

Record on Establishment of Israel of Soviet Delegations:
actions, attitudes and words of Andrei Gromyko and others

I. Soviet Actions:

a. When Israel was created the U.S.S.R. and other Communist delegations to the UN were to be found:

1. Forcing the decision to permit the Jewish Agency for Palestine to be heard on the Palestine question (May 5, 1947 General Assembly adopted resolution submitted by Byelorussian SSR and others.)

2. Voting against an Egyptian proposal* that the General Assembly begin its consideration with "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence". (by the General Committee April 30, 1947)

3. Providing the margin of votes which defeated an Arab-supported resolution which would have referred basic Palestine questions "involving the rights and fate of the indigenous population of Palestine, and also on certain treaties and covenants affecting these people", to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion (a move obviously aimed at forestalling a partition resolution.)

4. Combating an Arab backed effort "to stem the flow of Jewish refugees and displaced persons from Europe into Palestine.

5. 5. Voting against the resolution on which the Arabs based their main hopes, which proposed "formation of a unitary government in Palestine and establishment there in of reunitary sovereign state..." (Note: Five Moscow line delegates--the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR Byelorussian SSR--voted against this resolution; while Yugoslavia broke with U.S.S.R. on this issue).

6. Voting for partition of Palestine (Again, Yugoslavia, broke with Orbit, being the only Communist delegation to abstain.)

7. Opposing reconsideration of the partition plan, when this was proposed in the Second Special Session of the General Assembly (April 16 - May 14, 1948). This involved opposing a draft trusteeship plan for Palestine submitted by the U.S., and in effect, any proposal which would have modified the partition plan of November 29, 1947.

* All underlining in this paper is by the present writer.

8. Proposing a resolution aimed at forcing the Arab armies out of all of Palestine. This was to be achieved by recommending "that immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine...of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel. Such "foreign troops" were deferred by the Soviets as the "regular troops of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere".

9. Opposing a Syrian proposal for a commission to prepare in Palestine "proposals" for the establishment of a single state of the whole of Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis...

10. Providing the votes necessary to defeat a Syrian proposal that the International Court of Justice be asked to rule upon the power of the General Assembly to partition Palestine, and the international status of Palestine upon termination of the Mandate on May 15, 1948.

B. The review of these actions makes it clear that the representatives of the Communist bloc:

1. Display a complete prejudice in favor of the Jewish minority in Palestine, and of the Jewish position on the Palestine question, and paid only lip service in support of the aspirations of the Arab majority, as defined by the legal representatives of this majority. Thus, the Communists were the only delegations which insisted that no decision on the Palestine question should be taken "prior to hearing the views" of Zionist groups.

2. Sponsored, or supported by votes every measure favored by the Zionists and their representatives; while opposing or sabotaging every measure sponsored or favored by the Arab majority or Arab representatives in the United Nations.

3. Opposed and sabotaged "every compromise solution proposed for the Palestine question, after the Partition Plan had been hastily adopted on 29 November 1947." The Communist delegations were responsible for nullifying efforts to reverse the partition decision and to attempt to establish one state in Palestine, beginning with establishment of a temporary trusteeship.

4. Were "the first to introduce in the Assembly discussion of the possibility of partitioning Palestine, and were the first to declare that no solution other than partition should be worked out for Palestine.

II. Soviet Words--General:

A. At the creation of Israel--

1. On whether Zionist groups should be heard concerning the disposition of Palestine:

a. Winiewicz (Poland):* We cannot vote for the inclusion of the Arab-sponsored proposal for termination of the Mandate "before we have heard the opinion of the most interested party, the Jewish people, for which the mandate in Palestine provided special rights."

b. Gromyko fought for Zionist representation at the General Assembly, rather than only at committees or sub-committees, saying "Such half-hearted decision would be especially unjust from the point of view of the Jewish population in Palestine, which is vitally concerned in this matter."

c. Gromyko attacked an Arab-supported US-move to refer to the First Committee the question of whether Zionist organizations could be heard under the Charter, and to refer documentation presented by these organizations to the First Committee as "a resolution..which no only makes no provision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not provide for inviting representatives of the Jewish organizations.

d. Gromyko It is well known, however, that the question of Palestine is largely a question of arrangements which are to be made for the Jews.."

e. Fiderkiewicz (Poland) "The Jews deserve the highest consideration. Let us remember that there is no dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. The problem is to solve the Palestine problem for the Arabs and the Jews". He then asked for a favorable vote on the Communist-offered resolution to have the Zionists heard by the General Assembly, labelling it a move "on behalf of the welfare of Palestine and its people".

f. Gromyko's willingness to offend the Arabs by his extreme solicitude for Zionists' causes and sensibilities is well illustrated by the following:

* Then totally subservient to the USSR in both foreign and domestic policy.

During the discussion of these two questions, an number of delegations touched upon the general problems of Palestine from various important angles. This was especially so in the case of the delegations of the Arab States. I am not reproaching any delegation at all, and least of all those of the Arab States...

"I repeat, I am not about to reproach any delegation; I merely state a fact. Up to the present, however, we have not heard the voice of those organizations which speak for a considerable part of the Jewish population of Palestine. Note a single representative of any Jewish organization speaking on behalf of the Jewish population of Palestine has yet spoken before the General Committee or the General Assembly. Can such a situation, even in the present initial stage, be considered normal in the discussion of the Palestine Problem?

"The Soviet delegation maintains that such a situation cannot be considered normal. We cannot over look--still less can we ignore--the fact that if the Palestine problem has arrested the attention of the United Nations, it primarily concerns and, furthermore, alarms the Jewish population of Palestine.

"For this reason, in the interest of an objective and thorough consideration of the Palestine problem, even in this first stage, it would be perfectly just to invite representatives of the Jewish population of Palestine. It would be unjust to deprive the Jewish organizations, or organization, of the rights to express their views on this matter."

"If the General Assembly does not agree to give the Jewish organizations an opportunity to speak at the Assembly--I mean the plenary meetings of the Assembly--the whole Jewish population, and many others, may interpret and understand this to mean that the United Nations does not wish to give due consideration to a considerable part of the Palestine population. It would not be in the interests of the General Assembly of the United Nations as a whole if such an impression, or even such a conviction, were to be created among the Jewish population, and among others besides the Jewish population.

g. The Communist representatives were concerned with "Jewish rights" (Wineiewicz). They apparently considered one of these "rights" tremendous and accelerated entrance to Zionists into Palestine. Thus, Wineiewicz thought that "the problem ought to be solved primarily by Jewish immigration into Palestine. The immediate admission of 250,000 refugees who were awaiting their turn..."

2. In an effort to ridicule the original proposal of the Arabs that the Mandate be terminated Mr. Gromyko (who showed contempt for Arab views and sensibilities throughout the debates) said:

a. Since "the representative of the Arab States have said that they do not insist on a vote on their proposal at this meeting"... , we have no reason at present to vote on the proposal for it is as if this proposal did not, as it were, exist at the present meeting...I consider that the proposal cannot be put to a vote at the present moment, and that it does not, as it were, exist at this stage"; and, again:

b. "The statements made here by the representatives of Lebanon and Syria have not introduced any new factor which could in any way change the situation; there is nothing new in their statements which would affect the position.* They mentioned the establishment of a federal state. We referred to this as one of the possibilities at the outset of the debate on this question. The Arab representatives did not wish to discuss the matter. That is their business. They are free to behave as they deem necessary in the discussion of the question."

3. At the same time, Gromyko told the Arabs in effect, that they did not know what was for their own good, but that the Communists did know, in fact were quite clear on what actions (re partition) was in the best interest of the Arabs. Thus:

"The opponents of the partition of Palestine into two separate, independent, democratic States usually point to the fact that this decision would, as they allege, be directed

*i.e., that partition was, in the Communists' view the only equitable "solution" to all Palestine questions, and the establishment of one (Arab-controlled) state in Palestine was out of the question.

against the Arabs, against the Arab population in Palestine and against the Arab States in general. This point of view is, for reasons that will be readily understood, particularly emphasized by the delegations of the Arab countries. But the USSR delegation cannot concur in this view. Neither the proposal to partition Palestine into two separate States, nor the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee that was created at the session and which approved the proposal which is now under discussion, is directed against the Arabs. This decision is not directed against either of the two national groups that inhabit Palestine. On the contrary, the USSR delegation holds that this decision corresponds to the fundamental national interests of both peoples, that is to say, to the interest of the Arabs as well as of the Jews.

"The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition of Palestine would be a historic injustice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if only because after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine, for a considerable period of history."

"In connection with the proposal to partition Palestine, the representatives of some Arab States referred to the USSR and attempted to cast aspersions on the foreign policy of its Government. In particular, /Camille Chanoun/ the representative of Lebanon twice exercised his ingenuity of the subject. I have already pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine into two separate independent States, and the position which the USSR has taken in this matter, are not directed against the Arabs, and that, in our profound conviction, such a solution of this question is in keeping with the basic national interests not only of the Jews but of the Arabs."

4. Other Communist delegates also chimed in on this note:

a. Panyushkin, USSR: the partition decision "of 29 November constituted a just and correct decision and met the deep-rooted national interest of the Arab and Jewish peoples of Palestine".

b. Houdek, Czechoslovakia: Partition was "not necessarily anti-Arab in character, nor was it irreconcilable with the national and political aspirations of neighboring Arab Countries."

5. The Communist representatives at this stage of the discussions, showed not only a keen desire to advance the Zionist position, but also a great urge to get on with partition as speedily as possible. Thus, in countering a US proposal which would have had the effect of limiting Zionist representation, a Communist delegate (Dr. A. Fideraiewica, Poland) opposed a move which "would serve only to prolong the situation for the present, and no one knows for how long."

6. The Yugoslav delegation was apparently under considerable pressure to vote with ~~the Russians~~. ~~As~~ Dr. Ales Bebler, then Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister and permanent delegate, UN pointed out that Soviets actions were bound to alienate the Arab and all Moslem countries, he was told by Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, Chief Ukranian delegate, "Two Soviet divisions are a greater revolutionary force than the whole of the Moslem world".

7. The clear hope of the Oribt governments that some of the Zionist migrants who went from Communist countries to Palestine might be of use to them in advancing Communism in the region is reflected in the statement of the Polish delegate Mr. Winiewicz that: "this problem is a major concern of the Polsih delegation. That can easily be explained by the fact that nearly fifty percent of the Jewish population of Palestine speaks the Polish language and has always shown keen interest in the fate of the Polish people. We cannot forget them in their distress".

B. At the later, Special Assembly Session where efforts were made to reverse the partition decision:

1. Gromyko (opposed consideration of a US draft trusteeship plan for Palestine, which if adopted would have set aside the partition decision and establish one juristicition in Palestine, pending a final settlement, perhaps also of one state. He saw no reason for the convoking of the Special Session. He "shared the anxiety felt by some representatives by reason of the fact that the partition had not been carried out, that the Palestinian question was being brought before the General Assembly for the third time and that one Government (the US) was putting forth proposals which had the effect of nullifying the General Assembly's decision, and further, promoted neither the interests of the people of Palestine nor the maintenance of international peace."

Moreover, "The USSR delegation considered that the decision on the partition of Palestine was a just decision and that the United Nations should take effective measures to enusre its implementation."

2. In opposing the Syrian (Faris El-~~Marri~~) proposal for a Commission to prepare proposals on the scene for a single state of the whole of Palestine, the Communists simply disregarded Arab assurances on minority rights

and the Holy Places. In opposing the proposal they simply stated flatly that: "the proposal for a unitary state: had been debated at length by the Assembly once and this body "had rejected it as impracticable". In addition, no less than Mr. Vyshinsky expressed the Soviet's fear that a commission for preparing new proposals on Palestine might consist of states which were "prejudiced against" the partition resolution.

3. In fighting efforts to reverse the partition decision the Communist representatives made it abundantly clear that they had no particular interest in any Arab state in Palestine, but were ardent advocates of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus:

a. Tsarapkin asserted that: "The Jewish people were therefore striving to create a state of their own and it would be unjust to deny them that right."

b. Gromyko waxed rhapsodic on the historic importance of meeting the Zionist demands: "The solution of the Palestine problem based on a partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of profound historical significance, because this decision will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people".

c. The principal reason why later proposals for territorial adjustments, made by the UN Mediator, were opposed vigorously by the Soviet Bloc was that they would weaken the Jewish state, perhaps in the Soviet view, fatally. Thus Mr. Tsarapkin: "The Mediator, however, proposed a reshuffling of territory which would jeopardize the very life of the Jewish State by giving the Negeb (which was two-thirds of the Jewish State) to Transjordan, although he offered the Jewish State Western Galilee as compensation".

4. The Soviet and other Communist delegates not only supported vigorously in deed and word the partition which Mr. El Khairi described as having "initiated the disasters in Palestine, they raised it to the level of high principle, invoking, "democratic principles", "justice", and "self-determination" and all of the "high principles and aims of the United Nations"; and international law. Thus:

a. Semen Tsarapkin, USSR: partition was "based on the principles of the equality of peoples and the right of self-determination, principles upon which the USSR had based its domestic policy and on which it was duty bound to base its international policy". On the other hand, the Arab-desired plan for one state in Palestine was unacceptable, for the plan paid no regard to democratic principles...

b. Another Communist representative (Lange, Poland)* supported partition by stating: "There is no other way out, and anyone anxious to do justice to the national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs must support this proposal."

c. Gromyko asserted further: "The delegation of the USSR maintains that the decision to partition Palestine is in keeping with the high principles and aims of the United Nations. It is in keeping with the high principles of the national self-determination of peoples".

d. Gromyko: "Jewish demands for statehood were based on international law and could only be confirmed by the Assembly".

e. Gromyko even crowed about the emergence of Israel: "A Jewish state", he stated emphatically, "was in existence, in spite of attempts by certain countries to impede the implementation of partition.

5. The Soviet view of the Arabs right to self-defense against Israel was equally illuminating:

The Arabs were, in effect, ordered by Gromyko to accept partition and anything else which Estell them!"

(Gromyko) "With regard to the Arab objections, no one expected that the Arabs would help enforce partition. They were free to refuse their support, but under the Charter they were obliged to refrain from the use of force to prevent implementation. Any infringement of this obligation should be branded as aggression".

6. One main purpose of the Soviets efforts at the UN was to get Arab armies to withdraw from those areas in Palestine where they had advanced after hostilities began.

a. These "foreign troops" of "Transjordan, Egypt, Syria and elsewhere", which had moved into Palestine" were said to have "invaded the country" (Tsarapkin, USSR). "Their presence", Mr. Tsarapkin continued, was "illegal and unjustified", "maintained a tense situation", and "was a hindrance to peaceful adjustment of the situation." In fact, an "insurmountable obstacle in the way of any peaceful settlement", "everyone knew... the presence of those troops had caused the war, the present disorders and the sufferings of the population...". Moreover,

it was significant that the departure of the United Kingdom troops had been immediately followed by the invasion of Palestine by Arab forces. The synchronization of those two events showed that the military intervention by the Arab States was part of the United Kingdom plan to prevent the Assembly from carrying out partition. That it had been successful only in preventing the creation of an Arab state in Palestine was due solely to the quick action of the Jewish people in defending the area assigned to them".

b. Galagan, Ukrainian SSR: The Ukrainian delegation that the most effective decision for the General Assembly to take would be to require that foreign troops and personnel be withdrawn as soon as possible. Such a decision would make possible the further implementation of the 29 November resolution and would raise the United Nations prestige throughout the world."

III. US Policies and Actions as Described by the Soviet Delegates

The Communist representatives attacked US proposals constantly as opposing partition and a Jewish State, and, in effect, favoring the cause of the Arabs.

A. Pre-Partition

Gromyko's and other Soviet attacks on US policy as pro-Arab began early, with a denunciation of the US proposal which would have limited the receipt of Zionist views to routing of their written views to committees of the General Assembly: "We heard the statements of the representative of the United States of America, Senator Austin. He submitted a resolution to us which not only makes no provision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not provide for inviting representatives of the Jewish organizations at all. The resolution merely states that statements and documents received from Jewish and other organizations should be transmitted to the appropriate Committee of the General Assembly. The transmission of documents to the appropriate Committee is practically a technical operation. Therefore, the solution offered by the resolution does not get us much further; it does not constitute the slightest progress in any way.

"So far as the particular organizations which have applied to the General Assembly are concerned, the course of the discussion on this question has shown that the Jewish Agency would seem to be a representative organization which can speak in the name of the Jewish population of Palestine.

"If this is so, of course a positive decision can and should be made on the statement of this Agency. If there are any other Jewish organizations whose communications merit attention, the Soviet delegation is ready to take part in the consideration of communications from such other organizations."

B. Post-Partition

1. Soviet actions in opposing the US-proposed moves to nullify partition of Palestine with a single, temporary trusteeship, as observed earlier in this paper. See in particular the Gromyko statements.

para. 1, pp. 11-12, and para. 4, p. 13.

2. The attack on US policy continued during the Soviets' presentation of their proposal for the forced withdrawal of the Arab armies from Palestine: Garagan, Ukrainian SSR: "The reasoning of the United Kingdom Delegation, which held that it would be difficult to define what troops should be regarded as foreign was groundless, as foreign troops in Palestine were those who resisted the implementation of the resolution of 29 November 1947; such, for instance, were the British officers of the Arab Legion.

"The argument advanced by the delegations of the United Kingdom and of the United States to the effect that his question was a matter for the Security Council was not valid either, as those delegations had never asked the Security Council for the withdrawal of troops. Moreover, they had opposed the proposals that has been submitted to that effect. Thus the United Kingdom and the United States had shown that they did not desire the re-establishment of peace in Palestine."

3. The US, sometimes together with the UK, was charged with sabotaging and attempting to undo partition and the Zionist state in a wide variety of ways: Thus Mr. Cromyko:

a. "The USSR delegation, unlike some other delegation (i.e. the US and the UK), has from the outset taken a clear-cut definite and unequivocal stand in this matter. (i.e. in favor of partition).

b. "The delegation of the USSR considers that it would be wrong now to set the General Assembly back six months and to begin all over again. I say nothing of the fact that to adopt such a proposal would mean wrecking the settlement of the Palestine problem."

"Since the close of the previous session of the Assembly, public opinion, even in the United States, had found that the position taken by that country on the Palestine question had really been directed against the General Assembly resolution. Official denials by the United States deceived no one; it was clear that the United States was preparing to deal a mortal blow to the partition decision and to present a new plan for Palestine. "The trusteeship plan proposed by the United States was likely to lead to an intensification of the struggle in Palestine; it would create a threat to peace and would increase anxiety in the Near East.

c. Discussions among the permanent members of the Security Council had revealed that the United States not only did not wish to consider how the General Assembly decision might be implemented but wished to revise that decision.

4. Plus other Communist spokesmen:

a. Tarasenko, Ukrainian SSR: The United States insisted

partition and to begin a search for an alternative solution.

b. Katz-Suszy Poland: For the sake of the future dignity of the United Nations, they should act now in the spirit of the Charter and in accordance with the will of the peoples of Palestine. The Assembly had put the Jews and Arabs of Palestine on the road to national independence and could not now force them away from it.

c. Kieselew, Byelorussian SSR: When the United Kingdom realized that it could not nullify the decision of 29 November, it had attempted to destroy the Jewish State by using armies of the Arab States. When that too failed, the United Kingdom had recourse to a Mediator, in a further attempt to get rid of the Jewish State, the existence of which it regarded as a threat.

"The chief responsibility for the hostilities in Palestine lay with the United Kingdom and with the United States. Long before the end of the Mandate, the mandatory Power had authorized the entry into Palestine of an Arab Legion which was reinforced by Nazi officers formerly interned in camps in Egypt. After the termination of the Mandate, moreover, British officials had 'voluntarily' offered their services to that same King Abdullah who was to be the chief beneficiary of the Mediator's plan, which had in fact been rejected by the Arabs as well as by the Jews."

d. Tsarapkin, USSR: The aims of the United States and the United Kingdom were to prevent the implementation of the 29 November resolution. The Mediator, however, proposed a reshuffling of territory which would jeopardize the very life of the Jewish State by giving the Megeb (which was two-thirds of the Jewish State) to Transjordan, although he offered the Jewish State Western Galilee as compensation."

e. Lange, Poland: In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America were primarily responsible for the armed conflict which had broken out in Palestine. The United Kingdom Government had done everything in its power to hinder the implementation of the resolution of 29 November 1947 by tolerating the presence of armed Arab bands and by taking no measures to check the preparation for invasion of Palestine by the Arab States. Transjordan, which was financially and militarily dependent upon the United Kingdom, had been in the vanguard in the war. As for the other Arab States, the United Kingdom had refrained from exercising her influence upon them in the cause of peace. The negative attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards the General Assembly resolution had thus given the rulers of the Arab States the impression that it would favor an attempt to oppose the General Assembly's resolution by armed forces."

f. Kiselev (Byelorussian SSR): "As regards the United States, since the decision of the partition of Palestine, its Government had been subjected to strong pressure from military circles and United States oil companies. The United States had approved for release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-02771R000400380002-2

and on the contrary, attempted to wreck the Partition Plan. Indeed the United States had taken the initiative in calling a second special session and had proposed placing Palestine under a Trusteeship System, while declaring herself the champion of both Jewish and Arab interests. When the proposal for United States and the United Kingdom had proposed the appointment of a Mediator, it was then that, on various pretexts, the British and American poured into Palestine, while the United States tried to come to an agreement with the United Kingdom, at the expense of the Jews.

"But even the United States and the United Kingdom had had to take into account the existence of a Jewish State which had proved its right to exist, and which had been recognized, de jure or de facto, by 18 states. Like other States before it, Israel was borne of an armed struggle for liberty and independence."

g. Zebrowski, Poland: ".... just over a year ago the General Assembly at its 128th Plenary meeting, had adopted by a very large majority a resolution concerning Palestine which provided for the establishment of two independent States, an international regime for Jerusalem and the economic union binding the two States together. That resolution, if fully implemented and respected by all the Members of the United Nations would have brought in the family of nations two new States and would have advanced the cause of peace and progress in the Middle East.

"The implementation of that resolution, however, was obstructed by the maneuvers and machinations of certain Powers, led by the United Kingdom and the United States of America."

"Twice in the course of the past year, the United Kingdom & U.S. had tried to use the General Assembly as an instrument for reversing previous decisions. In spite of their abject failure at the second special session during the previous spring, when the United Kingdom and the United States had tried to replace independence by Trusteeship, the same two Powers were again trying at the current session to undo what had already been implemented.

11. When they found the US proposal met favor with the Arabs, the Soviet delegates attempted to: (A) Raise legalistic objections,-- saying (A.I. Galagan, Ukrainian SSR) "On the whole, no organ could examine a new decision in the Palestine question as long as the General Assembly's decision has not been annulled by a two-thirds majority and (b) Obscure the fact that the US proposal was a boost to Arab aspirations by labelling it "bondage". (Leonid Kaminsky, Byelorussian SSR): "The aim of the trusteeship was to keep Palestine in a state scarcely distinguishable from bondage and to place it under the control of American monopolies. Trusteeship was contrary to the right of the peoples to self-determination; it would intensify the

struggle in Palestine and increase anxiety in the Near East."

12. Gromyko even found it incredible that the Arab leaders appeared to favor the US proposal over Soviet-backed partition: "The Arab States and the Arab High Committee had adopted a curious attitude in that, although they disliked trusteeship, they were prepared to explore the United States proposals."

13. The Communist representative were also amazed at the lengths to which the US was apparently prepared to go in an effort to nullify partition. Thus Tarasenko, Ukrainian SSR: Moreover, the proposal for a trusteeship system did not remove the necessity of applying armed force. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews wished to be deprived of their sovereignty and at least one of the parties (the Jews) had stated in the Security Council that it was opposed to the trusteeship system. Yet it appeared that the United States was prepared to provide armed contingents to implement the trusteeship, but not to carry out partition".