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ADDENDUM

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(Addendum)

In chapter and verse one may trace Castro's betrayal of the promising revolution which put him into power in Cuba. Here are some examples:

Agrarian Reform. Perhaps no battlecry epitomizes the appeal of Communism better than "Land for the Landless"; certainly no other exposes the failure and deception of Communism as well as it does. As the Organization of American States special consultative committee on security concluded, Communist promises of delivering land to the landless constitute "the most tragic deceit practiced by the Communists." In his betrayal of the Cuban Revolution, Castro confirms the OAS evaluation.

From the outset Castro posed as a national "champion" of the peasants. However, he acquired his "championship" via curious and twisted reasoning. He declared (addressing the Congress of Peasants 24 February 1959):

"I was not born poor. I was born rich. I was not the son of a landless peasant. I was the son of a rich landowner. I never lived in a miserable house. I was near poverty, but I never suffered from it. That is why I do not defend the landowners, but the people and the peasants. The Prime Minister is the leader of the peasants and no one can defend them better than he."

Agrarian reform was one of Castro's original panaceas offered to the people. It was a promise before he gained power and he repeated it in his first public statements after the success of the revolution. He declared (in the 24 February speech noted above) that without agrarian reform the country's economy would founder and everybody would be ruined. It was necessary, therefore, to break up the big estates. Castro promised the peasants that the land would be theirs and that nobody would take it away from them.

By 27 March 1960, the "champion of the peasants" was singing a different tune. He revealed a "modification" in his "land for the landless" pledges. The large sugar estates would not be broken up into parcels for the peasant; they would be converted into cooperatives. "Split up the sugar cane plantations," why, Castro said, "imagine what the results would have been! A tiny piece of land for each family with separate administration, and contracting, and machinery for each piece."

Castro painted a glowing picture of the cooperatives, but added (in a 17 May 1961 speech as quoted by Blas Roca in Cuba Socialista, September 1961):

"Only you can decide whether you want to organize cooperatives . . . The Revolution respects your will in this matter. If you are not convinced that cooperatives are the solution, try (emphasis added) to maintain yourselves on small parcels."

Also in May 1961, Castro ridiculed the idea that farms would be collectivized. "The revolution would never do such a foolish thing," he said. "If a farmer prefers to keep his bit of land, then the revolution will never try to socialize it."

But by early 1961, state farms began to appear. Castro proclaimed the "happiness" of the peasants over this development. The peasant, Castro declared (Revolucion, 8 March 1961), saw "no difference now between himself and the national authority."

On 13 November 1961 (talking to "revolutionary orienters"), Castro admitted agricultural problems and in a veiled way revealed his next move: to take land away from the peasants, abolish the cooperatives and convert to state farms. He said:

"Naturally when the time comes to reorganize all this, it is much more difficult to take away than to give, thus creating a problem. This is simply because the workers do not have a clear understanding . . . "

Castro declared (10 May 1962 speaking in Matanzas Province): "We are not going to be afraid of appearing to have taken a step backward." His admitted "step backward" was to collectivize the cooperatives--to form so-called "people's farms" copying the Soviet state farm plan in which the government owns the land and the peasant becomes a state worker.

The final step--the difficult part of taking away--was accomplished without the publicity Castro's propagandists usually attached to his acts. But the act was summed up in a statement by an agricultural official (Carlos Rafael Rodeiguez, Revolucion, 17 May 1962) when he referred to the "transformation of cane cooperatives into people's farms announced by Fidel (Castro) a few days ago,"

Castro addressed a "Congress of Cooperatives" on 18 August 1962 and the Congress approved his decision to convert cooperatives into state farms.

Thus, agrarian reform had traveled the full circle. As applied to Cuba's most important agricultural product--sugarcane--the workers were first promised land; then the plantations were turned into cooperatives (with propaganda stressing this made the workers part owners); then, the cooperatives became state farms which left the worker back where he started--landless and working for the land owner, in this case, the state.

Living Standards. As "champion" of the people, Castro regularly insisted in his early statements that the chief aim of his revolutionary program was to improve the living standards of the people. Pre-Castro Cuba was one of the richest nations in Latin America (in the top five in per capita income and manufacturing, for example), but Castro promised that each peasant would have more than ever before.

In promulgating the Agrarian Reform Law on 17 May 1959, Castro declared that its implementation would mean two million Cubans "will have their income increased and will become buyers in the domestic market." On 10 June 1959 (in an interview in Revolucion), Castro claimed: "Next year we will have other resources and production will have increased considerably..."

A year and a half after taking control, Castro told the people he was accomplishing the goal of raising their living standards and that an even better future was ahead. But by early 1961 Castro acknowledged that he hadn't been too effective; there were hitches in his program. On 8 April 1961,

he stated: "Today some things, it is true, are lacking." In presenting the 1962 economic program (21 October 1961), Castro admitted: "Our economy cannot afford to do more for the people than it is doing right now."

On a radio interview on 13 March 1962, Castro announced rationing for oils, butter, rice, beans and milk. Soap and toothpaste would be rationed in major cities and in Havana--where almost one-third of Cuba's population lives--additional rationed items would be beef, chickens, fish, eggs and produce.

A Havana broadcast of 14 March 1962 claimed that Castro's announcement of rationing was received by the people "with great enthusiasm." The broadcast reasoned that rationing meant "that some people who have been getting less than their share will now get more."

But it didn't work out that way. Writing in the Manchester Guardian the first week in June, 1962, David Holden reported that rationing in Havana was "severe and inefficient." He reported that his friends in Cuba were unable to secure even their authorized quotas of rationed items.

Castro said on 14 May 1962 (addressing the Camaguey Sugar Plenum):

"This is the price that people must pay for the right to a better future. We have difficulties. We know that . . . . Imagine the unimaginable of a revolution without difficulties."

Or one might observe: Imagine the unimaginable of a Communist country without food shortages. The state farm system was evidently working as well in Cuba as it was in Soviet Russia and the people suffered from shortages of food and other necessities.

The Cuban peasant found he couldn't eat promises and his standard of living was going down, even below pre-Castro levels.

Elections. In his first political declaration from the Sierra Maestra in July of 1957, Castro included a "formal promise" of general elections at the end of one year and an "absolute guarantee" of freedom of information, press and all individual and political rights provided in the 1940 constitution.

This was the promise to the Cuban people--a promise that helped inspire them to take up arms and overthrow a regime that was denying them these same constitutional provisions. Castro elaborated on his promises in a February 1958, magazine article (in the now defunct Coronet) in which he said he was fighting for a "genuine representative government" and "truly honest" general elections within 12 months. He defended himself against the accusation "of plotting to replace military dictatorship with revolutionary dictatorship."

In his first speech after assuming power (9 January 1959), Castro promised that elections would be held "as soon as possible." One month later he promised the people elections would be held in two years. After that positive statement, Castro became progressively vague. He argued that the Cuban people didn't want elections; the people, he said in 1961, have "no time" for elections. Finally, he ridiculed the idea of elections altogether. Castro showed similar respect for his other promises to enforce the constitutional provisions for freedom of press, information, and

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to the Cuban people:

\*28 February 1959: "It is not necessary to have a constitutional convention. The next thing will be general elections. . . . Any place where the government wants to be in for very long without free elections . . . it begins to make inventions, planning ways to be there a long time. We are not in that class. . . . The people do not want elections now."

\*8 April 1959: "Clean and honest elections, yes. We are the first to favor elections and submitting matters to popular verdicts . . ."

\*9 June 1959: "The consensus is this: that as soon as the nation demands it, we will have elections. . . . Later we may again sound out when the people want elections held."

\*2 September 1960: "This, here, this certainly is representation, because we have no ballotbox-stuffing here, nor fraud, nor bought votes, nor political sergeants, nor a machine, nor bottles, nor anything. This, here, is pure. This one--this one really is a democracy free of impurities. This is a truly pasturized democracy. . . . Can there be anything purer than a meeting of minds of all the people?"

\*2 May 1961: "A revolution expressing the will of the people is an election every day, not every four years. . . . Direct, government by the people has replaced the conception of pseudodemocracy. Do the people have time for elections? No!"

Communism. Castro's early public statements were anti-Communist, but before 1959 was over his tone changed. In a four-hour television talk on 22 October, Castro asserted: "I declare that all that is said in the United States through the press concerning Communism is a lie!" A few days later (26 October 1959 in an interview with Henry J. Taylor of the Washington Daily News) Castro declared: "I am no Communist. Just because Karl Marx had a beard and Castro also has a beard, Americans should not jump to conclusions. . . . I want no foreign power dominating my country. . ."

But his association with Communism mounted--internally as well as externally. In a Cuban-Soviet communique of 19 December 1960, the two countries pledged to work together and endorsed their respective domestic and foreign policies. Moscow's TASS (reporting on an interview with Castro which appeared in the Italian Communist Party organ, L'Unita) on 1 February 1961 quoted Castro: "The Communists have shed much blood and shown much heroism in the struggle for the cause of the Cuban people. Now we continue to work together, honestly and fraternally."

On 1 May 1961, Castro proclaimed Cuba was a "socialist" state:

"To those who talk to us about the 1940 constitution we say . . . That constitution has been left behind by this revolution, which, as we have said, is a socialist revolution. . . . That new social system is called socialism, and this [new] constitution will therefore be a socialist constitution."

Castro's brand of "socialism" was not, of course, the Western social democracy but rather the second stage in the newly proclaimed Communist three-stage theory of social evolution. Approved For Release 2009/08/27 : CIA-RDP79-03064A000100070010-4

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and communism. This fact became clear as Castro continued to proclaim his unequivocal embrace of communism.

In his historic "I-am-a-Marxist-Leninist" speech of 2 December 1961, Castro said he was forming a new political party to absorb all other parties to "lead Cuba through socialism to a people's democracy or the dictatorship of the proletariat." He said he had hitherto hidden his belief in Communism from the Cuban people because "otherwise we might have alienated the bourgeoisie and other forces which we knew we would eventually have to fight."

Castro said:

"When I left the university, I was not a Marxist-Leninist, but I was basically influenced by their works. . . . Do I believe in Marxism? I believe absolutely in Marxism! Did I believe in it on 1 January? I believed on 1 January. Did I believe in it on 26 July? I believed in it on 26 July. . . . Do I have doubts about Marxism? . . . I do not have the slightest doubt. . . . That is why I began to tell you with all candor, that we believe in Marxism, that we believe that it is the most correct, most scientific, the only true theory, the only true revolutionary theory. Yes, I state it here, with complete satisfaction and with full confidence. I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life."

Since his 2 December confessional, Castro has continued to proclaim his Marxist-Leninist orientation proudly stressing that he is following the Soviet model. For example, in a 22 December 1961 address to the "Schools of Revolutionary Instruction," he called attention to the fact his "people's farms" were the same as the Soviet "sovkhoz," that the "Schools of Revolutionary Instructions" would be called "Schools of Marxism-Leninism" in the USSR, and that his "political orienters" are counterparts of the Soviet "agitators."

Confirming his Marxist-Leninist position and necessarily related homage and dependence upon the Soviet Union, Castro has executed a series of military agreements with the Soviets. Examples of Soviet imperialism became an every-day-affair for the Cubans as Soviets took over homes and hotels, commandeered farms, schools, land; took over docks and ports; built walls to hide their activities and limit Cuban access to the areas they occupied, etc. The objective of this haste, secrecy and militancy became public knowledge on 22 October 1962 when President Kennedy revealed the Soviets had constructed medium range ballistic missile sites in Cuba.

Thus, Castro completed his betrayal of a promising revolution and his betrayal of the Cuban people. In accepting the Soviet line in international affairs, accepting Soviet arms, equipment, technicians and money and embracing Communism "until the last day of my life," he completed a sellout of his nation and his people. The full extent of his betrayal became evident in late October when Khrushchev stated the arms in Cuba were his, were manned by Soviets and that he would be willing to withdraw them under certain conditions--in short, Cuba was but a pawn in his program of world conquest and domination.

Castro's promise of "Land for the Landless" has become "Less Land for the Landless"; his promises of higher living standards have meant

rationing and increasing taxes. **Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100070010-4**  
promises of elections have given away to his plan to remain perpetually in  
power; his nationalism and anti-Communism have been shams to hide his  
embrace of Communism and his role as a pawn in the scheme of international  
Communism.

These are the facts in Castro's betrayal of Cuba's revolution.

The Soviet Union and the Freedom of the Seas

The United States quarantine of Cuba raised questions about the freedom of the seas. Pro-Soviet observers took pleasure in recalling that hitherto, the United States had been an opponent of blockades, and had frequently become embroiled with countries that tried to impose them. They ignored the fact that the United States obtained the agreement of the Organization of American States (with 20 favorable votes and one abstention) to taking sanctions, in accordance with the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Article 8 of that treaty provided for action to be taken to meet a threat to the peace of the Americas, including "the use of armed force." As the crisis developed, it became clear that the blockade-type action was designed to bring pressure short of invasion or bombing, that in effect it was a means of postponing and, if possible, avoiding actual hostilities. At this writing, it appears that the quarantine, together with the obvious American resolve to take further measures if necessary, has produced the desired result. It is likely, however, that more discussion will follow on the subject of the supposed American infringement of the freedom of the seas.

It should not be supposed that the Soviet Union and previous Russian regimes have always been champions of maritime freedom. By a ukase of 4/16 September 1821, Czar Alexander I unilaterally forbade all foreign vessels from approaching Russian coasts and islands "within less than 100 Italian miles /i. e., 185 kilometers/ under penalty of confiscation." Great Britain and the United States successfully insisted on the abandonment of this order. In 1827, Russia joined with France and Britain in a "peaceful blockade" of Turkey. War was not considered to have been declared, but the Turkish fleet was defeated in battle at Navarino, and as a result, Greece obtained her independence. As one of the Great Powers, Russia also participated in "peaceful blockades" around Greece in 1886, Crete in 1897, and Montenegro in 1913; these blockades were designed to prevent or limit the spread of hostilities, and although they showed a disregard for the rights of small nations, they achieved their purpose.

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR has been too much at odds with other powers to join with them in imposing any "peaceful blockade". But the Soviet Union has continued to take unilateral action which has restricted the freedom of the seas. In 1909, the Czar's government had asserted that Russian territorial waters extended 12 miles from Russian shores, whereas most other nations had limited their claims to a three or four mile limit. (If all nations claimed and enforced a 12 mile limit, there would be no free entrance into the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Aegean Sea, or through the English Channel, the Strait of Malacca, or some 60 other straits and passages.) This claim, contested by the principal maritime powers, was reasserted by the Soviet government in a decree on "the protection of state boundaries" dated June 15, 1927. Unlike the claims of some other nations to extended water areas, the Soviet 12 mile limit has been rigidly enforced. Swedish, Danish, and Japanese fishermen have been repeatedly interned for infringements, real or supposed, on Soviet waters. A Japanese protest of March 1959 stated that 744 Japanese vessels had been seized by the Soviets since 1945. The USSR refuses to submit the question of the 12 mile limit to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

Soviet leaders have aimed at placing the seas surrounding the Soviet Union--the Black-Sea, the Baltic, the Barents Seas, the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk--under Soviet control, even beyond the 12 mile limit. They claim that these seas should be "closed seas," i. e. seas controlled by the powers immediately fronting on them. In effect, however, this would mean in each case Soviet control, since Soviet power would outweigh the other countries involved.

1. Access to the Black Sea has been an object of contention since the 18th century. Russian policy has aimed, first, at barring the warships of non-Black-Sea states, and second, at gaining effective control of the straits at Constantinople (Istanbul). A secret treaty concluded during World War I would have conceded the Czarist government control of the straits, but this was discarded when Russia made a separate peace with Germany. The Lausanne Convention of 1923 demilitarized the straits, placed them under an International Commission with a Turkish chairman (and no Soviet member), and opened them freely to all nations. After war began to threaten in the 1930's, a new convention was concluded at Montreux (1936), giving Turkey sole control of the straits, including the right to fortify them, and placing low limits on the amount of non-Black -Sea war tonnage that may be admitted, while almost



all warships of Black Sea powers are permitted to leave. This convention, generally favorable to the USSR, is now in effect. It does not satisfy Soviet desires, however; in 1945, Moscow demanded that Turkey share the control of the straits with the USSR, Bulgaria and Rumania, which would have meant effective Soviet control. (The Soviets also claimed sections of Turkish territory at Kars and Ardahan.) Turkey refused, and was supported by the United States and Great Britain; the demand was abandoned after Stalin's death in 1953.

2. A Soviet handbook of international law says, "The Baltic should also be considered a closed sea." Since 1957, the Soviets have been urging the exclusion of non-Baltic warships. But the non-Communist countries on the Baltic do not desire to have that sea closed, in any sense. Incidents with aircraft and ships have occurred, and the Soviets frequently block off large areas for naval maneuvers, to the irritation of the Scandinavian countries.
3. The Barents Sea is notable for the shooting down, by the Soviets in July 1960, of a US RB-47 airplane, which was travelling at least 30 miles from Soviet territory.
4. In the Sea of Japan, the Soviets in 1957 drew a line 115 miles long across Peter the Great Bay, making "internal waters" out of a large area centering on Vladivostok. Foreign ships or aircraft are required to obtain permission for access.
5. In March 1956, negotiations for a peace settlement between Japan and the USSR broke down, and the Soviets immediately and unilaterally declared restrictions on salmon fishing in large areas of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Japan and Bering Seas. Since the supply of fish is a matter of life and death for overpopulated Japan, the Japanese were soon compelled to sign a fisheries treaty with the Soviet Union, according to which Soviet and Japanese areas and quotas for fishing are "agreed" on each year. Each year, Soviet pressure has progressively reduced the area in which the Japanese may fish, and the Sea of Okhotsk has now been completely closed for salmon fishing (though not for some less important kinds of fishing). The total area affected by the treaty extends eastward in the Pacific to 175° west longitude, beyond the tip of the Aleutians, and the Soviets this year proposed an extension of the zone southward along the main Japanese islands. Quotas for the Japanese salmon fishing catch throughout the northwest Pacific area have been progressively reduced from 120,000 metric tons in 1957 to 55,000 tons for 1963. There are many international agreements in force intended to prevent the exhaustion of fisheries, and this is a legitimate objective; the Soviet-Japanese agreement, however, is used by the USSR to extend its economic and political power and illustrates the pitfalls which Turkey and the Scandinavian countries have been able to avoid. Aside from fishing, the Soviets tried at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, and in peace talks with the Japanese in 1955-6, to obtain agreement to making the Sea of Okhotsk a closed sea. Although the Soviets failed to get agreement to their proposal, the Naval Handbook of International Law, published by the Soviet Defense Ministry in 1956, defined the Sea of Okhotsk as a closed sea.

If Soviet policies for closing neighboring seas succeed, they will in effect make good the claim of Alexander I to a zone of "100 Italian miles"--continuing, as in many other fields, the imperialist traditions of Czarist Russia. The Berlin blockade of 1948 showed that the Soviets were quite ready - where, as in the Berlin situation, they were able to do so - to impose unilateral blockades in times of "peace."

1 . . . What stand should the Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reactionary nationalism followed by Nehru? Here a review of an episode in Chinese history of more than 30 years ago may be useful. The Chinese people still remember that when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world it was provoked and attacked by China's reactionary, big bourgeoisie and big landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that the Soviet Government had given vigorous support to the Kuomintang of China, the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, stirred up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-communist, antipopular moves. In December 1927 the Kuomintang reactionaries forcibly and outrageously closed down the Soviet consulates in various cities of China, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials, and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. After a year or more, in July 1929 the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of the "Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924," manufactured "the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway" and arrested more than 300 Soviet nationals.

When the Soviet Union repeatedly showed forbearance and proposed the holding of a meeting to settle the Chinese Eastern Railway question peacefully, Chiang Kai-shek took the self-restraint of the Soviet Union to mean that "the Soviet Union meekly submits, not daring to make the slightest resistance." In October of that year, the army of the Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the Soviet border, stirring up an armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union was compelled to act in self-defense and defeated this military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries.

Did the socialist Soviet Union do the right thing at the time? History has long since handed down its verdict: It was absolutely the right thing to do. The Soviet Union's resolute counterblow to the military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries not only defended the interests of the socialist state but also accorded with the interests of the Chinese people and of the revolutionary people of the world. Sino-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to Sino-Soviet relations of more than 30 years ago.

More than 30 years ago, when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched that anti-Soviet campaign, the Chinese communists were not caught in the toils of the reactionary nationalism of the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese communists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of the Kuomintang government. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration on 24 September 1927 in which it solemnly stated: "The reactionary Kuomintang government absolutely does not represent revolutionary China, and its orders to sever diplomatic relations with Russia absolutely do not represent the public opinion of the great majority of the Chinese people. The reactionary Kuomintang government regards the Soviet Union as an enemy, but we, the masses of the people, still regard the Soviet Union as a good friend of China and will always unite with it in fighting for the Chinese revolution and the world revolution." Soong Ching-ling, leader of the revolutionaries in the Kuomintang, also sent a cable to the Kuomintang authorities at that time, denouncing them as "criminals ruining the party and the nation."

After the reactionary Kuomintang clique launched the anti-Soviet war in northeast China in July 1929 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued another declaration, calling on "the broad masses to rise against the war on the Soviet Union." In response to this call, the Chinese communists and the masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and demonstrations in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many communists, workers, peasants, students, and progressives laid down their lives with glory.

Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the Kuomintang reactionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly, it was perfectly right. It was none other than the Chinese communists who thoroughly exposed the false propaganda of narrow nationalism fanned up by the Kuomintang reactionaries in their anti-Soviet campaign. It was none other than the Chinese communists who upheld the truth and resolutely safeguarded the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people under extremely difficult conditions. Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the Chinese communists by their acts during this incident proved themselves genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Today, the communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than 30 years ago. As a result of the reactionary policy of the Nehru government, the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces are subjected to persecution. Each time the Nehru government stirs up an anti-China campaign, he simultaneously mounts an attack on the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces. But large numbers of Indian communists and progressives, large numbers of politically conscious workers, peasants, intellectuals, and fair-minded people have not been deceived by the reactionary propaganda of the Indian ruling circles, nor have they knuckled under to their attacks. In the interests of the Indian people, they have, under extremely difficult conditions, stood firm for truth, justice, and Sino-Indian friendship and waged unflinching struggles. History will prove that it is they who really represent the interests of the great Indian nation and people.

2 ... The goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history. The sphere of influence of this great empire would include a series of countries from the Middle East to southeast Asia and far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British Empire. Second, this ambitious Nehru believes that when the "regional grouping" with India as "the center of economic and political activity" is established, or, in other words, when the great empire conceived by Nehru comes into existence, "minority problems will disappear" in this region. According to Nehru, "the small national state is doomed," "it may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit." In a word, it can only be a vassal in Nehru's great empire.

3 ... It is quite clear that the Indian people are clear-sighted. No deceit on Nehru's part can fool the broad masses of the Indian people. But it is surprising that in India some self-styled Marxist-Leninists, such as S. A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of "encroachment" on Indian territory, alleging that "China has committed a breach of faith," that one must "support the Indian Government," and so forth. How far these so-called "Marxist-Leninists" have lagged behind the ordinary Indian people in their understanding! How far have they departed from the interests of the Indian people, from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and from proletarian internationalism!

1 ... What stand should the Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reactionary nationalism followed by Nehru? Here a review of an episode in Chinese history of more than 30 years ago may be useful. The Chinese people still remember that when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world it was provoked and attacked by China's reactionary, big bourgeoisie and big landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that the Soviet Government had given vigorous support to the Kuomintang of China, the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, stirred up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-communist, antipopular moves. In December 1927 the Kuomintang reactionaries forcibly and outrageously closed down the Soviet consulates in various cities of China, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials, and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. After a year or more, in July 1929 the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of the "Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924" manufactured "the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway" and arrested more than 300 Soviet nationals.

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After the reactionary Kuomintang clique launched the anti-Soviet war in northeast China in July 1929 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued another declaration, calling on "the broad masses to rise against the war on the Soviet Union." In response to this call, the Chinese communists and the masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and demonstrations in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many communists, workers, peasants, students, and progressives laid down their lives with glory.

Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the Kuomintang reactionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly, it was perfectly right. It was none other than the Chinese communists who thoroughly exposed the false propaganda of narrow nationalism fanned up by the Kuomintang reactionaries in their anti-Soviet campaign. It was none other than the Chinese communists who upheld the truth and resolutely safeguarded the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people under extremely difficult conditions. Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the Chinese communists by their acts during this incident proved themselves genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Today, the communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese communists and progressives more than 30 years ago. As a result of the reactionary policy of the Nehru government, the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces are subjected to persecution. Each time the Nehru government stirs up an anti-China campaign, he simultaneously mounts an attack on the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces. But large numbers of Indian communists and progressives, large numbers of politically conscious workers, peasants, intellectuals, and fair-minded people have not been deceived by the reactionary propaganda of the Indian ruling circles, nor have they knuckled under to their attacks. In the interests of the Indian people, they have, under extremely difficult conditions, stood firm for truth, justice, and Sino-Indian friendship and waged unflinching struggles. History will prove that it is they who really represent the interests of the great Indian nation and people.

2 ... The goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history. The sphere of influence of this great empire would include a series of countries from the Middle East to southeast Asia and far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British Empire. Second, this ambitious Nehru believes that when the "regional grouping" with India as "the center of economic and political activity" is established, or, in other words, when the great empire conceived by Nehru comes into existence, "minority problems will disappear" in this region. According to Nehru, "the small national state is doomed," "it may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit." In a word, it can only be a vassal in Nehru's great empire.

3 ... It is quite clear that the Indian people are clear-sighted. No deceit on Nehru's part can fool the broad masses of the Indian people. But it is surprising that in India some self-styled Marxist-Leninists, such as S. A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of "encroachment" on Indian territory, alleging that "China has committed a breach of faith," that one must "support the Indian Government," and so forth. How far these so-called "Marxist-Leninists" have lagged behind the ordinary Indian people in their understanding! How far have they departed from the interests of the Indian people, from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and from proletarian internationalism!

## "Khrushchev in the Ukraine"

In August 1937, Pravda announced that a special commission composed of Molotov, Yezhov (the head of the NKVD), and Khrushchev was coming to investigate the situation at Kiev. The commission was preceded by an NKVD contingent, which placed the Ukrainian party leadership under guard. Molotov demanded that the Ukrainian party organization accept Khrushchev as its new First Secretary. The Ukrainian Central Committee bravely rejected this demand, but did (with one exception) accept a second demand that they come to Moscow to confer with Stalin. (The exception, Panas Lyubchenko, committed suicide.) As a result of the trip, all the members of the Orgburo and the Control Commission died. The three secretaries of the Ukrainian party, Kosior, Khataevich, and Popov, lost their lives. (At the 22nd Congress in 1961 Khrushchev said Kosior "perished innocently"; he does not seem to have said so in 1937.) Of 62 members and 40 candidate members of the Ukrainian Central Committee, all but two were purged. Then on 28 January 1938, Pravda announced that the plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee (actually non-existent at this point) had named Khrushchev as its new First Secretary. Khrushchev's appointment was made more legal in June 1938, when a Congress of the Ukrainian party was held. At this Congress, Khrushchev told his audience: "The enemies of the people, the bourgeois nationalists... removed the Russian language from the school curriculum... Comrades, now all the peoples will learn Russian."

It appears that Khrushchev's Russification policy did not confine itself to linguistic training. In 1943, while the Nazis were in occupation, a Ukrainian doctor caused some digging in an area which had been fenced off by the NKVD near Vinnitsa, in the Central Ukraine. Eventually 95 mass graves were discovered, containing 9,439 victims. One thousand three hundred ninety bodies were discovered buried in the Gorky Park of Culture and Rest. Of the victims, 676 were identified: they included 212 peasants, 82 workers, 51 government officials, 26 specialists, 16 soldiers and 4 priests. The graves were investigated by an international commission, and photographs made which were displayed in New York in 1954. Relatives identified some of the bodies in 1943 as those of people arrested for "nationalism" in late 1937 and 1938. The investigating experts concluded that the deaths had occurred between 1938 and 1940. It was during this period that Khrushchev became known as "the Hammer of the Ukraine." According to a report in an Armenian newspaper, published since the 22nd Congress, Malenkov was guilty of arresting more than 3500 prominent Armenians in a few months in 1937, many of whom were shot. The Reuters report states: "Bardamants /Chief of the Armenian KGB/ told a Party meeting Tuesday in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, that in 1937 Malenkov was given the assignment of repressing the Republic's Party apparatus. This was after the Soviet secret police chief, Lavrenti Beria, had personally shot the Armenian Communist Party First Secretary." Actually, Malenkov was conducting the Armenian phase of the same purge of nationalists that Khrushchev was conducting in the Ukraine.

## THE UKRAINIAN SSR

### 1. Territory and Population, Resources and Industry

The territory occupied by ethnic Ukrainians is about 328,000 sq. m. with nearly 50 million Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has an area of 232,493 sq. m. and a population of 40.6 million.

The Ukraine exceeds in size such European countries as England, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland all put together. In production of pig-iron per capita of population, the Ukrainian SSR surpasses England, France, Italy and West Germany; in steel production the Ukraine surpasses France, England and Italy; in mining of iron ore the Ukraine is ahead of all important countries, including the United States. -During the year 1956, the Ukraine produced 48% of the Soviet Union's total pig-iron, 38% steel, 56% iron ore, nearly 1/3 hard coal, 53% coke, nearly 30% natural gas. Ukrainian factories produced 80% of the Soviet Union's total of locomotives, nearly 50% beet-harvesting combines, nearly 40% tractors, 60% traction plows, 48% freight cars, 44% tractor sowers, and 72% of the Soviet Union's sugar.

The primary industrial region in the Ukraine is in the Donets Basic. In 1956 the output of the large machine building and metalworking industry exceeded the figure for 1913 more than 130 times. A variety of machine tools are made in the Ukraine, as well as tractors, locomotives, turbines, ball-bearings, precision tools, aircraft and automobiles.

The actual industrial potential of the country is much greater than the figures indicate since under its present policy, the central Soviet Government favors development of Asiatic regions for strategic reasons to the disadvantage of Ukraine.

Known at one time as "the granary of Europe" the Ukraine is now the breadbasket and sugar-bowl of the far-flung Communist empire.

### 2. Highlights of Recent Ukrainian History and Politics

When World War I began in 1914, the Ukraine was partitioned among two powers: the bulk of the Eastern and Central territory was within the Russian Empire, and western Ukrainian lands of Galicia, Bukovina and the Carpatho-Ukraine were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The tsarist Russian government was completely hostile to any and all Ukrainian aspirations for independence, its plan being to obliterate the Ukraine through Russification and assimilation. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was somewhat more liberal in its treatment of the Ukrainians and permitted them a limited cultural and administrative home-rule.

The one aim which united Ukrainians under both the Russians and the Austrians on the eve of World War I was complete national independence in a unified state. The Ukrainians took advantage of the overthrow of the tsarist rule in 1917 and began setting up their own state. Even before the outbreak of the Communist October Revolution in Russia, a Central Rada (Council) was established in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev in March, 1917. This body was the nucleus of the subsequent independent Ukrainian Government. On January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic and within one year it was joined by West Ukraine which had proclaimed its independence after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A number of governments recognized Ukraine de jure and de facto.

Even during the initial stages of its organization, the Ukrainian nation had to stand up to aggression on the part of Communist Russia. Notwithstanding the fact that Soviet Russia (RSFSR) had officially recognized the Ukrainian National Republic in a diplomatic note dated December 17, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia issued an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Government the same month demanding the right of Russian troops to enter the Ukraine. Following the ultimatum came a march of Russian armies upon the Ukraine. The new Ukrainian nation rejected the ultimatum and accepted the challenge. Armed resistance to Communist aggression lasted in organized army fighting until 1921, and partisan warfare against the Red occupying power went on into the 1930's.

It was only by overwhelming force of arms that the Russian Communists succeeded in conquering the Ukraine and their puppet government called "Soviet Ukrainian" was set up under a reign of terror. The Ukrainians were not, however, broken in spirit, and even under Communism continued their struggle for their national rights. In addition to revolutionary and underground resistance, there were attempts to secure rights unto the Ukrainian people within the framework of the USSR. Even as early as the late 1920's such forerunners of Tito and Gomulka appeared in the Ukraine in the persons of the Ukrainian Communist leaders M. Skrypnyk, M. Shumsky, M. Khvylovy and others who chose Communism along a Ukrainian road and opposed Moscow's policy of Russification and curtailment of Ukrainian national rights. They stood for a truly independent Ukrainian SSR. Stalin and his regime dealt with them summarily: many were liquidated immediately, and some were given the chance to commit suicide. After the liquidation of Ukrainian national-communists there came a wave of mass liquidation of Ukrainian intellectuals, writers, cultural leaders and teachers. There were 223 writers and artists alone, liquidated by the Soviet central government in 1933 and 1934. Many were shot on the spot, others were sent to Siberia where they disappeared without trace.

In liquidating Ukrainian patriots the present Prime Minister of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev was Stalin's most efficient tool. He was appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in January 1938, and while holding this position he was responsible for the mass executions of more than 10,000 Ukrainian patriots in Vinnitsa which like Katyn in Poland, was a mass grave and symbol of Moscow's policy of extermination.

Thus, before the outbreak of World War II, the Ukraine became the hardest hit ethnic area of the USSR in terms of mass terror carried out by the Stalin regime. Attesting to its extent is the fact that during the compulsory collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930's, over 5 million Ukrainian peasants died of famine, artificially induced to break their resistance. Hundreds of thousands of educated Ukrainians were deported or liquidated at the same time.

### 3. World War II and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.

The Ukrainian people faced the outbreak of World War II believing that war would give them a chance to shake off the Soviet Russian domination and regain Ukrainian independence. Other non-Russian nations of the USSR had the same hopes. Nazi Germany failed to see this, however, and its policy of terror made the Ukrainians and others actively opposed to German conquest. It is hardly surprising that following years of Communist terror, the Ukrainian population greeted the advancing German army as liberators, and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the Red Army surrendered (700,000 in the Kiev "pocket" alone). The Ukrainian people recognized the real intentions of German policy soon, and joined in a relentless underground warfare against them. As early as the fall 1942, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and its political underground leadership went into action against the Germans and inflicted heavy losses upon them. Given support by the entire population, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the underground organized in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), waged war on two fronts: against the German occupants and against Communist partisans. The latter began operations in the Ukraine as soon as the Germans withdrew.

This national struggle did not cease even after the Soviet Army re-occupied all of the Ukraine. Under the leadership of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR), an active armed struggle by tens of thousands of UPA soldiers actively supported by the populace went on day-by-day not for months, but for years, at least until 1950, the year in which General Taras Chuprynka - Shukhevych, Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, died in battle. This struggle went on not only on Ukrainian territory, but also beyond its borders. Armed raids of UPA units initiated or aided the nationalist underground struggle of other neighboring peoples. The Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and the Byelorussians. In 1947, a detachment of the UPA soldiers, about 400 strong, made a fighting march from the Ukraine to West Germany (where they were interned by the American Army). At that time the West did not understand the power nor the significance of this struggle of the UPA and of the underground liberation struggle of other enslaved nations, and gave them no support or encouragement.



After 1952 there began in the Ukraine a mass movement of resistance of the people in all walks of life, particularly passive sabotage on collective farms and in factories, absenteeism, higher wage demands, premium wages, etc. Along with this, especially since 1954, the people began to isolate themselves from all echelons of the administration and slowly rid themselves of the fear of the MVD and MGB terror. The people hid their private thoughts within a shell but made a common silent, cooperative effort to better their social and living conditions.

#### 4. Recent Developments.

Considering the danger of all these anti-Soviet processes and ferment and to preserve the empire, the Soviet Government embarked on a policy of liberalization after the death of Stalin. In addition to decentralization on an All-Union scale, amnesty for political prisoners of concentration camps and some improvement of the living standards of the people in the USSR, for the past five years have been noted especially in the Ukraine. Moscow became particularly fond of stressing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR and some of the liquidated Ukrainian writers have been partially rehabilitated, and the number of schools using Ukrainian as the language of instruction has increased. Along with such liberalization, however, the course of Russification in the Ukraine and in other non-Russian republics continues albeit in somewhat changed form. The attack also continues against so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who allegedly are in the service of American capitalism and the Vatican.

In summarizing the situation in the Ukraine, it must be stated that today the Ukrainian people are facing another attempt by the Soviet Government to include them, through the Ukrainian members of the Communist Party, as junior partners to the Russians in the administration of the Soviet empire and at the same time to place upon them the burden of responsibility for the policies of the party's Central Committee. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people today are attempting, step by step, to regain their rights within the framework of the Ukrainian SSR. It may sound paradoxical, but as a matter of fact, the Ukrainian people are struggling for autonomy in their own ostensibly sovereign country.

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