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1 July 1963

Briefly NotedSoviet Officials Fabricate Slave Stories to Prevent Fraternization.

The New York Times carried on 4 June (Press Comment, 4 June) an article describing a controversy which has arisen between African students in Moscow and the Soviet authorities. On 27 October last year, Komsomolskaya Pravda, the official paper of the Young Communist League, published a story on the alleged adventures of a Soviet girl who married a Moslem student, left the Soviet Union with him, and later was sold by him to a friend, who wanted a sixth wife in his harem. The Soviet press being rather deficient in spicy stories of this kind, the tale attracted widespread interest. Actually it appears that the story was completely fictitious, and that it was published in order to discourage Soviet girls from fraternizing with foreign students. The purpose was accomplished, in that symptoms of hostility to foreign students increased. A group of Arab students obtained an assurance that the abduction had not been to any Arab country, but a group of African students was unable to gain satisfaction. According to the African students, they were told that the story was invented and they were promised that a retraction would be published. But such a retraction has not appeared. (See also New York Times, 9 June 1963, in Press Comment, 10 June 1963. Coverage in non-American media is expected, and will be reproduced in Press Comment.)

This incident should be given maximum play in all non-white areas sending students to the Soviet bloc. Comment should point out (1) the attempt of the Soviet authorities to discourage fraternization, and (2) their admitted lying and their failure to carry out the promise of a retraction. (Note: Separate guidance has been dispatched to selected stations on this subject.)

Chinese People's Congress Postponed.

Chou En-lai announced on June 7th that the 1963 session of the National People's Congress (the fourth session of the 2nd NPC), Communist China's rubber-stamp legislature, has been rescheduled from the second to the last quarter of this year. The Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to begin July 5 probably affected the decision. However, since the chief purpose of these conclaves has been to publicize regime policies and accomplishments, the worsening crop outlook and continued retrenchment in industry are the more likely causes of its postponement. The sessions have been held annually since 1954, with the exception of 1961 which was also a year of exceptional economic difficulties.

Whatever the reasons, the postponement of the Congress is evidence that the body, which strives to create the appearance

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of being a democratic institution, exists only for the convenience of the regime and this year it would be a distinct inconvenience even to such a totalitarian regime as the CCP. In commenting on the postponement, we note that it would not be possible to eliminate the convening of a legislative body if it had any real functions to perform in governing a society. We also point out that the election of deputies for the third NPC Congress will have to be postponed into 1964, so that even the pretence of having a legislative body will be suspended.

Soviet Concern over African Developments

An article by Izvestiya "observer" V. Kudryavtsev in the May issue of the Soviet publication International Affairs (see Attachment), the English version of the monthly journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, reveals a considerable Soviet concern over African developments.

Kudryavtsev attended all three conferences of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Writing after the most recent AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, he finds that AAPSO's work is of diminishing value for two main reasons: (1) power in Africa has gradually shifted from popular (liberation) movements to the growing number of independent governments which are preoccupied with local problems and are not adequately represented at the non-governmental AAPSO conferences; and (2) while not stating so specifically but strongly implying, because AAPSO is increasingly dominated by the Chicoms.

The article is of particular interest because it fails generally to take an optimistic view of African developments and, indeed, rather critically views those African trends which are potentially inimical to Soviet interests. It may be inferred from the article that the Soviet Union will at appropriate occasions point to trends in Africa which in its opinion are wrong. The author contemptuously refers to unnamed antagonists as simpletons who have forgotten their own origin and fail to realize that African liberation would be impossible were it not for the Soviet revolution, the defeat of Fascism, and the work of "progressive forces" in the West. In the same context the author notes that some of the intensely nationalistically inclined figures are using the solidarity movement not only against imperialism and colonialism but also against "white people in general."

In unattributable outlets we use this article as a basis for editorial treatment following the same line as in previous AAPSO guidances, generally as follows: The Soviet Union, and other Communist regimes, look with favor on newly independent countries only when these countries permit the local CPs to work freely

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towards gaining control of the country. When developing countries search for their own policies or adopt policies which are opposed to Communism, national aspirations are decried or labelled as being mere expressions of bourgeois ideology. We explain that Communists have only scorn for attempts to carry out social, economic and other reforms, unless these reforms are carried out completely along Communist lines and lead to social revolution within the country. On appropriate occasions, we also throw light on the Soviet concern over the growing Chinese influence in front organizations such as AAPSO, and we comment that the Chinese-led split along racial lines may well cripple Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world areas.

Sixtieth CPSU Anniversary 17 July - 10 August.

The CPSU dates its birthday from the second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) held in Brussels and London in 1903. Factional disputes over the type of party organization to be developed dominated the sessions. Lenin rejected the view of the majority and stuck to his concept that the party should be a small revolutionary conspiratorial group, centralized and tightly controlled. Several delegates opposing his views walked out of the meetings in disgust at Lenin's intransigence, leaving him at the end of the Congress with a small majority of 4 in the remaining 44 representatives. Lenin used this temporary situation to name his faction the Bolsheviks (majority) and his opponents the Mensheviks (minority) and utilized the opportunity to pack the controlling organs of the RSDLP and the party newspaper Iskra in Switzerland. There was a final break between the two factions in 1912 although they continued to work together before and during the 1917 Revolution. The Mensheviks were liquidated as a political force after the Lenin-Trotsky coup d'etat in which similar dictatorial, conspiratorial maneuvers were used by the CPSU minority to eliminate the provisional government and all opposition.

Wherever comments on the CPSU's anniversary celebration are appropriate, we question the political and historic right of Khrushchev's organization of the ruling managerial class to take credit for the revolutionary endeavours of the RSDLP 60 years ago. Commenting to non-Stalinists and Communist sympathizers we seek to counter the forthcoming eulogies of Lenin by concentrating on his dictatorial rule and his use of conspiracy to out-manuever and ultimately liquidate opponents.

We characterize the developments in and the present state of the Soviet Union in historical terms: to all European or other audiences (mainly intellectual) who understand the French Thermidor we compare Khrushchev's "collective" leadership, policies

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and practices with the Directorate which followed Robespierre's execution (this was treated fully more than a year ago in BPG #87 item 503 "The Thermidorean Reaction" 26 March 1962); to other audiences, particularly Communists and their sympathizers, we stress that the loss of revolutionary leadership in the present CPSU, the failure to solve conflicting demands, the effort to suppress both the right and the left, and the increasing appearance of popular demands and pressures against restraints of the regime, are all part of a historical process, the running out of the limited Communist plan to organize society in its image and dominate mankind.

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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

- 20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement 1954 (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam)
- 22 July OAS Panama Declaration of principles signed by 19 Western Hemisphere countries in 1956. (US invited first International Conference of American States to Washington in 1899, the first step toward creating the Pan American Union.)
- 31 July Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against Communist guerrillas, 1960.
- August Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco State scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes.
- 6 Aug. 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, still scheduled for Santiago, Chile, 6 - 11 August but likely to be postponed or cancelled.
- 13 Aug. Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin border by building a wall in 1961 (more than 30,000 refugees had registered in West Berlin in the preceding month).
- 14 Aug Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic (Chiang Kai Shek) signed in 1945.
- 17 Aug. Soviet-Polish Treaty went into effect. Poland received German territory as compensation for territory annexed by the Soviet Union, 1945.
- 20 Aug. Leon Trotsky assassinated in 1940 in Mexico City.
- 24 Aug. Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
- 24 Aug. North Atlantic Treaty entered into force 1949 (NATO).
- 17 Sept. International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ) Conference on board Soviet ship in the Medeterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct.
- 29 Sept. International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be followed by UIA General Assembly and International Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#6

11-24 June 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese Communists delivered and published their long-delayed response to the CPSU letter of 30 March (see Chronology, 15 June). It was a long, unyielding, arrogant, even insulting re-statement of their most militant interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory, plus harsh denunciation of recent Soviet internal developments and of Soviet conduct in relations with other fraternal socialist parties and countries, topped off by another taunting challenge to the CPSU to publish the materials on both sides. (NCNA announced that the new message had already been published in booklet form, together with the CPSU letter to which it replied.) On the same day, the Peking People's Daily and the Albanian Zeri I Popullit featured nasty attacks on Tito and Yugoslavia, the Albanians coupling Tito directly with Khrushchev.

2. Moscow observers report that Soviet officials were obviously shocked by the tone and timing of the CCP message, just three days before the opening of the CC plenum of the CPSU, convened to discuss ideological problems. The CPSU reacted with a statement released on the first day of the plenum which regretted the "arbitrary interpretation" and "unwarranted attacks," and which stated that they would not publish it because publication would call for a public reply which would further aggravate polemics, contrary to "the understanding reached." Speakers at the plenum were compelled to address themselves to the Chinese dispute and the plenum adopted a resolution on the subject, all rejecting the attacks and supporting the Khrushchev line. The Soviet press joined in the chorus.

3. Meanwhile, the North Koreans again demonstrated their support of the Chinese in a joint statement at the conclusion of President Choe's visit to China and with the North Vietnamese during a visit of a North Korean delegation to North Vietnam.

4. On the other side, the Yugoslavs have taken advantage of several opportunities to reassert their firmness, and the East Germans officially protested to the Chinese against their dissemination of their polemical materials.

5. The Rumanian party further demonstrated its "independence" by publishing a lengthy review of the Red Chinese message to the CPSU, contrary.

6. The resignation of a CC member from the Australian CP and the ousting of five from their Central Executive positions was interpreted locally as portending the formation of a dissident, pro-Chinese party there. Somewhat the same situation seems to be developing in the Ecuadoran CP (according to the OCI Weekly Summary dated 21 June), though we are not able to furnish any published reports in the Chronology. FBIS has furnished an unpublished (?) OOU report of a 3-day plenum of the Chilean CP, at which the Secretary General violently attacked the ChiComs and condemned visiting Chinese writers in Chile for making anti-Soviet propaganda. The plenum repeated its support of the Soviet line, but it is believed that a purge of the ranks will be forthcoming.

Significance: In their conduct during this period, the Chinese could hardly have been more provocative, insolent, challenging, and downright hostile toward the CPSU and still remain within the outermost limits of nominally "fraternal" relations. It is not only that their polemic directly contradicts the Soviet line on many vital questions and labels Soviet positions as "absolutely impermissible," but they directly impugn Soviet sincerity (see the two uses of "under the pretext" sections 20 and 23, and the "CPSU should match their deeds with their words" in section 22) and spew out such nasty insults as great-power chauvinism, sectarianism, splittism, subversion, crudely interfering, imposing their own wrong line, advocating one thing today and another tomorrow, -- and, horror of horrors, -- tantamount to helping restore capitalism! And finally, their repeated challenge to the Soviets to publish both sides was so worded as to make it a matter of deciding between truth and falsehood rather than honest differences of opinion. Moreover, their maneuvers were no less provocative than the content of their message. After deliberately refraining from replying to the CPSU letter for ten long weeks, the Chinese launched this massive attack just 3 days before the important CPSU plenum and about two weeks before the bilateral talks are to begin, -- and simultaneously announced that it had already been published in booklet form.

Only the outcome of the Sino-Soviet talks, still scheduled to open on 5 July, will conclusively show how to interpret the perplexing submissiveness of the Soviets who, despite their protests, appear to be "turning the other cheek" towards their Chinese tormentors. For the time being, several different, mutually exclusive interpretations are conceivable:

a. the Soviets want to give the Chinese sufficient rope to hang themselves, e.g. they refrain from repaying the CCP in kind until the negotiations, in order to demonstrate Peking's guilt before the entire World Communist Movement (relatively the most likely explanation).

b. Or the Soviets are primarily playing for time, willing to swallow some more ideological insults (especially since Khrushchev apparently -- and mistakenly, seen from his place -- underestimates the importance of "doctrinal squabbles," putting first priority on military, especially nuclear strength, second on scientific and industrial achievements) -- hoping that time is working for them, e.g. by way of seeing Mao depart from the scene.

c. Or the Presidium has inside information to the effect that the Chinese dragon's bark is far worse than its bite, i.e. that the CCP is really willing to make concessions behind closed doors but tries to save face and improve its bargaining position until then (an admittedly unlikely, but not impossible alternative).

d. Or the pressure on Khrushchev inside the CPSU to come to terms with Peking is so strong that K. cannot aggressively deal with the increasingly deadly insults compiled in that latest letter (no evidence to support this possibility, either -- but the "inferiority complexes," caused among Soviets and other European Communists by the barrage of devastating ChiCom accusations, may have led to a crisis between revolutionary emotions and more conservative practices which characterize the Khrushchev line).

The foregoing is intended mainly as "food for thought" for recipients.

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11-24 June 1963

June 7 - In a speech at Ljubljana, reported in Politika, Belgrade, of 8 June, Yugoslav Deputy Premier Kardelj told China that relations between socialist countries must be based on equality and mutual respect. "What would the relations . . . become if every socialist country ascribed to itself the right to declare another socialist country to be capitalistic, imperialist, agent of imperialism, etc. . . . China must realize that it cannot subordinate the whole of international socialism to its momentary interests and ambitions."

June 12 - The North Korean organ Nodong Sinmun in a lengthy, repetitive article stressed the necessity to build "a self-supporting economy under the banner of self-reliance."

June 15 - NCNA announced that the ChiCom Ambassador in Moscow had delivered to CPSU Presidium member Suslov a reply dated 14 June to the CPSU letter of 30 March to the CCP (Due to its length, we are appending our analysis of this highly important document at the end of this Chronology.) The full text was published by all Peking papers on 17 June under the heading "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," and NCNA announced on the same day that it had already been published in booklet form, together with the texts of the 30 March CPSU letter to which it replied and of the earlier exchange between the two, 21 February from CPSU and 9 March from CCP.

June 15 - On the same day, both the Chinese People's Daily and the Albanian Zeri I Popullit carried harsh attacks on Tito and the Yugoslav revisionists. The relatively short Chinese article, accusing the Titoites of "trying to worm their way into the ranks of the international Communist movement to carry out unscrupulous sabotage," is distinguished only by its scurrilous language: "The Tito group's attacks and slanders are no novelty; they are mere spittle collected from the cuspidors of the imperialists and other revisionists." The Albanian, however, picks up the underlined implication of Soviet collusion and spells it out unequivocally. Tito, it says, "expounded their T and K identical profoundly anti-Marxist and anti-revolutionary views on questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the paths and forms of the transition to socialism, etc. What is characteristic is that in dealing with all these questions, Tito used N. Khrushchev's language." And later:

"The renegade Tito in a string of slanders, in particular against the CCP, has qualified the firm struggle of principle being waged by the CCP to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and to oppose the counter-revolutionary views and hostile attacks of the modern revisionists, as 'a struggle for hegemony,' exactly as N. Khrushchev attempted to

judges others from his chauvinistic angle. Because it is precisely they who claim to have the monopoly on the 'creative development of Marxism' -- and all others must join in step -- they have not shrunk from anything to impose their own views: from plots -- even organizing counter-revolutionary insurrections as in Hungary, -- from the liquidation of leading cadres in fraternal parties who oppose their revisionist course, dispatching for their purpose special envoys to convince the leading circles of these fraternal parties, -- and even economic and military pressures and use of flattery and means of corruption."

And later, this aggrieved indictment: "The modern revisionists manipulate Lenin in a cynical way and they distort him without shame."

June 17-20 - On the 17th, the Havana Revolution (formerly official organ of Castro's 26th of July movement; still regarded as reflecting Fidel's personal line) published a 5-column Prensa Latina dispatch from Peking on the CCP letter. Hoy, (recently designated as the official organ of United Party of the Socialist Revolution as well as the CP) carried a similar piece on the 18th, credited to Hsinhua, Peking. However, this reportage craftily avoided any description of the harshly controversial polemics: for example, each of the 25 sections was listed, but only in a single title-like sentence or phrase denoting the "problem" discussed, such as "11 - The transition from capitalism to socialism." The Cuban articles were published before the CPSU had issued its statement (see next item in Chronology) vetoing any publicizing of the CCP letter, but on the 20th, the Rumanian Party organ Scinteia published a report almost identical with the Cuban, credited to the Rumanian agency Agerpress, Peking.

June 18 - TASS released a statement which, after recalling the earlier CPSU-CCP exchanges proposing the halting of polemics and holding of a bilateral meeting, acknowledged receipt of the CCP letter of 14 June. However, the CPSU stated:

"This letter gives an arbitrary interpretation to the declaration and statement of the Moscow conferences of Marxist-Leninist parties, distorts the major theses of these historic documents, and contains unwarranted attacks on the CPSU and other fraternal parties. All this gives rise to deep regret.

The CPSU CC believes that the publication at present in the Soviet press of the letter of the CC CCP dated 14 June 1963 would call for a public reply which would lead to a further aggravation of the polemics, would not accord with the understanding

reached, and would run counter to the opinion of the fraternal parties on this question. This should not be done, all the more in view of the coming meeting between representatives of the CPSU and the CCP on 5 July this year."

June 18-21 - Although the large "ideological plenum" of the CPSU CC had been scheduled to discuss internal problems, most of the speakers in the closed session and resolution reacted to the Chinese attack by rejecting as "groundless and slanderous" the Chinese attacks on Soviet policy, supporting the Khrushchev line, and approving Khrushchev's action "in rallying further the forces of the world Communist movement" and his "concrete actions and measures" taken in the USSR's relations with Peking. The resolution on China and the appointments of Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat were generally regarded as evidence of enhanced support for Khrushchev in his foreign as well as domestic policies.

June 19 and continuing - A visit to North Vietnam by a delegation of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, led by Vice President Pak Kum-chol, is being used to propagate the Chinese-oriented North Korean line, with repeated attacks on modern revisionism in a Nodong Sinmun editorial on the 19th and in Pak's speeches in Hanoi. Pak's host, Truong Chinh (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the DRV National Assembly), in his reception speech on the 20th, gave restrained concurrence: "Together with the fraternal parties, we resolutely defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, oppose revisionism and dogmatism and other wrong tendencies, especially revisionism." On the 19th NCNA also reported that the latest issues of two North Vietnam organs, Party theoretical journal Hoc Tap and the Labor Youth Union's Tien Phong, had carried attacks on Yugoslavia and its new constitution.

June 19 - The Yugoslav agency TANYUG described an article in the Belgrade Komunist responding to the ChiCom attacks on the Yugoslav party following her Fifth Plenum. In answering the questions as to what is the direct aim of the Chinese attacks, Komunist said: "They are, in fact, efforts to impose their own views on the international labor movement on the pretext of protecting Marxism-Leninism and taking the role of arbiter over the policy of all the socialist countries and parties. The Chinese leadership thus only aggravates the actual dilemma in the international labor movement -- the need of deciding between blind dogmatism and arbitrary adventurism, and the active and persistent struggle for peace and socialism based on a creative application of Marxism, a policy which springs from a genuine sense of responsibility for the fate of the world in which we live."

June 20 - News dispatches from Moscow reported that the ChiCom Embassy, in defiance of stated Soviet desires, was distributing copies of "the 67-page CCP letter" to Soviet organizations, newspapers and foreign correspondents, including those from Communist countries. Western reporters who usually encounter

difficulties in passing beyond the front door of the Chinese Embassy have been cordially handed as many copies of the letter as they wanted, UPI reported.

June 20-24 - The Australian Overseas Service reported that the Australian CP has split over the issues of the CPSU-CCP dispute. It cited the ACP weekly Guardian, which reported the dismissal of five members of the Party's Central Executive in Victoria for "fractionalism, breeches of the Party's constitution and rejection of democratic centralism." Radio Australia's reporter said that all named have shown strong Peking leanings. One Victoria CC member veteran of 22 years, resigned from the Party. On the 24th, Radio Australia reported that another 25-year CP member had resigned "because he opposed the revisionist policy (of) its CC," thus feeding speculation that Australia may soon have two Communist Parties.

June 21 - The East German news agency ADN announced that First Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer had protested to the Chinese Ambassador over Chinese dissemination of printed matter in violation of the existing order and legal regulations. ADN added: "It is to be regretted that the Embassy of the CPR in the GDR by such steps has acted against the wish entertained by the Marxist-Leninist parties that public polemics among fraternal parties should be ended and that differences of opinion should be ironed out by means of negotiations."

June 21 - The Peking People's Daily published a commentary on "John F. Kennedy's Great Conspiracy" which interprets the American President's 10 June American University speech as "a cunning and vicious move in his 'peace strategy,'" aimed to influence the outcome of the Sino-Soviet debate and "to divide the Red bloc." "As a special detachment of US imperialism, the Yugoslav modern revisionists are beside themselves with joy at Kennedy's speech and have lauded it to the skies." "However, all who firmly uphold the unity of the socialist camp and that of the international Communist movement will never allow themselves to be taken in."

June 23 - The extensive visit of North Korean President Choe Yong-kon to China (see our last Chronology, June 5) ended with a 12-page joint statement signed by Liu Shao-chi and Choe, which (to nobody's surprise, after Choe's earlier speeches) followed a tough Chinese line, denouncing modern revisionism and declaring that "it is absolutely impermissible one-sidedly to reduce the foreign policy of the socialist countries to peaceful coexistence."

June 23 - The Rumanian Scinteia, again alone of all the East European bloc, published a lengthy report of the CPSU plenum's resolution on China, including its rejection of the CCP charges and its charging of the Soviet representatives to "promote undeviatingly" the Khrushchev line in their talks with the Chinese.

June 24 - Editorials in Pravda and Izvestiya reviewing the work of the CC plenum reiterated the terms of the plenum resolution which "categorically rejected" as "groundless and slanderous the attacks by the CC CCP on our party and other Communist parties," and authorized the delegation to the July talks to follow Khrushchev's policies "unswervingly." Reporting this from Moscow, New York Times correspondent Topping added that Soviet officials, who had not expected that the July talks would result in any ideological reconciliation but had hoped for an agreement that would limit the dimensions of the dispute and maintain some facade of unity, were obviously shocked by the delivery of the harsh Chinese letter only three days before the opening of the plenum.

June 24 - NCNA quoted "a spokesman of the CPR Embassy in the GDR" as expressing "utter amazement at the ADN statement of 21 June which attacked the Chinese Embassy for distributing printed matter." The spokesman said that the printing and distributing of "this important Marxist-Leninist document" was "fully justified and in accordance with international practice," and it "undoubtedly will help increase the fraternal German people's correct understanding of the CCP's position and viewpoints and thus will be beneficial to strengthen unity." After complaining that ADN "hurriedly published the statement," even before the Embassy could communicate with its government, the spokesman said: "such practice can only be regarded as a deliberate attempt to incite an uproar, attack the CCP, widen differences in the international Communist movement, and undermine the unity among fraternal parties." He concluded with a reminder that the Sixth SED Congress had "resorted to non-Marxist-Leninist tactics in launching preposterous attacks on the CCP."

APPENDIX to CHRONOLOGY

Analysis of CCP letter to the CPSU dated 14 June 1963

After a few introductory remarks about the "common and sacred duty" of all parties to uphold and strengthen unity, the ChiCom message stated that, inasmuch as the CPSU letter "raises the question of the general line of the international Communist movement," "we, too, would like to express our view, which constitutes our proposal on the general line . . . and on some related questions of principle." (The CPSU letter had not "raised the question of the general line," but it had defined the CPSU's views as "the line of the Communist movement," the correctness of which has been fully confirmed by "the entire course of world development in recent years," and had flatly stated that "we are deeply convinced that there are no grounds for a re-examination of this line.")

The Chinese position is set forth in 25 numbered sections (about 18,000 words), the first 17 of which re-hash previously expressed ChiCom views on the theoretical issues in the dispute, especially the questions of revolution and war. "In the last analysis, it is a question of . . . whether or not to accept the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, whether or not to recognize the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution, whether or not to accept the fact that the people still living under the imperialist and capitalist system, who comprise two-thirds of the world's population, need to make revolution." The ChiCom answer: "the transition from capitalism to socialism can only (our underlining here and throughout) be brought about through proletarian revolution," and those who try to "predict peaceful transition" on the basis of "absurd parallels" are repudiating Marxism. Continuing in this vein, they repeatedly emphasized that Asia, Africa and Latin America "are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." On war: those "certain persons /who/ now actually hold that it is possible to bring about 'a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars' through 'general and complete disarmament'" are perpetrating "sheer illusion." "Peaceful coexistence" (a "Lenin thesis," and not a "great discovery" by certain persons a few years ago) is a valid concept within a narrow, strict interpretation, but it cannot be made "the general line of foreign policy of the socialist countries." "If the general line . . . is one-sidedly reduced to 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition,' and 'peaceful transition,' this is to violate the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement, to discard the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism." "If anybody, following in the footsteps of others, defends the erroneous opportunist line and policies pursued by a certain socialist country . . . , then he is departing from Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

With section 18, the Chinese begin attacking specific Soviet internal developments and Soviet conduct in relations with other fraternal parties and states, and the tone grows increasingly arrogant and nasty. A novel feature of the CPSU 3rd Program, adopted by the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, was the statement that, "having brought about a complete and final victory of socialism -- the first phase of communism -- and the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the USSR from the point of view of the tasks of internal development." Until the achievement of full communism -- with the disappearance of classes and the withering away of the state, -- Soviet society will be governed by a "state of the entire people" (an ill-defined and nebulous concept). In sections 18 and 19 the Chinese roundly denounce "the announcement, half-way through, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer necessary." "This, too, is not a question about the internal affairs of any particular party but a fundamental problem involving the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism." "Does this not disarm the proletariat and all the working people, organizationally and ideologically, and is it not tantamount to helping restore capitalism?"

In section 20, the Chinese turn to "the issue of 'combating the cult of the individual'" which they brand as "erroneous and harmful," because raising this question "is actually to counterpose the leaders to the masses, undermine the party's unified leadership which is based on democratic centralism, dissipate its fighting strength and disintegrate its ranks." Furthermore, "what is more serious is that, under the pretext of 'combating the cult of the individual,' certain persons are crudely interfering in the internal affairs of other fraternal parties and fraternal countries and forcing other fraternal parties to change their leadership in order to impose their own wrong line on these parties. What is all this if it is not great-power chauvinism, sectarianism, and splittism? What is all this if it is not subversion?"

In 22, the Chinese attack Soviet conduct in its economic relations with the socialist camp: "Economic cooperation must be based on the principles of complete equality, mutual benefit, and comradely mutual assistance. It would be great-power chauvinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name of 'international division of labor' or 'specialization,' to impose one's own will on others, infringe on the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries, or harm the interests of their people. . . . It would be preposterous to follow the practice of gaining profit for oneself at the expense of others."

The attack is shifted to the field of political relations between fraternal parties in section 22. The CPSU should match their deeds with the fine words of their 30 March letter: "it is impermissible for any party to place itself above others, to interfere in their internal affairs, and to adopt patriarchal ways to impose the program, resolutions and line of one's own party on other fraternal parties

as the "common program of the international Communist movement." How to treat the "Marxist-Leninist fraternal Albanian Workers Party" and the "Yugoslav revisionist clique of traitors to Marxism-Leninism" are "two essentially different questions" and "must on no account be placed on a par."

"Who is it that has taken splitting actions in Soviet-Albanian relations? Who is it that has extended the ideological differences between the Soviet and Albanian parties to state relations? Who is it that has brought the divergence between the two countries into the open before the enemy? Who is it that has openly called for a change in the Albanian party and state leadership? All this is plain and clear to the whole world. Is it possible that the leading comrades of the CPSU do not really feel their responsibility. . .?"

"The series of distressing developments which have occurred in the socialist camp in the past period have harmed the interests not only of the fraternal parties concerned, but also of the masses of the people in their countries. This convincingly demonstrates that the larger countries and parties need to keep in mind Lenin's behest never to commit the error of great-power chauvinism. The comrades of the CPSU state in their letter that 'the CPSU has never taken and will never take a single step that could sow hostility among the peoples of our country toward the fraternal Chinese people or other peoples.' Here we do not desire to go back and enumerate the many unpleasant events that have occurred in the past, and we only wish that the comrades of the CPSU will strictly abide by this statement in their future actions. During the past few years, our party members and our people have exercised the greatest restraint in the face of a series of grave incidents which were in violation of the principles guiding the relations among fraternal parties and countries, despite the many difficulties and losses which have been imposed on us."

Concentrating in section 23 on the Yugoslav problem, the Chinese note that "certain persons are attempting to introduce the Yugoslav revisionist clique into the socialist community," and assert that "this is openly to tear up the agreement unanimously reached at the 1960 meeting. . . and is absolutely impermissible." Now "certain persons are openly saying that dogmatism and not revisionism is the main danger, or that dogmatism is no less dangerous than revisionism, etc. . . . They must not barter away principles, . . . advocating one thing today and another tomorrow, On the pretext of 'creatively developing Marxism,' . . . they describe as 'universal Marxist-Leninist truths' their own prescriptions which are based on nothing but subjective conjecture and are divorced from reality and from the masses, and they force others to accept these prescriptions unconditionally. That is why

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Communist movement."

In the brief section 24, the Chinese scornfully contrast to their ideal of a self-reliant, Marxist-Leninist, proletarian revolutionary party such despicable types as a "bourgeois reformist party," a "revisionist party," and "a party that parrots the words of others, copies foreign experience without analysis, runs hither and thither in response to the baton of certain persons abroad, and has become a hodgepodge of revisionism, dogmatism, and everything but Marxist-Leninist principles."

Finally, in section 25 the Chinese tauntingly repeat their challenges to the CPSU to follow their example and publish the articles on both sides of the dispute, because "it is the duty of Marxist-Leninists to distinguish between truth and falsehood with respect to the differences that have arisen in the ICM."

CHRONOLOGIE - DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES

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7 juin: Dans un discours à Liubliana, relaté dans "Politika", Belgrade, le 8 juin, l'adjoint du premier ministre Kardelj a dit à la Chine que les relations entre pays socialistes doivent être basées sur l'égalité et sur le respect mutuel. "Que deviendraient les relations... si chaque pays socialiste s'arrogeait le droit de qualifier un autre pays socialiste de capitaliste, d'impérialiste, d'agent de l'impérialisme, etc... La Chine doit comprendre qu'elle ne peut subordonner le socialisme international tout entier à ses intérêts et ses ambitions du moment."

12 juin: "Nodong Sinmun", journal paraissant en Corée du Nord, a souligné en un long article plein de répétitions la nécessité de construire "une économie qui se supporterait elle-même sous la bannière de la confiance en soi-même".

15 juin: L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle annonce que l'ambassadeur de la Chine communiste à Moscou a remis à Souslov, membre du Présidium du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, une réponse datée du 14 juin à la lettre des partis communistes de l'Union soviétique du 30 mars adressée au Parti communiste chinois, (en raison de la longueur de ce document important, nous en donnons une analyse à la fin de cette chronologie). Le texte fut publié en entier dans tous les journaux de Pékin le 17 juin sous le titre "Une proposition concernant la ligne générale du mouvement communiste international", et l'Agence de presse chinoise annonçait le même jour que sa publication existait déjà sous forme de livre, contenant également le texte de la lettre du 30 mars du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, à laquelle elle répondait, ainsi que l'échange de lettres précédentes entre les deux partis, lettre du 21 février émanant du Parti soviétique, et celle du 19 mars adressée par le Parti chinois.

15 juin: Le même jour, le "Quotidien du peuple", journal chinois, et le "Zeri i Popullit", journal albanais, attaquèrent violemment Tito et les révisionnistes yougoslaves. L'article relativement court, publié par les Chinois qui accusaient les partisans de Tito "d'essayer d'infiltrer les rangs du mouvement communiste international pour y pratiquer leur sabotage sans scrupule", ne se distingue que par son langage grossier: "Les attaques et les diffamations du groupe de Tito ne constituent pas une nouveauté; ce ne sont que crachats recueillis dans les crachoirs des impérialistes et autres révisionnistes". Les Albanais de leur côté reprennent l'implication soulignée de complicité soviétique et la précisent sans équivoque possible. Tito, déclarent-ils, "a exposé leur opinion identique et profondément anti-marxiste et anti-révolutionnaire sur les questions de la guerre et de la paix, sur celles de la coexistence pacifique, sur celles des chemins et des formes que prend la transition vers le communisme, etc... (c'est-à-dire les opinions de Tito et de Khrouchtchef). Ce qu'il y a de caractéristique c'est qu'en traitant de toutes ces questions Tito a employé le langage de Khrouchtchef. Et, plus loin:

"Le renégat Tito en une série de calomnies, proférées notamment contre le Parti communiste chinois, a traité de lutte pour l'hégémonie la lutte de principe que le Parti communiste chinois mène fermement dans le but de défendre la pureté du marxisme-léninisme et de s'opposer aux opinions contre-révolutionnaires et aux attaques hostiles des révisionnistes modernes. Il l'a fait comme Monsieur Khrouchtchef lui-même a essayé de le faire. Il est clair que Tito aussi bien que Khrouchtchef juge les autres d'un point de vue

monopole sur le développement créateur du marxisme, et que tous les autres n'ont qu'à se mettre au pas, que rien ne les arrê-
tés pour imposer leurs vues: ni les complots, y compris l'organi-
sation d'insurrections contre-révolutionnaires comme en Hongrie,
ni la liquidation des cadres dirigeants dans des partis fraternels
qui s'opposaient à leur cours révisionniste, ni l'envoie avec mis-
sions spéciales de délégués chargés de convaincre les cercles diri-
geants de ces partis fraternels, ni même les pressions économiques
et militaires et le recours à la flatterie et aux moyens de corrup-
tion."

Et plus tard, cette accusation: "Les révisionnistes modernes manipulent
Lénine d'une façon cynique et le déforment sans honte."

17-20 juin: "Revolucion", journal publié à La Havane (qui fut l'organe officiel
du Mouvement du 26 juillet de Castro, et que l'on considère toujours comme ex-
primant les idées personnelles de Castro) a reproduit un communiqué sur cinq co-
lonnes de "La Prensa Latina" adressé de Pékin au sujet de la lettre du Parti com-
muniste chinois. "Hoy" (qui récemment a été désigné l'organe officiel du Parti
unifié de la révolution socialiste aussi bien que celui du parti communiste) pu-
bliait un article analogue le 18 qu'il attribuait à "Sinhua", Pékin. Cependant,
ce reportage a évité adroitement de mentionner les polémiques violentes: par
exemple, les 25 sections n'étaient mentionnées que par une simple phrase sous
forme de titre, ou de phrases indiquant le "problème discuté, comme par exemple:
"11 - Transition du capitalisme au socialisme". Les articles cubains furent pu-
bliés avant que le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique n'ait fait paraître sa
déclaration (voir l'article suivant de la Chronologie) par lequel il interdisait
toute publication de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois, mais le 20 "Scin-
teia", organe du Parti roumain, publiait un rapport presque identique à celui des
Cubains attribué à l'agence roumaine "Agerpress", Pékin.

18 juin: L'agence Tass publiait une déclaration qui, après avoir rappelé les
échanges précédents entre le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique et le Parti
communiste chinois qui proposait de cesser la polémique et de fixer une r'eunion
bilatérale, accusait réception de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois datée du
14 juin. Le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique déclarait cependant:

"Cette lettre donne une interprétation arbitraire des déclarations
faites aux conférences de Moscou des partis marxistes-léninistes,
déforme les thèses principales de ces documents historiques, et
contient des attaques injustifiées contre le Parti communiste de
l'Union soviétique et d'autres partis fraternels. Tout cela est
profondément regrettable.

"Le Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique es-
time que publier à présent dans la presse soviétique une lettre
du Parti central du Parti communiste chinois datée du 14 juin 1963
exigerait qu'il soit répondu publiquement ce qui entraînerait une
aggravation de la politique, ne serait pas dans l'esprit de l'accord
obtenu, et irait à l'encontre de l'opinion de partis fraternels sur
cette question. Cela devrait être fait d'autant moins que les repré-
sentants du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique et du Parti commu-
niste chinois doivent se réunir le 5 juillet de cette année."

18-21 juin: Bien qu'un "plénum idéologique" important du Comité central du Parti
communiste de l'Union soviétique ait été prévu pour discuter des problèmes in-
ternationaux, la plupart des orateurs d'une réunion privée ainsi que la résolu-
tion

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et en rejetant comme étant non fondées et calomnieuses les attaques chinoises contre la politique soviétique. La résolution a approuvé Khrouchtchev d'avoir "continué à relier les forces du mouvement communiste mondial," et elle a approuvé "les actions et les mesures concrètes" prises à l'égard des relations entre l'U.R.S.S. et Pékin. La résolution sur la Chine et la nomination de Brezhnev et de Podgorny au Secrétariat sont considérées en général comme étant une preuve de soutien accordée à sa politique étrangère aussi bien que de sa politique intérieure.

19 juin et les jours suivants: Une visite dans le Vietnam du Nord par une délégation de l'Assemblée populaire suprême de la Corée du Nord, sous la direction du vice-président Phak Kum-chol, sert à propager la ligne nord-koréenne d'orientation chinoise, à l'aide d'attaques répétées contre le révisionnisme moderne exprimées dans un éditorial du "Nodong Sinmun" paru le 19, et dans les discours que Phak fit à Hanoi. L'hôte de Phak, Truong Chinh, (président du Comité permanent de l'Assemblée nationale de la République démocratique du Vietnam) approuva en termes mesurés dans son discours de réception du 20: "De concert avec les partis fraternels, nous défendons résolument la pureté du marxisme-léninisme, nous nous opposons au révisionnisme et au dogmatisme ainsi qu'à d'autres tendances erronées, le révisionnisme en particulier." L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a également communiqué le 19 que les derniers numéros des publications vietnamiennes, le "Hoc Tap", journal théorique du parti et le "Tien Phong", journal du syndicat professionnel de la jeunesse, se sont également attaqués à la Yougoslavie et à sa nouvelle constitution.

19 juin: L'Agence yougoslave "Tanyug" parle d'un article paru à Belgrade dans le "Komunist", qui répond aux attaques des communistes chinois contre le parti yougoslave à la suite de son cinquième plénum. De savoir quel était le but des attaques chinoises, le "Komunist" déclare: "Ce sont en effet des efforts pour imposer leurs propres vues sur le mouvement travailliste international, sous prétexte de protéger le marxisme-léninisme et de prendre un rôle d'arbitre au sujet de la politique de tous les pays et de tous les partis socialistes. Les dirigeants chinois ne font qu'aggraver ainsi le dilemme véritable qui se pose au mouvement travailliste international - le besoin de décider entre un dogmatisme aveugle et une politique aventurière arbitraire, et la lutte active et persistante pour la paix et le socialisme basée sur une application créatrice du marxisme, politique qui jaillit d'un sens véritable des responsabilités pour l'avenir du monde dans lequel nous vivons."

20 juin: Des communiqués de Moscou font savoir que l'ambassade de la Chine communiste, en dépit du désir exprimé par les Soviets, distribuait des copies "d'une lettre de 67 pages adressée par le Parti communiste chinois" aux organisations soviétiques, aux journaux et aux correspondants étrangers dont ceux des partis communistes. Les journalistes occidentaux qui d'habitude éprouvent des difficultés de dépasser la porte d'entrée de l'ambassade chinoise furent reçus cordialement et obtinrent autant de copies de la lettre qu'ils en désiraient, rapporte la United Press International.

20 juin: La radio de la Australian Overseas Service annonce que le Parti communiste australien s'est trouvé divisé sur la question du différend idéologique entre le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique et le Parti communiste chinois. Ces radios citent l'hebdomadaire du Particommuniste australien, le "Guardian", qui annonce que cinq membres du comité exécutif central du parti dans l'Etat Victoria ont été relevés de leurs fonctions pour raison de "fractionnalisme, enfreinte à la constitution du Parti et opposition au centralisme démocratique." Le speaker de Radio Australia a déclaré que tous les membres relevés de leurs fonctions avaient fait preuve d'un manque de loyauté. Le 20 juin, un membre du Comité central de l'Etat de Victoria a donné sa démission au parti après en

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21 juin: L'A.D.N., agence de presse de l'Allemagne Orientale, annonce que le premier adjoint du ministre des affaires étrangères Winzer a protesté auprès de l'ambassadeur chinois contre la dissémination d'imprimés pratiqués par les Chinois en dépit des instructions et des règlements en vigueur. L'A.D.N. ajoute: "Il est regrettable que l'ambassade de la République populaire de la Chine dans la République démocratique allemande ait, en ce faisant, agi contre le désir des partis marxistes-léninistes de faire cesser les disputes en public entre les partis fraternels et de faire régler les différences d'opinion au moyen de négociations."

21 juin: Le "Quotidien du peuple" de Pékin a publié un commentaire sur "la grande conspiration de John F. Kennedy", dans lequel il déclare que le discours du président fait le 10 juin à l'American University était "une manoeuvre habile et mal-faisante dans sa stratégie de paix, tendant à influencer les résultats des débats soviétiques prochains et 'à diviser le bloc rouge'." "En leur qualité de détachement spécial de l'impérialisme américain, les révisionnistes modernes yougoslaves ne peuvent contenir leur joie en présence du discours de Kennedy et en font les louanges jusqu'au ciel." "Cependant, tous ceux qui maintiennent fermement l'unité du camp socialiste et celui du mouvement international communiste ne permettront jamais à s'y laisser prendre."

23 juin: La visite prolongée du président de la Corée du Nord Choe Yong-kon en Chine (voir notre dernière Chronologie du 5 juin) a pris fin par une déclaration commune de 12 pages signées par Liu Shao-chi et Choe, qui, pour ne surprendre personne après les discours prononcés par Choe, a suivi la ligne rigide des Chinois, dénonçant le révisionnisme moderne, et déclarant qu'il était "absolument impossible de permettre une réduction unilatérale de la politique étrangère des pays socialistes à l'état d'une coexistence pacifique."

24 juin: Les éditoriaux de "Pravda" et d'"Izvestiya" passent en revue le travail du Comité central du plénum et reproduisent les termes de la résolution de ce plénum qui "rejeta catégoriquement" comme calomnieuses et non fondées les attaques du Comité central du Parti communiste chinois dirigées contre notre parti et d'autres partis communistes; cette résolution autorisa également la délégation pour les entretiens de juillet de suivre la politique de Khrouchtchev "sans dévier". Dans sa dépêche de Moscou, le correspondant du "New York Times" Topping ajoute que les officiels soviétiques qui, s'ils ne s'attendaient pas à ce que les entretiens de juillet aboutissent à une réconciliation idéologique espéraient toutefois qu'un accord surviendrait limitant la dispute et maintenant une certaine façade d'unité, furent manifestement choqués par la violence de la lettre chinoise distribuée trois jours à peine avant l'ouverture du plénum.

24 juin: L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle cite "un porte paroles de l'ambassade de la République populaire chinoise auprès de la République démocratique allemande" qui s'est déclaré "profondément étonné par la déclaration de l'A.D.N. du 21 juin, attaquant l'ambassade chinoise pour avoir distribué des imprimés". Le porte paroles a déclaré que l'impression et la distribution de "ce document marxiste-léniniste important" était "pleinement justifié et en accord avec la pratique internationale," et qu'il allait "certainement aider le peuple fraternal allemand à mieux comprendre la position du parti communiste chinois ainsi que son point de vue, et qu'il contribuera de cette façon à renforcer l'unité." Après s'être plaint que l'A.D.N. "avait publié sa déclaration en hâte" même avant que l'ambassade n'ait pu communiquer avec son gouvernement, le porte paroles déclara: "une façon pareille d'agir doit être considérée comme n'étant qu'une tentative concertée à provoquer une explosion, une attaque dirigée contre le Parti communiste chinois, à séparer davantage le mouvement communiste international des partis fraternels". Il conclut en rappelant que le sixième congrès de la S.E.D.

Analyse de la lettre datée du 14 juin 1963, adressée par le Parti communiste chinois au Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique.

Après une introduction sur "le devoir est sacré" de tous les partis de maintenir et de renforcer l'unité, le message des communistes chinois déclare que dans la mesure où la lettre du Parti communiste sino-soviétique "soulève la question de la ligne générale du mouvement international communiste"... nous aussi, nous voudrions exprimer notre point de vue qui représente notre proposition concernant la ligne générale... et sur certaines questions de principe qui s'y rattachent." (La lettre du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique n'a pas "soulevé la question de la ligne générale," mais elle a qualifié les vues du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique de "ligne du mouvement communiste," dont la justesse a été entièrement confirmée par "le cours entier des événements mondiaux de ces dernières années," et elle a déclaré carrément que "nous sommes profondément convaincus qu'il n'existe aucun fondement pour examiner de nouveau cette ligne.")

La position chinoise est définie dans 25 articles numérotés (comprenant environ 18.000 mots), dont les premiers 17 reprennent les vues déjà exprimées des communistes chinois sur les questions théoriques soulevées au cours de disputes, particulièrement celles de la révolution et de la guerre. "En dernière analyse, c'est une question... d'accepter ou de ne pas accepter la vérité universelle du marxisme-léninisme, de reconnaître ou non la signification universelle de la route tracée par la révolution d'octobre, d'accepter ou de rejeter le fait que des gens qui vivent encore sous des régimes impérialistes et capitalistes et qui composent les deux tiers de la population mondiale ont besoin de faire la révolution." Les communistes chinois répondent: "La transition du capitalisme au socialisme ne peut être accomplie qu'à l'aide d'une révolution prolétarienne," et ceux qui essaient de "prédire une transition pacifique" sur la base de "parallèles absurdes" répudient le marxisme (le passage souligné dans cette phrase et ceux jusqu'à la fin de ce texte l'ont été par nous). Poursuivant dans cet état d'esprit, ils soulignèrent constamment que l'Asie, l'Afrique et l'Amérique Latine constituaient "les zones les plus vulnérables parmi celles placées sous la domination impérialiste, et déchoyaient de révolutions mondiales d'où partaient des coups directs adressés à l'impérialisme." Sur la guerre: ces "certaines personnes" qui, à l'heure actuelle, prétendent "qu'il est vraiment possible de créer un monde sans armes, sans forces armées et sans guerre au moyen d'un désarmement général et complet ne font que créer "une illusion pure et simple." "La coexistence pacifique (qui est une thèse de Lénine et non pas une grande découverte faite il y a quelques années par certaines personnes) représente un concept valide dans le cadre d'une interprétation étroite et stricte, mais on peut en faire "une ligne générale de politique étrangère pour les pays socialistes." "Si la ligne générale... se trouvait être réduite unilatéralement à une coexistence pacifique, une compétition pacifique et une transition pacifique, cela enfreindrait les principes révolutionnaires de la déclaration de 1957 et de celle de 1960, ferait abandonner la mission historique de la révolution prolétarienne mondiale, et ferait dévier des enseignements révolutionnaires du marxisme-léninisme." "Celui qui, sur les traces de certains autres, défend la ligne opportuniste et erronée ainsi que la politique poursuivie par un certain pays socialiste... s'écarte du marxisme-léninisme et de l'internationalisme prolétaire."

Avec l'article 18 débute l'attaque chinoise contre certains événements précis de la vie intérieure de l'Union soviétique et contre la conduite par les Soviets de relations avec d'autres partis fraternels et Etats, et le ton des

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chinois deviant de l'Union soviétique, adopté par le 22ème congrès du parti en 1961, comportait une nouveauté dans la déclaration suivante: "Ayant abouti à la victoire complète et finale du socialisme, première phase du communisme, et au passage de la société à la construction étendue du communisme, la dictature du prolétariat a rempli sa mission historique et a cessé d'être indispensable en Union soviétique en ce qui concerne les tâches de développement intérieur." Jusqu'à ce qu'on arrive au communisme intégral, avec la disparition des classes et l'atrophie de l'Etat, la société soviétique sera gouvernée "par un Etat du peuple tout entier" (conception mal définie et nébuleuse). Les articles 18 et 19 des Chinois exposent avec vigueur "l'annonce, à mi-chemin, que la dictature du prolétariat n'était plus nécessaire." "Là non plus il n'est pas question d'affaires internes d'un Etat particulier, mais d'un problème fondamental qui implique la vérité universelle du marxisme-léninisme." "Est-ce que cela ne désarçonne pas le prolétariat et tous les travailleurs dans leur organisation et leur idéologie, et est-ce que cela n'équivaut pas à contribuer à la restauration du capitalisme?"

Dans l'article 20, les Chinois se portent sur "la question de combattre le culte de l'individu", qu'ils qualifient "d'erronée et de malfaisante" car soulever cette question équivaut à dresser les leaders et les masses les uns contre les autres, à saper la direction unie du parti basée sur le centralisme démocratique, à dissiper sa force combative et à désintégrer ses rangs". D'autre part, "bien plus sérieux est le fait que sous prétexte de combattre le culte de l'individu certaines personnes font preuve d'ingérence sans scrupule dans les affaires intérieures des autres partis et pays fraternels, et obligent d'autres partis fraternels à changer leurs chefs afin d'imposer à ces partis leur propre ligne erronée. Qu'est-ce que tout cela représente sinon un chauvinisme, un sectarisme et un esprit de diffusion de grande puissance? Qu'est-ce que tout cela sinon de la subversion?"

Dans l'article 22, les Chinois attaquent la conduite par les Soviets de leurs relations économiques avec le camp socialiste: "La coopération économique doit être basée sur des principes d'égalité complète, d'avantages mutuels, et l'assistance mutuelle fraternelle. Ce serait du chauvinisme de grande puissance que de nier ces principes fondamentaux et, au nom de la division internationale du travail ou de la spécialisation, que d'imposer sa propre volonté aux autres, que d'empiéter sur l'indépendance et la souveraineté des pays fraternels, ou que de heurter les intérêts de leurs peuples... Il serait absurde de suivre la pratique de se ménager des avantages aux dépens des autres."

Dans l'article 22, l'attaque est transférée dans le domaine des relations politiques entre partis fraternels. Le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique devrait mettre ses actions d'accord avec les belles paroles de sa lettre du 30 mars: "On ne peut permettre qu'un parti prenne le pas sur les autres, qu'il interviene dans leurs affaires internes, et qu'il adopte une attitude patriarcale à leur égard... qu'il impose en tant que programme commun du mouvement communiste international le programme, les résolutions et la ligne de son propre parti aux autres partis fraternels. Les questions d'attitude envers "le parti fraternel marxiste-léniniste des travailleurs albanais" et "la clique révisionniste des traîtres du marxisme-léninisme yougoslave" sont "deux questions essentiellement différentes" que l'on ne doit à aucun prix "placer sur le même niveau."

"Qui est-ce qui par ses actions tend à semer le désaccord dans les relations entre Soviets et Albanais? Qui est-ce qui a introduit dans les relations d'Etat les différences idéologiques qui existent entre les partis soviétique et Albanais? Qui est-

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istent entre les de pays? Qui est ce qui a demandé ouvertement que des changements aient lieu parmi les groupes de dirigeants du parti et de l'Etat albanais? Cela est simple et clair pour le monde entier. Il est possible que les camarades dirigeants du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique ne se rendent pas compte de ce que représentent leurs responsabilités...?" "La série d'événements angoissants qui s'est produite dans le passé au sein du camp socialiste a porté préjudice non seulement aux partis fraternels intéressés, mais encore aux masses populaires de leurs pays. Cela prouve d'une manière convaincante qu'il est du devoir des pays les plus grands et de leurs partis de garder présents à l'esprit le commandement de Lénine de ne jamais commettre l'erreur de pratiquer un chauvinisme de grande puissance. Les camarades du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique déclarent dans leur lettre que le Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique n'a jamais rien entrepris et n'entreprendra jamais quoique ce soit de nature à semer l'hostilité parmi les peuples de leurs pays envers le peuple fraternel chinois et les autres peuples. Nous n'avons pas l'intention de retourner en arrière et d'énumérer le grand nombre d'événements déplaisants qui se sont produits dans le passé, et nous espérons simplement que les camarades du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique adhéreront strictement à cette déclaration dans leurs actions futures. Au cours des quelques années récentes, les membres de notre parti et notre peuple ont fait preuve de la plus grande réserve en présence d'une série d'incidents graves aux principes directeurs des relations entre partis et pays fraternels, et cela malgré les difficultés nombreuses et les pertes qui nous ont été imposées."

Dans l'article 23, se concentrant sur le problème yougoslave, les Chinois soulignent que "certaines personnes cherchent à introduire la clique révisionniste yougoslave dans la communauté socialiste," et affirment que "cela équivaut ouvertement à déchirer l'accord pris à l'unanimité au cours de la réunion de 1960... et cela il est absolument impossible de le permettre. Maintenant, "certaines personnes déclarent ouvertement que c'est le dogmatisme et non pas le révisionnisme qui constitue le danger principal ou que le dogmatisme est aussi dangereux que le révisionnisme, etc... Ils ne doivent pas marchander sur les principes... préconisant une chose aujourd'hui et une autre demain... sous le prétexte de développer le marxisme d'une façon créatrice... ils qualifient de vérité marxiste-léniniste universelle leurs propres ordonnances qui ne sont basées que sur des conjectures subjectives et qui n'ont rien à voir avec la réalité ou avec les masses, et ils obligent les autres à accepter ces ordonnances sans poser de conditions. C'est pour cette raison que bien des phénomènes graves se sont produits au sein du mouvement international communiste."

Dans un article bizarre et court, l'article 24, les Chinois comparent avec dédain l'idée qu'ils se font d'un parti révolutionnaire qui soit indépendant du marxisme-léninisme et prolétaire à ces genres de partis méprisables qui sont "le parti réformiste bourgeois..., le parti révisionniste..., et le parti qui comme un perroquet répète les mots des autres, imite tout ce qui est étranger sans chercher à l'analyser, court de tous les côtés sous la direction de certaines personnes à l'étranger, et qui est devenu une sorte de macédoine de révisionnisme, de dogmatisme et de tout ce que l'on veut à l'exception des principes marxistes-léninistes."

Enfin, dans l'article 25, les Chinois répètent avec sarcasme leur défi au Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique de prendre leur exemple et de publier les articles représentant les deux côtés de la dispute, parce que "il est du devoir des marxistes-léninistes de distinguer entre la vérité et le mensonge en ce qui concerne les différences qui se sont créées au sein du mouvement communiste international."

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7 Junio: El vicepremier yugoslavo Kardelj, en un discurso en Ljubljana informado el 8 de junio en el órgano "Politika" de Belgrado, manifestó a China que las relaciones entre los países socialistas deberían basarse en la igualdad y el respeto mutuo. "¿Qué sería de las relaciones ... si cada país socialista es capitalista, imperialista, agente del imperialismo, etc. ...? China deberá comprender que no puede subordinar a sus momentáneos intereses y ambiciones todo el socialismo internacional."

12 Junio: El órgano norcoreano "Nodong Sinmun" en un extenso y repetitivo artículo destacó la necesidad de construir "una economía que se mantenga a sí misma, bajo la bandera de la autodependencia."

15 Junio: Sinjua (la agencia noticiera china) informó que el embajador de China comunista en Moscú había entregado a Suslov, miembro del presidium del PCUS una contestación fechada el 14 de junio a la carta del PCUS del 30 de marzo al PC chino (importantísimo documento cuyo análisis ofrecemos como apéndice a esta Cronología debido a su longitud). El texto íntegro fue publicado en todos los diarios de Pekín del 17 de junio bajo el titular de "Una Propuesta concerniente a la línea general del Movimiento Comunista Internacional." Sinjua anunció el mismo día que el texto ya había sido publicado en forma de follete junto con los textos de la carta del PCUS de 29 de marzo a la cual contestaba y del intercambio anterior entre los dos, del PCUS el 21 de febrero y del PC chino el 9 de marzo.

15 Junio: El mismo día el "Diario del Pueblo" chino y el "Zeri i Popullit" albanés publicaron fuertes ataques contra Tito y los revisionistas yugoslavos. El artículo chino, relativamente breve, acusando a los partidarios de Tito de "tratar de insinuarse en las filas del movimiento comunista internacional para llevar a cabo sabotaje sin escrúpulo," se distingue solo por los improprios que contiene: "Los ataques y calumnias del grupo de Tito no son novedad; son mera saliva recogida de los escupidores de los imperialistas y otros revisionistas." El artículo albanés, por otra parte, recoge la implicación que subrayamos sobre colusión soviética y la pone en tantas palabras. Tito, manifiesta, "expuso sus opiniones idénticas [de Tito y Krushev], profundamente antimarxistas y antirrevolucionarias, sobre cuestiones de guerra y paz, coexistencia pacífica, las vías y formas de la transición al socialismo, etc. Lo que es característico es que al tratar todas estas cuestiones Tito empleó el lenguaje de N. Krushev." Y más adelante:

"El renegado Tito en una sarta de calumnias, especialmente contra el PC de China, ha calificado la firme lucha de principio que mantiene el PC de China en defensa de la pureza del marxismo-leninismo y en contra de la opinión contrarrevolucionaria y los ataques hostiles de los revisionistas modernos, como 'lucha por la hegemonía,' precisamente como el mismo N. Krushev pretendió calificarla. Está claro que T., como K., juzga a los demás desde su ángulo chovinista. Como son ellos precisamente los que reclaman para sí el monopolio del 'desarrollo creador del marxismo' -- todos los demás tienen que marchar al mismo compás -- no se han abstenido de nada para imponer sus propias opiniones: de complots -- hasta organizando contrar revoluciones como en Hungría -- de la liquidación de cuadros dirigentes en los partidos fraternos que se oponen a su

actuación revisionista, despachando para sus fines enviados especiales que convengan a los círculos dirigentes de dichos partidos fraternos -- ni aun de presiones económicas y militares y el empleo de la lisonja y los medios de corrupción."

Y más adelante, esta denuncia quejumbrosa: "Los revisionistas modernos manipulan a Lenin cínicamente y lo deforman desvergonzadamente."

17-20 Junio: El 17, el diario "Revolución" de la Habana (órgano oficial que fue del Movimiento 26 de Julio de Castro, y considerado aun como reflejo de la opinión personal de Fidel) publicó a cinco columnas un despacho de Prensa Latina desde Pekín describiendo la carta del PC chino. El diario "Hoy" (designado recientemente órgano oficial del Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista así como del PC), publicó el 18 un artículo, atribuido a Sinjua, Pekín. Este reportaje, sin embargo, astutamente evadió la descripción de las amargas polémicas: anotando, por ejemplo, cada una de las 25 secciones pero solo con una oración o frase a estilo de titular denotando el "problema" discutido, como "11 - La transición del capitalismo al socialismo." Los artículos cubanos fueron publicados antes de haber el PCUS emitido su declaración (véase a continuación) vetando toda publicidad para la carta del PC chino, pero el día 20 el órgano del PC rumano "Scinteia" publicó un informe casi idéntico al cubano, atribuido a la agencia rumana Agerpress desde Pekín.

18 Junio: TASS emitió una declaración que después de recordar los anteriores intercambios entre el PCUS y el PC chino proponiendo la suspensión de las polémicas y la celebración de una reunión bilateral, acusó recibo de la carta del PC chino de fecha de 14 de junio. Sin embargo, el PCUS declaró:

"Esta carta da una arbitraria interpretación a las dos declaraciones de las conferencias en Moscú de Partidos marxistas-leninistas, deforma las tesis principales de dichos históricos documentos y contiene injustificados ataques contra el PCUS y otros Partidos fraternos. Todo esto ocasiona gran pesar.

"El CC del PCUS estima que la publicación en la prensa soviética actualmente de la carta del CC del PC chino de 14 de junio de 1963 demandaría una respuesta pública que conduciría a una mayor agravación de la polémicas, no concordaría con el acuerdo a que se ha llegado y sería contraria al parecer de los Partidos fraternos sobre esta cuestión. Esto no deberá hacerse, más aun en vista de la próxima reunión entre representantes del PCUS y el PC chino el 5 de julio de este año."

18-21 Junio: Aunque el "pleno ideológico" ampliado del CC del PCUS había sido para discutir problemas internos, la mayoría de los oradores en las sesiones secretas y la resolución final reaccionaron ante el ataque chino apoyando la línea de Krushev y rechazando como "sin fundamento y calumniosos" los ataques chinos contra la política soviética. La resolución aprobó la actuación de Krushev al "reunir más estrechamente las fuerzas del movimiento comunista mundial" y se suscribió a las "medidas y acciones concretas" llevadas a cabo en las relaciones de la URSS con Pekín. La resolución sobre China y el nombramiento de Brezhnev y Podgorny al secretariado fueron generalmente considerados como indicio de acrecido apoyo para Krushev en sus actuaciones en materia internacio-

19 Junio y sig.: La visita a Vietnam del Norte de una delegación de la Asamblea Suprema del Pueblo de Corea del Norte, encabezada por el vicepresidente Phak Kum-chol, está siendo utilizada para propagar la línea norcoreana pro China, con repetidos ataques contra el revisionismo moderno en un editorial de "Nodong Sinmun" del 19 y en los discursos de Phak en Hanoi. El anfitrión de Phak, Truong Chinh (presidente de la comisión permanente de la Asamblea Nacional de la República Democrática de Vietnam), en su discurso de recepción el día 20 expresó su acuerdo restringido: "Junto a los Partidos fraternos, resueltamente defendemos la pureza del marxismo-leninismo, nos oponemos al revisionismo y el dogmatismo y otras malas tendencias, especialmente el revisionismo." El 19, Sinjua también informó que los últimos números de dos órganos de Vietnam del Norte, la revista teórica del Partido, "Hoc Tap," y el órgano "Tien Phong" de la Unión Juvenil Obrera, habían publicado ataques contra Yugoslavia y su nueva constitución.

19 Junio: La agencia yugoslava Tanyug informó sobre un artículo en el órgano "Komunist" de Belgrado respondiendo a los ataques del PC chino contra el Partido yugoslavo a raíz de su Quinto Pleno. En contestación a la pregunta sobre el propósito directo de los ataques chinos, "Komunist" expresó: "Son de hecho esfuerzos por imponer sus propias opiniones en el movimiento sindical internacional so pretexto de proteger el marxismo-leninismo y tomar el papel de árbitro de la política de todos los países y partidos socialistas. De esa manera los líderes chinos solamente agravan el dilema mismo del movimiento sindical internacional -- la necesidad de decidir entre el dogmatismo ciego y el aventurismo arbitrario, y la activa y persistente lucha por la paz y el socialismo a base de una creadora aplicación del marxismo, política que nace de un genuino sentido de responsabilidad por la suerte del mundo en que vivimos."

20 Junio: Despachos de prensa de Moscú informaron que la embajada de China comunista, a despecho de los deseos soviéticos declarados, estaba distribuyendo ejemplares de la "carta de 67 páginas del PC chino" a organizaciones soviéticas y periódicos y corresponsales extranjeros, incluso los de países comunistas. La agencia UPI informó que a los redactores occidentales, que normalmente tienen dificultad para ir más allá del portal de entrada de la embajada china, les fueron cordialmente entregados todos los ejemplares de la carta que quisieran.

20 Junio: La Australian Overseas Service informó por radio que el PC australiano se ha dividido por las causas de la disputa ideológica del PCUS y el PC chino. Basó su información en el semanario "Guardian" del PCA, que dio a conocer el despido de cinco miembros del ejecutivo central del Partido en el Estado de Victoria por "fraccionismo, infracciones de la Constitución del Partido y rechazo del centralismo democrático." El periodista radial de Radio Australia expresó que todos los hombres mencionados han demostrado fuerte tendencia pro Pekín. Un miembro del comité central en Victoria, con historial de 22 años, se dio de baja del Partido, dando lugar a pensar que Australia puede pronto tener dos Partidos comunistas.

21 Junio: La agencia ADN de Alemania oriental anunció que el primer vicescanciller Vinzer había protestado ante el embajador chino por la distribución de impresos en contravención del orden existente y las reglas legales. Añadió la ADN: "Es de sentirse que la Embajada de la RPCh en la RDA con tales pasos haya actuado contra el deseo que anima a los Partidos

marxistas-leninistas que se acaban las diferencias entre Partidos fra-
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ternos y que las divergencias de opinión sean resueltas por la negocia-
ción."

21 Junio: El "diario del Pueblo" de Pekín publicó un comentario sobre "La Gran Conspiración de John F. Kennedy," interpretando el discurso del Presidente en American University el 10 de junio como "jugada astuta y maligna de su 'estrategia de paz'" con intención de influir en el resultado del debate chino-soviético y "dividir el Bloque Rojo." "Como destacamento especial del imperialismo norteamericano, los revisionistas modernos yugoslavos están fuera de sí de regocijo con el discurso de Kennedy y lo han alabado hasta los cielos." "No obstante, todos los que firmemente sustentan la unidad del campo socialista y la del movimiento comunista internacional jamás se dejarán engañar."

23 Junio: La extensa visita del Presidente Choe Yong-kon a China (véase nuestra última Cronología, 5 Junio) concluyó con una declaración conjunta de 12 páginas suscrita por Liu Shao-chi y Choe, siguiendo (para sorpresa de nadie, en vista de los discursos anteriores de Choe), la dura línea china, denunciando el revisionismo moderno y declarando que "es absolutamente impermissible reducir unilateralmente la política exterior de los países socialistas a la coexistencia pacífica."

24 Junio: "Pravda" e "Izvestiya" publicaron editoriales repasando el trabajo del pleno del CC y reiterando los términos de la resolución del mismo que "categóricamente rechazó" como "infundados y calumniosos los ataques del CC del PC chino contra nuestro Partido y otros Partidos comunistas" y autorizó a la delegación a las conversaciones de julio a seguir la política de Kruschev "invariablemente." Informando esto desde Moscú, el corresponsal Topping del "New York Times" añadió que los funcionarios soviéticos, que no habían contado con que las conversaciones de julio resultaran en reconciliación ideológica alguna pero sí que hubiera un acuerdo que limitara las dimensiones de la disputa y mantuviera alguna apariencia de unidad, dieron muestras inequívocas de sobresalto por la entrega de la ruda carta china solo tres días antes de la fecha del pleno.

24 Junio: Sinjua citó las palabras de "un portavoz de la embajada de la RPCh en la RDA" expresivas de "completo estupor por la declaración de la ADN del 21 de junio atacando a la embajada china por distribuir materia impresa." El portavoz manifestó que la impresión y distribución del "importante documento marxista-leninista" era "completamente justificada y de acuerdo con la practica internacional." e "indudablemente ayudará a incrementar la correcta comprensión por parte del fraterno pueblo alemán de la posición y opiniones del PC de China y así será beneficiosa en el fortalecimiento de la unidad." Después de quejarse de que la ADN "apresuradamente publicó la declaración" aun antes de que la embajada pudiera comunicarse con su gobierno, el portavoz declaró: "Semejante práctica solo puede considerarse como tentativa intencional de incitar a escándalo, atacar al PC de China, ensanchar las divergencias en el movimiento comunista internacional y socavar la unidad entre los Partidos fraternos." Concluyó con un recordatorio de que el VI Congreso del SED había "echado mano de tácticas no marxista-leninistas al lanzar ataques descabellados contra el PC de China."

ANÁLISIS DE LA CARTA DEL PC CHINO AL PCUS EL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1963

Después de unas palabras de introducción referentes al "deber sagrado y común" de todos los Partidos de mantener y reforzar la unidad, el mensaje del PC chino declaró que como la carta del PCUS "trae a cuento la cuestión de la línea general del movimiento comunista internacional," "nosotros también quisiéramos expresar nuestra opinión, que constituye nuestra propuesta sobre la línea general ... y sobre algunas cuestiones relacionadas de principio." (La carta del PCUS no había "traído a cuento la cuestión de la línea general," pero si había definido las opiniones del PCUS como "la línea del movimiento comunista internacional" cuya corrección ha sido completamente confirmada por "el curso entero del desarrollo mundial en años recientes," y había declarado lisa y llanamente que "estamos profundamente convencidos de que no existen fundamentos para un reexamen de dicha línea.")

La posición china está expresada en 25 secciones numeradas (unas 18.000 palabras), entre las cuales las primeras 17 recalientan opiniones chinocomunistas expresadas anteriormente sobre las cuestiones teóricas en disputa, especialmente las cuestiones de la revolución y la guerra. "En último análisis se trata de ... aceptar o no la verdad universal del marxismo-leninismo, reconocer o no la significación universal de la vía de la Revolución de Octubre, de aceptar o no el hecho de que la gente vive aún bajo el sistema imperialista y capitalista, y que comprende las dos terceras partes de la población mundial, necesita hacer la revolución." La respuesta chinocomunista: "La transición del capitalismo al socialismo se puede producir solamente (el subrayado aquí y en adelante es nuestro) por medio de la revolución proletaria," y aquello que tratan de "predecir la transición pacífica" a base de "paralelos absurdos" están repudiando el marxismo. Continuando con este tenor, repetidamente se declara que Asia, Africa y América Latina son "las zonas más vulnerables bajo el dominio imperialista y los centros de tormenta que asestan golpes directos al imperialismo." Acerca de la guerra: las "ciertas personas [que] ahora llegan a mantener que es posible producir 'un mundo sin armas, sin fuerzas armadas y sin guerras' por medio del 'desarme completo y general'" están perpetrando una "pura ilusión." La "coexistencia pacífica" ("tesis de Lenin" y no "gran descubrimiento de ciertas personas hace unos años) es un concepto válido dentro de una estrecha y estricta interpretación, pero no se puede hacer "la línea general de la política exterior de los países socialistas." "Si la línea general ... es unilateralmente reducida a la 'coexistencia pacífica', 'competencia pacífica' y 'transición pacífica,' eso es violar los principios de la declaración de 1957 y la de 1960, desechar la misión histórica de la revolución proletaria mundial y apartarse de las enseñanzas del marxismo-leninismo." "Si cualquiera, siguiendo las pisadas de otro, defiende la errónea línea oportunista y las políticas proseguidas por cierto país socialista ..., se estará apartando del marxismo-leninismo y el internacionalismo proletario."

Con la sección 18 los chinos comienzan a atacar asuntos internos soviéticos específicos y la conducta soviética en sus relaciones con estados y Partidos fraternos, haciéndose su tono más y más arrogante y ofensivo. Una característica novedosa del III Programa del PCUS, adoptada por el XXII Congreso del Partido en 1961, fue la declaración de que, "habiendo producido una victoria completa y definitiva del socialismo--- primera fase del comunismo

... en el registro del comunismo, la dictadura del proletariado ha cumplido su histórica misión y ha cesado de ser indispensable en la URSS desde el punto de vista de las tareas del desarrollo interno." Hasta la consecución del comunismo completo -- con la desaparición de las clases y el desvanecimiento del estado -- la sociedad será gobernada por un "estado del pueblo entero" (concepto mal definido y nebuloso). En las secciones 18 y 19 los chinos denuncian fuertemente "el anuncio, a medio camino, que ya no es necesaria la dictadura del proletariado." "Esto también no es cuestión de los asuntos internos de un Partido determinado sino un problema fundamental que envuelve la verdad universal del marxismo-leninismo." ¿No desarma esto al proletariado y a todo el pueblo trabajador, organizativa e ideológicamente, y no equivale a coadyuvar a restaurar el capitalismo?"

En la sección 20 los chinos se dirigen a "la cuestión de 'combatir el culto al individuo'" que ellos denuncian como "errónea y nociva," ya que traer al tapete esta cuestión "es realmente contraponer los líderes a las masas, minar el liderato unificado del Partido que se basa en el centralismo democrático, disipar su fuerza combativa y desintegrar sus filas." Además, "lo que es más grave es que so pretexto de 'combatir el culto al individuo,' ciertas personas están burdamente interviniendo en los asuntos internos de otros Partidos fraternos y países fraternos y forzando a otros Partidos fraternos a cambiar su liderato para imponer su propia línea errada a dichos Partidos. ¿Qué es todo esto si no escisionismo, sectarismo y chovinismo a estilo de gran potencia? ¿Qué es todo si no subversión?"

En la sección 22 los chinos atacan la conducta soviética en sus relaciones económicas con el campo socialista: "La cooperación económica deberá basarse en los principios de igualdad completa, beneficio mutuo, y asistencia mutua en compañerismo. Sería chovinismo propio de gran potencia negar dichos principios básicos y, a nombre de la 'división internacional del trabajo' o 'especialización,' imponer la voluntad propia sobre otros, conculcar la independencia y soberanía de países fraternos o perjudicar los intereses de sus pueblos. ... Sería descabellado seguir la práctica de sacar partido para sí mismo a expensas de otros."

En la sección 22 el ataque vira hacia el campo de las relaciones políticas entre los Partidos fraternos. El PCUS debería emparejar sus hechos con las buenas razones de su carta del 30 de marzo: "Es impermisible que ningún Partido se coloque por encima de otros, intervenga en sus asuntos internos y adopte modales patriarcales en sus relaciones con ellos, ... [y es impermisible] imponer el programa, las resoluciones y la línea del propio Partido sobre otros Partidos fraternos como 'el programa común del movimiento comunista internacional.'" La manera de tratar al "fraternal Partido marxista-leninista de los Trabajadores Albaneses" y la de tratar la camarilla revisionista yugoslava de traidores al marxismo-leninismo" son dos "asuntos esencialmente diferentes" y "de ninguna manera deberán ser puestos a la par."

"¿Quién es el que ha realizado actos de escisionismo en las relaciones entre soviéticos y albaneses? ¿Quién es el que ha extendido las divergencias ideológicas entre los Partidos soviético y albanés al terreno de las relaciones entre estados? ¿Quién es el que ha puesto las divergencias entre ambos países al descubierto ante el enemigo? ¿Quién es el que ha demandado abiertamente un cambio en el liderato del Partido?"

entero. ¿Será posible que los camaradas dirigentes del PCUS realmente no recuerdan su responsabilidad...?

"La serie de acontecimientos apenantes que han tenido lugar en el campo socialista en el pasado período ha perjudicado los intereses no solo de los Partidos fraternos en cuestión sino también las masas populares en sus países. Esto comprueba convincentemente que los mayores países y Partidos necesitan tener en mente el encargo de Lenin de nunca cometer el error chovinismo propio de gran potencia. Los camaradas del PCUS manifiestan en su carta que 'el PCUS jamás ha dado ni dará ni un solo paso que siembre la hostilidad entre los pueblos de nuestro país hacia el fraterno pueblo chino u otros pueblos.' No deseamos aquí volver atrás y enumerar los muchos acontecimientos desagradables que han ocurrido en el pasado, y solo deseamos que los camaradas del PCUS se ajusten estrictamente a dicha declaración en sus actuaciones futuras. En los últimos años, los miembros de nuestro Partido y nuestro pueblo han ejercido el mayor dominio de sí mismos ante una serie de graves incidentes violatorios de los principios que guían las relaciones entre países y Partidos fraternos, no obstante las muchas dificultades y pérdidas que nos han sido impuestas."

Concentrando en la sección 23 en el problema yugoslavo, los chinos apuntan que "ciertas personas están tratando de introducir a la camarilla revisionista yugoslava en la comunidad socialista," y afirman que "esto es destrozarse abiertamente el acuerdo adoptado unánimemente en la reunión de 1960 ... y es absolutamente impermisible." Ahora "ciertas personas están declarando abiertamente que el dogmatismo y no el revisionismo es el mayor peligro, o que el dogmatismo no es menos peligroso que el revisionismo, etc. ... No deberán cambalachear los principios ... abogando hoy por una cosa y mañana por otra... So pretexto de 'desarrollar el marxismo creativamente' ... describen como 'verdades marxistas-leninistas universales' sus propios preceptos basados unicamente en la conjetura subjetiva y divorciados de la realidad y de las masas, y obligan a otros a aceptar dichos preceptos incondicionalmente. Por eso es que muchos fenómenos graves se han producido en el movimiento comunista internacional."

En la breve y extraña sección 24 los chinos desdofiosamente contrastan a su ideal de un Partido revolucionario proletario marxista-leninista confiado en sí mismo tipos despreciables tales como un "partido burgués reformista," un "partido revisionista" y "un partido que parlotea como el loro las palabras de otro, copia la experiencia extranjera sin analizarla, corre de un lado a otro obedeciendo a la batuta de ciertas personas en el extranjero y se ha convertido en una mescolanza de revisionismo, dogmatismo y de todo menos los principios del marxismo-leninismo."

Finalmente, en la sección 25 los chinos repiten con chufletas sus retos al PCUS a seguir su ejemplo y publicar los artículos de ambos lados de la disputa, porque "es deber de los marxistas-leninistas distinguir entre la verdad y la falsedad con respecto a las divergencias surgidas en el seno del movimiento comunista internacional

BACKGROUND:

The Supreme Test of the Cold War. It is safe to predict that the Cold War -- i.e. the free world's continuous effort to reduce Communist expansion, subversion and aggression at least to a "safe" level where it no longer involves the threat of general war, if only by miscalculation -- will last quite a few more years and will require, for its successful conclusion, continued maximum exertions by all free nations. Even if its course does not lead to actual nuclear conflict, there is a pressing need to overcome a succession of political and socio-economic crises, local and regional insurrections, and diplomatic, propagandistic and mass-organizational pressures by the World Communist Movement. For this purpose, Cold War allies will continue to require the very highest degree of loyalty, moral fiber, endurance and far-sightedness among all free people: if nuclear war should be added to all Cold War strains and stresses, these demands will be obviously still far higher, if the free world is to win the war and rebuild its civilization afterwards. Consequently, the free world's efforts through the years ahead must be spearheaded by those nations which offer mankind the best possible hope for passing this supreme test: nobody can predict the future with a high degree of certainty, but we can unquestionably derive important lessons from the past performances and the present conditions of the nations involved.

Criteria of Stability and National Cohesion. The following factors are essential in evaluating a nation's ability to pass the above described tests:

1. Constitutional Continuity. The better a nation has succeeded in adapting its institutions and government policies to internal and external changes without a violent break of constitutional order, the more probable that it will master future crises, too, and that its citizenry will remain loyal. All other circumstances being equal, a constitution which has functioned for several generations will command far higher and more reliable allegiance than a regime set up relatively recently after one or more violent and/or fundamental changes in the constitutional order.

2. Military Record. A nation's role in past wars not only success in war but also ability to maintain the integrity and loyalty of its forces and

population in war emergencies --, while no automatic guarantee of future victories (the character of enemies, as well as its own warlike qualities may change quickly), is as significant as its continued maintenance of both nuclear and conventional armaments and present psychological preparedness for all types of military conflicts.

3. National Cohesion Vs. Internal Subversion.

No nation is today entirely immune to possible subversion since the Communist Bloc will stimulate subversion even in countries where it does not arise spontaneously. However, there is a fundamental difference between small-scale, isolated subversive efforts which can be controlled by the country's security services and large-scale subversion, bolstered by tangible popular sympathies, which seriously threatens the nation's fabric in peace or in war. The seriousness of subversion in any given country can be measured not so much in absolute terms, but in comparison with the cohesion loyalty and the constructive, patriotic socio-political efforts of the majority of the population. (Subversion, in this context, denotes not only Communists, but includes also any other elements endangering the stability of a nation, whether Fascists, separatists or the like.)

4. Flexibility and Adaptation to Internal and External Changes. The manner in which a nation has dealt with major changes in its domestic situation or in its international relations, the relative ease of transition to new positions and the acceptance of necessary changes by population and government, are also highly indicative of a nation's ability to pass new tests. Such shifts may include transition from rural to urban economy and society, technological revolutions (e.g. automation), immigration and emigration, minority problems, relations between motherland and colonies, and so forth.

(The following paragraphs apply the foregoing criteria to the principal nations of the free world.)

United States. Has maintained the same constitutional system since 1789, adjusted to changing conditions by amendments: even the Civil War, 1861 -- 1865, did not break the continuity of the constitution or of the institutions based on it. The US has won all wars in which she became involved: her participation in World Wars One and Two was decisive for the outcome of these global conflicts. Neither Nazis nor Communists gained dangerously strong influence. Whatever sympathies local Nazi groups may have enjoyed among the millions of German-Americans evaporated quickly when Hitler declared war on the US.

unions and certain intellectual circles was reduced, largely through the initiative of the groups concerned (e.g. CIO's investigation and subsequent expulsion of Communist-controlled unions), below the danger point. US settled relations with her former possessions amicably, granting independence to the Philippines, raising Hawaii and Alaska to statehood and establishing the commonwealth of Puerto Rico according to the vote of its population.

Britain. Has continued her unwritten constitution without break, adapting to changing conditions -- for instance, by reducing the role of the House of Lords and increasingly shifting towards a "welfare state." Britain participated in winning World War One and Two -- though she could not have won either war without massive US intervention. Her latest military venture, Suez 1956, was a failure. Fascist and Communist groups are small, though defeatist trends -- "unilateral disarmament" -- have spread far beyond the insignificant CP. Britain has divested herself of her once farflung empire with only relatively minor conflicts and maintains, on the whole, close relations with most of her former colonies -- many of which are now voluntary members of the British Commonwealth. On the whole, Britain has adjusted to her reduced world position in good grace and has taken realistic measures to rearrange her diplomacy, defense and economy accordingly.

France. Has experienced four violent breaks in her constitutional order within the last 100 years: the end of the 2nd empire and the establishment of the 3rd republic in the wake of her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, 1870/71; the 3rd republic was replaced by the Pétain regime as a result of France's defeat in the first year of World War Two, 1940; the Pétain regime (Vichy) was followed by the 4th republic at the end of World War Two; the 4th republic was overthrown by the present de Gaulle regime in 1958.

France lost the war with Germany, 1870/71; fought on the winning side -- bearing the main burden among the Western powers -- in World War One (even though her armies were severely shaken by the great mutiny of April, 1917); her forces collapsed after a few weeks of fighting in the first stage of World War Two, a crushing defeat repaired only by US intervention later in the war; lost the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria and the intervention against Suez (jointly with Britain and Israel), 1956.

The French CP, though radically reduced in her parliamentary representation through de Gaulle's sweeping electoral reforms, still polls more than one fifth of the popular vote and controls the strongest labor union federation. Right-wing extremists, too, have played significant roles in recent years, from the Cagoulauds of 1934 through the groups which collaborated with the Nazis during World War Two to the "Secret Army" in

France lost her richest colonies, Indochina and Algeria, after costly and protracted wars, leaving especially in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) many critical, unsolved problems. Settlement with most of her other colonies in Africa was amicable and France retained considerable influence there. (France still owns some minor overseas territories, such as Martinique and French Guiana in the Caribbean and New Caledonia in the Pacific.

While France has recovered remarkably well from the destruction suffered in World War Two and from the loss of her colonies, any realistic adjustment to her changed (i.e. reduced) role in world affairs is still impeded by strong and emotional wishful thinking about her past grandeur -- delusions by no means limited to de Gaulle and his close associates.

Germany. Her constitutional regime was changed violently four times in the last 100 years: 1871, the Second Empire was established by Bismarck as result of the victory over France; 1918, the Kaiser was replaced by the Weimar Republic in the wake of the defeat in World War One; 1933, Hitler seized power; following military occupation in 1945, after Germany's defeat in World War Two (during which the Allied Powers established a 4-Zone regime over all of Germany), two separate governments were established in West and East Germany in 1949.

Germany was the principal loser in both World Wars. Her split into a Communist and a free part (likely to last until the Soviet Union should retreat) provides an element of basic instability. In West Germany, the CP is outlawed and was numerically weak even while legal; but West Germany is a prime target of Soviet (and East German) subversion efforts. Right-wing extremism hardly appears on the West German political scene today -- but this may be temporary and due to the present prosperity and to the moral condemnation of Nazi crimes rather than to a genuine disappearance of anti-democratic tendencies.

Other Nations. The free world includes many other countries besides those discussed above, including big and important nations such as India, Japan, Italy, Argentina, and so forth. None of these is a real candidate for leadership in the Cold War since all are lacking either the military or industrial potential, or occupy too peripheral a position in the community of the free world -- quite apart from any shortcomings in their constitutional stability. The general criteria outlined above, however, apply to any nation, large or small.

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674-12, WE, a, d. CEMA Reveals Economic Difficulties of
25X1C10b Soviet Bloc



BACKGROUND:

CEMA's Failure to Progress. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is the economic planning and trading organization of the USSR and the East European satellites. CEMA was founded in 1949, partly as an answer to the American Marshall Plan, and partly as a move to discourage other satellites from following the example of Yugoslavian heresy. Economically, it was intended to coordinate the plans and economies of the bloc countries and to direct the satellite economies into specialized types of production. Such specialization would be much more rational economically than the prevalent attempts to make each country self-sufficient, but specialization was apparently also designed to make the satellites obedient and subservient; with thorough specialization, it would become impossible for these countries to imitate Tito.

But it was easier to establish the CEMA organization than to bring the coordination and specialization program into effect, and in fact almost nothing happened. Following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956, which revealed the persistence of nationalist feelings in the satellites, and following the related failure of the over-ambitious five year plans of that period, the Kremlin decided to make a new, second effort to turn the bloc into a closely knit economic group. In succeeding years CEMA planned inter-satellite electricity networks and pipelines and work was begun on them. But progress in trade volume was still slight, in embarrassing contrast to the success of the West European Common Market, while specialization was virtually non-existent.

Therefore in June 1962, the Soviets began a third campaign to get CEMA off the ground. Judging by some of Khrushchev's remarks, he may have been anxious to enable CEMA to trade on equal terms with the Common Market and the capitalist world generally; his interest in East-West trade has often been shown, as in the recent reception accorded to the manager of Krupp's of Essen, Berthold Beitz. At all events the party secretaries assembled in Moscow, a document entitled "Basic Principles of International Socialist Division of Labor" was issued, the Communist press circulated a long article by Khrushchev, and the construction of a new CEMA headquarters building began in a Moscow suburb. The CEMA Executive Committee, whose members are all deputy premiers in their countries, now meets every two months, and CEMA's bureaucracy, including a permanent secretariat and an increasing number of permanent commissions, has expanded rapidly. At the Executive Committee's December 1962 meeting, the non-Soviet members agreed to establish a joint pool of freight cars. Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5
pool arrangement.

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Nevertheless, CEMA is failing to accomplish its goals. The most notable sign of its built-in difficulties has been the resistance of Rumania to a central planning system, expressed at many committee meetings, and especially at the April Executive Committee meeting in Moscow (Economist Foreign Report, 2 May 1963; London Times, 9 May 1963). The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian press has also made implicit criticisms of CEMA's plans to dismantle factories in certain satellites and transfer them elsewhere. While the Czech radio denied on 29 March that Czech plants were as yet being dismantled and moved, it admitted that they would be moved in the future, and a part of the Hungarian radio industry was packed up and shipped to Bulgaria; later, the Hungarians refused to buy Bulgarian radios.

All the smaller CEMA states have some doubts about specialization, and Rumania, more vocal than the others, is said to be especially aroused over the opposition of the CEMA planners to a large-scale expansion of the Rumanian steel industry. (On Rumania, see also Guidance #657a, 6 May 1963.) With the USSR beginning preparations for its next five year plan, and with the satellites exposed to the rival attractions of Peking, the West, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets badly need to get CEMA into operation. Yet they face two tremendous problems: Economic nationalism and the lack of economic prices.

Economic Nationalism. The leaders of Eastern Europe are determined to make their countries technically comparable with the Soviet Union and with Western European nations. It was probably this goal that led many of these men to become Communists, and in their party training, often in the USSR, they absorbed Soviet lore on giant dams and steel mills. In the postwar years, even while Soviet troops were removing equipment to rebuild the USSR, and even while Stalin was using so-called "joint stock companies" to operate choice satellite industries for Soviet profit, local Communists were planning and starting to implement grandiose plans for miniature Soviet Unions, complete with steel mills, tractor plants, and all the other typically Soviet industries. Stalin, who was much more a Machiavellian politician than an economist, seems to have feared that if the satellites specialized, they would tend to cooperate with each other, perhaps eventually forming a political union against the USSR. On the other hand, he did not take them seriously as individual countries, and he calculated that with each satellite a weak, non-specialized economy, they would compete with each other for Soviet favor; Moscow would hold the reins.

But economically, and especially from the standpoint of Soviet economic interests, this multiplication of small, all-around economies made little sense. More than half the ore needed by satellite steel plants is imported from the USSR, and substantial amounts of other raw materials are drawn from the same source. Not only are these materials diverted from Soviet use, but the overburdened Soviet and satellite transport facilities must haul them over long distances. From being

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 ers of 1954, the industrializing and collectivizing satellites have changed into importers, and they draw on the none-too-ample food supplies of the Soviet Union. Although most of the relief for Poland and Hungary after the 1956 uprisings was squeezed out of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have discovered on that and other occasions that satellite economic difficulties may entail Soviet economic contributions.

The predominately Soviet officials in CEMA have logic on their side in demanding that Rumania abandon her Stalinesque plans and concentrate on oil and grain production. But for Rumanians, industrialization is all-important, an expression of inherited nationalism and, at the same time, the only way of emerging from Balkan backwardness. The choice between economic nationalism and specialization is ultimately a choice between political independence and lasting vassal status. Other CEMA members are less defiant at the moment, but they too are likely to resist any sacrifice of their "national sovereignty." Most Communists are also nationalists, and if forced to choose between national interests and loyalty to Khrushchev -- who in any case is no longer an unquestioned authority -- many will follow the line of national interests.

The Lack of Economic Prices. The question of economic nationalism would be much less acute if the bloc had a normal market economy. Among western countries, industries are usually located in the most economic places. Steel plants, for example, have usually been placed where coking coal and iron ore were readily available, since steel plants in other locations will have higher costs and make less profit. One reason why Switzerland and Sweden prosper is that, instead of running large-scale, unprofitable steel complexes, they concentrate on the products (such as cutlery and watches) they are best able to make and sell. But (paradoxically for economic materialists) the economic policies of Communist countries are settled on political, not economic grounds, and these policies are influenced by quasi-aesthetic factors, such as reverence for tall smokestacks and massive masonry walls. Economic activities are pursued by plan -- that is, by order -- and supply and demand are deliberately ignored; according to Marx, economic values are based on labor cost, and not on supply and demand. Therefore prices in each Communist country are established by the state, allegedly on a cost basis, actually with the intention of favoring plan execution, but in any case arbitrarily.

This means that prices reflect the whims of the administrator, that they constitute no reliable index to the scarcity of delivery cost of a commodity, and that they provide no true reflection of the costs of capital depreciation and stockpiling. Factories have been built in Siberia which received their materials from and delivered their products to the Ukraine; managers amass vast stores of unused machines and equipment against the possibility of shortages; and machines once produced have sometimes proved unneeded or unsuitable, and have been left to rust in the open. Not only is there no price indicator of demand and overhead costs, but the absence of a market makes

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 cause of hoarding and waste. Lip service is rendered to "accountability," but in the last analysis, production and use are determined by order.

Price problems become more acute in Soviet foreign trade, and most acute of all in trade with other bloc countries. All Soviet foreign trade is conducted by corporations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In trading with capitalist countries, the planners first decide what imports are needed and what exports may be disposed of, and then the Ministry strikes the best bargain it can; often the transaction amounts to a quantitative barter. The Soviet domestic cost plays no role in deciding the amount to be traded, and indeed the arbitrary Soviet prices, insulated from the influence of world markets, would be practically useless for making such a decision.

As to Soviet trade with other bloc countries, these countries have price structures which are like the Soviet structure in being arbitrary, but which differ from the Soviet structure in all their particular prices, being the product of different sets of planners working with different economies. Between these economies and the Soviet economy, there is no objective standard of cost, and in order to find such a standard, the bloc countries have had to use world market prices as a point of departure in their negotiations with each other. At present, 1957-58 world prices are used, and beginning in 1964, these will be replaced by a new average world price, based on the five year period 1957-61. This should be an improvement, but obviously the standard is somewhat out of date.


At all events, even with such a capitalist yardstick, CEMA trade is a two-way barter, based on the particular quantity of goods needed for each country's plan. Foreign exchange (i.e., funds available for use in any foreign free market) plays virtually no role in intra-bloc trade. Without foreign exchange, barter is necessary, and simultaneous multilateral barter is difficult to work out. Various expedients have been tried, but the right to obtain as-yet-unspecified goods at an unspecified future date (essential if trade is not arranged in a single quid pro quo agreement) is hard to reconcile with a planned, controlled economy. Some third or fourth country might suddenly appear and demand goods earmarked for domestic purposes.

In short, the bloc is unwilling to adopt a real market economy, with real money which can be spent as the owner of the money wishes. Adoption of a market economy would of course mean abandoning a major part of Communism. But without markets, trade relations remain primitive and cumbersome. One result of the no-market, play-money system is that, for the most part, the bloc countries do not know what commodities are in short supply. Another result is that it is difficult for them to tell who produces a given commodity most cheaply. Most important of all (and most characteristic of Communism), trade tends to become a contest of political power and cunning.

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The borrowed yardstick of world prices serves as a point of departure for this contest, but the final terms must be hammered out in diplomatic-type negotiations. It is no wonder that departures from the yardstick usually favor the politically and economically superior country, the USSR. A survey of 1960 statistics has shown that, in that year, the Soviets overcharged their partners (relative to western prices) in 41 cases, and undercharged them in 10. The total of overcharges was 23 times the total of undercharges. Thus, while official figures made it appear that the USSR exported more to its partners than it imported from them, this appearance was due to Soviet over-pricing, and trade in terms of western prices made the USSR a net importer, exploiting the bloc. The variation from market prices may not be due entirely to plan, but had the advantage been to the smaller countries, we may imagine that it would have been quickly corrected.

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675. Cuba's "New Look" Economy is Soviet Colonialism

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BACKGROUND: Cuba's new emphasis upon developing its sugar production constitutes a basic policy change. During the first years of Castro's regime, the objective was agricultural diversification and industrialization, intended to reduce Cuba's dependence on a single crop and to make it "economically independent." The problems this policy created have been detailed in earlier Guidance items on Cuba (see below). Cuba's sugar production has deteriorated and the leaders of the Castro regime have become more strident and critical as they exhort the Cubans to greater efforts. The decision to increase the production of sugar now emerges as part of the Communist pattern of Soviet economic control and imperialism as it limits Cuba to the role of a producer of raw materials within the Soviet realm.

Castro himself revealed the plot in his long 4 June "meet-the-press" report on his trip to the Soviet Union (see Guidance #668, "Castro's Mission to Moscow"). He said his talks about Cuba's sugar and economy were "of the highest import to Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet Government" and declared:

"For us, it means that we must seriously get to work on all this, in order to prepare the position that we are going to occupy in the world of production in which we are going to specialize. What are we going to do? We are going to build an economy based on international division of labor."

That Cuba's "specialization" would be agriculture and specifically sugar was emphasized by Cuban agricultural chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on 8 June as he urged radical improvement in sugar production which he described as the "basic factor" of the economy, and on 15 June when he told the Cubans "to produce much more sugar and also much more corn, rice, more and better tobacco, more vegetables, more products of all kinds, and more cattle. That is our duty and that is your obligation. . ."

The Communist Pattern. The Soviet Union established the basic pattern for a Communist economy, namely a totally controlled state plan centered on the development of capital goods and heavy industry. The Soviets have maintained a rigid doctrine of industrialization first, particularly vital industries, at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods industries.

But the USSR has now decided that its satellites should not follow this Communist pattern, and it assigns to other Communist states the economic role of supporting the dominant

economy of the Soviet Union. In particular, countries like Rumania, with her oil (and now Cuba, with her sugar) are to specialize on their traditional primary products. None of the satellites is to develop a balanced economy, none is to be able to provide for its own economic needs in independent trade throughout the world. This specialization is aimed generally to strengthen Soviet political control by keeping the satellites dependent on the USSR.

Aside from the general control technique, control and dependency have been developed by the Soviet Union through a variety of specific methods, such as:

1. Trade treaties -- especially supplying armaments in exchange for goods at prices favorable to the Soviet Union;
2. Binational "joint stock companies" -- which gave the Soviets control of key industries (these were largely dropped in the 1950's, but recent Soviet proposals for "joint investment" suggest that the concept is being revived and refined);
3. Loans -- which insure long-term indebtedness to the Soviets;
4. Technicians, managers, advisers, experts -- extending Soviet influence and control at key points in the planning and execution stages of every major economic enterprise.

The Soviet Union strives to control the trade of the Bloc and is the main buyer, seller, broker and clearing house. While there are signs of "independence" movements within the Bloc, these only strengthen the Soviet interest in extending its economic exploitation of new areas, for prestige as well as economic reasons. In this context, Latin America offers an appealing prize and Cuba represents the Soviet "foot in the door."

The Cuban Experience. Soviet "trade imperialism" constitutes an effort to pry developing countries loose from trade relations with the Western world and to bind them to the USSR. Latin America offers an example of how this works -- the Soviets buy surplus goods and materials without regard to the world market; then "dump" the goods on the world market at prices to suit their own propoganda purposes regardless of the economic crisis this might create.

Soviet handling of Cuba's sugar illustrates the pattern -- a long-term purchase contract at prices favorable to the USSR, a "generous" adjustment in the purchase price when the world market price goes up (but a price which at the time was only half the world price), evidence of re-selling on the open market at a profit, etc. (See Guidance #668, "Castro's Mission to Moscow," "Briefly Noted" 24 July 1963)

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 #621 WHb, "Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings.")

When Castro came to power, the United States was Cuba's most important source of capital and its chief trading partner. In 1959, the last year of normal trade, 75% was with the US -- 450 million dollars in each direction, 350 million dollars of Cuba's exports being sugar. Trade with the Soviet Union was negligible -- about 18 million dollars a year.

Using the propaganda slogan, "economic independence," Castro prepared the way for Soviet economic imperialism and colonialism. Foreign private capital was confiscated without compensation; aid from the West was refused; trade with the West was rejected as a form of "imperialist exploitation." As a substitute, he accepted Soviet offers of marvelous prospects of trade -- "generous help" as the propaganda describes it.

By 1961, Cuba's trade with the US had all but stopped while trade with the Soviets had jumped -- the dollar exchange probably was more than Soviet trade with Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria. At the same time, Cuba's trade with the Communist countries of Europe also increased -- Poland-Cuba trade tripled between 1960 and 1961.

But this did not mean that the Bloc trade compensated for Cuba's losses from severing trade with the US. Cuba-US trade was nearly in balance but there was a deficit -- a growing one -- in Cuba-Bloc trade -- 40 million dollars in 1961, 225 in 1962. Also, there was a loss of at least 100 million dollars from the transfer of sugar from the preferential US market to Communist markets which pay a lower price. This sugar loss has increased as the market price went up while the Soviets continued to pay the pegged low price and Cuba's production has decreased.

In addition, more than 76% of Cuba's export income is only a credit on the books of the central banks of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. This means that Cuba must accept the products the Bloc countries offer in trade without regard to normal price and quality considerations. Cuba's economy must be geared to the Bloc in order to utilize the Bloc's exports. Realistic economic considerations are minimized; political considerations are emphasized. As Cuba's Minister of Industries Ernesto "Che" Guevara acknowledged 6 January 1961 when discussing the Soviet purchase of Cuba's sugar, "it happened simply as a political proposal." From another aspect, there is no information to indicate the extent to which Cuba's sugar exports to the Soviet Union are considered as payment for the excessive amount of military hardware which has been sent to the island.

How have these developments affected Cuba? In explaining "the magnitude of the agreements signed in the socialist countries," Guevara declared in 1961 that Cuba would have to change -- "the socialist countries use the decimal system, we

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
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use the . . . system of pounds and so forth. The socialist countries measure electricity at 50 cycles per second, ours is 60 cycles per second. We will have to change all of this." The "change" has meant the deterioration of Cuba's economy and the Cuban's living standards. Wages have been lowered; rationing has been imposed; there are shortages of imported foodstuffs and consumer durables; raw materials, fuels and capital goods are limited; long haulage from Communist countries has increased freight charges and added drains on the limited foreign exchange; quality as well as quantity has deteriorated.

The departure of Cuba's managerial class and its trained and experienced workers has caused problems in every sector of the economy. Coupled with shortages of raw materials and spare parts, it closed plants and slowed down production. Lack of spare parts for the American machinery has led to conversion to Bloc equipment and there is evidence that this switch has been less than satisfactory (see attached unclassified press comments).

Castro's revelation that henceforth Cuba will be an agricultural specialist and a supplier of raw materials for the Soviet Union completes the colonization of Cuba and fixes its role as a satellite of the Soviet Union. The attendant propaganda promising a brighter future cannot hide the fact that the average Cuban, who had more than the average Soviet to begin with, is getting less and less.

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676 AF, FE, WH. Chinese Influence in International Communist Front Organizations
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BACKGROUND: In attempts to counter Soviet influence in Asia, Africa and to a lesser degree in Latin America, the Chicoms apparently seek to form a competing set of front organizations to the older, established international fronts. The most concrete example of this trend is the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference (AAJC) in Djakarta, Indonesia (24-30 April 1963; see [REDACTED] where the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and the Soviet delegation had only observer status. The new Afro-Asian Journalists' Organizations (AAJO) set up in Djakarta will undoubtedly be dominated by the Chicoms and enjoy the strong support of the Indonesians, who did much of the organizational work prior to and at the Conference, and did the Chinese bidding during the Conference proceedings. In line with general AAPSO policy, the Chicom representatives called for a tri-continent journalists' meeting to include Latin Americans as well as Afro-Asians.

The International Union of Students (IUS) may also have to cope with a rival organization in the Afro-Asian-Latin American area. The New Delhi daily Patriot /recently created to support Krishna MENON and thus not suspected of anti-Communist propaganda/ reported on 25 April 1963 in an item datelined Hong Kong, April 24, that the Chinese Students Union has strongly backed the proposal of the Indonesian Federation of University Students to convene a tri-continent conference of students which is expected to found a new international organization. According to the news item, the Soviet Asian student organization is to be kept out of the planned conference, following the pattern established at the AAJC in Djakarta. Also, according to an NCNA broadcast of 11 May, the chairman of the Union of Indonesian Student Organizations called on the all-China Youth Federation and All-China Students' Federation to convey a March resolution concerning the convocation of a tri-continent student conference.

However, a Chicom/Indonesian CP-backed Afro-Asian Workers' Conference, which was planned for Djakarta in May has been postponed, probably because of the conditional response of many Afro-Asian trade unions which called for prior consultation among WFTU affiliates.

The work of the World Peace Council (WPC) is also severely hampered by tensions caused in its ranks by clashes of pro-Soviet and pro-Chicom forces -- with Soviet-oriented elements, however, still having the upper hand. At council meetings last winter, the WPC was faced for the first time with difficulties in passing resolutions on vital questions and was forced to delay and re-

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a spring meeting of the WPC council, Warsaw was finally designated as the site and the date fixed for 8-12 June. The meeting was to concern itself with the key problems of international policy, including the problems of European security and Germany, the formation of atom-free zones and the development of national liberation movements. While some participants already were en route to Warsaw, the meeting was indefinitely postponed, presumably because the WPC's spring disarmament campaign throughout the world had been so successful as to call for a full assessment of its impact prior to a council meeting. This explanation was, of course, a cover for whatever serious internal conflict must have been the true reason for the last-minute, embarrassing postponement of the meeting. A basic difference in tactics between the Soviets and Chicoms is that the latter seek to advance the "liberation" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America without the participation of "peace organizations." The Chicoms make little-veiled attempts to exclude the WPC from AAPSO's mission and they have been fairly outspoken on the matter of excluding the WPC (as well as women's and youth international organizations) from a tri-continent "liberation" alignment.

In the meantime, the established Soviet-controlled international front organizations seek to increase their own activities in the underdeveloped world areas to the degree that they are able to do so.

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PROBLEMS OF AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY
Thoughts at the Foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro

V. Kudryavtsev *

I have attended all the All-African Peoples' Conferences (in Accra, Tunis and Cairo) and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conferences (in Cairo, Conakry and Moshi) held in Africa in recent years. The latest solidarity conference met early in February at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro, in the Mawenzi School on the outskirts of Moshi in northern Tanganyika.

As I sat in the hall of the School (named after Kilimanjaro's second tallest peak), I involuntarily compared all these forums. The importance of these meetings for the struggle of the African and Asian peoples can hardly be overestimated. At the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, for example, one of the issues was whether the word "imperialism" should be mentioned in the resolutions. This time no delegate had the slightest doubt that imperialism is Enemy No. 1 of the peoples of both continents. The resolutions of the Moshi conference are sufficient to show how much more politically mature the participants are.

These conferences have rallied progressive public opinion in the African countries, mapped out common tasks in the national-liberation struggle, exposed the latest, cunning methods of the colonialists and have clearly shown that American imperialism is the chief mainstay of colonialism. The Afro-Asian forums have helped the African peoples realize that they are not alone, that their fight is part of the general struggle of progressive mankind against imperialism and its disgraceful system of colonialism, and that peoples fighting for their freedom and independence enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and all the other Socialist countries and of all progressive mankind. This has greatly increased the strength of the African freedom fighters and has inspired them to work even more persistently for the complete abolition of colonialism on their continent.

And yet against the background of all these indisputable successes, there have been changes in the atmosphere at these conferences since the first one held in Cairo in 1957 and what is more, not all these changes have been for the better.

A great number of national flags -- over 60 altogether -- fluttered outside the school building in Moshi; miniature national flags decorated the delegates' tables, many more than in the Cairo University Hall in 1957; and naturally the envoys of the Afro-Asian peoples were given a hearty welcome by the host country. Nevertheless in Moshi I noticed many things which have changed over the last five years.

To begin with, the familiar faces of many well-known leaders of the African peoples' struggle for national liberation were conspicuous by their absence. Many who hold governmental posts in the newly independent countries now attend inter-governmental meetings and not public forums like the conference in Moshi. Others thought it necessary to stay away for reasons of inter-party rivalry or because of unwillingness to impair, now or perhaps in future, their relations with the former metropolitan country by co-operating with "Communist" circles which, they claim, have initiated such conferences.

To bring home this point I need only compare the list of those expected at Moshi and those who actually came. For example, Dr. Hastings Banda, the national-liberation movement leader who now heads the Government of Nyasaland, was invited but did not come. Judging by his quite frank statements, narrow party considerations outweighed any consideration of the need for solidarity in the struggle for Africa's freedom. Nor did I see any delegates from the Afro-Malagasy countries (formerly French colonies) with the exception of representatives of the Union of the Peoples

of Cameroon, the opposition party, and one delegate from the progressive organisations of Malagasy Republic. Former French Africa was virtually unrepresented at the Moshi conference owing to opposition from the Governments and ruling parties. This naturally has harmed the cause of solidarity and brought grist to the mill of the colonialists.

These remarks do not only apply to existing independent states. As regards Kenya which is still fighting for independence and is certainly in need of solidarity, there were no representatives from the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the rival of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) particularly on the question of the future constitution (whether Kenya is to be a federal or unitary state). The two parties are contesting which will be in power after the proclamation of independence. Moreover, Ronald Ngala, leader of KADU, evidently prompted by purely party politics, persisted in slinging mud at the organisers of the Moshi conference, trying hard to represent it as a "Communist conspiracy".

Friction between certain countries was felt more keenly than before at the recent conference and on several occasions it nearly precipitated a crisis. I am not speaking of the Indochinese border conflict which some enemies of Afro-Asian solidarity strove to exploit for their own ends. A cloud was also cast by the conflict between Somalis and Kenyans over the part of Kenya in the north inhabited by Somalis. The British colonialists, aware of the Kenyans' negative attitude to the possible secession of the northern territory, had arranged something in the nature of a referendum shortly before the Moshi conference which showed that Somalis favoured joining the Somalia Republic. This added fuel to the flames, which was also apparent at the conference.

There are a number of border disputes of this kind due to the arbitrary frontiers fixed by the colonialists at the Berlin Conference at the end of last century. The colonialists, directly or through their agents, keep rubbing salt into these unhealed wounds.

The recent upsurge of extreme nationalist feeling in different parts of Asia and Africa, particularly in the Middle East, laid its imprint on the Moshi conference. Some of the more chauvinistically-inclined leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement not against imperialism, colonialism and its agents, but against all white people. They are ready to sacrifice the truth, as they did, so far cautiously, in Moshi, and to shrug their shoulders at the participation (even though only partial) of international organisations such as the World Council of Peace, international women's and youth organisations, etc. They sacrifice the truth because they pretend that the liberation of Asia, Africa and Latin America is possible even without the participation of progressive organisations throughout the world, without those white people who because of their views actively fight against imperialism and its colonial attributes.

There are in fact people with short memories who want to forget that the liberation of Africa would have been inconceivable without the Great October Socialist Revolution, without the existence of the powerful Socialist community, without the defeat of fascism in the Second World War, without the selfless struggle of the progressive forces inside the imperialist countries. The danger of imparting to the solidarity movement some kind of a nationalistic slant exists, and this danger was evident at the Moshi conference.

The main thing that put me, a veteran of the Afro-Asian conferences, on guard was the relatively "good-natured" attitude of the imperialists to the proceedings at Moshi. I recalled the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra and the First Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo. There the imperialists, particularly the Americans, rushed into battle discarding almost all disguise. Things went to such lengths that Irving Brown, representative of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in Western Europe and Northern Africa, despite his official position, personally translated delegates' speeches from French into English and vice versa to give a favourable tinge to some of the statements. In Accra the conference organisers (the official "host" on that occasion was the British Governor-General Lord Listowel, who opened this conference against imperialism!)

decorated the hall with the flags of all the United Nations members. Among them were the flags of the colonial Powers against which the conference was directed, and also of puppet regimes, like that of the Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan. Even in little things one saw that the colonialists were giving battle to the peoples of Africa and Asia at the solidarity conferences. Now, in 1963, they behaved very modestly, although the choice of Tanganyika as the conference site was very symbolic. After the First World War, it was Tanganyika, wrested by the British from the Germans, that completed the solid British colonial chain from Cairo to Capetown. Now it was the place where debates were held on how to eliminate all forms of colonialism once and for all.

There is no need to speak at length about the importance of such conferences. The struggle for the complete independence of Africa is far from over. The young independent states have not yet grown strong, while colonialism, enriched with the experience of recent years, has become more flexible and cunning. That is why the Afro-Asian peoples need solidarity now, like the air they breathe.

While tremendous changes have occurred in Africa since the first solidarity conferences and new trends and new conditions have arisen, the form of expressing solidarity through these conferences has remained unaltered. A certain discrepancy between form and content has appeared and was apparent at the latest conference.

In 1957, when the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Cairo, there were few independent states in Africa apart from the "old" ones, like Ethiopia and Liberia. The winning of independence and freedom was the main task confronting almost all the African countries. The national-liberation movements followed different political directions, but they were all brought together by one common objective -- the overthrow of the colonial regimes. If a delegation failed to attend the conference, the colonial authorities were to blame, and all the delegates vigorously denounced their action. At that time the conference was able to voice its unanimous opinion on all general issues, inasmuch as there were almost no specific questions.

Today there are many independent states on the African continent. Many public and political organisations which a few years ago were leading the fight for independence have become ruling parties. In some countries opposition parties and organisations have appeared. At times it is opposition from the Left, the kind that seeks to push on the Government which wants to stop halfway and is inclined to find a common language with the former metropolitan country. There is opposition from the Right which thinks that the policy of the Government is too revolutionary. There are also countries with no opposition, since many young African states have introduced the one-party system.

Whereas formerly it was clear who should take part in solidarity conferences, it is now much harder to decide. If the ruling party is represented it is bound to inject an element of statehood, of international relations into the conference. A left opposition may attend which is denounced in its own country as "the agent of third states"; if the Right opposition attends, the question arises: is it worthwhile, from the standpoint of over-all African interests, to lend importance to this opposition by allowing it to participate in the conference? The participation of one or another delegation, especially against the wishes of the Government of the country concerned, may therefore do more harm than good to general African solidarity, viewed in the light of the common interests of completely abolishing colonialism.

Inter-state relations and official foreign policy lines are increasingly having an effect on the proceedings of solidarity conferences. Member countries of the Afro-Malagasy Union, as I noted earlier, were absent at Moshi, and border issues are being brought up more and more often at such conferences. In these conditions conference recommendations impose few obligations and are not really binding on anyone. Nor is it clear who will carry them out. A Kenyan delegate, for example, told me that as soon as he returned home he would find the decisions of the Moshi conference relegated to the background by the struggle between KANU and KADU.

A great many purely local, specific problems have arisen in each country, which all-African or Afro-Asian public conferences are unable to settle.

Africa has today become a continent of independent states, while the general concept of "Africa" has been cast into political oblivion. Therefore it would be appropriate, for example, to call a conference on the struggle against racialism in the South African Republic, in support of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique in their fight against Salazar Portugal, against the artificial federations created by the colonialists who want to fan tribalism, etc. The first undertaking of this kind is the recommendation of the Moshi conference to arrange an Afro-Asian conference on cultural questions.

Other questions are increasingly being transferred to governmental meetings and conferences of African states where the struggle between different political trends and orientations is now being fought out. The imperialists and their agents have shifted their main attention to this field, having realised in time that governmental policy has now advanced to the fore and that this is where battle must be joined with the mounting national-liberation movement of the African peoples.

What direction will governmental policy follow, what paths of economic development will be taken, who will provide economic aid and on what terms? -- these and many other questions on which the future of African states depends, are now being decided at governmental level. (In many African countries Governments are not formed by political parties, but themselves organise mass political parties in order to create a broad base for themselves.) While emphasis is correctly being laid on the struggle for economic independence, it would be premature for Africa to reduce everything to economic problems.

A struggle is under way as to who will determine the direction of economic development (this is clearly revealed by the internal political struggle in Senegal, Ghana and other African states). On this question too the imperialists naturally do not want to yield to the African progressive forces which see the future of Africa in Socialism.

The struggle around these issues is no less bitter than it was in the period directly prior to the winning of political independence. There are the examples of the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio, the numerous plots against President Kwame Nkrumah, the arrest of Mamadou Dia in Senegal, the anti-Communist terror in some Arab countries, etc. The imperialists do not necessarily have to do this dirty work themselves since they have agents who were carefully groomed and bred in the spirit of Western "civilisation" during colonial rule.

These pro-colonialist circles knocked together the Afro-Malagasy Union, for example, which has now openly pitted itself against African opinion, assembled in Moshi to demonstrate all-African solidarity reinforced by solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Latin America. This Union has been set up on the basis of the "French-speaking countries", former French colonies which economically are still bound hand and foot to the metropolitan country. Within this bloc there is "solidarity" not in the struggle for the complete abolition of colonialism, but in preserving ties with France.

Such Afro-Malagasy solidarity is of most benefit to French imperialism -- since it represents a more flexible way of keeping former colonies in check by invisible reins and in this way strikes a blow at all-African solidarity.

Bargaining is now going on over the terms for binding the Afro-Malagasy Union to the European Common Market. France and her allies would also like to draw the former British colonies (Nigeria, Sierra Leone and perhaps some others) into this net. Moreover, they make no secret of the fact that this is a struggle between imperialists for influence in Africa. This is the meaning and purpose of such an alliance as the Afro-Malagasy Union.

Everything associated with colonialism has been implacably criticised and condemned at the solidarity conferences, but usually nothing has been said about colonialism's African agents for fear that this could harm African solidarity. In the present conditions, however, this "silence" unwittingly screens or even exonerates the actions of those African leaders who, together with the colonialists, are blocking the road of the African peoples to genuine independence.

When the call of Soviet fishing boats at a southern Madagascar port for fresh water, a normal thing under maritime law, is used by Phillibert Tsiranana, President of the Malagasy Republic, as a pretext to urge France and other NATO Powers virtually to occupy Madagascar by naval and air forces of this bloc to protect the island from a mythical "Communist menace", he inflicts on the African people no less, and perhaps greater, harm than the colonialists themselves. The French colonialists will calmly exploit Tsiranana's request to spread neo-colonialist propaganda about the equal relations France has supposedly established with her former colonies.

We could also refer to the pro-colonialist policy pursued by Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast Republic, and some other leaders of former French colonies. All these matters however are bound up with the general question of foreign policy orientation, and the policy of economic attachment to the former metropolitan country. But there are dangerous symptoms of another kind. They are to be found in the sphere of internal politics in countries where power has been taken over by men brought up in the spirit of Western "civilisation", and not by patriots ready to make any sacrifice for the future of their people. We could refer, for example, to the artificial expansion of the administrative apparatus in Nigeria with the direct co-operation of the colonialists who themselves drew up the country's constitution even prior to the proclamation of independence. This was done in keeping with the old policy of "divide and rule" and for the personal enrichment of a definite group at the expense of the national budget.

The American Foreign Affairs has counted up that Nigeria has one Governor-General, three Governors, one Federal Prime Minister and regional Prime Ministers, over 100 ministers and almost as many deputy-ministers, and a large number of members of the eight Federal and regional Legislative Assemblies. The result is that Nigeria, with a smaller population than Britain, pays four times as much for the maintenance of the country's administrative machine. Is not this too much for a young country badly in need of funds for building up an independent economy? The country is also harmed in yet another way: a stratum of government officials, divorced from the people and brought up in the old spirit of the colonial administration, is created; it is not particularly interested in innovations nor is it prepared to make any sacrifices for the good of the state.

We could here refer to the authoritative opinion of David Dacko, President of the Central African Republic (the former French colony of Ubangi-Shari, which was very backward economically). Addressing the National Assembly last year, he spoke anxiously about the conduct of the administration set up after the winning of independence. The President said that there was inter-tribal rivalry for jobs and posts in the ministries and departments, which naturally was undermining the unity of the people in face of yesterday's colonialists. Noting that the people believed in the new administration, the President asked: "But do we not live today in the most beautiful villas, drive around in luxurious cars and eat regularly every day? Aren't we, the elite, responsible for the disorders and the extinction of the people, for not solving the problems which doom them to poverty?"

President Dacko quoted a deputy who said that in some respects the African elite was even more dangerous for the country's future than colonialism. "We must not forget that it will be against us that the masses will rise up if we do not remedy the situation in good time," the President declared in conclusion.

How serious this question is can also be judged from the very strict measures taken by President Kwame Nkrumah against ministers of his Government who sought to enrich themselves. He rightly branded their acts as a plot against the republic's national independence.

It is important to realise that the proclamation of independence of the African states owing to the abolition there of the political and economic monopoly of a colonial Power has opened up their borders to other Powers who seek to gain influence there. American, West German and Japanese monopolies have swarmed into the former French and British colonies in Africa. They would all like to give them "aid", knowing in advance that a good deal of it would go on bribing government officials or for administrative purposes, and not on economic development. Politically they make use of this "aid" to foster a feeling of dependence among the leaders of the young states. At the same time their propaganda seeks to convince the Africans that most of the new countries are unable to develop their economy and culture with their own resources and are fully dependent on foreign Powers.

CPYRGHT

U.S. "aid" in the form of surplus agricultural commodities has a particularly demoralising influence. American propaganda centres (which receive for their upkeep 20 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of the delivered agricultural commodities) tell the Africans that the assistance given by the Socialist countries in building dams, power stations and heavy industry plants will make itself felt only in many years' time, while the United States, you see, is even now "saving" the people from starvation and poverty.

This type of propaganda does influence some people. Some leaders of the newly independent states like to be in the position of a beautiful young girl who has many "suitors" and expects to get something from every one of them. The attitude of these African leaders who want to "keep their suitors on a string" is to the economic, and also political advantage of the monopolies both of the former metropolitan country and capitalist states which have never had any colonies in Africa.

There is a great desire for Socialism among the African peoples who have tasted all the "blessings" of capitalism under colonial rule. Aware of this, imperialist propagandists are losing all hope of discrediting the experience of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries among wide sections of the people (I am not speaking of the narrow stratum of administrative personnel and perhaps intellectuals brought up under the colonial regime and convinced of the superiority of Western civilisation). The colonialists have therefore invented a new ruse, picturing the Soviet Union as after the same objectives in Africa as the United States and the other Powers which want to get a firm grip on the African continent and its natural wealth.

After this kind of spade-work, the monopoly propagandists find it easier to declare that local progressive organisations, including Communist, are "agents of Moscow" bent on tying Africa to the Soviet chariot. Choose who gives you better service today, American propagandists tell the African peoples. They lay stress not on future development, but on current exigencies which make it easier to influence a country by a showy display of economic "aid". They want to substitute high-pressure salesmanship for the real issue in the competition between the two systems, which is most directly linked with the question of the African countries' future development.

It is a pity that this propaganda leads some African political leaders away from the right road.

Personally I am not surprised at the appearance of many theories of "African Socialism". First, this reflects the tremendous striving of the African peoples for Socialism and, second, it shows that the African countries are increasingly turning from an object of history into a subject, a fact which is exerting ever greater influence on the development of mankind. Psychologically, it is understandable why so many African leaders want to put forward their own theory of their country's development along Socialist lines.

The Senegalese journal L'Unite Africaine has written: "Africa must no longer allow others to do its thinking for it. It must no longer be satisfied with ready-made patterns, obsolescent schemes, imported doctrines and ideologies." For many years the colonialist concept of the world was indeed dinned into the heads of the Africans. After liberation colonial ideological chauvinism almost inevitably aroused a reaction in the form of ideological nationalism, which tries to limit human experience to the African continent (African originality) and temporarily refuses to see the tried and tested experience of all mankind.

A few words should be said about the latest theories of international relations circulating in Africa, which, I am deeply convinced, are a product not of African "originality", but of the subtle, corrupting propaganda of the neo-colonialists.

An article by President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, one of the outstanding leaders of the new Africa, was published in the Tunisian weekly Jeune Afrique at the end of last year. The main theses of this article, only in more concise form, were outlined in his speech which I heard at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi. President Nyerere holds that "a second invasion of Africa" is now taking place, which is more dangerous than the first invasion by the colonialists. The difference in these invasions, in his opinion is that during the first invasion the foreign Powers disunited the African peoples by inciting some tribes against others, while now they are inciting not tribes, but entire countries, because the political geography of Africa has changed so greatly in the meantime.

Who, in Nyerere's opinion, is engaged in the "second invasion of Africa"? He draws an equation sign between the rich capitalist states and, what he calls, the rich Socialist countries, because both, he asserts, are using their wealth not to wipe out poverty but to "gain might and prestige".

Although President Nyerere mentions neither the United States nor the Soviet Union by name, it is clear to all whom he means. He concludes that the principal task of the poor (read, African) countries is "vigilantly to watch that neither some nor other of the rich countries utilise them as their tool", and to create the unity of the African peoples under the banner of pan-Africanism.

I want to repeat that after my many visits to Africa, I am not surprised that there is some mistrust of the Great Powers and, frankly speaking, of all whites in general.

These sentiments were fed by colonialism and it would be ridiculous to think that they could be eradicated in two or three years.

The leaders of the African states might, however, be expected to be more wary of neo-colonialist bait dangling from rusty colonial hooks. They ought to realise that today when the correlation of forces in the world has changed in favour of Socialism and when the formerly oppressed peoples want to follow the Socialist road, imperialist propaganda is eager to claim that the Socialist countries are as self-seeking as the capitalist Powers. Moreover, the imperialists rely on their extensive colonialist experience and on another advantage (temporary and overrated), namely, that many of the present leading people in Africa have been educated in the spirit of Western "civilisation" and are infected with capitalist ideology.

To draw a sign of equation between the capitalist and the Socialist countries means a failure to see that the abolition of colonialism and the rise of the many independent states in Africa is extremely closely bound up with the existence of the powerful Socialist community; to see that the Soviet Union uses its wealth not to "gain might and prestige", not to subjugate other countries, as Mr. Nyerere infers, but to abolish poverty the world over, Africa included. Only Soviet people as Marxists hold that this cannot be achieved by a redistribution of existing wealth among consumers. They think that the less developed countries must be given real assistance in building up their independent economy.

Theories, like the ones we heard in Moshi, cannot be regarded as being to the credit of African nationalism about which the inventors of these theories are so concerned. Speaking of these theories, N. S. Khrushchev said at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany that "this confused thinking pollutes the minds of the liberated peoples and makes it easier for the colonialists to preserve their positions in the young independent countries". What kind of African nationalism is this if the harvest of these theories is reaped by the colonialists, the sworn enemies of any sign of African nationalism or originality (who if not the colonialists has falsified the history of the African peoples, asserting that they had neither a culture nor even a history to speak of!).

These countries, as I said earlier, have ceased to be an object of history. They now have their own interests. Naturally many elements in these countries are still bound, as though by an umbilical cord, to the colonialist Powers and are economically dependent on the big monopolies. These elements act as vehicles of imperialist influence. At the present moment, however, nationalism can play an independent role in international affairs, moreover, a role which is often at variance with the interests of the imperialist Powers.

All these are temporary phenomena and eventually each country will have to choose one or another road of development, the more so since there is no "third road", much as it may be desired by the advocates of "originality". History is implacable and does not forgive confused thinking even if it springs from the best of intentions.

There are still many difficulties facing the African peoples. What is most needed to surmount them is unity, and it is to develop and strengthen this unity that the solidarity movement was created and Afro-Asian solidarity conferences are held. The biggest enemy of this unity is American imperialism which now in fact heads all the colonial Powers. U.S. imperialism employs every ruse and artifice to break up the unity of the African peoples. It does not necessarily do it itself, but often resorts to the services of African leaders who are closely associated with the colonialists and are prepared to make any compromise at the expense of the people.

The American imperialists and their neo-colonialist colleagues do not disdain any means: economic pressure alongside hypocritical "philanthropy" and "aid", diplomatic talks combined with terror and assassination of outstanding African fighters for freedom, ideological subversion together with provocations, blackmail and lying propaganda.

The peoples of Africa have to exercise the greatest vigilance, they must learn to differentiate between friends and enemies and to match shoulder to shoulder towards their cherished goal -- the complete emancipation of the African continent from colonialism. To repulse neo-colonialism the African peoples must strengthen to the utmost their unity and their solidarity with all progressive forces of the world.

Chaos in Castro's Cuba

Edward Behr, former Reuter correspondent and a Saturday Evening Post editor, wrote in the 6 June 1963 issue of the Post, under the above title:

"The Cuban revolution has failed. Four years after Fidel Castro's take-over, this once prosperous Caribbean island is in an inextricable mess. Its agriculture and industry are nearing collapse. Under Castro's Communist-dominated regime, a paralyzing bureaucracy is wasting badly needed Soviet aid. In short there is a tremendous -- indeed comical -- discrepancy between the image projected by Cuba's propaganda machine and the reality of Cuba today.

"I recently spent three weeks in Cuba. . . . I worked on a sugar plantation as a volunteer machetero. I talked to scores of Cubans, both high and low. . . . I talked to embittered Soviet-bloc technicians. In the company of a Polish engineer, I went on a tour of Havana's houses of ill fame, which Cuban officials say no longer exist, ending up in a brothel catering specially to Russian soliders. . . . I came away with facts which contradict some rosy, recent reports.

"Despite Soviet arms, promises and investments, however, I found in Cuba only one flourishing industry -- the creation of Communist propaganda designed to hide the differences between the Cuban image and the truth. . . . everything is crumbling at the edges. Nothing works any more. Nothing can be replaced if it goes wrong. . . . Today cars in various states of disrepair litter the streets. . . . they story of Cuba's once-prosperous agriculture and its budding industry is a story of almost fatal failure. 'It will take five years,' a Russian economist working in Cuba said, 'just to consolidate the country.'

Sugar Production Lags

"What has happened to Cuba's sugar industry, once the most efficient in the world? Absenteeism on a large scale. . . . valuable sugarcane fields were uprooted. . . . enthusiasm is waning. . . . most of the Soviet-made mechanical cane cutters have broken down. . . . bureaucracy and idleness. . .

"And the Japanese embassy is still chortling over the case of the Japanese watermelon farmer, long settled in Cuba, who produced 130 tons of watermelons on his 10-acre farm; the people's farm next door, which had planted watermelons over 130 acres, produced 10 tons.

"Cuba's estimated 10,000 Soviet-bloc technicians include burly women cotton pickers from Uzbekistan, chemical engineers from Poland, police and army officers from East Germany, teachers and doctors from Czechoslovakia as well as Russians in almost every walk of life. . . . they are appalled by the confusion and waste. 'Guess what happened today?' said one. 'They ordered 100,000 hospital thermometers. They showed up today. They are weather thermometers, for God's sake.'

"'They want me to plant a million oil-palm seedlings in eight days,' a French agricultural expert complained. 'They don't even want to know where. . .'

"'How can I work under such conditions?' says a Pole.

Communist "Gains"

"What gains Communism brings to such people is open to some question. One employee in the Education Ministry told me how she watched a schoolteacher write a sentence on a blackboard for the class to copy. 'Every word contained a spelling mistake, including the word 'school'.' Standards have plummeted even further in the universities.

"A Polish lecturer at Havana University explains: 'These people want a formula for everything. . . . they no longer think for themselves. . .'

THE RED DICTIONARY: IMPERIALISM, COLONY, COLONIALISM

IMPERIALISM: "A State policy which leads to the annexation of territories and the national oppression of occupied countries."
-- Lenin in "Imperialism-the Highest Stage of Capitalism."

". . . . a predatory foreign policy." -- Eshakov,
Standard Dictionary of the Russian Language.

". . . . an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry . . . for the conquest of territory . . . to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony." -- Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V.

COLONY: "An industrially backward country which has completely lost independent sovereignty, politically, economically and culturally and is under the domination, suppression and exploitation of imperialist countries. These countries supply raw material to imperialist countries and the imperialists market commodities in the colonial areas. Large investments are made by the imperialists to take over control of the colonial areas.

"Semi-colonial countries appear on the surface to have independence and sovereignty but actually are manipulated politically, economically, and culturally by imperialists."
-- Dictionary of New Terms, Shanghai, 1952.

COLONIALISM: "The colonizers . . . bribe people who have power, install 'good governments' and set up aggressive blocs . . . They allot funds for 'economic aids;' they give armaments to certain countries 'free of charge.' But in return the states which receive these arms must supply the colonizers with cannon fodder, set up big armies and thereby exhaust their peoples. The colonizers give a dollar in 'aid' in order to receive ten dollars later in return by exploiting the peoples who have accepted such 'aid.' After this, they enslave the peoples politically. Such are the 'new' forms of colonial domination."
-- Khrushchev, Pravda, 30 Dec. 1955.

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"In one of the various houses frequented by Russians in Havana, I saw four soldiers glumly waiting their turn while the Cuban girls argued interminably with a couple of Cuban militiamen who wanted to close the place down for the night. Last year, I was told, business was far more brisk.

"Even before last October's crisis, the Russians were not popular in Cuba, either with the Cubans or the other East Europeans. 'They live apart from the rest of us,' says a Polish factory manager. . . . They suffer, too, from two major drawbacks. They are utterly unused to giving, and -- in a country where 60 percent of the population is colored or of mixed blood -- they are profoundly racist.

"So far the revolution has meant a steady deterioration in living standards. . . . It is, to the Russians, a costly white elephant. It has yet to demonstrate that Communism brings anything but hardships, muddle, and economic regression. It is producing nothing but millions of half-baked Communists, so crudely untutored that they are, in the words of a Communist-bloc adviser, 'unfit for export.'"

Cuba's Most Vocal Critics: Soviet Bloc Technicians

Edward Behr reported in the London Sunday Times, 26 May 1963:

"It is significant that the most vocal critics of Castro today are to be found, not among the cautious, resigned remnants of Cuba's middle class, but among the Soviet bloc technicians there. As efficient technocrats and specialists in their various fields, they know a country in a mess when they see one.

"Today most Cubans see . . . the gradual breakdown of transport, the impossibility of getting the smallest and simplest spare parts. . . . 'Cuba has a flavour all its own'. . . . As anyone arriving in Havana soon finds out, the flavour is one of rotting garbage, over-powering Russian petrol fumes and exposure, 24-hours a day, to Cuba's sole really flourishing industry: its Communist propaganda . . . Shops are dispiritingly bare . . . All but the topmost Cuban officials are dogmatic. Communists-come-lately whose keenness is equalled only by their ignorance of the outside world. . . .

"Cuban officials agree that the next five years will be a transition period. During this time, presumably, the remaining American-made cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, factory machines, buses and lorries will have broken down. A third of Cuba's buses has already been immobilised owing to a shortage of spare parts. Cars in various states of decay litter the sides of roads. Water supplies in Cuba are subject to the vagaries of American-made pumps which are beyond the ingenuity of even the most skilled Cuban mechanic. Telephones are breaking down. And, ominously, there are no signs that the Soviet bloc can come to the rescue by supplying either spare parts or comparable goods.

Sinking Economy

"Cuban officials admit that the revolution has led to a deterioration of living standards . . . Cubans dismiss the shortages of consumer goods with the answer that productive investments come first. But, as the Soviet bloc technicians are quick to point out, both Castro's agricultural and industrial development programmes have gone seriously wrong. . . . Nowhere is failure more visible than in the field which matters most to Cuba's economy: sugar production. Until 1961, production oscillated between 5.5 and 6.5 million tons. This year, the harvest will be around 3 million tons. . . . Absenteeism, combined with a daily minimum wage regardless of work actually done, plus a heavy drift to the towns, to the army and to the softer 'people's farms' explains the plight of the sugar industry The 'people's farms' are plagued with bureaucracy. . . . Absenteeism is high [in industry] and the Czechs, Poles and East Germans who run most of Cuba's factories today are driven to desperation by the Cubans' lackadaisical ways. . . . Cubans tend to look down their noses at Soviet products, and Rumanian telephones have rightly been singled out for special derision. The Russian tractors, adapted in Cuba to work as cane-cutters, have been an almost total failure.

". . . there is a deep-seated difference between Castro and Khrushchev on the ways and means of spreading the Cuban example he [Castro] is in favour of 'direct action' by armed rebels, exploiting peasant discontent with the backing of 'liberals' who can be eliminated later The last thing Khrushchev wants is the massive export to the rest of Latin America of half-baked Communists 'suitable,' as one Eastern European in Cuba put it, 'only for home consumption.' This, and not aid . . . has been the main topic of discussion between Castro and Khrushchev this month. Despite newly found cordiality between Khrushchev and Castro, there is a feeling in Cuba, that Khrushchev is not entirely displeased with the American cordon sanitaire which cuts off Cuba from the rest of the world except for air and sea communications controlled from Moscow."

David Rousset, writing in the Italian-language monthly, Corrispondenze Socialista (Socialist Correspondence), Rome, March 1963, reported:

"The first thing I was struck by in Cuba was the deterioration of the cities and the disaffection of the Cubans toward Castroism. . . . Today the cities are falling apart and the farm youths are invading them. . . . Gradually paralysis spreads over the cities. It threatens industry. It beats against the plantations. . . . The technical substructure established by the Americans in Cuba is gradually coming apart. From factories to light switches -- everything in Cuba is American.

"Thus the Cuban can make a very instructive comparison every day: a comparison between the quality of the American products and the quality of the Russian products. This, at the same time, only increases his imagination and his discontent. . . . As far as the Cuban city dweller is concerned, there is no longer any doubt but that people in the United States live better than in the USSR.

"The technical deterioration goes hand-in-hand with the scarcity in consumer products and the almost vertical drop in the quality of consumer articles. . . . Within a span of 2 months, all prices rose between 100 and 200 per cent. . . . Rationing has caused a tremendous price rise . . . today the ration card dominates the country. . . the people in general are expecting the situation to become worse and worse.

"The cities have become hostile . . . they are at the point of breaking with the leaders of the revolution . . . about 50 per cent of the medical profession fled from the island and the figure would be 100 per cent if you included the surgeons and specialists. . . . Practically all the administrators, technicians, farm managers, engineers, and a very large percentage of skilled workers have left Cuba. This vast exodus has created a vacuum that cannot be filled. . . . The foreign experts, most of whom know very little Spanish and are ignorant of the local traditions, remain an alien body."

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Cuba's Standard of Living Higher than USSR

Guillermo Martinez Marquez, reported in the Spanish-language newspaper, La Esfera (The Sphere), Caracas, Venezuela, 18 April 1963:

"The Russian technicians, who actually disembarked to dismantle some industries installed in Cuba and unknown in Russia, have the mission of industrializing the country. The reality of the most recent statistics proves that in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, Cuba has more rooms, more hospital beds, more schools, more newspapers, more automobiles, more highways, more televisions, more radio receivers, more movie houses, more telephones, better doctors, better food, less illiteracy, and a higher standard of living than the Russians. Faced with the axiom that one cannot give what he does not have, Marxist dialectics has succeeded in convincing some ingenues that Communism is going to give Cuba what it had not been able to give the Russians in the 45 years since the so-called revolution of October 1917."

USSR AND CUBA: A STATISTICAL COMPARISON

The Soviet Union is a socialist country. Cuba is striving to emulate the Soviet example and to be called a "socialist" state also. How far does Cuba have to go?

As an example, selected items from the Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations for 1961 and from the Soviet statistical handbook, Narodnoye Khozyaystov SSSR, for 1956 and 1959, offer a base for comparison.

Housing: In 1953, 6 million Cubans lived in 7.9 million rooms. Assuming that these rooms were small, say, 6 square meters, each Cuban had 7.9 square meters of housing space. In 1955, the average Russian had 4.8 square meters of housing space.

Meat: In 1948/49, the average Cuban ate twice as much meat as the average Russian did in 1959.

Cars: In 1958, the Cubans had 8 times as many passenger automobiles as an equal number of Russians did in 1959.

TV Sets: In 1960, Cubans had 4 times as many television receiving sets as equal number of Russians did in 1960.

Summary: For Cuba to "achieve" socialism, therefore, the Castro regime must destroy about 140,000 cars, 400,000 TV sets and several hundred thousand houses and eat less. The latest reports from Havana indicate that considerable progress is being made on Cuba's road to socialism.