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28 March 1960

220. Turkish Restraints on A Free Press

On March 7, the "dean" of Turkey's journalists and editor of the liberal, independent Istanbul newspaper, Vatan, 72-year-old Ahmet Emin Yalman, was jailed for reprinting an article from a US daily which the court said belittled Turkey's Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. Yalman said that a recent medical examination had shown that he was unwell. He added: "In spite of the strength of my will, these troubles may not allow me to resist for long the hardships of prison life." The International Press Institute (IPI), which again has met in Tokyo, recently appealed at Geneva to editors to protest "in the strongest possible terms" against what it called increasing persecution of press freedom in Turkey. Although there are no official statistics, the IPI believes that more than 200 Turkish journalists have been imprisoned over the past five years. In Turkey, where the government, as in most countries other than the US, has a monopoly of broadcasting facilities, most of the press supports the opposition. There is no doubt that sometimes its criticism of the government, in articles or cartoons, is immoderate. But the fact remains that the Turkish press cannot operate freely, fearlessly, or efficiently under the present restrictive press laws which are sometimes as unpredictable as they are unjustifiably severe. Turkey has been a republic almost thirty-seven years and has enacted a constitution which provides its citizens with certain rights and freedoms, including freedom of the press. However, in all but ten of those years, despite the constitution, it has been ruled by dictatorships (beginning with that of Ataturk), and its ruling governments, like the present one, have yet to learn to accept the buffetings and unkind cuts of democratic life. For your information only, a good example of the sort of distorted thinking that goes on in their minds is contained in a recent letter to the Washington Post by the Turkish Embassy's Press Attache, referring to a report reprinted in that paper on December 26 about the indictment passed against a number of journalists in Turkey. He says: "As outlined in detail in the joint communique issued by the Turkish Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Press and Information, Turkey is ruled by its representative National Assembly, whose laws are executed by the country's law courts. Therefore, any attempt by a non-official organization at not only protesting against, but even questioning of the decisions of these national institutions constitute no other than an attempt at interfering in the country's internal affairs."

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221. The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty

The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty was signed in Washington on 19 January. Since then a running fight has been raging in Japan over its ratification. The principal opponents of Prime Minister KISHI Nobusuke are: (1) the so-called "anti-mainstream" faction of Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the leader of which, KONO Ichiro, is trying to use the ratification issue to embarrass, harrass and eventually topple Kishi and gain the premiership for himself; (2) the two Socialist parties, the left-wing Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the more moderate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which are opposing ratification because of a combination of sincere neutralist anti-militarist conviction held by many members and the fact that their opposition gives them a means of enhancing their own following at the expense of the LDP; (3) the USSR and Communist China, which oppose the treaty because it deals a blow to their hopes of neutralizing Japan and restricting US influence there; and (4) the Japanese Communist Party, which supports the bloc's aims. The satellites and other free world CP's also have echoed the bloc's line. There exists in Japan a fairly widespread fear that the US military presence there will eventually mean the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles and the use of the islands as a staging area for military operations in other parts of the Far East - leading ultimately to Japan's becoming involved in another war. It is from this well of feeling that the Socialists are drawing most of the support for their opposition to the treaty. Propaganda from Moscow and Peking also is trying to play on this sentiment, by portraying the treaty as the basis for turning Japan into an imperialist stronghold, and condemning the revised treaty as an aggressive alliance aimed at the "peace-loving" nations of the Communist bloc. In a bitter exchange of diplomatic notes, the USSR has charged that the treaty violates the joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of October 19, 1956. The USSR therefore has concluded that it is no longer obligated to return the two Japanese islands of Shikotan and Habomai -- to which it had agreed in the joint declaration. 25X1

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28 March 1960

222. Soviet Diplomatic Blundering in Pakistan

On March 12, the same day on which he presented his letters of credence as the new Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, M. S. Kapitsa, said in Rawalpindi, provisional capital of Pakistan, that Pakistan Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir's proposal to Afghanistan that a referendum be held among the Pushtu-speaking people of Afghanistan could be only a "joke." (These people are called Pathans in Pakistan and Pushtus in Afghanistan.) Kapitsa said that as the Pushtu-speaking people comprise the basic population of Afghanistan, the question of a plebiscite among them does not arise. On the other hand, he said, it is logical that a section of Pushtu-speaking people who were separated from Afghanistan by "British colonialists" 60 years ago should be asked through a plebiscite if they wanted to remain in Pakistan or join Afghanistan or to form an independent state. Khrushchev had said much the same thing after his recent Asia tour. The Soviet Government, Kapitsa said, found it easy to understand the Afghan Government's point of view and felt "that self-determination is in line with the UN Charter." Reportedly, Kapitsa also stated that the USSR did not recognize the Durand Line, which has been the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1893. A total of approximately 9 million Pathans live in the areas on the two sides of the Durand Line. King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and his cousins Prime Minister Daud and Foreign Minister Naim are Pushtus; similarly, the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub, is a Pathan, as is the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Musa.

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223. Continued Soviet Interference in Iran

Following the failure of direct talks with the Shah of Iran, which began in January 1959, and the signature of an Iranian-US bilateral pact, the Soviet Union has resorted to an old and well-tried Kremlin technique to achieve its purposes through use of more devious and covert methods in trying to rebuild its subversive potential in Iran. Soviet agents, presumably including both Soviet intelligence personnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist) Party, are attempting to organize anti-regime Iranian nationalists. The Soviets have criticized the Tudeh Party Central Committee for lack of action from its base, since being forced underground, in Leipzig, East Germany. This Committee has now been directed to organize and develop a nationalist group that is more suited to Soviet designs, which include the ousting of the present regime. The Soviets have already approached a number of Iranian military men to lead this nationalist group but apparently have not yet decided whom to select. Nationalist elements in Iran, many of whom for a variety of reasons have all been opposed to the Shah's regime, for years have been powerless to develop an effective organization. It is probable that, after protracted suppression, some of them would be willing to accept Soviet support, although many of the more moderate nationalist groupings would prefer free world backing. Meanwhile, Soviet broadcasts continue to flay the Shah and his "coup" regime. On 7 March Moscow Radio stated: "The anti-national policy of (Shah) Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and (Prime Minister) Manuchehr Eqqbal is augmenting the revulsion and anger of the people of Iran." The following is a typical sample from the same broadcast: "In Teheran and other cities in Iran, leaflets are being published and distributed among the people inviting Iranians to overthrow the rotten and perfidious Pahlavi dynasty. These days official quarters in Teheran debate with great anxiety the shaky position of Eqqbal's government and the Shah's throne." If the Soviet agents succeed in dodging the vigilance of SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence and security organization, their moral and material support will undoubtedly add significantly to the strength of anti-regime nationalist forces.

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224. East Germany and the Underdeveloped Countries

A major objective of Soviet foreign policy is to gain worldwide recognition of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the East German government. By such recognition Moscow hopes to expand its capability for economic penetration of the underdeveloped countries by utilization of East German industry. Tempting aid and trade offers from East Germany are eventually coupled with pressure for diplomatic recognition. Thus, in a recent statement in which he reiterated a longstanding offer of aid to India, East German Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau spoke of political recognition, implying that the granting of credits would be possible only between countries which maintain diplomatic relations. By the end of 1959 the East German credits since 1954 totaled only \$50 million, of which only \$20 million had actually been used. From July to December 1959 there were 265 East German technicians in the underdeveloped countries, mainly concentrated in Turkey and the UAR. By December 1959 some 640 nationals of underdeveloped countries had received or were about to receive training in East Germany. In 1958 trade between East Germany and underdeveloped countries was about \$180 million (and remained about the same in 1959 although there was a sharp fall in trade with Syria and Turkey and a sharp increase with Egypt and India). This trade will probably increase rapidly over the next few years providing additional pressures for international acceptance. Thus, the role of East Germany in the bloc's penetration program has so far been slight. In the case of Guinea, deliberate haziness on the part of all parties has clouded the situation as to whether there is "real" recognition or not and consequently it is expected, at least as long as the situation remains hazy, that West Germany will not break relations with Guinea. This precedent may spark a rapid erosion of the Halstein doctrine that West Germany will break relations with any nation recognizing East Germany and the development of diplomatic relations between underdeveloped countries and the bloc. Most vulnerable to East German persuasions because of their hunger for capital or their economic commitment to the bloc are Ethiopia, Iraq, the UAR, India, Ghana, and Indonesia.

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Item #221: Themes outlined in Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 29, Item No. 181, "The Battle for Japan" dated 21 December 1959, and Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 30, Item No. 185, "Revision of the United States-Japan Security Treaty" dated 4 January 1960 remain generally valid and still should be played.

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