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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE
NUMBER 27

23 November 1959



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158. New Party in Iraq Suggested

The editor of Al Thawra, a pro-Qasim nationalist daily in Baghdad, Yunis al Tai, has launched what is apparently a trial balloon: the suggested creation by Premier Qasim of a new political party. According to al Tai's proposal Qasim, now convalescing in the hospital from bullet wounds inflicted during the recent assassination attempt, is to lead the party himself, as a sort of "third force" between the anti-Communist nationalist and the Communists. Qasim's support, if any, could arise from a possible wish to develop grass roots support in addition to what he already has among groups of both left and right, none of which is now under his control. Although Al Thawra reportedly has published "hundreds" of messages in favor of the idea, including some from prominent army and government officials, no message from Qasim has been printed, while three members of the Cabinet, all five army divisional commanders and nine of Iraq's fourteen provincial governors have declared their approval of the idea. Recently, however, the movement has received less public attention and seems to have lost some of its momentum, and Foreign Minister Jawed has publicly voiced disapproval. If Qasim were to select the party as a means for achieving his objective, there would probably be a general rush to join the band wagon. If a new party is created, it would give Qasim a logical excuse to extend the present political "transition period" perhaps until the middle of next year, which would give him time for necessary organization. It is possible that from Qasim's adoption of an instrument for domination of Iraq's civilian political life there might emerge a one party state similar to the UAR. There is also, however, another possibility which is that given Qasim's apparent lack of interest in political organizations and his political naivete, the Communists might infiltrate the new party and convert it into a convenient facade for their activities.

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164. Crisis in Indonesian and Chinese Communist Relations

During early October Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio went to Peking to discuss Sino-Indonesian relations and in particular, the position of the overseas Chinese who will be seriously affected by an Indonesian decree, to become effective 1 January 1961, prohibiting foreign-owned retail enterprises outside urban areas. The Overseas Chinese, who make up an economically-dominant middle-class, number two and a half million. Indonesian local cooperatives will replace the Chinese-operated enterprises as an initial step toward economic reform. Subandrio's visit was climaxed by a joint communique with Foreign Minister Chun Yi consisting largely of platitudes with respect to Taiwan, West Irian, Bandung, etc. In connection with the decree on retailing, the communique stated both nations recognized that Indonesian steps towards economic development would entail measures that would affect "in some way" the economic position of the Chinese. The innocuousness of the communique belied the rupture in Sino-Indonesian friendship caused by the extremely harsh treatment Subandrio suffered at the hands of Chinese leadership. In conversations with Indonesian diplomats at Hong Kong, Manila, and Tokyo and to Indonesian officials upon his return, Subandrio revealed that Chinese Communist leaders insulted and tried to intimidate him. Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung received him in a cavalier fashion and Chou En-lai threatened Indonesia with economic warfare through the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya if the decree was not changed. Chou stated the decree was a Western-inspired move against the Chinese and that if necessary Chinese economic aid to Indonesia would be terminated. Subandrio reported that he believed the Chinese already considered Indonesia a vassal state and were bent on controlling Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Government has not yet issued a statement on Subandrio's reception in China and it is not believed they will. The Government is going ahead with the enforcement of the decree. The content of Subandrio's report on his treatment in Peking has been leaked by many sources to Western and Asian observers. Chinese Communist reaction to the visit has resulted in a propaganda campaign in the pro-Communist Hong Kong press stressing the "difficult plight" of the Chinese and denouncing the Indonesian Government for "wrong nationalism".

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165. Soviet Ceremonies

Newspapers in the Soviet Union recently have been sponsoring a campaign among their readers for suggestions on new "Soviet Rites" which would give color to the drab procedures of a Communist Society. Izvestia, the government newspaper, has offered prizes for the best descriptions or proposals for marriage rites, ceremonies for newborn children and other festivities that could enrich the USSR's churchless life. A complaint from an automobile factory foreman supposedly started the search. He deplored the fact that many persons in the Soviet Union were married in churches, or had their children baptized, not because they believed in God, but because they enjoyed the solemn and picturesque ritual. "Regardless of what some moralists say," the foreman declared, "customs and rites live among the people." Most of the suggestions for "new traditions" (if such a thing is rhetorically possible) deal with weddings. At present a Socialist wedding is a brisk and businesslike affair, which requires only that the couple trot down to a convenient civil registry and signify their desire to be wed. The whole affair can be performed during lunch hour, and is somewhat simpler and considerably cheaper than buying a new pair of shoes from the local GUM. One of the most imaginative suggestions for a "new Soviet marriage" came from a cultural director in Byelorussia. He recommended that weddings be held in a specially decorated club, with suitable dignitaries presiding. Wide sashes (red, of course) bearing such slogans as "Jealousy is a survival of corrupt bourgeois society" and "Every girl has the possibility of becoming a mother heroine" would be tied around the couple. The ceremony would be followed by a dance, sports and a concert. Early in November, the nation's first wedding palace was opened in Leningrad. It boasted facilities ecstatically named "the stair of happiness" and "the hall of triumph", and a public address system playing sentimental music.

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166. The Hungarian Party Congress

On 14 August 1959, the Central Committee Plenum of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Communist), which replaced the discredited Hungarian Workers Party (formed in 1948 with merger of the Communist and Social Democrat Parties) fixed 30 November 1959 as the opening date of the first Party Congress since the Revolution. Between 1 September and 10 October lower level Party organizations representing a claimed 450,000 membership met to elect Congress "representatives" and to discuss the Congress agenda already formalized on highest Party levels. This was announced on 27 September with the publication of 41 political theses and the blueprint for the second Five-Year Plan, 1961-1965. The frequent condemnation of various aspects of revisionism indicate that it still constitutes the principal threat to Party discipline today. It is interesting to note that no date was announced for the completion of collectivization in spite of its rather accelerated promotion during the Spring of 1959. Since the theses' publication some of the lower level "electoral" meetings have been criticized as displaying "vestiges of revisionism" when the debates and resolutions appeared apathetic toward the announced program. Others, who apparently registered dismay over Kadar's failure to announce a more specific program for collectivization, were scored as dogmatists and characterized "as grave a threat" to the Party as revisionists. In summary, outside an external show of Party unity and probable minor personnel changes, there appears to be no real change forthcoming from the Congress, unless Kadar feels compelled to work against the dogmatists. While assiduously working toward stability and extension of tight Stalinist control of Hungary internally, the puppet regime of Kadar has carried on an effort to achieve the appearance of respectability. Effective 16 September, diplomatic representation to Indonesia was elevated to embassy status; reports indicate that the regime has prevailed upon the Finnish government to consider similar elevation of missions. Previously Japan had consented to re-establishment of relations with Hungary for the first time since World War II. The regime has concentrated intensive efforts on having the Hungarian issue dropped permanently from the agenda of the UN.

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
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167. Free World Communist Parties and the Detente

Important changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy have always caused trouble for local Communist Parties. Coordination of the action policies of the entire world Communist movement is a complex operation, involving harmonization of the policies of the individual CPs, front organizations and clandestine action assets with the tactics of the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and propaganda agencies to achieve the objectives of the CPSU. At present, the CPs and fronts must adjust their tactics to the developing detente, and in some cases such adjustment is a radical reversal of previous policies. A major concern for the CPSU is to make the CPs believe that their own revolutionary interests really coincide with the strategy of long-term "relaxation." The movement is uneasy. It foresees trouble with its own "hard heads", dilution and penetration by "bourgeois opportunist" concepts and individuals, the apparent indefinite postponement of revolution, and, in some cases, more aggressive action against it by local enemies. The CPs have fought the cold war so long that they have trouble shifting to other forms of "class struggle", in defining enemies other than "US imperialism", and in working out effective action tactics against the new "nebulou enemy of the detente."

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168. Nile Waters

On 8 November the UAR and Sudan signed an agreement outlining the proposed division of the waters of the Nile River, made necessary by the imminent commencement of construction of the High Dam at Aswan in Egypt with Soviet technical and economic help. This work has been divided into phases, in the first of which the USSR has agreed to aid. After work on the first phase is completed, Egypt is to receive 55.5 billion cubic meters of the water annually, while Sudan is to get 18.5 billion cubic meters. In addition, Sudan will lend Egypt 1.5 billion cubic meters until the Sudanese have built irrigation canals needed to utilize the additional water. A difficult issue, both during and prior to the negotiations, was the compensation Sudan was to receive for the many villagers (perhaps 50,000) whose lands are expected to be flooded by a lake to be formed above the proposed dam. According to the terms included in the present agreement, Egypt will pay 15 million Egyptian pounds (about \$43,200,000) as compensation for the Sudanese areas to be flooded by the Aswan High Dam. The signature of this agreement may pave the way for a loan of \$50-60 million by the World Bank to Sudan for construction of another dam at Roseires on the Blue Nile near the Ethiopian border. Although the UAR-Sudan agreement culminates years of wrangling in this complex dispute, it is probable that this is by no means the end of the matter. Other riparian states did not participate in the conference which ended with signature of the agreement: not only Ethiopia (source of the Blue Nile) but Great Britain (whose colonies of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika are all users of some of the head waters) have strong views on the subject of dividing use of the waters. Perhaps one of the main reasons why the expression of the expected vehement views from both have so far been relatively mild is that neither anticipated that the UAR and Sudan would come to an agreement so quickly on the subject. The preceding agreement was in 1929, when Great Britain was in virtual control of most of the areas mentioned, excluding Ethiopia but including both Egypt and Sudan. There has already been opposition to the agreement within Sudan, with charges that the Sudanese delegation to Cairo was tricked into the agreement. However, there have also been reports that the Sudanese themselves were fairly devious during the period of the negotiations.

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APPENDUM TO BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NO. 27

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Item #169: In this Guidance East Africa is meant to include Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda, Belgium Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, Angola, Mozambique, Bechuanaland, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

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169. East African Political Organizations

East Africa (see appendix sheet) is faced with complex problems in developing political structures which will insure the stability necessary for economic and social progress. The outlook for a satisfactory solution to these problems is gloomy because of three factors: the existence of sizeable European and Asian minorities; the unpromising economic prospects; and the tribal orientation of most Africans. The major organization vehicles for achieving independence are the political parties and the trade unions.

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