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
SUMMARY OF RECENT [REDACTED] REPORTS ON THE SITUATION

I. Poland

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The bulk of the [REDACTED] reports (separate from those issued since 1 March 1956) describes confusion in the Polish Communist Party after the denigration of Stalin and details manifestations of dissatisfaction evident at various levels of the Party. To a lesser extent they report such manifestations outside the Party hierarchy, the various levels of which can be divided into seven groups: (1) Politburo and other prominent Party members, (2) general Party membership including rank-and-file, (3) intellectuals, (4) journalists, (5) youth groups, (6) scientists, and (7) parliament groups. All, except the first group, direct their dissatisfaction at the top leadership. The dissatisfactions center around poor economic conditions, lack of freedom within the Party, general Politburo policies, and to a lesser extent express dislike for the Soviet Union and Khrushchev. Gromeka's position is discussed in a few instances. (Gromeka, formerly a Party secretary, who was purged in 1948 apparently for nationalism in Leningrad, has been partially rehabilitated within the past year.)

ED reports include statements of highly placed Poles and people "in the know" expressing their opinions on Poland's domestic political situation and their speculations on Poland's relations with the US and the Soviet Union.



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A. Party Differences and Dissatisfaction

1. Politburo Level

Party First Secretary Gombi is characterized as wanting to stop the process of liberalization by any means and is confronted with Premier Gromekiewicz who allegedly is encouraging discussion and open criticism in the press [REDACTED] asserts that two opposing groups are forming in Poland, the one rallying around Gromekiewicz, the other around Gombi. The former favors while the latter opposes present liberal policies. The opposing views presumably will have to be settled by gaining Moscow support for either one or the other policy. High ranking Poles maintain two positions. One group feels that current criticism should be cut off, while the other group doubts that it could be cut off [REDACTED]

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2. General Party Membership

Criticism of the Party leadership is said by a journalist to have started in mid-1954. [redacted] From March 1956, local leaders met to pool their criticism of mistakes by top leaders. Biazut in one instance was asked point blank why wages were so low [redacted]. Some time before May, Central Committee (CC) members touring the country to discourage criticism were unsuccessful in holding back this criticism directed against the regime and the Soviet Union. The 1st CC Secretary Malin was booed by factory workers [redacted]. An instance of rank-and-file Communists in a factory near Warsaw asked Party discussion leaders pointedly why the exposure of Stalin was so late, and why Stalin's men in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria remained unpunished [redacted]. [redacted] asserts that discontent now is reportedly spreading beyond Party and intellectual circles, and if it continues to rise in intensity the regime or the Soviets will have to take forcible measures.

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3. Intellectuals

Some Communist journalists and writers speak frankly. For example, Ma Worfel (chief editor of Gazeta Warszawska and wife of the editor of Trybuna Ludu, the main Party newspaper) demanded the resignation of the whole Party Central Committee [redacted]. At a special meeting in Warsaw on 23 December 1955, attended by Party leaders, to discuss cultural work in the new Five-Year Plan, writers, artists and teachers persistently, bluntly and rudely quizzed the top leaders on economic matters. The latter had few answers, made no attempt to stop criticism, and listened attentively [redacted].

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4. Journalists

The assistant chief editor of Gazeta Warszawska was reprimanded and the censor fired for allowing a letter to appear asking why the release of Gorchalski and others associated with Gomulka was not accompanied by public discussion. The victims claimed they thought they were adhering to the Party line in the matter. The editor and staff of the paper, who did not like the decision against the censor, requested he be reinstated. Soon after his reinstatement, he was again dismissed.

Security forces surrounded the premises of the printing plant of Gazeta Warszawska and of Po Prostu (youth publication) on 10 March 1956. All copies of Po Prostu were confiscated because the paper proposed abolishment of the ZMP (Youth Organization) for its lack of purpose and corruption of its top leadership. It also criticized the fact that all kinds of consumer goods are available to the Party elite but not to the civilian population. All copies of Trybuna Wolnosci carrying an article implying disrespect to Gomulka also were confiscated [redacted].

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At a meeting of newspaper editors, District Party secretaries, and factory managers, Eda Warfel vehemently declared she has lost faith in the Party and regime [redacted]. Eda Warfel's removal as editor of Trybuna Ludu is reported to be partly the result of not exercising sufficient stringency in control of articles appearing in his paper [redacted].

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5. Youth

Discontent appears to be most pronounced among Polish Youth. The editor-in-chief of Przegląd has stated that a new organization of Polish Revolutionary Youth will soon be formed, not within the present ZPP but independent of it [redacted]. Another report [redacted] describes such a youth organization as intended to be modeled after "Revolutionary Youth Councils" active during the war. Its aim would be to "expose the destructive elements which had penetrated the highest ranks of the ZPP."

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6. Scientists

In mid-January 1956, at a meeting of scientists, Party members instead of adhering to the agenda to be discussed, engaged in harsh criticism of economic shortages and the deception and betrayal of the people which they involved [redacted].

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7. Parliament Groups

[redacted] is present at many parliament group discussions in late May 1956, where arguments become heatedly anti-Russian and sounded as if the groups wanted to destroy the Party [redacted].

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8. Anti-Soviet Reaction

Polish contempt of Fomchenko, Soviet ambassador, is prevalent, and journalists of the press and radio and CP members call him a "perfect idiot." Khrushchev particularly is unpopular. He is blamed for crimes in the Ukraine and is held responsible for Kuchuk's dominant position [redacted]. He was insulted indirectly by CP member Helena Kortowska during a Sixth Plenum meeting about 20 March as a result of which he left the meeting [redacted].

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A veteran Communist [redacted] who was imprisoned in the USSR during the war and released in 1946, after Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin, described at length in an organized meeting the horrors of his imprisonment in the USSR. Considerable discussion as to the possibility of unnatural death for Bierut in Moscow arose in left circles. Contempt for Soviet

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medical know-how was displayed. [REDACTED] Similar questions on Bierut's death arose among workers in a factory in [REDACTED]

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Winiarski, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that the question of investigating the Katyn massacres is being raised and is being seriously considered [REDACTED]

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Kata-Szuchy, Polish delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), is quoted as saying that Poland will never turn against the Soviet Union, but may evolve a relationship toward Soviet analogies to that of England and France vis-a-vis the US [REDACTED]


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9. Gomułka

Gomułka wrote a sharply worded letter in reply to Ochab's 6 April 1956 statement in Trybuna Ludu, but was refused publication. The Party is negotiating his readmittance to the CC on hard conditions. Many editors on Trybuna Ludu want better terms for Gomułka and rank-and-file Communists want Gomułka to be given a chance to defend himself in discussions with Party leaders [REDACTED] reports that the Party is trying to persuade Gomułka to rejoin the Party but that the latter is playing hard-to-get. His terms are public diagrams to several present Party leaders. These terms/under discussion by the Party Leadership.

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[REDACTED] generalism on the significance of the second-level Party and government changes as efforts by the leadership to convince the general public of the persistence of liberalization policy (by promoting former Socialists and firing personnel associated with Stalinist methods). These documents also speculate on the inner Party maneuverings for position, but do not seem of particular significance from the point of view of unrest or instability inasmuch as such maneuverings have been reported during past years.

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[REDACTED] revision of Party history will include posthumous rehabilitation of over a hundred former Polish Communists who had been liquidated in the Soviet Union. Moscow allegedly has given formal approval,

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suggesting that their liquidation be attributed to Stalin/Beria machinations. Moscow invited Polish representatives to come to the Soviet Union to examine the records and prison camps to ascertain the facts for themselves.

The significance of [redacted] analysis of Gomulka's position is the [redacted] imputation that there is openly and total lack of sympathy for Gomulka personally and ideologically. This apparently contradicts the implications of some of the reports summarized under Section A above.

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[redacted] suggests that the present rightist deviation in Poland is of considerable strength and poses a problem for the leadership as to how to eliminate it. [redacted] has little doubt that sooner or later the rightist deviation will be strangled down.

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The Central Party Activ (Centralny Aktywny Partijny - CAP) is composed of "leading Party elective functionaries (many of whom occupied the highest governmental, cultural and mass organization posts), the Central Party appointive functionaries, and the first secretaries of the voivodship/provincial Party committees." It comprises at least 150-200 members. It originated spontaneously perhaps two years ago, and discussed Party policies and affairs informally as a collective group. The consensus of their deliberations was relayed to the Politburo, which has used it since December 1954 to keep in touch with Party morale and thinking.

Discontent in the Party derives from poor economic conditions; a moral revolution at "bestial" Party methods; the outdated ideology, considered inapplicable to modern times; lack of inner Party democracy and freedom of expression (in the press, for example); and the falseness of Party propaganda, which the CAP feels should be based on facts.

The history of the CAP conflict with the top leadership dates from a December 1954 meeting at which CAP members were invited to state their thoughts freely. Their criticisms (see the lines of the above) came as a complete surprise to the top leadership who took it under advisement, but actually was very reluctant to accede to the request for changes. To the present time the conflict has continued with little compromise or firmly held convictions in prospect.

[redacted] divides the conflict into three phases: (1) December 1954-May 1955, (2) May 1955-September 1955, and (3) September 1955-June 1956.

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In phase one, meetings held for liberalization within the Party resulted in a fairly pointed warning by the Politburo against rightist deviation.

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Phase two was essentially a period of quiet in view of the warning and in the hope that the Politburo would take action in the desired direction. However, Gdansk's defiance weakened the Politburo position, and particularly that of Rokossovski, Minister of Public Security. The GPP pushed their advantage and succeeded in getting him fired, after some hesitation by Bierut and Berman.

The third phase was characterized by considerable activity by journalists and "cautious aggressiveness" by the GPP. The magazine Smok was castigated for overstepping the bounds of propriety in satirizing an edious type of Party member. The Prasa for Admity written by Hayk, which appeared in Nowa Kultura caused considerable consternation in the Politburo, but even under heavy Politburo pressure, the editor and staff almost to a man refused to disavow the poem. As a consequence the whole staff was fired by Berman who had considerable difficulty replacing the staff because of the refusal of the prospective members of the staff to serve. In a third instance, Ochab, a prominent member of the GPP, criticized in Przeglad Kultury that Marxist sociological research had stopped with a pre-revolutionary book by Lenin. He was severely castigated for several hours by Bierut, Ochab, and Berman as a result of which he resigned. There was also a thorough shake-up in the staff of Przeglad Kultury to test of ideological firmness.

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██████████ would not predict the outcome of the struggle, though he doubted seriously that the Politburo could afford to institute ameliorative changes. They would need Moscow approval, assuring that the political and economic system would not be endangered, and that we assurance of their own continued control and power.

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██████████ states that not even the most aggressive proponents of de-stalinization asked for free criticism of a solution once passed (underlining supplied). ██████████ statement is on paper Leninist definition of "democratic centralism," eloquized as "freedom in discussion, unity in action," and seems to mark the GPP members as loyal Communists ideologically. The whole dispute is within the Party and there is virtually no indication that the GPP is concerned with general de-stalinization of Poland.

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████████ stated that not even the most aggressive proponents of democratization asked for free criticism of resolutions once passed (underlining supplied). ██████████ statement is one proper Leninist definition of "democratic centralism," sloganized as "freedom in discussion, unity in action," and seems to mark the CAP members as loyal Communists ideologically. The whole dispute is within the Party and there is virtually no indication that the CAP is concerned with general democratization of Poland.

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As the result of equivocation on the highest levels, serious discontentment has been expressed among the Party intelligentsia, at the managerial and directing level of the Party, and among provincial Party chiefs. The burden of complaint has been directed against the Party leaders who have lost the confidence of their subordinates. It bears a strong resemblance to the demand of the dissatisfied element in Poland for increased freedom of thought and certain basic civil liberties. The removal of Gopick from the Politburo and his positions as Vice Premier and Minister of Defense, and the postponement of the Party Conference scheduled for June 1956 are believed due to pressure from lower Party levels [REDACTED]

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That the crisis exists throughout the Party is indicated by reports that lower Party functionaries have been meeting in discussion groups and demanding that the Party course be altered to accord better with Czech conditions [REDACTED]. That criticism expressed at such meetings is felt to be significant can be assumed from the fact that the Party has issued new instructions stating that the previous practice of forwarding names of critics in reports of Party meetings be discontinued. Henceforth criticism is to be attributed only to the group and a full written report is sent to the Central Committee for study [REDACTED]

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The degree of disintegration in Party authority may be observed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that the political officer of his battalion, following a meeting at [REDACTED] Headquarters, openly accused Ministers Stoll and Mojedy and Vice Premier Kopecky of mistakes, belief in the "cult of personality," and culpability in the Slansky affair [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The campaign to denigrate Stalin resulted in a noticeable drop in morale and interest in Party matters among members. The fact that the political officers of the brigade were instructed to hold discussions on the Party line shift but were told not to answer any questions on the part of the troops was further evidence of the confusion among Party leaders [REDACTED]

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That some liberalization of the executive control of the regime has taken place is suggested by the fact that the expressions of discontent described above were voiced at all, as well as by a report that mail censorship has been relaxed to permit persons sending mail abroad to do so without presenting such mail to the post office with identification documents [REDACTED]. That any relaxation has occurred is

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the fundamental mechanisms of control was unlikely in view of the reports which state that many of the students involved in the May Day parade were arrested [REDACTED] as were some of the low level Party functionaries involved in the [REDACTED] of Party leaders and policy [REDACTED]

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SECRET**III. DISSENT**

The current unrest, manifested by criticism of Party members and confusion on all levels of the Party hierarchy, which has followed the Soviet campaign to denigrate Stalin and repudiate some of the less effective features of his policy, can be observed also in Hungary. The first meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party after the 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in March 1956. It took place in an atmosphere of violence and recrimination against Party leader Rakosi and was dissolved after two days without either a vote or resolution having been reached. The dissension among high Party leaders was mirrored in subsequent meetings of lower level Party functionaries and organizations. District branches were instructed to hold meetings of Party activists to receive guidance on the shift in the Party line. Despite the presence of members of the Central Committee, several of these meetings expressed strong criticism of the Party Line and Rakosi's position. Further direct criticism of Rakosi, specifically as the "murderer" of Rajk, was made at the hard meeting of the Writer's Association. The meeting adjourned in disorder. The next meeting in April 1956 resulted in demands for self-criticism on the part of Rakosi and of critical discussions of the Central Committee and the present leadership. Meetings of Party members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Hungarian Radio Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs displayed the same spirit of dissatisfaction and reluctance to accept Party discipline [REDACTED].

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Confusion on the part of the hierarchy and lower echelons is further indicated by reports emanating from Budapest. It is stated that contradictory opinions have been publicly expressed by high Party officials, that courses on the history of the Communist Party have been suspended to be replaced by analysis of the mistakes discussed by the 20th Party Congress, and that the hierarchy is unable to give Party secretaries in factories and institutions any guidance to explain the sudden changes [REDACTED]. Furthermore, governmental officials are reported to avoid taking any action until the situation has been clarified [REDACTED].

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Although some indications of response to this state of discontent have been reported, notably Rakosi's self-critical speech of 18 May 1956, it appears probable that he will retain top man in the region, possibly heading up some form of collective leadership.

Reports that the fortifications on the border between Austria and Hungary were being removed appear to have been too optimistic. [REDACTED] Some mines and watch towers were removed, but are probably being replaced behind the old line. [REDACTED] The border will continue to be fortified though not so obviously and perhaps not so fortitiously as before.

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SECRETIV. Bulgaria

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Three of the five [] reports on Bulgaria concern discussions among top leaders on the Central Committee Plenum held from 31 March to 2 April 1956. The subjects to be discussed were the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, Chervenkov's denunciation, and whether to admit malpractices in the trial of Koster for his alleged Titoist leanings. The line-up of factions, consisting of pro and anti-Chervenkov people and middle-of-the-roads (including his eventual successor Ligov) are described. The alleged conversations in the preparatory Politburo meetings are summarized. One speaker presented the details of the Koster trial as a horrifying result of the Stalinist dictatorship. General Trunski, a partisan commander and war-time collaborator with Tito, told of the pressures he underwent in Moscow where he was interrogated for a month on his Titoist connections. The report also related the pressure of colleagues on Chervenkov in these meetings to curtail "self-criticism."

A [] memorandum summarizes conversations among members of the Bulgarian trade delegations [], inferring from the conversations considerable dissatisfaction with the Party and the political and economic system on the part of the trade delegation. [] the conversation suggests equally plausibly that the influence of discontent is no more than the easy-going griping of armchair chattees informally and speculatively about things "back home." [] does not necessarily suggest serious disaffection.

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[] reports that a fire broke out in a cotton-goods factory in Khamsanli on 7 or 8 March. Arrivals and repairs concerning an empty kerosene can found near the premises suggests sabotage.

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SECRET**V. East Germany**

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reports on the effects of the 20th Congress of the CPSU relate to the uneasiness and nervousness of the Party's middle and lower levels as to how to deal with the denigration of Stalin. The upper sections of these two levels generally avoid discussing the "Stalin problem." When occasionally forced to respond by a print-blank question, they fall back on the anti-Stalin statement of Khrushchev in Pravda, the Party newspaper, as the line-setter. His bad effect on youth, who know only Stalin's (and allegedly not Lenin's) writings, is deplored by older Party members. What one report describes as an admitted "revolutionary mood" in the SED, is manifested in these reports only by murmurings of dissatisfaction with the equivocal line on Stalin and an occasional forthright request for better guidance as how to deal with the Stalin question (for example, in newspaper writing and in answering letters to the editor).

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