

## STUDY OF COMMUNIST NEGOTIATIONS

"For Party people, an agreement is an attempt to enlist others for the purpose of carrying out the Party policy . . . by coming to an agreement . . . we mean enlisting them on our side, convincing them that we are right...."

-- Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 4  
p. 201, International Publishers,  
New York, 1943

From first-hand experience and scholarly research on the subject of Communist negotiations, we gain a clear-cut picture of how Communists negotiate and what they hope to achieve with this tool of their cold war arsenal.

There follows extracts from various reports and studies of Communist negotiations and use of negotiations.

Of special interest are the first two selections which are based upon the "two years and seventeen days, 575 regular meetings, 18,000,000 words" of the Korean Armistice Agreement where the United States represented the United Nations in negotiating with Korean and Chinese Communists. "Two years of agonized travail," as the senior UN delegate described it, but two years which enable the Free World to make a penetrating analysis of Communist use of negotiations as a weapon of war and to employ this knowledge to insure victory at the "peace table."

### Lessons Learned from Korea

How Communists Negotiate, Admiral C. Turner,  
Joy, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1955

Communists neither blunder into conferences nor rush pell-mell to engage in negotiation, First, they carefully set the stage.

The Communist system of negotiating does not depend critically on the individuals involved. Their method is a dogma followed slavishly by each of their representatives.

They seek an agenda composed of conclusions favorable to their basic objectives.

Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset.

Once negotiations have actually begun, Communists do not allow matters to proceed in a climate of peace and calm. They create "incidents" calculated for their negotiating advantage or for their basic propaganda objectives, or for both. Such "incidents" are not left to chance: they are plotted and triggered by the Communist negotiating teams. Their two purposes, negotiating advantage and propaganda, are usually served equally by a single incident.

One thing, is certain: future negotiations with the Communists will be marked by more incidents. The "incident" is one of their tested techniques.

One of the most notable negotiating tactics of the Communists is to delay progress. As a general matter, Communists believe that once negotiations have been initiated, to delay progress toward consummation of agreements tends to weaken the position of their opponents.

Accordingly, Communist negotiators act upon the premise that if they delay matters long enough, their free-world opponents will recede from previously held positions in order to achieve a measure of progress, especially in the face of continued war and its attendant horrors.

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Communists realize that negotiations must necessarily result in some few agreements that are objectionable from their point of view . . . . Since they appreciate this as inevitable, Communists seek to reduce the magnitude of commitments they are compelled to make and which they intend to dishonor. They aspire to reduce the scope of investigations which may arise from their premeditated violations of agreements.

When their attempts to avoid agreements tending to restrict them are not entirely successful, and their efforts to reduce the magnitude of agreements they intend to dishonor have been pressed as far as possible, the Communists then seek to retain a veto on all machinery of enforcement of agreements.

A basic negotiating technique of Communists is to introduce spurious issues and use them as bargaining points.

Communists have two techniques with which to deal with truth. One: they deny it. Two: they distort it. The flat denial of truth is the less frequent tactic of Communists, because they have learned that truth is buoyant: submerged, it will pop to the surface at embarrassing moments. Therefore, the Communists much prefer to employ the tactic of distorting truth.

The distortion of truth as practiced by the Communists is a science. The basic procedure is to select out of the whole truth certain parts, which, if put together in a particular way, produce a conclusion exactly contradictory of the whole truth.

Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness . . . . The Communists reason that their opponents would not accept any part of Communist proposals if any other choice were available. Communists expect their opponents to accept their proposals only when compelled to do so, or when an exchange of concessions by each side is involved. Therefore, if Western negotiators simply agree to a Communist proposal without insisting on an equal concession on another point, the Communists conclude that their opponents are in a weak general position. With this conclusion in mind, the Communists become more aggressive, demanding more, and conceding nothing.

Communist negotiating procedure is replete with devices designed to avoid agreements in any way prejudicial to their objectives. Yet when these have been fully employed the Communists have not shot their final bolt. Communists are not embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement already reached. It makes little difference that such agreements may be in written form. If so, the Communists simply state that your interpretation is an incorrect one.

Perhaps the moral of this story is: Never trust a Communist promise, however given: trust only Communist deeds.

Allied with all other Communist techniques heretofore considered, and invariably used in conjunction therewith, is the Communist procedure of endless, stupid repetition of their demands. "Stupid" does not imply that their procedure as a whole is senseless. Far from it. Altogether too often, mere repetition of their demands gains Communist objectives. The substance of the statements used in repetition of demands introduces the irritatingly stupid element. On day after barren day the Communists will regurgitate the identical statements, the same arguments, used endlessly before.

Throughout the long arguments over the exchange of prisoners of war, the Communists engaged in every nefarious practice known to them. They lied; they blustered; they became vindictive; they welshed; they twisted, distorted, and denied truth; they delayed; they threatened.

. . . they were motivated by the basest of considerations--an advantage for Communism.

. . . the one negotiating factor that Communists respect above all else . . . : naked, massive power and the willingness to use that power when necessary . . . . It was as simple as that. It had always been as simple as that.

Force is a decisive factor, the only logic the Communists truly understand.

The foregoing leads to the lesson that armistice conferences should be brief. A time period should be set for reaching an agreement. If an acceptable agreement is not reached within a reasonable time, discussions should be terminated until the enemy again indicates a desire for (that is, a need for) an armistice. To allow armistice talks to become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This encourages your Communist opponents.

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the area of conflict.

Communists should not be allowed unilaterally to select the site for a conference.

Reaction to a Communist suggestion for a conference or to discuss an armistice should be unhurried.

The team selected to conduct negotiations with Communists should be of the highest available quality. Rank, renown, and position are a secondary consideration. Clear thinking, rapid thinking, are the criteria to be sought. Every man should be the best in his line, whether stenographer, signalman, interpreter, or delegate. You can be assured that the Communists will put in their first team. You can be assured your second team will not be good enough.

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress. Make the Communists pay for your acceptance of their point of view. Require an equivalent concession to match yours. . . . Never imagine that any point is unimportant.

Avoid a "hurry-up" attitude, for such an attitude tends to invoke a Communist conclusion that you are pressed for time.

The agenda of a conference with Communists should receive careful study.

When a firm position has been taken, from which you do not intend to withdraw, do not thereafter engage in long-winded and repeated statements supporting your position.

The lesson learned in Korea was that crystallization of political objectives should precede initiation of armistice talks.

. . . . it is only through the imminent threat of application of military power that the Communists can be compelled to negotiate seriously for the alleviation of the basic issues between their world and ours. . . . When the Communists believe that failure to resolve issues with the Western world will engage a serious and immediate risk to their present empire, they will then, and only then, seek to resolve those issues.

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Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations, William H. Vatcher, Jr., Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1956

The armistice negotiations in Korea provide us with further evidence of the trickery and deceit of Communist "diplomacy."

Our experiences at Kaesong and Panmunjom have increased enormously our knowledge about Communist methods. We have learned much about their strengths and their weaknesses. But knowledge is useful only as it is applied.

. . . Long experience with Communist "diplomacy" has taught the world that no Communist move is without some secret significance. . . . And every Communist proposal, therefore, must be studied for hidden purposes and for its conformity with the pattern of Communist strategy.

The circumstances and conditions under which an offer is made always have a bearing on the offer itself.

What techniques did the Communists employ during the Korean military armistice negotiations?

The Communists made masterly use of propaganda to support their goals at the conference . . . . When they uttered a word in the conference tent, it was only secondarily intended for the ears of those who sat opposite them. The Communists were not genuinely interested in reaching an agreement. The eyes and ears of the world were directed to the talks in Korea. Communist words and deeds were tuned to that audience.

The Communist arguments during the meetings were based on illogical premises and manufactured incidents. They would stage their proposition in such a way as to suggest that it was right and represented the wishes of the people of the whole world. Their presentation reduced all arguments to a black and white basis.

Once a stand was taken, the Communists subjected the United Nations Command to a lengthy repetition of bombast . . . . The Communists recognized the value of repetition to the ultimate acceptance of their viewpoint. And they talked loud and heatedly . . . . They injected extraneous issues into the discussions . . . . They rewrote history to support their arguments . . . . They knowingly and purposely delayed consummation of the armistice in order to reap a greater propaganda harvest.

The Communists always insisted on having the last word--always a lengthy and distorted review of the proceedings.

If the UNC /United Nations Command/ asked a question, the Communists would answer with questions of their own or assert that the question had previously been answered. They never answered a question pointblank.

The Communists lied without hesitation.

. . . What were the weaknesses they exposed during the long course of the negotiations?

The Communists revealed their extreme sensitivity to the public opinion they were attempting to subvert. They also revealed a sensitivity to opinions among those peoples they controlled. . . . Thus, it behooves the free world to continually expose Communist failures through every known and available communications medium, and to beat them down at all international conferences by unmasking the falseness of their argument and offering a logical presentation in refutation.

Standing up to the Communists--calling their bluff--proved effective on more than one occasion.

The Communists revealed a sensitivity to ridicule and laughter. . .

. . . Communists are sensitive to having their side presented as unequal.

The Communists also exposed their complete reluctance to act without higher approval--no matter how trivial the point.

. . . To the Communists, negotiation proved again to be simply one weapon in their arsenal of war. And that weapon, being considered as a weapon of war, could employ, by Communist logic, any device if it contributed to their long-run goal . . . In other words, what is truth to the Communists or what is ethical must be considered in the light of what it contributes to the final goal of world communism.

. . . Not long after the Armistice had been signed, its usefulness to the Communists as a step toward their goals terminated, and the UNC was forced to commence its tiresome presentation of fruitless protests.

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"For Continuing War"

/What We Must Know About Communism, Harry and Bonaro  
Overstreet, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1958/

From the Communist point of view, in brief, the delegates to a conference do not merely represent their nations. Far more deeply, they represent one or the other party to the class struggle; and this is not a struggle which can, in any basic sense, be negotiated. It cannot be negotiated because, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, it cannot eventuate in peace until the capitalist class has been liquidated; and this class "will never voluntarily yield up one iota of its power or privilege." Thus, a conference table--even when it is called a peace table--is simply one more place where war is carried on.

This, then, is a first fact to pin down in our minds--however reluctant we may be to receive it: when Communists negotiate with non-Communists, they are not seeking to establish peace. They are seeking to maneuver themselves into the best available position for continuing war. . . .

. . . they have come to learn what they can from the enemy and about the enemy; and in light of this, to get what they can in the way of concessions or favorable agreements, while warding off the danger implicit in a meeting of minds: the danger of being influenced.

. . . No shaper of Communist theory from Marx to the present has ever held that a promise made across class lines was to be kept any longer than expediency might dictate. When morality has once been defined as "class morality," promises become tactics; and tactics are subject to change without notice.

In the queer topsy-turvy scheme of things which Communism has created, a show of strength on our part does not bring on a crisis which we might have prevented by a more conciliatory or generous approach. Rather, it is what prevents crisis--and keeps the way as open as it can be kept for constructive bargaining. Every free-world veteran of Summit and pre-Summit conference tables has learned this fact the hard way. . . .

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"Negotiations and Deals Are Weapons"

/A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of  
World Revolution, Stefan T. Possony, Henry Regnery  
Company, Chicago, 1953/

The fundamental rule of defensive action is to protect the life force of communist power. While the enemies of communism will inevitably win victories and even force the communists into retreat, space and time are expendable as long as the life force of communism is preserved for future counteroffensives.

. . . The defensive is meant to compensate for temporary weakness and should provide the opportunity for power accumulation.

Occasionally forces may have to be withdrawn to avoid overexpansion. Loss of face or diminished prestige is less important than the preservation of the life force. So long as the defensive forces retreat in order, they can resume battle once the force relationship has been altered. . . .

Mao went furthest in his thinking aimed at wresting success from failure. He holds that retreats "should be executed so that tactically they will possess the same military value as advances."

With a change in a strategic situation, a new line of action may become necessary. There are two types of changes of course: those which the communists can carry out on their own volition, and those which require a "deal" with the opponent.

In the former case, the change of course should be made without hesitation. . . .

When the decision cannot be made unilaterally, deals are made in order to negate defeat or exploit victory. The purpose of a defeat deal is to cut losses and to save the life force. If an unsatisfactory deal or surrender cannot be avoided, it may have to be signed but should not be honored.

Negotiations and deals are weapons. The communists utilize this device in a defeat situation to recover maneuverability and strength. The enemies of communism are usually pacifist-minded. Hence, discussions induce premature rejoicing which, in case of unsuccessful negotiations, makes it difficult for the anticommunists to resume battle. Negotiations per se compel non-communists to make concessions.

Negotiations should be undertaken whenever the non-communists show eagerness to talk. Negotiations should be preceded by discussions about the agenda or by preliminary agreements on some fundamental points. This is a method of scoring success beforehand. Properly handled, preliminary agreements can predetermine the outcome of the formal negotiations themselves.

Negotiations should be conducted in such a fashion that in case of failure the blame can be put on the non-communists. The communists always should appear as champions of peace, justice, and progress, enabling them to strengthen their concurrent psychological warfare and put their opponents under pressure.

Deception is an important negotiation technique. Communist objectives should be camouflaged, the opponent deceived as to true communist objectives. He should be led into error on this point in order that he may be induced to yield on the important issue and be adamant about the trifle.

In the case of exploiting victory, negotiations should be employed if non-military means are adequate; or if further use of military means would be disproportionately costly and reduce communist freedom of action; or if continuation of hostilities would entail undesired complications. Victory deals are a method to make war cheap and easy.

By camouflaging communist objectives, weakening the enemy life force, undermining the will to resist, and making a show of conciliatoriness negotiations can transform limited military successes into politico-military victories of considerable scope.

Communists, of course, never consider any deals permanent. "Agreements" are the phase lines of strategy, sooner or later to be violated or rendered inoperable.

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#### "Struggle by Negotiation"

/A Study of Bolshevism, Nathan Leites,  
The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill, 1953/

When the Party and a certain enemy have failed in their attempts to advance against each other, the conditions for an effective agreement between them have come into existence. An agreement is then the result of overt conflict pursued up to the very last moment. It is by maximizing one's success in that conflict--by maximizing the damage one inflicts on the enemy--that one maximizes the enemy's incentives to substitute, for the time being a struggle by negotiation for the preceding type of war, whether hot or cold. The struggle by negotiation in its turn, proceeds in the same fashion: the exertion of pressure on each other by both sides--including the threat to break off negotiations, and actual rupture--is apt to foster the conclusion of an agreement. The more pressure one has exercised not only before, but also during the negotiations, the more favorable will the final agreement be. At any point it is the "sharpening" of conflict which is likely to increase the chance of a favorable settlement. If the issue is important--and which is not, directly or indirectly?--the conflict is likely to be protracted.

Bolsheviks . . . tend to apply to negotiation the techniques . . . they strive to push to the limits of their strength using verbal assault

as one of their means and trying hard and long for all their objectives, whether big or small. They fiercely resist anything which seems to be a concession . . . .

. . . the Soviet delegates elaborate or change their position in strict isolation and then present it in dogmatic fashion. They rarely take account of the views and objections of the other side, and frequently affirm and repeat points which the other side (they know) as well as they themselves regard as grossly false, without bothering to furnish evidence . . . To be open-minded on the spot towards what enemies may have to say is to surrender to their control . . . .

Bolsheviks also react against the temptation to believe that enemies can be persuaded by appeals to their morality or their real interests, and their enmity thus reduced . . . .

The enemy [the Bolshevik believes] selects statements he makes in talking to the Party without any regard for their truth and only with a view to their damaging impact on the Party. The Party must act likewise towards the enemy . . . .

. . . a Soviet concession in one matter might be offered to obtain an advantage in another matter which, from a conventional point of view, seems wholly unrelated to the first. In acting thus, the Party prevents itself from becoming absorbed in the irrelevant details of affairs, focusing at all times on the goal: more power . . . .

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#### The Politburo Code

[The Operational Code of the Politburo, Nathan Leites,  
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1951]

Soviet negotiators are adverse to--or even seem to place a tabu on--free exploration of problems with the other parties to the negotiation. They tend to present fully elaborated positions, keeping ready for substitution under certain circumstances other positions, which are put forward with the same finality . . . .

Only by putting the greatest pressure on an outside group can the Party induce it to modify its policies in ways that are most useful to the Party.

One type of useful pressure is intense and incessant expression (or, if necessary, simulation) of hostility.

Threats are useful in the same way.

In attempting to obtain concessions, anything less than exertion of maximum pressure is ineffective and will bring humiliation to the Party.

Mastery in the skill of retreating is as necessary as mastery in the skill of advancing.

Feelings of distress about retreating must not keep the Party from executing an expedient retreat.

The Party must retreat if, and only if, the experience gained in attempting to hold an attacked position shows that not to retreat would involve greater losses . . . .

By such a retreat the Party gains time, which works in its favor.

Any degree of retreat is preferable to risking the annihilation of the Party or the total loss of state power.

In a retreat every point must be contested as long and as intensely as possible, and the withdrawal of forces must occur only when the advancing enemy is about to become overwhelming. . . .

Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as barriers against the

liquidation of the Party by them . . . .

Therefore there is no essential difference between coming to an ostensibly amicable arrangement with an outside group or using violence against it; they are both tactics in an over-all strategy of attack.

When an attempt by the enemy, or by the Party, to advance by violent means has failed, the conditions for an effective agreement between the Party and the enemy come into existence.

These attitudes imply that a "settlement" with the Western Powers-- that is, an agreement sharply reducing the threat of mutual annihilation-- is inconceivable to the Politburo, although arrangements with them, codifying the momentary relationship of forces, are always considered.

"We must understand that 'peaceful negotiations' and 'armed struggle' are two related methods. The people of /North/ Korea were persistently smashing and eliminating the aggressors during their one year's peace talk. This is a very good lesson for the people . . . to learn." -- from a captured Communist document in Malaya, Asian Analyst, March 1956.



## MIKOYAN'S TWO VISITS TO CUBA

"You yourselves can choose." Mikoyan 1960

"We are going away satisfied." Mikoyan 1962

"There are some differences between the  
Soviet government and the Cuban govern-  
ment." Castro 1962

Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan has been to Cuba twice. His first trip in 1960 was to open a Soviet exhibition of scientific, technical and cultural achievements; his second in 1962 was to reconcile Castro to the fact that Premier Khrushchev had reached an agreement with President Kennedy without consulting him.

The first visit was prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and Soviet Russia; the second after the Soviets had turned Cuba into an armed outpost. The first visit contained elements of warmth, friendship and cooperation; the second, coldness, disagreement and trouble.

The following summarizes the contrasts of 1960 and 1962, revealing the process of domination in Soviet foreign relations, and the status of Soviet-Cuban relations.

1960

Mikoyan was greeted at the airport in Havana by a large crowd on 4 February. The dignitaries "had to force their way through the crowd to reach the cars." When he placed a wreath at the foot of the monument to Jose Marti, Cuban national hero, the next day, Mikoyan "was cheered and warmly applauded" and "was immediately surrounded by people eager to shake hands."

(This account of Mikoyan's visit is taken from a booklet based on translations of Soviet press reports of the trip: Mikoyan in Cuba, Crosscurrents Press, New York, 1960. This "official" account naturally omits some details. For example, shortly before Mikoyan arrived at the Marti monument, an anti-Communist demonstration had to be broken up by police. The police fired into the air to quell the demonstrators and 17 university students were reportedly arrested.)

Mikoyan talked to individuals in the crowd. "What are the Cuban people fighting for?" he asked one. "We're fighting for our freedom and independence," a student answered. To another, Mikoyan praised the sunny climate--a sharp contrast to snowy Moscow. "We take in corn crops four times a year," someone told him. He replied, "That goes to show that you shouldn't be living poorly."

At the opening of the Soviet exhibit of scientific, technical and cultural achievements of the Soviet Union--the event which brought Mikoyan to Cuba--Minister of Commerce Raul Cepero Bonilla commented on the distance between Russia and Cuba adding, "political differences separating nations tend to disappear thanks to reciprocal respect for each other's decisions." He declared: "Small nations are entitled to their own international policy, for otherwise they are not independent... Our views are our own," he said, "and this permits us to conduct ourselves on the international scene with full freedom and autonomy."

In his speech Mikoyan rambled over the history and development of Communism in Russia and commented on its production and accomplishments. A statement praising production--including ballistic missiles--prompted "stormy applause" according to the Soviet press.

"Through possessing the most accurate and the longest-range rockets both for peaceful purposes (the conquest of outer space) and for defense needs, the Soviet Union," Mikoyan declared, "has not resorted, nor will it resort, to the language of threats and 'brinkmanship.'" (Emphasis added.)

"This expansion of ties between the Soviet people and the people of Cuba," Mikoyan maintained, "will be a worthy contribution to the cause of easing international tension . . ." The Soviet press reported that Mikoyan's remarks were "followed with keen attention" and "were given a stormy ovation."

The press recorded several "long cordial conversations" between Mikoyan and Castro. Mikoyan had an airplane tour of Cuba with Raul Castro and a four-day ground tour with Fidel Castro.

To a group of Cuban businessmen, in reply to a question about what they could buy from the Soviet Union "to use at once in Cuba," Mikoyan said: "The Soviet Union never imposes goods they don't need on other countries . . . . I would not like to influence your choice. You yourselves can choose. . ." (Emphasis added.) He added: "We are absolutely normal people with ethical standards . . . Is there anything bad in communist ethics? Some of you are still scared of communism, but there is no reason to be. We must get to know each other better, so as to overcome any apprehensions, so that you understand us and we you." As Mikoyan put it in a later speech: "Our morals are clear and noble."

In dispensing aid, Mikoyan told the Cubans, "we attach no political, military, or any other extraneous strings. We highly value and respect the national sovereignty of all countries." (Emphasis added.) He declared, "Generally speaking, we do not thrust our friendship and contacts on anyone."

Mikoyan's "feathers" were ruffled several times, on one occasion during a television interview with a panel of newsmen. Mikoyan was asked "how the Soviet Union explains to the public such a controversial issue as that of Hungary?" Mikoyan began his reply with a mild rebuke of the questioner but "warmed" to the question as he proceeded. "Generally speaking," he maintained, "there is no such question. Hungary is prospering, and I think that it is no worse there than in many other countries you know about . . . . You needed this question to make a reproach," Mikoyan told the questioner. "But we won't accept any reproaches on this score. We are conducting an honest policy, but your attempt is not quite honest. Why stir up such matters if you want us to have closer relations?"

The Soviet press reported that "after the broadcast the dean of the press corps, Anibal Maestri, thanked Mikoyan and offered an apology for the question about Hungary, which he, like many of the others, thought tactless and out of place."

Mikoyan was also needled by questions at his exit interview at the airport on 14 February 1960. An American newsmen asked if the Soviets by granting Cuba credits "envisage the sale of military planes at present, or in the future," Mikoyan replied: "No, this is not envisaged. No one raised this question with us." The questioner asked, "And armaments as well?" Mikoyan answered: "No. The credits granted to Cuba will be used exclusively to purchase machinery. You are extremely interested in arms. We are interested in disarmament, while you are interested in armament. We shall never reach a common denominator in this way." (Emphasis added.)

(The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Mikoyan's visit included Soviet agreement to buy 450,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and one million tons in each of the subsequent four years. The purchase price was established at world market prices. The Soviet press, of course, did not report that previously the United States bought three million tons of Cuba's sugar annually at an average price of 2.7¢ above world market prices.)

Mikoyan stopped in Norway en route back to Russia. At a press conference in Oslo on 16 February 1960, he said: "You are probably interested in the question of my trip to Cuba. I can say a few words about why I went there. I have been asked about that by a good many people--true, not by you, but mainly by American correspondents. All of them probably thought that I had dynamite in my pocket and was going there to engineer a conspiracy, and they spread many other horror stories." (Emphasis added.)

1962

By 1962, the "dynamite" which Mikoyan had indeed carried to Cuba had "exploded" and the conspiracy which he had indeed engineered was revealed. President Kennedy's exposure of the Soviet's missiles and bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs in Cuba prompted his demand that these offensive weapons be removed. Khrushchev's agreement exposed the hollowness of Mikoyan's 1960 pledges of respect for Cuba's sovereignty, promises to allow the Cubans to decide for themselves what Soviet goods and products they wanted and his boasts of the Soviet's peaceful intent, interest in disarmament and promise not to resort to "the language of threats and 'brinkmanship.' "

The day before Mikoyan's 2 November arrival, Castro admitted differences of opinion with the Soviet Union and ruled out public discussion or speculation on these differences. He said:

"In the course of this crisis, it must be said that during the development of the crisis there arose some differences between the Soviet government and the Cuban government. But I want to say something to all Cubans. It is not here that we should discuss those problems; it is not here, where our enemies might find it useful or try to profit from those discussions. We must discuss this with the Soviets at the level of government and party, sit down with them to discuss everything that might be necessary in the light of reason and principles."

Castro's comments put the damper on the Cubans' reception for Mikoyan. As one report from Havana recorded it:

"Mikoyan was given a cold and somewhat ambiguous reception, verging almost on insult. On the day of his arrival, it is reported that he was not even able to have a private conversation with the Cuban leader. . . . Three days later, none of the top men of the regime--Castro, his brother Raul, and Guevara--descended to make an appearance at a ceremony commemorating Russia's October Revolution that took place in the Havana Municipal Theater. At the reception in the Soviet embassy the conversations never rose above the level of polite trivialities enlivened by toasts to friendship.

"The press and radio boycotted news about Mikoyan. The man who is thought of as second only to Khrushchev was reduced to a sort of a ghost never summoned into existence. It is true that the newspaper Revolucion reported a conversation between Castro and Mikoyan that took place on a state farm--three columns of harmless remarks about fruits and cows. Only two or three phrases were of any interest. For example, when the Soviet leader admired some thoroughbred bulls, Castro reportedly informed him that they were imports from the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.

"As always when officialdom is silent, one studies the news photographs: the pictures showed nothing but frowning faces. On television Castro somehow forgot to shake hands with Mikoyan."

(--"Some Misunderstanding!" by Fanatela,  
The Reporter, 6 December 1962.)

As one Havana Radio commentator put it: "The worst thing is that the enemy, taking advantage of the complex subjective state, tried to create fear and distrust."

Mikoyan was quick to respond to the air of "fear and distrust" by reaffirming the solidarity of Soviet-Cuban relations. "As for me," he declared upon arrival, "I want to be one more soldier of revolutionary Cuba!"

There was little public reference to any high-level talks and even less speculation or commentary. When news was reported it was brief: Mikoyan visits a stock farm; Mikoyan attends dinner, etc. In his only major public speech nine days after his arrival, Mikoyan praised but did not endorse Castro's five conditions for settlement of the crisis and claimed that the Soviet Union and Cuba had common objectives. He was high in his praise for Castro, claiming: "In every little corner, in any part of our country, you will find the picture of Fidel Castro, although anyone already knows his beard and the intelligence which shines in his eyes." He concluded: "Your cause is our cause."

When he departed from Cuba on 26 November, Mikoyan's farewell was broadcast to the Cuban people. He said Castro "is greatly satisfied with our exchange of impressions, and this is not just my opinion, but that of my government and of Nikita Khrushchev." As for the Soviets, he said "we are going away satisfied."

Having witnessed the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and the crating of Soviet bombers, Mikoyan declared: "Whom is Cuba threatening? And with what? Cuba cannot be a military threat."

Impressed in 1960 by Cuba's sunny climate that permitted four crops a year, Mikoyan in 1962 had to acknowledge that the Cubans were not faring as well. "Today," he said, "they endure the rationing of commodities" but he reassured them with the observation that "the Cuban people's difficulties with reference to food are not dangerous. They are temporary."

"When our Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev is speaking," Mikoyan concluded, "the Cubans are listening to him and supporting him, just as when your Prime Minister Fidel Castro is speaking, the Soviets are listening and supporting him." Mikoyan declared that "no corner of our country is without portraits of Fidel Castro," and in an expansive mood added, "and other comrades."

While the official press reports were limited and no joint communique was issued at the conclusion of Mikoyan's visit, some press reports from inside Cuba did reflect the tenor of the situation. In addition to the Havana report quoted above, French news agency dispatches reported criticism of the Soviet was commonplace among the people and that Mikoyan, in talks with students in his one public speech during his 24-day stay, was subjected to severe criticism.

While Mikoyan stopped in Washington en route to Moscow and met with President Kennedy and publicly expressed confidence in him and said some nice things about him, editorials in the official Cuban press were proclaiming Kennedy could not be trusted. Castro himself was remaining silent and as one observer noted, this was "extraordinary."

The Soviet Union declared officially that the purpose of Mikoyan's visit to Cuba was to discuss trade and economic questions. No talks or agreements in these fields were announced. But, Cuba did report that it was sending a trade delegation to Moscow. Even this action became embroiled in the still-smoldering embers of Cuba-Soviet tensions.

In a version of "musical chairs," the Cubans got entangled in naming the leader of its trade delegation. First it said it would be headed by the minister of foreign trade; next it substituted the number one theoretician of the old Cuban Communist Party and current president of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA); then it said the latter would head the mission to Moscow while the former would be its head as it traveled on to Peking. The final announcement, of course, raises the specter of Sino-Soviet tensions.

Confusion persisted even as the Cuban trade mission departed, Havana Radio announcing on 5 December (emphasis added):

"The delegation is headed by Major Alberto Mora Becerra, minister of foreign trade, and includes Carlos Rafael Rodeiguez, president of the INRA. . . The delegation will be headed by Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez . . . during its stay in the Soviet Union and later will be headed by Major Alberto Mora, minister of foreign trade. After the trade protocol is negotiated with the Soviet Union, the Cuban trade delegation, headed by Major Alberto Mora will leave the Soviet Union for Peking to engage in talks in connection with trade between our country and the Peoples Republic of China."

BLAST AND COUNTERBLAST: Extracts from Communist Doctrines

I. "Carry Forward the Revolutionary Spirit of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement," People's Daily (Peking), 15 November 1962:

Imperialism and all reactionaries have always bullied the fainthearted but feared the firm. They have always bullied the weak but feared the strong. Historical experiences show that the more resolute is the struggle against imperialism, the better will world peace be safeguarded. On the contrary, if one retreats, bows down or even begs for peace before imperialism at the expense of the revolutionary people, one only encourages imperialism to carry out more aggressively its policies of aggression and war, thereby increasing the danger of a world war. As Comrade Fidel Castro has said: "The way to peace is not the way of sacrificing and infringing upon the people's rights, because that will be the way leading to war."

Whether world peace is secured by relying chiefly on mass struggles of the peoples or by relying on the "kindheartedness" of certain representatives of the imperialist bloc--this is an important question of principle. Marxist-Leninists have never refused to negotiate with the enemy and make the necessary compromise under certain conditions. The socialist countries have always stood for peaceful coexistence between countries having a different social system, and made consistent efforts for the relaxation of international tension. But in any negotiation and compromise, it is absolutely impermissible to barter away principle nor is it ever permissible to barter away the vital interests of the people and their revolution.

The modern revisionists represented by the Tito group, instead of waging a resolute head-on struggle against imperialism, are spreading illusions about imperialism, publicizing the allegation that the nature of imperialism has changed, and wanting people to believe in the assurances, promises, reason and good will of such imperialists as Kennedy. The Tito group trumpets the need for achieving "economic integration" and "political integration" of the world, serves openly the counterrevolutionary plan of US imperialism, and become an important detachment of US imperialism in carrying out its counterrevolutionary grand strategy.

The distinction of a Marxist-Leninist from a modern revisionist lies, first of all, in the attitude toward imperialism. Marxist-Leninists stand at the forefront of the struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism and of the struggle against US imperialism. But modern revisionists submit to imperialist pressure, are afraid of US imperialism and of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples, oppose these struggles to the struggle in defense of world peace and have degraded into the voluntary propagandists, political agents, and stooges of imperialism.

\* \* \* \* \*

To cater to the needs of imperialism, the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique are trying their utmost to benumb and undermine the national liberation movement. According to their version, imperialism and colonialism seem no longer to exist in the present-day world and the tasks of the national liberation movement are over. They deliberately oppose the national liberation movements to the world peace movement. They hold that in face of imperialism's armed suppression and armed aggression, the oppressed nations should not wage an armed struggle. Under the signboards of "peace," "neutrality," and "nonalignment," the Tito group peddles in Asian, African and Latin American countries the neocolonialism of the United States, in an attempt to weaken and disintegrate the national liberation movements. Another important distinction between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism is whether the rights of the oppressed nations to liberate themselves is acknowledged or not, and whether national liberation war are actively supported or not.

II. "Defend the Purity of Marxism-Leninism," Red Flag (Peking),  
16 November 1962:

If communists fail to recognize the outwardly strong but inwardly brittle nature of imperialism and reactionaries of the various countries, are awed by the temporary power of the enemy, and overestimate the strength of the enemy, they will show vacillation in struggles and dare not win the victory that can be won. The right opportunists, that is, the revisionists, grossly exaggerate the strength of the enemy among the masses of the people and underrate the great role of the masses of the people in struggles. This will only increase the arrogance of imperialism and the reactionaries of the various countries and break the revolutionary struggle of the masses.

The modern revisionists are scared stiff before the "policy of strength" of US imperialism. They have discarded the Marxist-Leninist method of class analysis, advertised that the nature of imperialism has changed, and glorified the monopoly capitalist class and its representatives. They hold that when imperialism still exists and when the systems of exploitation and oppression still exist it is possible to eliminate war and eliminate arms throughout the world. The danger of modern revisionism lies first of all in its confusing the distinction between the enemy and ourselves, dimming the objective of the struggle, weakening and undermining the struggle of the world people against imperialism. Therefore, communists of all countries, while leading the masses in the struggle against imperialism, must resolutely and thoroughly oppose modern revisionism and defeat revisionism with Marxism-Leninism.

The Tito group in Yugoslavia is the most conspicuous representative of modern revisionism. It has become the enemy of the international workers movement and a special detachment of US imperialism in its opposition to the world people's revolution. The Tito group, clad in Marxist-Leninist garb and under the sign of a socialist country, serves its master in several spheres: First, to advertise among the socialist countries the so-called Yugoslav road, that is, the road for the socialist countries to "peacefully evolve" into capitalist countries, to restore capitalism; second, to popularize among the Asian, African, and Latin American countries where national, democratic revolutionary struggles are being waged the so-called above bloc polity of "positive coexistence," which eliminates the distinction between the enemy and ourselves in an attempt to paralyze the revolutionary will of the peoples of these countries and undermine their liberation struggle so as to pave the way for the neocolonialism of US imperialism; third, to peddle among the working class and laboring people in the capitalist countries the theory of "peaceful growth" into socialism in an attempt to cancel the revolution and preserve the reactionary rule of the monopoly capitalist class; fourth, to spread among the peoples struggling for the defense of world peace the allegation that the source of modern war is not imperialism but the antagonism of the two so-called military blocs, and attack in a thousand and one ways the socialist camp, the bulwark of world peace, in defense of the US imperialist policies of aggression and war.

The modern revisionists usually raise their signboard of opposition to dogmatism. Their so-called opposition to dogmatism really opposes the Marxist-Leninist theories on class struggle, the theories on the state and revolution, the theories on imperialism, the theories on proletarian dictatorship, and the theories on the people's revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries. What they oppose is precisely the core of Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

Common laws presented in the Moscow declaration for socialist revolution and socialist construction have summed up the experiences of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and must be observed by all countries which have embarked on the socialist road. The modern revisionists distort, tamper with, and oppose these common laws in one way or another. They repudiate Lenin's theory on party building. They deny that the communist and workers parties are the vanguard of the proletariat. They renounce proletarian revolution and the proletarian dictatorship. They hold that capitalism can pass into socialism by relying on bourgeois democracy and through the peaceful parliamentary road without smashing the state machinery of the bourgeoisie. They discredit the important significance of carrying out the socialist revolution in ideological and cultural spheres in the period of socialist construction. Under the pretext of changed conditions of our time, they declare that the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism are out of date.

In the name of "creatively" developing Marxism, they revise Marxism-Leninism with bourgeois ideologies. In everything they try to suit the taste of the bourgeoisie, they remold the proletarian policies into what the bourgeoisie can accept, and the criterion in the formulation of their policies is whether they will please the bourgeoisie. They substitute bourgeois pacifism for anti-imperialism struggle, substitute reformism for proletarian revolution, substitute bourgeois nationalism for proletarian internationalism, and substitute humanitarianism for the Marxist-Leninist theories on class struggle.

III. Boris Ponomarev, "The Victorious Banner of World Communists,"  
Pravda (Moscow), 18 November 1962:

The forces of socialism, of the workers and national liberation movement, are on a historic offensive. The communist parties see their international duty in contributing in every way by deeds to the development of this offensive against imperialism. One should not take a stand of preaching to the whole communist movement on the struggle against imperialism and at the same time stand in fact aloof from this struggle, not contributing to the development of the revolutionary processes and carrying out provocative actions which do not strengthen but undermine the cause of peace and socialism, something which is being done in practice by the Albanian upper crust.

\* \* \* \* \*

The attempts of the Albanian upper crust, without a knowledge of the concrete situation, on the basis of quotations out of context and farfetched designs, to teach the communist parties headed by their tempered Marxist-Leninist leadership, are not only ludicrous but also harmful.

\* \* \* \* \*

At present there is not a single conclusion in the documents of international conferences of communist and workers parties which the Albanian leaders would not take up arms against. They have launched a particularly shameful and even a directly provocative campaign in connection with the crisis in the Caribbean. If in the past they used to speak hypocritically about the policy of peaceful coexistence, to which they ascribed anti-Leninist content, in recent times they are openly following a course aimed at wrecking peaceful coexistence and at pushing mankind nearer toward thermonuclear war. They are taking a stand against peaceful settlement of international problems, against the diverse forms of transition to socialism, and against the struggle for disarmament. The Albanian upper crust took the path of unbridled slander of the USSR, the CPSU, and other Marxist-Leninist parties, and thus it in fact joins ranks with imperialist propaganda.

Recently the ideologists of imperialism in the United States proposed to remove from the arsenal of the general anti-communist strategy the principle, "He who is not with us-- i. e. with the US imperialists--is against us," and to replace it with another "He who is against the CPSU and Soviet policy is with us." The stand taken against the generally recognized vanguard of the world communist movement which, according to the definition of the Moscow conferences has been and remains the CPSU, shouldering the heaviest burden in the struggle against imperialism and rendering great and effective support to all progressive liberation movements and trends, leads the Albanian upper crust into camp with the anti-communists.

Pseudorevolutionary phrases and slogans cannot conceal the main fact--the actions of the Albanian upper crust harm the cause of socialism and communism. In the contemporary situation the words of Vladimir Ilich Lenin are more current than ever before: we do not need hysterical impulses; we need a steady advance of iron battalions of the proletariat.

IV. Speech by Frol Kozlov at the 10th Congress of the Italian Communist Party, 3 December 1962:

The attitude which rejects the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, which ignores the possibility of sensible compromise solutions in the sphere of the foreign policy of a socialist state which are in the interests of the peoples, was condemned by V.I. Lenin as an adventurous attitude having nothing in common with Marxism. It is not difficult to understand that in present conditions, when any so-called local military conflict can easily grow into a world thermonuclear war, such an attitude even though it may be disguised in pseudo-revolutionary phraseology, becomes particularly harmful and dangerous.

\* \* \* \* \*

Whether there is going to be war or peace is determined not by the noisy, albeit useless, phrases uttered by the Albanian leaders, for example. It is to them that one might apply Lenin's expression with every good reason: "the group that shouts loudest of all."

\* \* \* \* \*

Recently the border conflict between the ~~CPR~~ and India provoked great anxiety of peace-loving people throughout the world. This inflicts serious harm both on the interests of the fraternal Chinese people and on India which is friendly to us. The imperialists would like to make use of this conflict, as also would India's reactionary circles who are dreaming under the influence of chauvinist intoxication of destroying the Communist Party and the country's progressive forces, of pushing India away from the path of neutrality, and of dragging it into the imperialist aggressive blocs.

Therefore, the Soviet people, all of progressive mankind, received with satisfaction the news about the cease-fire on the Sino-Indian border. We all sincerely hope that the border dispute between the two great Asian powers will be solved by peaceful means.

\* \* \* \* \*

We note with satisfaction that Italian comrades, who have made a creative contribution to the working out of the program documents of the communist parties, are resolutely fighting for unity of the international workers movement on the principles of proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism and are fighting against revisionist splitters and opportunists of every brand.

We are in full agreement with Comrade Togliatti's description of the present anti-Leninist course of the Albanian leadership. Those who genuinely strive for the cohesion of the ranks of the



communist movement, who cherish the achievements of socialism, who strive to strengthen the cause of peace, and who are concerned for the interests of popular masses resolutely and wrathfully condemn the schismatic line of the Albanian leaders. The Albanian leadership is coming out against the agreed documents of the conferences of the communist and workers parties and is levelling such monstrous slanders against the CPSU, the Italian Communist Party, and other fraternal parties which are even avoided by some anticommunists in the imperialist camp. The provocative activity of the Albanian leaders in the international arena, in fact, is grist to the mill of the more aggressive and adventurous circles of imperialism.

We attempted to settle the disagreements with the leaders of the Albanian Workers Party by means of consultation. Particularly in the period when their present schismatic line was only just coming into being, we have repeatedly suggested to the Albanian leaders that we should meet and discuss controversial issues. But they rejected our proposals and, more and more departing from Marxism-Leninism, embarked upon the road of worsening their relations with the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties, going so far as to place themselves in opposition to the entire communist movement.

Our party exposed and will go on exposing the shameful role of the Albanian splitters, who with their actions are trying to shake the unity of the world communist movement. For the communists there is nothing higher than the interests of unity and we shall do everything to strengthen the fraternal solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

Broken Soviet Pledges1925-1945

PLEDGE	YEAR	RESULT
Turkish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1925	The U.S.S.R. denounced this pact in 1945.
Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1926	In 1940 the U.S.S.R. forced Afghanistan to cede frontier territories.
Lithuanian-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1926	The U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in 1940.
Iranian-Soviet Neutrality Pact	1927	The U.S.S.R. refused to withdraw her troops from Iran after World War II.
The U.S.S.R. signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact repudiating war as a means of settling international disputes.	1928	In 1929 the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria in order to regain possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
The U.S.S.R. solemnly renounced war, signing a protocol to that effect with Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania	1929	The U.S.S.R. attacked Eastern Poland in 1939, and in 1940 seized Estonia and Latvia.
Finnish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1932	The U.S.S.R. invaded Finland in 1939.
Estonian-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1932	The U.S.S.R. annexed Estonia in 1940.
Latvian-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1932	The U.S.S.R. annexed Latvia in 1940.
Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1932	The U.S.S.R. seized Eastern Poland in 1939.
The U.S.S.R. signed a Convention repudiating aggression with Finland, Yugoslavia, Turkey	1933	The U.S.S.R. invaded Finland in 1939, broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1941, and denounced her Nonaggression Pact with Turkey in 1945.
Franco-Czech-Soviet Alliance	1935	The U.S.S.R. would not aid Czechoslovakia against Hitler in 1939.
Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia	1936	The Soviets used this alliance as a means to infiltrate Outer Mongolia. By 1945, Outer Mongolia had completely lost its autonomy.
The U.S.S.R. became a member of the Committee for Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War	1936	In the same year the U.S.S.R. sent weapons and war materiel to the Spanish communists.
Chinese-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1937	In 1945 the Soviets plundered the industries of Manchuria.
Lithuanian-Soviet Alliance	1939	The U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in 1940.
Yugoslav-Soviet Nonaggression Pact	1941	The U.S.S.R. broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia one month after signing the Pact.
Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Government in London	1942	The U.S.S.R. broke the alliance in 1943 by supporting the puppet Lublin government.
Anglo-Iranian-Soviet Alliance	1942	The U.S.S.R. violated this alliance by refusing to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran after World War II.
Czech-Soviet Alliance	1943	In 1948 a coup d'état supported by the Soviet Union reduced Czechoslovakia to a puppet of the U.S.S.R.
Chinese-Soviet Alliance	1945	At the same time they made this alliance with the National Government of China, the Soviets were arming the Chinese communists.
Yugoslav-Soviet Alliance	1945	The U.S.S.R. denounced this alliance in 1949.
Polish-Soviet Alliance	1945	In 1947 the communists seized Poland, transforming that country into a Soviet puppet.

## CEASE-FIRE -- WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Editorial: The Nation Stands calm and determined, more solidly united than ever before behind Prime Minister Nehru in this hour of trial.

The Chinese aggression, stripped of its last pretences, lies naked before all mankind. The relentless, obviously pre-planned drive of the Chinese army with heavy mortars and artillery, with tens of thousands of trained soldiers, threatening the oil-fields and tea-gardens of Assam, has opened wide the eyes even of those in other lands who were unable to see the exact nature of the hostilities and were consequently deliberating as to who is right and who is wrong. As the Chinese offensive advanced, their claim that they were only defending against India's "aggression" fell hollow. The efforts of non-aligned countries to halt the war gathered momentum. The Chinese became more and more isolated from world opinion. For everyone began to see that this was a war and one that might lead to world war.

It is in this context and confronted by the united strength of the Indian people, roused as never before in their history, that the Chinese Government suddenly announced its proposals for a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal of its troops. Even these proposals calling for a ceasefire repeat false accusations against India. With a full-scale invasion army deep inside Indian territory, the Chinese Government still seeks to paint the picture of "frontier guards" "defending" against "Indian aggression"!

India is not concerned now primarily with the abusive chain of untruth which accompanies the Chinese Note: we are concerned with the concrete proposals made. The Government of India is, at this moment as New Age goes to press, giving these proposals its serious consideration. Since the Chinese Note announces unilateral action, India will "wait and see". Tomorrow is to be the first day of China's proclaimed ceasefire and India waits to see how it will be implemented.

There is every reason for India to display the utmost vigilance. For, the unscrupulous violation of all previous undertakings and invasion of our soil by the Chinese forces has taught India to be vigilant.

There is every reason for India to continue with ever greater zeal, to build up and strengthen our armed defence potential, to rally and strengthen the defence economy, so that the aggressors may never again dare to enter our land.

The Prime Minister has again and again made our position clear: we shall not talk or negotiate till the Chinese forces are withdrawn at least to the positions they held before September 8, 1962. The Chinese Note claims that when they have completed their proposed unilateral withdrawal, their forces "will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962."

Prime Minister Nehru has rightly stated that we have "to watch how they (the Chinese) give effect to it (their announcement of withdrawal) before we can form any opinion."

Leaders of certain rightwing parties in Parliament demanded on outright rejection of the Chinese Note and the giving up by India of its position in regard to negotiations. The motives of these gentlemen are clear enough. The Prime Minister spoke for the nation when he answered them:

"We do not shift it (our position) every 24 hours. I think it is a good position and a strong position... To that we have stuck all along and to that we stick now."

No negotiations till the pre-September 8 position is restored -- this is the will of the nation. If after clarifications, the Government of India is satisfied that Chinese withdrawal in essence means the vacation of the aggression since September 8, the Government of India will be justified in starting preliminary talks as previously contemplated and since suggested by a number of non-aligned countries.

United behind the Prime Minister, India watches the developments on our front-line. The last three days have been in many ways the most decisive days for India since we won our independence. These have been the days when a storm of interested and ill-informed criticism sought to make us lose faith and confidence in our leadership. We have held firm. We have held the sheet anchors of our position.

our honour and independence -- the policies of non-alignment, of peace, of defending our sovereignty and integrity with our last drop of blood -- which have made India great.

Let the world hear the united voice of our people, let our determination and our strength be known, let the voice of the Prime Minister ring out for all to hear:

"We have no desire for any territorial expansion in any direction and our aim is to live in peace and amity with our neighbours."

# LINK

INDIAN NEWSMAGAZINE

## CHINA'S WORLD AMBITIONS

SPECIAL REPRINT



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# CHINA'S WORLD AMBITIONS

In the *People's Daily* article entitled "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question", the Chinese have charged Jawaharlal Nehru with harbouring the ambition to build a vast empire that would "far surpass the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British Empire". All the evidence that they could offer in support of this allegation was a quotation from *The Discovery of India*, lifted out of the context and mutilated to serve their propagandist ends. Referring to India's role in the future, Jawaharlal Nehru had written: "Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in south-east Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future. If there is a regional grouping of the countries bordering on the Indian ocean on either side of India—Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Burma,

Malaya, Siam, Java, etc.—present-day minority problems will disappear, or at any rate will have to be considered in an entirely different context."

This was enough for the Chinese propagandists to charge India with imperialism. The *People's Daily* article quoted this portion and then immediately launched upon its abusive campaign. It did not have the honesty to reproduce the sentences that follow in which Nehru refers to the late G.D.H. Cole's view that in the long run India "is destined to be the centre of a mighty supernational State covering the whole of the Middle East" and then rejects this view as pure conjecture and adds: "For my part I have no liking for a division of the world into huge supernational areas, unless these are tied by some strong world bond." This is the classic example of the Devil quoting the scripture. For there is sufficient evidence on record to show that it is not India but China which has been dreaming of building a vast empire. In fact, China's ambitions seem to be much

bigger than merely the desire to annex India's Ladakh and NEFA.

I was a student at the Peking University from Sept. 1959 to July 1960. In March 1960 I heard from some fellow-students that the Nepalese students studying in Peking had presented a Chinese text-book of history carrying an intriguing map to the visiting Nepalese Government Delegation headed by the then Prime Minister B. P. Koirala. Out of curiosity I searched for and got hold of a copy of the book. It was entitled *A Brief History of Modern China*. The author was Liu Pei-Hua and the publishers were the Yi-Chang Book Company. This was the second edition of the book and the date of its publication was March 1954. What attracted my attention most in the book and left me bewildered and shocked was a map showing "The Chinese Territories taken by the Imperialists in the Old Democratic Revolutionary Era (1840 - 1919)". The present-day Chinese historians divide the modern history of China into three broad periods. The first period beginning with the Opium Wars of 1840 and ending with May Fourth Movement of 1919 is called the "Old Democratic Revolutionary Era" the second period ends with the establishment of the "People's Republic" and is called the "New Democratic Revolutionary Era" (1919-1949); and the third period is "The Era of Socialist Construction" which is not yet over. The map in the book showed the territories which the Chinese claim as their own and which according to this book were seized by the imperialists during the first period.

The map is reproduced on the facing page. The translation of the text inside the map reveals the true extent of China's expansionist ambitions:

- 1: The **Great North-West**, according to the Chinese text in the map, "was seized by Imperialist Russia under the Treaty of Chuguchak, 1864". It covers huge segments of the present-day Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan.
- 2: The **Pamirs** was "secretly divided between Britain and Russia in 1896".
- 3: **Nepal** "went under the British after 'Independence' in 1898".
- 4: **Che-Meng-Hsiung** (i.e. present-day Sikkim) was "occupied by Britain in 1889".
- 5: **Pu-tan** (i.e. the whole of Bhutan) "went under Britain after 'Independence' in 1865".
- 6: **Ah-sa-mi** (i.e. the whole of Assam) was "given to Britain by Burma in 1826".
- 7: **Burma** "became a part of British


## From Nehru's Letter to Chou

"It is a matter of deep regret that the Chinese in their relations with India have paid back evil for good. Friendly and peaceful relations with China have been our basic policy ever since India became independent. We have consistently followed this policy and gone out of our way to support China's case in the councils of the world. We regret that in their relations with India, China has not merely shown a hostile attitude, but has also resorted to dissimulation. Even the pre-meditated and massive attack on our Defence forces on the 20th October has been represented by China as an attack by Indian forces on China's border guards. That this assertion is completely false is clear from the weight and intensity of the Chinese attack which is not confined to the Eastern sector but includes other sectors of the India-China border. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to such aggression, whatever may be the consequences. Nor can India allow China's occupation of Indian territory to be used as a bargaining counter for dictating to India's settlement of the differences regarding the boundary on China's terms.

"This is not a mere boundary dispute or a question of small territo-

rial frontier adjustments. Apart from the vast and fantastic claims that China has made, China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of India territory during the last five years. While notes were being exchanged for arranging talks and discussions to ease tensions and even dates and places were being suggested, further aggression by China started on 8th September and further areas of Indian territory were occupied in a new sector. The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow the principle of 'Might is Right' to prevail in international relations. Bearing this in mind, India will continue to resist aggression, both to preserve her honour and integrity and to prevent international standards from deteriorating into the jungle law of 'Might is Right'. When aggression is continuously taking place and vast Chinese armies are moving further into our territory, how can we discuss or talk about a peaceful settlement? The first essential is that the Chinese forces along the India-China border should go back at least to where they were prior to the 8th September, 1962."

# PEKING'S DREAM OF EMPIRE



## DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF CHINESE EXPANSIONISM

This map is reprinted from a Chinese text-book, "A Brief History of Modern China", published in Peking in 1954. The entire area falling within the bold line on the map is claimed to be Chinese territory. The legend at bottom left in the map reads: Dash line—Borders at the time of Opium War, 1840; dash-and-dot line—Borders on the conclusion of the Era of the Old Democratic Revolution, 1919.

Empire in 1886".

8: The Andaman Islands "went under Britain".

9: Ma-la-chia (i.e. the whole of present-day Malaya) was "occupied by Britain in 1895".

10: Hsien-Lo (i.e. the whole of Thailand) was "declared 'Independent' under joint Anglo-French control in 1904".

11: Annam (covering the present

day North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) was "captured by the French in 1885".

12: Taiwan and P'enghu Islands were "relinquished to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895".

13: Su-Lu Island was "occupied by the British".

14: The Region where the British crossed the Border and committed

aggression.

15: Liu-Ch'iu (i.e. Ryukyu Island) was "occupied by Japan in 1910".

17 and 18: The Great North-East, covering a huge area of the Soviet Far East, "was given to Russia under the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860)".

19: K'u-Ye (i.e. Kurile Island) was "divided between Japan and Russia."

—GHANSHYAM MEHTA