Department for Agricultural Economy (Peoples' Commissariats for Agriculture, Grain and Cattle Breeding, State Farms).
- o. Section for Shipbuilding Industry.
- p. Department for the Oil Industry.
- q. Department for the Aircraft Industry.

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Special departments and units of this directorate reportedly existed in all armament and munitions factories and in a majority of important industrial concerns. The personnel of these departments and units allegedly was made up of regular NKVD employees or in smaller concerns from volunteer, trustworthy workers. Although these special departments were originally a part of the factory's organization, they reportedly were operationally controlled by the appropriate industrial department, section, or representative in the local provincial or territorial EKO. The task of such special departments were:

- a. To ensure the political reliability of all workers and to determine immediately any signs of anti-Soviet activity..
- b. To direct operationally the guarding of the factory by NKVD personnel and to take reasonable fire prevention precautions as well as to control entry into and exit from the factory.
- c. To see that the factory fulfilled its production quota.
- d. To see that factories having or operating under a mobilization plan adhered to the plan and were ready at any time for mobilization.
- e. To maintain security and secrecy in factories of military importance.

It should be emphasized that the above information, which is believed accurate, concerns the period when EKO was operating as an NKVD directorate. We cannot definitely establish the present existence of an EKO/MGB, and it is considered possible that functions previously exercised by this directorate are presently being exercised by certain specific directorates of the MGB concerned with intelligence and, perhaps to an extent, security in major fields of industrial effort. It is also possible, as noted above, that certain supervisory functions may presently be exercised by the MVD. *Fr. Chief in '46 NIKOLAYEV*

5. DTU (Dorozhno-Transportnoye Upravleniye): Road Transport Directorate *Fr. confirmed in '48*

The DTU, prior to its absorption by the NKGB in 1943, appears to have been an organ of the NKVD with, as far as our sources show, no formal subordination to the GUGB. It is believed now to be a directorate of the MGB. Very little information is available to us on DTU at the USSR level. It apparently exercises counterintelligence supervision of the sea, river and railway transport systems of the USSR. DTU's responsibilities probably include security measures to safeguard all military and non-military cargoes in transport, direction of the work of the MVD railway militia branches

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The Directorate of OO's/NKGB was established at the beginning of the Soviet German War as part of the NKVD; it was transferred in April or May 1943 to the newly formed NKGB and had the function of maintaining counterintelligence surveillance among the Partisan troops. It is important to emphasize the distinction between the OO's/NKGB and the OO's/NKVD. The latter developed out of the old OGPU VO's (Voyennoye Otdely) or military sections, which had counterintelligence functions in the Red Army and Red Navy, and were officially dissolved in 1943, only to reappear outwardly under the direction of the NKO or Peoples' Commissariat of Defense where they were known as the Counterespionage Section of NKO, Death to Spies, UKR-NKO Smersh, concerning which further data are set out below. Briefly, the OO's/NKGB appear to have borne the same relationship to Partisan units as Smersh bore to the Red Army and the Red Fleet.

8. SMERSH: Directorate for Counterintelligence in the Armed Forces (now usually referred to as GUKR)

The purpose of the Directorate for Counterintelligence in the Soviet armed forces is to discover politically unreliable elements in and to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services of the armed forces. In carrying out the first objective, the directorate aims at elimination of all opposition to Bolshevism and of all tradition antedating the establishment of the Soviet Union.

Counterintelligence functions in the Red Army were first initiated in 1918 when numerous non-Communists were taken in as specialists and it was believed necessary to place them under constant surveillance to prevent them from making contact with the enemy. For this purpose the military sections of the Cheka were established, subordinated not to Army but to Cheka command.

In 1922, when the GPU replaced the Cheka, the military sections' functions were expanded to include counterintelligence control of all other branches of the armed forces; the Navy, Air Force, etc. With the formation of the NKVD in 1934, these military sections were redesignated as special sections of the NKVD (OO's - Osoby Otdel). The term special section became synonymous to the Soviet soldier with denunciation and spying; partly to

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efface this connotation counterintelligence functions were, in the spring of 1943, placed under the command of the NKO (Narodny Komissariat Oborony) or Peoples' Commissariat of Defense, and were renamed OKR (Otdely Kontr-Razvedki) NKO SMERSH; these OKR (counterintelligence sections) were set up administratively under the Central Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKO or GUKR (Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontr-Razvedki) NKO SMERSH. No basic differences in the work of the organization have been noted during these transitions. The NKO was replaced by the MVS (Ministerstvo Vooruzhyonnykh Sil) or Ministry of Armed Forces, in 1946. For a time, at least, the organization continued as GUKR MVS but in the summer or fall of 1946 SMERSH was transferred to the MGB as the Directorate for Counterintelligence in the Armed Forces.

Prior to 1946, SMERSH units were attached to the various unit headquarters of the Red Army, and SMERSH informants operated in all troop echelons. Close liaison was effected with KRU and 1st and 2nd Special Sections of the NKGB, with the PO's or Political Sections of the Red Army (responsible for the political education of members of the armed forces), with police installations of the NKVD, and, during the war, with the 4th or Partisan Directorate of the NKGB. Of great importance was the transfer of agent nets between KRU and SMERSH, depending on whether control of territory during wartime was by a civilian or a military agency. 1st Special Section files were constantly referred to by SMERSH and the technical facilities of the 2nd Special Section were habitually employed. Contact was never lost with the OO's NKGB, which carried out counterintelligence functions in the Partisan troops; SMERSH agents committed behind the German front lines found Partisan regions the best bases for the initiation of missions.

The responsibilities of SMERSH have been reported as divided into two groups, that of surveillance and protection of Soviet troops at home and abroad, and that of preventing penetration by foreign intelligence services. SMERSH took the following measures in carrying out the first function:

- a. Attempted to discover counterrevolutionary elements and tendencies.
- b. Sought to prevent desertion, self-infliction of wounds, panic and sabotage.
- c. Reported on "any laxity in army discipline," such laxity being considered sabotage.

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- d. Observed and tried to eliminate defects or poor quarters, poor messing facilities, inadequate equipment and the like.
- e. Sought to discover defects in leadership and any conditions which might adversely affect the outcome of operations.
- f. Protected secret material; protected headquarters of military units from foreign agents and saboteurs. Traced, identified and interrogated foreign agents in the troops and in civilian groups with which troops came in contact.
- g. Made security checks on all Smersh and military intelligence agents before and after commitment; examined returning Soviet soldiers.
- h. Evaluated enemy documents of intelligence value.

In attempting to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services,

SMERSH's most important aims were:

- a. Acquisition of information on foreign intelligence services, primarily those working against the Soviets.
- b. Undermining foreign intelligence services by infiltration of agents.
- c. Deception through agent playbacks and W/T playbacks.
- d. Surveillance of Soviet agents in foreign countries, especially of those considered not completely reliable and those with especially important missions.

The establishment of SMERSH agent networks and the operation of the mechanics of surveillance are the same as in other MGB networks in the Soviet Union. Foreign agents discovered by SMERSH are interrogated at various echelons on other agents committed in the same mission; personnel, schools and counterintelligence methods of foreign intelligence services; personnel possibly susceptible to Soviet influence; and the foreign political, economic and military situation.

It can be assumed that since World War II, with Soviet soldiers exposed to foreign influences outside of the USSR, the importance of counterintelligence surveillance in the armed forces is greater than ever. The Counterintelligence Directorate has today, in addition to the responsibilities listed above, the task of nipping every sign of dissatisfaction on the part of Soviet armed forces personnel returning to the Soviet Union and of preparing them for the return in such a manner that they realize what subjects they may discuss after their return and about what they must keep silent.

#### 9. Partisan Directorate

The Partisan Directorate, also known as the 4th Directorate, was set up within GUGB/NKVD either in or before August 1942, probably with the status of a section until, upon the formation of NKGB in 1943, it became

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a directorate of that new commissariat. The Partisan Directorate is inseparably linked with the Partisan Movement which, it is believed, had been officially organized, at least on paper, since the period of the Civil Wars. Under the NKVD, the organization of the Partisan Movement had been centrally controlled, in close co-operation with the Partisan Administration in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), by the 4th Directorate of GUGB. Although its primary peacetime mission was to combat Partisan activity within the USSR, even before the Soviet-German war the 1st Section of the 4th Directorate had prepared the operations of Partisan groups in the rear of any possible invading enemy. Locally this was effected in the following manner: Party members, workers in large factories, farm laborers and others were appointed by the regional committees of the Communist Party to organize annihilation squads, special troops of the NKVD, destruction squads and other diversionary efforts. Lower echelons of the 4th Directorate confirmed the selection of personnel and assumed responsibility for training. In wartime, these organizations were composed mainly of men ineligible for military service. Units were especially trained to conduct active sabotage behind enemy lines in case of military occupation. Detailed instructions issued by the Directorate for the training of these units stressed transition to Partisan activity in the rear of the enemy.

During the German offensive in the summer and fall of 1941, there were at first only small groups which actually retreated into the forests. They comprised a few members of the NKVD who had remained behind, Party functionaries, Red Army men who had separated from their units, and, quite frequently, criminal elements who took advantage of the activities of these groups to further their own ends. The Soviet population, as a whole, displayed little sympathy at first for these as yet undisciplined guerrillas. However, in the winter of 1941-1942, the organization of the Partisan Movement was activated at a low level by the Communist Party and the NKVD. Paramilitary organizations were mobilized by the local Communist Party committees and by the local NKVD branch offices, the latter supplying mainly elements of the GUPO or Central Directorate of Fire Protection. The Partisans gained members due to the nonrealization of expectations of liberation from

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Bolshevism, the influence of stories told by escaped Russian PW's of their experiences in German prison camps, the increasing success of Bolshevik penetration of the German Eastern administration and the policies of the German SS formations which forced thousands of Soviet citizens to flee to the forests. The clever change in the Soviet propaganda from internationalism to the slogan "Defense of the Fatherland," from official atheism to purported freedom of worship, pictured the Partisans to be fighting for fatherland and religion.

It has been reported that when the central Partisan organization was set up in 1942, it included the following Partisan intelligence units:

In Soviet territory:

Intelligence Department (RU) of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement.  
 Intelligence Sections (RO's) of the various staffs of the Partisan Movements of the various republics.  
 Intelligence Sections (RO's) of the representations of the Partisan Movement of the Soviet republics; attached to army group headquarters.  
 Intelligence officers of the operative groups of the Partisan Movement of the Soviet republics; attached to various army headquarters.

In Enemy Territory:

Intelligence Sections (RO's) of all Partisan headquarters down to battalion.  
 Intelligence officers of all smaller Partisan units  
 Intelligence schools for sabotage, espionage and W/T were attached to most of the intelligence sections.

A documentary source indicated that the strength of paramilitary Partisan units was 75-100 men in a group, organized in platoons of 25 men each and squads of 8 men each. Their missions, including intelligence activities, were the combatting of anti-Soviet and enemy elements behind the front, "vigilance" against enemy agents, air raid protection, destruction of Soviet industries in case of enemy occupation, and subsequent organization of armed bands in the rear of the enemy.

German documentary sources are the basis for the remainder of this section on the Partisan intelligence. Unfortunately, the Germans never learned in detail the connections between the Partisan Directorate and the Partisan Movement it organized, and we have no information from the Germans on this relationship during the years 1943-1945. Although the Germans have stated that the entire Partisan intelligence organization

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was, in respect to purpose, closely linked with the military command, they were never able to clarify the exact relationship between the Intelligence Directorate of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. On the other hand, enough information was available to the Germans so that they could make clear the co-ordination between Partisan intelligence and the Communist Party. For example the Partisan command staff at the level of army group headquarters received orders from the Central Committee of the Communist Party at republic level. Such an order might read as follows: "By order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, your groups are to move farther to the west." However, if the Partisan command wished to initiate a movement or publish an order involving organizational matters, it had first to receive the confirmation of one of the Central Committees of the Communist Party, depending on the level on which the command function was exercised. The instance quoted is an example of this co-ordination between Partisan command staffs at army group headquarters level with the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Republics. According to the Germans, reconnaissance and intelligence orders were released without prior concurrence by Party organs.

A fairly complete picture of the structure and functions of the Partisan intelligence service on the lower levels was obtained by the Germans as early as 1943; however, by that time the more or less tenuous connection with the Partisan Directorate had been lost and no information on the activities of this Directorate has been received since that time. It is believed possible that organizing offices for the Partisan Directorate may exist at the present time within the MGB and may be prepared to reactivate the Partisan Movement in any country and at any time. Thus the Partisan Movement may be considered a latent component of Soviet espionage and sabotage capable of being activated whenever needed under the necessary extant conditions.

#### 10. Other Headquarters Directorates

Set out below are other headquarters directorates which have been reliably reported as presently existing within the MGB but concerning which we have insufficient information to discuss their composition, functions,

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or jurisdiction adequately. While, from their titles alone, the purposes and functions of most of these directorates would appear obvious - the maintenance of State security in specific fields and the intelligence control of specific ministries - we do not have authentic data upon which to base further comment. In addition to the directorates listed below, we believe that there are still other, as yet unidentified, MGB headquarters organs.

- a. Central Intelligence Directorate.
- b. Directorate of Intelligence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- c. Central Directorate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- d. Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Trade.
- e. Central Directorate for the Control and Maintenance of State and Military Secrets.
- f. Central Directorate for the Control of the Purity of the Communist Party.
- g. Central Directorate in the Ministries of Heavy Machine Construction.
- h. Central Directorate in the Armaments Industry.
- i. Operational Directorate.

#### 11. Service Directorates and Sections

Sections of service directorates or service sections are attached to all MGB directorates mentioned above in order to carry out the numerous service functions, such as investigation, technical supply, personnel administration, administrative supplies, finances, etc. Most of these sections, herein referred to as service organs, are set up on USSR level and the following discussion of their functions is based on such admittedly incomplete information as is available at the present time.

##### a. Investigation Directorate

The Investigation Directorate, also referred to as the Investigation Bureau or SB (Slodstvennoye Byuro), investigates and interrogates suspects, prepares the legal dossiers on cases and makes transfer of cases to the State Prosecutor. A military tribunal tries cases received from the Investigation Directorate. In addition, the SB allegedly collects information about the organization and methods of foreign intelligence services; clarifying details are not available concerning this report. During wartime, the SB interrogated prisoners of intelligence interest. From USSR level, the Investigation Directorate directs the work of subordinate sections attached to MGB directorates and to their subordinate organs down to province level.

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**SECRET**b. Operational Directorate

The Operational Directorate at USSR level organized and directed the work of sections attached to the other GUGB directorates; these sections were the actual operating organs of the directorates to which they were attached and controlled the mass of agents and informants comprising the agent nets within the USSR. Detailed information on the functions of this directorate on USSR level is not available; it is doubtful whether the Operational Directorate exists under MGB, for operational work in the MGB appears at the present time to be carried out by the local offices of the MGB at republic, province and district levels.

c. Special Sections (Spetsotdely or SO's)

From information at hand there can be no doubt that five numbered Special Sections had existed up to the establishment of the NKGB in 1943, and, with little doubt, have continued to exist, occupying the same place today in the MGB that they occupied previously in its predecessor organizations. They were organized on USSR level and their subordinate sections were attached to most, if not all, NKVD directorates to carry out the functions assigned to them. The functions of the Spetsotdely are believed to be as follows: 1st SO - files and card indices; 2nd SO - technical equipment and services; 3rd SO - surveillance and search; 4th SO - consorship; and 5th SO - codos.

(1) 1st Special Section

The 1st Special Section NKVD, also known as the 1st Special Section Center, was organized at USSR level to direct the work of all subordinate 1st Special Sections through constant liaison and official directives. At conferences, mutual problems were discussed. The Center also maintained on USSR level the bulk of the archives and files of all completed cases investigated by NKVD directorates.

Under the direction of the 1st Special Section its subordinate organizations maintained a wide variety of files, card-indices and registers principally in two categories: the suspected

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classes of the population, and the agents and informants detailed to keep them under surveillance. Persons registered in an operative record of anti-Soviet elements by the 1st Spetsotdel include those from among the following categories: all citizens having in one way or another connections with foreign countries; immigrants to the Soviet Union; foreign deserters; surviving members of the Czarist regime; kulaks; members of religious denominations; former participants in all types of anti-Soviet mutinies; former members of the police forces of the Czarist and Kerensky governments; Mensheviks, Trotzkyites, Social Revolutionaries, Constitutional Democrats, monarchists, etc; participants in national organizations and uprisings; suspected saboteurs, spies, terrorists and anti-Soviet agitators; smugglers; repatriated emigrants; surviving members of families of persons sentenced to death by State Security organs; persons released after serving sentences for political crimes; former agents of the State Security services dismissed for double-dealing and giving false information; former Party or Komsomol members expelled for dissension and other political reasons; members of the families of traitors; persons expelled from large cities; persons formerly employed by foreign firms; persons having contacts with foreign consulates or foreign political or commercial representatives; all foreigners in the USSR, except members of the diplomatic bodies; and others.

All those known to fall in these categories are recorded in the operational register of the 1st Special Section on a card in an alphabetical index containing general information on anti-Soviet elements. A special record or register is then prepared on every registered person combining all available information concerning him: biography, reports of agents and informants, a general decision in regard to the methods to be used in the case, information from the archives, official records of the interrogation of witnesses, the manner in which the person came to the attention of the State Security organs.

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Usually the special register forms the basis for a more active form of agent supervision called the acute case or the agents' case. The distinction between the two is that an acute case involves surveillance by one or more agents of a single individual, while in an agents' case surveillance over a group of individuals is carried on by one or more agents. Persons figuring in this form of active supervision by agents are called "figurants" and are registered in an alphabetical index of "figurants." In these active cases of surveillance, all kinds of combinations of agents and all varieties of operations are undertaken. The one stable factor in this picture is the 1st Special Section, the subordinate organizations of which collaborate with State, State Security and other organizations in the preparation for and the carrying out of all surveillance operations from their inception to the conclusion, whereupon the accumulated papers are stored in archives. Among State Security organizations co-operating with the 1st Special Section are the Investigation Sections, SPU sections, KRU sections, EKV sections, the organs of the 2nd and 3rd Special Sections. As an example of the volume of cases handled by the 1st Special Section, a defector has advised that in the Leningrad Office of the NKVD during the first six months of 1940 there were about 55,000 register cases, 9,000 to 10,000 acute cases and approximately 900 agents' cases.

The registration of agents is done in the following manner: After recruitment, informants and agents are all registered by alias in an alphabetical card file in the 1st Special Section. This index contains the following information: family name; christian name; date and place of birth; residence and place of work; education; race; social position; when and by whom recruited; whether informant, agent or local resident; signature of section head and with whom the recruited person is to keep in contact. Working papers, personal documents and special information forms on each agent are kept, and

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provide very detailed information on his previous occupations, places of work, foreign relations, relatives, friends, knowledge of foreign languages, remuneration, persons mentioned by the agent in his reports, etc. A photograph of the agent is always kept with his papers, in order to assist contacting him should he become lost.

When a person under surveillance has been arrested and imprisoned, all the material received from agents about him, statements of witnesses, recordings of conversations, etc., is gathered into an investigation file in the 1st Special Section and sent to the Investigation Section concerned with the case. It is the duty of the 1st Special Section to supervise the Investigation Section's handling of the case, ensuring that the investigation is completed within a prescribed time. Upon completion of the investigation and sentence of the accused, documents concerned with the case are sent to archives on USSR, republic, province or district level, depending apparently upon the importance and locale of the case. Archives of the 1st Special Section keeps all documents connected with completed or interrupted surveillances by agents, all completed or discontinued investigation cases, all personal and working papers of dismissed agents, deceased agents or emigrated agents, and copies of all kinds of communications and reports. Strict rules govern the operation of the archives office and the means of disposing of documents, as well as the kinds of documents to be destroyed.

(2) 2nd Special Section

The duties of agents of the 2nd Special Section were, and apparently still are, in the main, to provide the State Security organs with technical equipment of all types needed in their work. The staffs of the subordinate organs of this section are large and include personnel of considerable training and education. The 2nd Special Section is responsible for radio, telephone, photographic, and chemical equipment, maintaining laboratories for the production and improvement of all

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material. It also censors mail, telephone and radio messages, and code correspondence.

Chemical laboratories of the 2nd Special Section manufactured and provided agents with poisons, explosives and sympathetic inks; analyzed documents and papers seized on the state frontiers, especially with the purpose of discovering secret writing; and analyzed chemicals and explosives seized in connection with arrests at the frontiers. In May 1941, the 2nd Special Section allegedly was ordered to begin research on infectious diseases suspected of being spread by German agents. Whether it was the only Soviet organization concerned with bacteriological warfare, and the extent of its research, are not known.

Entirely subordinated to and controlled by the 2nd Special Section was the so-called PK, or Post Control, sometimes referred to as Political Control. The work of mail censorship was carried out by this agency in secret rooms of post offices. Post control of a person or address was arranged on direction from operational sections and orders requesting post control were required to contain the subject's christian name, family name, father's name, address of residence and working place, as well as the time during which PK must be maintained, and the signature of the head of the section requesting the control. The procedure then was to send the incoming (in rare cases also the outgoing) correspondence of the controlled party via Special Section 2, where it was opened, to the officer handling the investigation. The investigating officer would fill out a card, recording the contents of the correspondence and then affix his signature. If the letter "K" was written on the card, the correspondence was to be confiscated; if the letter "A", the correspondence was to be forwarded by the post office to the addressee. If the correspondence or other confiscated material contained anything of operational interest, it was sent as evidence to the investigation section or sections. In addition to control by direct order, a random control was carried out regularly and

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all material of operational interest thus intercepted was sent to the proper operational section for investigation. Letters mailed by soldiers and sailors reportedly have been especially subject to this random control as a means of determining morale and political attitudes. Special Section 2 co-operated with the OO's/NKVD in turning over to them suspicious items intercepted through this random control and the section was also required to make content reports to the City and District Committees of the Communist Party and to an NKVD office in Moscow.

The larger 2nd Special Sections had at their disposal wireless laboratories equipped with transmitters of every construction and capacity, powerful radio stations, sound equipment, etc. Radio stations of the 2nd Special Section reportedly have been used to jam foreign broadcasts. The Section's laboratories studied all confiscated wireless equipment, supplied Soviet agents working abroad with the necessary wireless equipment and supplied specialists to install microphones whenever and wherever they were needed.

The 2nd Special Section handled monitoring of telephone lines much as it handled post control. Monitoring was only undertaken in important cases and only on a written request from an operational section. At the end of the order requesting the service, the expression "M" or "Mikhail" was used to signify that conversations of the person mentioned in the order were to be monitored. In addition to the above responsibility, the 2nd Special Section, at least at one time, organized and maintained the "VTj" or high-frequency communications network linking every NKVD organ of republic, district, province and large city with the NKVD in Moscow, and also used by important Party and Government officials. Only a few administrative officers were entitled to use this system; for example, in the Leningrad NKVD administration only its chief, his deputies, the head of the 2nd Special Section and the chief of the 2nd Special Section subsection for

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cipher telegrams. In addition to expediting service, the advantage of VTj was that by the use of a system of filters listening-in was almost impossible. Every VTj point was equipped with special sets for supply of energy in cases of breakdowns in the regular telephone net. All VTj equipment was kept strictly secret. VTj stations were also used to control Soviet international telephone and telegraphic communications, control being exercised by the use of filters and by monitoring of incoming telephone and telegraphic messages.

Photographic laboratories under the 2nd Special Section arranged for photographing all NKVD personnel once or twice each year and also all arrested persons. They photographed documents, and other material necessary for investigation or for use as evidence, developed film exposed by agents during their assignments, and duplicated pictures of wanted persons. An additional responsibility of the laboratories was to forge passports, identification documents, seals, stamps, etc.

The simple encoding and decoding of ordinary incoming and outgoing cipher correspondence was done by the 2nd Special Section. Operational Sections (with the exception of peripheric sections) did not ordinarily code or decode messages but if they had to send a message in cipher the text was sent to the cipher subsection of the 2nd Special Section with the signature of the section head and a note "To be sent as a cipher telegram via VTj." In the peripheric organs, encoding and decoding was usually done by the head of the district section, but sometimes they were entrusted to secretaries of district and city sections.

As may be judged from the foregoing, the work of the 2nd Special Section was many-sided. In addition to the tasks described, the 2nd Special Section employed expert safecrackers, locksmiths, and experts in forgery and in all types of search. Although this information is limited to the period of NKVD, inasmuch as source's active participation was with NKVD units,

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it is believed that fundamentally much of the work ascribed by him to the 2nd Special Section is still carried out by the present 2nd Special Sections.

(3) 3rd Special Section

Third Special Section agents carried out surveillance of suspected persons and house searches. The predecessor of this organ seems to have been the Operod (Operativny Otdel) which observed travelers arriving in the Soviet Union by train. As late as 1940, 3rd Special Section agents frequented railroad stations, hotels, restaurants and other places where new arrivals were likely to be encountered; many agents were employed as janitors, hotel personnel, railway workers and porters. They were ordinarily recruited among former NKVD employees dismissed on account of illness or age. One source, who has given, or substantiated, much of the information set out above on the 1st and 2nd Special Sections, states that the 3rd Special Sections handle the "outside supervision" of foreigners arriving in and resident in the Soviet Union, as well as of the diplomatic corps. The meaning of this phrase seems to be that supervision of certain diplomatic representatives, believed to be engaged in espionage and in contact with foreign intelligence services, is carried out by 3rd Special Section agents. However, the same agents are also used to carry out open surveillance of members of foreign diplomatic establishments with the purpose of preventing the shadowed persons from meeting agents or recruiting new ones. Contacts of such shadowed foreigners are turned over to KRU sections for thorough examination and control by KRU agents. Actually "outside supervision" is carried out on orders of the operational sections. An order from an operational section will request the 3rd Special Section to place a person under outside supervision (in Russian: NN or Naruzhnoye Nabludeniye). An agent team from this Spetsotdel will then take the assignment and report all the moves of the suspect person, as well as checking on his contacts, all

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this data being added to the "NN" report. Supervision is continued for as long a period as the order demands. Upon receiving the "NN" report, the operational section concerned carefully investigates all contacts of the suspect as reflected therein.

Officers of the 3rd Special Section are supplied with legitimation cards entitling them to use various means of transportation, including private conveyances. Otherwise, officers conducting surveillances must depend on their initiative and ingenuity, except when a search of persons or property is necessary, in which case a subsection of the 3rd Special Section is called in. This subsection searches houses, apartments, etc., and their occupants on warrant. All employees of this section reportedly are supplied with special clothes, costumes and disguises, as the need arises, by a store which was apparently, during the existence of the NKVD, under the jurisdiction of the 1st Special Section.

(4) 4th Special Section

This Section, on the basis of scanty information, is believed to be responsible for civil censorship. It co-operates with the Ministry of Communications in spot-check censorship of mail within the Soviet Union. According to one source, its relatively minor role as a counterintelligence agency is probably due to the small volume of mail in the USSR. The 4th Special Section reportedly is responsible also for "supervising" telephone conversations within the organization of the Ministry of Communications in the USSR.

(5) 5th Special Section

This Section is apparently the cryptographic section. Nothing more is known at present concerning its activities, organization or relationship with the 2nd Special Sections and the 7th Directorate.

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**SECRET**d. 7th Directorate of GUGB

According to a defector familiar with the GUGB, a 7th Directorate of the GUGB handled the elaboration and deciphering of the most complicated ciphers and of all types of codes. This statement is corroborated by a German translation of a captured Soviet document, entitled "Instructions for the Organs of the NKVD Concerning the Performance of the Code Service." Coding activities in general were set up for all organs of NKVD/USSR under the jurisdiction of the 7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD/USSR. Specifically, the 7th Directorate and its subordinate groups were directly in charge of code activity, controlling the correct performance of code work, conducting entrance examinations for code applicants in all organs of NKVD, and supervising the code communications of the Red Army. This document describes how personnel were to be selected, the specifications for code rooms, regulations for encoding and decoding, the protection of code material, and the regulations for the transmission of codes and of correspondence relating to them. The document was signed by the Chief of the 7th Directorate of GUGB/NKVD/USSR, Captain of State Security BALAMATOV.

The 7th Otdel of GUGB/NKVD, later the 7th Upravleniye of NKGB and presumably of the MGB, exercised complete control and supervision over RKKA code and cipher communications during World War II, including violations of code cipher procedures, as well as instances involving the loss or compromise of code and cipher materials. There are clear indications that this supervision is continuing.

e. INFO: Information Section

According to German sources and a defector, an Information Section (INFO) was established under GUGB/NKVD on USSR level and had sections attached to INU and the Directorate for the Security of Government Leaders. The Information Section on USSR level dealt with all problems of information between individual GUGB offices and between individual NKVD offices and published daily top secret bulletins for STALIN, members of the Politburo and certain other members of the Central Committee. It also published daily bulletins for the chiefs of all GUGB departments and offices and the heads of other NKVD

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directorates. Besides the daily bulletins, the office also published periodically top secret bulletins for Party leaders, for certain members of the Government and for NKVD offices. Another source reports the existence of Information Sections with the responsibility of collating agents' reports on various levels down to districts and forwarding them to the next highest echelon. Such reports were made up every five days and distributed to the following: The Directorate for the Security of Government Leaders, SPU, EKV, and the Investigation Directorate.

f. GUK (Glavnoye Upravleniye Kadrov): Central Personnel Directorate

This Directorate, possibly the 15th Directorate of MGB, and its sections are in charge of the personnel administration for MGB, the maintenance of personnel records, the recruiting of personnel and probably the administration of MGB schools. GUK agents also check the employees of important government officials and of the Kremlin. Information is still lacking on how GUK controls the training of personnel, but it is assumed that such training is the responsibility of GUK at USSR level and of this directorate's sections in the various other directorates to which they are attached. For example, the Personnel Section attached to KRU probably trains KRU personnel in their special work.

g. AKhU (Administrativno-Khozyaistvennoye Upravleniye): Administrative-Economic Directorate

This Directorate, sometimes referred to as AKhFU, exercises the responsibility for general administrative and supply functions. Its sections are attached to all directorates of MGB to provide materiel, to maintain administrative records and files, to provide food, quarters, clothing and transportation and to carry out similar administrative functions.

h. FO or FU (Finotdel or Finupravleniye: Finance Office or Finance Directorate)

The FO's attached to directorates control the financial resources of the directorates. It is possible that FO has been incorporated in AKhU to form an AKhFO or AKhFU.

i. Secretariat

A Secretariat has been traced in the NKVD and may exist under MGB; it is believed to have had supervisory control powers over

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**SECRET**V. ORGANIZATION OF THE MGB WITHIN THE USSR ON REPUBLIC, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS

Each of the Soviet Socialist Republics has its own Ministry of State Security (MGB) which is patterned after the central organization of MGB/USSR. Technically, all Soviet republics have their own independent governments and therefore their MGB's are, in theory, directly under the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers in each republic. Practically, however, each republic MGB is under, and operates as a part of, MGB/USSR which issues its controlling directives.

Republic MGB's are organized similarly to those of MGB/USSR. It should be emphasized that under GUGB operational orders were probably transmitted through an Operational Directorate; this is not now considered to be the case. Both operational and administrative control is believed exercised through lower level MGB offices. On province, territory and autonomous province levels the MGB organization is referred to as UMGB, the U being best translated as "office". Thus UMGB/LO is the MGB office of Leningrad Province. In the provinces of the RSFSR, the UMGB's are directly subordinate to the MGB/USSR in Moscow. In all Soviet Socialist Republics, however, the UMGB seems to be subordinated to the MGB of the republic. UMGB jurisdiction includes an entire province with all its towns and cities, the headquarters usually situated in the largest city. Subordinate to the UMGB's are city sections and subsections, district subsections and county subsections. At the lowest MGB levels officers apparently share the work according to the object of surveillance and not according to whether it is, for example, KRU, SPU or EKV activity. Officers attached to district sections have various agents, informants and subagencies, depending largely on local conditions and with less regard for strict regulations and delineations of formal jurisdiction than at the higher levels.

In the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, MGB chiefs are Ministers of State Security; in oblasts (provinces), krajs (territories), and autonomous provinces they are chiefs of UMGB's or offices of MGB. The following list, which is considered substantially accurate as of late 1946, is made up of such principal MGB officers as are known and includes the head of MGB on USSR level and his known deputies:

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USSR

✓  
 Minister Col. Gen. Viktor Semyonovich ABAKUMOV  
 Deputy - Minister Gen. Lt. S. I. OGOLTSOV, deputy for general questions  
 " Gen. Lt. N. N. SELIVANOVSKI  
 " Gen. Lt. A. S. BLINOV  
 " Gen. Lt. N. K. KOVALCHUK, later transferred to MGB Soviet Zone in Germany  
 " Gen. Maj. M. G. SVINELUPOV

Soviet Socialist Republics

Ukraine	Minister	Gen. Lt. S. R. SAVCHENKO
White Russia	"	Gen. Lt. L. F. TSANAV
Uzbekistan	"	Gen. Maj. M. I. BASHAKOV
	Deputy-Minister	Col. Gen. A. G. GAVITOV
	"	A. NIYAZOV
	"	K. B. RYZMETOV
Georgia	Minister	Gen. Lt. A. N. RAPAV
	Deputy-Minister	Gen. Lt. Sh. O. TSERETELI
	"	Gen. Maj. I. I. NIBLADZE
Azerbaijan	Minister	Gen. Maj. S. F. EMELIANOV
Lithuania	"	Gen. Maj. I. M. BAR TUSHANAS
	Deputy-Minister	Gen. Maj. P. M. KAPRALOV
	"	Col. A. A. MITSKEVICHYUS
Latvia	Minister	Gen. Maj. A. A. NOVIK
	Deputy-Minister	Col. Ya. Ya. VEVERS
	"	A. S. SOLOMATOV
Kirgizstan	Minister	Col. A. M. IVANOV
Estonia	"	Gen. Maj. B. G. KUMM

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics

Abkhazian ASSR	Minister	Gen. Maj. I. A. GAGUA
Adzhar ASSR	"	Col. M. I. KUKUTARI
Dagostan ASSR	"	Col. M. I. KALININSKI
Kara-Kolpak ASSR	"	M. SHERALIEV
Komi ASSR	"	Col. I. I. FEDYUKOV
Mari ASSR	"	Lt. Col. S. I. SOLOVEV
Tatar ASSR	"	Gen. Maj. A. F. RUCHKIN (since end of 1947 Maj. Gen. SIDNEV?)
Chuvash ASSR	"	Col. S. T. MITRYASHOV
Yakut ASSR	"	G. K. ZIMIN

Oblasts (provinces) and Krai (territories)

Moscow	Chief of UMGB	Gen. Maj. I. I. GORGONOV
Leningrad	"	Gen. Lt. P. N. KUBATKIN
Krasnodarsk Krai	"	Gen. Lt. M. M. GVISHIANI
Kursk	"	Major M. P. DEMIDOV
Dnepropetrovsk	"	Col. N. V. SYRKOV
Molotov	"	Gen. Maj. I. I. ZACHEPA
Novosibirsk	"	Gen. Maj. P. P. KONDAKOV
Orlov	"	Lt. Col. A. D. DOMAREV
Khabarovsk Krai	"	Col. Gen. S. A. GOGLIDZE
Novgorod	"	Col. I. V. RECHKALOV
Tuvinsk	"	N. N. PETROV
Oirotsk	"	A. P. KAZARIN
South Osetinsk	"	I. I. GASSIYEV

We are able to delineate the lower level operational and organizational structure of only a few MGB directorates. The data appearing below in this connection frequently are more accurate in theory than in practice, as dual and multiple functions are frequently carried out by the same individual or office.

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**SECRET**1. INU, INO

Information on the lower echelons of INU comes primarily from defectors with varying knowledge of INU/NKGB and INU/MGB. INU in the NKGB organization is believed to have been represented on republic level in the form of a section or INO, which, one source states, was always the 1st Section in a Republic NKGB. INO's of Republic NKGB's are said to have received their directives from INU/NKGB/USSR. The importance and the size of an INO depended on the amount of interest shown by both NKGB/USSR and the Republic NKGB in the affairs of the neighboring country. INU was also represented by an INO in the UNKGB's of provinces bordering foreign countries and was considered by one source to be a sort of border office of the INO of the Republic and of INU/USSR. The INO/UNKGB allegedly had very limited independence of action in the performance of its duties.

Except for the limitation of functions of lower echelons of INU, MGB apparently follows the same pattern as NKGB. One source believes that INO's of UMGB's may carry on intelligence activities independently although they are generally utilized as service organizations for intelligence operations undertaken by a Republic MGB or MGB/USSR. But, according to one report, believed reliable, the mission of a minor MGB agent, on assignment from UMGB/Uzhorod, was held up in June 1947 due to the necessity of obtaining specific approval from MGB/Kiev (Ukrainian SSR), as the existing directive forbade UMGB/Uzhorod on province level to mount operations outside the USSR without clearance. In any case, provinces bordering on a foreign country have an INO and probably INO subsections of UMGB for each country the province borders. In Uzhorod, which borders on four countries, there are subsections of the UMGB for each border country. In provinces without foreign frontiers, the UMGB reportedly has no INO.

2. SPU, SPO

No information is available on the organization of SPU under MGB. The SPO's of the UNKGB's and UGB's (under GUGB) were subordinated both administratively and operationally to the SPO for the respective republics, except in the provinces of the RSFSR which were under direct SPU control. The structure of the province SPO's conformed almost exactly to that of the Republic SPO's, their size and importance varying in accordance with the density and political development of the population, and the number of

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objects of surveillance in the province. Information on the SPO or 2nd Section of UGB of the Leningrad province reflects that the inhabitants of Leningrad were, at least in 1941, under surveillance by two SPO's: the SPO of the province and the SPO of the city administration. The latter supervised suspected citizens, institutions of learning, movie houses, theaters, public parks, museums, sport societies, city and district Soviets, the Academy of Science, courts of law, the public prosecutors and other government agencies in the city. Agents of the province SPO dealt with government institutions situated in the city of Leningrad but of importance also to the province, such as the provincial Public Health Sections, the provincial Section of Public Education, provincial law courts and prosecution officers, etc.

### 3. KRU, KRO

The source who provided the above information on the SPO has also made the following statements in regard to KRO, also known as the 3rd Section of UGB under GUGB, in the Leningrad Province. The particular importance of the Leningrad KRO was due to the proximity of the frontiers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, to the existence of a large commercial harbor and to the number of nationalities living in the city and province of Leningrad. The Leningrad KRO played the organizing part in dealing with espionage and counterespionage in its area, aided by 3rd Special Section agents. The principal objects of KRO attention were persons who had arrived in the USSR at various times (in particular, persons not possessing Soviet citizenship), persons who had relations with citizens of foreign countries, members of the foreign diplomatic corps, members of non-Soviet national groups, such as Finns, Germans, etc., inhabitants of the towns and villages in border districts, prisoners of war, officials of harbors of commercial importance, and Soviet citizens sent on official business abroad. The duties of KRO Leningrad included a careful registration of persons belonging to the aforesaid categories which, in respect to surveillance by agents, are divided into three types of cases: registration, active and agents' cases.

KRO Leningrad, according to this source, also prepared individual agents and groups of agents for missions outside of the USSR and transferred

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them abroad. Such agents were largely persons acquainted with life in the countries to which they were sent. On the basis of reports from these agents, KRO Leningrad compiled detailed reports on the espionage activities of foreign countries directed against the Soviet Union, on the activities of all types of hostile foreign parties and organizations and on persons trained abroad for espionage work in the USSR. These reports were sent to all operational sections of the NKVD so that agents might become familiar with their contents. This source also stated that to KRO of the Leningrad province were transferred duties of the Leningrad INO, or 5th Section UGB Leningrad province.

Reliable information on SPO and KRO operations at republic level is available only from the example of the NKGB/Lithuanian SSR, which existed for three months in 1941. Since the two directorates cooperated very closely, they will be dealt with together in the following pages.

During April, May and June of 1941, the NKGB operated in Lithuania until the advance of the German forces after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war forced the Soviets to leave the country. Captured NKGB documents from this period, believed authentic, throw considerable light on Soviet State Security work against anti-Soviet elements in the Lithuanian SSR in 1941, as well as on the collaboration between the various organs of the NKGB at that time. These documents indicate that one of the principal purposes of the NKGB in Lithuania was to register all anti-Soviet elements of the population, to prepare them for exile to the USSR and to initiate the exile. Captured NKGB orders indicate that SPO and KRO/NKGB/Lithuanian SSR shared in the responsibility of registering anti-Soviet elements, each directorate in its own field. The following order, dated 20 May 1941, from the Deputy Peoples' Commissar of State Security, Lithuanian SSR, was directed to the Chiefs of SPO and KRO/NKGB/LSSR, all chiefs of county sections of NKGB/LSSR, the chief of the City of Vilna NKGB office and chiefs of rail transport sections of NKGB/LSSR; "Forwarded herewith a form for daily report of categories of anti-Soviet elements by order of the Peoples' Commissar of State Security USSR, Commissar of State Security Comrade MERKULOV. Completed forms must be sent to me by courier on the enclosed blanks and must arrive before 15:00....."

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A list of categories of counterrevolutionary activities has been found among these captured documents. Persons falling into any of these categories were subject to operational registry. The demarcation between SPO and KRO is made very clearly, since the first section of the list contains categories to be registered by SPO and the second section categories to be registered by KRO. A translation of the list follows:

Categories to be registered by SPO:

- a. Former officials of the government of the country.
  1. Principal branch heads.
  2. Directors of departments and above.
  3. County chiefs.
  4. Military commanders of counties.
  5. Police officials.
  6. Gendarmerie.
  7. Prison officials and administrative workers.
  8. Public prosecutors.
  9. Members of military field courts.
  10. Members of district, etc., courts and sections concerned with trial of political cases.
  11. Members of other courts.
  12. Members of the Supreme Court.
  13. Members of appellate courts.
  14. Examining magistrates for important cases.
  15. Officials of the Lithuanian Intelligence Service.
  16. Officials of the criminal police.
  17. Officers of the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army.
  18. Trotskyites.
  19. Active members of the PLEKHAVICHUS, BERMONT-AVALOV and von der GOLTS bands, working in Lithuania against the USSR.
  20. Social-Revolutionaries.
  21. Leading members of the Social-Democrats.
  22. Agent provocateurs of State Security
  23. Families of "back-sliders."
  24. Landowners.
  25. Important manufacturers.
  26. Important merchants and landlords with property valued at not less than 60,000 lits.
- b. Members of the Lithuanian National Counterrevolution
- c. " " Polish " "
- d. " " Jewish " "
- e. Members of the Russian White Emigrant Formations.
- f. " " Ukrainian National Counterrevolution
- g. " " White Russian National Counterrevolution.
- h. Leaders of Catholic Organizations.

Categories to be registered by KRO:

- a. Employees of foreign legations, regular representatives of foreign firms and counter-agents of:
 

Germany	England	United States	Vatican
Italy	France	Scandinavian	Baltic countries
Japan	Spain	countries	Others
- b. Germans forbidden to depart for Germany.
- c. Members of "Kulturbund" and "Mannschaft."
- d. Contrabandists and smugglers linked with Germany.
- e. Persons living on the border and having relatives in Germany.
- f. Families and close relatives of persons being exiled to the USSR.

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- g. Persons trying to flee from LSSR to Germany under pretense of repatriation.
- h. Persons arriving in LSSR from Germany or repatriated through Germany, concerning whom exact details are available on their relations with German or other foreign intelligence services.

A final example serves to clarify the chain of command and the headquarters organization in charge of preparing and conducting "operations to rid the LSSR of hostile anti-Soviet elements." Carrying out an order of V. S. MERKULOV, the Peoples' Commissar of State Security, LSSR, ordered on 23 May 1941 the following to constitute the operational staff for this operation. He picked his own deputy as chairman and appointed the deputy chief of SPO, the chief of a subsection of SPO, the deputy chief of a KRO subsection and several NKVD section chiefs to work with him. This group was joined by two NKVD officers from NKVD headquarters in Moscow to arrange liaison with the NKVD. Operational "troikas," or three-man committees, were set up throughout the country to carry out the actual operations at county level. Of the three members of these troikas two were NKGB officers and one an NKVD officer, usually the chief of the local county NKVD office. Of the two NKGB officials one was, in most counties, but not necessarily, either an SPO or KRO officer. Among other NKGB sections represented on these troikas were the Investigation Section, Personnel Section, and the Administrative and Economic Section. The troikas were responsible for rendering daily reports on all persons registered and subject to exile and for maintaining a file on all suspected persons. These files were to contain information supplied by agents, full details on the head and members of the family and a complete inventory of property. The rail transport sections of NKGB set up their own troikas; three for the whole of Lithuania. The NKVD militia was specifically ordered to render assistance to the organs of the NKGB in conducting the operation.

These captured NKGB orders, although old, afford an excellent example of the field co-ordination on specific operational problems not only between various State Security directorates but also between those directorates and the uniformed troop formations of NKVD. There are also, of course, numerous other instances of such operational co-ordination indicating State Security control of NKVD troops.

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**SECRET**4. EKU, EKO

Although it is quite possible that EKV has changed radically in the last seven years and may, indeed, no longer exist, consideration of its operational activities should be made, if only to provide useful background material and a more complete understanding of MGB bureaucracy. Available information, based on a reliable knowledgeable source, is therefore presented in some detail on the operations of the EKV for the Ukrainian SSR and the EKO for the Azerbaijan SSR on republic level, the EKO for the province of Arkhangelsk of the RSFSR, the EKO for the province of Gorki and the EKO for the Primorsk Territory.

The EKO's on republic level are believed to have been subordinated administratively to the republic NKGB, but operationally each EKO was subordinated to EKV/USSR. The reason for the existence of an EKV, rather than an EKO, for the Ukrainian SSR was that the republic contained a highly developed industrial plant disproportionately vital to the economy of the entire USSR. Each of the Ukrainian industries was represented by a section directed by the EKO's of the twenty-four provinces of the Ukrainian SSR. These in turn were operationally subordinate to the republic EKV. Thus each provincial EKO had a combined operational and investigation unit which, within the sphere of the province, combined the work of the operational and investigation sections at higher levels. It was this combined unit which directed the sections which represented EKO in the various factories of each province. Control was effected either directly or through the section representing the industry concerned. The operational and investigation unit of the provincial EKO was also directly responsible for the guard arrangements for such local factories requiring special NKVD troops. Each industry within the province was represented by a branch section in the provincial EKO; the number of such sections varying in each province according to the economic and industrial development of the province.

Since the Azerbaijan SSR contains one of the largest oil-producing fields in the Soviet Union, the organization of the EKO in Azerbaijan was varied to control this special situation. The Operational Section planned and directed the work of the Azerbaijan EKO in accordance with instructions

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received from the Oil Industry Department of EKU/NKVD/USSR. It compiled periodical reports and returns for EKU and controlled operationally the NKVD troops guarding oil wells, pipelines, factories, and related facilities. The Investigation Unit conducted investigations into cases dealt with by this department and the Records Unit had functions similar to those of the corresponding departments in the EKU/USSR.

The Oil Industry Department was the chief department of the EKO of the Azerbaijan SSR. It was divided into two sections:

- a. Oil Production Section: Kept a watch on the work of the oil-producing trusts and organs, and directed the work of special departments and special units in these organs.
- b. Oil Refinery Section: Kept a close surveillance on the activities in the oil refineries by means of special departments in the refineries.

The small machine-construction industry of the Azerbaijan SSR was represented in the EKO organization by a special section controlling special departments in pertinent factories.

The structure and functions of the Arkhangelsk EKO were determined primarily by the following factors: The main wealth of the province of Arkhangelsk lies in the enormous forests which cover its entire territory; the development of the timber industry constitutes its main economic activity and in Arkhangelsk alone there were thirty mills, two of the largest timber combines in the Soviet Union, a large paper factory and a host of smaller woodworking concerns. In addition to the timber industry, there were two large shipbuilding yards (the Molotovsk yard being the largest in the USSR), and deep-sea fishing, stock raising and agriculture were important economic assets.

Under orders received directly from EKU/NKVD/USSR, an operational and investigation unit directed the work of the Arkhangelsk EKO and investigated any cases of economic counterintelligence within the province. Resembling corresponding organs at other levels, it was responsible for security guard measures for factories and forwarded periodic reports to EKU/USSR. The most important department in the Arkhangelsk EKO was the Timber and Floatage Department which worked under the general direction of the Timber Industry Section of EKU, dealing with timber and its by-products. This department was responsible for economic security in all the timber concerns in Arkhangelsk and controlled special departments in the Timber

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Collecting Trusts, special units in the sawmills, wood-pulp and by-products plants and special units in the Timber Floatage Trusts. A Household Industry Section was responsible for all Arkhangelsk industries other than those represented in EKO by separate sections or representatives. These industries included a tannery, a knitted fabrics factory, a rope works and several brick works.

The Shipbuilding Industry Section of EKO, Arkhangelsk was directed by the corresponding branch department in EKO/USSR and was mainly concerned with the activities of the Molotovsk yard already mentioned. The Section reportedly came into existence in 1935 and was also responsible for the other ship-repairing and building concerns, operating through special departments or units.

Natural geographical advantages in the Province of Gorki facilitated the development of many industries, among which were the largest motor works in the Soviet Union, several war industries, a locomotive works, a diesel engine plant, an enormous river shipyard and numerous other mechanical engineering and metallurgical shops. Two of the more important sections of the Gorki EKO were the Machine Construction Industry Department, which checked on all the activities of this industry in the province by means of the usual special departments, and the War Industry Section, responsible for factories engaged in armaments production.

The Primorsk Territory, one of six territories or krajs in the Soviet Union, comprises the Pacific Soviet seaboard from Vladivostok to the Bering Strait. Industry developed here rapidly after 1934 and the EKO of the territory was correspondingly enlarged. A War Industry Section carried on counterintelligence work among the developing armaments and munitions plants and, according to one source, there were, under GUGB, an Operational Section, an Investigation Unit and the usual sections and individuals according to the various industries and agricultural enterprises. Of these a combined section for the coal and oil industries, prominent in the industrial life of the territory, was the most important.

It is assumed that some sort of organization of other MGB direct-orates similar to EKO, KRU, and SPU exists below USSR level, but believedly authentic information on the organization at lower levels is lacking at present, except for the following on operations in Leningrad province, primarily as of 1941.

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**SECRET**5. Operations

At the field operational level, operations are in the hands of "Operational Collaborators," roughly case officers, attached to the MGB directorates, sections and subsections, which are referred to as "operational sections." An example of the work of such a case officer is available from a defector, who has described the activities of one assigned to a subsection of the 1st Section of the Economic Section of the UNKVD of Leningrad Province. Through an industrial branch of EKO this officer received a completed questionnaire on an individual under suspicion of anti-Soviet activity in a Leningrad factory. The case officer made a record on this individual, bearing the signature of his section head, and this card was placed in an alphabetical index of the 1st Special Section.

Since it was an absolute requirement that surveillance by agents be planned in advance and that concrete operational measures of surveillance be proposed, the case officer drew up a plan of surveillance calling for collaboration by agents of the 2nd and 3rd Special Sections, the former to assist with technical monitoring aids and the latter to provide agents to surveil the suspect. All data on the case had to be processed by the 1st Special Section, by which means accurate and centralized records were assured.

The case officer now had to plan a safe and secure method of mutual co-operation with his agents, supplied in this case by the 3rd Special Section. He arranged and paid for a conspirative apartment for meetings and he met his agents according to a schedule drawn up by himself. On occasion he may have had to consult with his superiors in the 1st Section of EKO/UNKVD/LO. He made daily notes on the progress of his agents and was responsible for a summary each month of the agents' reports. By means of these summaries his own work was ordinarily controlled by his superiors. When information proving the guilt of the suspect had been obtained -- in this case a monitored meeting with an accomplice and statements by fellow workers attesting to anti-Soviet remarks uttered by the suspect -- a local warrant of arrest was made out by the case officer. On occasion, however, such a warrant might be made out by the section to which the case officer was assigned. The case was then turned over to the

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Investigation Section. Had the suspect fled in the meantime, the case officer would have had one final responsibility, the issuance of a general warrant of arrest requiring all operational sections throughout the Soviet Union to initiate local searches for the individual.

The case officer commonly recruited his own agents. He was responsible for determining the education, manners, character, etc., of a prospective agent by personal interviews, for writing a report requesting confirmation of the recruitment by the chief of the local NKVD section and, on obtaining this permission, for getting a written agreement from the prospect to work as an agent or informant. The case officer trained his agents himself and was at all times responsible for their acts. If he himself was transferred, he first transferred his agents personally to his successor. When he was ill or on vacation, temporary transfer of his agents was made to the head of his section or subsection.

VI. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MGB IN SOVIET ZONES OF OCCUPATION

The chief positive intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the MGB were carried out, it is believed, in the Soviet zones of occupation directly after the close of World War II by, or at least through, the organs of the MVD (formerly the NKVD). State Security officers apparently were assigned to the MVD units which primarily fulfilled police functions in the Soviet Zones of Germany, Austria and Korea. Gradually, however, as the areas became stabilized, the work of the MGB assumed greater importance, and in 1946 a broad reorganization took place, at least in Germany and Austria. In Austria and Hungary, MGB activities previously had been masked behind the protection of the Allied Control Commissions. The MGB now took full authority for positive intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

The reorganization which took place, as noted above, appears obviously to be a field manifestation of the general reorganization and redistribution of the functions of MGB and MVD which, it will be recalled, began in 1946 and apparently is still continuing. However, there is considerable authentic information reflecting that in the Soviet Zone in Germany certain intelligence and quasi-intelligence functions have been carried out by the MVD concerning matters which normally would be considered

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at the present time to be within the jurisdiction of the MGB. It is possible that this has resulted from the somewhat unusual status of Eastern Germany as a military occupation zone. It is also entirely possible that MVD installations in this regard have been used as cover by MGB, although this has been denied by at least one defector.

The Soviets apparently consider the principal intelligence problems confronting them in the occupation zones to be those of counterintelligence surveillance of all groups capable of anti-Soviet activity, and of all the branches and employees of the Soviet and native administrations, the prevention, penetration and interception of foreign intelligence missions, and the preparation of Soviet intelligence missions to obtain political, economic, military, naval and technical intelligence about foreign powers. For the purpose of both counterintelligence and positive intelligence, full Soviet use of their zones of occupation as staging areas from which to mount operational intelligence missions can be accepted as axiomatic. Dominant in this field will be the organs of the MGB.

#### A. Soviet Zone in Germany

When hostilities ceased in Germany in 1945 Soviet Intelligence units on German soil were on a wartime footing, their activities overlapped considerably and there seemed to be no coordination or chain of command. To correct this situation, Col. Gen. I. A. SEROV, who had been in command of the combined Soviet Intelligence services in Poland, was placed in charge of all Soviet Intelligence activities in Germany, Austria and Western Europe. It is not necessary to take up in detail the organization of SEROV's headquarters in Potsdam; documentary evidence has proven, it may be noted, that it was responsible to the NKVD (MVD) in Moscow. During the summer of 1946 all Soviet Intelligence services in Germany were still nominally under SEROV's control, but a reorganization was probably under consideration at that time and may have been based on the failure up to that time to coordinate missions among the various units of the intelligence services and on a lack of unity in the results obtained.

The reorganization of Soviet Intelligence in Germany, the first phase of which ended about November of 1946, resulted in the setting up of a uniform system of intelligence and counterintelligence sections pri-

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marily under jurisdiction of the MGB. The basic structure of the old NKVD organization in Germany was retained with the Operational Sector (Opersektor) at province level, the Oper Okrug at district level and the Oper Gruppa at "kreis" or county level. A recent source refers to the Oper Gruppa as "Rayonnoye Otdeleniye." It is possible that quite recently the letters MGB have been superseded by SVA (SMA), representing Soviet Military Administration; thus one would expect to find today, for example, Oper Okrug SVA, instead of Oper Okrug MGB. In the present paper the names Okrug and Gruppa have been used throughout.

The above-outlined reorganization coincided with the departure of SEROV from Germany. His successor is not yet definitely known, but is believed to be one of the following: Lt. Gen. or Maj. Gen. KOBULOV, Maj. Gen. L. F. TSANAVA, Maj. Gen. Nikolai K. KOVALCHUK. Whoever the successor may be, the functions of his office are believed to be largely administrative and directional, Actual operations are carried out by the six Operational Sectors and their subordinate organizations, the Oper Okrugs and the Oper Gruppy. Soviet Zone Operational Sectors are:

1. Brandenburg, commanded by Gen. Maj. FIIA TOV, with headquarters in Potsdam and Oper Okrugs in the cities of Potsdam, Eberswalde, Kottbus, Brandenburg and Bernau.
2. Thuringia, commanded by Gen. Maj. IGNATOV, with headquarters in Weimar. Oper Okrugs are located in Weimar, Gotha, Erfurt and Gera.
3. Saxony, was commanded by Gen. Maj. KLEPOV, with headquarters in Dresden and Oper Okrugs in Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz and Zwickau. KLEPOV has been relieved of his command; his successor is unknown.
4. Saxony-Anhalt, commanded by Col. KUZNETSOV, with headquarters in Halle. Oper Okrugs are located in Magdeburg, Morsburg, Dessau, Altmark and Torgau.
5. Mecklenburg, commanded by Gen. Maj. NIKITIN, with headquarters in Schwerin. Oper Okrugs are located in Schwerin, Greifswald and Gustrow.
6. The Operational Sector of Berlin, commanded by Gen. Maj. A. M. VUL, (successor to Maj. Gen. SIDNEV) has always seemed basically different organizationally from the other five sectors. There are no Oper Okrugs in the Sector but a number of district sections MGB or SVA (Raionny Otdel, abbreviated to Raiotdel MGB or SVA) are under the Sector's direct command, each reportedly covering a postal district of Berlin in the same way as the original MVD Oper Gruppy did formerly. It is believed that the organization of the MGB in Berlin proper was designed to cope with the special circumstances prevailing in the city under quadripartite occupation, and that there are, in Berlin, Soviet Intelligence agencies in addition to the usual installations of the MGB in an Oper Sector.

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It has been reported that Oper Sectors are divided into an administrative branch and an intelligence branch, and that a similar division exists at lower levels but on a smaller scale. The administrative branch is stated to consist of a secretariat, a personnel section, a Party organization section, a finance section, a supply section, a records and registry section and a prison section. The intelligence branch reportedly has six operational sections of positive intelligence, counterintelligence operations into western zones, counterintelligence in the Soviet Zone, search of wanted persons, counterintelligence among SMA personnel and investigation and interrogation.

A more detailed analysis has been provided by a defector who was familiar with the organization and functions of the Operational Sector of Brandenburg. While the source does not make the distinction outlined above between administrative and intelligence branches of an Oper Sector, his information, especially on the intelligence sections of Oper Sector Brandenburg, is sufficiently detailed to permit full quotation below. He could provide no explanation for his listing of A, I and IV as subsections and not as sections:

- Subsection A - Maintains all files of an operational nature, all informant card indices and all case files, which cannot be removed from this section.
- Subsection I - Positive Intelligence. A network of informants is maintained in the American, British and French Zones and agents are sent on missions into these zones. Targets are order-of-battle information on troops in these zones; political, economic and technical intelligence; public opinion; the situation in the DP camps; and the activities of foreign intelligence services.
- Section II - Conducts counterintelligence operations. In MGB Operational Sector Brandenburg there are two subsections, one dealing with United States espionage and the other with British and French espionage. This Section also engages in offensive operations, sending agents into the United States, British and French Zones on counterintelligence missions.
- Section III - Counterintelligence section for every branch of the German administration, political parties, schools, churches and cultural organizations in the Soviet Zone. Information is obtained through networks of informants in these organizations.
- Subsection IV - Section for locating persons wanted by the MGB; it makes use of a number of German "log men" and of German police facilities.
- Section V - Section for counterintelligence within the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Informant networks are established in every local headquarters and in other administrative offices.

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- Section VI - Section for investigation and interrogation. This Section investigates all arrested persons and interrogates on the basis of briefs submitted by other sections, particularly Sub-section I and Section II.
- Finance Section - Maintains payrolls of officers, enlisted men and civilian interpreters and distributes confidential funds at the request of section chiefs.
- Personnel - Maintains all personnel files of officers, on-(kader) Section listed men and civilians.

Source states that this MGB Operational Sector has, under the jurisdiction of its five Oper Okrugs, twenty-eight Oper Gruppy. Of these he was familiar with the names of sixteen: Prenzlau, Angermunde, Templin, Bad Freienwalde, Frankfurt an der Oder, Neuruppin, Rathenow, Nauen, Malow, Wittenberge, Belzig, Luckenwalde, Fuersternwalde, Spremberg, Guben, Beeskow.

In this same source's opinion, Lt. Gen. KOVALCHUK is Chief of MGB in the Soviet Zone and has a complete staff with sections corresponding to those of the operational sectors. He is sure that a staff section corresponding to Section VI of an operational sector exists on KOVALCHUK's staff, and this section carries out investigations covering the whole of Soviet-occupied Germany. Commanding officer of this section is Col. CHIZENKOV, and the offices of the section are located in Potsdam. Under the command of Col. CHESTAKOVICH, another staff section, corresponding to Section III of an MGB operational Sector, is entrusted with the surveillance of all aspects of German public life.

Command channels between MGB Operational Sectors and Oper Okrugs are sketched by this source as follows: The Commanding Officer of an Operational Sector may give orders directly either to the Commanding Officer of an Oper Okrug or to chiefs of sections in an Oper Okrug. Also, section chiefs of Operational Sectors are authorized to give orders to chiefs of corresponding sections in Oper Okrugs. For example, Lt. Col. PAGENTRIGER, at the time of source's defection, was Chief of Section II of the Operational Sector Brandenburg. PAGENTRIGER was authorized to order the chief of Section II in Oper Okrug Eberswalde to undertake operations. The Eberswalde official followed PAGENTRIGER's orders, knowing that they had been cleared through PAGENTRIGER's chief, Gen. Maj. FIATOV, Chief of Operational Sector Brandenburg.

As a further example of the close integration between sections of an Operational Sector and its Oper Okrugs, source states that Oper Okrug

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chiefs report once a month to chiefs of corresponding sections on sector level. Only after completion of these reports do they prepare reports for their own Oper Okrug chief. Section chiefs of Oper Okrugs have the same command functions vis-a-vis Oper Gruppa chiefs under the jurisdiction of the respective Oper Okrugs.

MGB organs are not only integrated as to command functions but they also collaborate closely in the conduct of operations and the collecting of intelligence. Source has given an apparently authentic example of this. While Section VI is not authorized to engage in agent operations, the chief of that section is, however, by virtue of his position as section chief, in a position to initiate such operations. If, in the course of interrogation of a suspect by Section VI, certain facts are learned which warrant a special follow-up, the Chief of Section VI may go to the officer in charge of his sector, give him a summary of the case and propose that an agent be briefed to get the desired confirmation or information. The sector chief will, depending on the nature of the case, call in the chief of either Subsection I or Section II, and order him to brief one of his agents on the elements of the information in which Section VI is interested. In cases of minor importance, the section chiefs will arrange among themselves to obtain the information. As a rule the Chief of Section VI will not know the identity of the agent entrusted with the mission and will merely receive a report from the section concerned. Source believes that in an involved case an officer of Section VI might be called in to de-brief the agent.

**B. Hungary and the Soviet Zone in Austria**

Little detailed authenticated information on the MGB in these areas is available. During the existence of the Allied Control Commission from early 1945 until late in 1947, Soviet counterintelligence activities were, according to a report from two apparently reliable defectors, masked under a section of the ACC known as the "Inspektsiya." From a reading of the functions of the Inspektsiya, it seems evident that both military and State Security counterintelligence were carried out, although this section had apparently no positive intelligence duties. The Inspektsiya seems to have made use of both Hungarian and Soviet agents and to have collaborated with local Hungarian police and military organizations. Although these defectors

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could not provide an exact organizational breakdown of the Inspoktsiya, they were able to give the following delineation of its functions:

1. Counterintelligence activities on Hungarian territory; discovery of spies or of elements suspected of espionage; investigation of sabotage cases.
2. Detection of "anti-democratic," anti-Soviet and anti-Communist organizations or activity, carried out with the help of informants and agents.
3. Co-operation with the Military Political Division of the Hungarian Ministry of National Defense, located at Nador Street, Budapest, and with the Hungarian National Political Police, at 60 Andrassy Road, Budapest. This co-operation consisted of a constant exchange of information, of commonly organized operations, of joint recruitment and exploitation of agents and of an exchange of prisoners of interest to any particular agency.
4. Security of industrial concerns charged with the delivery of reparations to the Soviets. Checks on political attitude of such firms' personnel were conducted, and, in addition, the Inspoktsiya had informants in practically all Hungarian industries.
5. Security of former German-owned factories and other properties taken over by the Soviets. Local and Soviet informants were used extensively for surveillance duties.
6. Security of Soviet military and civilian personnel in Hungary.
7. Surveillance of Soviet personnel in Hungary. This group was headed by a Maj. REVIN whose deputy was a Maj. GORLENKO, and it had the task of observing the behavior and political reliability of ACC personnel. It also reported on the attitude and behavior of the members of the Soviet diplomatic representations, trade missions and other Soviet representatives in Hungary. The group studied the background and daily activities of such Soviet representatives, learned how they spent their free time and determined their acquaintances. Informers in the ACC reported to the two majors. All military personnel were also under close surveillance, in which work Hungarian informers were used. Special emphasis was laid on surveillance of Soviet personnel during official receptions, banquets, etc. Soviet officers were instructed to speak with foreign representatives only through interpreters who were always informants working for REVIN.
8. Special security precautions concerning the Inspoktsiya itself.
9. Functions of a nature unknown to sources. These involved frequent meetings in secret places between members of the Inspoktsiya and people unknown to sources, apparently for the purpose of recruiting, briefing and debriefing agents employed by the Inspoktsiya.

Lt. Gen. Mikhail BELKIN was Chief of the Inspoktsiya. The above sources reported that he was succeeded by Col. VELIKANOV in July 1947, and left for Baden, Austria to command a SMERSH unit under the Baden Area

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HQ Central Group of Forces. Previously, the Baden group, under Col. BEVZ, had been controlled by the Hungarian Inspektsiya, but on the arrival of Lt. Gen. BELKIN the entourage of Col. BEVZ was assimilated and the Hungarian headquarters reduced in strength by approximately one-half.

As yet, the name and structure of the MGB organization in Baden have not been established. It has been reported that the Baden group includes both MGB and SMERSH, which may be a further example of the re-organization of 1946 when SMERSH was again placed formally under State Security control as the MGB Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence in the Armed Forces (presumably GUKR-SMERSH). According to available information, positive intelligence functions are included in the group's duties, the Baden headquarters reportedly exercising the following functions:

1. Counterintelligence against the Western Powers.
2. Positive intelligence against the Western Powers.
3. Counterintelligence against the Hungarians and Austrians.
4. Counterintelligence among Soviet and Soviet-employed personnel.
5. Security of industrial concerns controlled by the Soviets, especially of those charged with the delivery of reparations to the USSR.
6. Security of intelligence buildings.
7. Co-operation with the Soviet element of the Allied Control Commission in Austria.

C. The Soviet Zone of North Korea

A definitive delineation of the MGB organization and operations in North Korea is not possible at present. Much of the information received concerning Soviet Intelligence in this area appears, with little question, to refer to SMERSH activities.

VII. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MGB IN SATELLITE COUNTRIES

At the present time the primary MGB objective within satellite countries appears to be the organized control and utilization of satellite intelligence, security, and police agencies. This does not, of course, preclude the operation by the MGB in these countries of its own separate and distinct agent nets, although the use of such satellite agencies decreases the necessity for such separate nets.

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The utilization of these satellite agencies is accomplished not only by direct liaison between them and MGB offices or representatives, but also by placing MGB personnel in controlling positions in these agencies. In addition, satellite intelligence agencies, particularly in Poland, have been staffed with Soviet-trained satellite personnel. Not only is the product of these agencies available to the MGB, but there are strong indications that the MGB consistently assigns them specific objectives and tasks. In addition, it is known that in the foreign intelligence field these satellite agencies are used to provide cover, support, and facilitation to Soviet espionage nets. According to a number of reports received during the past two years, the Soviets are increasingly concentrating their intelligence through these channels, including particularly the use of satellite diplomatic establishments for cover and communications purposes. In a number of instances, satellite official representatives abroad, who, without question, have been engaged in operational intelligence work, reportedly have been responsible directly to Soviet Intelligence and not to any of their own country intelligence agency. The available information clearly reflects that the utilization of such satellite services is primarily a responsibility of the MGB. However, we cannot categorically assert that satellite intelligence, security and police agencies, as well as satellite diplomatic establishments, are not also utilized by Red Army Intelligence.

There are certain variations in the accomplishment of such Soviet control, depending on circumstances. In Rumania, for example, it is apparent that key Soviet Intelligence personnel find cover in Soviet legations, commercial organizations or missions of one type or another. In Bulgaria, controlling MGB officials were given cover positions in the Allied Control Commission before the signing of the Peace Treaty, while in Hungary the entire MGB counterintelligence activities were carried on under the cover of the ACC.

In the satellite countries the Soviets have clearly adapted their methods to the exigencies of the local situation. It appears also that there is a closer, more direct, operational relationship between the Communist Parties and the intelligence agencies there than exists within

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the Soviet Union. Reports received point out that the Communist Parties have a direct interest in intelligence and counterintelligence, and that there are strong indications of a frequent, direct, operational relationship between satellite Communist Parties and satellite intelligence agencies.

**A. Poland**

The primary purpose of the Polish security and intelligence agencies is reported to be the fulfillment of Soviet policy. Three of these agencies were organized in, or prior to, 1945: the MBP, or Ministry of Public Security, which was set up by the SEROV group, a Soviet joint operational intelligence command which operated at the close of the war in Poland and later in Germany; the UB, or Security Police, which was organized by the MBP; and the GZI, or Polish Military Intelligence, which grew from a small Soviet SMERSH detachment forming the intelligence section of the Soviet-inspired Polish Kosciuszko Division. Founded in 1945 were the KBW, or Internal Security Corps, a uniformed security army; the MO, or Citizens' Militia, an ordinary police force; and the intelligence service of the PPR, the Polish Workers' Party (the Communist Party of Poland). Of these, all but the UB were founded, staffed and controlled by Soviet officials or by their Polish puppets. Sufficient information is available to permit a limited and generalized analysis of Soviet control of the intelligence organization of the PPR and of the MBP.

The PPR is the principal instrument of Soviet policy in Poland. With all important offices held by its members, the PPR dominates Polish life, both at home and abroad, indulging in the usual Soviet tactics of penetration, surveillance, and sabotage. It is said to collaborate closely with the Soviet MGB and MVD and with the Polish MBP, UB and GZI, all staffed largely by PPR personnel and Soviet Intelligence officers. This service relies for agents and facilities on the Communist Party organization and on such front organizations as the ZWM (Association for the Struggle of Youth) and the OM-TUR (Youth Organization of the Association of Workers' Universities).

Outwardly, the PPR is governed by its large public Central Committee, but actually a secret Politburo of eleven members decides all important matters and allegedly has policy liaison with the Soviet Politburo and the

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Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow.

The influence of the Polish Politburo is augmented by its control over the intelligence service of the PPR which is established under the cover designation "Section B" of the Central Secretariat of the PPR Central Committee. "Section B" is a complete intelligence organization dealing with both positive and counterintelligence at home and abroad. There is evidence that Soviet officials occupy some key positions in it and that actual control is exercised by the MGB. The service is believed to have the following sections: a sabotage section, a foreign intelligence section, possibly an agent recruitment section, an internal surveillance section with the purpose of observing and penetrating all legal and illegal opposition groups in Poland, a technical section and a personnel section.

The MBP is, in some of its functions, similar to the PPR "Section B." It is charged with the political and civil security of Poland and its jurisdiction covers the suppression of all opposition and underground forces, the surveillance of government employees and the enforcement of laws relating to State Security. It has the authority to use the thousands of soldiers of the KBW and the MO. As informers, it uses members of the PPR and of various youth organizations and it uses not only informers ideologically motivated, but also many forced to collaborate through fear. The Ministry has its own prison and its own guard unit.

The KBW, MO and UB have little intelligence or counterintelligence importance, but the GZI (Glowny Zarzad Informacji) or Polish Military Intelligence is charged with procuring military and political intelligence, maintaining security in the Polish armed forces and counterintelligence operations in Poland, all of which are under Soviet direction and operated for the benefit of the USSR. Direct control of the GZI in 1945 and 1946 is believed to have been in the hands of Lt. Gen. N. N. SELIVANOVSKI, a Vice Minister of State Security.

#### B. Bulgaria

Information on MGB activities in Bulgaria is very meager. The Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo is reported to control intelligence chains within the country, which before the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1947, were said to be directed by Soviet Intelligence through liaison channels in the

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Allied Control Commission and the Soviet Embassy. Maj. Gen. A. M. VOLKOV, one-time Chief of the Security Inspectorate of the ACC in Bulgaria and reported Chief of the MVD in Bulgaria, was said to be indirect contact with both Bulgarian militia and army intelligence agencies. Col. L. A. SEREDA, Chief of the Soviet Military Section of the ACC and head of the intelligence service of the Soviet occupation forces, maintained contact with the Bulgarian RO (Military Intelligence). Fyodor FECHIN, formerly 3rd Secretary of the Soviet Legation, now said to be in Polvdiv, and believed to be Chief of MGB in Bulgaria, has been maintaining daily contact with the Bulgarian State Security Section of the militia. It is also of interest that the source for this information comments that the usual distinction between MVD and MGB - the former the executive arm for the enforcement of State Security and the latter strictly an intelligence agency - appears to be nonexistent in Bulgaria. MVD personnel there have been reported serving in various intelligence and propaganda activities.

We are not in possession at the present time of sufficient additional authentic data to completely clarify this situation.

C. Yugoslavia and Albania

In Yugoslavia and Albania Soviet control of local agencies seems to be exercised through key Soviet officials in Soviet missions. The Yugoslav Intelligence Service, UDB, seems to be controlled by MVD and MGB technicians and supervisors. Overall head of Soviet agents in such key positions in the UDB is reportedly Maj. Gen. SIDOROVICH, Soviet Attache in Belgrade since March 1947. In Albania, Soviet liaison officers, supervisors and technicians are attached not only to every agency of the central government but also to its local subdivisions. The center of Soviet Intelligence activities for Albania is said to be Tirana and the Soviet director is a Col. CHUVAKIN. Apparently the Yugoslav Intelligence Service exercises a greater degree of independence and autonomy than is true in other satellite countries. It is known that considerable authority over Albanian Intelligence efforts is exercised by Yugoslav Intelligence personnel.

D. Rumania

Information on the work of the MGB in Rumania is available in detail from an agent source, much of the material covering the organization of

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the MGB in Rumania during 1946. To an unknown extent, therefore, this information may have been affected by a reorganization of the MGB in Rumania in the fall of 1946. Inasmuch, however, as the MGB in Rumania, as this source sketches its organization, follows fairly consistently the pattern of the known MGB organization in the USSR, it is felt that the data furnished by this source are still at least relatively accurate.

The MGB in Rumania is charged with the collection of information on all aspects of Rumanian life and public opinion. It keeps under surveillance foreigners and foreign missions, the Rumanian Government, the Rumanian Communist Party and Soviet officials in Rumania, as well as Soviet soldiers and citizens residing in the country, Bessarabians and Soviet emigres. It also conducts operations involving the arrest, abduction and deportation to the USSR or liquidation of elements of the population considered to be dangerous to the safety of the Soviet Union.

The Director of MGB in Rumania reportedly was Ivan Andreyevich BAKHTIN, who had a cover employment as Director-General of the Sovrombank, the joint Soviet-Rumanian banking institution of Bucharest. Besides his advisory staff, BAKHTIN controlled the sections listed below:

1. Secret Section (Sekretny Otdel) or SO, directed by Col. MIROSHCHNICHENKO and charged with the following functions:
  - a. Surveillance of the Rumanian Communist Party.
  - b. Surveillance of the Rumanian Ministry of the Interior.
  - c. Surveillance of the Royal Palace.
  - d. Surveillance of members of the Rumanian Government.
  - e. Preparation of false documents and counterfeit money for all sections of MGB.
  - f. Control of transmitting stations of the Soviet Embassy and Army.
  - g. Operation of photostat and photography sections.

Also connected with SO are a group in TASS with unknown duties and a group in Sovkino, said to be responsible for surveillance of the Royal Palace, leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party and members of the Rumanian Government. The effect of the abdication of Mihai on the functions of certain of these sections is not known. Closely collaborating with the MGB in the operational functions indicated above is the Rumanian SSI.

2. Foreign Section (Inostrany Otdel) or INO, directed by D. G. YAKOVLEV, and divided into the following subsections:
  - a. Subsection for the control of foreigners. (Pod-otdel kontroly inostrantsov), headed by A. A. MIKHAILOV. Maintains copies of files and photographs of all foreigners resident in Rumania.

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- b. Subsection for the control of foreign embassies (Pod-otdel kontroly inostrannykh posolstv), headed by A. V. YARSIN. Controls agent networks of
    - (1) Georghe ALEXANDROVSKI, with the function of recruiting informers in legations and the collection of information through them.
    - (2) Alexander MOJAISKI, with the function of surveillance of foreign legations through the Rumanian State Security Service and the Bucharest Police Prefecture. Special interest is said to be given the Turkish, Swiss, French and Italian Legations
  - c. Subsection for the control of Allied Missions (Pod-otdel kontroly soyuznykh missii), directed by A. A. SEVASTIANOVA. Controls agent networks of
    - (1) Constantin DRAGONESCU, with the function of surveillance of the American political and military missions.
    - (2) N. CARJE, investigating and shadowing squad made up of detectives from the Rumanian Security Service.
  - d. Subsection for the control of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pod-otdel kontroly ministerstva inostrannykh del v Ryumini), directed by Leonid KARANDASHOV.
  - e. Subsection for the control of citizens having relations with persons abroad (Pod-otdel kontroly zhitelei kotoryye imeyut svyazi inostrantsami), directed by Nikolai BARDICHEV. Makes use of the Rumanian post office for censorship of mail.
3. Economic Section (Ekonomicheski otdel), directed by N. P. FINOGENOV, chief representative in Rumania of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade; divided into the following subsections:
- a. Industrial subsection, directed by I. G. GRINENKO, reported as head of Sovromlemn, the joint Soviet-Rumanian lumber company, and as an official of Resitza, a large metallurgical corporation. Controls networks of industrial espionage. A sub-office handles oil information from all parts of Rumania, including data on American, British and French oil companies.
  - b. Financial and economic subsection, directed by K. S. MALINOVSKI, under Sovrompetrol cover. Studies Rumanian financial developments and trends; includes an important research group known as the section for the destruction of capitalism (Otdel pogloshcheniya kapitalisma), directed by Iosif KOTLEAR, under cover of the economic section of the Soviet Embassy.
  - c. Subsection for co-ordination and economic information, directed by Igor POLESCHIUK, under cover of Yuzhvneshtrans, a shipping agency. Collects Rumanian economic intelligence for a so-called Research and Co-ordination Bureau in Moscow. (Affiliation of this bureau with the MGB is considered problematical).

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- d. Armistice Subsection, directed by Nikolai RAMZAITEV. Responsible for field supervision of deliveries to the USSR under the armistice, and the fulfillment of economic agreements with Rumania.
  - e. Subsection for collaboration with Combined Political Police and Security Services, directed by Capt. Taris NIKOLSKI. Probably collaborates with the economic sections of Rumanian security services and maintains surveillance over the black market and other clandestine economic activities of Soviet citizens.
4. Information Section (Informatsionny Otdel). Reported to be the largest MGB section in Rumania, directed by M. P. SHUTOV, a press attaché of the Soviet Legation, divided into the following subsections:
- a. Political Information Subsection. Gathers intelligence on activities of the historical parties and opponents of the present regime in Rumania.
  - b. Military Information Subsection. Directed by Col. YERIOMIN; collects intelligence on the Rumanian Army and Navy and resistance movements in these services.
  - c. Subsection on information regarding the USSR, directed by Yaska ROTTMAN; collects material on the Rumanian attitude toward the USSR and its Slavic satellites.
  - d. Political Tendencies Subsection, directed by P. A. ZOTOV, attaché in the Soviet Embassy.
  - e. Subsection for the supervision of Bessarabians and White Russians, directed by Col. LEOCHENKO. Carries out surveillance of Bessarabians, Ukrainians, and Russian emigres resident in Rumania and maintains card files on all such individuals.
5. Operations Section (Operatsionny Otdel). Directed by I. A. BAGRATIN or BAGRATION. Handles arrests, abductions and deportations and maintains liaison with Rumanian and Russian police and intelligence agencies.
6. Special Section (Osoby Otdel). Directed by Col. LISTROV. Charged with the political surveillances and education of the Soviet armed forces in Rumania.
7. Private Section (Chastny Otdel). Reportedly directed by Col. N. I. VEREVKA. Charged with maintenance of the security of the Soviet Embassy, MGB offices and other Soviet installations; protection of prominent Soviet officials in Rumania.
8. Records and Files. Divided into three types of files: political card files, state security files, and files of material relating to MGB liaison with Rumanian organizations.

VIII. FIELD ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE  
MGB ABROAD

Insofar as it is possible to do so, there have been discussed above the field operations of various MGB organs within the USSR. While it is not within the purview of this study to attempt to discuss or summarize

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in detail specific MGB operations abroad, or to set out in detail MGB operational techniques and methods as they relate to operations abroad, certain comments are set out below concerning the field organization and operations of the MGB in countries outside the Soviet Union.

The MGB organization responsible for operational espionage and other operational intelligence work in countries outside the Soviet Union obviously does not reflect or parallel with any exactness the headquarters organization of the entire MGB. It is, of course, well established that such operations are under the jurisdiction primarily of the INU and its subordinate INO's, although there are numerous reports available concerning alleged foreign operations of the KRU and possibly of the SPU.

Although certain relatively constant characteristics of INU organization abroad have been noted, it is difficult to draw general conclusions concerning the form such organization may take in any given area, since the INU, while rigid in its discipline and controls, has exhibited considerable elasticity in adapting its field organization to varying conditions. Basically, INU operations abroad are conducted through a series of independent, primarily unconnected espionage nets or parallels. For purposes of convenience, these nets are generally referred to as being of one of two types, either a legal or official residency or an illegal or underground residency, depending upon whether or not the staff official responsible for their direction is operating under official cover, i.e., as a known and admitted official Soviet representative.

While it is known that the MGB makes constant efforts to keep not only its espionage nets separate, but even to separate parts of the same net for security purposes, there are numerous case examples where this principle has been extensively violated. Also typical of INU operations is the use of a legal residency to support and facilitate the operations of a net or nets operated by an illegal resident. Thus, in many areas, MGB agent parallels directed by an MGB official in an illegal status have still consistently been supplied with funds, instructions, and communications channels by the MGB organization within an embassy, consulate, or trade mission.

In some instances, high-ranking officers of State Security have been dispatched abroad apparently with jurisdiction and control over most, if not all, MGB operations within a single country or even more than one country.

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For example, it was reliably reported in 1943 that a Major General of State Security, assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., was in charge of all INU operations for North America. There also have been instances where MGB/USSR has apparently dispatched agents directly to a particular country or area to operate independently of any resident or superior in the country of their assignment, reporting directly to MGB headquarters through their own channels. Typical also of INU/MGB operations abroad is the use of one country as a base of operations against another. This operational approach has been so consistently followed that it has almost become an established principle, involving security advantages which are obvious.

At the field level, the organizations and instrumentalities of INU are, insofar as possible, kept separate and distinct from those of any other operating Soviet Intelligence agency, and as a matter of standard practice, for example, it appears that GRU representatives in any given country know practically nothing of MGB operations in the same area. Particularly noticeable in INU operations abroad has been the complete and constant stress placed on security measures, an emphasis frequently carried almost to ridiculous extremes. Obviously, no operational intelligence agency can run agent nets abroad with absolute and consistently unbreached security, but the MGB has approached this goal in its foreign operations.

Characteristic of INU operations abroad is a consistent dependence upon the Communist movements in all countries for support, assistance, and as a recruiting base for agent and operational personnel. As a result of this dependence, a large percentage of INU agent and even operational personnel continues to be recruited from Communists, crypto-Communists, fellow-travelers, parlor bolsheviks, and so-called left-intellectuals. Numerous instances have been noted of instructions and advice from personnel forbidding the identification of INU operations with a local Communist Party, and even going so far as to enjoin against the use of Communist Party members as agents. Despite these instances, the use of Communist personnel in agent operations by INU is both widespread and consistent. Frequently local Communists have been compelled to sever all connections with the Party. In other instances, however, Communist Party members and Communist Party officials involved in INU operations have continued to

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maintain their Party posts without apparent change in status. Although there is no definite proof, it is probable that major INU officials operating abroad are still given carefully selected Party contacts to facilitate their operations. It is known that in numerous cases during recent years one or more high officials of local Communist Parties have been made aware of MGB recruitment of Communists for "secret work"; i.e., espionage.


According to one defecting Soviet agent, the organs of State Security in 1943 began stressing the formation of agent parallels, using the so-called "pole" system of organization, more frequently referred to as the "double cutout system." While it is difficult to perfect a consistent system of this character, considerable effort apparently has been expended to attain success. This type of organization, of course, contemplates a maximum security parallel wherein instructions and information are passed through a series of cutouts, very few of whom are given any knowledge of the real identity of their subordinate agents or of their superiors. According to this same defector, at about the same time INU, at least in one area of major importance, began to transfer the direct control and operation of a number of agent nets from operational personnel originally recruited from native or international Communists to staff officers of complete Soviet background. At least one important NKGB agent, who apparently was recruited originally from international Communist circles, has been quoted as complaining bitterly in 1944 that the "old timers" in the business were being replaced by young Russian State Security officers who knew little of the areas or problems involved.

**IX. ESTIMATE OF MGB EFFECTIVENESS**

At present any detailed estimate of the effectiveness or of the strengths and weaknesses of the MGB is not only difficult but perhaps presumptuous. There is insufficient authentic or documented knowledge of the extent, character, and identity of all MGB operations upon which to base a definitive analysis of its effectiveness. However, certain comments can be made on the basis of available data.

It is not difficult to detect flaws in various MGB operations or to tabulate a considerable number of maneuvers and techniques which, in

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particular instances, have appeared both incorrect and foolish. There is also abundant evidence available reflecting extreme competence and effectiveness in MGB operations, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. Obviously, if the MGB is to be compared with a standard of perfection, a number of valid criticisms might be made of its operations. If, on the other hand, it is to be compared with the standard of performance generally attained by other intelligence and security agencies, it must be admitted that, as a whole, the MGB is competent, efficient, effective, and at times brilliant in its operations. Among the obvious strengths of the MGB, of course, are numbered its size, power, facilities, continuity of operations, continuity of personnel, and the prestige and prerogatives which are known to be given to the officers of State Security. Within the Soviet Union, itself, as a State Security and repression agency, there appears little question that the MGB is, as its predecessors have been, an extremely effective force - with little question, the most powerful single agency within the USSR. The power, jurisdiction, and facilities of the MGB are so extensive that it is possible, of course, for it to approach the saturation point in both intelligence and security operations. We do not question, in this regard, that the MGB and such components of the MVD as are operationally utilized by it, represent by far the largest, most extensive, and the most all-pervading intelligence agency which is, or has recently been, in existence. Not the least among the assets of the MGB also is its unlimited choice of methods, the effectiveness of which was amply demonstrated in a parallel situation during World War II by the contrast between the effectiveness in certain instances of the Abwehr and the RSHA in Germany. Another strength of the MGB is, of course, its strong Party character and the consequent consistent reliability of most of its personnel. The tremendous benefit which it derives from the availability of the World Communist Movement for facilitation and support has been covered adequately in other sections of this study.

Finally, a knowledge of the particular strengths and effectiveness of the MGB includes a realization that the Soviet State as a whole not only places great stress and dependence on both the security and intelligence aspects of MGB work, but is obviously willing to expend almost unlimited men, money, and resources in the accomplishment of security and intelligence objectives.

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Such weaknesses of MGB operations, as have been pointed out, primarily apply to MGB operations abroad. That these weaknesses are far from fatal is amply demonstrated by the disconcerting lack of knowledge which other intelligence agencies possess of MGB operations. Also, such weaknesses as can be pointed out and such apparent errors in judgment and approach as have been noted have not appeared in all known MGB operations, nor have they been revealed with sufficient frequency to state definitely that they are symptomatic of all or even a major portion of MGB operations abroad. One of the characteristics of MGB operations which can be considered at least as a weakness is the provincialism and lack of foreign experience apparent in much of its personnel. Obviously, however, many of the unfortunate results of this are obviated by the availability of native Communists and crypto-Communists as agent personnel. In many cases, the omnivorous thirst for knowledge displayed by the MGB has appeared to prejudice the procurement of good, vital, important information. In certain cases also, an apparent lack of judgment as to the relative importance of operations and information has been obvious.

Also noted has been an extreme range in the competence of various MGB agents and operations, varying from those involving the most carefully conceived operational plans to be carried out by extremely able personnel to numerous "shotgun" operations using poorly trained, unsuited, and stupid personnel, the results of which could hardly be of any great value or importance. There has also been noted in certain instances a tendency to waste time and personnel in the conspiratorial procurement of information which could more readily and more quickly be procured through overt means. A corollary to this has been a frequent refusal to utilize or depend on available facilities and to so over-complicate an intelligence operation that it appeared to involve a deliberate avoidance of simplicity. The constant stress on security and on the strictly conspiratorial aspects of intelligence operations seems to have contributed to a lowering of efficiency and effectiveness in many cases.

Although the procurement by MGB of intelligence information sometimes appears to involve an unjustified expenditure of time, effort and resources, the MGB unquestionably does procure a great volume of extremely valuable and important data from practically every area on earth.


  
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Our knowledge is too limited to permit us to draw valid conclusions as to the comparative effectiveness of MGB headquarters evaluation, correlation, and utilization of this tremendous mass of reports and documents. Possessing as it does the automatic cross-checks of an intelligence system composed of independent parallels working to attain the same objectives, it would appear that such evaluation, correlation, and utilization at the headquarters level should be proficient. However, there are grounds for belief that the effectiveness of Soviet evaluation and utilization of this intelligence information is considerably lessened by the tremendous bulk of the information, by the provincialism of certain headquarters personnel, and by the bias and self-serving analyses inculcated not only by a too strong belief in the dialectical approach but also by the pressures necessarily incident to a monolithic, despotic bureaucracy.

# INU Agent Dispatch Channels


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- Border
- Operational and Command Channels.
- Departure of Agents Under Cover.

Note: See attachment.

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NOTE: In connection with the chart of the dispatch of INU agents, the bulk of known cases reflecting the dispatch of an agent to a foreign country by an INO at republic level, shows that, while the actual dispatching and the authority therefor are centered in the INO of a republic, the agents were dispatched through the channels and facilities of an INO/UMGB at oblast level. However, it is not believed that this is universally true, and it is felt that in certain instances, at least, agents may be dispatched by MGB at republic level independent of the channels and facilities of the oblast INO. The extent of the authority possessed by an oblast INO to dispatch agents independently of the authority or control of either MGB at republic or USSR level is not clear. Remembering however the extent of centralization of MGB structure and organization, it is felt that any independent dispatch of agents by an oblast INO is subject at least to authority and clearance from MGB at republic, or in certain instances, USSR level. It should also be noted that INO/UMGB of the Leningrad oblast appears to occupy a status paralleling in importance that of a republic INO, being similarly directly subordinated to INU/MGB, USSR.


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**MINISTRY OF  
STATE SECURITY (MGB)  
ALL-UNION LEVEL**

Minister - ABAKUMOV, V.S.  
 Dep. Min. - ATAKISHIEV, A.S.  
 Dep. Min. - ELINOV, A.S.  
 Dep. Min. - KOVALCHUK, N.K.  
 Dep. Min. - GOLITSOV, S.I.  
 Dep. Min. - BELITSKI, N.H.  
 Dep. Min. - SHUMILOV, R.G.  
 Dep. Min. - FEDOTOV, P.V.

**SERVICE DIRECTORATES**

**OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATES**



**NOTE:** Complete information has not yet become available on the internal structure of the directorates of the MGB since the organization became a Ministry in 1946. This chart is based upon the most recent information on the constitution of the MGB at the present time. The majority of these central directorates control subordinate organs at republic, province, and district levels. There is not as yet sufficient detailed information on the administrative and operational channels between organs on the same level and on different administrative levels to permit concrete statements on the exact chain of command.