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Editorial Page

Results of the 22nd CPSU Congress

We have selected for this issue some relatively light, readable commentary (see Attachments) appearing in a monthly journal closely associated with the French Socialist Party (SFIO), La Nation Socialiste, in December, 1961. Although they strongly oppose the French CP, SFIO is a Marxist party and the journal's editors are former CP members. Material from this source would normally be most effective in democratic and left socialist circles; but in the present confusion and soul-searching, it might well reach CP and front activists everywhere for effective impact.

The first brief article, "Khrushchev Will not Rehabilitate Trotsky" by Marcel Briand (name not immediately identifiable), sarcastically demolishes, from the Trotskyite point of view, the de-Stalinization by Stalinites within "limits imposed by the need to keep the present apparatus in place at all costs." The author effectively uses a demand by (the late) Mme. Trotsky for rehabilitation of that former Lenin partner, including the quote that she considered the present Soviet regime "as far removed from Marxism and the proletarian revolution as that of Franco in Spain."

The second article, "Broken Idols and Opened Eyes" by Francois Veron (also not identified), attacks the limited de-Stalinization more heatedly, going back to show that Stalin's excesses stemmed from Leninism: "the procedures that ... attained the annihilation, not only of the Czarist bourgeoisie, but also of the non-Bolsheviks and primarily the social-democratic Mensheviks served later during the Stalin regime to eliminate the standpat or reticent Communists." The author concludes by describing the consternation in the ranks of the French Communists and bids the Socialists to help them "to disentangle themselves from their ideological quagmire: if they are ready once again to struggle for a free and democratic socialism, their place is in the Socialist Party."

For an inside view into the consternation and confusion in the French CP which Veron describes, we would refer to an article signed only "J. A." in the French Communist monthly La Nouvelle Critique for December (No. 131, pp. 28-36), "The Wisdom of Our Choice." Stating that "there was no personality cult at the time of Lenin," the author lists "the unquestionable authority acquired by Stalin in the victorious construction of Socialism," "the nature of his character," and "the vestiges of feudalism in the conscience of the backward masses," which "combined ... when external dangers became apparent ... to transform his authority into a reign and his reign into despotism."

The author considers and rejects several justifications, including Boris Leontiev's reaction when half his colleague at Pravda were arrested one morning: "I was an honest Communist and wasn't bothered;" and Francoise Giroud in l'Express: "his hands had to strangle the throat of old, lazy and romantic Russia to bring forth not only torrents of blood but also tons of steel; who would have done more and faster?"

In the succeeding paragraphs the author tortuously relates the cult to morals (Communist, of course) and answers to his satisfaction the questions "But if Stalin had not died" and "Why raise the question now, after he's been dead for eight years?" Suddenly, however, he is asking the question "How had we been able to believe?" (his emphasis) just like a defector, and his answer is pitiful:

"This is not a matter of defense, but an effort at explanation. The facts revealed were true. No one knew them or published them. We pushed them aside. There are several reasons for this. The most profound are, perhaps, those which have to do with our social being, our function: idealism, individualism. We pushed these facts aside because they did not conform to our image of a socialist society It was not possible to have thieves in the Soviet Union, no liars, no crimes, no injustices because socialism, by definition, (his emphasis) excluded lying, injustice and crime (we were wrong not about the principle but about the time element); and the USSR had brought the Socialist Revolution,

The author squirms on through another dozen paragraphs of diffuse Communist gobbledegook and concludes in confirmation of "the wisdom of our choice," but this must be anti-climactic to anyone who reads beyond the above.

We are not attaching the text because of its length and limited usefulness, but will be glad to comply with requests for copies.

BRIEFLY NOTED

What I Forgot to Tell the 22nd Congress ... by Nikita S. Khrushchev
Khrushchev gives an arrogant answer to critics who taunt him with his fear to tell the "full truth about his own role in promoting the personality cult of Stalin" -- in a satire (which is based on accurate statements of fact and quotations from Khrushchev's Stalin era speeches and articles) published by the editors of the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News in their January, 1962, issue. In a series of flashbacks attributed to Khrushchev, he indicts himself twice over for his admitted complicity in Stalin's crimes, and for distorting or glossing over that complicity in the 20th and the 22nd CPSU Congresses. He spologizes time after time for "having forgotten" to tell the Congresses certain very important facts about his own involvement. The mythical speech is replete with humorous irony which also exposes the current propaganda line of the Kremlin. Mr. K reports that it is necessary for him to reveal these facts because educated people must not be kept waiting decades to read his speech to the 20th CPSU Congress (as they were for publication of Lenin's testament warning the Central Committee about Stalin's serious defects), and because the articles from which he quotes (which he assures them are not a "bourgeois forgery") are securely buried.

A copy of the AFL-CIO News in which "What I Forgot to Tell the 22nd Congress..." appears, will be found in the Attachments. Translations in French, Italian, Spanish and German, as well as the English original, are available in any quantity and may be obtained by simple request to Headquarters. The article is one of the best compilations of fact, from the point of content and style, available on K's tactics and the Communist Party system. The primary target is the Communist fellow traveller in whatever group or audience he may be found. The article may be used in direct mailing or it may be reprinted in whole or in part with or without direct attribution.

Cuba Welcomed as 13th Member in the Family of Socialist States
Following is an excerpt from a speech by Paul de Groot, Secretary General of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN) published in De Warheid, CPN daily, on 5 January 1962:

"Socialism has made great successes in 1961 and has spread itself to new countries. The People's State of Cuba is, on the third anniversary of its revolution, well on the way to Socialism. A unity party of workers, peasants and progressive persons is busy bringing this about on the basis of Marxism-Leninism through fusion with the old Communist Party. Cuba is the thirteenth member in the family of Socialist States."

Every opportunity should be taken to bring this blunt admission by the head of the Dutch CP that Cuba is a Communist State to the attention of leftists and liberals who persist in refusing to recognize the character of Castro's Cuba. We contrast this statement with the much more cautious treatment given to Cuba by Soviet media, which, while encouraging close relations and mutual assistance, have not acknowledged Castro's Cuba as a member of the Communist Bloc in any way.

20 January 1962

485. The Winds of Change in Africa

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Background: In 1945 there were four independent states in the continent of Africa (South Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt). Today - 17 years later - there are twenty-nine and others are expected; the total is more than that of any other continent. The twenty-nine votes of these states make up more than one-fourth of the UN General Assembly's present total of 104. Further, there are prospects that other African areas will gain independence, namely: Ruanda-Urundi, Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, Algeria; perhaps Portuguese Africa the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, British protectorates in South Africa, S. W. Africa. It is worthy of note that almost all the African territories freed during the period 1946-1961 were previously British or French, despite reams of Communist propaganda criticizing the British and French as colonialists.

By contrast, it is of interest to inquire what state (anywhere) has been given independence by the Soviet Communists once they have gained control of it. Answer: none. In fact, during the same period and just before it the USSR and the Chinese Communists were adding enormously to their empires and subjugating territories and peoples wherever they could... e. g. in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, East Germany, Rumania, the Baltic States, Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea. This background serves to place in perspective the request by the USSR on 28 August 1961 at the UN General Assembly that the Sixteenth UNGA include an item on colonialism. The USSR claimed that

"the colonial powers' efforts to frustrate the United Nations Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples are a challenge to the United Nations and create a threat to world peace and security. The Soviet Government, firmly convinced that the United Nations cannot remain inactive in the face of the intolerable situation that has arisen with regard to the complete and final liquidation of colonialism, is submitting to the General Assembly, for consideration at its Sixteenth Session, the question of the situation with regard to the implementation of the 'Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.' " [The Declaration referred to was passed by the UNGA on 14 December 1960]

Less than a month later, the USSR accused the United States of being an "accomplice in all the bloody atrocities perpetrated by the other colonial powers in their colonies. "

The growth in the number of independent states of Africa - each with the same voting strength in the UNGA as the U. S. or USSR - brings to the fore the question of the alignment of these states especially since together they number more than a quarter of the UNGA total. In general (and with certain exceptions on both the "West" and the "East" side) they are neutral and express the desire to remain aloof from the cold war. Even Guinea, which has hitherto followed the Soviet lead in the UN, has been showing signs of

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late of a weakening of this attitude and as late as January 7, in the presence of the Soviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, President Sekou Toure said in Conakry (the capital) that Guinea was determined to keep out of the cold war. There are three major groups in Africa, each named after a particular conference of African states. The first, "Brazzaville Group," consists of a total of 13 states, 11 of them former French colonies,⁽¹⁾ plus Togo and Cameroun. The "Casablanca Group" consists of six states: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and the Provisional Government of Algeria. Then there is the "Monrovia Group" (conference of African and Malagasy states) of 21 African states which mostly combines - no nation in the "Casablanca Group" is a member - those former British and French states which are now independent.⁽²⁾ Although there are a number of alliances among the African states, there can be no generalization about them - either on the "East-West" struggle or even on some African issues. While almost all African states, for example, detest apartheid, they cannot speak with one voice even about it: South Africa is, of course, the dissident. Even the Arab states, despite constant disagreements about one question or another within the Arab League, are more united on one question about which they all feel the same, namely, Israel.

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⁽¹⁾ Central African Republic, Chad, Malagasy, Congo (B), Gabon, Senegal, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania

⁽²⁾ Liberia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Congo (L), Congo (B), Cameroon, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Togo, Libya, Somalia, Central African Republic, Chad, Senegal

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January 1962

486 Soviet-Communist Support of German Fascism: The Historical Record
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Background: The following selected incidents offer ample evidence in support of the above thesis:

a. Secret Rearmament Conspiracy. The Versailles peace treaty (1919) forbade Germany all modern, heavy weapons. The Soviet Union, struggling to build up its Red Army in the midst of civil war and other emergencies, was sorely lacking in military equipment, experienced officers and military technicians. Despite violent political clashes between German Communists and the government of the first German (Weimar) Republic, secret cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr (the 100,000 man military force permitted Germany under the Versailles treaty) developed on a large scale, until it was exposed in a sensational investigation conducted by the German Reichstag (parliament).

Ruth Fischer, one-time German Communist Party leader, wrote in STALIN AND GERMAN COMMUNISM (Harvard University Press 1948): "During 1922-1923 liaison between the General Staffs of the two armies (i. e. German and Soviet) was made by order of Trotsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. This was done, however, following the foreign policy worked out by the Politburo and first of all by the General Secretary (Stalin)..."(p. 265). Later in the same book, Fischer relates: "In March, 1921, the Russian General Staff sent Karl Radek (one of Lenin's closest associates) to Berlin with a secret proposal.... The German army was offered Russian assistance in building up its armament, contrary to the provisions of Versailles, by establishing arsenals on Russian soil. The Junkers firm (German aircraft manufacturer) built factories at Fili, Samara and Saratov.... Reichswehr Major Lohmann tested submarines in the Baltic and the Black Sea. German officers were sent to Russia to conduct training courses for experts in chemical warfare and for pilots.... Late in 1926, three German-owned ships arrived at Stettin from Russia with a cargo of grenades for the Reichswehr." (pp. 528-530) The account given in INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES by Gustav Hilger, who was Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow and participated in the negotiations between the two countries, confirms many of the facts related by Ruth Fischer and provides more details of the extent of German secret arrangements with and military activities in the USSR.

b. Communists Eulogize Nationalist Saboteur Schlageter. The first wave of German nationalism after World War One struck in 1923, with French occupation of the Ruhr industrial center, run-away inflation and

finally Hitler's abortive beerhall putsch in Munich, 9 November 1923. The Communists, instead of opposing their internationalist ideology against this feverish spread of nationalist agitation, tried to outbid Hitler and other nationalist demagogues by assailing the Versailles treaty and the German republic, while at the same time attempting to fraternize with the right-wing extremists. These tactics reached a climax in a speech in which the above mentioned Karl Radek praised the memory of Albert Leo Schlageter, a German nationalist executed by the French for sabotaging a railroad in the occupied Ruhr area.

Ruth Fischer (op. cit.) reports: "After years of secret discussions with German nationalists, Radek at last openly proposed a united front between them, the army and the Communist Party. In June 1923, at a meeting in Moscow of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Comintern, Radek delivered a speech under the title 'The Comintern's Fight Against Versailles and the Capitalist Offensive....'" (p. 268) "A few days later, at the same meeting of the Comintern's Executive Committee, ... Radek took the floor, to deliver a panegyric on the nationalist hero, Leo Schlageter: '... Schlageter, a courageous soldier of the counterrevolution, deserves to be sincerely honored by us, the soldiers of the revolution.'" (pp. 270-271)

c. Communists Aid Hitler's Rise to Power. Communism -- as an internal and as an external threat -- was one of the most effective pretexts which provided conservative, middle class and business leaders' support for fascist adventurers like Hitler and Mussolini. The continuous German Communist efforts to undermine the Weimar Republic, to split the labor movement and to destroy the Social Democratic Party, effectively weakened the position of Hitler's opponents in Germany: the German CP before Hitler was a powerful force, with up to 100 deputies in the Reichstag and nearly 5 million popular votes. The Comintern tactics declaring the moderate Socialists as the principal enemy also benefited Hitler.

George F. Kennan, in RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN (Little, Brown & Co., 1961) recalls: "At the sixth Congress of the Communist International, which convened in Moscow in 1928... the line was laid down that the spearhead of Communist political activity in Germany was to be directed squarely against the Social Democrats. The latter were, in fact, to be called for agitational purposes 'Social Fascists' -- with a view to obliterating in the minds of the German electors all real distinction between the Social Democratic leadership and that of the extreme right-wing groups." (p. 286)

In the critical period between 1930, when the Nazis obtained for the first time 107 seats in the Reichstag, and 1933, when Hitler seized power, the German Communists assisted Hitler in many ways. For instance, they participated in a Nazi-sponsored campaign for a referendum to oust the Social Democratic state government of Prussia, they took part in a Nazi-provoked transport workers strike in Berlin, their propaganda tried to

surpass that of the Nazis in nationalist demagoguery and they continued to assail the institutions of the republic and the parties which supported the republican regime.

Kennan (op. cit.), after discussing the direct responsibility of the Communists for Hitler's seizure of power, concludes: "The consequences of Hitler's accession to power were not entirely disagreeable to the long-term purposes of the Russian Communist movement. Hitler's triumph in 1933 put an end, after all, for more than a decade to come, to the possibilities for genuine rapprochement between the German people and the remainder of the West. It produced precisely that aggravation of the contradictions within the Western world on which both Lenin and Stalin had staked their diplomacy. It produced another world war, constituting the second great drain in a century on the spiritual and physical energies of the Western peoples and ending with the delivery of half of Europe into Soviet hands." (p. 292)

d. Moscow's Share of Guilt in Hitler's World War Two. Stalin directly opened the way for Hitler's war of aggression by signing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939, occupying the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) as his reward and sharing with the Nazi war-lord the spoils of Poland. Moreover, from the beginning of the war until Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Communists the world over sabotaged the Western war effort against Hitler, especially in France.

Franz Borkenau, himself once a senior Comintern official, describes the impact of Communist treason on the French war effort in 1939-40 (in EUROPEAN COMMUNISM, London 1953): "When the French Communists hinted at the desirability of desertions, there were real desertions. When they prompted sabotage of war production, they instigated real acts of sabotage. A frighteningly large part of the armaments issuing from the Paris factories whose workers were under Communist influence were duds, or worse, were sabotaged so as to produce mortal accidents. Here and there, but not in general, the evildoers were caught and three young Communists were shot after having sabotaged hundreds of airplanes in the Farman works. It is more difficult to assess quantitatively the effects of Communist propaganda for desertion, fraternization with the enemy, and throwing away one's arms. But the generals were convinced that Communist propaganda was the major factor in the rapid collapse of the army." (p. 304)

At the same time, the Soviet Union furnished huge quantities of strategic raw materials and essential foodstuffs for Hitler's war machine and permitted the Nazi Reich to maintain contacts with its ally, Japan, across its territory. Documents captured in the Nazi archives provide ample evidence of Soviet support of the Nazi war effort. Sections extracted from two of these documents illustrate the nature of this support as follows:

".... The supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a very substantial prop to the German war economy. Since the new commercial treaties went into effect, Russia has supplied over 300 million Reichsmarks worth of raw materials...." /Foreign Office Memorandum, signed by Schnurre, Berlin, 28 September 1940/ "The Navy intends to abandon the base on the Murmansk Coast /of Russia/ as such are now available in Norway. Please inform the Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Government of the Reich, convey our thanks for valuable assistance. In addition to the official note, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy intends also to express his gratitude in a personal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.... /Telegram to German Embassy, Moscow, signed by Woermann, Berlin, 4 September 1940/

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487. THE BERLIN CRISIS: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

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Background: The following important developments have taken place since the last Guidance dealing with the situation in Berlin (No. 73 of 28 August, entitled The Berlin Crisis: Encouraging Communist Opposition):

1. West German Elections of 17 September: Replacement of CDU majority control by coalition government and a weakening of Adenauer's position; likelihood the Chancellor's "European" policies may increasingly be challenged by elements concerned primarily with German national interests.

2. Rusk-Gromyko Talks in New York in October: represent the first direct U.S.-Soviet talks since the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation in Vienna in June, 1961; in his speech to the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev characterized the Rusk-Gromyko conversations as an indication of a "more reasonable" attitude on the part of the West.

3. Khrushchev Report to 22nd CPSU Congress 17 October: the Soviet leader, "in order to remove the quality of an ultimatum" (if a new Berlin arrangement satisfactory to the Soviets was not forthcoming), formally withdrew his threat of proceeding by the year's end with a separate Soviet bloc "peace treaty" with East Germany, which unilaterally would abridge the West's Berlin access rights. Khrushchev told the Congress that he saw a "prospect for achieving peaceful coexistence for the entire period in which the social and political problems now dividing the world will have to be solved." The reasons for Khrushchev's removing the deadline on Berlin may have included the following:

a. The fact that -- in a certain sense -- the talks with the West regarding Berlin had already begun, and to pave the way for formal negotiations by removing Western objections to negotiating under duress;

b. The erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 and the prohibition of free movement within Berlin, went a long way toward accomplishing immediate Soviet objectives (closing the refugee escape hatch and preventing further flight of badly needed manpower; sealing off East Berliners and East Germans from the "pernicious" influence of West Berlin; more firmly incorporating the Soviet sector of Berlin into the "GDR" and establishing a de facto state border through the center of Berlin);

c. The Soviet Union also may have believed that the results of the September elections and the impact of the 13 August action improved the Soviet chances of weakening West Germany's ties to NATO and the Common Market -- the Soviet memorandum handed to German Ambassador Kroll in Moscow in late December, 1961, is the most striking of several recent examples of Soviet

efforts to persuade West Germans that a mutually advantageous Soviet-Federal Republic accommodation is possible and in the German national interest.

4. Thompson-Gromyko Exploratory Talks in Moscow, December, 1961 - January 1962: These talks represent a Western effort to determine if realistic negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin are possible.

Soviet Objectives: With the most pressing of the Soviet objectives accomplished by the 13 August action sealing off East and West Berlin in violation of Four Power agreements, the hard core of the controversy at this stage concerns the continued Soviet effort to erode the status of West Berlin by bestowing on the East German regime the life and death power to regulate all entry to and all egress from West Berlin, by severing West Berlin's close ties to the Federal Republic, and by divorcing the internal defense of West Berlin from the three Western protection powers, thus preparing the way for the eventual absorption of a withered West Berlin into East Germany. (The Soviet Union has indicated it is willing to accept the token presence of allied garrisons in West Berlin; however, in this case they insist on the presence of a contingent of Soviet troops. Having violated the Four Power status of all of Berlin, they now prepare a "Four-Power status" for West Berlin.) Together with further Soviet pursuit of their Berlin objectives, there has been a re-focusing of Soviet sights on their principal strategic objective in Western Europe: the separation of West Germany from NATO and the Common Market. In this re-focusing, they have been impelled by three principal factors, two of which from their point of view are positive -- namely, the successful sealing of the Berlin sector borders in August and the outcome of the German elections in September -- and one of which is very definitely negative -- the impressive forward movement toward unification of Western Europe.

Because of the above-mentioned re-focusing, and possibly also because of current preoccupation with relations with the other members of the Communist bloc, Khrushchev appears currently to be marking time on Berlin and awaiting the results of his recent initiatives. Since Khrushchev's removal of the separate "peace treaty" deadline, the Soviet Union has avoided authoritative comment regarding deadlines or unilateral action on Berlin. East German propaganda and high-level pronouncements have reflected a general uncertainty over the course of Soviet policy in the coming months. Finally, the evident Soviet interest in continuing the talks with Ambassador Thompson suggests that no new major Soviet moves (this would not preclude East German moves) will be taken against Berlin until the current round of diplomatic probings is concluded.

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29 January 1962

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Communists Unmask Subversion in South Vietnam



Background: Radio Hanoi on 18 January 1962 announced that in late December, 1961, "Marxist-Leninists in South Vietnam met and decided to set up the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party." Prior to this announcement the Hanoi Regime propaganda line was that the Viet Cong (Communist guerrillas) and the National Liberation Front (Communist front organization operating in South Vietnam) were simply indigenous South Vietnamese fighting to liberate the area from the "imperialists's puppet clique of Ngo Dinh Diem." Despite massive evidence to the contrary, the Communist line has suggested that once the imperialists were thrown out, South Vietnam would enjoy some measure of autonomy in a united Vietnam. The Communists have now chosen to unmask their direction and control of the Viet Cong. Besides parroting Viet Cong's usual propaganda line (workers unite and throw off the yoke of the U. S. /Diem clique, support the National Liberation Front, etc.), they new party's declaration "calls on the people in the north to strive to build an ever more prosperous and strong North Vietnam, making it a solid base for the struggle for peaceful reunification of the country...." Thus in its 18 January announcement, Hanoi belatedly felt compelled to acknowledge that the guerrillas in South Vietnam are Communists and North Vietnam is their base.

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2591C Reactions to the 22nd CPSU Congress Among Latin American CP's.

Background: During the 22nd CPSU Congress, none of the Latin American delegates endorsed Khrushchev's attack against the anti-Party group. Those from the Dominican Republic and Honduras failed to support Khrushchev's attacks on Albania or on the Stalin cult of personality. Delegates from 14 Latin American countries supported the attack against Albania only, while six Latin American delegates specifically attacked Albania and the Stalin cult of personality. This disparity indicates the confusion which was created among the delegates by the Soviet actions at the Congress.

Subsequently, after the return of the delegates, the Communist Party of Uruguay was the first of the Latin American Parties to formally endorse Khrushchev's new Party Program. Although the Parties of Paraguay and Colombia later joined Uruguay in supporting Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians and the Chinese Communists, the other Latin American Parties were generally late in responding to developments within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. There is some reason to believe that intra-Party debates, between supporters of the Soviet line and those supporting Peiping have taken place in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador.

The results of the Moscow proceedings have probably had a more disquieting impact on some Latin American Communists, and particularly on their sympathizers, than the relatively calm public reaction they evinced would seem to indicate. The most important consequence of Khrushchev's opening speech at the Congress was the effect it had on all those to whom, in spite of his defects, Stalin remained the great theoretician of Marxism and worthy successor of Marx and Lenin who made the Soviet Union what it is today and should continue to be revered throughout history as one of the fathers of Socialism. Although most Party members had managed to accept Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, many were unconvinced and now wondered why it had been necessary to reopen this issue at the 22nd Party Congress. Some have interpreted the renewed attacks on Stalin as a device to persecute certain leaders in the Soviet Union.

Although the leaders of the various Parties have accepted the conclusions of the Congress as law, lower levels within the Party have been somewhat bewildered and have been asking numerous questions. Why, they ask, have the letter which Molotov sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU in October 1961 and the statements made by the Albanians in their own defense not been published locally? Some have expressed disappointment in the fact that the 22nd CPSU Congress was mainly concerned with local problems such as the dispute between the CPSU and Albania, the internal ideological difficulties of the CPSU, and the re-emergence of the cult of personality issue. They felt that, since the beginning of the Congress, Khrushchev was largely defending himself and appeared to be trying to maintain his position within the CPSU. The question has been raised as to where some of the present CP leaders were (and how they behaved) during Stalin's rule.

The special situation prevailing in both Brazil and in Cuba is noteworthy. A long standing and profound rift has been in existence within the Brazilian CP. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8
obtain advice in his struggle against the "opportunistic and revisionist" policy
S E C R E T 489. (Continued)

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of the Secretary General of the Party, Carlos Prestes. Sino-Soviet frictions, emphasized by Khrushchev during the 22nd CPSU Congress, have been reflected in this struggle. Prestes has accused Prado's group of being Stalinist, of violating the organizational principles of Lenin, of refusing to recognize past errors, as revealed by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and of forming an anti-Party group. In addition, Prado has been accused of taking advantage of the Brazilian CP's new policy, which they knew was designed principally to achieve the legality of the Party, in order to attack the Party leaders. Another criticism has been that Prado's leftist group has, by participating in pro-Cuban front activities, attempted to use the Cuban revolution as an example of the successful application of leftist revolutionary theory. The PCB leaders have objected to the fact that the leftists have distributed Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare which was translated into Portuguese by leftist leader Mauricio Grabois. A number of leftist leaders, including several members of the Central Committee, were expelled from the Party for factional anti-Party activity, for plotting against the Party unity line, for following dogma and assuming a sectarian position on basic principles, thus serving the interests of the enemies of the proletariat and of the people.

Prado's group, on the other hand, has accused Prestes of using Stalinist dictatorial methods in order to gain approval of the new Party line which they claim has abandoned the basic tenet of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in order to adopt a policy of compromise and revisionism. The PCB leadership is condemned for refusing to recognize that the political and economic ills of the country can only be solved by modifying the basic political and social structure of the nation, thus failing to adhere to the traditional revolutionary principles of communism. The leftists deplore the fact that even the experience of Cuba has failed to open the eyes of the PCB leadership to the need for revolutionary communism and they wish to lead the Party back along the true path of Marxism and to restore its role as the vanguard of the proletariat. They want to apply the concept of class struggle and argue in favor of a policy which uses other than "peaceful" means to achieve power. They claim that the present statutes and program of the PCB are no longer in accord with Marxist-Leninist theory.

In addition to Brazil, Cuba presents a situation wherein Cuban allegiance to Moscow is open to question. In spite of professions of faith on the part of Fidel Castro and of Blas Roca, which included Roca's condemnation of the Albanian CP at the 22nd CPSU Congress, the Cuban leaders sent greetings on 29 November 1961 to Albania on the anniversary of the establishment of the Albanian People's Republic. This was followed by the arrival of the first Albanian ambassador in Havana in early December, 1961, which was sharply criticized by several Latin American CP's, particularly the Uruguayans and the Chileans.

In discussing the 22nd CPSU Congress on 1 December 1961, Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Cuban CP was very careful not to offend Stalin's admirers while explaining why the Stalin cult of personality had to be condemned. He described how Stalin's first period was the fight against the enemies of the Party - that is, of Leninism - and that this fight, which gained great victories over these enemies, contributed greatly to the victory of Socialism in the Soviet Union. He went on to explain that Stalin, "who was a great Marxist, an outstanding Marxist," had a series of negative aspects in his personality which caused him to promote his deification as a result of which the principle of collective leadership was eliminated. Roca was careful, however, to explain that Beria, the Security Chief, had been

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responsible for the numerous unjust condemnations and executions which took place under Stalin. Roca then added: "There are those people who say that Stalin had great merits. Yes, nobody denies that. The Soviet Party will not deny it either. Stalin will occupy his place in history with his merits and his errors."

In addition to maintaining close friendly diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Peiping, certain attitudes of the Cuban leaders seem to be more inspired by Peiping than by Moscow. A good example of this lies in the criticism which was made in December, 1961, of certain "improprieties" extant among the militiawomen. The latter were accused of transforming their baggy uniforms by giving them a waistline and of using fancy hairdoes, nailpolish and perfume. These objectionable features were described as vestiges of capitalism which must be discarded in the new social order. Such comments are more reminiscent of a Chinese population uniformly clad in shapeless dungarees than of a renascent Moscow which attempts to improve the clothing habits of the population and invites the Paris house of Dior to put on a fashion show in Moscow.

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