

PRESS COMMENT

21 FEBRUARY 1957

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New York Times Summary

International

President Eisenhower warned Israel that the United Nations must exert pressure to force her withdrawal from Egyptian territory. In a country-wide television and radio speech, he said the international organization must not fail to solve the issue. He offered the Israelis the same formula propounded by Secretary of State Dulles—that this country would use all its influence to give them security, but could not give the absolute guarantees Israel had asked. [Page 1, Column 8; Text, Page 4.]

The Senate leaders of both parties remained opposed to United Nations sanctions against Israel after a meeting with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., United States was said to have predicted that the United Nations General Assembly would vote sanctions even if this country abstained. Participants in the White House conference said they got the impression the United States would tacitly accept the sanctions by abstention. [1:6-7.]

The consultation took place in the Cabinet room of the White House and was described as the fullest and freest of the dozen such bipartisan sessions of the Eisenhower Administration. One source said the decision for the President's broadcast speech came on the spur of the moment during the talk. [6:6.]

It was noted that Israel is singularly vulnerable to dollar sanctions, and that a stroke of the President's pen could bring her virtual ruin. [6:5.]

President Nasser summoned an urgent Cabinet meeting to discuss the crisis over Israel's refusal to withdraw. [1:7.]

Israel's Ambassador to London rejected a return to the "disastrous" situation before the invasion. [8:2.]

Debate on the issue was

again postponed at the United Nations until tomorrow, at the United States' request. The Arab-Asian bloc withheld action on introducing the sanctions resolution. [1:5.]

The heads of governments of six Western European nations agreed on the basic provisions of treaties tending to merge their economies. One would pool their nuclear resources, the other would introduce steps toward a common market without tariffs or trade barriers. [1:1; Text, Page 2.]

The Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution asking its chairman to go to India and Pakistan to try to mediate in the Kashmir dispute. [1:2.]

Sweden told the Soviet Government that it could not escape responsibility in the death of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg by ascribing it to the corrupt Stalinist police. It said the Kremlin lied, either by saying for twelve years that Mr. Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union or in saying it had made a thorough investigation. [1:3.]

The Soviet Union extended new credits and aid to Bulgaria in the latest of a series of moves to cement its links with the satellite nations. [8:5.]

A number of abstentions and negative votes gave unaccustomed liveliness to the opening of Poland's Parliament. [1:1.]

Union of Europe long sought by many leading men. Page 3

Europeans yield more in common market, atom pool. Page 3

Soviet and Bulgaria sign economic, party pacts. Page 8

Britain eases some restrictions on use of fuel. Page 9

U. S. bids U. N. drop both proposals about Cyprus. Page 10

Draft constitution for Malaya stresses racial equality. Page 11

Jeep beats all in political campaigning in India. Page 11

Personality sketch of Poland's Premier. Page 12

Several trials against writers planned by Hungary. Page 13

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1957.

Text of Eisenhower's Address to the Nation on Situation in Middle East

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20.—Following is the text of President Eisenhower's speech tonight on Middle East problems:

I come to you again to talk about the situation in the Middle East. The future of the United Nations and peace in the Middle East may be at stake.

In the four months since I talked to you about the crisis in that area, the United Nations has made considerable progress in resolving some of the difficult problems. We are now, however, faced with a fateful moment as the result of the failure of Israel to withdraw its forces behind the Armistice lines, as contemplated by the United Nations Resolutions on this subject.

I have already today met with leaders of both parties from the Senate and the House of Representatives and we have had a very useful exchange of views. It was the general feeling of that meeting that I should lay the situation before the American people.

Before talking about the specific issues involved I want to make clear that these issues are not something remote and abstract, but involve matters vitally touching upon the future of each one of us.

The Middle East is a land-bridge between the Eurasian and African continents. Millions of tons of commerce are transmitted through it annually. Its own products, especially petroleum, are essential to Europe and the western world.

U. S. Has No Ambitions

The United States has no ambitions or desires in this region other than that each country there must maintain its independence and live peacefully within itself and with its neighbors and, by peaceful cooperation with others, develop its own spiritual and material resources. But that much is vital to the peace and well-being of us all. This is our concern today.

So tonight I report to you on the matters in controversy and on what I believe the position of the United States must be.

When I talked to you last October, I pointed out that the United States fully realized that military action against Egypt resulted from grave and repeated provocations. But also I said that the use of military force to solve

international disputes could not be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations, to which we had all subscribed. I added that our country could not believe that resort to force and war would for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations, which were Britain, France and Israel.

So I pledged that the United States would seek through the United Nations to end the conflict and to bring about a recall of the forces of invasion, and then make a renewed and earnest effort through that organization to secure justice, under international law, for all of the parties concerned.

Since that time much has been achieved and many of the dangers implicit in the situation have been avoided. The governments of Britain and France have withdrawn their forces from Egypt. Thereby they showed respect for the opinions of mankind as expressed almost unanimously by the eighty-nation members of the United Nations General Assembly.

A Tribute to Allies

I want to pay tribute to the wisdom of this action of our friends and allies. They made an immense contribution to world order. Also they put the other nations of the world under a heavy obligation to see to it that those two nations do not suffer by reason of their compliance with the United Nations resolutions. This has special application, I think, to their treaty rights to passage through the Suez Canal which has been made an international waterway for all by the treaty of 1888.

The Prime Minister of Israel, in answer to a personal communication, assured me early in November that Israel would willingly withdraw its forces if and when there should be created a United Nations force to move into the Suez Canal area. This force was, in fact, created and has moved into the canal area.

Subsequently, Israel forces were withdrawn from much of the territory of Egypt which they had occupied. However, Israeli forces still remain outside the armistice lines, notably at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba which is about 100 miles from the nearest Israeli territory and in the Gaza Strip which, by the armistice agreement, was to be occupied by Egypt. This fact creates the present crisis.

We are approaching a fateful moment when either we must recognize that the United Nations is unable to restore

peace in this area, or the United Nations must renew with increased vigor its efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal.

Repeated, but so far, unsuccessful, efforts have been made to bring about a voluntary withdrawal by Israel. These efforts have been made both by the United Nations and by the United States and other member states.

Cease-Fire Recalled

Moreover, equally serious efforts have been made to bring about conditions designed to assure that if Israel withdraws in response to the repeated requests of the United Nations, there will then be achieved a greater security and tranquility for that nation. This means that the United Nations would assert a determination to see that in the

Middle East there will be a greater degree of justice and compliance with international law than was the case prior to the events of last October-November.

A United Nations Emergency Force, with Egypt's consent, entered the nation's territory in order to help to maintain the cease-fire, which the United Nations called for on Nov. 2. The Secretary General, who ably and devotedly serves the United Nations, has recommended a number of measures which might be taken by the United Nations and by its Emergency Force to assure for the future the avoidance by either side of belligerent acts.

The United Nations General Assembly on Feb. 2 by an overwhelming vote adopted a

resolution to the effect that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza areas, the United Nations Emergency Force should be placed on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines to assure the scrupulous maintenance of the armistice agreement.

Also, the United Nations General Assembly called for implementation of other measures proposed by the Secretary General. These other measures embraced the use of the United Nations Emergency Force at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, so as to assure nonbelligerency in this area.

The United States was a co-sponsor of this United Nations resolution. Thus the United States sought to assure that Israel would, for the future,

enjoy its rights under the armistice and under international law.

In view of the valued friendly relations which the United States has always had with the state of Israel, I wrote to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on Feb. 3. I recalled his statement to me of Nov. 8 to the effect that the Israeli forces would be withdrawn under certain conditions, and I urged that, in view of the General Assembly resolutions of Feb. 2, Israel should complete that withdrawal.

However, the Prime Minister, in his reply, took the position that Israel would not evacuate its military forces from the Gaza Strip unless Israel retained the civil administration and police. This would be in contradiction to the armistice agreement. Also, the reply said that Israel would not withdraw from the Straits of Aqaba unless freedom of passage through the straits was assured.

It was a matter of keen disappointment to us that the Government of Israel, despite the United Nations action, still felt unwilling to withdraw.

Cites U. S. Policy

However, in a further effort to meet the views of Israel in these respects, Secretary of State Dulles, at my direction, gave to the Government of Israel on Feb. 11 a statement of United States policy. This has now been made public. It pointed out that neither the United States nor the United Nations had authority to impose upon the parties a substantial modification of the Armistice agreement which was freely signed by Israel and Egypt. Nevertheless, the statement said, the United States as a member of the United Nations would seek such disposition of the United Nations Emergency Force as would assure that the Gaza Strip could no longer be a source of armed infiltration and reprisals.

The Secretary of State orally informed the Israeli Ambassador that the United States would be glad to urge and support, also, some participation by the United Nations, with the approval of Egypt, in the administration of the Gaza Strip. The principal population of the strip consists of about 300,000 Arab refugees, who exist largely as a charge upon the benevolence of the United Nations and its members.

With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the gulf constitutes international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent pas-

that the United States prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

The Government of Israel has not yet accepted, as adequate insurance of its own safety after withdrawal, the far-reaching United Nations resolution of Feb. 2 plus the important declaration of United States policy made by our Secretary of State on Feb. 11.

But Israel seeks something more. It insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion.

This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal.

Turning Back the Clock

If we are that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. We will, in effect, have countenanced the use of force as a means of setting international differences and gaining national advantages.

I do not myself see how this could be reconciled with the charter of the United Nations. The basic pledge of all the members of the United Nations is that they will settle their international disputes by peaceful means and will not use force against the territorial integrity of another state.

If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope of establishing a real world order. That would be a disaster for us all.

I would, I feel, be untrue to the standards of the high office to which you have chosen me if I were to lend the influence of the United States to the proposition that a nation which invades another should be permitted to exact condition's for withdrawal.

Of course, we and all the members of the United Nations ought to support justice and conformity with international law. The first article of the Charter states the purpose of the United Nations to be "the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes." But it is to be observed that conformity with justice and international law are to be brought about "by peaceful means."

We cannot consider that the armed invasion and occupation of another country are "peaceful means" or proper means to achieve justice and conformity with international law.

We do, however, believe that upon the suppression of the present act of aggression and breach of the peace, there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international

law. Peace and justice are two sides of the same coin.

Perhaps the world community has been at fault in not having paid enough attention to this truth. The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law. And we shall in this great effort seek the association of other like-minded nations which realize, as we do, that peace and justice are in the long run inseparable.

What To Do Next

But the United Nations faces immediately the problem of what to do next. If it does nothing, if it accepts the ignoring of its repeated resolutions calling for the withdrawal of invading forces, then it will have admitted failure. That failure would be a blow to the authority and influence of the United Nations in the world and to the hopes which humanity placed in the United Nations as the means of achieving peace with justice.

This failure would be harmful to the long term good of Israel. It would, in addition to its injury to the United Nations, jeopardize the prospects of the peaceful solution of the problems of the Middle East. This could bring incalculable ills to our friends and indeed to our nation itself. It would make infinitely more difficult the realization of the goals which I laid out in my Middle East message of Jan. 5 to Congress seeking to strengthen the area against Communist aggression, direct or indirect.

The United Nations must not fail. I believe that—in the interests of peace—the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. Of course, we still hope that the Government of Israel will see that its best immediate and long-term interests lie in compliance with the United Nations and in placing its trust in the resolutions of the United Nations and in the declaration of the United States with reference to the future.

I do not believe Israel's default should be ignored because the United Nations has not been able effectively to carry out its resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for its armed suppression of the people of Hungary. Perhaps this is a case where the proverb applies that two wrongs do not make a right.

Deplores Soviet Action

No one deplores more than I the fact that the Soviet Union ignores the resolutions of the United Nations. Also no nation is more vigorous than is the United States in seeking to exert moral pressure against the Soviet Union, which by reason of its size and power and by reason of its veto in the United Nations Security Council, is relatively impervious to other types of sanction.

The United States and other free nations are making clear by every means at their command the evil of Soviet conduct in Hungary. It would indeed be a sad day if the United States ever felt that it had to subject Israel to the same type of moral pressure as is being applied to the Soviet Union.

There can, of course, be no equating of a nation like Israel

with that of the Soviet Union. Those of the United States, are imbued with a religious faith and a sense of moral values. We are entitled to expect, and do expect, from such peoples of the free world a contribution to world order which unap-

pily we cannot expect from a nation controlled by atheistic despots.

It has been suggested that United Nations actions against Israel should not be pressed because Egypt has in the past violated the armistice agreement and international law. It is true that both Egypt and Israel, prior to last October, engaged in reprisals in violations of the armistice agreements and that Egypt ignored the United Nations in exercising belligerent rights in relation to Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba. However, such violations constitute no justification for the armed invasion of Egypt by Israel which the United Nations is now seeking to undo.

Egypt, by accepting the Six Principles adopted by the Security Council last October in relation to the Suez Canal, bound itself to free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, and to the principle that the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country.

Makes No Assumptions

We should not assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the Armistice agreement or other international obligation, then this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations.

The present moment is a grave one, but we are hopeful that reason and right will prevail. Since the events of last October and November, solid progress has been made, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. There is the cease-fire, the forces of Britain and France have been withdrawn, the forces of Israel have been partially withdrawn, and the clearing of the Canal nears completion. When Israel completes its withdrawal, it will have removed a definite block to further progress.

Once this block is removed, there will be serious and creative tasks for the United Nations to perform. There needs to be respect for the right of Israel to national existence and to internal development. Complicated provisions insuring the effective international use of the Suez Canal will need to be worked out in detail. The Arab refugee problem must be solved. As I said in my special message to Congress on Jan. 5, it must be made certain that all the Middle East is kept free

from aggression and infiltration.

Help for Mideast

Finally, all who cherish freedom, including ourselves, should help the nations of the Middle East achieve their just aspirations for improving the well-being of their peoples.

What I have spoken about tonight is only one step in a long process calling for pa-

tience and diligence, but at the same time it is the critical issue on which future progress depends.

It is an issue which can be solved if only we will apply the principles of the United Nations.

That is why, my fellow Americans, I know you want the United States to continue to use its maximum influence to sustain those principles as the world's best hope for peace.

M. Y. JAMES

FEB 21 1957

U. N. ASSEMBLY URGES HUMAN RIGHTS DRAFT

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Feb. 20.—The General Assembly called on its Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee today to finish work in the 1958 session on the draft covenants of human rights.

At the same time it voted to shift the problem of what to do about human rights violations over to the Human Rights Commission. For the second year it postponed discussion of three proposals to establish commissions on self-determination or the right of a people to choose their own political destiny.

The Assembly committee has been working for three years on the drafts of the two covenants, which were submitted to the Assembly in 1954 by the Human Rights Commission. One covenant deals with economic, social and cultural rights, the other with civil and political rights.

Last year the committee adopted a preamble and an article recognizing that all peoples have the right to self-determination. These would be the same in both covenants.

This year the committee approved texts for seven articles in the covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. They cover the right to work, to just working conditions, to belong to a trade union, to protection of the family, to social security, to an adequate standards of living and to the highest attainable health standards.

All these articles were adopted without opposing votes, save for the one on social security. Seven countries voted against that article, to which a Soviet proposal had been attached providing that social security included social insurance.

EASTERN EUROPE

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

NEW PARLIAMENT
LIVELY IN POLANDSome Deputies Voice 'Nays'
—Cyrankiewicz RenamedBy SYDNEY GRUSON
Special to The New York Times.

WARSAW, Feb. 20—The Polish Parliament that was elected in a nation-wide demonstration of support for Wladyslaw Gomulka last month opened today with a show of unaccustomed liveliness.

To the surprise and audible show of delight of spectators in the crowded galleries, several nay votes and abstentions were registered in a departure from the tradition of legislative unanimity in Communist countries.

Most surprising was the vote of one unidentified deputy against the designation of Jozef Cyrankiewicz to continue as Premier. M. Gomulka, who is First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party, nominated M. Cyrankiewicz to form a new Cabinet.

Because there were so many new faces among the Deputies, no one was certain who had voted against M. Cyrankiewicz. The dissenter sat in the center of the semi-circular chamber in the back of the section assigned to the Democratic party.

The Democratic party is one of the two non-Communist parties in Poland that back the Communist-led regime. The other is the United Peasants party.

Dissenting votes were also cast against some candidates to the Council of State, a group that corresponds to a national presidency. For the most part the dissenters were independents, but there was one Communist who raised his hand to signify absenteeism.

The business of the first day's session was purely organizational. Nevertheless, the display of scattered opposition was considered a portent giving point to the words of 74-year-old Boleslaw Drobner, who as the oldest Deputy opened the new Parliament.

"Our Sejm [Parliament] should no longer remain mute," M. Drobner said. "This Sejm must not be a parliamentary fiction. It must become a source of renovation. It must and shall be a furnace in which we will be forging iron and steel as long as our October [when M. Gomulka returned to power] remains hot."

New Speaker Elected

Czeslaw Wiecech, a Peasant party leader who had been in eclipse for several years, was elected as the new Marshal, or Speaker, of the Sejm. Deputy Marshals elected were Zenon Kliszko of the Communist party, a close associate of M. Gomulka, and Jerzy Jodlowski of the Democratic party, who made critical speeches in the last sessions of the previous Parliament.

They were elected unanimously and so were three Communists and one Democratic party member at the top of the list of the State Council candidates. When the fifth name on the State Council list was read, that of Boleslaw Podedworny of the Peasant party, the Speaker called as usual for those in favor to raise their hands and as usual called afterward for those against and those abstaining. As usual he said "I see none."

Several Deputies shouted "But there are two!" and heads snapped to stare. As many as seven abstentions and four nays were registered against most of the remaining candidates for the fifteen-member council.

A notable exception was the unanimous vote for M. Gomulka, which was preceded by a long ovation.

Earlier in the day party caucuses adopted their disciplinary rules, said to be more lenient than in the past. The organization of Deputies into party groups instead of regional groups was itself a revival of a tradition that had been suppressed for many years.

The Communists, who with 237 members have 51.7 per cent of the seats, take up the left half of the hall. Then come the Peasants, who have 118 seats, and the Democratic party, with 39 seats. On the right sat the 63 independents, a designation that includes 12 Roman Catholics.

The SEJM will meet again next Tuesday, when a new Cabinet may be announced. The new rules of procedure that are to be formulated by that time will have an important influence in deciding whether the Parliament will in effect begin to have a hand in making as well as ratifying the nation's laws.

ANTI-POLISH DRIVE TO STOP
Soviet-Led Bloc Calls Off Its
Campaign of Criticism

Special to The New York Times.
WARSAW, Feb. 20—Within the last few days Poland's Communist leaders have received assurances from the Soviet Union that the anti-Polish campaign in the Soviet-led press will be called off.

The signal has already been given to halt criticism that was piling up on Poland from every country in the Soviet bloc except China. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet party secretary, flashed the signal publicly last

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

PROTEST ON BALLOONS

Czechs Ask International Body
to Discuss the Matter

MONTREAL, Feb. 20 (AP)—Czechoslovakia plans to ask the International Civil Aviation Organization to take steps to prevent West Germany and the United States from launching balloons that sail over Czech territory.

The Czechs say the balloons are used for espionage purposes and menace planes.

The protest was contained in a message from the Czech Civil Aviation Directorate to Carl M. Junberg, Secretary General of the international body. It asked that the matter be placed on the agenda for a meeting tomorrow of the group's twenty-one-nation council here.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

Times on Sale in Poland

Special to The New York Times.
WARSAW, Feb. 20—The International Edition of The New York Times went on sale in Warsaw today and was placed on files in public rooms throughout the country. The Times is the first United States paper to be made available for general reading in the last ten years of Communist rule here.

night in a Kremlin speech marking Soviet-Bulgarian friendship.

Mr. Khrushchev said the Polish United Workers (Communist) party under Wladyslaw Gomulka, its First Secretary, was successfully "repelling the reactionary conspiracy" and working for the consolidation of socialism in Poland and for cooperation with all Communist countries. Mr. Khrushchev added:

"We on our part will do everything for Poland to develop and strengthen her as an equal and independent Socialist state marching side by side with other Socialist countries toward the triumph of our common cause: the construction of socialism and the strengthening of peace throughout the world."

This was a remarkable change of tone toward Poland's leaders. The Eastern European press had in effect accused them in recent weeks of giving comfort to the counter-revolution by the new liberalized policies instituted since M. Gomulka returned to power.

N. Y. Times

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Bowles Sees Khrushchev

MOSCOW, Feb. 20 (AP)—Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India, spent more than an hour today with Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist party. Mr. Bowles declined to say what they had talked about. He is here as a tourist.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

PLAN ON HUNGARY URGED

Lodge Says U.N. Should Be
Ready for a New Revolt

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (AP)—Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. believes the United Nations should have a plan of action ready for any new outbreak of violence in Communist-ruled Hungary.

The chief United States delegate to the United Nations expressed this view in a letter to Senator Roman L. Hruska, Republican of Nebraska, who had urged such a course in a letter to Mr. Lodge Feb. 12.

Mr. Lodge's letter was made public today by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Mr. Hruska was acting as chairman of the subcommittee when two participants in the Hungarian revolt last October testified recently that preparations for a new uprising were under way.

Mr. Hruska forwarded their testimony to Mr. Lodge with a suggestion that the United Nations Special Committee on Hungary prepare a plan of action in the event that a new anti-Soviet revolt breaks out.

Chicago Tribune

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Russian Paper Deplores
Influence of Church

LONDON, Feb. 19 [Reuters]—The Russian youth newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda published a letter today saying the growing influence of the church on young people "cannot be tolerated." Moscow Radio reported. The writer complained that priests "by subtly adapting their work to contemporary conditions and developing their struggle for possession of the hearts and minds of young men and women."

HUNGARY PASSES DRIVE ON WRITERS

Plans Several Trials as U.S.
Bars Refugee Intellectuals
Who Were Idealistic Reds

By JOHN MACCORMAC

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Feb. 20.—The Hungarian Government has begun a drive against intellectuals just when the United States seems to have decided that nothing much can be done for Hungarian intellectuals who have escaped.

There are a number of Hungarian writers in Austria who cannot be admitted to the United States because they say they once joined the Communist party for idealistic rather than economic reasons.

They include Tamas Aczel, winner of the Stalin and Kossuth Prizes; Endre Ecs, editor of the *Uj Magyar Nemzet*, in whose columns began the intellectual ferment that led to the 1956 revolution.

Other Hungarian writers in Austria who cannot be admitted to the United States because they say they once joined the Communist party for idealistic rather than economic reasons. They include Tamas Aczel, winner of the Stalin and Kossuth Prizes; Endre Ecs, editor of the *Uj Magyar Nemzet*, in whose columns began the intellectual ferment that led to the 1956 revolution.

Trial Directed at Writers

The trial of Ilona Toth, Gyula Obersovszky, Jozsef Gall and others now going on in Budapest is the first of a number of planned trials directed at Hungarian writers.

Mr. Gall is a young playwright whose piece "On Freedom Mountain" made a stir in intellectual circles shortly before the revolt. It was a bitter indictment of police regimes and a glorification of human values. Mr. Obersovszky was editor of a provincial newspaper before he was expelled from the Communist party in 1955.

According to reliable information, Hungary is preparing a public trial against even better-known writers, including Gyula Hay, Jozsef Zelk, Tibor Tardos, Domokos Varga, Balazs Lengyel, Zoltan Novak and Pal Locssei.

The indictment against Mr. Hay is reported to be that he spoke on the rebel radio when the Russians attacked Budapest. Mr. Zelk, a Stalin Prize winner, is accused of connections with foreign embassies in Budapest; Mr. Tardos of connections with revolutionary youth; Mr. Varga of inciting the workers of the Csepel district to strike.

Writers' Friends of Nagy

The charge against Mr. Novobacksi is that he tried to flee to Yugoslavia with Mr. Aczel and Mr. Meray. Mr. Locsei, who was a close acquaintance of Imre Nagy, former Premier, is alleged to have collected material from witnesses of the revolt.

Miklos Gimes, another friend of Mr. Nagy and a member of the editorial board of *Szabad Nep* until expelled from the party in 1955; Gyula Fekete and Zoltan Molnar are in jail. Istvan Eorsi, one of the most talented young Hungarian poets,

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir.—It is evident that over the past few weeks the attitude of British people towards Hungarian refugees has undergone a marked change. The reason for this appears to be almost entirely based on certain Press reports of bad behaviour among the refugees. Refugees have caused riots in hostels, expressed in violent forms their dislike of England and the English, and refused to work, it is claimed.

Yet much of this criticism seems to be based on very flimsy evidence, and in any case the number of incidents is extremely small in comparison with the number of refugees in this country. Having worked for over three months with Hungarians I would not hesitate to say that the vast majority are extremely grateful for what is being done for them. They are also extremely honest, as the warden of one large hostel at Wapping pointed out to me recently. Yet some reports have suggested that the contrary is the case. What few incidents there have been may largely be put down to boredom. In several hostels the refugees have had nothing to do since November and the rate of employment is still painfully slow.

Another factor which does not seem to be widely appreciated is the extent of A.V.H. or secret police infiltration among the various camps. It is now certain that several secret police agents have penetrated into nearly every camp as bona-fide refugees. Their methods of causing unrest are extremely insidious. By plaguing officials with complaints, by writing lists of names to Communist authorities in Hungary and by giving false information about working conditions in this country they seem, unfortunately, to be able to cause trouble of far greater significance than their numbers. These methods are of course familiar to many in this country. The sending of refugees' names to Hungary does very easily allow pressure to be brought on the refugees through relatives still in that country and already about 20 refugees have returned home.

Yet another factor to be considered before condemning the refugees for ingratitude is that there are also some convicted criminals among them. When the political prisoners were liberated in the few days of freedom, genuine criminals were also freed. Doubtless the instincts of the latter were to escape before they could be recaptured by civilian police.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that due to the inept policy of certain instruments of western propaganda many of the Hungarians felt certain that either the western Powers or at least the United Nations would come to their aid. As one young Hungarian housewife remarked to me through an interpreter: "We felt that we had been sold down the river." Surely we have not become so complacent about our own moral standards that we turn our backs on those in distress because they do not all meet our own codes of behaviour?

Yours faithfully,

DESMOND WETTERN, Press officer,
Hungarian Relief Fund.

8, Cumberland House, Kensington High
Street, W.8.

will be tried with the so-called Angyal group when the present trial is over. He is accused of having prepared pamphlets against the Russians and the regime of Premier Janos Kadar.

The Kadar regime is trying to rally intellectual support. It has sought to induce those writers who fled to Yugoslavia and Austria to return. These efforts are facilitated by the fact that they cannot get to the United States unless they plead that they became Communists only as a result of political or economic pressure.

Red Rulers Tighten Grasp on Hungary

By Frederick Brook

Special Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

Hungary's Stalinist - Communist Government has removed the last doubt of an early end of Soviet occupation and has made it plain that it intends to stay in power, relying on the support of Soviet tanks and troops.

Only six weeks ago Communists in Hungary were encouraging speculation that a Soviet withdrawal might follow the formation of a more broadly based government in spring.

Red Star Hoisted

Had the statement of "no retreat from the Stalin line," which Minister of State Georgy Marosan made Feb. 16, been made at that time, it might well have led to another flare-up. Yet now it has been swallowed in silence. This is partly because the patriots have learned the futility of armed resistance and partly because Premier Janos Kadar's regime anyway has got things in hand for the moment.

These unpalatable facts must be faced in the West. All the clocks in Budapest now are rapidly being put back to 1956 time and it is difficult to see what forces inside or outside Hungary can stop the process.

The first grim sign of this new Soviet era in Hungary was noted last week at the Danube industrial center of Komarom in Western Hungary. A huge red star allegedly made by the workers was hoisted onto the roof of a factory in town. It was the first of all the hundreds of red stars torn down from Hungarian factories last October to be formally replaced. It will not be the last.

Furthermore, the Communists now have ordered the restoration by April 4 of all memorials to the Soviet Army which were destroyed during the October revolution as spontaneous expressions of the Hungarian people's universal anti-Russian feeling.

The regime had to remind the nation that Feb. 13 was the 12th anniversary of the entry of Soviet troops into Budapest in 1945. The people were asked to believe that in 1956, as at the end of World War II, Soviet soldiers fought in the streets of Budapest for the cause of liberty.

Affront to Moscow

In the field of education the renewed wave of Sovietization has been expressed in a recent order that the Russian language must again be adopted as a compulsory subject in all schools. Only at the universities will Western languages be allowed as alternatives.

The explanation given for this retrograde step was the lack of teachers and textbooks. The real reason is that the lifting of compulsory Russian instruction during the brief patriot triumph last fall was an open affront to Moscow which the Kremlin has de-

termined to redress at the earliest possible moment.

Economically Hungary is being tied again to the hammer and sickle of the Eastern bloc. The main bond is a fresh \$24,000,000 Soviet reconstruction loan, the terms of which now are being negotiated. This renewed economic dependence on Moscow became virtually inevitable after the Western powers rejected all feelers for financial aid put out in recent weeks by the Kadar regime.

New Army Readied

On the internal economic front, too, the old policies of the Stalin era are returning. Radio Budapest has announced that more than 500 of the collective farms dissolved during the revolution now have been set up again.

In the factories, the Workers Councils, which were once the main organs of patriot resistance, are being steadily pressed against the wall or else allotted unpopular tasks in a deliberate effort to drive a wedge between them and the workers.

Finally, on the all-important military front, the formation of a completely new Hungarian Army has been started. On Feb. 19 the government announced the formation of an armed "workers' guard" of undisclosed size to make sure that labor follows orders and to prevent strikes.

[The Associated Press quoted the government announcement as saying that the workers' guard's mission would be "to defend the achievements of socialism, to guarantee the maintenance of unhindered calm among the working people and also smooth production, and to prevent the efforts of counterrevolutionary elements to regain power and, in pursuit of these ends, to support the armed forces."

[The announcement said the guardsmen would be volunteers over 18 "drawn from people loyal to socialism." They will get no additional pay.]

Chicago Tribune
FEB 20 1957

Report Hungary to Let Churches Channel Relief

GENEVA, Switzerland, Feb. 19. (Reuters)—The Lutheran World Federation disclosed here today the Hungarian government had given permission for church organizations in the West to sponsor their own relief programs inside Hungary. Until now, the Hungarian government had insisted that the international committee of the Red Cross was the only acceptable channel for relief goods.

Washington Post

FEB 21 1957

Refugee Loads Seen on Austria

By Warren Unna
Staff Reporter

he chief of the Quaker relief mission in Austria was Washington yesterday warn that resettling Hungarians still very much of a problem particularly for the Austrians.

At least 70,000 Hungarians still in Austria and the Hungarian food crisis may well require another 100,000 or 200,000 spring or early summer. It is a tremendous expense with the main burden still on the Austrian government. And there are signs of rapid deterioration of morale among refugees, particularly those in the camps," Edward H. Meyerding declared.

Meyerding, 37, former director of the American Civil Liberties Union chapter in Chicago, has just returned from two years of supervising clothing and feeding of 100,000 refugees seeking asylum in Austria.

He declared the United States effort for the Hungarians not only has not been enough so far, it also suffers from "great confusion."

This country first agreed to take in 5000 Hungarian refugees, then 21,300. More recently, the Administration decided to continue taking in refugees under temporary parole certificates. As of Monday a total of 26,593 Hungarians have now come to this country, 6356 of them under permanent immigration visas. Said Meyerding: "In Vienna officials are given quotas from time to time but they are never sure what the quotas are or if they are going to attain tomorrow. There have been reports that a quota of 5000 a month would be ad-

missible into the United States but the officials have never fully been informed of that.

"There are more than enough refugees amongst those who have relatives in the United States to fill the quotas. And those who don't have relatives are out of luck," he added.

Picking and Choosing

Meyerding noted that many inquiries, but particularly the United States, have been picky and choosing the refugees. He said Austria is likely to be filled with what is left: "the old, the sick and the undesirable."

Refugee workers in Austria are "very optimistic that progress would do something quickly" several months ago, Quaker leader reported. It now they all seem to be merely pessimistic.

Meyerding minimized charges by Chairman Francis Walter (D-Pa.) of the House Immigration Subcommittee that the first 6356 refugees

to arrive here, all with permanent resident visas, were the hard-core Communists who were first to flee Hungary.

Meyerding said some Communist officials did flee—but mainly to the East and closer to Russia. He added that Austria's "Inner Ministerium" (Ministry of the Interior), which long ago began investigating refugees as a basic national security problem, has effectively been weeding out what hard-core Communists there are among the refugees.

'They Know the Russians'

As for the bulk of refugees, Meyerding declared: "Nobody has to give them any lessons about the evils of communism and the glories of being free. These people will be good anti-Communist agents. They know the Russians. They have lived with them. They can teach us more than we can teach them."

Meyerding also noted that there was a definite relation between the large numbers of students and highly trained technicians among the refugees and the fact that the government, out of necessity had granted both groups access to western literature.

The Quaker leader also confirmed reports of anti-semitism among the refugees themselves. He said part of this was caused by the fact that some of the ruthless Hungarian Communist leaders were Jewish.

He said anti-semitism also had arisen in envy over the special dietary treatment and other services Jewish refugee officials had been able to render their own people.

Baltimore Sun
FEB 17 1957

5 Sentenced As Spies

Belgrade, Feb. 16 (AP)—A Yugoslav district court today sentenced five persons, two of them Italian citizens, to prison terms ranging from eighteen months to fifteen years on charges of spying for Italy.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

SWEDEN BLAMES SOVIET ON ENVOY

Rejects Note Laying Jailing
of Diplomat to Police

Special to The New York Times.

STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Feb. 20—Sweden told the Russians today that they could not disclaim responsibility for the abuses of the Stalinist regime by trying to shift the blame to their corrupt secret police.

A Foreign Office note said Sweden would continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the kidnapping and imprisonment in the Soviet Union of Raoul Wallenberg, Swedish diplomat, who disappeared from Budapest, Hungary, in 1945.

Until two weeks ago the Kremlin insisted for twelve years that Mr. Wallenberg was not and never had been in the Soviet Union. It accused the Swedish Foreign Office of using the Wallenberg case to defame the Soviet Government before world opinion.

Then on Feb. 6 came a brief note reporting the discovery of a single piece of evidence from which the Kremlin said "it ought to be concluded" that Mr. Wallenberg died of a heart attack in a Moscow prison July 17, 1947.

The Soviet note contended that the Foreign Ministry had been kept in ignorance of Mr. Wallenberg's imprisonment, death and cremation by its security police generally and particularly by Victor S. Abakumov, Minister for State Security, who was executed with Lavrenti P. Beria and others for what were called high crimes against the state.

In its reply today the Swedish Foreign Office said the Soviet Government could not escape responsibility for the autocratic actions of its secret police.

Either the Soviet Government had lied for twelve years in saying Mr. Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union or it had lied in saying it had made a thorough investigation before reaching this conclusion, the Swedish reply said.

The Foreign Office note stopped just short of saying the Kremlin knew of Mr. Wallenberg's imprisonment all the time. It said:

"The Soviet Government cannot, considering the numerous Swedish appeals while Wallenberg was confined in a Moscow prison, have been unable to obtain reliable information in the matter had they really undertaken the thorough investigations they have repeatedly assured the Swedish Government that they had made."

"If the Soviet security police was able to act in such an autocratic way as to make a diplomat of a neutral country a prisoner and keep him in a prison for two and a half years without reporting the case to the Soviet Government or the Foreign Ministry, this fact is not in itself a circumstance for which the Soviet Government can be held responsible."

The Swedish Government

London Times

FEB 14 1957

THE HUNGARIAN RISING

GEORGE MIKES: *The Hungarian Revolution*. 192pp. André Deutsch. 12s. 6d.
NOEL BARBER: *A Handful of Ashes*. 130pp. Allan Wingate. 12s. 6d.

Mr. George Mikes, a Hungarian by origin, but now a naturalized British subject, has attempted with remarkable competence to piece together all the events, both before and behind the scenes, that made up the victory and the disaster of the Hungarian revolution. He adds a short introduction to cover the period from the end of the first war to the outbreak of the revolution and a chapter of suggestions concerning the future, which many will think is so succinct as to have been hardly worth doing. In the middle of the book are illustrations which form one of the best collections (and one of the most gruesome) that have appeared of this episode.

Mr. Mikes's summary of the period from 1919 to 1955 shows Hungarian political life to be nasty, brutish, and short-sighted. But it also brings out how infinitely less intolerable, in spite of its oppression, was the oligarchic government of the period between the wars—and even during the last war—than the various governments and regimes that succeeded the Russian invasion.

It is well to be reminded of the personal histories of those whose names were brought up daily in the reports published during the revolution itself: Rakosi, Rajk, Kadar (the present Prime Minister), Gerö—who, according to Mr. Mikes, was the snake in the grass throughout—Imre Nagy, at first the hero, later the suspect, and then again, but too late, the upright man of the revolution, and Cardinal Mindszenty, not, it would seem, the most diplomatic of prelates.

One is left with some unanswered questions, for instance, how was it that during the first crucial days the revolution did not at once (as almost all revolutions nowadays do) seize the broadcasting station in Budapest? It is doubtful, however, whether it would have altered the outcome. Much more to the point is the story, pieced together by Mr. Mikes, for the authority of which he vouches, that the Russians, by their clumsiness in preventing Mr. Nagy from telling all the facts thereby undermined his prestige at a moment when he might have stopped the bloodshed and turned the Hungarian revolution into something similar to Mr. Gomulka's in Poland.

Mr. Mikes discusses what effect the Anglo-French attack on Suez might have had on the Soviet attitude to Hungary and comes to the conclusion that, had the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt been sent a month later, Hungary might well be a second Poland today. He ends on a chord of hope—perhaps over-optimistically. He also thinks that a solution for Central Europe might be found by the establishment, on the Austrian model, of a wide band of neutralized territory, even to the length of abolishing N.A.T.O. altogether. This is too big an issue to be dealt with here—or, indeed, in the short section he devotes to it. What is, however, perhaps most valuable in this book is the way in which it brings out that the Russian Communist system is founded on the lie—systematically, and without limit.

Mr. Barber's work is a piece of very personal reportage, altogether lighter in weight, full of conversation, and even a little romance; but his book too has some illustrations which make one shudder and bring home how brutal were the passions unleashed on either side.

It is difficult to believe that all further documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons, with the exception of the report mentioned in the Soviet Government memorandum, should have been completely obliterated."

London Times

FEB 14 1957

ISTANBUL. A group of 79 Hungarian refugees have arrived for permanent settle-

Hint Soviet Return Of 4 Million Poles

By KATHARINE CLARK

VIENNA, Feb. 19 (INS).—The Soviet Union may soon send 4,000,000 Poles back to their native land in an apparent move to disrupt Poland's economy.

Polish travelers reaching Vienna today reported the expected development and described the Soviet plan as a "diabolical attempt" to ruin the teetering Polish economy.

They claimed that under the guise of friendship and compliance with Polish wishes to regain her lost population, the Soviet plan was to "crum 4,000,000 people down our throats at one shot."

The probable returnees consist of prisoners from World War II, thousands used as semi-slave labor and Poles absorbed by Russia in the White Russia and Ukraine republics.

"Who in Poland would dare raise his voice against the return of our people?" the Polish sources said. "But what country in the world could absorb 4,000,000 pouring across the frontiers all at about the same time?"

The Poles said that if Russia did not think 4,000,000 was enough she could send back even more. When the Polish republic was reconstituted at war's end, Russia retained nearly 70,000 square miles of former Polish territory.

More than 12,000,000 Poles lived in the area, some of which formed part of White Russia and some a part of the western Ukraine.

Poland recently asked Soviet permission to send into the Soviet Union teams who would search for missing Poles and repatriate them. However, Poland expected little to be a gradual process and at any rate the Polish proposal was turned down.

"But," said the Polish travelers, "it must have given the Russians an idea. They will simply say it is not necessary for us to spend time and money with repatriation teams because they know who is Polish and will ship everyone back at once."

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

WITNESS DISPUTES U. S. REDS' 'BREAK'

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (AP).—The American Communists' supposed "break" with Moscow is a sham, a New York lawyer testified today.

He said he had attended the party's recent convention and found the Communists intent on "fooling the public."

Carl Rachlin, an official of the New York chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, was assigned by his organization to act as an "observer" at the convention in New York.

He told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee the meeting "was designed to create an atmosphere and machinery to return them [the Communists] to the American stream of life."

"The main concern of the Communist party," he testified, "is that they felt and feel their isolation from the rest of the United States."

Within the party, he said, "hardened" leaders are in a "real fight for power." But he said the party's objectives had not changed and all of its leaders had subscribed to traditional goals.

Party ranks are "decimated," he added, and a major membership drive is planned.

"There will be an extra special effort to infiltrate and take over Negro groups," he said.

Robert Morris subcommittee told of efforts to subvert a Polish delegate to the United Nations Children's Fund.

He said the Ludwig Rajchman, the delegate, "may in fact have been one of the Soviet superiors" in a Communist spy ring that operated in Washington.

Manchester Guardian

FEB 13 1957

POLAND NEEDS 70,000 MINERS

Past policy blamed

GENEVA, FEBRUARY 12.

Mr. Eugene Horster, director of the Polish Central Mining Administration, said today that there was a shortage of at least seventy thousand workers in the industry. This was partly due to the past policy of attracting workers from country districts to the cities to work in industries, some of which were completely unnecessary to the country's economy.

Another reason was the vast increase in the bureaucratic posts. In the Boleslav mine where he worked before the war there was an administration staff of 40, and the mine produced about 2,200 tons of coal a day. To-day production in the mine has doubled, but the administrative staff had risen to 250.—Reuter.

BULGARIANS SIGN ACCORD IN SOVIET

2 Nations Conclude Economic and Party Pacts Following New Red Bloc Pattern

By WILLIAM J. JORDEN

Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Feb. 20.—The Soviet Union continued today its program of strengthening the position of Communist governments that are loyal to it with an extension of new credits and aid to Bulgaria.

The two countries also concluded a long-range agreement for complementary agricultural development.

In a communique signed under glaring floodlights in a former Kremlin apartment of the Czars, the Soviet Union gave the Bulgarians a 200,000,000-ruble long-term loan (\$50,000,000 at the official rate) for the construction of fertilizer, lead and zinc factories. The Russians also promised to grant technical assistance in the construction of those plants.

Bulgaria as her contribution promised to continue to sell uranium ore to the Soviet Union at a "fair and mutual beneficial price." Profits from the sale are to go into improvement of Bulgarian uranium mines.

Other Clauses Listed

The two countries also agreed: To work out in time for signing in June or July an agreement for mutual trade during 1958 through 1960.

To sign in the near future an agreement concerning the repair and construction of ships for the same period.

Just a year ago the two countries signed an economic agreement in which the Soviet Union granted a credit of 300,000,000 rubles for the purchase here of tractors, harvesters and other agricultural machinery. Moscow also gave the Sofia Government a 70,000,000-ruble loan to pay

for technical assistance in the construction of two chemical fertilizer plants.

Today's economic accord was signed Premiers Nikolai A. Bulganin of the Soviet Union and Anton Yugov of Bulgaria. A joint statement by the Communist parties of the two countries was approved by Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet party secretary, and Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian Communist leader. While cameras recorded the scene, Mr. Zhivkov rose from his chair, grasped Mr. Khrushchev around the neck and kissed him.

Aides Smile Approvingly

Bulgarian and Soviet officials all smiled approvingly and shook hands with each other vigorously. It was precisely the kind of atmosphere of unity that the Communists have been seeking to present to the outside world for the last four months.

While the economic pact was being signed, Mr. Khrushchev stood behind Premier Bulganin and he was flanked by Mr. Zhivkov and Vukko Chervenkov. The latter, who was the Bulgarian leader toward the end of the Stalin era, appears to be moving back into a position of more open authority. At a huge friendship rally yesterday Mr. Chervenkov received longer and louder applause from the Soviet leaders and Government officials than any other member of the visiting Bulgarian delegation.

The plan for the complementary development of agriculture calls for the Soviet Union to concentrate on products like grain and cotton to supply Bulgaria's needs while the latter will devote her attention to fruits and vegetables, both fresh and processed. The hope is that by 1970 neither country will have to depend on any outside supplies of these products.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

SOBLES SEEK TO KILL MOST OF INDICTMENT

George Wolf, counsel for Jack and Myra Soble, who are accused of being spies for the Soviet Union, filed five motions in Federal Court yesterday. One asked for the dismissal of five of six counts in their indictment. Argument on the motions will be held on Monday.

In asking for dismissal of five counts, including the charge that carries a possible death penalty, Mr. Wolf said the language of the statute was vague and uncertain and violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Wolf also asked that the Government be directed to make available to the defense books and document seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He asked for a bill of particulars in an effort to identify unnamed conspirators.

In addition, Mr. Wolf wants further identifications of ten Russian nationals named as co-conspirators as well as a list of Government trial witnesses. Last, he asked for statements made to the F. B. I. by the Sobles and their co-defendant, Jacob Albam.

London Times

FEB 4 1957

POLAND ENDS RADIO JAMMING

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

All radio jamming stations in Poland have ceased to function and are rapidly being turned into radio communication services. It is revealed that 52 stations have been jamming foreign broadcasts, at a cost of nearly £3m. a year. M. Kozlowski, director-general of the Ministry of Communications, said over Warsaw radio that some of the stations, mostly short-wave, have already been handed over to the Navy to aid navigation; other transmitters will be used for industrial purposes or general broadcasting.

More Sun
EB 20 1957

N.Y.H.T.
FEB 20 1957

London Times
FEB 14 1957

Khrushchev Assails Tito's Communism

Slavs And Cohorts With Vile Red Label
As Cold War Gets Colder

By HOWARD NORTON
(Moscow Bureau of The Sun)

Moscow, Feb. 19.—The cold between Russia and Yugoslavia grew sharply colder today. The freeze was turned on by Khrushchev's top Communist party speech, Nikita S. Khrushchev, in a speech to Soviet and Bulgarian leaders in the Kremlin this evening.

Without naming names but making it clear whom he meant, Khrushchev branded Marshal Tito and his cohorts with the red label in the Communist vocabulary—"corrupted revisionists."

They "wear the clothes of revisionist-Leninists," he said, "but trying to split or violate the unity of the laboring class and the Socialist countries."

"Committing Treason" They are, in fact, committing treason against Marxism-Leninism to make the enemies of the working class happy," he thundered.

Then, to make sure no one would mistake the target of his attack, the Communist party leader told the assemblage that the Soviet Union intends to strengthen its unity with "Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Albania, Hungary and other countries. . . ."

He pointedly omitted from the list the only other Communist nation in the world, Yugoslavia.

The new anti-Tito attack also coincides with the publication of Pravda today of a detailed account of charges flung at Tito Enver Hoxha, head of the Communist party in Albania.

Praises Soviet Move Hoxha is quoted by the Communist party organ as accusing Yugoslav leadership "with taking an 'anti-Marxist attitude' and the Albanian party, state people.

The Albanian party chief accused the Soviet Union for trying to patch up its relations with Yugoslavia, and charged that the Yugoslavs perverted the effort for their own ends "abused the initiative of the Soviet Union."

Pravda reported that Hoxha said: "We were in accord with the Belgrade declaration [the 1955 declaration of rapprochement by Yugoslavia and Russia] we express our readiness to improve relations with Yugoslavia," Albanian leader added, ac-

Red Party's Soviet Ties Face Probe

Dennis Called
In Senate Quiz

By Don Irwin

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19.—An investigation aimed at determining the actual dimensions of the break with Moscow's party line voted last week at the closed convention of the Communist party of the United States will be launched tomorrow by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee.

As its first witness, the subcommittee has called Carl Rachlin, an unofficial observer from the American Civil Liberties Union who was permitted to attend the closed convention the Communist party held in New York. He will testify tomorrow morning.

Dennis to Testify

But the inquiry will be focused toward testimony expected from Eugene Dennis, Communist national committeeman and former general secretary of the American Communist party. After a series of negotiations between Robert Morris, chief subcommittee counsel, and John Abt and Joseph Forer, counsel for Dennis, the Communist leader has been summoned to testify Monday afternoon.

The Dennis appearance was arranged only after elaborate efforts to locate the Communist leader. When party sources in New York first said Dennis could not be located, Mr. Morris issued an alternate subpoena for John Gates, editor of "The Daily Worker," party organ, and another Communist national committeeman. Dennis was located soon thereafter at the Gates subpoena was withdrawn.

At the New York convention from which reporters were barred—Dennis was reported to have voted for a controversial resolution stating that the American Communist party "interprets" the "principles" of scientific socialism developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin." Interpretation of such Communist holy writ has hitherto come from Moscow.

Subcommittee sources said plans are to question Dennis and three other Communist officials for whom subpoenas have been issued on the extent of the American Communist party's existing ties to Moscow.

No one is quite sure what to expect from the Dennis appearance. He served ten months in Federal prison for contempt of Congress because he flouted a 1947 subpoena from the House Un-American Activities Committee. He was also cited for contempt because he acted as his own attorney in

MR. SHEPILOV PEEVES YUGOSLAVIA

AIM TO CAUSE RIFT
IN BELGRADE

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BELGRADE, Feb. 13

The references to Yugoslavia by the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Shepilov, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet, were pointedly omitted to-day from Belgrade's newspaper reports of the speech.

Only later to-night did a semi-official news agency comment upon Mr. Shepilov's remarks, which, though brief, were certainly not palatable to the Yugoslavs. Mr. Shepilov expressed his Government's interest in an improvement of relations between the two countries, but declared that this now depended principally on the Yugoslav leaders—presumably to curb what he described as manifestations of ill will and continued open attacks on the Soviet Union and some of the peoples' democracies by "some elements" in Yugoslavia.

According to to-night's comment, Mr. Shepilov's charges were unfounded and, regardless of any good intentions on the part of Russia, the speech did not contribute to an understanding nor to the principles upon which relations were supposed to have been re-established between the two countries.

DIFFERING IDEAS

Admittedly, the comment went on, differences existed both in internal ideas and practice and in foreign policy, but public discussion of them should not be detrimental to friendly relations.

The Yugoslavs, it is clear, see more in Mr. Shepilov's remarks than this. His reference to the hostility of "some elements" among the Yugoslavs seems to be aimed at members of the leadership who all along have been the particular targets of Kremlin attacks.

Among these Mr. Kardelj, the Vice-President, is believed to be the principal object of Soviet annoyance; and, although Mr. Shepilov's observations were, by Soviet standards, wrapped in polite language, the purpose was the same as on former occasions—to cause a rift in Belgrade.

Borba, in an editorial article to-night, says that Yugoslav views on the differences between the two sides remained and would remain unchanged. In other words, the article, which bore the stamp of the central committee's authority, appeared to tell the Russians that the Yugoslavs are not prepared to yield their own ideological viewpoint as the prerequisite or condition for good or advantageous relations in interstate affairs; and that being so, it seems that Mr. Shepilov's threat, or invitation, to Belgrade to make any next step towards conciliation has already been rejected here.

the Smith Act trials of top Communist leaders five years ago.

Released last year after serving forty months for conspiracy to teach overthrow of the government, Dennis was immediately rearrested for knowingly being a member of an organization dedicated to overthrow of the government. He is now free in \$5,000 bail on that charge.

London Times
FEB 14 1957

BERLIN.—An 81-year-old woman was shot by sentries at Potsdam, east Germany, when she approached a military camp and failed to hear their warnings.

FEB 19 1957

LIFE'S BETTER, BUT AGRICULTURE LOOKS SICK

Yugoslavs Aren't Buying Red Line

By CHARLES LUCEY

Stearns-Howard Staff Writer

BELGRADE, Feb. 19—

What's life like in Yugoslavia today?

Twelve years after the war this still is largely a backward, primitive country. But there's no question Marshal Tito has done much to yank it at least part way into the 20th century.

There's general agreement life is better than it was. Yet in a land where a factory worker gets only 25 cents an hour, a pair of shoes costs \$10 or \$12, a suit \$40 or \$50. A small electric refrigerator costs a whole year's pay.

A small vacuum cleaner represents two months' pay, a bicycle six weeks or more. Most such items are completely out of reach for Yugoslavs.

There's no real freedom of speech, press and religion as known in the Western democracies. The regime has a real hatred, for the Catholic Church and Tito regards the Vatican as a prime enemy.

News & News

American and English newspapers can be bought on Belgrade newsstands, but few Yugoslavs read them. Their own press hews closely to the Tito line. Newspapers here do print more news of the outside world than in Poland and Czechoslovakia, yet in terms of criticism of domestic affairs they seem more restricted than the Polish papers.

There seems, too, less herding of people to party meetings than in other satellite countries. The Communist Party has 600,000 members but party organs complain the membership is "stagnant."

Over a beer in a corner saloon a Serb can sound off, and a housewife in a queue buying bread may denounce the terribly high prices. But it's unwise for enemies of the regime to get out on a street corner and shout: "Down with Tito!"

The terror of a 2 a. m. police knock on the door is gone, and so, too, the mass arrests as in the first post-war years. But Yugoslavs are sharply conscious that the police are always in the background. There's still a system of internal passports, pictures included, for all Yugoslavs and it is regarded as unhealthy to wander far without them.

Fear Reprisals

Some people are still chary of spending too much time with foreigners. There always are stories of the peasant who talks against the government, having trouble getting fertilizer, and of the

Dictator Tito's trademark in the communist world is shooting for socialism in a different way. His name has gone into the dictionaries as descriptive of individual nationalism under Red rule. In the second of two dispatches, Charles Lucey tells what this means for the ordinary Yugoslav.

young son of an outspoken regime opponent failing to get into a university.

There are many signs of friendship for America. In every little Balkan village, people unearth a battered snapshot of an uncle in Brooklyn or Cleveland. And the smile on their faces testifies that that far-off place is still the land millions here would love to reach.

It must be conceded that Tito, with huge outside bounties from the United States and elsewhere, has done a pretty fair job of making over Yugoslavia industrially.

His boys have pulled some boners, but the direction has been right. Yugoslavia's post-war advance is near the top in Europe.

But in agriculture—and this was and is largely an agricultural country—the communist way looks sickly. The regime seems fully convinced now that compulsory collectivization is not the answer, that individual initiative is still a big factor in getting men to produce.

Talk of collectives is soporific today as the government stresses, instead, cooperative to aid the farmers in growing and marketing their crops. It is emphasized that 90 per cent of Yugoslav farm land is privately owned.

Urban Shift

As in most countries, the population shift is to the cities. But farm output hasn't kept up with the task of feeding bigger urban populations. Yugoslavia has roughly a million-ton deficit yearly in wheat, for which she must turn to the United States and Russia.

Tho the story is brighter in industry, you can still walk into a steel mill and find chickens and other domestic life wandering about.

Yugoslavia's economic gains have been made at a time when the United States was pumping huge aid into the country. Most of that early post-war UNRRA aid was ours, after all, and it ran nearly \$500 million. Year after year since, trying to help Tito survive, and often to offset devastating drought and floods here. The United States has poured out millions more to Yugoslavia, despite much congressional opposition.

Supply of military goods has been formidable from the

U. S., tho nobody talks figures, of course. And major assistance has come into Yugoslavia from France, England and thru private agencies and in technical assistance by various international agencies.

So Tito hasn't done it all with his own little pick and shovel. He still has terrific problems in trying to offset the nation's deficit in overseas trade—\$90 million in 1954; \$180 million in 1955.

S. Monitor
FEB 16 1957

Press Curbs Revived In Yugoslavia

By Eric Bourne
Special Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Belgrade

A reassertion of Communist Party control over the press is taking place in Yugoslavia.

So-called "publishing councils" are being appointed now—by outside political groups—to exercise policy supervision of editorial and interpretive content on domestic and foreign affairs in all daily newspapers and periodicals.

For several years newspapers here have enjoyed under the general "democratization" some degree of relative independence in the handling and presentation of the news, though nothing in the way of criticism of policy or the policy makers has been, nor would be, tolerated.

None the less, the effect has been a marked advance from the stereotyped conformity of the press of other Communist states. Yugoslavia's Communist press has given the news at least, and given it quite straight.

Vell Ripped Off by Press

The new move, however, appears largely to have been inspired by the way in which newspaper editors here and their foreign correspondents treated the events of last October-November in Hungary and the Middle East.

Whatever the reticence of the Yugoslav leaders, from President Tito downward, to take a public stand while the Hungarians still were grappling with Soviet tanks for their independence, there was little doubt where the sympathies of Yugoslavia's man in the street rested.

And Yugoslav reporters in Budapest throughout the fighting fanned those feelings by categorically refuting Soviet fables

Incentives

He must find a way to increase farm output—and here as in industry the experts say the answer can be found only in providing greater incentives for the people to work longer and harder.

Yet over all, for a country always poor and also smashed considerably by war, Tito has come far. Every day Belgrade newspapers tell of new plants opened, new power lines strung from the mountains, new lengths of canal built along the Danube to check floods and provide irrigation in times of drought.

It's quite a bootstrap operation—but after 12 years of Tito, observers say the Yugoslavs as a people still haven't bought communism.

or 'counterrevolution' and 'Western intervention.' They declared boldly that the revolution was a nationwide uprising against the tyranny of Soviet occupiers and their puppets. They were attacked themselves by the Soviet press for their factual reporting.

Against the background of Yugoslavia's own newly ruffled relations with the Kremlin, much of this, obviously, went too far for the convenience of those responsible for top policy planning.

Jolted Policy Makers

To a lesser extent, it is being said, there was also uneasiness about the lengths to which unbridled criticism of Britain and France over Suez was given free rein in the party press, while, editorially, the papers became more and more silent over Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Subsequently, government circles showed signs of being concerned lest permanent damage might not have been done by this torrent of abuse to the still apparently valued friendship of and association with the West as a whole.

At a recent meeting, an important party committee lauded the prompt, initial pro-Egyptian reaction of the press to Suez. But, over Hungary, it said, there were "differences of view," "misconceptions," and "misunderstanding, and all this it blamed on the lack of clarity and line presented by the press.

Still more recently, the question was reviewed by the top leaders of the Socialist Alliance, the ostensibly nationwide front movement, which, of course, is controlled by the party. The decision to appoint "publishing councils" to hold newspapers more firmly to party policy lines was the outcome.

Pulled Into Line

At this meeting, the Yugoslav newspapers were accused of failing to make proper use of various public relations departments set up to help them with information and guidance, particularly in matters of comment and interpretation.

The Yugoslavs hotly deny that the new councils will "interfere" in an editor's conduct

C. S. Monitor

FEB 16 1957

Societs Boast 'Progress'**Estonian Poverty Disclosed**

By the Associated Press

New York

of his newspaper or that they are being set up to do more than insure him the best possible information and guidance in its presentation for the public weal.

They say the councils also will be responsible for "elevation" of the standards of journalism and training of newsmen. This might even be so and, if some of the personalities already elected to the new councils have the time and are able to exert their influence, better written newspapers might well emerge from their advice.

But, and here's the rub, the political priorities implicit in their appointment are evident. According to Borba, official party newspaper which always has had its special Central Committee guidance machinery behind it, the councils will devote particular attention to the "development of newsmen as politically responsible persons."

Party Chiefs on Councils

"The most important role in this," the newspaper added, "should be played by the publishing councils through which the Socialist Alliance can best exert its influence on the press."

The point is further underscored by the personnel so far nominated to councils in various newspaper offices.

Politika, for example, which is Belgrade's second daily newspaper (though its circulation is higher than Borba's) and the one which hitherto has shown the most lively trends toward some independent treatment of

The average worker in Soviet Estonia with a wife and two children gets far too little pay to provide even an adequate diet for his family.

This conclusion can be reached easily by analysis of an article comparing standards of living of Estonian workers now with those prevailing before the Soviet annexation of that formerly independent little Baltic country in 1940.

The article, in the Communist Party magazine *Kommunist*, purports to show that things are a lot better now than they were when Estonia was free.

What it actually shows is that life in Estonia is one long struggle to get enough to eat.

Here's the essence one can get

The news, has a council of eight.

Four are members of the party's Central Committee — among them Srdjan Prica, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Two others hold highly responsible posts in government and party administration. The seventh and eighth are Borba's editor and director.

from the article:

The average monthly pay in Soviet Estonia, including that of highly paid top executives, was 823 rubles before deductions. Direct income tax deductions out of 823 rubles come to about 74 rubles per month.

The author does not mention another important deduction from gross pay—state bonds sold in the annual compulsory bond sale drive. The bonds are not negotiable so the worker can get nothing back on them without waiting for many years. For them he has to put up three weeks' to a month's pay. At three weeks' pay this would amount to a deduction of 40 rubles per month.

This would leave him a take home pay of 700 rubles per month. His rent, electricity, and firewood for heating, the Soviet author estimates, amount to 54 rubles per month.

This would then leave 646 rubles to provide for all other family needs except medical care, which is generally available without charge.

Food cost for the family can be estimated on the basis of a table printed in the *Kommunist* article outlining a "worker's ration" described by a prewar Estonian expert in 1926. This ration provides fair variety by Estonian standards and some 3,500 calories per day—a figure adequate for an average worker on the basis of generally recognized international nutritional standards.

The Soviet author gives as the cost for such a typical ration as 7.87 rubles a day per person. He then qualifies this figure to explain that since not all the listed foods can be purchased in state stores, an allowance must be made for higher open market food prices. The total cost likely would be 870 rubles a month for the family of four. This compares with the 646 rubles available.

Thus anything the average Estonian city dweller finds he must spend on all his other needs — including clothing, transportation, amusements, and necessary consumer goods — must come out of the insufficient food allowance of himself and his family.

Wash. Evening Star
FEB 18 1957



Cornerstone of Soviet Foreign Policy

FEB 21 1957

Malyshev, Soviet Leader Treated 'Secretly' by Specialist, Dies at 54

Deputy Chairman of State Economic Unit Had Headed Top Industrial Ministries

SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES.
MOSCOW, Feb. 20—Vlacheslav A. Malyshev, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Union's powerful State Economic Commission and one of the country's outstanding industrial directors, died tonight of leukemia. His age was 54.

Mr. Malyshev was the so-called "mystery patient" treated early this month by Dr. Hans Shulten, West German blood specialist. The name of the patient was not disclosed even to the German physician.

During his career Mr. Malyshev had headed some of the most important Soviet industrial and technical ministries. At the December meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee he was selected as one of six top executives to help Mikhail G. Pervukhin reorganize the work of the State Economic Commission. This long-term planning commission is to play a key role in the new Soviet program to revise this country's industrial system with emphasis on decentralization of actual management with tighter central supervision.

Served in Soviet Army

During World War II Mr. Malyshev had been a lieutenant general in the Soviet Army, but it was believed that his assignments concerned transport and supply rather than military tasks. He was believed to have had a role in the Soviet Union's elaborate atomic energy development plans and some circles identified him as one-time chief of the Central Atomic Agency.

Until his promotion to the State Economic Commission, Mr. Malyshev had headed the State Committee on New Techniques. That group's function is to encourage new technical developments, gather information on such developments abroad and introduce them into Soviet industry, agriculture and other fields.

Mr. Malyshev had directed such ministries as Transport, Engineering, Shipping, Heavy Machine Building, Light Machine Building and Medium Machinery. He had been appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1953, but was relieved in December, when he became one of Mr. Pervukhin's top assistants.

On his fiftieth birthday, Mr. Malyshev received the Order of Lenin. He will receive a state funeral with all honors.

Archtypal Executive

A plain-faced, balding former locomotive mechanic, Mr. Malyshev was the archetype of the kind of driving Soviet industrial executive produced by the Stalin era.

He had three big jobs in the course of a varied career in the heavy industrial field. He was boss of Soviet tank production in World War II. He directed the development of Soviet naval construction after the war. And following the arrest of Lavrenti P.

Beria at the end of June, 1953, he was placed in charge of Soviet nuclear energy and weapons development.

Mr. Malyshev was in the second rank of Soviet leadership—the level of the top administrators, just below the level of the political leadership that, under Stalin, was concentrated in the Politburo of the Communist party and which is now centered in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party.

As was typical with the second-rank executives of the Soviet regime, little was known of Mr. Malyshev's personal life outside the bare bones of his career. Like most of his fellow Soviet bosses he devoted his time and energies exclusively to the interests of the state.

He was born on Dec. 16, 1902, in the remote town of Ust-Syolsk, now Syktyvkar, 625 miles northeast of Moscow. The settlement was originally founded as a place of exile by Catherine II.

Mr. Malyshev's father was a schoolteacher. The son went to the local schools and toward the end of the Civil War and intervention period after the Bolshevik revolution he went to work as a railroad mechanic.

Joined Party in 1926

Able and ambitious, Mr. Malyshev studied his craft in railroad technical schools, became a skilled mechanic in the shops of the Moscow-Belorussian railroad, and for a time was a locomotive engineer on the Stalin-grad line. He had become a member of the Communist party in 1926 and with party encouragement entered the Moscow Institute of Mechanics and Machine Building, graduating in 1934.

After this, Mr. Malyshev began to rise rapidly. He became director of an important machine shop at Kolumna on the outskirts of Moscow and when a big shake-up of the Soviet heavy industries was carried out in February, 1939, he was made People's Commissar of Heavy Machine Construction.

On a number of occasions, Mr. Malyshev conferred with foreign technical delegations. Only last summer he headed a Soviet industrial purchasing mission to England.

FEB 21 1957

Durable Polish Premier

Jozef Cyrankiewicz

WHEN Polish farmers near Warsaw see a Mercedes car speeding along they know it is their Premier indulging in his favorite relaxation. For Jozef Cyrankiewicz an hour or two behind the wheel is a release from tension and great fun.

The Polish leader comes by his hobby naturally. His elderly mother says she was the first woman to drive an automobile in Cracow, a somewhat startling act almost half a century ago for the distaff side of the then conservative and soberly bourgeois Cyrankiewicz family.

Premier Cyrankiewicz, who was re-elected yesterday, has been head of the Polish Government since 1947, both in the Stalin and Gomulka eras.

Along with Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Communist party leader, he has been one of the chief architects of the peaceful revolution that has transformed Poland into one of the freest Communist-ruled states.

In the process M. Cyrankiewicz has had to stand up against Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Communist leader, and against Polish Stalinists who would like to see a return to the days when Poland was a Soviet satellite and there was no nonsense about "independence" or "sovereignty."

An Imposing Figure

Ruddy complexioned and bald, M. Cyrankiewicz, whose name is pronounced tsee-ran-KEE-vich, is six feet tall and weighs 200 pounds. He makes an imposing figure when, as he speaks in Parliament or at a political meeting, his deep, warm, resonant voice roars out in a witty speech.

He is alone among the Polish leaders in displaying anything resembling a Westerner's conception of politicking. He walks easily among crowds and talks just as easily on street as in party caucuses.

Polish women argue whether their Premier is handsome, but Polish men agree that the Premier's wife, Nina Andrycz, is one of the most beautiful women in the country.

Mrs. Cyrankiewicz, an actress, is appearing on the Warsaw stage in the little role of George Bernard Shaw's "Saint Joan." The couple are childless.

Born in 1911, the son of a construction engineer, the Premier initially studied law in Cracow and became a member of the Socialist movement in 1930. He continued as a Socialist organizer until the Nazi invasion of Poland, when he fought the brief war as an artillery officer.

Captured by the Germans, he escaped twenty-four hours later and went into the underground for two years until the Gestapo caught him and imprisoned him in Oswiecim, where he stayed until near the war's end. Liberated from the Mauthausen prison by United States troops in 1945, he returned to Poland and became Secretary General of the Polish Socialist party.

Foes Call Him Opportunists

M. Cyrankiewicz's detractors describe him as opportunistic, blaming him for leading the Social party into a suicidal merger with the Communists after the war. In fact there was no choice.

During the years of terror that followed, M. Cyrankiewicz was Premier, but his job was no more than a facade for the Communists who ruled. He is one of the less discredited leaders because he took no active part in the terror and is generally credited with having tried to do what little he could to ameliorate the situation.

In his many years in office, he made only one serious mistake. That was his speech on the first night of the Poznan riots. He accused Western agents as the instigators and threatened to cut off the hand of anyone seeking to destroy the peoples' power in Poland.

These phrases were thrown back at him at many election meetings. Premier Cyrankiewicz does not try to disclaim them. He acknowledged his error and went back to baby-kissing, shaking hands, reassuring workers and cementing the relationship he has always had with intellectuals, who consider him their spokesman within the party's politburo.

Manchester Guardian

FEB 13 1957

"PEN" THAT FIRES .22 OR TEAR GAS

From behind Iron Curtain

A weapon firing .22 ammunition or a tear gas cartridge, and camouflaged as a ball point pen, which writes, was confiscated yesterday by Bolton police. The "pen" was owned by Mr. Bernard M. Woolley, a Bolton showman, and he states that it was smuggled from behind the Iron Curtain by a circus artist. At 20ft. the "pen" would blind a person if tear gas were used or kill or wound if used with ammunition.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

FEB 19 1957

DRUMMOND

Awakening Satellites Worry Reds

Writers Question Marx Line About Evils of Capitalism.

By ROSCOE DRUMMOND
WASHINGTON.

WHAT is worrying the Kremlin, among other worries, is that many satellite Communists in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere are beginning to demand and to get from their own intellectuals some of the facts about what life is like in a western capitalist country. They are asking the most disturbing questions.

What do you figure a dedicated, reasonably independent minded Marxist really thinks when he starts to open his mind and to get a first hand view of how workers fare under capitalism?

The best answer is contained in an engrossing article published recently in *Po Prostu* (Straightforwardly), a Polish weekly newspaper founded in 1954 by a group of young Communists. After it quit being a party organ, its circulation went from 10,000 to 100,000 and is recognized today as one of the most intelligent courageous and non-conformist Polish newspapers.

Embarrassing Questions.

One of its special writers made a journey to Austria and Switzerland and he simply refused to dismiss with the casual Marxist dialectics what he saw with his own eyes. He was profoundly impressed by the "prosperity of capitalist Europe as compared with the people's democracies."

He concluded that an Iron Curtain Communist's "knowledge of modern capitalism is ridiculously insignificant."

"How did it happen," he asked in his article, "that, in spite of all (Marxist) expectations, the capitalist countries were able to avoid an economic crisis?"

"How is it," he asked, "that the standard of life and tempo with which it develops is higher than in Poland?"

Here is a sincere Marxist who after seeing some of western Europe for himself, is, from the standpoint of the party line, asking all the wrong questions and is certain that official Communist answers simply aren't good enough.

"It is very important," he wrote, "to reconsider our thesis about the position of the working classes in the capitalist system, about the pauperization of the working aristocracy... the heedless, simplified, ignorant opinions we have formed."

Chicago Daily Tribune
Wednesday, February 20, 1957

SEEK MILLIONS CONFISCATED IN RED COUNTRIES

Claims Date Back to World War I

Claims seeking hundreds of millions of dollars have been filed by American companies against soviet Russia and three satellite nations for the recovery of assets lost behind the iron curtain. Some suits date back to World War I.

New Point of View.

He declares that Marxists must look at the truth about capitalism for these reasons:

"Because the standard of life of the working classes has become, not lower, but higher in the course of the last 10 years in the capitalist states. The thesis about pauperization of the working classes cannot be defended by means of any statistical tricks.

"Because it is a substantial part of the working classes, and not a minority, which is being well paid.

"Because the role of the state in the non-socialist (capitalist) world is one we know very little about... We still cherish a secret conviction that the state plays an important economic function only in our system."

One of the most candid aspects of this article is in repudiation of the old canny and epithets which the Communists hurled at the Marshall plan in trying to thwart it. They called it "economic farce," the "colonization of western Europe" and worse.

"It was our unpardonable mistake at the time," this honest Marxist now writes, "to jump to the conclusion that this operation would directly strike at the well-being of the masses and cause their economic ruin just because it was initiated by the capitalists. Such statements are contrary to the truth."

What He Would Do.

What, then, would this Marxist have Marxism do? His answer in *Po Prostu* is:

"We will not achieve success in peaceful competition, we will not convince the masses in capitalist countries of our superiority and lastly we will not satisfy our own community, if the higher tempo of production is not followed by a higher standard of living, industrial modernization, better housing conditions and better organization of work."

But there is another answer and Marxists as honest as this writer may find it—That Western capitalism can do the whole job better, with freedom, too.

Largest of the claims filed with the foreign claims settlement commission—an independent federal government agency—are those of the Singer Manufacturing company amounting to \$100,096,389, and Standard Oil company [New Jersey] totaling \$97,432,206.

Other organizations which have filed claims are Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing company, Eastman Kodak company, First National City Bank of New York, Ford Motor company, International Telephone and Telegraph, Standard-Vacuum Oil company, and Socony-Mobil Oil company.

Harvester Claim

Chicago's International Harvester company has a claim seeking \$41,424,571 for the recovery of assets seized shortly after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.

Harvester then owned a manufacturing plant at Lubertzy, 25 miles from Moscow, where it maintained executive offices, Wholesale branch offices were located in 11 other Russian cities.

Harvester, in its claim, said: "The loss of the property was the direct result of a policy adopted by the Soviets that no property was to be recognized."

"In pursuance of that policy the government itself participated in the looting of private investments by seizure of properties by a process known as 'nationalizing industry' which combined confiscation of physical assets with repudiation of debts.

"There can be no doubt that all our assets in Russia are now in the hands of the Soviets and are presently being operated as their exclusive property."

The Lubertzy plant, purchased by Harvester in 1909, employed 2,000 workers and produced 60,000 pieces of farm equipment annually.

The claims commission also is authorized to handle suits against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Funds for the payment of claims, in the case of the three satellites, are derived from blocked assets of the three countries totaling 34 million dollars.

Deadline Is Expired

Claims against soviet Russia are to be paid from presently liquidated assets of Russian nationals amounting to \$9,100,000.

The commission said that the time for filing claims against the four communist countries has expired and there is no procedure whereby an American company can file a claim for losses behind the iron curtain.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

MOSCOW-BELGRADE RIFT

In his Moscow speech this week Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced "those who style themselves Marxists, Leninists, but who in reality seek to revise Marxism-Leninism at the bidding of the traitors to the working class and fawn on the imperialists." If there were any doubt about what he meant by this it was dispelled by the tempestuous applause his audience gave to his mention of Vuklo Chervenkov, the man who was Bulgaria's little Stalin and who has probably been the most bitter opponent of Marshal Tito of any leader still in power in Eastern Europe. A week earlier the renewed Soviet antipathy toward Yugoslavia was indicated in Dmitry Shepilov's final speech as Foreign Minister, when he accused Yugoslavia's leaders of counter-manning "manifestations of ill will and even open attacks against the U. S. S. R. and a number of the people's democracies."

Thus the present situation begins to resemble that which existed when Stalin died. One cannot say that the Soviet leaders did not go far in trying to repair Stalin's errors against Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's public apology in May, 1955, and the hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet economic aid offered Yugoslavia were but two steps in the massive effort to bring Yugoslavia back into Moscow's camp. Now Khrushchev's latest words would seem close to signifying return to the period of open hostility.

The central issue on which the Soviet courtship of Yugoslavia foundered is clear. It was the issue of actual independence for Communist parties. The Yugoslavs were promised this in the agreement Marshal Tito reached in Moscow last June. But the consequences of such independence proved bitter indeed for the Kremlin when they became clear in Poland and Hungary, and when Tito exercised independence of judgment in his Pula speech last November and expressed his own view of what had happened in Hungary, the Kremlin found such "impudence" intolerable. The moral is clear enough: Moscow wants satellites, not equal allies or truly sovereign friends.

CHANGES AT THE TOP IN MOSCOW

Shepilov's return to party secretaryship

REPLACED BY GROMYKO

BY VICTOR ZORZA

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov, has been appointed one of the several secretaries of the Soviet Communist party under the First Secretary, Mr Khrushchev. The First Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, has taken over the post to which Mr Shepilov was appointed last July on the resignation of Mr Molotov.

Because the changes are at the Foreign Ministry, and because Mr Shepilov has been closely associated with Mr Khrushchev, the reason for the new appointments might appear at first sight a defeat for Mr Khrushchev. It was he who was largely responsible for the rapprochement with Yugoslavia which led some of the satellite leaders to believe that they could follow something like Yugoslavia's policy. He also made the now famous "secret" speech at the Moscow party congress a year ago, the consequences of which further weakened Soviet control over the satellites.

Mr Shepilov was the man who, at Foreign Ministry level, carried out the foreign policy—or tried to clear up the mess—which Mr Khrushchev made at the highest party level. Also the appointment of Mr Gromyko, who has long been associated with Mr Molotov, might look like a victory for the Molotov group, which is generally regarded as more Stalinist and anti-Khrushchevian—even though Mr Khrushchev has more recently rediscovered in Stalin some merits which he ignored when he made his "secret" speech.

Ideological task

But to view these changes only from the Foreign Ministry angle would be misleading, for Mr Shepilov's new post as a party secretary can, in the circumstances, be even more important than that of Foreign Minister. Mr Shepilov first became a party secretary in July, 1955, a post which he must have relinquished on his appointment as Foreign Minister in June last year. His departure from the party post was formally announced only in December, for this was the first occasion on which the party's Central Committee had met since the change was made.

But it is clear from this that the decision that he should leave the Foreign Ministry and return to party work can hardly even have been contemplated as recently as December. Therefore, up to that time, such Soviet foreign policy failures as might be attributable directly to the actions of Khrushchev and Shepilov do not seem to have affected the latter's position at the Foreign Ministry.

Since December Soviet foreign policy has suffered no major reverse—if anything, the stabilisation of the situation in Poland can be accounted a success for the Russians—and Mr Shepilov's confident speech in the Supreme Soviet on Tuesday does not suggest that he was a man about to be demoted. His return to the post of party secretary, to work under Mr Khrushchev, can there-

fore hardly be regarded as a blow at either appearances notwithstanding. Indeed, it is far more likely that Mr Shepilov has been recalled to undertake one of the most important jobs now going in Russia—that of giving a more coherent shape to Soviet ideology, which has been badly shaken of late, and more important still, of making the Soviet intelligentsia accept the ideological restraints under which it has been operating recently.

Shepilov's experience

There have been signs that, as in Poland, the Khrushchev speech, or rather its consequences, are provoking a delayed reaction among the intelligentsia. Unless this can be controlled and directed into the channels desired by the party leadership, there is no telling how far the intellectual reaction may go. Poland and Hungary are not lessons that the Soviet leadership is likely to ignore. That is why it may be said with full justification that the task of reconciling the intelligentsia to the party line may be one of the most important in Russia to-day. And, by reason of his past experience, Mr Shepilov is the best man for the job.

In the thirties Mr Shepilov was first a student at the Institute of Red Professors and later a teacher of political economy, reaching the rank of professor in 1938, when he was 33 years old. During his career he has held such varied posts as head of the political department of a State farm, at the very bottom of the ladder, and at the very top as head of Agitprop, the party's agitation and propaganda department, in 1948. It is this department of the Central Committee that lays down the ideological line and sees to it that it is understood and adhered to.

In 1949 Shepilov fell foul of Stalin by allowing the party's ideological organ "Bolshevik" (since renamed "Kommunist") to publish an article praising the book on Soviet economy by Voznes-

sensky, for whom Stalin conceived a dislike as soon as it appeared that the book contained original thoughts not previously expressed by the dictator. Voznesensky was shot, and Shepilov retired to the Institute of Philosophy until the storm blew over.

Such was the man's resilience, however, that he soon re-emerged as an inspector of the party's Central Committee, became editor of "Pravda" and, at the last party congress presided over

by Stalin, in 1952, a full member of the Central Committee. He now becomes a party secretary at a time when not only a strong hand but also a persuasive manner is needed. The country's intellectuals will no longer respond to dictation by the party leadership. Thought-control must be more subtle, and Mr Molotov, who exercised it recently on the party's behalf, is hardly a subtle man.

A "Khrushchev" man

The Central Committee meeting which called Mr Shepilov back to party work also elected a new candidate member of the Praesidium in the person of Mr P. R. Kozlov, the First Secretary of the party in the province of Leningrad. Mr Kozlov is a "Khrushchev" man, for he was appointed to his Leningrad post at a meeting in September, 1953, which dismissed a "Malenkov man," Andriyev, and which was presided over by Mr Khrushchev. In February last year Mr Khrushchev had him appointed to the party bureau for the Russian Republic, of which he himself is head, and now he has pulled him up higher still. This does not look very much like a defeat for Mr Khrushchev.

No doubt the fact that Mr Shepilov will no longer be at the Foreign Ministry will make it more difficult to conduct a "personal" foreign policy through an intimate friend and dependant at that Ministry. Although the policy is laid down by the party leadership collectively, a chat over a bottle of vodka—or perhaps by the steaming samovar—could have helped Mr Khrushchev to convince his friend Shepilov that things should be done the Khrushchev way.

Mr Gromyko, whether he drinks vodka or tea, is far more likely to have the civil service mentality, by reason of his past career and inclination, and will hardly conduct a "personal" foreign policy for any one. He will be, like Mr Vyshinsky was, the faithful servant of whoever gives the orders—and in the Soviet Union to-day it seems the orders are given by the "collective leadership."

London Times
FEB 14 1957

NO RUSSIAN ORCHESTRA FOR EDINBURGH

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT
EDINBURGH, FEB. 13

The statement in Moscow yesterday by the Soviet Minister of Culture, Mr. Nikolai Mikhaïlov, that the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra was ready to take part in the Edinburgh International Festival drew from Mr. Robert Ponsbury, artistic director to the Festival Society, the comment that this year's programme had now been arranged and the orchestra could not be given a place in it.

Mr. Ponsbury recalled the fact that after Russian intervention in Hungary the society broke off negotiations for the orchestra to take part in this year's festival. Although it was not impossible that the invitation would be repeated in the future, Mr. Ponsbury said he would not like to say when.

The Royal Ballet would be delighted to go to Moscow when a visit could be arranged according to Mr. David Webster, general administrator of Covent Garden, yesterday, in commenting on Mr. Mikhaïlov's statement on cultural relations with other countries.

"I am very pleased that Moscow has made this approach," said Mr. Webster. "When the time is ripe the company will be very delighted to go."

WESTERN EUROPE

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

Baltimore Sun
FEB 20 1957GERMANS LEAVE
AREAS IN POLANDMigration May Hurt Bonn's
Oder-Neisse ClaimsBy EDWARD C. BURKS
(German Bureau of The Sun)

Bonn, Feb. 19.—Quietly a great migration of Germans is under way which may gravely jeopardize Germany's future claim to those territories east of the Oder-Neisse line lost after World War II.

By the thousands Germans are now coming back from those Polish-controlled areas.

Sixteen thousand came last year following the conclusion of an agreement between the German Red Cross and the Polish Government.

The Poles have agreed to let an additional 60,000 to 70,000 return during the course of this year.

However, the Federal Refugee Ministry thinks this year's total of immigrants from the Oder-Neisse lands will amount to 90,000, since the Poles seem to be speeding the Germans on their way.

Others Apply

In addition to the 90,000 expected this year, approximately 160,000 more Germans in Poland have applied for permission to come to West Germany.

If this trend continues, the Oder-Neisse territories will have no Germans and thus for the first time in 1,000 years there will be no German settlements east of the Oder-Neisse line.

A look at the map of Europe shows the Oder-Neisse line is only about as far east as Prague. Vienna is considerably farther east than the Oder-Neisse line.

Germany, in short, is becoming more and more a Western nation geographically speaking. The Oder-Neisse line is about 300 miles to the west of the farthest eastern reaches of prewar Germany.

Helps Set Claim

The Federal German Government is by no means giving up its claims to the Oder-Neisse territories.

But the big movement to the west of the comparatively few Germans remaining there helps the Poles establish a claim to the territories.

An example is the city of Breslau, now known as Wroclaw. Before the war it had some 600,000 inhabitants and was the capital of German Silesia.

Now it has about 250,000 inhabitants and only about 5,000 of them are German.

The Oder-Neisse territories cover an area about the size of Virginia and constituted more than one fifth of the prewar German territory.

N.Y.H.T.
FEB 20 1957Strike Threatens
West in Germany

NUERNBERG, Germany, Feb. 19 (A.P.)—Western forces in Germany were threatened today with a strike by their 300,000 German employees.

Union leader Karl Kaula told a news conference he and his colleagues will meet tomorrow and Thursday to decide whether the employees should take a strike vote.

Germans in supply depots and heating and generating plants are demanding wage increases ranging from 8 to 10 per cent, plus job security guarantees.

Before the war about 10,000,000 Germans lived there.

At the end of the war Germans were expelled from these areas by the millions but some remained. The German estimate is that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Germans still are in these areas.

But now the big migration is under way in earnest. For a long time the Poles held up applications of those wishing to return but now the Poles seem to be expediting things.

It is believed the Poles want to replace the departing Germans with repatriated Poles coming back from Russia, especially from those eastern areas of Polish territory which were annexed by Russia after the war.

This migration comes at a time when some important voices in West Germany, such as Kurt Sieveking, Bundesrat President, are hopefully talking about the time when Germans can freely return to the Oder-Neisse territory.

But what excuse will they have if they all leave now?

Noted By Papers

Some German newspapers have taken note of this and are asking if the departure of the Germans won't seriously affect future attempts to regain the Oder-Neisse territories.

Germans, of course, will continue to claim these lands on the grounds they were settled by Germans many centuries ago.

And, of course, they can argue that most Germans were forcibly driven out after the war's end.

But the fact remains that a unique situation is developing. There have been innumerable territorial changes in European history but this is a case where a nation not only lost a huge piece of territory (one fifth of its total) but also saw the area

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957

2 Firms Fail Spy Trials
HELSINKI, Finland, Feb. 20 (Reuters)—Two Finns, a farmer and a shoemaker, will be tried for espionage shortly. It was announced today.

Baltimore Sun
FEB 20 1957

Missing Germans Sought

Bonn, Germany, Feb. 19 (A.P.)—West Germany's Red Cross leaders leave for Moscow tomorrow to ask Russian help in finding out what happened to a million German soldiers still missing from World War II. The investigators were invited by the Soviet Red Cross.

Chicago Tribune
FEB 20 1957Rising Prices Reduce
British Pound's Value

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

LONDON, Feb. 19.—Rising prices have slashed 52 cents off the value of the British pound (\$2.89) since October, 1951, the chancellor of the exchequer, Peter Thorneycroft, told the house of commons.

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957OLLENHAUER SAYS
NATO HAS FAILED

SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 20.—Erich Ollenauer, chairman of the West German Social Democratic party, said today that the present systems of military alliances in both the West and the East were failures.

He called instead for a new system of collective security in Europe. This would include a reunited Germany and would be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Herr Ollenauer said at a Commonwealth Club luncheon.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

NORSTAD RIDICULES
NOTION OF DEFEAT

Special to The New York Times.

UTRECHT, the Netherlands, Feb. 20.—Gen. Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, declared today that "nothing could be more ridiculous" than the notion that the Soviet Union could destroy the West by a surprise attack.

The NATO chief emphasized, however, that he was speaking "from the military standpoint."

His remarks were in an address before the Netherlands

RED UNION DEFEATS
CONTINUING IN ITALY

Special to The New York Times.

ROME, Feb. 20.—Communist-controlled labor unions are continuing to take a severe beating in the election of shop steward throughout northern Italy, where they once reigned supreme.

This year's results are the more remarkable because in 1956 the power of Communist-controlled unions had decreased considerably compared with 1955.

Therefore the Communist decline evidently is not because of events in Hungary but because of deeper causes.

In the Piaggio Works at Pontedera, which manufactures one of the best-known makes of motor scooters, Communist and anti-Communist unions ran neck and neck last year. This year the Communist vote declined by 27 per cent and the anti-Communist unions emerged firmly in control. At the Societa Metallurgica Italiana, an ironworks in Barga, the Communist vote dropped from 40 to 15 per cent of the total.

Both Pontedera and Barga are in Tuscany, one of the Red-tinged regions in Italy.

Another test of Communist strength will come next month when the vast Fiat industrial empire holds shop steward elections.

that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, representing the West, and the Warsaw Pact, of which the Soviet Union and its satellites are signatories, had not met the test posed by events in the Middle East and Hungary.

During a question period, Herr Ollenauer said there was no likelihood of armed revolt in East Germany in the near future.

HOUSTON, Texas, Feb. 20 (A.P.)—Dr. Kurt George Kiesinger, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Bundestag, lower house of the West German Parliament, said today that there was no evident prospect for a reunited Germany at present. He is one of the top advisers of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Public Relations Society. He appealed for greater appreciation in both the United States and Europe of the need for unity and for understanding of the interdependence of the two continents in defense.

"The will to act in concert is the great weapon in our arsenal," he asserted.

The general had been in the Netherlands since Tuesday for talks with Dutch defense officials and a tour of military installations. He returned to Shape headquarters in Paris this afternoon after having lunch with Queen Juliana.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

6 EUROPEAN PREMIERS JOIN FOR ATOM RESOURCES POOL AND A TARIFF-FREE MARKET

Communique on Europe

PARIS, Feb. 20 (Reuters)—Following is the text of a communique issued today after the final meeting of premiers and foreign ministers of the six member nations of the European common market and the European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom).

At the invitation of Premier Guy Mollet the heads of government and the ministers of foreign affairs of the states taking part in the Brussels conference for the common market and for Euratom met in Paris on the 19th and 20th of February, 1957.

The following took part in the meeting: For Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dr. Heinrich von Brentano; for Belgium, M. Achille van Acker and M. Paul-Henri Spaak; for France, M. Guy Mollet, M. Christian Pineau and M. Maurice Faure; for Italy, Mr. Antonio Segni, Dr. Gaetano Martino and Mr. Bordini-Confalonieri; for Luxembourg, Mr. Joseph Bech, and for the Netherlands, Mr. William Drees, Dr. Joseph M. A. H. Luns and Mr. Van Der Beugel.

An agreement has been reached on the problems relating to the association of the overseas territories with the common market.

It has been agreed that the treaty shall contain the principles expressing the will of the six states to associate with the European common market those overseas territories which are linked to them and to contribute to the economic and social investments which the development of these territories call for.

A first convention concluded for a period of five years which will be annexed to the treaty will define the terms of application of these principles.

It will fix the participation of the member states to the important investment effort which they are willing to undertake in the overseas territories. Furthermore the convention will establish the

Common Market Group Fixes Overseas Outlays

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Feb. 20—Following is a tentative plan for European investment in overseas territories, under the common market plan approved today.

The contributions to the investment fund would be paid in during five years, and the allotments, for the territories of the nations, would also be over that period.

Contributions Allotments	
France	\$200,000,000 \$312,000,000
West Germany	\$200,000,000
The Netherlands	
Belgium	\$70,000,000 \$35,000,000
Italy	\$70,000,000 \$30,000,000
Italy	\$40,000,000 \$5,000,000
Luxembourg	\$1,250,000

Total \$581,250,000 \$582,000,000
West Germany and Luxembourg have no overseas territories.

conditions under which the market of the member states and of the overseas territories will be thrown open progressively to reciprocal trade.

Before the expiration of this first convention a new agreement will be negotiated within the Council of Ministers.

Furthermore it has been agreed that the European Community of Atomic Energy will have the property rights in special fissile materials.

At the end of this meeting the ministers took note of the fact that their work, conducted under the active impulse of M. Spaak, is sufficiently advanced in order for the results of this work to be submitted shortly to their respective Councils of Ministers and that the signature of the two treaties can be hoped for shortly in Rome.

The six heads of government on this occasion reaffirmed the determination of their countries to pursue their efforts for an increasingly close European integration of which the Euratom and common market treaties constitute a decisive step.

London Times

FEB 4 1957

ANOTHER PROTEST BY FRENCH WRITERS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, FEB. 3

A delegation of French writers led by M. Vercors delivered to the Hungarian Legation in Paris a protest signed by M. Sartre and others against the Hungarian Government's suspension of the activities of the Union of Hungarian Writers and against the new arrests of Hungarian intellectuals. Most of the signatories are Communists or former Communists who three months ago expressed their disgust at the Russian action in Hungary.

London Times

FEB 4 1957

SOVIET PROMISE TO FINLAND

MORE COAL AND OIL

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

HELSINKI, FEB. 3

The visit of the Finnish Prime Minister, Mr. Fagerholm, to Moscow ended to-day; he is staying two days in Leningrad on his way home. The results of the exchanges between the Prime Minister and his Russian hosts were summed up in a statement issued last night.

From the Finnish point of view the most important result is a Soviet promise to deliver additional supplies of raw materials needed by Finland. It is understood these deliveries will include coal and oil, which Finland has been unable to get from Poland and Rumania since the breakdown of the triangular trade agreements. The Leningrad area will become a special market for Finnish dairy products. The chief Soviet gain from the talks seems to be the Finnish Government's invitation to Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev for the spring.

The statement declares that no outside events can be allowed to interfere with good neighbourly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the Russians express their belief that Finland's peaceful and impartial foreign policy, and her friendly relations with all countries, are a valuable contribution to international peace. Both Governments agree on the importance of good neighbourly relations in northern Europe for the maintenance of peace, and they emphasize the importance of achieving practical results in the field of disarmament and the placing of atomic and hydrogen weapons under international control.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

Mollet Visit to Canada Set

OTTAWA, Feb. 20 (Canadian Press)—Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau of France will visit Canada March 2 to 4, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced today in the House of Commons. Premier Mollet will speak to both Houses of Parliament on March 4. The French leaders will come to Canada following a visit in the United States. They will leave for Paris on March 4.

N.Y.M.T.

FEB 20 1957

Health Fund Cost to Rise, Britain Told Cries of 'Resign' Greet Statement

By William J. Humphreys

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

LONDON, Feb. 19.—Chancellor of the Exchequer Peter Thorneycroft announced today that Britons will have to increase their contributions to the government-subsidized National Health Service, school meals and welfare milk in order to preserve national solvency.

Labor outcries of "Resign!" greeted his statement. The opposition party created the health service in 1948, when it was expected to cost £175,000,000 (\$490,000,000) annually. But for the tax year starting in April, Mr. Thorneycroft estimated that the cost will be £260,000,000 (\$1,332,000,000).

Rent-Bill Concessions

Mr. Thorneycroft made the unpopular decision about the popular welfare services in the course of informing the House of Commons that the total estimates of civil expenses during the budget year 1957-58 will be £2,654,000,000 (\$7,431,200,000), an increase of £110,000,000 (\$308,000,000) over last year.

Prime Minister's government, which last week lost a Commons seat to the Labor party in a London suburb by-election, had announced earlier concessions in the rent bill which it has been trying to get through Parliament. The bill's consideration for landlords is said to have swayed the by-election.

NEAR EAST, AFRICA

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957EISENHOWER SAID
TO PROD ISRAELISBy THOMAS J. HAMILTON
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Feb. 20—The General Assembly's debate on Israel's failure to withdraw her troops behind the Palestine armistice lines was postponed tonight at the request of the United States.

The United States asked Arab delegates to agree to delay the debate for twenty-four hours. This was asked presumably to await Israel's response to a message said to have been sent by President Eisenhower today calling for the withdrawal.

As a result the Assembly debate, which was scheduled to start tomorrow, will not begin until Friday afternoon. Abdel Monem Rifai of Jordan, chairman of the Asian-African bloc, announced the decision after a meeting tonight.

"We have been asked by the United States mission to permit a further short postponement of the plenary to allow a little more scope for the efforts which are now being made outside the United Nations," he said.

Arabs Agree to Delay

"In our extreme desire to be helpful in getting over the present difficulty, we have accepted a twenty-four-hour postponement."

In addition, the group postponed introduction of the long-threatened resolution calling for economic sanctions against Israel.

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., United States delegate, who returned from Washington during the afternoon, informed the Arab delegates of the President's message. He had a joint meeting with Mr. Rifai and Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Minister, and later had a talk with Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon.

The decision to postpone the Assembly meeting came after a day of confusing reports about the result of President Eisenhower's meeting with Congressional leaders.

Earlier in the day Washington dispatches reported that the United States would not ask for a postponement and that the debate would start tomorrow on schedule. United States sources here said the same thing.

The report of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to the General Assembly, in which he

declared that his efforts to bring about Israel's final withdrawal had been "frustrated," was submitted ten days ago. Normally it would have been debated at once, but the United States had continued to ask for successive postponements.

Efforts to find a compromise

solution were headed by Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, who return from Ottawa during the afternoon. For weeks Mr. Pearson has been working on different ways of satisfying the basic Israeli requirement: some positive guarantee that Egypt would not resume hostile actions after a final Israeli withdrawal.

Mr. Pearson originally had drafted a resolution under which Egypt would have been required to give up the claim to exercise belligerent rights after withdrawal.

The United States, however, insisted upon the ambiguous resolution, adopted Feb. 2, which merely asked Mr. Hammarskjöld to carry out "other measures" suggested in his earlier report on the withdrawal deadlock.

Israeli supporters contend that the proposals by the United States, which were published Monday, do not give dependable guarantees. This is on the ground that, even if the United Nations Emergency Force were stationed in the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area, there is no guarantee that Egypt would permit it to stay there.

It was believed that Mr. Pearson might try to revive the original draft of his resolution if he found sufficient support. He also is working on a complementary plan to add naval forces, which would be stationed in the Gulf of Aqaba, to the United Nations force.

It was understood that if the Assembly approved such a plan, Canada would be willing to consider providing a warship. Israel already has at least two frigates and some torpedo boats in the gulf. But it is feared that if Israel used them to prevent the reimposition of the Egyptian blockade, the war might be resumed.

Aide on Canal Departs

Alfred G. Katsin, who is the principal lieutenant of Mr. Hammarskjöld in clearing the Suez Canal, left for Egypt during the afternoon. His departure apparently reflected Mr. Hammarskjöld's misgivings over the delay in reopening the canal.

This has resulted from Egypt's unwillingness to permit work to start on removal of the Edgar Bonnet, which is one of the last vessels to be removed before the canal can be reopened next week for 10,000-ton vessels.

The Suez Canal and Israeli withdrawal problems are interlinked, since Egypt apparently is delaying the salvage operation until Israel agrees to a final withdrawal. Secretary of State Dulles said yesterday that the United States would "deplore it very much" if Egypt delayed the reopening of the canal.

The United States, Britain, France and Norway proposed an

interim plan yesterday for operation of the canal. Mr. Hammarskjöld transmitted it last night to Dr. Fawzi.

Although Dr. Fawzi declined to comment, a spokesman denied today a report from London that Egypt had agreed to the plan. This provides that the canal would be operated by Egypt, but the tolls would be collected by an outside agency.

Even Share Is Proposed

The United States and Norway, as well as Britain and France, had proposed that the tolls be divided 50-50 between the United Nations and Egypt. It was said, however, that the United Nations part of the receipts would not be used immediately to pay the \$20,000,000 salvage bill, but would be retained in a reserve for this and other expenses.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

BRITAIN IS URGED
TO BAR SANCTIONS

Israeli Envoy Makes Appeal
to Macmillan—Unofficial
View Is Sympathetic

By DREW MIDDLETON

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Feb. 20—Eliahu Elath, Israel's Ambassador to Britain, pleaded with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan today for British opposition to the imposition of sanctions against Israel by the United Nations.

The British Government, forced out of an active role in the Middle East by pressure from the United States and the United Nations, is on the sidelines.

There is much unofficial sympathy with Israel's position in Government circles. This is combined with discreet doubts about the Washington Administration's handling of its "initiative" in the Middle East and disapproval of the idea of sanctions.

The Government's cardinal desire, it was reported by a highly qualified source, is for prolongation of the present discussions between Israel and the United States at least until after Mr. Macmillan's meeting with President Eisenhower in Bermuda next month.

The imposition of sanctions on Israel now would face the Government with an extremely difficult situation. Approval of sanctions by Britain would reawaken all the bitterness occasioned by the Suez crisis. The Government has been stressing its desire to follow an "independent" role in foreign affairs. But it also wants to restore good relations with the United States.

To support sanctions would irritate Conservative supporters

To oppose them would affront those whose first aim is the im-

provement of cooperation with Washington.

Ambassador Elath who made his plea to Mr. Macmillan in a visit to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, emphasized in a speech tonight three conditions his Government considered vital to a settlement of the conflict with the Arab states.

The conditions reject a return to the "disastrous" situation of the armistice agreement; two laws, "one for Egypt and the other Arab states, and another for Israel," and a "double standard" for members of the United Nations.

These conditions, it is understood, apply to both Israel's current dispute with the United Nations over abandonment of her remaining positions in Egypt and to future negotiations with the Arab nations for a permanent settlement.

These views are more strongly and explicitly expressed in the newspapers.

"It is all very well," The Daily Telegraph commented editorially this week, "for President Eisenhower to say (to Israel) 'rely on Uncle Sam' but where did such reliance get Britain, America's closest ally?"

The newspaper called the contention that the United States could not give concrete assurances in advance of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip but would do so afterward, "a contemptible evasion."

These views by the leading Conservative daily in London accurately reflect those of a considerable proportion of Britons.

After elaborating the three conditions for peace, Mr. Elath said Israel would "certainly" insist on the right of passage through the Suez Canal once it is cleared; just as she was now insisting on her rights in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Officials doubt that Israel should be asked to abandon her remaining positions in Egypt without concrete guarantees on freedom of passage through Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal and the integrity of her frontiers. They also recognize the effect that anything that could be construed as a concession to Israel would have on Arab opinion in the Middle East.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

Egypt Spurns Two Britons

CAIRO, Feb. 20 (Reuters)—The Egyptian State Prosecutor announced today he would demand the death penalty for only two of the four British subjects to go on trial for espionage here. They are James Swinburn, Cairo manager of the Arab News Agency, and James Zarb, a Maltese business man.

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957

NASSER SUMMONS CABINET IN CRISIS

President Calls Emergency
Session After Meeting
With War Minister

By OSGOOD CARUTHERS

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Feb. 20.—President Gamal Abdel Nasser called an urgent meeting of his cabinet tonight to discuss the growing crisis over Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Agaba area.

He talked with Maj. Gen. Abdel Makim Amer, his War Minister, before the meeting.

There was a distinct air of tension as the President and his ministers began their secret session at the Presidential Palace.

Up to now Egypt has placed complete reliance on the United Nations to deal with the critical issue of Israel's continued occupation of areas she invaded at the end of last October.

The only apparent alternatives left to the Egyptians at this time are a resumption of hostilities in an effort to drive the Israelis out of the Sinai Peninsula area along the Gulf of Agaba and from the Gaza Strip, or a possible halt in the clearance of the Suez Canal in an effort to increase world pressure on Israel.

Diplomatic and political observers in Cairo do not expect the Egyptians to choose the military way at this time. However, there is a strong assumption that President Nasser may either openly or in a subtle way put a halt to the United Nations clearing operations in the Suez Canal.

Some Work Now Barred

Already the Egyptians have refused to permit salvage crews under the command of Lieut. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler to begin work on the two most important remaining obstructions in the canal: the tug Edgar Bonnet, near Ismailia, and the frigate Abukir, near the southern terminus of the Canal at Suez. Authorities say the Egyptian Navy has not yet been able to remove explosives found aboard the Edgar Bonnet and therefore it would be unsafe for the United Nations crews to start work. No reason has been given for withholding permission to start on the Abukir.

The afternoon newspaper Al Massa printed a banner headline today declaring Egypt would not discuss any Suez Canal project until Israel withdrew.

This was over a dispatch from New York reporting that Dr. Mahmoud Fawzy, Egyptian For-

eign Minister, had informed United Nations delegates of such a stand.

The paper also said that until the Israelis withdrew, Egypt would not discuss proposals made by Britain, the United States and other canal users for the establishment of an interim regime to operate the canal until a final settlement of the dispute over President Nasser's seizure of the waterway.

The Egyptian President has been noncommittal up to now regarding the question of freedom of passage for ships of all nations, including Israel, through the Gulf of Agaba or the Suez Canal. Nor has he made his stand known on the future of the Gaza Strip, that was wrested from Egyptian by the Israelis.

The Egyptian position has been that none of these questions can even be discussed until the Israelis withdraw their troops behind the 1949 armistice lines.

An Egyptian official tonight offered veiled criticism of the United States proposals to guarantee that the gulf and the canal would be free to all international shipping.

Abdel Kader Botem, Director General of the Egyptian Information Department and an official spokesman for the Nasser regime, charged that "certain imperialist countries are striving to achieve illegal guarantees for Israel while ignoring totally the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs who were driven out of their homes."

"If these imperialists persist in their efforts to help Israel in defying the United Nations and violating its resolutions, then they can only do that at the expense of world peace," Mr. Hatem said.

Nasser Seen Adamant

LONDON, Feb. 20 (Reuters).—Col. Cyril Banks, a Member of Parliament and a frequent visitor to President Nasser, said today that Egypt would not negotiate on the Suez Canal until Israel withdrew her troops.

"You cannot negotiate with Nasser on anything to do with Suez until the Israelis have gone back to where they were," Colonel Banks said on his return from a trip to Egypt. "If they get out of Gaza and Agaba, then I think the way is open to negotiate for the opening of the Canal."

Colonel Banks had a seventy-five-minute interview with President Nasser in Cairo two days ago.

Syria Halts Lebanon Travel

DAMASCUS, Syria, Feb. 20 (Reuters).—Syria banned travel to Lebanon today following armed attacks on Syrian vehicles within Lebanese territory. Sabri el-Assali and Sami es-Sohi, Syrian and Lebanese Premiers, respectively, were reported to have agreed to meet tomorrow at the Lebanese border town of Shtura to discuss the attacks.

London Times
FEB 14 1957

CAIRO.—Russian-made jet aircraft are to be used on an air service which will link Cairo with Prague, according to the Czechoslovak Embassy here.

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957

ISRAEL RUIN SEEN IN A DOLLAR BAN

If U. N. Calls for Sanctions
and U. S. Complies, Tel Aviv
Would Be in Dire Straits

By EDWIN L. DALE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20.—A stroke of President Eisenhower's pen could bring virtual economic ruin to Israel.

The President, to back up any United Nations sanctions recommendation, merely would have to direct the Treasury Department to bar all dollar payments to Israel. Such payments already are barred to Communist China and North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Such an order would hurt virtually any country, but Israel probably most of all. The reason is that Israel relies for her economic survival on "extraordinary" dollar payments—payments made by the United States Government and private citizens outside of normal trade.

Israel's foreign trade is gravely out of balance. In 1955, for example, imports were \$326,000,000 and exports only \$86,000,000. Many of the imports are vital not only to Israel's development but also to her economic life. They include, for example, most of her food and fuel.

U. S. Aid a Big Help

Israel covers the gap in these ways:

United States Government Aid—This includes farm surplus sales for Israeli currency, and came to \$45,000,000 in the last United States fiscal year. When the invasion of Egypt began Israel was discussing straight economic aid of \$25,000,000, farm surplus deals totaling \$30,000,000, and an Export-Import Bank loan of \$75,000,000. These are in suspension and Israel is to some extent already pinched.

German Reparations—These come to about \$70,000,000 a year. West Germany, not a member of the United Nations, has indicated these reparations will continue.

Sale of bonds in the United States—These amounted to \$51,000,000 last year. If President Eisenhower should order a bar on dollar payments to Israel these sales would stop.

The United Jewish Appeal—This supplies between \$60,000,000 and \$100,000,000 a year. These remittances too would be stopped by such a Presidential order.

Private capital investment—This runs between \$10,000,000 and \$25,000,000 a year, mostly from the United States.

Tourism—This brings in about \$5,000,000 a year. United States tourists already have been stopped.

Latitude Is Wide

Under the Trading with the Enemy Act the President could impose almost any degree of economic sanctions he wanted. To the extent that foreign aid and tourism are in suspension, "sanctions" already have been imposed at a potential cost of

\$130,000,000. A United Nations General Assembly recommendation merely calling for a halt on all foreign aid to Israel would continue this suspension in effect, assuming the United States complied.

A United Nations call for total economic quarantine of Israel could lead, at least theoretically, to invocation of a complete payments ban, as with Communist China and North Korea. This would cut off more than \$100,000,000 from the U. S. A. and Israeli state bonds, plus whatever private capital investment was planned.

Finally, such a complete quarantine could involve a shut-off in trade. United States exports to Israel came to \$80,200,000 in 1955 and imports from Israel to \$17,100,000.

The United Nations could, of course, start simply with "diplomatic" sanctions, which would mean withdrawal of recognition and diplomatic missions. If it moved to economic sanctions, it could be vague or specific. And finally, it could recommend military sanctions, meaning armed force to push Israel behind her borders.

United States officials are doubtful that sanctions ever would be imposed to the extent of cutting off all trade and payments with Israel. But this is theoretically possible.

The history of the use of economic sanctions indicates that they are not effective. It is quite clear that they would not be effective now against many countries—probably including Egypt.

But complete economic sanctions against Israel would hurt deeply.

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957

Israel Reports New Raid

JERUSALEM, Israel, Feb. 20 (AP)—Three raiders armed with rifles and a submachine gun ambushed an Israeli civilian jeep near Beisan last night and wounded the driver, an Army spokesman said today. Col. Nehemia Brush said investigators had traced the path of the retreating marauders to the Jordan-Israeli armistice line.

N. Y. Times
FEB 21 1957

EGYPT ACTS ON POUND

Revokes Old Import Permits
in Stabilization Move

CAIRO, Feb. 20 (AP)—Egypt's Finance Ministry today canceled all import permits issued before Jan. 8 except those for goods already en route.

The order was one of several measures aimed at stabilizing the Egyptian pound in foreign exchange.

Another directive halted imports paid for through a third company. This means that Egyptian importers must deal directly with foreign exporters with the latter agreeing to accept payment in Egyptian pounds at the official rate.

Washington Post

FEB 21 1957

Last Chance for Compliance

Israel ought to understand fully the earnestness of the American appeal for her to withdraw from Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh. President Eisenhower spoke for Congress as well as the Administration last night, and his words were directed as much to the Ben-Gurion government as to the audience at home. This country has gone as far as it can reasonably go in reassuring Israel that her rights will be protected. If she demurs further, she will prejudice her case severely and perhaps irreparably in the United States as well as the United Nations.

Rather remarkably, the urgency of the situation has served to bring Congress and the Administration together. Yesterday's meeting at the White House was held in a spirit of genuinely bipartisan consultation—perhaps the first real give and take in many months—and the resulting cooperation reflects great credit on the responsibility of legislative leaders as well as on the sobriety with which the Administration is approaching the problem. If there is no easy agreed-upon solution because the issues are agonizing, there is no split either.

There is little stomach in the United States for sanctions, which could not in any event be enforced merely by vote of the United Nations General Assembly. But Israel would be mistaken to attempt to trade upon this reluctance. It is true that the U. N. has not taken action against defiance in the Hungary and Kashmir disputes, or earlier in the case of Egypt's flouting of the resolution on the Suez Canal. These failures are regrettable and they open the U. N. to the accusation of one-sided justice; but they do not in any event mean that Israel's current course is right or should be condoned.

A vote in the Assembly cannot be staved off for more than a few hours longer, and a U. N. sanctions debate would do Israel considerable psychological if not economic harm. It would place the United States in an excruciating dilemma. It could hardly fail to alienate sympathy for Israel, and any curtailment of the private funds from this country which figure so largely in Israel's economy could be very serious indeed.

Israel is fully entitled to the assurance that her shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba will not again be molested by Egypt (and in this connection, should the matter come to that, it might be possible for this country to furnish convoys). If Israel accepts the assurance, there is a growing possibility that the Aqaba route (with new pipelines) can be developed as an alternative to dependence on the Suez Canal. That possibility in itself will greatly aid Israel's demand for free access to the Suez Canal. Israeli acceptance, moreover, will help deflect world censure from herself to Colonel Nasser.

Israel is further entitled to ask that the U. N. Emergency Force move into the Gaza Strip simultaneously with her withdrawal so as to insulate it against *fedayeen* raids. The United States could well pledge itself to insist on this clarification in the U. N. But this can come about only if Israel gives up what amounts to an attempt to change the 1949 armistice by force while asking the protection and blessing of the U. N. Israeli retention of the Gaza Strip even for purposes of civil administration would in effect abrogate the armistice. Israel cannot reasonably demand that Egypt renounce beligerency while she herself remains in territory assigned to Egypt for occupation under that armistice.

No one can expect that the Ben-Gurion government will yield gladly. The government is understandably preoccupied with security, and Israel has had some severe provocations. Accordingly, it will be perfectly logical for Israel, if she now bows to the appeals, to state her case as compellingly as possible. Let her declare explicitly that if Colonel Nasser undertakes new *fedayeen* raids and if the U. N. does not afford her adequate protection, she will reserve the right to take whatever steps she deems necessary in her defense with a clear conscience. That will place the responsibility squarely on the U. N. and at the same time invite new respect for Israel in world opinion.

Manchester Guardian

JAN 28 1957

Gain and Loss

India has defied the Security Council and Integrated Kashmir. Mr Nehru can look back on succeeding in the long game he has played with Pakistan, but in the longer game of keeping the world at peace he has injured his own position. By occupying Kashmir and refusing to budge, by delaying the plebiscite upon one pretext or another until the idea of a plebiscite had gone stale, Mr Nehru has been able to achieve what he wanted with a minimum of violence. He has most of India behind him. But for the future he has stored up a feud with Pakistan which in all reasonable likelihood will bring disaster to both countries, and which at least will distort their foreign policies indefinitely. The Security Council is bound to be angry—the more so as India's action is a flagrant disregard of her promise to the United Nations in 1951—but the Council is scarcely likely to take any measures which will inconvenience India. But by its deed over Kashmir, India has weakened its own standing in the United Nations and throughout the world; and on the next occasion when it tries to bring its moral influence to bear in a great international issue it will find its voice less heeded. India, like others before, has shown itself to have two standards—one for the world and one for itself.

N.Y.N.T.

FEB 20 1957

Nasser Seen Slipping But Still Far From Overthrow

(This is the first of four articles on Egyptian President Nasser. Mr. Parsons has just completed one year as Herald Tribune Mid-East correspondent.)

By Arch Parsons Jr.

Gamal Abdel Nasser is slipping.

This is the consensus of a variety of sources—official and unofficial, here and abroad.

These sources warn, however, that it would be wrong to assume that the reins of power are on the verge of falling irretrievably from President Nasser's hands. Although he may be considered an international presence in some parts of the world, he is still a popular hero among much of the Arab masses. Through effective propaganda and intelligence machines, he still appears to control the main sources of his power—the Egyptian Army and the streets of Cairo.

These same sources add, however, that there is increasing evidence that the network of advisers around Col. Nasser is doing more than advising. It is a moot question these days, they say, whether he is receiving advice or orders from the twenty-five or thirty persons closest to him. This group will be examined in a subsequent article, but it can be stated here that reasonably substantial reports indicate that the network is riddled with extreme left-wingers, if not out-and-out Communists.

Rumors spring up like weeds. This correspondent's recent travels amounted to a trek through heavy underbrush; a French news report in Port Said, two days after the Anglo-French landings there in November, that Nasser had been deposed; whisperings in Lebanon in December of intrigues against him; "common knowledge" in London in January that he was about to be ousted; "Swiss reports" in Washington this month that he had quit; corridor talk at United Nations headquarters in New York that he had been shot.

But the signs indicate strongly that mounting dissension is surrounding this thirty-nine-year-old army colonel, who parlayed a gift for conspiracy, personal charm and an instinctive awareness of the demands of Arab nationalism into a rise from obscurity to the center of the stage of world politics—from which he could shout to the United States: "Choke to death on your jury!"

Now, it seems, the results of his angry actions of the last few months are becoming in-

creasingly difficult to swallow at home.

It was through the Egyptian Army that Col. Nasser overthrew a king—ending sixty centuries of monarchy in Egypt—ousting and arrested a highly respected rival and shoved the Middle East into the crucial position it now holds in world affairs.

Today, that army is reported to be restive. Among the officers—Egypt's elite class, under President Nasser—there are mutterings about his military prowess: the ease with which half of Egypt's Communist-supplied jet air force was destroyed on the ground in the recent attack by Israel, France and Great Britain; his decision to send what remained of that force into hiding in other Arab countries, and his failure to keep his oft-repeated promise to "fight to the last drop of blood."

Five thousand Egyptian prisoners of war, captured by the Israelis in Sinai, are streaming home with a different story than the description of this campaign, by the government-operated Cairo Radio, as "Egypt's Dunkirk." In spite of a reported "re-indoctrination" course that many have had to undergo since returning home, large numbers of these prisoners are said to be describing what happened in the sandy reaches of that desert peninsula as "abandonment."

There are reports that Col. Nasser held back his army, not to fight another day, but to scatter it around key locations in Egypt to prevent any possibility of a coup against his regime.

Gen. Naguib's

Death Rumored

Some rebellious officers are believed to have been arrested—some, perhaps, executed. Recently, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Naguib, the popular officer who governed Egypt at least nominally after King Farouk's ouster in 1952 until he himself was ousted by Col. Nasser in 1954 and placed under arrest, was reportedly slain. Even when this report is contradicted, the basis for the contradiction is that present circumstances are so unsettled that Col. Nasser would not have dared to kill, Gen. Naguib.

Just last week, it was reported from London (and denied in Cairo) that Maj. Salah Salem, former Minister of National Guidance, the "Dancing Major" who has been in and out of President Nasser's graces on several occasions, was arrested after it was discovered that the forces with which he was to defend the southern half of the Suez Canal appeared to be deployed more for an attack against Cairo than for defense.

In a region where the ability to maintain power is likely to

depend upon the ability to maintain control over a highly volatile populace, President Nasser's popular support is of considerable significance. "He who rules the streets of Cairo," according to the old observation, "rules Egypt."

Communists Outlawed But Influence Grows

Yet in this sphere, too, signs of unrest have been noted. Col. Nasser's picture still hangs in virtually every shop in Cairo, but some of his old political enemies—the Wafdist party that fell before him, a victim of its own corruption, and the extremist Moslem Brotherhood, outlawed by him—are believed to have gained sufficient support to become active underground. The latter group is particularly adept at inciting mob violence. This reporter saw signs of its activity during the brief period of street fighting that preceded the withdrawal of the British occupation forces from Port Said.

Communist influence within the country is increasing, and all of it may not be due to Col. Nasser's growing dependence—forced or invited—upon the military, economic and political support of the Soviet bloc. Some of this influence is homegrown, although the Communist party is outlawed in Egypt and many of its old leaders are languishing in jail. "Egyptian Communists do not have a mass following," one observer—an Egyptian himself—put it, "but they are in the machine." The "machine" is Nasser's regime.

To make matters worse, large quantities of arms, distributed to Egypt's semi-civilian "National Liberation Army" during the recent attack on Egypt, have not been recovered. Every dissident group in the country is well-represented in this army.

Cost of Arming

Burdens Economy

The Egyptian economy is in a bad way. Most of its dominant export commodity, cotton, has been virtually mortgaged to the Communist bloc for the next two or three years in payment for the arms Egypt bought. And arms are of little help in expanding a national economy, as Egypt needs to do. On top of this, the Communist countries reportedly have broken their promise to Col. Nasser and are competing against him with his own cotton in his own markets.

Most of Egypt's foreign assets remain frozen, mainly in Britain and France, some in the United States, in retaliation for President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal last July. The canal, a major source of revenue to Egypt, remains closed. Unemployment is increasing.

Lashing out at this situation with typical anger, Col. Nasser resorted recently to the "Egyptianization" of British and

French banks and businesses in Egypt. The move caused a near-ruinous run on the banks, brought much of Egypt's business to standstill, threatens to wipe out a middle class that has long borne the day-to-day responsibility for keeping the country's perennially unstable economy on some sort of going basis, and has given impetus to the exodus of long-time foreign residents from Egypt.

Although these persons have been forced to leave their businesses—and most of their personal belongings—behind them, they preferred this course to the increasingly extreme difficulties of making a living in the country under the "Egyptianization" program.

A highly reputable financial expert, Franz Pick, publisher of Pick's World Currency Report, observed a few days ago that while the Egyptian pound is pegged officially at \$2.87, it has been selling on the free market in Beirut, Lebanon, for \$1.70 to \$1.80. "If it goes as low as \$1.50," Mr. Pick said flatly, "then the hour glass will have run out for Mr. Nasser."

Finally, Col. Nasser's stock among other Arab leaders is decidedly lower. His Suez policies have hurt their economies, too. Observers noted that King Saud of Saudi Arabia accepted an invitation to visit the United States at the precise moment when an estimated one-third of the King's oil revenues, totaling \$300,000,000 annually, have been cut off by the shut-down of the canal.

Egypt's political activities in neighboring countries have taken on enough of a subversive character to cause downright alarm. At least six countries—Ethiopia, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Sudan—have expelled Egyptian military attaches from their territories for "unbecoming" political acts of one type or another.

No Indication Yet

Of Imminent Coup

In spite of all these developments, there is not yet sufficient evidence to prove that anti-Nasser sentiment has become organized in such a way as to pose a serious, co-ordinated and immediate threat against the continuation of his rule. What sort of scramble for power may be going on behind the scenes in Cairo has yet to reveal itself. There is little doubt, however, that some degree of scrambling is under way and a coup against Nasser would raise few eyebrows around the world.

Once Col. Nasser commented: "Many people come to me and say, 'you have angered all the people.' I have always answered, 'the anger of the people is not the decisive factor in the situation. The question is, was the thing that angered them good for the country or not?'"

The growing belief of many qualified observers is that President Nasser may have forgotten that the people are the country—and may have underestimated both the public anger and his ability to contain it.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

MOSCOW VETOES KASHMIR INQUIRY

Opposes a Security Council Move to Use U.N. Force to Pave Way to Plebiscite

By MICHAEL JAMES
Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Feb. 20—The Soviet Union vetoed today a resolution that would have sent the Security Council's president to India and Pakistan in an effort to settle the dispute over Kashmir.

Astady A. Sobolev, head of the Soviet delegation, told the Security Council that the veto was based mainly on two points that Moscow could not accept.

One was the suggestion that a United Nations Emergency Force might be used to pave the way for a plebiscite. The other was the fact that India was not amenable to the resolution and that it thereby violated the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

The United States, along with Britain and Australia, immediately presented a new resolution that was milder than the original text.

Previous Motions Cited

The new resolution would call on the Swedish President of the Council, Gunnar V. Jarring, to go to India and Pakistan to explore the situation.

It does not mention either a United Nations force or the word "plebiscite," but includes the words "having regard to previous resolutions." These previous resolutions, now nine years old, call for an eventual plebiscite.

The vote on the vetoed resolution was 9 to 1, with Mr. Jarring abstaining. He said he did so because of his "delicate" position. Since the opposing vote, by Mr. Sobolev, came from one of the five permanent members of the Council, it was an automatic veto.

The text of the vetoed resolution, which was sponsored by Australia, Britain, the United States and Cuba, was published in The New York Times last Saturday.

In explaining his vote, Mr. Sobolev said the Soviet Union intended to oppose any future resolution that in his opinion violated the Charter.

Many took this to mean that the Soviet Union intended to veto the new resolution. In reply to a direct question after the meeting, Mr. Sobolev said he would have to await instructions from Moscow before his next vote.

It was reported that India had been pressing the United States and Britain in the last few days to agree to amendments that might have made the vetoed resolution palatable to the Russians. The two nations, however, stood by the proposal, and abstained on Soviet and Colombian amendments that would have moderated it.

The Soviet veto was not a cause for joy among the Indians here. They feared that it made it look as if Moscow had "saved the day" for India and pushed the neutralist state a little toward the Soviet side.

Pakistani delegation sources commented that the American public now knew the Indian position.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's friends were and just how much good "those billions of American dollars sent to India have done."

This was a difficult day for V. K. Krishna Menon of the Indian delegation.

On Monday the Council had adjourned until today because Mr. Krishna Menon had something "very important" to tell the body but was unable to do so because he was ill. This morning Mr. Krishna Menon, looking wan, spoke for nearly two hours.

He renewed charges that Pakistan was the guilty party and asserted that there could not even be talk of a plebiscite until Pakistani troops moved out of Kashmir. The Indian delegate then repeated India's refusal to permit a United Nations force to replace the Pakistanis.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

U.S. BIDS U.N. DROP CYPRUS PROPOSALS

Says Greek or British Text Would Aggravate Issue— Compromise Is Pressed

By LINDSEAY PARROTT

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Feb. 20—Strong support built up in the United Nations today for compromise on the Cyprus issue.

Delegates from both the Atlantic powers and the Asian-African bloc were discussing a resolution that would follow the lines of the General Assembly's action on Algeria. That resolution expressed "hope" that a solution might be found in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter but voiced no condemnation of either side.

It was possible, also, that a compromise resolution on Cyprus might call on Britain and Greece to refrain from warlike measures on the Eastern Mediterranean island.

The Political Committee recessed for an additional lunch hour to permit unofficial discussion on the projected Cyprus resolution. A text agreeable to both sides was not forthcoming, but delegates on the floor continued to ask that both Britain and Greece withdraw their own resolutions in favor of a prospective compromise.

Greece wants the United Nations to declare itself in favor of the right of Cyprus, a British Crown Colony and base, to determine its own political future and appoint a commission to investigate conditions there. Britain has asked the international body to call on Greece to refrain from alleged support of Cypriot terrorism.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

JEEP BEATS ALL IN INDIA POLITICS

Country Has No Television, Government Runs Radio, Few Voters Can Read

By A. M. ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times.

MADRAS, India, Feb. 20—The Indian politician makes his Western counterpart look like a rather frail creature.

To win an election in India (at the moment about 10,000 Indians are trying to do just that) or even to get people to listen to you requires an iron throat, a good set of legs and a fine sense of theatre.

Money helps, too. But money cannot purchase mass audiences in India. There is no television to bring the politician's eager face into a few million homes.

There is a nation-wide radio network, but the "no politics" sign is hanging outside its headquarters. The Government-controlled radio network has offered ten minutes to each of the four major parties in which to explain their programs.

Opposition parties realizing that the radio news programs are usually full of news of Candidate No. 1 (Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru), have retorted with an angry "no thank you."

The majority of the population is illiterate, so the efficacy of the well-planted political hand-

out is nil.

That leaves only one way to get across to the voters: to speak to him directly. These days, all over India, in tens of thousands of villages, politicians are talking themselves hoarse.

In the back country there usually are only a few ways to get around: by foot, by bullock cart or by jeep. This is where a little money comes in handy.

In one of India's major cities the other day an automobile dealer was giving a short, pointed lecture on the relationship in India between the jeep and politics.

The Congress party of Mr. Nehru is far and away the wealthiest one in the land. Months before the campaign started, Congress party politicians had snapped up every jeep in town. The Socialists, coming around to buy a couple last week, found the garage cupboard bare.

Prime Minister Nehru has decided to carry the campaign, as his lieutenants have been begging him to do. He has the advantage of being able to hop about the country in a twin-engine plane the Russians gave him.

Other Indian politicians have to worry about giving the voters a good time along with the speech—a movie or a little political drama or a dance or a parade. But all Mr. Nehru needs to attract crowds is himself.

Local politicians make it a practice to be seen around Mr. Nehru because he is the owner of the longest and strongest set of coattails in India.

Blow to Karamanlis Seen

Special to The New York Times.

ATHENS, Feb. 20—Observers thought tonight that possibly a moral blow had been dealt to Premier Constantine Karamanlis' Government because Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff had not persuaded the United States that the Cypriotes' demand for self-determination constituted the kind of cause that the United States, for historic reasons, would automatically endorse.

Many contended that the United States' refusal to accept the proposals submitted by Britain or Greece left the Greek position as petitioner substantially as it was.

The Government is likely to seek a vote of confidence at a forthcoming meeting of Parliament.

The Greek ambassador to Egypt, Dimitri Lambros, returned tonight to Cairo with a memorandum to President Gamal Abdel Nasser on minorities in Egypt.

The minorities, including the Greeks, are reported threatened by recent Egyptian acts. Mr. Lambros also carried with him a renewal of an invitation to President Nasser to pay an official visit to Greece in April.

Cypriotes End Strike

Special to The New York Times.

LIMASSOL, Cyprus, Feb. 20—Greek Cypriotes this afternoon ended their two-day strike against British control of the island.

Streets in this town, one of the chief trouble spots of the crown colony, were heavily patrolled all day by British troops. Turkish Cypriot policemen and soldiers were also present. There were no major incidents.

London Times
FEB 7 1957

INDIAN COMMUNIST HOPES

MORE CANDIDATES FOR ELECTIONS

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BOMBAY, FEB. 6

Judging by public statements of Indian Communist leaders and the number of candidates submitted by the party for the coming elections, the Communists entertain high hopes of doing much better this time than in the 1951 elections.

According to an estimate from party sources, the Communists are contesting 720 seats in various state legislatures and 140 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower House of Parliament. In the last election the Communists and their allies contested 563 seats in state legislatures, winning 165, and 63 in the Lok Sabha, in which they won 33. Although the party is putting up a large number of candidates in every state, its main efforts are concentrated in West Bengal and Kerala, where they are making a determined effort to defeat the Congress Party.

According to Mr. B. Gupta, a member of the party Politburo, the "situation in both these States is quite favourable and mature for the leftist parties to fight the election on the slogan of an alternative democratic Government." The party appears to prefer regional campaigns to nation-wide electioneering and is trying to exploit to its benefit such Congress legislative measures as the nationalization of insurance companies, the Imperial Bank, and the Kolar gold fields, and the reimposition of the capital gains tax, on the ground that these were some of the measures demanded by the Communist Party in the last election.

"CULTURAL SQUADS"

The party claims the solid backing of the masses, which they hope to strengthen by employing hundreds of "cultural squads" and to win votes through songs and dramas. An appeal for £75,000 for the election campaign has been made by the Communist Party, which expects "to expose Mr. Nehru's new builders of Socialism, who, significantly enough, include rajas, maharajas, and millionaires," according to Mr. Gupta.

In spite of Mr. Nehru's strong support of the candidature of Mr. Krishna Menon, Minister without Portfolio, for a seat in the Lok Sabha to vindicate India's foreign policy, Mr. Menon has stiff opposition in Bombay City North, the constituency in which he is contesting the election.

The United Maharashtra organization, a combination of nine left-wing parties, has put up against Mr. Menon Mr. Peter Alvares, a front rank Praja Socialist and outspoken critic of the Government, and a strong advocate of the merger of Goa with India. Criticism of Congress in the "foisting" of Mr. Menon on this constituency was heard from voters, including those who were Congress-minded before Mr. Nehru's advocacy of Mr. Menon's candidature.

London Times
FEB 12 1957

Leadership in India

Who follows NEHRU? "The question is foolish and meaningless"—it is Mr. NEHRU himself answering—"I am not running the country. India is shaping herself." Yet the question is not stilled with the approach of India's second general election since independence, for which polling begins on February 24. India is undoubtedly shaping herself, but it is the Congress Party that still dominates this vast political landscape and it is Mr. NEHRU who, more than ever, still dominates Congress. He is both a national leader and a party leader, and the time has not yet come when one role can be separated from the other. It will not, therefore, be in these elections that an answer will be given to the question, if the answer sought is the name of a national leader to succeed Mr. NEHRU. But it will not be healthy for Indian parliamentary democracy if the shape of a future Opposition does not soon begin to emerge. It is parties with their roots in the people that are the strength of a parliamentary democracy rather than a succession of national leaders.

To say this is to admit the shapelessness of what now exists; 193 million electors must return 494 members to the Lok Sabha (the Lower House) and 2,906 members of the state legislatures. Television can do nothing to sway these millions. A ten-minute statement of party policies on the radio will touch few people. Even the Press, in a country where so many are still illiterate, can hardly reach more than 10 per cent. of the electorate. The shape of national politics must inevitably grow out of the states, and it is in the legislatures of the reorganized states that the prospect for the future will be discerned.

At the national level there are only three opposition parties of substance: the Praja Socialists, the Communists, and the Hindu Jan Sangh. The Praja Socialists have in Mr. JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN the only political leader outside Congress with a national appeal. But the Socialists can hardly offer a policy of markedly different stamp from the economic planning and social change to which Mr. NEHRU has committed Congress. Their demand for more nationalization or for the immediate introduction of Hindi as the official language is basically a difference in timing from

Congress rather than a difference of political outlook. The Communist appeal is even less. They have suffered from Russian behaviour in eastern Europe, though this can affect only a small part of the electorate. Their hopes are concentrated more in the state legislatures, but their roots are still sparse. The Jan Sangh may have its roots too, but the tide is running against its communal appeal.

There remains the invincible weight of Congress. How well founded is it as a party? Its future, after Mr. NEHRU goes, is as much in doubt as is the emergence now of an effective Opposition. It is not surprising that there have been angry squabbles over the nomination of Congress candidates. The local parties have small say in their selection and the choice from above, however well meaning, may produce an artificial list of candidates. The orders have been for new blood, for a suitable number of Muslim and Christian candidates and—since it is a mark of progress—for women (though they have been hard to find). The immediate result of such a selection may be good Government, but the party roots may suffer in the

process. There is no escaping the conflict in India's present development. Where nationalism has split into rival parties, as in Indonesia, the result has been disastrous. There is much to be said for what, in effect, is one-party rule at a time when the foundations of a new State are being laid. But if this rule continues for too long disaster of another kind may follow. The forthcoming elections may do little to determine the change that must come, but it is a responsibility to be faced if democracy in India is to progress.

G. S. Hunter

FEB 7 1957

India: Ban on Red Patronage

The Indian Government has forbidden federal and state ministers to patronize pro-Communist cultural and social organizations, the Times of India reported. The All-India Peace Council, the Indo-Soviet and India-China Cultural Societies were among the organizations listed as coming under the ban.

The standing committee of the All-India Newspaper Editors Conference passed a resolution criticizing a government bill to set up a Press Council in India. It was particularly critical of the bill's proposal to give the Press Council power to extract information compulsorily from newsmen.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
FEBRUARY 5, 1967

Syria: Middle East Proving Ground

Despite Communist inroads, this strategic Arab nation is still largely a power vacuum. The question is: Who is going to fill it?

By **HANSON W. BALDWIN**

SYRIA, a small country with large dreams, is a testing ground of the President's new Middle East program.

Like many of the Arab countries, Syria, to Western minds, is paradoxical, anachronistic, enigmatic. It is at conflict with itself and its neighbors. It is a hodgepodge and an amalgam of races and religions. Damascus, its capital, is, according to Julian Huxley, the "oldest continuously inhabited large city in the world." Few people know who governs the country; even the Government is confused about where power lies. Nobody knows where Syria is going. It presents, in the words of one observer, "a classic case of the influence of Moscow in a Mideastern country with which no one has interfered. Syria is a spongy vacuum..."

Syria's population epitomizes, perhaps to a greater degree than that of any other Arab country, the virtues and the faults of the Arabs. Syrians are divided, frustrated. Most of them would like to be let alone. They are a shrewd, simple and tenacious people, with the likable character of the peasant and the desert dweller. But most of Syria's small upper and middle class and its students are nationalistic, xenophobic. Syrians hate well—with Israel as their primary hate—and Radio Damascus mouths the venom. Many live in a dream world where all Arabs are heroes, their opponents knaves and infidels.

Syria, in other words, offers more starkly than most Arab lands the portrait of all of them, a portrait of contrasts—small nations with the inhibitions and frustrations of the weak, the dominated, the feudalistic; small nations fanatic in their anti-colonialism; small nations groping for the mechanisms of self-government; small nations seeking for pride and self-respect; small nations eager for an Arab renaissance. It is, in a sense, symbolic that the tomb of Saladin, the great Moslem conqueror, is in Damascus, and Syrians do not forget that during the Ommeyyad era in the seventh and eighth centuries their capital was the center of an empire larger than Rome's.

Today Damascus is again a focus of world attention but for far different reasons than those of twelve centuries ago. And Syria's rulers—sometimes a little diffident in the glare of their newfound publicity—are certainly not the Saladins of the past.

But Syria, though symbolic and

typical, also presents a special case among the Arab states—not so much in an emotional, racial or psychological sense but in its geographical, political and military context.

GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGY

SYRIA'S geographical position gives her a unique strategic importance in the Arab world. Today the tide of Arab nationalism is undoubtedly symbolized and led—though not controlled—by Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, and Cairo, not Damascus, has been the principal focus of Soviet Russia's attempts to infiltrate and penetrate the Middle East. But Syria is an extremely useful stepping stone—geographically—to Egypt and to other points in the Middle East. It lies directly south of Turkey, and Turkey, facing north toward the colossus of Com-

munist Russia, would be outflanked by a Communist state to her south.

From Russia's oil fields at Baku to Aleppo—across rugged and sparsely settled Iranian and Iraqi territory distinguished by its lack of radar—the distance is only about 800 miles, an easy flight for a jet fighter. Air bases in Syria could checkmate British positions in Cyprus and the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. Syria lies squarely athwart the normal air routes from Europe through Beirut to Baghdad, Teheran and the Far East. The disruption of air traffic that can be caused by the closing of Syrian air lanes to foreign planes was demonstrated forcefully during the recent crisis. Syria's most important strategic role is that of a potential air base.

But her geographic position also offers her political advantages. Her territory virtually surrounds the little seaside enclave of Lebanon, which is generally friendly to the West. The pipelines from Iraq's oil fields cross her territory. She has a common frontier to the south with Jordan, the artificial kingdom of King Hussein, and her rugged mountains and those of Lebanon offer innumerable gateways to Israel for fedayeen raiders.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

LIEUT. COL. ABDEL HAMID SARRAJ, chief of the Syrian Army's *département bureau* (G-2), is neither a Rasputin nor a Communist. He has energy, ambition,

and apparently organizing and executive skills. His pocketbook seemingly has not profited from his power. He is called the "strong man" of Syria. But Syria has had many "strong men" since 1949, when the army assumed major power in the Government, and most of them are now forgotten.

Sarraj is the leader of a young officer faction—he is 31—which is probably the strongest single group among Syria's many factions. This group epitomizes the yearning for power, the hatred of the Jew and the nationalism which are common factors in all Arab countries.

SARRAJ is a curious type to hold such power. He has some charm but little of the breadth, the presence or the shrewdness of Nasser, whom Sarraj extravagantly admires. He is ill at ease when photographed. His face, in repose, has a sullen, hard look which disappears when he smiles. He is considered handsome and something of a lady's man. His intelligence section is appraised as relatively ineffective as far as knowledge of the Israelis is concerned, but good and improving in the field of internal security.

Shadowing, wire-tapping—all of the techniques of counter-espionage, equally useful for dictatorial political control—were somewhat primitive in their applications in Syria some time ago; today, apparently with Communist tutelage, they have shown marked improvement. Like Nasser, who exercises so much of his internal power through Zachariah Mohieddine, the Egyptian Minister of the Interior, and his efficient secret police, Sarraj knows the keys to power.

But Sarraj is no Nasser. He alone does not hold dictatorial power; in fact, he apparently exercises much of his authority by veto. He did not hesitate to correct his own commander, the Commander in Chief of the Syrian Army who is a major general, in front of this correspondent recently. After the British invasion of Egypt, Sarraj and his fellow "young Turks," despite the opposition of some civilian members of the Cabinet, ordered the Syrian Army to destroy the pumping stations of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipelines.

HANSON W. BALDWIN, The New York Times military editor, visited Syria while on a recent three months' tour of the Middle East.

Sarraj does, however, seek the aid, advice and support of Nasser. He is known to have talked on the phone to the Egyptian President during the Suez crisis. But probably his more normal liaison is through the Egyptian Embassy, which maintains a large staff in Damascus, and via Colonel Hommad, Egyptian Chief of Staff of the Joint Egyptian-Syrian military command in Damascus. The Egyptians maintain liaison with all walks of Syrian life; the Egyptian Consul General in Aleppo, for instance, keeps in close touch with Syrian labor.

Akram Hourani, leader of the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist party, extreme Left-Wing and pro-Nasser Socialist group, is also influential. Khalid Bakdash, native Communist leader educated in Moscow, flew back from Russia with President al-Kuwatli last fall and has also visited Red China in the past year. Bakdash, who exercises very considerable influence among leftist groups in Lebanon and Jordan, seems to exert most of his authority in Syria at grass-roots level.

IN the Cabinet itself, two Left-Wing members, Economics Minister Khalil Kallas, brother-in-law of an army colonel associated with Sarraj, and Foreign Minister Salah el-Bitar probably have more authority than other ministers. Kallas, a strong and able man, controls all export and import licenses and works closely with the dominant young officer clique in the Army.

All of these people and parties have some power and influence in Syria. But Syrian ruling circles are fractionalized; that is one reason why Soviet Communist inroads have made considerable headway. The Conservative parties are split. So is the Army, and a number of officers—particularly some in the personnel branch of the General Staff—are believed to be out of tune with the leftist, ultra-nationalist measures of Sarraj and Company.

The divisions of the more moderate groupings, the schism in the army and its immersion in internal politics, the personal struggle for power which has marked Syrian politics for many years, the fanatical nationalism of the Arabs, the sympathy for Communist Russia evoked by Russian support of the Arab cause, and the new wave of hatred and do-or-die chauvinism caused by the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt—all have been cleverly exploited by domestic propaganda and Communist actions.

THE propaganda is of the same virulent, aggressive, dis-

torted "black-is-white" variety that characterizes propaganda in so many of the Arab countries, and in some ways it even outdoes Cairo and Egypt's "Voice of the Arabs." Nasser's photograph is prominent in shop windows; alleged British and French "atrocities" at Port Said are widely publicized; Premier Nuri as-Said of Iraq is pilloried and attacked as a colonialist "stooge" and "blood-thirsty cutthroat." The radio is the principal means of indoctrination, but photographs and illustrations also play an important role in a country with a 40 to 60 per cent illiteracy rate.

There are some twenty-seven daily newspapers in Damascus, a city of 400,000 people. All of them are shrill, most of them strident defenders of Arab nationalism, many of them "bought" by printing or other subsidies. Nine of the papers are strongly pro-Soviet. None in recent months has opposed communism. It was increasingly difficult, even prior to the British-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt, for Right-Wing or moderate papers to operate. Since then rigid censorship and slanted news have reduced mention of Hungary to a minimum and have convinced the people that there was no defeat of the Egyptians in Sinai by the Israelis. Probably 80 to 90 per cent of public credit for stopping the Sinai-Port Said fighting has gone to Soviet Russia, the rest to the United States.

The normal economic situation in Syria is neither as fluid nor as unstable as her political situation. She has been self-supporting in the past, with only about 2 per cent of her open trade (as compared to 36 per cent of Egyptian exports) with Soviet bloc countries. Her normal suppliers have been Britain, the United States and West Germany, in that order. In Roman times Syria was able to support an estimated population of about 10,000,000 people, as compared to her present 4,200,000. She grows cotton, barley, wool, wheat, much of which was normally exported to Western European countries.

BUT politics and Arab emotionalism have altered the picture. More than a year ago Syria made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. There have been at least two separate contracts involved. The first batch of arms was apparently paid for from the proceeds of Iraq Petroleum Company royalties from the oil pipelines which traverse Syrian soil. These royalties represented—in last year's budget—about one-fifth of the total at a time when Syrian defense expendi-

tures had reached about 60 per cent of the entire budget.

The Egyptian crisis and the sympathetic but illogical Syrian reactions greatly worsened the economic picture. With the oil pumping stations blown up, royalties ceased. The disruption of war and an informal boycott of the "colonialists and imperialists" closed off the normal Western European markets for Syria's cotton and wheat. To payments for the Czech-Soviet arms deliveries—which are still continuing—had to be added payments for "mazout" or "gas-oil" used for cooking and heating. Development projects, except for a few, were stopped. Today Syrian economy is, to put it mildly, strained—though not bankrupt.

THE ARMY

IN any Arab country the army is both an instrument of internal political power, a source of prestige and a shield against Israel. But Syria committed herself in December, 1955, to a major army expansion and modernization program.

Arms requests to the United States had encountered some delays and some conditions. Within about three weeks after Damascus signed an arms contract with Czechoslovakia, the first shipment was delivered by air. Since then, supplemented by a second contract and now possibly by a third, Czech-Russian arms have been delivered by ship through the Syrian port of Latakia or transshipped from Egypt.

The quantities have been sizable perhaps 120 T34 tanks, fifty to sixty SU100 self-propelled guns, field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, personnel carriers, machine guns, small arms, ammunition, trucks, rocket launchers, hundreds of tons of barbed wire, engineering and medical equipment. Syrian pilots were being checked out in MIG-15-type aircraft in Egypt when the British struck. Since then it has been reported that about ten of the MIG-17 swept-wing jets have been delivered to Syria. But the army, which has been expanded from about 40,000 to 65,000 men in the past year, is poorly trained, and it will be months before the Syrians have mastered their new equipment.

In one category—small arms—the Communist shipments plainly exceed the army's needs. Thousands of submachine guns and rifles have been distributed to Syrian students and to members of the Syrian Popular Resistance Movement. Most of these hastily trained, part-time soldiers are intensely xenophobic. They have been given the rudiments of discipline, have

been taught hastily how to use their arms, how to fight guerrilla warfare and how to employ sabotage techniques.

They represent a volatile political force which, if it could be controlled by any one faction, could hold the balance of power in Syria. For these armed civilians could be the hard core of the street mobs which always are a major factor in Arab politics.

THE 'SPONGY VACUUM'

THIS, then, is the "spongy vacuum"—political, economic, military and psychological—which communism is attempting to fill. Soviet Russia has won friends and influenced people in Syria, particularly the people who matter, by three major politico-psychological policies:

(1) Moscow has backed the cause of the Arabs vis-a-vis Israel.

(2) Moscow has provided arms to Syria when they were wanted, without haggling or delay.

(3) Moscow vigorously opposed, with the implied threat of force, the Israeli-British-French attack upon Egypt.

These policies have been the basic and fundamental reason why Syria is friendly to Russia and has been softened up for Communist infiltration.

SO far, there have not been many Communist military advisers or technicians in Syria. Damascus admits there were nine at one time. Only four Syrian officers, Sarraj claims, are being trained in Czechoslovakia, while four officers and twenty-five students are also at school in the United States. There are only about two Syrian airfields—Damascus and Aleppo—really adequate for modern jets. Certainly Syria today is neither a Soviet military base nor, despite its Soviet equipment, an important military power.

The military danger is tomorrow. As Soviet arms flow into the country, there will be more and more need to send Syrian officers to Communist military schools, more and more need for Communist military technicians and advisers. The military danger—the danger of Syria as a Russian advance base, the danger of a well trained Syrian army advised by Russian or Czech officers—is still a potential one. But arms aid supports and makes possible other means of infiltration, more fundamental than the training and tailoring of armed forces.

THUS Syria is in flux—emotionally, psychologically, politically, economically, militarily. The tide of Arab nationalism is sweeping over Damascus and her bordering

deserts, and communism is trying to harness the tide.

There are a few—but only a few—Americans who believe that the process is beyond repair, that there is no power within the country to check Sarraj and company, to oppose the gradual trend toward ultra-nationalism of the Left. Their gloomy predictions have so far been borne out. There has been a Cabinet change in Damascus since the New Year, and the new Cabinet is considerably more leftist than the old. The former Minister of Interior (a key position in any dictatorial state) who was

relatively moderate, has gone. Internal power is more and more consolidated in the hands of Sarraj and his supporters.

Yet Syria—like Egypt—is not yet irretrievably lost. Most Syrians, as President al-Kuwatli has said, would undoubtedly like to be neutralist, to be apart from the "cold war." Syria, an uncertain childlike country with fierce passions and fierce pride, is still a vacuum filled only in part by communism. The question for tomorrow in the Middle East is: who fills the vacuum?

NY.N.T.

FEB 17 1957

Analysis of Russia's Objectives

By Frank Kelley

PARIS (Wireless).

The conquest of the Dark Continent of Africa, its wealth and its teeming peoples, remains a long-range goal of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

This is the view of European diplomats with extensive experience in the Middle East, where Russia's leap-frogging tactics into Egypt and Syria over the Baghdad Pact have been checkmated by development of the Eisenhower doctrine and the success of the visit of King Saud to the United States.

Basic Goals

Not even the dismissal of Dmitri Shepilov from the post of Soviet Foreign Minister will alter basically the goals of Russian policy in the Middle East area.

These, it is believed by many responsible officials, are to penetrate Africa on many fronts short of actual war, and to try to cut off ready access by the West to Pakistan, India and the historic routes of empire to Indonesia and Australasia.

George Orwell, in his prophetic and satirical novel "1984" foresaw a third world war over the riches of the Congo. There are some who say he was putting it off fifteen to twenty years.

Those favorably disposed to the West, like King Saud and Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef V, of newly independent Morocco, are aware of the dangers of penetration of the African Continent. This was demon-

strated in the last few days by the cordial talks that King Saud and the Sultan have had in Spain with Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Chief of State, and with Libyan leaders. King Saud also has talked with French and Italian officials.

Treaty Expected

Authoritative sources say the result may be some sort of Mediterranean treaty of friendship and commerce, without too much emphasis at the start on military co-operation.

This would provide the beginning of a Middle East-to-Morocco bloc in favor of the West, tending to combat a persistent Soviet drive, with Egypt as the spearhead, toward Africa, with its vast resources of uranium,

gold, copper, diamonds, petroleum, timber and farm products.

Apart from some regions of Latin America, Africa is regarded as about the last world storehouse of natural wealth.

To enter this, the Russians have been operating through Egypt and Syria. More recently, as a Paris dispatch to the Herald Tribune showed, there is a new form of combined Russian-Egyptian economic, religious, cultural and ideological penetration of at least eight areas of Africa, with the aim of promoting revolution by Moslem populations in these areas.

First Step

It was with this development in mind, diplomats here have said, that French Premier Guy Mollet's government, through an approving vote in the National

Assembly, has taken the first step toward setting up thirteen semi-autonomous republics in French West and Equatorial Africa, and on Madagascar.

The French effort in these areas is viewed as a backstop against the current Soviet-Egyptian moves to infiltrate and take over Moslem groups in Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia (plus Eritrea), Kenya, Uganda, the island of Zanzibar, and in West Africa, Nigeria and Liberia.

Speeches Recalled

Sources here said it was not without significance, in view of Soviet-Egyptian aims, that such French spokesmen as Foreign Minister Christian Pineau have spoken recently in Paris, and at the United Nations in New York, of their conception of "Eurasia," an interdependent group of nations and territories in Europe and Africa that can and should form an economic community, pooling European machines and African resources for their common good, and for their prosperity and freedom from communism.

The struggle for Africa is already well under way. It may never erupt into an atomic or conventional world war.

But the prizes are waiting, and diplomats say it is a question of timing and of methods to see how the West will fare against the East in order to win the South.

N. Y. Times.

FEB 21 1957

King Saud in Casablanca

CASABLANCA, Morocco, Feb. 20 (Reuters)—King Saud of Saudi Arabia spent the last day of his four-day visit to Morocco in Casablanca today. Earlier in the day, the King had separate audiences with the United States consul, and Alvaro y Sureda, Spanish Ambassador.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch
FEB 18 1957

ZHUKOV RETURNS TO RUSSIA AFTER TOUR OF INDIA, BURMA

LONDON, Feb. 18 (AP)—Soviet Defense Minister Georgi Zhukov was expected home today

after a 20-day tour of India and Burma. The Moscow radio reported his arrival.

On leaving New Delhi yesterday he said he would tell the Russians that "we have in India friends who have no other goal than to strive for peace and friendship."

The Hindustan Times, considered close to Prime Minister Nehru's government, said some uninformed foreigners mistakenly interpreted the visit as indicating an Indian-Soviet military alliance, adding:

"They would not think so if they knew how Marshal Zhukov tried to remonstrate with Mr. Nehru over India's attitude on Hungary (criticizing Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt) and how Mr. Nehru sharply reacted."

Washington Post

FEB 21 1957

Russia to Invite Saud

*CAIRO, Feb. 20—King Saud of Saudi Arabia, now on his way home after a visit to the United States, may soon be invited to Russia, the newspaper Al Akhbar reported today. It said the invitation would be extended by Soviet Ambassador D. Kiselev.

SOVIET EFFORT TO IMPRESS EGYPTIANS

PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY DISPLAYED

From a Correspondent

CAIRO, JAN. 27

Soviet and Egyptian flags flutter from the lamp standards along the parapet of the broad Kasr el Nil bridge that leads to the Gezira Island showground where a Soviet industrial exhibition—admission one piastre "in aid of Port Said"—is drawing crowds curious to see what the Soviet Union can produce besides armaments, wheat, and petroleum—and the Russian melodies that roll across the Nile from the showground loudspeakers.

Only a small, more sophisticated, minority are likely to be critical of what they find. Snatching at the opportunity presented by the cessation of imports from Britain and France and the good will engendered by the Kremlin's uninhibited political support of the Arabs, backed by consignments of jet fighters and tanks, Soviet foreign trade organizations, Machineexport, Stankoimport, Technopromimport, Iromsyrimport, &c., have set out a generous sample of what Russia officially can provide.

TWO HELICOPTERS

Free to all at the entrance gate is a large, well-illustrated booklet extolling the Soviet Union. It is a rotogravure production on good quality paper and, of course, in Arabic (the fact that the pages are arranged so that the reader has to turn from right to left instead of from left to right in the customary Arabic fashion is more likely to be the result of inadvertence on the part of some distant Muscovite printer than to possess any intended political symbolism).

Most conspicuous of the five dozen or so open-air exhibits, which include motor lorries up to 25-tonners, a long-distance motor coach, mobile cranes and earth-moving equipment, a highly scientific windmill, irrigation pumps, and agricultural machinery surrounded by clusters of interested farmers and *telluheen*, are two trim-looking helicopters in the colours of Aeroflot, the Soviet air line, one a three to four seater and the other a big commercial-type machine. In strange contrast beside them is an enormous single-engined biplane which looks like a museum piece, though the outsize cabin indicates that it is probably a useful aerial workshop.

JETS OF WATER

Few Egyptians ever see an aircraft at close quarters on the ground, and these specimens are the focus of enthusiastic interest, especially among many parties of school children and students. A MIG or two would have made an even deeper impression, but would have clashed with the big banners proclaiming that the policy of the Soviet Union is peaceful. The next attraction for the young is a bright coloured steel-hulled cabin launch, "equipped with a hydro-electric propeller"—propelled by jets of water, in other words, and with a very shallow draught.

A capacious two-storey pavilion adjoining houses capital and consumer goods. Russian operatives of both sexes in blue serge suits and costumes, a few speak Arabic—are on hand to explain and demonstrate the machine tools and factory plant, including textile and cotton-ginning machinery. There are scale models with flashing lights of larger installations, hospital and dental equipment, electric motors, printing machinery, everything, in fact, that the layman expects of a big industrial nation. Huge coloured photographs of suitable Soviet scenes cover the walls.

A grinning, waving throng watches itself on television, packed around a camera operating on a closed circuit to neighbouring receivers. A novelty is a small wireless set which draws its power from a paraffin ceiling lamp. There are motor-cycles, and

two types of cars. One of them, a small family saloon, looks modern, but the other appears to be roughly the equivalent of a big American limousine of several years ago. There are also cameras and refrigerators, books, and gramophone records, textiles and carpets, cosmetics, glassware, and handicrafts, furs, and ceramics, tea sets and samovars, foodstuffs and a big display of confectionery—sure to appeal to the sweet-toothed Egyptian bourgeoisie.

Contents of the exhibition shops include soap, perfumes, and caviare. The stocks of vodka are unlikely to appeal so much to the abstinent Muslims as the comfortable-looking lightweight camp beds. European-trained engineers say that the machine tools are excellent, but to the critical eye many consumer goods lack western styling and finish. But such a deficiency is of little consequence to the great majority of the Egyptian people, the have-nots.

NO PRICES GIVEN

Far more important is the cost. Names of Egyptian importers are displayed alongside the exhibits, but no prices are given. They are said to be strictly competitive, however, and in view of the importance of Cairo as a political and trade shop window there seems little doubt but that the Russians intend to follow up with brisk supply and delivery.

Mr. Bolshakov, a Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, who is here for the exhibition, has said to the Cairo Press that the Soviet Union is ready to accept the Egyptian pound for all trade deals, "however enormous might be the volume of Egypt's purchases." In addition a Russian offer to buy £12m. worth of Egyptian cotton is stated to be under consideration. Last year about 38 per cent. of Egyptian cotton exports went to the Soviet block.

The average Egyptian, after an interesting hour or so at the exhibition, must indeed conclude that life in the Soviet world is not altogether devoid of the comforts to which he aspires.

ONE PERFORMANCE ONLY

He can further indulge himself by buying a ticket for the Cairo opera house, where performances by the Moissiev troupe of 100 Russian dancers and musicians will soon be in full swing, and a Soviet film festival was inaugurated the other evening at one of the city's cinemas with *The Mother*, based on Gorki's classic.

The star of the film, Miss Vera Maretskaya, came all the way from Moscow for a personal appearance. Next night, however, film-goers were surprised to find the cinema offering them a Hollywood film instead. Nobody has since seen any more of *The Mother*, or of the six other Soviet films which were to have followed it.

Chicago Tribune
FEB 20 1957

Russia Donates Display Merchandise to Egypt

CAIRO, Egypt, Feb. 19 [Reuters]—Russia today presented Egypt with almost \$1,500,000 worth of goods displayed last month at a Russian industrial fair here. Egyptian Trade Minister Mohamed Abu Nosseir said the gift typified the good relations that exist between the two countries.

London Times
FEB 11 1957

EXODUS FROM EGYPT CONTINUES

GREEK GOVERNMENT'S ANXIETY

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

ATHENS FEB. 10

The treatment of alien minorities in Egypt is becoming a source of great anxiety for the Greek Government. Egyptian economic measures against non-Muslim residents was the subject of repeated conferences in Athens over the weekend between Ministers, the Greek Ambassador to Cairo and the representatives of Greek communal interests in Egypt.

Clearly in order to appease the Greek Press, which has been conducting a violent campaign against Egypt, the Greek Government has announced that the Foreign Minister, Mr. Averoff, now in New York, has asked the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Dr. Fawzi, that Egyptian citizenship with full rights and privileges should be granted to those members of the large Greek community wishing to remain there after the "Egyptianization" of foreign businesses. But in spite of the Government's efforts many Greeks have been liquidating their affairs in Egypt and are returning to Greece or emigrating to Australia.

Meanwhile, a new convoy of 816 Jewish refugees expelled or forced to flee from Egypt arrived at Piraeus on the steamship *Misir* to-day. They will be accommodated in 19 Athens hotels until they are moved to Israel in a special five-day airlift organized by the Jewish Agency.

11,000 JEWISH REFUGEES

This brings the total number of Jews to have left Egypt to 11,000. It is known that another 15,000 of the 34,000 Jews remaining are ready to leave but have no money to pay for their fares.

A spokesman for the United Jewish Appeal, an American-Jewish fund-raising organization that is financing the relief and migration of the Jewish refugees from Egypt and Hungary, told a Press conference here that at the rate anti-Jewish measures are being enforced in Egypt, this year may well see the end of the Jewish community dating back to the days of the Second Temple when the Judeans, escaping from the Babylonian armies, found a haven in Egypt.

He added that for the first time since the tenth century A.D., as a result of the Egyptian persecutions, contact had been established between Orthodox Jewry and the Caraites, a Jewish Protestant sect. There are about 4,000 or 5,000 Caraites in Egypt, the largest Caraites community known to exist in the world to-day. They are being expelled by the Egyptian authorities and have applied for material help to the Cairo Rabbinical Council. It is understood that in spite of protests from ultra-orthodox groups the Israel Government has agreed to their settlement in Israel. Some Caraites were among refugees on board the *Misir* to-day.

London Times
JAN 20 1957

A VISIT TO YEMEN


FRONTIER PROBLEM BEDEVILLED BY HATRED OF ISRAEL

From Our Special Correspondent

TA'IZ, JAN. 27

"Inglest?" The frontier guard frowned in disbelief. Yes, *Inglest*, the little Yemeni driver told him and pulled from his shirt pocket the magic letter—by the holy order of the Imam this Englishman was invited to enter Yemen. The guard scanned the paper and the accompanying passport; it was so indeed. He hitched at his great curved dagger, straightened his bandoleer, smiled and shook hands: "Welcome," he said, "you're welcome. *Salaam aleikum*."

The rough-hewn pole in front of the Land Rover was lifted, and we drove on up the stony bed of the wadi. A few miles farther on, the track curled up the side of a rocky knoll to a tiny village clustered round a fort. The gates were opened, and we drove through into



the courtyard for Customs inspection. Behind us a crowd assembled to view the stranger. "Welcome"—hands were thrust forward to be shaken, the glint of gold teeth matched the flash of dagger hilts in the sun, and small boys grinned shyly from beneath embroidered skull caps. Bolder than the rest, one man came forward to talk to the visitor on what he sensed would be common ground. "Suez, Suez," he repeated, and all too quickly one caught his drift, "Suez *tamam* (good)." Gamal, too, Gamal Abdel Nasser, *tamam* also. And *Saut el Arab* (Voice of the Arabs), one inquired? "Ah!" he cupped his ear in his hand and tilted his head to the sky, "*Tamam tantum*"—the best. At which point coffee arrived from the guardhouse pot, and your Correspondent was led ceremoniously away to eat Dutch tinned pears with a bottle of the ubiquitous cola in the cool light of a white-washed room in the fortress walls while his passport went from hand to hand.

FAMILIAR CURRENCY

Later in the afternoon at the Government guest house in Ta'iz, Yemen's administrative capital, he was still more graciously welcomed by his Excellency Said Hussein Ali Alwasi, acting secretary-general in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was formally dressed for the occasion in a gold-braided black robe and took him by the hand to a salon whose only furniture was a plain deal table and a suite of white and gold Egyptian Louis Quinze. The exchange of courtesies required two more coffees, and it was not until approximately 10 p.m. that the Excellency came to politics; then it was

in his bedroom, where he sat with almost indolent dignity upon his bed sucking a water pipe, while an interpreter handed back and forth between us the familiar currency of Middle East affairs.

On the dispute with Britain Said Hussein felt it would be best if the British Government sent a delegation to Ta'iz—

or perhaps invited a Yemeni delegation to London—for discussion of all outstanding questions between the two countries. Yemen wished something more than border talks, as suggested by the British, and he had lately handed a Note to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Ta'iz, Mr. W. Monteith, requesting more comprehensive discussions. No, he did not feel need of a United Nations commission to visit the frontier; between us we could say who is right and who is wrong, and Yemen did not want any one interfering in her affairs. She knew what the disease was and its remedy—simply find a solution!

THIRTY YEARS AGO

One wondered whether this would be so easy since the views of the two sides seemed so opposed, but his Excellency said that it would surely be good for all if there were no more incidents. With the most charming smile, he hinted that responsibility must lie with Britain; one did not find tribes fighting each other in Yemeni territory (and it is true, apparently, that internal security in Yemen is better than in the Protectorates), so that it must be the presence of the British which caused trouble on the border. Chiefs who did not want to submit to Britain had been exiled or had fled to Yemen—his Excellency named five or six—and the British had bombed their territory.

Had the British bombed Yemen territory, as was so often claimed? Indeed they had; they had even dropped bombs on Ta'iz. I would be able to see an unexploded British bomb in the town, and a ruined house, preserved as a memory of British enmity. Matters became clearer when it emerged that these were memories of a former dispute in 1926, when, it was said, some 50 people were killed by British attacks. And now? Well, there were many reports of attacks across the border; someone had seen bombers over Qataba, and six months ago there had been vapour trails in the sky over Ta'iz, which could only have been left by a British aeroplane.

TEST OF FAITH

But it was perhaps significant that the bulk of the conversation dwelt on the problem of Israel. Within five minutes, one was asked why Britain continued to support the enemies of the Arabs, namely Israel. How could Arabs be expected to have faith in Britain as long as this was so? It was necessary sometimes to turn towards Russia, because Russia did not support Israel; and Arabs and Jews could only live peacefully together again if Israel became part of an Arab State—preferably thought Said Hussein of Jordan, who was, after all, a great friend of Britain.

Discussion remained highly amicable, as it ranged over well worn paths, but between the Arab view of Israel and that of the West there seems to be no gulf that can be bridged; and to find it so deep, even in a country as territorially remote as Yemen from any conceivable Jewish threat, is an indication of the power of the idea in the Middle East to-day—spread by radio, entrenched by events, and now imprisoning both Arabs and West alike. It is an idea not without its role in the present troubles on the Protectorate frontier.

Sweet and Sour

Mr Shepilov's speech to the Supreme Soviet marks Russia's first serious attempt to regain the diplomatic initiative after the upsetting events of the last few months. She feels solid enough to launch another of those sweet-and-sour appeals for the solution of most of the world's problems, in which soothing nostrums balance denunciations and warnings, and approving mentions of peaceful coexistence set off forecasts of the crack-up of capitalism. To us at the receiving end the question is whether there is a morsel of meat beneath the sweet-and-sour sauce. What Western Governments have to examine is Russia's offer of a general settlement in the Middle East. Most of this seems designed to rouse sympathy in Asia—and it may well succeed—rather than to lead to serious negotiations. Russia asks that the four Powers should exclude the Middle Eastern countries from any blocks and should give up all their bases in the area. She must know that the withdrawal of Turkey from the North Atlantic alliance and the withdrawal of the Americans from Dhahran are neither of them matters that the West will negotiate about. There may be more substance in the proposal that both sides should stop supplying the Middle Eastern countries with arms. Certainly there is everything to be said for withholding arms from countries like Egypt or Syria; an agreement to treat the Arab States and Israel as neutrals in the East-West conflict is within the bounds of possibility. But Mr Shepilov's outright patronage of Egypt raises little hope of achieving it.

For the rest, Mr Shepilov has little to say that is new. The proposed world economic conference is an old warhorse that has taken part in many a "peaceful coexistence" campaign. Together with the general appeals for disarmament and "cultural contacts," it suggests a desire to spread sweetness and light rather than to achieve anything concrete. Mr Shepilov's more pointed remarks are addressed to individual Western countries and to the Communist camp itself. Western Germany is encouraged, as election time comes on, to think that greater friendliness to Russia may help forward unification; as in Marshal Bulganin's message to Dr Adenauer, soothing generalities rather than specific proposals set the tone—and this may not be bad tactics. France gets an acknowledgment of her "historic ties" with Algeria, whose right to independence she should, however, admit. The people who get no encouragement at all are Mr Gomulka and Marshal Tito. Mr Shepilov repeats at length the fable

according to which "counter-revolution" in Hungary forced the Soviet Union (without, of course, infringing Hungary's independence or interfering in her domestic affairs) to send in tanks and troops. He insists that "national communism" is a heresy and will be stamped out. This is now the unvarying Soviet line. But its reiteration suggests that in basing their policy in their own camp on a fantasy the Soviet leaders may be making a mistake. Sweet reasonableness abroad may fail when the next crack in the fantasy world at home shows the ugly reality beneath.

London Times

FEB 13 1957

NEW SORTIE

Every now and then, in a burst of Stakhanovite energy, the Soviet Foreign Office clears its in-trays, and a spate of Notes and speeches is the consequence. In the past few days Germany, Europe, Anglo-Russian relations, disarmament, and the Middle East have all been the subject for Soviet homilies, and though most of the argument is familiar there is no mistaking the persuasive manner in which it is presented. Hungary and Poland caused a period of silence or bluster. That period is past, and Russia once again takes the stage as the main architect of peace and the champion of coexistence. There can be no denying that in much of the Middle East this Russian role is already taken largely for granted, and there will be a ready audience for that part of Mr. SHEPILOV's speech yesterday which dealt with the region. To suggest that the sovereignty of the nations there should be respected, that foreign bases on their soil should be liquidated, and that there should be no attempt "to include these countries in military blocks with the participation of the Great Powers" is to echo what is heard hourly in Cairo, Damascus, and elsewhere. But it would be a mistake to dismiss MR. SHEPILOV's speech as simply an effort to keep the favour of Arab nationalism. Any proposals ostensibly designed to promote the stability of the Middle East deserve the closest scrutiny, since this must be the abiding aim of British policy.

The main purpose of the speech is clearly to counteract the Eisenhower doctrine. This doctrine is based on the belief that a vacuum of power is dangerous unless the countries concerned are strong enough to look after themselves. MR. SHEPILOV suggests a bigger and better vacuum. Not only does he recommend "non-interference in the internal affairs of the Near and Middle East"—a region left undefined—but also the cessation of all arms shipments. This may hardly be welcome to some of Russia's more ardent Middle Eastern supporters, and in fact is inconsistent with the well authenticated reports of fresh deliveries

of Russian arms to Egypt and the Yemen. Since these deliveries are also in defiance of the United Nations resolutions it is pertinent to wonder what guarantee there would be against any future infringement of an all-round arms embargo. It is of even greater interest to reconcile these proposals with the current Russian attitude towards the Arab-Israel problem.

In April last year the Russian Government issued a statement on the Middle East, the burden of which was the need to support the United Nations in a search for a "mutually acceptable" solution of the Palestine problem. This theme has now been dropped, except in so far as it is contained in Mr. SHEPILOV's first principle that disputes should be settled "exclusively by peaceful means and negotiation." But the Middle East is suffering from a surfeit of general principles. What it requires now is practical solutions for urgent problems, and Russia has not been exerting the considerable influence she could command towards the search for such solutions. MR. SHEPILOV's proposals are undoubtedly framed to have the greatest possible propaganda effect, but they also embody a definite policy. This is to weaken the Middle East through its progressive isolation, and so undermine the position of nations such as Britain and America which depend on the Middle East for oil and free communications. The latest sortie in the political war is a different approach from that of the United States. But what matters is efficacy. In this regard the Shepilov doctrine promises even less than the Eisenhower one.

FAR EAST

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

MALAYA CHARTER
ACCENTS EQUALITYPublished Draft Emphasizes
Common Nationality of 4
Major Ethnic Groups

Special to The New York Times.

SINGAPORE, Feb. 20—A draft Constitution for an independent Malaya aimed at establishing a democratic form of government was published today.

The Federation of Malaya, the only country in southeast Asia engaged in active combat against communism, will gain "merdeka" (the Malay word for freedom now commonly used for independence) from Britain in August.

It has a population of 6,200,000, of whom the Malays comprise 3,000,000, the Chinese 2,300,000 and Indians and Pakistanis together 740,000.

Chief Minister Tengku (Prince) Abdul Rahman, realizing the difficulty of giving one community permanent advantage over any other in the new state, as has been the case in other young nations in southeast Asia, had proposed to the commission that drew up the draft constitution that "in an independent Malaya all nationals should be accorded equal rights, privileges and opportunities."

Integration Objective

In other words, the aim of the Constitution is to provide a common nationality for the future major groups of people of different race, creed and culture.

The special privileges of the Malays would be confined to the ones enjoyed at present with regard to Malay reservations, quotas for admission to public services and quotas in respect to the issuance of permits and

licenses and in connection with scholarships.

The commission, under its chairman, Lord Reid, said that under the present circumstances it was necessary to continue the preferences since the Malays would be at serious and unfair disadvantage compared with other communities if the preferences were suddenly withdrawn.

"But with the integration of various communities into a common nationality, which we trust will gradually come about, the need for these preferences will gradually disappear," the commission added.

To Keep English 10 Years

The draft Constitution provides that Malay should be the national language and that for a period of at least ten years

English should continue to be the official language.

The supreme head of the Federation of Malaya will be the senior among the rulers of the nine constituent states. He will be known as the Yang di-Pertuan Besar, or paramount ruler.

There will be a Parliament of Malaya, which will consist of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar and two houses to be known as the Senate and House of Representatives. One hundred members of the House will be entirely elected while in the Senate twenty-two will be elected and eleven nominated.

Fundamental rights in the new nation will include freedom from arrest and detention without authority, freedom from slavery forced labor and banishment, freedom of speech, freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion and guarantees against discrimination in appointments to government service.

Malaya will become a dominion within the British Commonwealth. Defense and foreign affairs will continue to be directed from London.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

2 JAKARTA PAPERS
OPPOSE SUKARNO AIM

Special to The New York Times.

JAKARTA, Indonesia, Feb. 20—Two major opposition newspapers have demanded that the Communists not be given an opportunity to turn Indonesia into another Czechoslovakia.

Their demands were made in the form of a strong editorial attack on President Sukarno's reported plan calling for the inclusion of the Communist party in a "new-style" government that he feels will help solve the country's many problems.

The Communists are the fourth largest party in the country, having won more than 6,000,000 votes in the 1953 general elections.

The Presidential blueprint—or "conception," as it is called here—is scheduled to be made public tomorrow.

Keng Po, regarded as Socialist-oriented and believed to be the newspaper with the biggest circulation here, said:

"If the Communist party should join the Cabinet, no matter in which ministry, they would not hesitate to exploit their position not to strengthen the authority of the Government but to weaken it. They have often followed such tactics in countries such as Czechoslovakia."

Pedoman, also Socialist in outlook, declared that "the history of Czechoslovakia" demonstrated that Communist participation in a Cabinet could be considered "to afford an opportunity to the Communists to make preparations for a coup d'état and to take over government agencies."

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

PENALTY UNLIKELY
FOR PEIPING VISITSOfficials Hint Newsmen Who
Went to Red China Will
Not Be Prosecuted

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 (AP)

The Government apparently has dropped any idea of prosecuting three United States newsmen for visiting Communist China in defiance of a State Department ban.

At one time the Department indicated it was ready to impose legal and administrative penalties on the men. But now officials appear ready to forget the whole episode.

One official put it this way:

"We do not want to see anyone boiled in oil."

The three newsmen were William Worthy of the Baltimore Afro-American and Edward Stevens and Philip Harrington

of the magazine Look. Messrs. Worthy and Harrington are back in the United States. Mr. Stevens is at his regular post in Moscow.

The State Department indicated several weeks ago that any reporter who went to the Chinese mainland would risk punishment for violating passport regulations and provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act or the Logan Act. The latter law bars United States citizens from corresponding with foreign governments in an attempt to interfere with United States foreign policy.

Secretary of State Dulles declined yesterday to tell his news conference what might happen to the newsmen. But other officials indicated the administration was ready to drop the matter. Mr. Harrington's passport has expired and Mr. Worthy's will expire March 4.

Mr. Stevens has been told he will be given a passport good only for return to the United States when he leaves Moscow. However, he has asked for a hearing. It could be held in

either Washington or Moscow.

The newsmen went to Red China after being invited, with others, by the Peiping regime last August. The State Department issued a formal statement Aug. 7 saying it would not issue passports to any United States citizens for such a trip. The department said the policy was designed to prevent the Chinese Communists from using reporters and other Americans to gain "respectability."

Secretary Dulles said that he would review the travel ban if Peiping freed ten Americans held in jail.

Mr. Dulles also said last week that Peiping was trying to make a deal under which it would

allow imprisoned Americans to return home if the State Department would let United States reporters visit Communist China. Mr. Dulles called this "blackmail," that he said he did not propose to pay.

He also said the issuance of passports for travel to a nation not recognized by the United States "is something which is never done." But he said there were "all sorts of refinements" to the question of the status of a reporter who wanted to travel to such a nation without any protection from the Government.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

Turncoat G. I. Returning

HONG KONG, Feb. 20 (AP)—Samuel D. Hawkins, of Oklahoma City, Okla., will arrive in Hong Kong from Peiping Feb. 27, the British Embassy said today. He was one of the United States soldiers who chose to remain in Communist China after they were captured during the Korean war.

N. Y. Times

FEB 21 1957

TADAO OASA

KUMAMOTO, Japan, Feb. 20 (AP)—Taduo Oasa, a member of the Lower House and recently state minister in charge of police affairs, died today of a heart attack. His age was 67.

Mr. Oasa also held the State Minister's post in Gen. Hideki Tojo's wartime Cabinet.

Mr. Oasa was one of those removed from office after World War II because of his work in the Tojo Cabinet. However, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1952—a position to which he originally had been elected in 1924.

He had served recently as chairman of the Japanese Public Safety Commission.

STUDENT UNREST NOW IN CHINA

"Democratic freedom" not understood

By Victor Zorza

The student unrest which has been so noticeable recently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seems to be spreading as far afield as China. The Peking "People's Daily" yesterday complained that some students had no "clear understanding of the meaning of democratic freedom," while others failed to distinguish between "us and the enemy."

The paper, which was reporting a meeting of the Communist Youth League, said that this applied only to a minority of students, and it arose out of a lack of understanding on their part for the "class viewpoint." But it added that 80 per cent of China's university students "came from non-proletarian families, and said that their way of thought must be criticised and put right "as we would cure a patient." All the same, the main current of student thought, it said, was healthy.

The Chinese authorities have long had considerable difficulty in "re-educating" the old intelligentsia and its children, but the present difficulty is of a new kind. The reference to the students' misinterpretation of the meaning of democratic freedom suggests that the recent attempts at "democratisation" in China have led the students to demand more freedom than the scope of democratisation was intended to provide, in the same way as happened in the other Communist countries.

An old complaint

Last month, for instance, a Peking radio report referred to the desire among the students "to put individual interests above collective interests"—which is an old complaint—but added that other "unhealthy thoughts" included "over-emphasis on democracy and individual freedom." The party conference of Peking institutions of higher learning at which these unhealthy thoughts were noted attributed them to failure to strengthen ideological education.

But the democratisation of intellectual life, while on the one hand it was designed for the intelligentsia's more active participation in the "building of socialism," had also what might be called an ulterior motive. This was to bring dangerous thoughts out into the open, so that they could be dealt with more easily. As the "People's Daily" said on August 29: "Let them talk; only thus can we efficaciously guide their ideology. Marxism is an all-comprehending absolute truth."

The application of this new trend to university life found expression in an announcement which said that, "now that teachers and students have achieved a high level of consciousness," it was time to help them to "develop the spirit of independence and initiative" and to allow academic bodies more independent authority. But it was soon found that such relaxation of controls as was permitted had a most undesirable effect. On December 9 Peking radio urged teachers to "assume full responsibility" for their students.

The New China News Agency reported an even more serious development from Tientsin, where middle school students were found playing with pet animals or reading comic books in class, or even "asking the teachers ridiculous questions." There were also reports of "abnormal development of emotion" among girl students, and other undesirable results of the "lack of collective activities." These, however, were due to the shortage of teachers and contraction of school hours, and not to the relaxation of ideological controls.

FEB 4 1957

Freedom too Attractive

The peasants of China, who have just been celebrating Lunar New Year, are likely to say farewell in it to the free marketing system that was introduced last July. Alarmed by reports from all over the country the State Council in Peking has decreed that there shall be no further extension of free markets and that local authorities may henceforth restrict those in their area. As in so many policies, the task of transforming China results in a zigzag course.

What had happened during the "high tide" of bundling peasants into cooperatives was that subsidiary products—handicrafts and foodstuffs—were also put under control and marketed through state cooperatives. The result was near stagnation. The unlucky peasant who had a few dozen eggs to sell, who knocked together kitchen utensils from scrap metal in a backyard, or whose womenfolk busied themselves sewing cloth shoes, was forced to sell his produce through the state marketing co-operative. Buying prices were paltry, selling prices excessive. The work died away and the trade with it. Last July the peasants responded with alacrity when a free market was restored. Nothing more than a stool and a basket of chickens was necessary to set up shop at the city gates. The goods began to move swiftly again and the peasants did better for themselves than they were doing in the cooperatives. When the news circulated production teams in the cooperatives lost half their men overnight. Officials were soon reporting that the attractions of the free market were excessive.

Now the doors are closing again. The painstaking arguments lately set forth in the party journals to prove that the free market "will bear a socialist character and will not breed capitalism" must now be followed by even more tortuous articles expounding the virtues of state control. And the peasants will have to troop back to their places in the cooperative production team. It will be a testing year.

N. Y. Times

FEB 17 1957

GEN. YUAN, 53, DIES; RED CHINESE AIDE

Deputy Foreign Minister
Was Envoy to India—
Led Third Field Army

LONDON, Feb. 16 (AP)—Gen. Yuan Chung-shien, Deputy Foreign Minister of Communist China, died today of lung cancer, the Peiping radio announced. His age was 53. General Yuan, who joined the Communist party in 1924, was Ambassador to India from 1950 until last April, when he became a deputy to Chou En-lai, Red China's Premier and Foreign Minister.

London Times

FEB 13 1957

JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH EAST BLOCK STATES

GRADUAL RESUMPTION

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

The arrival in Tokyo of Mr. Tevosyan as the first post-war Russian Ambassador to Japan is likely soon to be followed by further missions from behind the Iron Curtain.

Since January 11 talks have been in progress in London, and have now been concluded, for the ending of the state of war between Japan and Czechoslovakia and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The talks were conducted by Mr. Nishi, the Japanese Ambassador, and Dr. Hajek, the Czech Ambassador in London, and after five meetings all that is now required is the formal approval of the two Governments.

The re-establishment of relations is likely to lead to an increase in trade between the two countries. Since the war this has been negligible, but imports to Japan from Czechoslovakia, both in 1935 and 1936, amounted to \$600,000. The exports were mainly for brewing, dye-stuffs, cotton tissues, sheet glass, iron and machinery. Among Japanese exports to Czechoslovakia textiles were important.

Japan and Poland signed a treaty for the resumption of diplomatic relations in New York on Saturday. Japan has no diplomatic relations yet with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Albania, and is likely to be still in a state of

Captured Nanking

General Yuan, a native of Hunan Province, became chief of staff of the Third Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He later led the army that captured Nanking for the Communists.

A year before he assumed his post in New Delhi, General Yuan was garrison commander and political commissioner of Nanking. There he negotiated with the British after the shelling of the sloop Amethyst.

While Ambassador to India, the general worked toward peaceful infiltration by Red China into the affairs of Tibet. He also successfully completed negotiations between the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal and Peiping and presented his credentials to King Mahendra in the Royal Palace at Katmandu.

Last year General Yuan became Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and directed an intensive campaign to develop contacts between Peiping and Asian and African countries. He was a graduate of the Whangpoa Military Academy.

C. S. Monitor

FEB 16 1957

Peace Talks Denied

Chinese 'Bridge' Rumored

By Gordon Walker

Chief Far Eastern Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

A sudden spate of rumors of peace talks between Peking and elements within the Nationalist government on Formosa appear at the moment to be without foundation in fact.

It is likely, even probable, however, that through devious channels—not altogether unofficial—contact has been made and continues between the two theoretically antagonistic governments.

[Nationalist China's Premier O. K. Yui has invited Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai to come to Formosa — if he "repents his past and comes here to begin life anew."

[He was referring at a press conference to Mr. Chou's recent statement that he is willing to visit Formosa if invited.

[Mr. Yui said Nationalist preparations for a counterattack had been "pushed to such a degree that the day could not be far when the Nationalist force would rally forth from Formosa."

Intelligence analysts here believe that the facts regarding Formosa peace rumors revolve around two points.

1. That Peking is deliberately encouraging the idea that peace talks are under way as a means of creating doubts among those overseas Chinese who are either openly pro-Nationalist or who are remaining on the fence.

2. That while a "deal" between Communist China and Formosa is possible and perhaps eventually probable, the time and "atmosphere" are not yet right.

The Nationalist government has suffered serious setbacks not the least of which is Vice-Admiral Stuart Ingersoll's recent statement that the Nationalist Army is being trained solely for defense and not for offense.

And this statement has already seriously undermined the

Nationalists' chief propaganda theme—namely, that Nationalist military forces are being groomed for an assault on the mainland.

But there still is no definitive indication that Washington intends to abandon its military support of the Nationalists or to shut off its flow of dollars.

And until such time as the Nationalists are convinced that they have been written off, there is unlikely to be anything more than exploratory contact between Peking and Taipei.

Key figure in the current peace rumors, meanwhile, is Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo, President Chiang's elder son and probably the second most important man on Formosa today. General Chiang is a man of many hats. Because of the fact that he studied 14 years in Mos-

cow and has a Russian wife, it is often suggested that he is the likeliest candidate for leadership of any potential defection movement.

What is left out of this type of estimate, however, is the fact that the general is not only boss of all the local secret police organization on Formosa itself, but is also the leader of the Nationalist espionage and guerrilla organization on the mainland.

And as a master spy—heir to the vast Nationalist espionage network left behind by the late Gen. Tai Li, who is often re-

ferred to as the Himmier of China — he probably has a greater stake in continuance of the Nationalist role as a refugee government than as a mediator in any possible "sell-out" maneuver.

The propaganda effect of the recurrent Formosan peace rumors, meanwhile, is difficult to assess, but observers here believe it is considerable, particularly in such key areas as Thailand, where there are some 3,000,000 overseas Chinese.

At the very least, the rumors create doubts in the minds of those Chinese who may support the Formosan regime but who don't want to be left out in the cold if there is any change in the status quo.

London Times

FEB 4 1957

CHINESE AID TO NEPAL

APPROACH TO RUSSIA

NOW LIKELY

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

KATMANDU, FEB. 3

Mr. Chou En-lai came here, not only with a message of good will to people on the other side of the Himalayas, as he claimed, but also with 10m. Indian rupees as the first instalment of Chinese financial aid to Nepal. This first instalment is stated to-day to be under the terms of an agreement which provides for 60m. rupees worth of aid to Nepal in cash and material.

Nepal has so far been offered 240m. rupees in foreign aid, of which India has offered 100m. rupees and the United States 80m. rupees, while she needs 333m. rupees to finance her first plan. She still needs 93m. rupees, for which she approached various countries. The United States is believed to be not inclined to increase its commitment. Britain is now constructing a road in eastern Nepal and is not willing to make a further commitment. Knowledgeable sources say that China has suggested asking the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister is reported to have sounded other countries about approaching Russia. The first Soviet Ambassador to Nepal is to present his letters of credence in the first week in March, when things are expected to take shape.

NEPALESE SENTENCED ON PLOT CHARGE

KATMANDU, Feb. 3.—A Nepalese court, sitting in secret, has sentenced 13 Nepalese to varying terms of imprisonment after finding them guilty of being involved in a plot to overthrow the Government. The sentences are understood to range from six months to three and a half years. Those sentenced include a police inspector, and two army officers.—Reuter.

London Times

FEB 4 1957

MR. CHOU EN-LAI IN BUDDHIST TEMPLE

CEYLONESE IMPRESSED

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

COLOMBO, FEB. 3

Mr. Chou En-lai's six-day visit to Ceylon, which ends on Tuesday, has been a success—for Communism. Ceylon's predominantly Buddhist population had hitherto shunned Communist doctrine because the United National Party never lost an opportunity of presenting Communism as the enemy of Buddhism, and pamphlets and posters showing Buddhist temples going up in flames with the hammer and sickle in the foreground were commonly distributed in constituencies where Communist candidates were in the field. Mr. Chou En-lai was given an opportunity to counter this belief, and he took it with both hands.

He reverently placed the palms of his hands together and stood with head bowed before a group of Buddhist monks who chanted a blessing when he arrived at Colombo airport on Thursday. Next day at Kandy, home of the Temple of the Tooth, which is sacred to millions of Buddhists the world over, he presented Buddhist books and a cheque for 10,000 rupees to the temple and received a blessing from the Kandyan chief who is the temple's administrator. He also offered flowers at the statue of Buddha in the temple and stood before it for a few moments with bowed head.

"GREAT WRONG" DONE

All this has made headline news in the newspapers, especially the Sinhalese newspapers read by the greater part of the population, and workers and peasants reading the reports are likely to conclude that for years they had done Communists a great wrong by believing them a godless set when here was Chou En-lai himself offering flowers to and bowing before the sacred statues and the Buddhist clergy. It is enough even to set the smaller part of the population, which is Christian, thinking.

Loyalty to religion, whether Buddhism or Christianity, is what has so far stood in the way of progress of Communism in this small country, and no one should be surprised if the Ceylon Communist Party, after years of frustration and defeat, now finds the way clear before it. The Ceylon Communists must thank Mr. Bandaranaike, who not only made the visit possible, but also arranged the stage on which Mr. Chou so admirably played the lover of Buddhism.

BUDDHIST COUNCIL FOR CEYLON

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

COLOMBO, FEB. 3

In spite of opposition from the two chief priests of the premier chapters of Malwatte and Asgiriya to a Government-sponsored council of Buddhist clergy, the Minister of Local Government and Cultural Affairs has, with the Prime Minister's approval, submitted the names of eight Buddhist monks and four Buddhist laymen to the Governor-General asking that they be appointed to a commission to report on the setting up of such a council. The names of the chief priests of Malwatte and of Asgiriya are not included in the list.

London Times
FEB 14 1957

INDONESIA SEES THE ROCKS

I—SHADOW STATE IN CENTRAL SUMATRA

From Our South-East Asia Correspondent

The mountains of Sumatra are the western bastion of that phenomenal design of islands strung along the Equator like a curtain on a rod and now called Indonesia. These mountains, hot with the eternal glare, stand in a north-south line as close as they can to Sumatra's west coast. Behind them, eastwards, Sumatra's sister islands range for a distance as great as the span of the Atlantic. Java, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, Dutch New Guinea—thus went the names of the largest of them until not long ago; now the Indonesians call them Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Moluccas, and West Irian, though the last territory has not like the others been transferred from the Netherlands to the Indonesian flag.

These islands, numbered down to the last pin points, total 3,000 in all. What happens in each of them is often lost in the mist and cloud of remoteness, insurrection or indifference, and in the



torpidity of some of the people who have barely ever been governed and are not likely of a sudden to govern themselves now.

The Dutch ran a girdle of efficiency round the islands, but it could only embrace the points it touched. Even if they had been as enlightened in their rule as many critics, wise after the event, are now ready to tell them they should have been, they could not have brought statistics, method, and self-government to jungle, *kampung* (village), and coral reef everywhere; and even if life on the islands were as organized to-day as in, say, the United States, there could not be complete exactness of government on 3,000 separated bits of land.

UNBORN MILLIONS

Anyone who stands slightly off from Indonesia and tries to follow what is happening there, or reads about it from afar, begins to think that the archipelago, politically and economically, is lost; that the island pieces are sinking away by one from sight beneath the waveless sea. Of course, this is not so. In 50 years' time, if living space can be found then for the many millions more who will have been born, the Indonesians will be getting along in some way, perhaps a good way. At the same time their politics can be ludicrous and their economics disastrous, and one island cares nothing of what the other is doing. In Java the public knows as little about what happens in its great neighbour Sumatra as if the continent of Africa interposed between.

When I landed at Padang, in central Sumatra, I entered what is now the little principality of Colonel Ahmad Hussein, 31 years' old, commander of the fourth regiment and chairman of the Banteng council. This council formed itself in December round the tradition and the emblem of the Banteng (buffalo) regiment which resisted Holland after the war in central Sumatra. Since December it has laid down the law in central Sumatra, forming, though it would deny this, a shadow State within a State.

Colonel Hussein sees to it that his men look the traveller over well at the Padang airport, and if the new arrival brings in a newspaper even that is examined. A military policeman and a soldier take their turn after the Customs official, who is galvanized into doing things as this stronghold of Sumatra would wish them done, not as the central government does them.

COMMUNISTS ARRESTED

Java's nominee as provincial governor—an intelligent man, it is said—has shed his responsibilities. Some say he has been under house arrest, but the Banteng men say he has "cooperated" with them. The version of the story depends on whom one talks to; but there have been other arrests of which there can be no doubt. Communists have been arrested, among them labour leaders on the Calix oilfields, the largest in Sumatra. The fields are at Pakanbaru, 150 miles north-east of Padang across the mountains, and only 180 miles from Singapore. These arrests, and the strife which has sprung up between the Banteng council and the Communists, may lead to serious trouble yet.

The setting at Padang is rather as if the Desert Rats were having a reunion in Devon or Cornwall and had decided to administer those counties until London came to its senses. The town lies amid rice fields on the narrow strip between the mountains and the sea, a part rich in scenery but lacking the magic oil or great estates of rubber. Most of the rubber, like the oil, is on the other side of the mountains. The oil from Pakanbaru goes eastwards downriver to be loaded crude into ocean-going tankers waiting on the coast. The 84,000-ton tanker *Universal Leader* was there a short time ago; it also went south to the mouth of the Musi river, leading from Palembang, to load from the Standard-Vacuum and Royal Dutch/Shell resources in south Sumatra.

OIL PRODUCTION

Sumatra produces altogether about 1.5 per cent. of the world's crude oil and natural gasoline, and in the south, though not in the north, much of it is refined on the spot. This share of world production is small, but the supply is valuable to-day, as the dispatch of the giant tanker showed. It is worth

remembering that while an 84,000-ton tanker carries crude oil from next door to Singapore to the dollar market in the United States, which was her destination, the Singapore public is told to pay more for petrol on the grounds that Singapore is affected by disruption of Middle East supplies and rising tanker freight charges.

The Banteng council prescribes now what is good for the oilfields at Pakanbaru, but administratively the fields are a part of the Rhio islands lying between Singapore and Sumatra, and the council agrees that the Rhio group should have as much autonomy as its own area, the west part of central Sumatra. No one knows what such autonomy is supposed to mean, but the real test in Sumatra as a whole would be whether she received more of the foreign currency earned by her rubber and oil. To operate her own foreign exchange independently of the central government in Java and the Bank of Indonesia she would need a provincial bank recognized abroad, and the Padang patriots vaguely hope that the allocations of such a bank would flow evenly over the island.

In truth, all this is hazily understood at Padang. What matters there is that the unlucky Colonel Simbolon, who thought to defy the central government in Java from Medan, had to take shelter near his friend Colonel Hussein. Colonel Hussein, who in spite of all has not formally defied the central government, has not been deprived of his command, nor has any force been planned against him. The central government dares not challenge the sentiment and the grievances for which he and Simbolon stand. Indeed, Colonel Hussein is now to have his military district to himself, independent of Medan, under which it formerly came, while Simbolon is for the time being left alone.

UNRESOLVED ISLAND

Sumatra is an unresolved island, its population only one-quarter of Java's 50 million, its size and resources much greater. The British went there—to Bencoolen, which is also on the west coast—long before they went to Singapore, and Sir Stamford Raffles languished at Bencoolen in between his journeys to found Singapore. To-day Bencoolen is a poor shadow of the promise of Sumatra; but then if Sumatra's towns were a measure of her promise she would be a desert. Palembang is hideous; Padang has a little dignity with tiny pony carriages trotting up and down the streets, and a bay that might belong to the Mediterranean, but the beach is made into a garbage heap.

Away from Padang the valley road runs up into the heights where grass and trees sway amid flowers in the mountain breeze, just as they might do in Switzerland, and the air at once pulls back shoulders drooping under the weight of the coastal heat. The people look happy, healthy, and natural. But ultimately the road runs into a town of miserable, rusty, corrugated iron roofs—*Bukittinggi*. Some of the roofs are normally tent-shaped; some have the central Sumatran motif of buffalo horns, as the two ends of the top ridge turn sharply upwards, tapering off into two needles pointing at the sky. Superimposed on this ridge is another smaller ridge shaped the same, so that two more curving spires stand inside the others, making four arms in all raised upwards as if surrendering to the squalid utilitarianism around. On original wood the design is a thing of beauty, on rusty iron it is debasement.

Squalid utilitarianism—debasement? Is that all one may now expect of Sumatra and Indonesia? In to-morrow's article we shall look for the answer.

To be concluded

THE CRISIS IN COMMUNISM

A collection of items on the confusion in Communist ideology and the resulting disaffection and desertions from Communism throughout the world. Material will be reproduced under this heading from time to time as it becomes available.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., IN CRISIS

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- II. Background
- III. The CPUSA Faces the Facts about Stalin
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- VI. The Present Outlook

I. INTRODUCTION

Since February 1956, when the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union shattered the Stalin myth, the international Communist movement has staggered from one crisis to another, notably the Poznan workers' uprising, Gomulka's accession to power in Poland, and the Hungarian revolution. American Communists, in particular, have been in continuous upheaval. The crisis in world Communism, less than a year old, has been more shattering to the American party than a decade of the Cold War.

This report, after presenting a general picture of the state of the Communist Party in the United States on the eve of the Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union, discusses a) the effects of the Twentieth Congress on the American Communists, b) the effects of Communist revelations of anti-Jewish policies and practices in the Soviet Union, and c) the effects of the Hungarian uprising.

II. BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) has undergone a continuous decline in membership and influence. The party's break from the united-front strategy that it pursued during the war and from its policy of political action through the Progressive Party was in large measure responsible for isolating its members from the labor movement and the mainstream of the

country's political life.¹ The Soviet Union's post-war aggressiveness, its opposition to the Marshall Plan, and its creation of the Cominform to replace the pre-war Comintern further isolated the CPUSA. As the Cold War progressed, it became increasingly apparent that Communists were agents of the Soviet Union and actual or potential spies and saboteurs, rather than mere apologists for the Soviet Union. Revelations of espionage by American Communists probably disillusioned some members of the party who had joined out of misguided idealism. Legal action by the United States government and local agencies against Communist and Communist-front groups harassed the party, driving it almost completely underground and probably further isolating many party units from contact with non-party groups.

With the outbreak of the Korean war, the party practically ceased to recruit new members. The rate of turnover had always been extremely high but now few new members joined, while many old ones left. The FBI has estimated that by the end of 1955 party membership was down to about 20,000. The organizational secretary of the New York State party organization (the largest and most effective of all party sections) has admitted that in the last ten years the New York organization has lost more than two-thirds of its members.²

Most of the remaining members of the CPUSA are middle-aged and older. (The report of the New York State organization says that "two-thirds of our present membership are over 40 years old.") To a large extent, the CPUSA is a two-generation party. The pre-World War I immigrants from Czarist Russia, who have continued to associate themselves with the aspirations of the Bolshevik Revolution, were followed into the party by the American-born who joined the Young Communist League and the party in the heyday of the Popular Front, during the Thirties. Only a small proportion of this hard core are industrial workers; most are small businessmen, storekeepers and professionals. More than half live in New York and most of the others are concentrated in Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Detroit and Philadelphia. Organized in small units, these members in recent years have had as their primary function maintenance of the party organization, activity in a Communist front, and infiltration into bona fide community and political groups.

Because the CPUSA has had its strength in the old-timers, with their cult of Stalinist Russia, it is little wonder that the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party seems to have had a more crushing impact on the CPUSA than on parties in other countries.

III. THE CPUSA FACES THE FACTS ABOUT STALIN

The Daily Worker's news reports and comments on the Twentieth Congress gave its readers no indication that anything unusual had taken

1. In Communist parlance, this change in line represented a shift from a so-called "right" or "right opportunist" deviation (generally any policy of seeking open alliances with non-Communist groups) to a "left" or "left sectarian" deviation (generally a "class war" policy involving rejection of alliances with any "class enemy" or "class betrayer"). The "right" line usually accompanies a "soft" Soviet policy in international affairs; the "left" line accompanies a "hard" Soviet policy. A policy is characterized as right opportunist or left sectarian only after it has been repudiated; it is a line while in force and a deviation afterwards.

2. "The Status of Our Party: Excerpts from a report by the State Organizational Secretary on the New York State Organization, Given to the National Committee," Party Voice (issued by the N.Y. State Communist Party) July 1956. Herschel D. Meyer, a high-level party insider, in his The Khrushchev Report and the Crisis in the American Left, (Brooklyn, N.Y., Independence Publishers, 1956), says that since 1945 the party has lost 85 per cent of its membership.

place in Moscow. Though excerpts from Mikoyan's anti-Stalin speech had been published in the New York Times on February 19, 1956 and evidence was piling up about the planned destruction of the Stalin myth, it was not until March 13 that the Daily Worker acknowledged the Soviet attacks on Stalin. On that day Alan Max, its managing editor, admitted that he had been "jolted" and went on to say: "Any Marxist who says he has not been jolted is either not being honest with himself, in my opinion, or minimizes the extent of the developments now in progress in the Soviet Union." He then wrote:

Many things bother a person like myself: where were the present leaders during the period when they say that collective leadership was lacking? --what about their own mistakes in that period of capitalist encirclement? --are they giving proper weight to the achievements of Stalin?

Max also blamed American Communists for uncritically having accepted the very things which were being condemned in Russia and concluded by urging readers to write their opinions on the subject. Five days later the first significant letter was published. It was by Ring Lardner, Jr., one of the "Hollywood Ten." Lardner attacked the failure of Communist journalists to face the implications of the Twentieth Congress and condemned the "cult of personality" not only in regard to Stalin, but also in regard to the CPUSA's adulation of William Z. Foster, party chairman.

Foster had already published an article in the Daily Worker which showed his reluctance to accept the new line of de-Stalinization. A few days later, Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the CPUSA, published a series of questions and answers on the Twentieth Congress in both the Daily Worker and Political Affairs, the party's monthly theoretical journal, in which he defended the Russian party's policy of de-Stalinization.

The lines of difference on Stalin's record were drawn almost from the start, and in the ensuing months it became even clearer that there were basically three factions in the party. The first was the group headed by Foster, which tried--tactfully, of course--to defend Stalin against the attacks of Khrushchev and his allies. Foster had led the CPUSA during the last decade of Stalin's rule. As a disciple and follower of Stalin, his reputation and influence required a defense of Stalin and Stalinism.

The second group, led by Eugene Dennis, the CPUSA's general secretary, followed the Twentieth Congress-Khrushchev line and identified itself with current Soviet policy. The third group, led by John Gates, editor of the Daily Worker, accepted the criticism of Stalin but was also critical of Khrushchev. It welcomed the Russian party's retreat on Tito and hailed the possibility of independent "national" Communism.

Rank-and-File Opinion

Differences among the leaders of the CPUSA and their failure to issue an authoritative statement on de-Stalinization compounded the confusion in the rank and file. The Daily Worker opened its columns for an exchange of opinion unprecedented in the past generation, at least -- for forthrightness and spontaneity. Here are some pro-Stalin views:

"A.F.," March 25:

The critics of Stalin are ungrateful sons of a great father. Let any one of them boast he could have done

3. The Daily Worker is published daily, Monday through Friday; the weekend edition, dated Sunday, is entitled The Worker.

better....Judging from what is happening today, Stalin was justified in mistrusting his co-workers; he went on alone in the great work and this adds to his greatness.

"F.M.," a worker from Grand Rapids, March 26:

I was for Stalin, I'm for Stalin and I will be for Stalin. If Stalin was bad for the working-class, why are the capitalists hollering against him so much?

"E.H.," April 10:

I don't understand Khrushchev, telling us about the achievements of Stalin while he attributes it to the Communist Party and at the same time blames Stalin as being a one-man ruler. If Stalin was a one-man ruler then all these accomplishments are thanks to Stalin. On the other hand, if the Communist Party accomplished all that, then Stalin was not the ruler but they were the rulers....The mistakes they blame on Stalin but the great accomplishments they take for themselves....I think it's terrible to attack a great man like Stalin, the Stalin who saved humanity from Hitlerism.

But many Communists began to view de-Stalinization as offering an opportunity to criticize both Russia and the CPUSA:

"Hank," March 29:

The decision to throw the columns of the Daily Worker open to readers' comments about the 20th Congress of the CPUSA is perhaps the best indication that the lessons of that Congress are being properly understood here....We demand of the bourgeoisie that they permit free discussion of socialist ideas....Too often we have failed to apply it within our own ranks. It seems to me that a certain contempt for the rank and file is implied in the constant fear that "destructive" criticism had to be stifled....

"A.G.," April 2:

Not only did we actively defend abuses where we had no proof of guilt, merely a statement from the Soviet party, unsubstantiated by fact--where, with perhaps some justification, we gave the leaders the benefit of the doubt and assumed they had good reasons why they couldn't make such proofs public--but we even went so far as to defend things that we knew were outright lies.

"A.B.C.," a member of the party for twenty-two years; July 9:

1. Why is there no democracy in the USSR? Surely the manner of replacing Malenkov by Bulganin, and the changes in policies, were not done by means of any democratic process such as we know.

2. We always thought that capitalist countries would rather export capital than raise the standard of living of their own people, and that the export of capital was the economic essence of imperialism, of finance capital. Now the USSR is engaging in vast programs of capital export when the needs of their own workers are far from met. Tell us how this socialism is different from capitalism.

3. How can William Z. Foster speak honestly of the "unspeakable Beria" when we all know that he and we have not seen the indictment nor the trial proceedings nor the Malenkov report to the CPSU central committee and have

The Official Position

The turmoil in which the Communists found themselves was summed up by Max Weiss, Educational Director of the CPUSA, in a report to an enlarged meeting of the party's National Committee in New York City, April 28 - May 1, 1956.⁴ He complained:

The disclosure of mistakes made under Stalin's leadership came as a stunning surprise to our party leadership and members. We have not been prepared for this despite the attention paid to all the political preparations for the 20th Congress. Neither did we grasp the full extent of the mistakes made even when Khrushchev's report was made available.

Weiss commended the Daily Worker "for its boldness and political courage in attempting to give leadership to the discussion at a moment of great unclarity in the ranks of the Party," but he went on to say that "some wrong and harmful formulations were included" in some editorials "which caused great confusion."

Finally, on June 24, the National Committee issued a statement commenting on the State Department's publication of Khrushchev's speech. This statement, undoubtedly a compromise reached among the various factions, expressed the party's devotion to Communism and Russia, but it went on to declare:

We cannot accept an analysis of such profound mistakes which attributes them solely to the capricious aberrations of a single individual, no matter how much arbitrary power he was wrongly permitted to usurp. It is just as wrong to ascribe all the mistakes and violations of socialist principle to a single individual as it was to ascribe to him all the achievements and grandeur of socialist progress in the USSR.

Since similar views had been expressed by other Communist parties, the Russian Central Committee adopted a resolution on June 30 rebuking the foreign parties for their criticisms. Obediently, the National Committee of the CPUSA went into session again, and on July 25 it issued a statement which conformed completely to the Russian position:

We believe that the resolution of the CPSU provides a convincing answer to the Big Business enemies of Socialism who claim that the gross mistakes made under Stalin's leadership are inherent in Socialism. Not only does the socialist character of the system remain in the Soviet Union, despite the mistakes and injustices under Stalin's leadership, but during the past three years important steps have been taken to correct the mistakes of the past, to further democratize Soviet life and institutions, and to establish guarantees that such harmful injustices will never occur again.

The Draft Resolution

Early in May 1956 the National Committee announced that a national party convention would be held in February 1957. Later that month the National Committee advised that it had arranged for space in the Worker in which members could express their ideas about what should go into a new draft resolution that would be issued in September for consideration

4. This report was published as a 40-page pamphlet, The Meaning of the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, New York: New Century Publishers, May 1956.

The National Committee leadership had compromised its differences on de-Stalinization and had bowed, as always, to the dictates of Moscow. But acceptance of de-Stalinization required the formulation of a new party line and program. A platform had to be found which would win back the membership to a party that was self-convicted of having for decades worshipped a maniacal killer.

There were some defectors, and even of those who remained many complained, "We have wasted our lives." "Liquidationist" trends were apparent: some Communists and some sympathizers were urging the party to disband or reorganize on more modest lines. Eugene Dennis, in his report to the National Committee meeting on April 28-May 1, had suggested an "approach to all honest socialist and Marxist-oriented groupings and individuals," but was vague about a future "mass party of socialism." Joseph Starobin, the Daily Worker's foreign editor from 1942 to 1954, when he presumably quit the party, in a letter to the Nation published on August 25, urged the party to dissolve and its members to join with other leftist groups in forming a new movement. John Gates, members of the Daily Worker editorial board, and Steve Nelson favor the party's reorganization into a political action group, not unlike Earl Browder's old Communist Political Association, or a political educational association, not unlike the Fabian Society. This faction also puts strong emphasis on loosening and democratizing the party's structure and making allowance for dissent and freedom of discussion within the party. Foster, in an article "On the Party Situation," in Political Affairs for October 1956, accused the New York State organization of the party of being aligned with the Gates-Worker-Nelson faction.

Even after de-Stalinization no longer seemed a crucial issue, there was conflict over relations between the American and Russian parties. Foster apparently favors the traditional subordination to Russia, while Gates is for more independence. Dennis seems close to Foster on this question. All factions, it must be stressed, accept the thesis that Russia is a socialist, peace-loving and progressive country.

On September 13, a draft resolution was adopted by the National Committee; all thirteen members voted for the resolution at that time, Foster and Benjamin Davis with reservations. Subsequently Foster changed his vote to oppose the resolution.

Essentially the draft resolution represented an attempt to conciliate different views in the party and yet to keep the CPUSA in harmony with international Communist policy. It therefore praised de-Stalinization and strongly criticized the Stalin-Foster era of the previous ten years. Considerable emphasis was put on the party's "left sectarian" errors, with a few generous gestures toward party "achievements" in this period. It is probably in large measure because the document criticized the party's "mistakes" under Foster's leadership that Foster finally voted against it.

The criticism of the Foster period pacified the "right" faction in the party. But in trying to hold the CPUSA to the Khrushchev line, the National Committee failed to take any satisfactorily concrete position on some of the basic questions that had aroused the membership: internal party democracy; relations with Russia, Tito, and the satellites; a re-examination of party theory, and reorganization of the party.

The draft resolution offered the membership very little guidance on these questions. It made some vague promises of increased democracy

5. Failure to view the draft resolution in the context of the Communist crisis following de-Stalinization is bound to lead an analyst astray. The consequences of that failure are apparent, for example, in Walter Millis' recent Fund for the Republic pamphlet, Communism and Civil Liberties.

within the party organization, but sternly rejected "factionalism."⁶ As for party relations with Russia and the international Communist movement, the draft resolution tried to satisfy the different factions in the party, all of which subscribe to the thesis that Russia is a "socialist" country. Admitting that the CPUSA had "uncritically" followed developments in Russia, the resolution promised that the party would now "engage in comradely criticism of the policies and practices of the Communists in any country whenever they feel this necessary." A passage that seemed to indicate a concession to the Gates faction (and therefore aroused the opposition of Foster) suggested some basic revision in Communist theory. It proposed screening out of "Marxist-Leninist" theory those aspects of Lenin's principles which seemed outdated or which were valid only for Russia.

But the draft resolution rejected all proposals for reconstituting the party. Concerning Dennis' vague suggestion about the future possibilities of a "united party of socialism," the draft resolution declared:

Such a development can by no means be expected as a quick and easy solution to the common problems of all socialist groupings, or to the specific problems of our own Party. Least of all to weaken or dissolve the Communist Party. On the contrary, it is essential that the Communist Party strengthen in every way its organization, mass work and general influence.

All the other proposals to reorganize the party were dismissed as liquidationist or unjustified in present circumstances.⁷

The first impression the draft resolution gives is that agreement was reached among the members of the National Committee and that earlier differences were somehow harmonized. But the very vagueness of the resolution on key issues is the best evidence of failure to reach real agreement.

IV. COMMUNIST ADMISSIONS OF RUSSIA'S ANTI-JEWISH POLICIES

Following the Twentieth Congress came admissions about Communist crimes against Jews. On this matter, too, the leadership and the rank and file tried to evolve a point of view that would be appropriate to the needs of the party.

The admission of Communist crimes against Jews and Jewish culture was published on April 4, 1956, in the Communist Folksstimme, a Warsaw Yiddish-language newspaper. Almost every important American party leader expressed himself on this subject and both the Daily Worker and the Morning Freiheit published innumerable articles, editorials, and letters.

Many of the statements by party leaders expressing shock and dismay were undoubtedly sincere; others were probably made opportunistically, to satisfy the disturbed rank and file and to show non-Communists that Communists were indeed concerned about the fate of Jews. Party spokesmen also took upon themselves the responsibility of promising that the Soviet Union would soon repair the damage done to Jews and to Jewish culture, in line with the article in the Folks-shtimme.

The Daily Worker and Freiheit went one step farther than the party officials. They demanded an explanation from Soviet leaders about what had happened to Jews and Jewish culture and a guarantee against the repetition of such crimes. They also freely admitted their own guilt in having too readily accepted Russian "explanations" about the destruction of Jewish culture.

6. An amendment on this subject was released on December 23, 1955. For details, see Section VI.

7. An amendment on this subject was released on December 23, 1955. For details, see Section VI.

Comment by the rank and file of the party was, oddly enough, more divided than among the leadership. Many letters expressed shock and dismay at the revelations.

"S.G.," Daily Worker, April 17:

I write to you in deepest shame for myself, other progressives, and you, and with realization of our grave negligence, in regard to the issue of the Soviet Jewish writers -- unheard from in the last eight years.

"Yehiel Pelzenmacher," Freiheit, May 20:

You comfort us with patience; revolutionary justice will punish the guilty. This is scant comfort. What will the dead have from it? After such shocking revelations, isn't there a need for a revision of the entire Communist philosophy?....For 36 years I didn't tolerate any criticism of the Soviet government. Today I can no longer do this.

"T.M.," Daily Worker, August 3:

Are we again going to accept everything coming out of the Soviet Union as gospel truth? It is important to us to find out what, basically, caused these distortions of Soviet life in order to make sure that they do not recur. It is not enough quietly to "repair the fences" as on the Jewish question, without going to the root of why these things happened.

But there were also many readers of both the Daily Worker and Freiheit who objected to criticism of the Soviet Union on the Jewish issue.

"A.F.," Daily Worker, April 24:

Your editorial "Grievous Deeds" written in indignation, anger and grief, could have been reserved for a better cause. The paper should not be so touchy. Doing so drags the paper into a cheap, religious, sectarian corner and it is not honest when done in the name of socialism.

"Max Sp.," Daily Worker, June 20:

The enemies of the Soviet Union were happy that under the Stalin cult Jewish culture there, which had bloomed, had a terrible setback. But from what we read new policies are in effect and socialism is being put back on the track. We can now, at least, look forward to great things. Itzik Feffer did not die in vain. Many have given their lives for socialism for a better world and for a peaceful world. We will live to see what they lived for come true.

"A millinery worker," Freiheit, May 25:

I would like to know if the struggle for peace has some relation to the Jewish people. If so and if Ehrenburg leads this struggle, then it seems to me he's doing something for the Jewish people. No? Or -- is it OK to be a war agitator as long as one reads Yiddish? I love Yiddish, but it seems to me that Jews who don't hold with Yiddish are also Jews....

"I. Even," Freiheit, July 3:

We progressive Jews dare not in the present moment of great sorrow and pain give up, lose courage and faith

in the justice of the socialist ideal....Some people in the progressive ranks of Jewish communal life have given up because of the tragic events, going about hopelessly with pessimistic attitudes....Our comfort is that Jewish culture will again blossom in the Soviet Union, in spite of all our enemies, the enemies of the Soviet Union.

The Official Position

The National Committee's statement of June 24 on the Khrushchev speech contained three sentences relating to the Jewish question:

We are deeply disturbed by facts revealed in information coming from Poland that organs and media of Jewish culture were summarily dissolved and a number of Jewish leaders executed. This is contrary to the Soviet Union's historic contributions on the Jewish question. Khrushchev's failure to deal with these outrages, and the continuing silence of the Soviet leaders, require an explanation.

A few weeks later the party began to retreat from this position. It had become clear that the Soviet Union was not interested in Jewish culture or Jewish rights. The Kremlin not only had not replied to questions on this subject by Communists; various Soviet leaders--including Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Furtseva--had issued equivocal and contradictory statements to visiting delegations. Most significant was the fact that when on June 27, Pravda reprinted from the Daily Worker an article by Eugene Dennis, "The U.S.A. and Khrushchev's Special Report," it deleted Dennis' reference to Russia's "snuffing out the lives of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures." To Dennis' remark about the "persecution of the Jewish doctors," Pravda commented in a footnote that doctors of other nationalities were also affected.

As a result, the CPUSA backtracked on this subject as well as de-Stalinization in general when it issued its second statement on July 25. No longer asking Khrushchev for an explanation, the CPUSA volunteered to explain the matter itself. A phrase about the "happenings in the sphere of Jewish cultural institutions and their leadership" was its one remaining reference to Russia's anti-Jewish policy.

By September, when the party's draft resolution was issued, Russia's crimes against Jews had practically disappeared from sight. An indirect reference appeared only in the admission of the CPUSA's previous uncritical attitude toward the "mistreatment of certain national minorities" in Russia.

The National Committee of the CPUSA has given no further official consideration to the Soviet Union's Jewish policy.

The Yiddish-Speaking Activists

After the Folks-shtimme's revelations, Freiheit hailed as a new dawn every Soviet promise, official, unofficial or apocryphal, to rehabilitate Jewish culture. But contradictory statements and denials by Soviet officials about Soviet anti-Semitism and the fate of Jewish culture in Russia seemed to have more recently made Freiheit and its supporters somewhat more critical of Soviet promises. On October 12, 1956, twenty-six activists in Communist "Jewish work" addressed a memorandum to Nikolai A. Bulganin, chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and K. Y. Voroshilov, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which "urgently" requested the Soviet Union to issue "as soon as possible" a "public and authoritative statement dealing with the injustices suffered and with the measures being taken in the direction of reestablishment of Jewish cultural institutions."

The twenty-six signers of this memorandum included the editor of Morning Freiheit, editors of the monthly Jewish Life, functionaries of

the legally defunct Jewish People's Fraternal Order (whose lodges have continued to operate as "autonomous" clubs), some teachers in the Communist Yiddish schools, officials of some surviving Communist fronts (Emma Lazarus Federation, Jewish Music Alliance, American Federation of Polish Jews), and a few Communists engaged in "trade-union work." No high-level CPUSA official signed the document. Though it was dated October 12, the memorandum was not published in full until October 29 in the Daily Worker and November 4 in Freiheit.

In the absence of positive news about Jews in the Soviet Union, the Daily Worker and Freiheit, the latter more noticeably, have tried to use the subject of Israel as a means of holding on to the party's Jewish supporters. Despite the clear evidence of an anti-Israel policy by the Soviet Union, both papers have questioned Russia's position on Israel and have defended Israel's right to exist. But they have stepped warily, refraining from attacks on Egypt, Syria or Jordan, singling out Iraq among the Arab countries for obloquy--Iraq is the only member of the Arab League that is also a member of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact--and condemning the United States and Britain, instead of Russia, as being responsible for the crisis in the Middle East.

There may be some basis for an assumption that national CPUSA leadership would prefer to ignore "Jewish problems" and to be rid of the Yiddish-speaking activists. One party member, writing about "A Return to the Mainstream of Jewish Life" in the Communist Party's discussion supplement to the Worker of August 12, 1956, complained:

Our approach to Jewish work for too long has been weighted down with the thinking and cultural patterns of our Jewish comrades and intellectuals, who brought with them to this country the rich political, intellectual and trade union experiences from Czarist Russia, pre-war Poland, and other countries....

I believe that a change is due. A fresh approach is needed.

Party leadership seemed also to blame Jewish members for the "profound disturbance" in party ranks and for "overemphasis" on Russia's treatment of Jews. In Party Voice of September 1956, a member attacked the National Committee's statement for its failure to discuss Russia's anti-Jewish policy:

There are those who argue that the reason this problem [Russia's anti-Jewish policy] is so acute in New York, is because the bulk of the New York membership is Jewish. Aside from the fact that it is not wrong for Jewish Communists to feel keenly about this matter, the comrades who argue thus, prove, "the poverty of their philosophy."...

One need not be Jewish to feel sharp pain at such acts in a Socialist state. To cite the Jewish membership as the reason for crisis is as insulting as it is un-Marxian.

Party leaders were undoubtedly right in believing that the Soviet Union's anti-Jewish policies had seriously affected the CPUSA. Testimony to this effect appeared in an article by Irv Becker, a former full-time party official, in Party Voice, June 1956:

It is falsehood to contend that in this country, Marxists did not know that, as far as eight years ago, and coinciding with the campaign against "cosmopolitanism," the Soviet Jewish Communities had been given severe cultural blows--an end to several of their publications and to the activity of prominent Jewish figures--or that in the Slansky trial, the Czech prosecutor had invoked anti-Semitism. Marxists in this country had the obligation to demand explanations as far back as then; innocent lives might well have been saved, and racism might not have been able to make more headway than it did. The opposite happened, and today there are more wedges between Marxists and the bulk of the Jewish masses. Today more Jews have lost faith in the ability of socialism [read: Communism] to end racism and

more of them have been strengthened in the conviction that if there is hope of Jewish survival it lies along the path of bourgeois nationalism.

If the course of events behind the Iron Curtain had proceeded as "normally" as it did under Stalinist rule, it is quite likely that the differences in the CPUSA regarding the future of the party and specific issues like Russia's attitude towards Jews would have been quietly resolved. But the unsuccessful workers' revolution in Hungary precipitated the most violent crisis in the party's history.

V. THE CPUSA SPLITS OVER HUNGARY

The Daily Worker hailed Poland's peaceful and comparatively successful stand against Russian control; Gomulka's accession to power, the ouster of Marshal Rokossovski, the new Polish government's promises of more freedom and better economic conditions--all were welcomed as evidence of the success of the new line on the rights of the satellites to their own national forms of "socialism."

Hard upon Gomulka's return to power, Hungary took some tentative steps toward democratization. Laszlo Rajk, whose memory had already been "rehabilitated," was removed from a traitor's grave and reburied with state honors. The Hungarian workers took these developments seriously, demanding greater freedom and independence from Russia. Then, instead of acceding to the demands of the Hungarians, the Soviet Union sent in troops.

If these developments had occurred before the Twentieth Congress, the CPUSA would probably have endorsed the Soviet Union's position, as always, but six months of comparatively free-wheeling debate had changed the situation. After all, Khrushchev himself had taught that Russia could make terrible mistakes, and the National Committee of the CPUSA had admitted that uncritical support of Russia was an error. On November 1, about a week after Soviet troops "defended" Gero's government against the Hungarian workers, the National Committee adopted a statement that was released on November 4, the day on which Soviet troops resumed their war against the Hungarians and the Nagy government. The statement was adopted by a majority of the resident members of the National Committee: Foster was absent, but subsequently cast his vote against it; Dennis and Benjamin J. Davis abstained; James E. Jackson, Jr., voted yes with qualifications. It supported the position taken by the Daily Worker and declared that the Polish and Hungarian upheavals

were initially and primarily mass democratic upsurges of the working class and peoples of these countries for democratization, for a solution to their economic problems, for full national sovereignty and equality in their relations with the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian Communist Party, by calling in Soviet troops had committed "a tragic error" and "dramatized the bankruptcy" of its policy. Furthermore, the events in Hungary and Poland showed that the principles of the Twentieth Congress "are yet to be fully applied in practice." (Note that this statement criticized the Hungarian Communist Party rather than the Soviet Union; it also attributed the upheaval in Hungary not to the Communist system, but to the "distortions and repression that developed during the latter years of the Stalin period.")

By the time the statement was published, the Hungarian situation had become even worse. The National Committee of the CPUSA met again, some time in the middle of November, and November 19 it issued an open letter to the party membership on the "tragic events in Hungary." Admitting that there were differences of opinion in the National Committee, the open letter declared that the earlier statement of November 1 "was inadequate" and criticized a Daily Worker editorial of November 5 that had deplored the use of Soviet troops against the Nagy government. The open letter said that the use of Soviet troops by Gero "was a tragic error for which the Soviet Union must also take responsibility," but

justified the use of Soviet troops against the Nagy government as necessary "to head off the White Terror and . . . the danger of the formation of an anti-Soviet, Horthy-like regime... which would threaten not only the security of the USSR and other Socialist countries but world peace as well."

In an effort to appeal to all factions within the party, the open letter then declared: "There are no ready answers and we are in no position to give final judgment on the Soviet action. On this there are different viewpoints in the national committee and in the party."

Subsequently, various members of the National Committee published their individual views in the Daily Worker. Dennis, Foster, Davis, and Jackson were among those who supported the Soviet Union on Hungary; John Gates, George Blake Charney (legislative director of the New York state section of the CP), and members of the Worker's editorial board (Alan Max, Max Gordon, Joseph Clark), were critical. Toward the end of November, the debate became personal and acrimonious. Max Gordon cited a letter by Dennis as an example of "blind apologetics." Davis described a Daily Worker editorial as "going off half-cocked." Dennis blamed the Daily Worker for looking at the Soviet Union "through the eyes of the American imperialists." Clark accused Dennis of misrepresenting him and Alan Max attacked Dennis for using invectives like "anti-Soviet" to "quash all discussion."

Rank-and-File Opinion

With the national leadership of the party disagreeing so violently, it was natural that there would be sharp differences on the lower echelons and among the rank and file. Within party units, clashes of opinion were sharp and bitterly expressed. One party member of nineteen years' standing wrote that he had attended a meeting at which the majority of the speakers and the audience opposed the position of the Daily Worker on the Hungarian situation. He concluded:

But now I do not want to belong to an organization whose members feel socialism should be imposed on the ends of bayonets. This is not the socialism I worked for and dreamed of.

A member of the Connecticut State Committee of the C.P., on the other hand, sought to dissociate himself from the statement issued by that group condemning "the intervention of the Soviet army in the present Hungarian situation." When the staff of the Lower East Side New York section of the party wrote to the Daily Worker voicing "strong protest and indignation" for its position on Hungary and supporting Foster and his group, a member of this section denied that the letter expressed the views of the rank and file and added that "any declaration issued by leaders is valueless and misleading when it does not reflect the range of attitudes of the members they are supposed to represent." The Erie County, N.Y., section of the CPUSA adopted a resolution condemning the use of Soviet troops in Hungary and demanding their immediate withdrawal (Buffalo has a large Polish population), and urged the National Committee to reconsider its position. The Executive Press Committee of L'Unita, the party's Italian-language monthly, opposed "the sudden liberalization of the Daily Worker following the 20th Congress," but a letter signed "Group of Italian-Americans" urged broadening the Worker's editorial staff to include "representatives of non-Communist Marxist groups."

Clubs and individual members vehemently expressed their opinions on the Hungarian situation. Here are some examples from the Daily Worker of views condemning the use of Soviet troops:

"A.E.," November 16:

Those who claim that the USSR was right in insisting on a friendly Hungary have a twisted conception of the friendship in a one hundred twenty millimeter tank gun.

"Ex-Know-Nothing," November 30:

I don't want any part of a movement which is going to condone the actions of the Soviet troops against the Hungarian population....Am I anti-Soviet? I don't think so. I just don't believe that I'm as naive as I once was about the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

"Frank A.," December 7:

While Dennis implies that American Marxists share his views on the situation there, I think it would be more accurate to say that many American Communists are concerned with our general secretary's dispassionate endorsement of the Hungarian bloodshed.

"Former Party and Union Organizer and Party Member for 15 years," December 13:

The Soviet crimes in Hungary have compromised every progressive person in the world. Our responsibility must be to oppose all that is evil, whether we find it here or in Hungary or in Prague or Belgrade. Davis and Dennis and Foster...are trying to lead us down a path which leads to the death of our movement in this country.

Many members defended Russia's actions in Hungary as necessary to suppress "fascism" and "American imperialist subversion":

"Joe Campin," November 6:

I am patiently waiting the return of sanity in the editorials of the Daily Worker. With the editorial on Hungary one week ago, I saw the disappearance of a Marxist approach to history.

"S.H.," November 28:

I assure you that I am in full agreement with many, about Stalin's "doings" in the last years of his life. I say in the last years, because Stalin and the workers... established Socialism in Russia. However, to save a country from turning to fascism, if there is no alternative (and there was not) the rebels had to be crushed.

"Bronx Family," December 13:

We would remind all our indignant friends that this is not the first time that the Soviet Union has "embarrassed" them (to wit, the so-called partition of Poland and the Nazi-Soviet Pact). We stood by them then and history has vindicated our judgment. This is another such moment when courage is needed.

VI. THE PRESENT OUTLOOK

As of the end of December 1956, the CPUSA seems to be split. Dennis, in his efforts to keep the party together, has moved closer to the Foster faction. The Gates-Worker faction, with the support of most of the New York State, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut sections seems to be holding its own.

Most of the Negroes in the party, leaders and rank and file, seem to be behind the Foster-Dennis-Davis pro-Soviet group. (It may be assumed that the colored party members, like many people in Asia and Africa, look upon racism and traditional colonialism as the prime evils to be fought. Hence the tendency to relative indifference about Eastern Europe.) Jews in the party seem to be split, with the workers tending

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to support the Russian position while the intellectuals and Yiddish-speaking activists have deepened their concern about the Soviet position on the Jewish question.⁸

To a large extent, the debate within the CPUSA over the Hungarian question represented a continuation of the debate on the proposed new line of the party in the draft resolution issued in September. The Hungarian revolution reopened the wounds--already bandaged and partially healed--inflicted by de-Stalinization and Communist anti-Jewish policies. The new controversy served to exacerbate the old. In the words of the chairman of the New York State section of the party: "We must say we are in a crisis!"

On December 23 the National Committee issued a message to the state conventions and clubs of the party deploring some "tendencies," manifested in the course of discussion, "to substitute invective for serious argument," and proposing two amendments to the draft resolution. These amendments deal with internal party democracy and proposals for reorganization of the party, the former having been dealt with inadequately in the original draft resolution and the latter having been summarily rejected. Now, facing the opposition of the "right" faction, the National Committee compromised in an apparent effort to reunite the party. In place of "democratic centralism" (decisions made by the party's highest echelon and imposed on the rank and file), the National Committee's first amendment proposes "majority rule with specific provision for the right of dissent after decision while guaranteeing our ability to act in a united way"; the right of dissent after decision represents a major concession--if it is meant seriously. The second amendment backtracks on the draft resolution's rejection of all forms of reorganization. The National Committee now takes the view that though such proposals are not admissible for discussion at the convention, they may be taken up by the next National Committee for consideration and exploration.

The decisions to be adopted at the CPUSA convention in February 1957 will be determined by several factors. The most important obviously is the Russian performance in Poland and Hungary. Russian toleration of Polish "democratization" and calming of the Hungarian situation may bring about some reconciliation in the National Committee of the CPUSA. This would of course help to keep the party together. On the other hand, limitations on Poland, a continuation of a harsh Soviet policy toward Hungary, and further Soviet vituperation against Yugoslavia may compound the party's difficulties.

Efforts by Foster and Dennis to stack the convention with delegates from the "left" (insinuations to this effect have been made in the party press in connection with dues-payment requirements for eligibility to vote) may alienate the "right" faction of Gates, his editors, Steve Nelson, and the New York State section.

Also important are the extent and depth of oppositional feeling among the rank and file. Some individuals and possibly entire party

8. On December 16, Freiheit published an extraordinarily long editorial, reversing its previous reliance on Soviet promises of concessions to Jews. This editorial rejected all Soviet promises of good intentions and demanded concrete proof of a return to "Leninist national policy." Though denying the existence of government anti-Semitism, it admitted that there was anti-Semitism in Russia and demanded prompt and forthright government action against it. The editorial also demanded a public rehabilitation of Jews in Russia in the wake of the Moscow doctors' plot, an answer to previous representations, and a revision of the Soviet attitude toward Zionism. It nevertheless expressed its belief that the Soviet Union was a "socialist" country and had, in the past, done much in behalf of Jews. This editorial was very critical of Khrushchev for his negative remarks about Jews, but stopped short of calling him anti-Semitic. This editorial was published also in English translation on December 23, in Freiheit's English page.

units may already have become too estranged to continue to give and questioning allegiance to party leaders here or in Russia. The problem they face, should they desire to break with the party, is to find some political fringe group that will be acceptable to them and also prepared to welcome them as allies. Otherwise, these people face political and social isolation for an indeterminate period.

All these factors--ideological, organizational, political and personal--will determine the future of the party and affect the outcome of the convention. At this point no one, including the party leadership, can know whether the party will split or whether some measure of unity can be restored. Nor can we yet know whether expulsion of any faction leader is in the cards or whether disaffection may lead to defection.

N.Y.M.T.

FEB 13 1957

Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast Off Moscow

Party Rejects Foster Warning

By Robert S. Bird

The Communist party of the United States decided by "overwhelming" convention vote yesterday to free itself of the Moscow party line.

Then, having flouted the warnings of its veteran national chairman, William Z. Foster, who had said there "can be no Communist party" under such a show of independence, it elected both Mr. Foster and his factional opponents to the new national committee.

Thus the convention formally moved the party to the right by throwing off the fetters of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy as interpreted abroad, and at the same time made a brave attempt to appear unified within its own ranks by including all factional elements in its new governing body.

The decision on the ideological issue that now makes the American branch of Communism a theoretically "independent" party was a severe blow to the hopes of Mr. Foster. He himself did not vote on the question, according to party press officers, who told reporters that "because of illness, Mr. Foster was not on the floor at the time."

They said that John G. Gates, editor of the "New York Daily Worker," leader of the Rightist group that wants independence, and Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the party, who oscillated in a center position in the convention fights, both voted for the resolution.

The election of the national committee members did not give any clear-cut picture of the factional alignment as it exists in the party today. This was because only twenty members-at-large were elected by the convention, leaving approximately still to be chosen by state conventions before March 31.

Until the full committee is selected and elected to elect party officers, the Communist party in this country starting yesterday, is without a titular chief or other officers.

Mr. Foster and the other officers automatically went out of office when the election began, and the governing body of the party now will be an interim "secretariat" of seven members of the twenty national committeemen elected yesterday. They will be elected today.

The twenty new members are largely a "rank and file" group. In the order of votes received, Mr. Dennis was the sixth highest; Mr. Foster was the seventh; and Mr. Gates, who was the ostensible victor in the ideological fight, was eleventh.

But this election gave no real indication of factional strength, because Gates supporters appeared to outnumber Foster supporters among the other members elected. In any event, the cross-crossing of battle-lines during the convention skirmishes was such that all that can be said with certainty is that all factions are making a great effort at showing outward unity.

The ideological struggle centered around one word, "interpret," inserted on an amendment to the main "draft resolution" embodying the party's new position.

As the resolution was adopted with about only fifteen dissents and seven abstentions out of almost 300 delegates present, according to party press chiefs who spoke with reporters, the controversial word is buried in the second of these two sentences:

"The Communist party bares its theory generally on the cultural heritage of mankind; and particularly on the principles of scientific socialism developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. These principles the Communist party of the United States interprets, and applies, and strives to develop further, in accordance with the requirements of the American class struggle and democratic traditions."

The pro-Moscow faction wanted to delete the word "interpret" and substitute "creatively applies." The Gates faction argued that it is necessary to interpret a doctrine before it can be applied and that the party should do its own interpreting.

Freedom of Maneuver

As matters now stand, party policy-makers may or may not follow the Moscow line as they choose. One effect of the switch from traditional enslavement to Moscow dictates will be to give the party an unaccustomed freedom of maneuver in shifting to new positions to meet changing situations in this country. The party hope is that it will help ending its present isolation on the American scene, and its low prestige where it formerly had strength.

Especially, it should facilitate operations in the party's proposed new effort to co-operate with labor groups and other mass movements going in directions acceptable to the Communists.

It probably will bring the American Communists into open conflict with the Communists of some other countries, such as France, where French Communists leader Maurice Duclos has already warned the American Communists that they should stay in line with Moscow.

In this connection, the convention threw a sop to these other Moscow supporters by saying in another resolution:

"Serious mistakes and shortcomings in the relations between the U. S. A. and other Socialist states, as in the examples of Poland and Hungary, have been revealed, and some have been corrected. Mistakes are being made in order to make these mistakes on the basis of a further development of the Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian nationalism, national independence and equality.

"Correction of errors in relationship between Socialist states is facilitated by the fact that the fundamental basis of such relations is common ideology, common aims, mutual assistance and co-operation."

"International working class solidarity includes the right and responsibility to make friendly criticism of brother parties in the actions of Socialist governments."

Max Weiss, one of the party's leading theoreticians and national education director, who introduced the ideological resolution, said it "is an explicit declaration of the independent and equal status of our party in relation to the world Communist movement."

He said that it ended a tradition "by which we tacitly assumed that the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism made by the Communist party of the Soviet Union was ipso facto valid, and all we had to do was creatively apply their interpretations to our conditions."