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Briefly Noted

Indonesia Reverts to "Confrontation" on Malaysia

Indonesian President Sukarno's 10 July statement heralded a return to his "confrontation" policy on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which is due to become formal on 31 August. It was widely assumed that his renunciation of that policy after the Manila foreign ministers' conference was only a tactical maneuver and that he would continue covert action to cause the Federation's downfall if he could not prevent its formation. Sukarno's real objection is that he sees the proposed federation as an obstacle to his own expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia. In what appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding of the position agreed to in Manila by the Malayan, Indonesian and Philippine foreign ministers, Sukarno claims that the signing of the Malaysian agreement in London violated Malaya's pledge not to take further steps without prior consultation. After a series of conflicting reports as to his attendance, Sukarno went to the 30 July "summit" meeting in Manila with Rahman and Macapagal. His main tactic presumably will be to continue to harp on the Borneo-referendum issue and to plug for a longer-range confederation of the area to include Indonesia.

US policy is to support, with some qualifications, the formation of Malaysia as an expression of the will of the Malayan, Singapore and Borneo peoples for voluntary association into a unit that best corresponds to the legitimate self interests of independent countries. Where appropriate, we preempt Indonesian and Communist efforts to stigmatize the federation as "neo-colonialist" and as a means for continuing Western influence. We point out that a common and more dangerous enemy -- Communist China -- is lurking in the background ready to take advantage of any confusion or ill-will that is brought about by prolonged disputes over the form that Malaysia should take or over the ultimate disposition of the British Borneo territories.

We also mention that Sukarno is using this issue to distract the attention of his own people from the serious internal shortcomings of his own regime, particularly economic and social stagnation. We further mention that when Sukarno finds himself compelled to think about popular referendums, he should confine himself first to West New Guinea, where he is showing signs of reneging on his commitment to allow the inhabitants there to determine whether they prefer to sever their ties with Indonesia.

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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

20 Aug	Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico City, 1940.
24 Aug	Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
24 Aug	North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) entered into force, 1949.
31 Aug	Fed. of Malaysia due to come into being.
1 Sept	WW II starts, 1939. Stalin sympathizes with Hitler by attacking West warmongers.
7 Sept	Khrushchev appointed First Secretary, CPSU, 1953 (<u>tenth anniversary</u>).
9 Sept	Red China's troops entered Lhasa, Tibet, 1951. (Chicom announcement came 14 Sept.)
12 Sept	Inter-Parliamentary Union conference to be held Belgrade, 12-13 Sept.
15 Sept	Soviet Union signed Friendship and Mutual Assistance and Collaboration treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, <u>pledging not to change their social or economic systems, 1947.</u>
17 Sept	Soviet Union invades Eastern Poland and divides country with Nazi Germany, 1939.
17 Sept	International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ) Conference scheduled on board Soviet <u>ship in the Mediterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct.</u>
19 Sept	Starts Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist).
21 Sept	People's Republic of China proclaimed, 1949.
28 Sept	First International founded London, 1864 (disintegrates by 1872).
29 Sept	International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be followed by UIA General Assembly and International Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#8

9-22 July 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The CPSU-CCP party talks continued in complete secrecy from July 5 to 20, -- with a day of recess following each session, presumably to permit the Chinese to consult with Peking. The CPSU Presidium, headed by Khrushchev, entertained the delegates at a banquet "in a friendly atmosphere" on the 20th. A brief joint communique was issued on the 21st: it stated only that both sides had set forth their views and agreed, on the initiative of the Chinese, to adjourn until some time later, the place and time to be agreed on through consultations. Mao himself, in one of his increasingly rare public appearances, headed the "tremendous welcome" to the Chinese delegates in Peking.

2. In sharp contrast to this ostensibly friendly stalemate in formal relations between the principal adversaries, political propaganda warfare raged throughout the Communist world with increased acrimony and hostility. The USSR and China were increasingly treating each other as outright enemies in a series of sharp pronouncements, featured by a hard-hitting, 22,000-word CPSU "open letter" of 14 July in response to the CCP letter of 14 June. On the Chinese side, a Peking rally of 10,000 welcoming their delegates back from their unsuccessful challenge to Soviet domination of the Women's Congress in Moscow heard the delegation praised for the struggle it waged "against the enemy."

3. The publication by the CPSU of their 14 July letter (together with -- at last -- the 14 June CCP letter to which it responded) was the signal for a wave of attacks on the Chinese positions by the Soviet European satellites, which published both documents with editorials and statements supporting the CPSU and condemning the CCP.

4. The Rumanians, however, further demonstrated their independence by publishing both letters but refraining from comment; boss Gheorgiu-Dej agreed to participate in the Moscow CEMA meeting mentioned below, but the Rumanian CP publicly condemned CEMA policy toward Rumania through an authoritative spokesman to a Western correspondent. Balancing this, the party published two pamphlets in support of peaceful coexistence and disarmament.

5. The Chinese were not noticeably shaken by the new Soviet-led European offensive, reacting immediately to the CPSU letter in a rather condescending manner, forecasting a massive counter-attack in good time.

6. The Czech Government also "transferred the ideological dispute to the sphere of state relations" by demanding on 3 July the recall by China of 3 NCNA correspondents, accredited to Prague, for illegal and harmful distribution of Chinese polemics, thus following the lead of the Soviet recall order of 27 June. The Chinese strongly protested this "serious incident, undermining the unity between the Chinese and Czechoslovak peoples and aggravating Sino-Czech relations."

7. The increased temper and scale of the warfare between parties in recent weeks has further intensified dissension within parties and front organizations throughout the world.

3. The visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak with Khrushchev in Kiev and the auspicious convening of the three-power test-ban talks in Moscow while the CPSU-CCP talks were in progress were non-Communist activities which infuriated the Chinese and were shrilly denounced by them. Khrushchev's announcement of his planned August visit to Yugoslavia was also a direct affront to Peking.

9. A Soviet plane crash in Irkutsk on 13 July killed the Albanian Ambassador to Peking and six other Albanians, plus a CPR official from their Afghanistan Embassy and two Chinese couriers.

Significance:

"U n i t y" is such a dominating concept throughout the history of all Communist (and socialist) movements, that the CCP and CPSU, despite the rapid deterioration of their relations and the increasingly open and spiteful hostility between them and their followers, still managed to avoid the onus of an open break and "saved face" by the transparent device of "adjourning" the Moscow talks for an indefinite period, subject to uncertain future agreements between the two Central Committees.

The 14 July CPSU open letter has ushered in a new phase of the conflict. It is the first really hard-hitting, counter-attacking CPSU document, presumably indicative of the fact that the Soviet leadership -- stung to the quick by the overweening arrogance and poisonous enmity of the CCP attacks -- has decided that any hope for a cessation of public polemics was dead and that the time for counter-attack had come. Moreover, it largely abandons the sterile attempt to answer Peking's casuistry by s h i f t i n g the debate from the scholastic refinements of Marxist-Leninist exegesis to a rather forceful exposition of the real issues of strategy and power politics at stake, accusing the CCP (by transparent insinuation) of

attempts to provoke nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the US,

promoting racial conflict instead of class struggle, trying to turn the non-white races against Moscow,
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failure to solve the problems of building
communism in China,

unwarranted interference in internal affairs
of the Soviet Union (aggravated by inability to
25X1C10b understand those affairs), and so forth.

/Note: The French and Spanish
translations of the CPSU 14 July
letter will be attached to the next
BPG issue⁷

#8

9-22 July 1963

July 9 - Pravda carried a 700-word CPSU statement which denounced the 7 July rally in Peking applauding the five Chinese expelled from the USSR for "illegal" dissemination of the 14 June CCP letter: It "cannot be assessed as other than a desire /a deliberate campaign/ to kindle in the fraternal Chinese people sentiments and moods unfriendly to the Soviet Union, to aggravate the situation in the course of the negotiations....disregarding the dangerous consequences of this policy."

July 9 and 16 - The Yugoslav agency Tanyug reported from Bucharest the publication of two Rumanian booklets supporting Soviet foreign policy lines. The first, on 9 July, entitled Peaceful Coexistence, contains "an objective criticism of dogmatic tendencies in the international workers movement," and "speaks of the absurdity of the theory of the export of revolution and defends current principles that peaceful coexistence and disarmament facilitate the national liberation process." The second, on the 16th, is devoted to the Moscow tripartite test-ban negotiations "unequivocally underlining Rumania's dedication to the idea of general disarmament" and "welcomes and defends Soviet initiatives" in nuclear test ban negotiations.

July 10 - All Peking papers gave front-page prominence to a 1200-word 10 July CCP statement in reply to the 9 July CPSU statement described above, and print the latter at the bottom. The Chinese complain that the CPSU accusation "is totally unjustified," and ask if it is not "in itself a slander against the CCP to refuse to let people know what our letter of reply actually said, while at the same time profusely attacking the letter as a 'slander' against the CPSU and raising a colossal uproar?" Noting that the CPSU has not only extended ideological differences to the sphere of state relations but "is also whipping up a campaign against the CCP all over the Soviet Union," the Chinese ask "how far are the comrades of the CPSU prepared to extend the Sino-Soviet differences?" The Chinese press also printed an NCNA Moscow dispatch reporting "the campaign whipped up by the CC/CPSU through meetings and resolutions of Soviet party organizations at various levels," and another dispatch rounding up the editorials of principal Soviet papers attacking the CCP.

July 10 - Both the Chinese and the Albanians used the occasion of Albanian Army Day to emphasize their ideological solidarity against the modern revisionists.

July 10 - A Hungarian Party and Government delegation headed by Kadar arrived in Moscow for a visit which observers saw timed to demonstrate East European solidarity with the CPSU and USSR. Kadar warmly greeted by Khrushchev, in contrast to his ignoring the Chinese delegation.

July 11 - The second anniversary of the Chinese-N.Korean friendship treaty was used to emphasize their ideological solidarity against modern revisionism. Top Chinese from Chou down.

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participated in a mass meeting in Peking, where Huo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference, included in his speech the charge that: "certain self-styled Marxist-Leninists have applauded Kennedy's so-called peace strategy and are trying their best to prettify US imperialism and its ringleader, Kennedy. They are deliberately deceiving the people to serve the needs of US imperialist schemes of aggression."

July 13 - The first public mention by either side that party talks are being held in Moscow came in a 2200-word Peoples' Daily editorial which acknowledged "a number of important differences...., serious in nature," and complained that "to describe them as being between the CCP on one hand and the whole international Communist movement on the other is not in accord with the facts and not helpful to the elimination of the differences." Despite the "distressing" Soviet actions on the eve of the talks, the Chinese "refrained from taking measures corresponding" and sent their delegation to the talks. "But we now have to point out with heavy hearts that events have gone contrary to our hopes." Seeing the Soviet actions, "people are fully justified in worrying whether the CC/CPSU wants to push Sino-Soviet relations to the brink of rupture.... Ideas cannot be blockaded and it is impossible to resolve ideological differences by dictates or commands.... There were many people who committed such follies in the past, and they all failed." But the differences will be resolved, they say, "if one really treats the other as an equal instead of trying to impose on him. If the differences cannot be resolved today, they can wait until tomorrow. If they cannot be resolved this year, they can wait until next year."

July 14 - Peoples' Daily carried an "Observer" article complaining bitterly about US efforts to "woo the Soviet Union, to oppose China, and to poison Sino-Soviet relations." The article accuses "US imperialism" of "deliberately misrepresenting the revolutionary viewpoints of the CCP, alleging that China 'stands opposed to peaceful coexistence,' 'is warlike,' and 'advocates the export of revolution,'" (but this is exactly what is done by the CPSU in their letter published simultaneously, -- see below).

July 14 - A brief Tokyo Mainichi article on Japanese Foreign Office scrutiny of the talks states that, according to the Foreign Office, there are 88 Communist parties in the world, of which 22 are pro-Soviet, 6 are pro-Chinese, "and the rest are mostly adopting the attitude of neutral opportunists. The Foreign Office says, however, that there are some so-called neutral parties which are leaning toward Communist China, such as those in Japan and Rumania. Therefore, the Foreign Office is noting the fact that a certain Communist Chinese leader said that 'half of the world's Communist parties are supporting Communist China.'"

July 14 - Pravda published a 22,000-word "open letter from the CC/CPSU to all Party organizations and all Communists of the Soviet Union," and also, at last, the text of the 14 June CCP letter to which it replied. In view of its length and importance we are appending our analysis of this document at the end of our Chronology. The CPSU letter was carried together with the text of Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
Rabotnichesko Delo, the Czech organ Rude Pravo, and the E. German

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Neues Deutschland, and on the 16th by the Hungarian organ Nepszabadsag. The Polish organ Trybuna Ludu on the 15th carried the full CPSU text but only excerpts of the CCP letter. (The Peking press reported the above information on the 17th but did not report the substance of the CPSU letter.) Continuing to be "different," the Rumanians followed later, publishing both letters in their organ Scinteia in two installments, half on the 17th and half on the 18th. All Mongolian newspapers published the text of the CPSU letter (but apparently not the CCP) on 19 July.

July 15 - A 1200-word "Observer" article in Peoples' Daily bitterly attacked "the Tito group" for "frenziedly fanning the flames, poisoning Sino-Soviet relations, disrupting the unity between China and the Soviet Union and that of the international Communist movement, and peddling its notorious modern revisionist goods."

July 15 - Pravda featured a 2500-word editorial on the CPSU "open letter," stating that the letter was published (on the preceding day) "in connection with the inimical actions of the CCP leaders, their aspiration to exacerbate the controversy in the international Communist movement which they themselves began, their deliberate distortion of the position of our party, and the incorrect interpretation of the motives which prompted us temporarily to refrain from publishing the 14 June CCP letter. Having taken our patience to be weakness, the Chinese comrades began to present our desire to avoid exacerbating the controversy almost as an intention to 'conceal' from Soviet Communists and the Soviet people the views of the Chinese leaders." It goes on to accuse the Chinese of "putting forth and upholding special positions on racial questions of the present day." The balance of the editorial consists of a brief review of the Soviet position on the vital questions at issue as stated in the open letter. Izvestiya devotes its editorial for the day to the same subject, emphasizing support of the CPSU line by the Soviet people.

July 16 - A 2000-word "Observer" article in Peoples' Daily attacked "the Indian reactionaries in the Anti-China chorus," using phrases almost identical with their July 14 attack on the US: "Nehru's tactics in making use of the Sino-Soviet differences and poisoning Sino-Soviet relations are to laud the Soviet Union and vilify China to woo the Soviet Union and attack China."

July 16 - Pravda published a 1400-word editorial on "The Unbreakable Unity of the Party and the People" which describes how "Communists and all Soviet people reacted with firm approval to the open letter." A 1000-word Izvestiya editorial, "A Mighty Support," went even further to state that "the press of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and of Communist parties in capitalist states fully shares the stand of the open letter," and it quotes from the Czech Rude Pravo and Polish Trybuna Ludu and cites L'Humanite and L'Unita as examples.

July 16 - The Czech central Party organ Rude Pravo and the Slovak Bratislava Pravda carried a 5000-word editorial on the Sino-Soviet exchange which slavishly follows the CPSU line, even in its phraseology. Castigating the 14 June CCP letter, it says that

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"everyone ... is surprised not only by its supercilious tone and its far from fastidious vocabulary, disregard of reality and objective facts, bluntness in proffering the coarsest charges against the CPSU and the other Communist parties: what strikes the eye ... is the endless stressing of the "revolutionary line" as opposed to the supposedly 'opportunist' and 'revisionist' line of 'certain people.'"

July 16 - The Hungarian Party organ Nepszabadsag accompanied the texts of both letters with a 900-word editorial which condemns the Chinese for "seeking further to sharpen these differences, so that, arbitrarily interpreting, distorting and falsifying the jointly discussed and universally accepted line of Communist and workers parties, it can force its own profoundly wrong views, which have been refuted by both history and the present reality, on the Communist movement," and affirms that "the Hungarian Communists fully agree with the CPSU CC's letter."

July 17 - All Sofia newspapers carried editorials stressing the importance of the CPSU letter. The Party organ Rabotnichesko Delo asserted that "the Bulgarian working people, closely united around the Bulgarian CP headed by its CC, again voice their warm support for the great CPSU,"

July 17 - The Yugoslav Politika concludes: "There can be no question of a compromise with the effete, reactionary Chinese ideas, since even the slightest concession to their present views would bring defeat to socialism as a whole, for this would mean surrendering the real ideas of socialism. Because of this, the determination of the CPSU headed by Khrushchev in the conflict with the Peking dogmatists has the backing not only of the Communist parties, but also of all the progressive people of the world." The Yugoslav organ Komunist carried a similar article on the following day.

July 17 - Moscow's Trud carried an article by its correspondent reporting on a trip through China after the 1963 May Day celebrations which complains about the CCP's ungrateful ignoring of Soviet aid. Also, "we found at the same time traces of unwise attempts to arouse among the fraternal Chinese people unfriendly feelings and moods toward the USSR. This, of course, embittered us. We thought: who needs that, and for what?" On the same day, Krasnaya Zvezda, armed forces newspaper, carried front page account of reports by top military officers to higher military academies on the nature of the dispute and the Soviet Party's views.

July 18 - The Polish Party organ Trybuna Ludu published a 2100-word editorial which, though more moderate in its opposition to the Chinese line than other Soviet bloc organs, asserted clearly its full support of the CPSU line.

July 18 - The Chinese press revealed -- by reporting the funeral proceedings -- that the Albanian Ambassador to China and six other Albanian comrades, plus the Commercial Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan and two Chinese couriers were killed in a Soviet airline disaster on 13 July, when a TU-104 carrying them

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from Peking to Moscow, crashed on landing at Irkutsk. The funeral was an affair of state, with wreaths by Premier Chou En-lai among others, and attendance by Vice Premier Chen Yi.

July 18 - Pravda carried a 2000-word Stepanov article defending the Soviet concept of aid to the national liberation movement, including the charge that "the Chinese comrades essentially do not wish to acknowledge as revolutionary a single process, a single action that does not bring with it the smell of gunpowder.

July 18 - The Indonesian agency Antara reported PKI Chairman Aidit as saying, "I wish to reiterate that Indonesia's Communists have no pretense at becoming the mediator because they do not feel that they stand outside of the current great discussion in the international Communist movement.... The PKI thinks it is good to hold bilateral talks... and to convene a meeting of all Marxist-Leninist parties." The Indonesian agency further reported "Observers noted that once again Aidit avoided openly and in public to side with the policy of the CCP. As is known, organizations and leaders of the PKI have supported the Chinese attitudes at international meetings and in press articles on various problems."

July 18 - Communist newspapers in Sydney and Melbourne, according to the Australian Overseas Service, state that the number of Communists who have resigned from the Party in Victoria over the Peking-Moscow differences now totals 62. The Central Committee alleges that this is the result of a calculated attempt by a group led by E.F. Hill, former Victoria secretary who rejects peaceful coexistence, to cause confusion and create the impression that the Party is experiencing a major split.

July 18 - The Chilean official CP organ El Siglo asserted its agreement with the CPSU against the "raving slanders" of the Chinese, which "not only are erroneous, but also are a falsification and betrayal of Marxism."

July 19 - The Peoples' Daily editorial, "Expose the U.S. Nuclear Fraud," concludes: "We hope that the Soviet Union will not fall into this trap." On the same day, the Peking press gives front-page prominence to a rally of more than 10,000 Chinese in Peking to accord warm welcome to the Chinese delegation back from the WIDF congress in Moscow. "A resolution adopted at the rally amid stormy applause pledged full support for the activities of the Chinese women's delegation and for the correct line it persisted in at the congress. The resolution condemned the leader of the Soviet women's delegation and some leaders of the WIDF for openly starting an anti-Chinese chorus at the congress, and for their arrogance and arbitrariness, their violation of democracy and their sectarian and splitting activities." Opening the rally, Teng Ying-chao said that the Chinese delegation, "...waging a common struggle against the enemy, successfully held its ground in a sharp and intense struggle against attacks, slanders and a series of most vicious maneuvers." Delegation chief Yang Yun-yu said that, "under the manipulation of Popova, head of the Soviet delegation," the congress "proceeded very badly." It was, she said, "the worst and most undemocratic congress ever held in the history of the WIDF."

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July 19 - NCNA reported that on 8 July the Czech Government demanded the recall of three Chinese NCNA correspondents from Prague (two were in Peking at the time) on the grounds that their news releases had published Chinese polemics. The Chinese Ambassador "rejected this unreasonable demand on the spot," and on 13 July the Embassy "lodged a strong protest and categorically rejected the unreasonable demand." On 17 July the Czech Government complained that the Chinese had not complied with the recall demand. "Furthermore, NCNA is still continuing the activities against which we have protested." The Czechs cancelled the press card of the remaining correspondent and gave him 48 hours to get out of the country. "Thus the Czech Government has precipitated a serious incident, undermining the unity between the Chinese and Czechoslovak peoples and aggravating Sino-Czech relations." On 20 July all Peking papers published a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on the expulsion as well as the NCNA commentary. Prague also released a Czech Government statement on the incident 20 July, stating that the ousted correspondent had departed 19 July.

July 19 - Speaking at a Kremlin rally honoring visiting Hungarian boss Kadar, Khrushchev, according to Western correspondent witnesses, exploded in an extemporaneous outburst against the Chinese, groping for words in obvious vexation and appealing to his audience for help as he spluttered to a halt while searching for a word. Khrushchev was quoted as saying: "I declare to those who would like to overthrow us: I challenge you, gentlemen. Comrades, let's pick out any plant or any collective farm. You present your program and we will present our program. Let the people be the judge. And you may rest assured you won't need armor or padding for protection...."

July 19 - The Czech Party CC issued a 2500-word statement which declares that the CPSU open letter "is in full harmony with the views and lines of our Party." They state that a letter sent on 20 January 1962 to the CC/CCP "described in detail the exceedingly harmful activities of Chinese representatives in international organizations and the incorrect views of the CCP leadership on basic political questions;" but "the facts and arguments of this letter were not given a direct answer by the CCP leadership, which refused to deal with them." A further letter was sent on 9 July 1962. The Czechs also claim that "serious damage" was caused to the national economy of Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries by the sharp reduction in Chinese trade relations "through the fault of the Chinese representatives."

July 20 - All Peking papers give top front-page prominence to a statement dated July 19 by a spokesman of the CC/CCP on the CPSU open letter. On inner pages they published the full text of the CPSU letter (many parts bold-faced) together with a Peoples' Daily editorial statement. Peoples' Daily also republished the full text of the 14 June CCP letter "so that members of the CCP and the Chinese people may know the views of both sides and compare and study." The CCP statement said that Chinese national, provincial and city papers would also publish the CPSU letter, and that both letters would be broadcast to the whole world in many languages.

They are replaying their own letter "so that our opponents will have the material at their disposal for making criticisms which are up to the mark. Frankly speaking, so far the criticisms are not up to the mark and not convincing." They add: "there is only one reason we are broadcasting the 14 July open letter of the CC/CPSU: it is a remarkable piece of work. To quote a Chinese poem: 'A remarkable work should be enjoyed together and doubts analyzed in company.' ... the open letter of the CPSU is superlative material for learning by negative example." The statement concludes: "the imperialists, headed by the U.S., and the Indian reactionaries and the Yugoslav revisionist clique have acclaimed it with one voice and vilified the CCP. Such statements deserve attention. We shall select the prize ones and publish them for all members of our Party and all the Chinese people to appreciate."

The Peoples' Daily editorial note accuses the letter of trying to confuse and poison people's minds on the question of nuclear war, trying to pin the vicious charge of bellicosity on China, and, in particular, to attack Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In accusing the Chinese leaders of making a 180-degree turn in evaluating the 20th CPSU Congress, "the CPSU leaders know full well that the CC/CCP has never considered the 20th CPSU Congress to be wholly positive." "Take another example, the question of extending ideological differences to the sphere of state relations. The fact is that on 16 July 1960 the Soviet side suddenly notified China of its decision to withdraw all the 1300 and more Soviet experts in China within a month, to scrap the hundreds of agreements and contracts it had signed, and to discontinue supplies of many important items of equipment and materials.... Yet the CC/CPSU blames China.... So complete a reversal of the truth is indeed astonishing! The open letter is full of instances of this sort -- no less than 70 to 80 of them -- and it is impossible to list them all here. We shall provide the necessary material to clear up these matters in future articles."

July 20 - The E. German Party organ Neues Deutschland published a 5000-word editorial expressing full endorsement of the CPSU open letter, including the statement that good relations between the CPR and the other socialist countries "changed with the beginning of the 'great leap forward.'" Also, the Germans remark that "it is significant that the whole CC/CCP letter of 14 June does not contain a single word about socialist democracy..... Perhaps this is connected with the fact that the CCP leaders have a special concept of socialist democracy. We recall, for instance, that they were conducting a campaign under the slogan: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend.'" But "the CCP leadership itself has done the opposite Whereas in their 1960 statement the Communist and workers parties proceeded from the fact that in our epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism the struggle between the two world systems is the main issue, the CCP leaders deny this fact and contend that the struggle of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America represents the main fighting front, the 'storm center of world revolution.'"

July 20 - The PKI delegation headed by Chairman Aidit arrived in Moscow. NCNA reported that Aidit stated at the Djakarta airport: "the imperialist and the Yugoslav revisionists were trying their utmost to torpedo the talks between the CPSU and the CCP" and: "For my part, I believe, to conduct consultations with these two Communist parties will be not only in the interests of the international movement, but also in the interest of the development of the new emerging forces." Answering a question by a Western correspondent, Aidit said: "I, and the PKI, have stood on the side of the Moscow statement because it states in definite terms, all Communists must condemn and expose modern revisionism."

July 20-21 - The CPSU-CCP bilateral talks ended on the 20th, with Khrushchev presiding at a banquet given by the CPSU Presidium for the delegates. A brief communique issued on the 21st states only that "in the course of the meeting, both sides set forth their views and positions on a number of important questions of principle in contemporary world developments, the international Communist movement, and Soviet-Chinese relations. At the CCP delegation's suggestion, agreement was reached to make an interval in the work of the delegations so as to continue the meeting some time later. The place and time of the continuation of the meeting will be agreed upon additionally through consultations between the CC/CPSU and the CC/CCP." Peking reported that Mao himself "and other leaders of the Party and State were among the 5,000 people who were present to give a tremendous welcome to the delegation" in Peking.

July 20-22 - Moscow announced on the 20th that the party chiefs of the CEMA countries would convene in Moscow on 24 July, to "discuss a report of the CEMA Executive Committee on work done to carry out the decisions of the June 1962 CEMA conference ... and the further task of the development of economic cooperation between these countries." The Washington Post of 22 July reported an interview granted by Mihai Ciobanu, "Chairman of the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce, who has recently emerged as his country's spokesman on relations with both the bloc and the Western world," in which he condemned Comecon for failing to respect the "rights, interests and sovereignty" of his country. Ciobanu said that "more than a third" of the capital equipment for Rumania's industrialization since the inception of the country's 6-year plan in 1960 had come from the West. The reporter adds that "foreign economists here feel that the figure is actually 60 percent or more."

July 21 - All Peking papers gave prominence to an NCNA report that the CC/CPSU in a new wave of opposition to the CCP has "set in motion all its propaganda media to launch unbridled slanders and vilifications." Pravda and other papers are reported to have carried statements "flagrantly attempting to incite the Chinese people and the members of the CCP against the beloved leadership of the CCP."

July 21 - The Hungarian organ Nepszabadsag states that Marxist-Leninist parties and leaders "unanimously condemn the schismatic activities of the Chinese leaders and their deviation from the guiding Leninist principles." It particularly describes the French, German, Austrian, Colombian and Chilean parties as favoring the Soviet line.

July 21 - The Czech organ Rude Pravo added another editorial supporting the Soviet line and "condemning the splitting policy" of the Chinese.

July 22 - Tanyug reported that Yugoslavia and the USSR have signed a protocol under their 1961-65 trade agreement whereby Soviet experts will be sent to Yugoslavia to advise on the installation of Soviet equipment to be shipped to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav technicians are also to be trained in the USSR. Press reports from Moscow on the announcement that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Hungary speculated that he may combine it with his planned visit to Yugoslavia in August (announced by Khrushchev on 19 July at a reception in the Hungarian Embassy).

References

The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Peking, by Edward Crankshaw. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.; and Mitcham, Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books 1963. A tight, readable review of the factors and events leading to open "cold war" struggle between the USSR and Communist China. 167 pp.

The full text of the 14 July CPSU open letter was published in English in all editions of the NYTimes, July 15, as a supplement to the Indian CP organ New Age, July 21, and to the CPUSA organ The Worker, July 28.

The letter states as its purpose "to set out our position on the fundamental questions of the international Communist movement in connection with the letter of the CC/CCP of 14 June 1963." It sweeps over the range of differences in theory with the Chinese, seldom coming to grips with their casuistic ideological argumentation, accusing the Chinese of attributing to the CPSU views and positions which it does not hold -- and at the same time stretching CCP positions to extremes which the CCP does not really hold. It sets forth a long list of complaints against Chinese conduct in recent years, in many cases reversing charges already directed against the CPSU by the Chinese! It names Mao and other Chinese leaders in such a context as to accuse them by inference of vacillating, wavering, and making 180-degree turns. The Soviets accuse their adversaries of substituting r a c i a l struggle for class struggle, propagating the slogan "the east wind prevails over the west" in place of "workers of the world, unite," and several times infer that the Chinese have "other goals which have nothing in common with revolution" or "the abolition of capitalism." The Chinese are accused of wanting to embroil the USSR and the USA in deadly warfare against each other. The tone of the letter can readily be seen in the wording of some of the phrases blasting the Chinese: "frankly inimical actions"; "splitting activities"; "camouflage their erroneous views and incorrect positions"; "did their best to insult and attack the Soviet Union"; "juggling quotations"; "monstrous fabrication and slander"; "trying to smear the CPSU Program"; "their utter helplessness"; "psuedotheoretical discourse"; "haughtily and abusively accuse"; "flouting of agreements"; "resort to foul language"; "sinks to insinuations"; "absurdity"; "use the Albanian leaders as their mouthpiece"; etc.

The CPSU letter (in 6 numbered parts) begins with a 1200-word review of the provocative June/July conduct of the Chinese, "mistaking our restraint for weakness." It recalls "nearly half a century" of Soviet leadership in the struggle for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet "tremendous, disinterested aid to all peoples fighting for their liberation from the yoke of imperialism," citing especially aid to China where it is even now assisting in the construction of 83 enterprises and projects. Mao is quoted as saying in 1957 that "the Chinese people will never forget all this," to which the CPSU adds: "one can only regret that the Chinese leaders did begin to forget this."

The letter points to the Chinese "Long Live Leninism" publication in April 1960 and attributed to Mao, as the first openly revealing the Chinese "differences with the WCM." The letter traces further steps by the Chinese to impose their views: the June 1960 WFTU session in Peking, the Bucharest congress, and the 1960 Moscow conference.

After the latter, "they resumed the propaganda of their course, using as a mouthpiece the leadership of the Albanian Workers Party. Behind the back of our Party, they launched a campaign against the CC/CPSU and the Soviet Government." In October 1961 the CC/CPSU "undertook new attempts to normalize relations with the CCP," and followed these with efforts through autumn 1962 which were not answered.

The letter then accuses the Chinese leaders of carry-
ing ideological differences over to state relations,
giving figures showing drastic reductions in trade over
the past three years "on the initiative of the Chinese
leaders." It adds that "disagreements among fraternal
parties are nothing more than a temporary episode, whereas
relations among the peoples of the socialist countries
are now being established for all time to come."

Reviewing the "splitting activities" of the Chinese at the December 1961 WPC session in Stockholm and 1962 sessions of the WFTU, WPC, AAPSO, WFDY and WIDF, the Soviets complain that the Chinese froze them out of the 3rd AAPSO conference in Moshi: "the leader of the Chinese delegation told the Soviet representatives that 'the w h i t e s have nothing to do here.'" The Chinese also prevented the Soviets from participating in the Djakarta journalists conference "on the plea that the Soviet Union is not an Asian country." And at the recent WIDF congress, the Chinese "accused the overwhelming majority of taking to splitting activities," when "only the representatives of two countries -- China and Albania -- out of 110 countries represented at the congress voted against" the appeal.

In Part 2 the CPSU turns to "the gist of the differences." "The essence of the matter is that, having started an offensive against the positions of the Marxist-Leninist parties on the cardinal positions of today, the Chinese comrades first ascribe to the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties views which they have never expressed and which are alien to them: second, they try by verbal recog-
nition of the formula and positions borrowed from the
documents of the Communist movement to camouflage their
erroneous views and incorrect positions." To come out openly against peaceful coexistence, disarmament, etc., "would mean to lay bare their positions in the eyes of the Communists of the whole world and peace-loving peoples and to repulse them." Therefore, "the clearer the weakness of the positions of the CCP leadership becomes, the more zealously it resorts to such camouflage." Behind this "scholastic" camouflage, however, are the vital questions of war and peace; the role and development of the world socialist system; the struggle against the ideology and practice of the "personality cult"; strategy and tactics of the world labor movement; and the national liberation struggle.

"The CC/CPSU believes it a necessary duty to tell the Party and the people with all frankness" that the CCP leadership takes "a diametrically opposite approach to such vital problems as the possibility of averting a world thermo-nuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and the interrelation between the struggle for peace and the development of the world revolutionary movement." "What stands behind the loud revolutionary phrases of the Chinese comrades? Lack of faith in the forces of the working class, its revolutionary capabilities," etc. "To take up the way proposed by the Chinese comrades means to alienate the popular masses." "The atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle: it destroys everybody within range of its devastating force." The Chinese "obviously underestimate all the danger of thermonuclear war" when they contend that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger." "Some responsible Chinese leaders also have declared that it is possible to sacrifice hundreds of millions of people in war. 'On the ruins of destroyed imperialism, the victorious peoples' -- asserts the collection 'Long Live Leninism' ... -- 'will create a civilization a thousand times higher than under the capitalist system.'"

The letter then remarks pointedly: "The posing of the question in this manner by the Chinese comrades may engender a well-justified suspicion that this is no longer a class approach in the struggle for the abolition of capitalism, but one with entirely different aims....It is impossible not to note the fact that instead of the class internationalist approach expressed in the call 'workers of the world, unite,' the Chinese comrades stubbornly propagate the slogan deprived of any class meaning: 'the east wind prevails over the west.'"

Reviewing the Cuban crisis, the letter states that "the Chinese comrades did their best to insult and attack the Soviet Union." It concludes: "The impression arises that the leaders of the CCP regard the preservation and intensification of international tension, especially in relations between the USSR and the United States, to be to their advantage."

Part 3 of the letter is given to the "personality cult," with the CPSU accusing that "the CCP leaders took upon themselves the role of defenders of the personality cult, the propagators of Stalin's faulty ideas." Mao, Liu and Teng are quoted as originally approving the 20th CPSU Congress action.

"Practice is the best measure of truth," the letter states, and cites advances of the last 10 years. But the CCP leaders "hint at some sort of 'bourgeoisization' and 'degeneration' of Soviet society. To follow their line of thinking, it comes out that if people walk in bast sandals and eat watery soup out of a bowl, this is communism, -- and if a working man lives well and wants to live even

better tomorrow, this is tantamount to a restoration of capitalism!"

The letter then turns to the CCP attack on the Soviet claim that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been replaced in the USSR by "a state of the whole people." "Anyone who reads the discourses in their letter ... will undoubtedly note their utter helplessness and lack of knowledge about the life of the Soviet people. We are being taught that hostile classes still remain in Soviet society, and therefore, you see, the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat remains." The CCP letter cites as hostile classes "bourgeois hangers-on, parasites, black-marketers," etc. "One must concede," say the Soviets, "this is quite an original notion of the Chinese comrades about classes and class struggle. Since when are these parasitical elements considered a class? And what class?"

In Part 4, the CPSU treats "the ways and methods for the revolutionary struggle of the working class in the countries of capitalism, the struggle for national liberation, the ways for the transition of all mankind to socialism." The Chinese depict it as though they stand for world revolution and the CPSU and other parties "have forgotten the revolution." Actually, says the CPSU, the division "lies on an entirely different plane: some -- namely the leaders of the CCP -- talk about world revolution ... while others -- those precisely whom the Chinese comrades criticize -- approach the matter of revolution with utmost seriousness and, instead of phrasemongering, work hard, seeking to find the best ways to the victory of socialism, ways which conform best to present conditions, and fight hard for national independence, democracy and socialism." By their peace policy, the letter says, Soviet Communists "give inestimable aid to the working class" of the capitalist countries, scoring "magnificent successes." Lenin is cited on the importance of economic victory, "but now it turns out that there are comrades who think that V.I. Lenin was wrong. What is this -- lack of faith in the ability of the countries of socialism to defeat capitalism in economic competition? Or is this the position of people who, encountering difficulties in the building of socialism, have become discouraged...?"

"The Chinese Communists haughtily and abusively accuse the Communist Parties of France, Italy, the U.S. and other countries of nothing less than opportunism and reformism, of 'parliamentary cretinism' and even of slipping down to 'bourgeois socialism,'" but "every knowledgeable Marxist-Leninist knows that to advance a slogan for an armed uprising when there is no revolutionary situation in the country means to doom the working class to defeat."

Turning to "the relationship between the struggle of the international working class and the national-liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America,"

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the letter calls them "the great forces of our epoch," and adds that "the correct coordination among them constitutes one of the main requisites for victory over imperialism." But the "new theory" of the Chinese, the CPSU says, is that the main contradiction is "not between socialism and imperialism but between the national-liberation movement and imperialism," and "the decisive force in the struggle against imperialism ... is not the world system of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, but again the national-liberation movement. In this way, the Chinese comrades apparently wish to win in the easiest way popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But let no one be deceived by this 'theory.' Whether the Chinese theoreticians want it or not, this theory essentially means the isolation of the national-liberation movement from the international working class and its offspring -- the world system of socialism!" "Behind the rumpus about 'world revolution' raised by the Chinese comrades are other goals that have nothing in common with revolution."

Part 5 of the Soviet letter focuses on the theme that "the erroneous views of the CCP leaders ... are inseparably linked with their practical activities directed toward undermining the unity of the world socialist camp and the international Communist movement." Chinese reduction in trade with the socialist community by more than 50% in the last 3 years is elaborated on again.

Further, the letter says, "the CCP leadership organizes and supports various anti-party groups of renegades who come out against the Communist parties in the U.S., Brazil, Italy, Belgium, Australia and India," and it gives some detail, including publishing and circulating "in many languages articles discrediting" these parties, resorting to "foul expressions" such as 'double-dealing,' etc. "And in its letter of June 14 the CCP leadership sinks to insinuations that the CPSU, too, allegedly 'comes out in the role of a helper of imperialism.' No one except T r o t s k y has yet dared, in view of the obvious absurdity of this, to level such slanderous accusations at the great Party of Lenin."

This section of the letter concludes with a reference to the CCP statement that it is "impermissible for one party to place itself above the other fraternal parties, ... to interfere in the internal affairs of fraternal parties...." As one example the CPSU cites Chinese "excommunication" of Yugoslavia. The letter quotes Peoples' Daily in 1955: "Yugoslavia has already achieved notable successes in the construction of socialism," and statistics show further consolidation of the socialist sector since that time. "Why, then, have the Chinese leaders changed so drastically their position on the Yugoslav question? It is hard to find an explanation other than that they saw in this one of the advantageous -- in their opinion -- pretexts to discredit the policy of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties."

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Section 6 is a 1000-word recapitulation on a note of triumph and confidence. "Our glorious Leninist party.... was steeled and strengthened in this struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and fears no attacks by latter-day splitters and opportunists from whatever quarter."

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No 8

9-22 Julio 1963

9 Julio: "Pravda" publicó una declaración del PCUS de 700 palabras condenando el mitin de 7 de julio celebrado en Pekín para festejar a los cinco chinos expulsados de la URSS por la difusión "ilegal" de la carta del PC chino de 14 de junio: "no se puede considerar otra cosa que el deseo [una campaña intencional] de encender en el fraterno pueblo chino sentimientos y disposiciones de inamistad hacia la Unión Soviética, de agravar la situación en el transcurso de las negociaciones ... pasando por alto las consecuencias de semejante política."

9 y 16 Julio: La agencia yugoslava Tanyug informó de Bucarest la publicación de dos folletos rumanos en apoyo de las líneas soviéticas de política exterior. El primero, de 9 de julio, titulado "La Coexistencia Pacífica," contiene "una crítica objetiva de las tendencias dogmáticas en el movimiento obrero internacional" y "habla de lo absurdo de la teoría sobre la exportación de la revolución y defiende los principios actuales de que la coexistencia pacífica y el desarme facilitan el proceso de liberación nacional." El segundo, de 16 de julio, está dedicado a las negociaciones tripartitas en Moscú sobre proscripción de los ensayos nucleares, "subrayando inequívocamente la dedicación rumana a los idea del desarme general" y "acepta con beneplácito y defiende las iniciativas soviéticas" en las negociaciones sobre proscripción de ensayos.

10 Julio: Todos los diarios de Pekín desplegaron en primera plana una declaración de 1.200 palabras expedida el 10 de julio por el PC chino en contestación a la declaración de 9 de julio descrita anteriormente, y publicaron esta última al calce. Los chinos se quejan de que la acusación del PCUS "carece totalmente de justificación," y preguntan si no es "en sí una calumnia contra el PC chino rehusar informar al pueblo lo que realmente dijo nuestra carta de contestación, en tanto que se ataca profusamente la carta como 'calumnia' contra el PCUS y se provoca un colosal alboroto." La "mesura" de China, dicen, "es patente a todos." Apuntando que el PCUS no solo ha extendido las divergencias ideológicas a la esfera de las relaciones entre estados sino que "está también agitando una campaña contra el PC chino por toda la Unión Soviética," los chinos preguntan "hasta qué extremos están los camaradas del PCUS dispuestos a extender las divergencias chino-soviéticas." La prensa china publicó también un despacho de Moscú de la agencia china Sinjua informando "la campaña agitada por el CC del PCUS por medio de reuniones y resoluciones de organizaciones del partido soviético en varios niveles," y otro despacho pasando revista a los editoriales de los principales órganos soviéticos atacando al PC chino.

10 Julio: Los chinos así como los albaneses aprovecharon la ocasión del Día del Ejército albanés para hacer enfática su solidaridad ideológica contra los revisionistas contemporáneos.

10 Julio: Una delegación húngara del partido y del gobierno encabezada por Kadar llegó a Moscú en vista que los observadores consideraron intencionadamente oportuna para demostrar la solidaridad de Europa oriental con el PCUS y la URSS. Krushev recibió afectuosa-

11 Julio: El segundo aniversario del tratado de amistad chino-norcoreano fue utilizado para acentuar su solidaridad ideológica contra el revisionismo contemporáneo. Los chinos más importantes, con Chou a la cabeza, tomaron parte en una manifestación en Pekín en la cual Kuo Mo-jo, vicepresidente de la Conferencia Consultiva Política del Pueblo Chino, incluyó en su discurso la acusación de que: "ciertos sedicentes marxistas-leninistas han aplaudido la llamada estrategia de paz de Kennedy y se están esforzando por embellecer el imperialismo norteamericano y su cabecilla, Kennedy. Están intencionalmente engañando al pueblo para suplir las necesidades de los planes de agresión del imperialismo norteamericano."

13 Julio: La primera mención pública de una u otra parte de que en Moscú se están sosteniendo conversaciones vio la luz en un editorial de 2.200 palabras en el "Diario del Pueblo" que reconoció "un número de importantes divergencias de principio" entre los partidos, divergencias "de carácter grave," y se quejó de que "presentarlas como que son entre el PC chino de una parte y el movimiento comunista internacional entero de la otra no concuerda con los hechos y no coadyuva a la eliminación de las divergencias." A pesar de las "apenantes" actuaciones soviéticas en la víspera de las conversaciones, los chinos "se abstuvieron de tomar las medidas correspondientes" y mandaron su delegación a las conversaciones. "Pero tenemos que apuntar con el corazón oprimido que los hechos han ido contra lo que esperábamos." En vista de las actuaciones soviéticas, "la gente tiene entera justificación en preocuparse de si el CC del PCUS quiere empujar las relaciones chino-soviéticas al borde de la ruptura... Las ideas no se pueden bloquear y es imposible resolver las divergencias ideológicas por dictados u órdenes... Hubo mucha gente que cometió semejantes locuras en el pasado, y todas fracasaron." Pero, añaden, las divergencias se resolverán "si uno trata al otro realmente como igual en lugar de tratar de imponérsele. Si las divergencias no se pueden resolver hoy, pueden aguardar hasta mañana. Si no se pueden resolver este año, pueden aguardar hasta el próximo."

14 Julio: El "Diario del Pueblo" publicó un artículo de "Observador" quejándose amargamente de los esfuerzos de los Estados Unidos de "congraciarse con la Unión Soviética, oponerse a China, y emponzoñar las relaciones chino-soviéticas." El artículo acusa al "imperialismo norteamericano" de "intencionalmente desvirtuar los puntos de vista revolucionarios del PC chino, alegando que China 'está en oposición a la coexistencia pacífica,' 'es belicista,' y 'aboga por la exportación de la revolución,'" (pero esto es precisamente lo que hace el PCUS en su carta publicada simultáneamente -- véase más adelante).

14 Julio: Un breve artículo en el "Mainichi" de Tokio sobre el examen de las conversaciones por parte del ministerio japonés de Relaciones Exteriores declara que, según dicho ministerio, hay en el mundo 88 partidos comunistas, de los cuales 22 son prosoviéticos, 6 son prochinos "y el resto están en su mayoría adoptando la actitud de oportunistas neutrales. El ministerio de Relaciones declara, no obstante, que hay algunos partidos llamados neutrales que se incli-

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han por China Comunista, como por ejemplo los de Japon y Rumania. Por lo tanto el ministerio de Relaciones apunta el hecho de que cierto dirigente comunista chino declaró que 'la mitad de los partidos comunistas del mundo están apoyando a China Comunista.'

14 Julio: "Pravda" publicó una "carta abierta del CC del PCUS a todas las organizaciones del partido y todos los comunistas de la Unión Soviética," de longitud de 22.000 palabras, y también por fin el texto de la carta de 14 de junio del PC chino a la cual replicaba. En vista de su longitud e importancia (el mismo PC chino la denomina "una notable obra" -- véase 19 Julio), hemos añadido nuestro análisis de dicho documento al final de nuestra Cronología. La carta del PCUS fue publicada íntegramente, junto al texto de la carta de 14 de junio del PC chino, el 15 de julio en el "Rabotnichesko Delo," órgano del partido búlgaro, el "Rude Pravo," órgano del partido checo, y el "Neues Deutschland," órgano del partido alemán oriental, y el 16 por el órgano húngaro "Nepszabadsag." El órgano polaco "Trybuna Ludu" publicó el 15 el texto íntegro del PCUS pero solo partes de la carta del PC chino. (La prensa de Pekín informó lo anterior el día 17 pero no informó el contenido de la carta del PCUS.) Persistiendo en su "diferencia," los rumanos salieron más tarde, publicando ambas cartas en su órgano "Scinteia" en dos partes, la mitad el 17 y el resto el 18. Todos los periódicos mogoles publicaron el texto de la carta del PCUS (pero aparentemente no la del PC chino) el 19 de julio.

15 Julio: Un artículo del "Observador" en 1.200 palabras publicado en el "Diario del Pueblo" atacó violentamente al "grupo de Tito" por "aventar frenéticamente las llamas, emponzoñando las relaciones chino-soviéticas, estorbando la unidad entre China y la Unión Soviética y la del movimiento comunista internacional y voceando su mercadería de revisionismo contemporáneo."

15 Julio: "Pravda" en un editorial de 2.500 palabras sobre la "carta abierta" del PCUS declaró que la carta había sido publicada (el día anterior) "con relación a las actuaciones inamistosas de los dirigentes del PC chino, su aspiración a exacerbar la controversia en el movimiento comunista internacional que ellos mismos empezaron, su intencional desvirtuación de la posición de nuestro partido y la incorrecta interpretación de los móviles que nos indujeron por algún tiempo a no publicar la carta de 14 de junio del PC chino. Tomando por debilidad nuestra paciencia, los camaradas chinos empezaron a presentar nuestro deseo de evitar exacerbar la controversia casi como intención de 'ocultar' de los comunistas soviéticos y el pueblo soviético las opiniones de los líderes chinos." A continuación acusa a los chinos de "proponer y apoyar posiciones especiales sobre cuestiones raciales del día de hoy." El resto del editorial consta de una breve reseña de la posición soviética sobre las vitales materias en cuestión: "la guerra y la paz, el papel y el desarrollo del movimiento comunista mundial, la lucha contra la ideología y la práctica del culto a la personalidad, la cuestión de la estrategia y la táctica del movimiento obrero mundial y la lucha por la liberación nacional." "Izvestiya" dedica su editorial de este día al mismo tema, subrayando el apoyo del pueblo soviético a la línea del PCUS.

atacó en 2.000 palabras a "los reaccionarios de India en el coro antichino, empleando fraseología casi idéntica a la que utilizaron en su ataque contra los EE.UU. el 14 de julio: "La táctica de Nehru para aprovecharse de las divergencias chino-soviéticas y emponzoñar las relaciones chino-soviéticas consiste en elogiar a la Union Soviética y denigrar a China; congraciarse con la Union Soviética y atacar a China."

16 Julio: En un editorial de 1.400 palabras titulado "La unidad irrompible del Partido y el pueblo," "Pravda" describe como "los comunistas y todo el pueblo soviético reaccionaron con firme aprobación de la carta abierta." Un editorial de 1.000 palabras en "Izvestiya" titulado "Poderoso Apoyo" fue aun más adelante, declarando que "la prensa de los países de la comunidad socialista y de los partidos comunistas en los países capitalistas comparte íntegramente la posición de la carta abierta," y da como ejemplo citas del "Rude Pravo" checo y el "Trybuna Ludu" polaco y menciona "L'Humanite" y "L'Unita."

16 Julio: El órgano central del partido checo "Rude Pravo" y el eslovaco "Pravda" de Bratislava publicaron un editorial de 5.000 palabras sobre el intercambio chino-soviético, siguiendo servilmente la línea del PCUS hasta en su fraseología. Comenzando por fustigar la carta de 14 de junio del PC chino, declara que "a todos ... sorprende no solo su tono de superioridad y su vocabulario que dista mucho de ser selecto, su indiferencia hacia la realidad y los hechos objetivos, su aspereza al presentar las más burdas denuncias contra el PCUS y los otros partidos comunistas: lo que salta a la vista ... es el interminable énfasis sobre la 'línea revolucionaria' en oposición a la supuesta línea 'oportunistista' y 'revisionista' de 'cierta gente.'"

16 Julio: El órgano húngaro "Nepszabadsag" acompañó a los textos de ambas cartas un editorial de 900 palabras condenando a los chinos por "tratar más de agudizar dichas divergencias, de modo que, arbitrariamente interpretando, desvirtuando y falseando la línea conjuntamente discutida y universalmente aceptada de los partidos comunistas y obreros, puedan imponer sobre el movimiento comunista sus opiniones profundamente equivocadas, que han sido refutadas por historia así como por la realidad actual," y afirmando que "los comunistas húngaros están completamente de acuerdo con la carta del CC del PCUS."

17 Julio: Todos los diarios de Sofía publicaron editoriales haciendo resaltar la importancia de la carta del PCUS. El órgano del partido, "Rabotnichesko Delo," declaró que "el pueblo trabajador búlgaro, unido estrechamente en derredor del PC búlgaro encabezado por su CC, de nuevo expresa su cálido apoyo del gran PCUS, ... "

17 Julio: El diario yugoslavo "Politika" declaró: "No puede admitirse componenda con las ideas decadentes y reaccionarias chinas, ya que la mínima concesión a sus actuales opiniones significaría la entrega de las verdaderas ideas del socialismo. Por este motivo, la decisión del PCUS encabezado por Krushev en el conflicto con los dogmáticos de Pekín cuenta con el respaldo no solo de los partidos comunistas sino de todas las gentes progresistas del mundo." El órgano del partido "Komunist" publicó al día siguiente expre-

corresponsal informando sobre un viaje por China después de las celebraciones del Primero de Mayo de 1963 en el cual se queja de la indiferencia desagradecida de los chinos hacia la ayuda soviética. También, "encontramos al propio tiempo rastros de imprudentes tentativas de evocar entre el fraterno pueblo chino sentimientos y actitudes inamistosas hacia la URSS. Esto por supuesto nos amargó. Pensamos: ¿quién necesita tal cosa, y para qué?" El mismo día "Krasnaya Zvezda," el diario de las fuerzas armadas, publicó en primera plana noticias sobre informes rendidos por los más altos jefes militares a las academias militares superiores sobre el carácter de la querella y las opiniones del partido soviético.

18 Julio: El órgano "Trybuna Ludu" del partido polaco publicó un editorial de 2.100 palabras que, aunque más comedido al expresar su oposición a la línea china que los otros órganos del bloque soviético, declaró su íntegro apoyo a la línea del PCUS en términos meridianos.

18 Julio: La prensa china reveló -- al informar las exequias -- que el embajador albanés en China y otros seis camaradas albaneses además del secretario comercial de la embajada china en Afganistán y dos mensajeros oficiales chinos perecieron en una tragedia aérea soviética el 13 de julio cuando un TU-104 en que viajaban de Pekín a Moscú se estrelló al aterrizar en Irkutsk. El entierro fue ceremonia gubernamental, con ofrendas florales del premier Chou En-lai entre otras y la presencia del vicepremier Chen Yi.

18 Julio: "Pravda" publicó un artículo de 2.000 palabras escrito por Stepanov en defensa del concepto soviético de ayuda al movimiento de liberación nacional, incluyendo la denuncia de que "los camaradas chinos esencialmente no desean reconocer como revolucionario ni un proceso, ni una acción que no traiga en sí el olor a pólvora."

18 Julio: La agencia indonesia Antara informó que el presidente Aidit del PKI había declarado: "Deseo reiterar que los comunistas de Indonesia no presumen de hacerse mediadores porque están al margen de la actual gran discusión en el movimiento comunista internacional ... El PKI cree que es bueno sostener conversaciones bilaterales ... y convocar una asamblea de todos los partidos marxistas-leninistas." La agencia indonesia informó además que "los observadores notaron que de nuevo Aidit había evitado abierta y públicamente ponerse del lado de la política del PC chino. Como se sabe, organizaciones y dirigentes del PKI han apoyado las actitudes chinas en reuniones internacionales y en artículos de prensa sobre diversos problemas."

18 Julio: La prensa comunista de Sydney y Melbourne, de acuerdo con el Australian Overseas Service, informa que el total de comunistas que han renunciado del partido en Victoria con motivo de las divergencias entre Pekín y Moscú llega ahora a 62. El Comité Central alega que esto se debe a una tentativa intencionada de un grupo encabezado por E. F. Hill, ex secretario de Victoria que rehusó avenirse a la política de coexistencia pacífica, de ocasionar confusión y crear la impresión de que en el partido está ocurriendo una escisión grave.

estar de acuerdo con el PCUS contra las "calumnias delirantes" de los chinos, que "no solamente son erróneas sino también falseamiento y traición al marxismo."

19 Julio: El editorial del "Diario de Pueblo" titulado "Denunciar el Fraude Nuclear de EE.UU.," termina diciendo que "confiamos que la Unión Soviética no caerá en esa trampa." El mismo día la prensa de Pekín dio provocativo realce en primera plana a una manifestación de más de 10.000 chinos en Pekín para rendir cálido recibimiento a la delegación china que regresaba del congreso de la FDM en Moscú. "Una resolución adoptada en la manifestación entre entusiastas aplausos prometió completo apoyo a las actividades de la delegación china de mujeres y a la línea correcta en que persistió en el congreso. La resolución condenó a la dirigente de la delegación soviética de mujeres y a algunas dirigentes de la FDM por iniciar abiertamente un coro antichino en el congreso y por su arrogancia y arbitrariedad, su violación de la democracia y sus actividades sectarias y escisionistas." Inaugurando la manifestación, Teng Ying-chao declaró que la delegación china, "... conduciendo una lucha común contra el enemigo, consiguió mantener su terreno en una lucha aguda e intensa contra ataques, calumnias y una serie de desalmadas maniobras." La jefa de la delegación Yang Yun-yu declaró que, "bajo la manipulación de Popova, jefa de la delegación soviética," el congreso "se desarrolló muy mal." Fue, indicó, "el congreso peor y más antidemocrático que haya sido celebrado en la historia de la FDM."

19 Julio: La agencia china Sinjua informó que el 8 de julio el gobierno checo requirió la salida de tres corresponsales de Sinjua de Praga (dos estaban entonces en Pekín) debido a que sus informes periodísticos habían publicado polémicas chinas. El embajador chino "rechazó de plano dicha exigencia irrazonable," y el 13 de julio la embajada "hizo protesta formal y categóricamente rechazo la irrazonable exigencia." Sin embargo, el 17 de julio el gobierno checo se quejó de que los chinos no habían satisfecho la demanda de retiro. "Además, Sinjua todavía continúa las actividades contra las cuales hemos protestado." Los checos cancelaron el carnet de prensa del corresponsal que quedaba y le señalaron 48 horas para abandonar el país. "De este modo el Gobierno checo ha precipitado un grave incidente, socavando la unidad entre los pueblos chino y checoslovaco y agravando las relaciones chino-chechas." El 20 de julio toda la prensa de Pekín publicó una declaración del ministerio de Relaciones chino sobre la expulsión así como el comentario de Sinjua. Praga también dio a la publicidad una declaración del gobierno checoslovaco sobre el incidente el 20 de julio, declarando que el corresponsal expulsado había partido el 19 de julio.

19 Julio: Hablando ante una manifestación en el Kremlin en honor al mandón húngaro Kadar, Krushev hizo estallido verbal inesperado contra los chinos, de acuerdo con corresponsales de Occidente que lo presenciaron, tratando de encontrar frases en su evidente irritación y pidiendo ayuda a los presentes mientras enmudecía por falta de palabras apropiadas. A Krushev le atribuyeron estos conceptos: "Declara a quienes quisieran derrocarnos: Yo les reto, caballeros. Camaradas, escojamos cualquier fabrica o granja colectiva. Ustedes presentan su programa y nosotros presentamos nuestro programa."

19 Julio: El CC del PC checo expidió una declaración de 2.500 palabras declarando que la carta abierta del PCUS "está en completa armonía con las opiniones y la línea de nuestro partido." Declaran que una carta enviada el 20 de enero de 1962 al CC del PC chino "describió en detalle las actividades extremadamente perniciosas de los representantes chinos a las organizaciones internacionales y las opiniones incorrectas de los líderes del PC chino sobre cuestiones políticas básicas;" pero "los hechos y argumentación de dicha carta no recibieron contestación directa por parte del liderazgo del PC chino, que se negó a tratarlas." Otra carta fue enviada el 9 de julio de 1962. Los checos también alegan que la seria reducción en las relaciones comerciales con China, "por culpa de los representantes chinos," ocasionó "grave daño" a la economía nacional de Checoslovaquia y otros países socialistas.

20 Julio: Todos los diarios de Pekín destacaron en primera plana una declaración fechada el 19 de julio por un portavoz del CC de PC chino sobre la carta abierta del PCUS. En páginas interiores publicaron el texto íntegro de la carta del PCUS (en muchas partes en negrita) así como una declaración editorial del "Diario del Pueblo." Dicho diario también publicó de nuevo el texto de la carta del PC chino de 14 de junio "para que los miembros del PC chino y el pueblo chino puedan conocer las opiniones de ambos lados y las comparen y estudien." La declaración del PC chino expresó también que los diarios nacionales, provinciales y urbanos también publicarían la carta del PCUS y que ambas cartas serían difundidas al mundo entero en muchos idiomas.

Están jugando otra vez una partida con su propia carta "para que nuestros adversarios tengan el material a su disposición para criticar a su altura. Hablando francamente, hasta ahora, las críticas no están a su altura y no convencen." Añaden: "existe solo una razón por la cual estamos transmitiendo la carta abierta del 14 de julio del CC de PCUS: es una obra extraordinaria. En cita de un poema chino: 'Una obra extraordinaria debe ser gozada en conjunto y dudas analizadas en compañía.' ... la carta abierta del PCUS es material superlativo para aprender por medio de ejemplo negativo." La declaración concluye: "los imperialistas, encabezados por los Estados Unidos, y los reaccionarios de la India y la carrilla de revisionistas de Yugoslavia la han aclamado todos de una voz y han difamado al PCC. Tales declaraciones merecen atención. Seleccionaremos las sobresalientes y las publicaremos para que todos los miembros de nuestro Partido y todo al pueblo chino las pueda apreciar."

La nota editorial del "Diario del Pueblo" acusa a la carta de tratar de confundir y de envenenar las mentes del pueblo con relación a una guerra nuclear, tratando de atribuirle la acusación viciosa de belicosidad a la China, y, en particular, atacar al camarada Mao Tse-tung. Al acusar a los líderes chinos de dar una vuelta de 180 grados al evaluar el Vigésimo Congreso del PCUS, "los líderes del PCUS saben bien que el CC del PCUS nunca ha considerado al Vigésimo Congreso del PCUS enteramente positivo." "Tomemos otro ejemplo, la cuestión de la extensión de la divergencias ideológicas hasta la esfera de relaciones de estado. El hecho es que el 16 de julio de 1960 el lado soviético de pronto notificó a China su deci-

un mes, de abolir los cientos de acuerdos y contratos que había firmado, y de discontinuar las provisiones de muchos accesorios importantes de equipo y de materiales ... Sin embargo el CC del PCUS le hecha la culpa a China... ¡Tal reversión de la verdad es realmente sorprendente! La carta abierta está llena de ejemplos de esta índole -- nada menos que de 70 a 80 -- y es imposible presentarlos todos aquí. Proveeremos el material necesario para aclarar estas situaciones en artículos futuros."

20 Julio: El órgano del Partido de Alemania Oriental "Neues Deutschland" publicó un editorial de 5.000 palabras apoyando completamente la carta abierta del PCUS, incluyendo la declaración de que buenas relaciones entre el RPC y los otros países socialistas "han cambiado con el comienzo del 'gran paso adelante.'" También, dicen los alemanes que "es significativo que la carta completa del 14 de junio del CC del PC chino no contiene ni una sola palabra acerca de la democracia socialista ... Posiblemente esté relacionado con el hecho que los líderes del PC chino tienen un concepto especial de la democracia socialista. Recordamos, por ejemplo, que estaban llevando a cabo una campaña bajo la frase de reclamo: 'Que Florezcan Cien Flores, Que Batallen Cien Modos de Pensar.'" Pero "el liderato mismo del PCC ha hecho todo lo contrario ... Mientras que en su declaración del 1960 los partidos obreros y comunistas prosiguieron del hecho de que en nuestra época de transición del capitalismo al socialismo la lucha entre los dos sistemas mundiales es el suceso principal, los líderes del PC chino niegan este hecho y sostienen que la lucha del movimiento de liberación nacional en Asia, Africa y la América Latina representa el frente de lucha principal, el centro de la tormenta de la revolución mundial.'..."

20 Julio: La delegación del PKI encabezada por el presidente Aidit llegó a Moscú. La agencia de noticias china Sinjua informó que Aidit declaró en el aeropuerto de Jakarta: "los imperialistas y los revisionistas yugoslavos estaban tratando hasta el último extremo de torpedear las conversaciones entre el PCUS y el PC chino" y: "Por mi parte, creo, que conducir consultas con estos dos partidos comunistas no será solamente en los intereses del movimiento internacional, pero también en el interés del desarrollo de las nuevas fuerzas que están surgiando." En contestación a una pregunta de un corresponsal del Occidente, Aidit dijo: "Yo, y el PKI, hemos respaldado la declaración de Moscú porque declara en frases definitivas, que todos los comunistas deben condenar y de desenmascarar el revisionismo moderno."

20-21 Julio: Las conversaciones bilaterales PCUS-PC chino terminaron el 20, presididas por Krushev en un banquete ofrecido por el Presidium del PCUS para sus delegados. Un comunicado breve emitido el 21 declaró solo que "através de la reunión, ambos lados expusieron sus puntos de vista y sus posiciones sobre varios asuntos importantes de principio en los desarrollos del mundo contemporáneo, el movimiento internacional comunista, y las relaciones sino-soviéticas. A sugerión de la delegación del PC chino, acordaron tomar un intervalo del trabajo para continuar con la reunión más tarde. El lugar y la hora de la continuación de la reunión se acordará adicionalmente através de consultas entre el CC del PCUS y el CC del PC chino." Pekín informó que el mismo Mao "y otros líderes del

20-22 Julio: Moscú anunció el día 20 que los jefes de los partidos de los países del CAEM se reunirían en Moscú el 24 de julio para "discutir un informe del Comité Ejecutivo del CAEM sobre trabajo que ha de llevar a cabo las decisiones de la conferencia de junio del 1962 del CAEM... y la otra tarea del desarrollo de cooperación económica entre estos dos países." El Washington Post del 22 de julio informó una entrevista concedida por Mihai Ciobanu, "Presidente de la Cámara de Comercio de Rumania, que ha surgido recientemente como el portavoz de su país en las relaciones no solamente con el bloque sino con el mundo Occidental." en el cual condenó al CAEM por haber fracasado con respecto a "los derechos, los intereses y la soberanía" de su país. Ciobanu dijo que "más de un tercio" del equipo capital para la industrialización de Rumania desde el comienzo del plan de seis años en el 1960 había llegado del Occidente. El corresponsal añade que "los economistas extranjeros aquí opinan que la estadística es realmente 60 por ciento o mas."

21 Julio: Todos los periódicos de Pekín le dieron importancia a un informe de la agencia de noticias china Sinjuá que el CC del PCUS en una nueva ola de oposición al PC chino ha "puesto en movimiento todo su medio de propaganda para lanzar calumnias sin freno y difamaciones." "Pravda" y otros periódicos se dice que han publicado declaraciones "tratando escandalosamente de incitar al pueblo chino y a los miembros del PC chino en contra del amado líderato del PC chino."

21 Julio: El órgano húngaro "Nepszabadsag" declara que los partidos y los líderes Marxista-Leninistas "condenan unánimemente las actividades cismáticas de los líderes chinos y su divergencia de los principios guías de Lenin." Describe particularmente a los partidos franceses, alemanes, austríacos, colombianos y chilenos como apoyando la línea de conducta soviética.

21 Julio: El órgano checo "Rude Pravo" añadió otro editorial apoyando la línea de conducta china y "condenando la línea de conducta divergente" de los chinos.

22 Julio: Tanyug informó que Yugoslavia y la Unión Soviética han firmado un protocolo bajo su acuerdo de comercio del 1961-65 bajo el cual los expertos soviéticos serán mandados a Yugoslavia para aconsejar en la instalación del equipo soviético que ha de mandarse a Yugoslavia. Técnicos yugoslavos serán entrenados en la Unión Soviética. Informes de prensa de Moscú sobre el anuncio de que Krushev había aceptado una invitación para visitar a Hungría especularon que posiblemente lo combine con su planeado viaje a Yugoslavia en agosto (anunciado por Krushev en una recepción en la embajada húngara).

No. 8

9 - 22 juillet 1963

9 juillet - Pravda a publié un communiqué de 700 mots du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique attaquant la manifestation du 7 juillet à Pékin au cours de laquelle furent applaudis les 5 Chinois expulsés de l'Union Soviétique pour "dissemination illégale" de la lettre du 14 juin du P.C. chinois; "Cela ne peut être considéré que comme une action concertée tendant à faire naître chez le peuple fraternel chinois des sentiments et un état d'esprit hostiles" à l'égard de l'Union Soviétique, à aggraver la situation alors que les négociations sont en cours... sans tenir compte des conséquences dangereuses d'une pareille politique".

9-16 juillet - L'Agence yougoslave Tanyug annonce de Bucarest la publication de prospectus en langue roumaine qui soutiennent la politique étrangère soviétique. Le premier, daté du 9 juillet, contient sous le titre de "coexistence pacifique" "une critique objective des tendances dogmatiques dans le mouvement international des travailleurs", et mentionne "l'absurdité de la théorie d'exportation de la révolution et parle des principes actuels selon lesquels la coexistence et le désarmement faciliteront le progrès de la libération nationale". Le deuxième, daté du 16, est consacré aux négociations tripartites de Moscou sur l'interdiction des essais atomiques, et "souligne sans équivoque le dévouement de la Roumanie à l'idée du désarmement général" et "salue et soutient les initiatives soviétiques" dans ses négociations.

10 juillet - Tous les journaux de Pékin publient en première page des articles allant jusqu'à 1.200 mots, la déclaration du 10 juillet faite par le parti communiste chinois en réponse à celle du 9 juillet du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique mentionnée ci-dessus, celle-ci étant publiée en bas de la page. Les Chinois se plaignent de ce que l'accusation du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique "était tellement injustifiée" et se demandent si ce n'est pas commettre un acte de calomnie contre le P.C. chinois "que de refuser de porter à la connaissance du peuple ce que notre lettre contenait, et en même temps d'attaquer violemment cette même lettre en la qualifiant de calomnie dirigée contre le P.C. de l'Union Soviétique et en soulevant un tumulte énorme?" La Chine fait preuve de "modération", disent-ils, "ce qui ne fait de doute à personne". Soulignant que le P.C. de l'Union Soviétique a non seulement étendu les différences idéologiques au domaine des relations d'Etat mais "qu'ils fomentent une campagne contre le P.C. chinois à travers l'Union Soviétique", les Chinois demandent "jusqu'à quel point les camarades du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique ont-ils l'intention de porter le différend sino-soviétique?" La presse chinoise a publié également un communiqué de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle émanant de Moscou qui mentionne "la campagne fomentée par le comité central et le P.C. de l'Union Soviétique au moyen de réunions et de résolutions prises par les organisations du parti soviétique d'échelons variés" ainsi

10 juillet - Les Chinois et les Albanais profitent de l'occasion du jour de l'armée albanaise pour souligner leur solidarité idéologique contre le révisionnisme moderne.

10 juillet - Une délégation du parti et du gouvernement hongrois ayant à sa tête Kadar est arrivée à Moscou pour y faire une visite que les observateurs considèrent avoir été arrangée à un moment propice pour prouver la solidarité des européens de l'Est d'un côté et le P.C. de l'U.R.S.S. de l'autre. Khrouchtchev a fait une réception chaleureuse à Kadar, qui fait contraste avec la manière dont il a ignoré la délégation chinoise.

11 juillet - Le deuxième anniversaire du traité de l'amitié entre la Chine et la Corée du Nord a servi de prétexte pour mettre en relief leur solidarité idéologique contre le révisionnisme moderne. De hauts fonctionnaires chinois, commençant par Chou, ont pris part à un rassemblement en masse à Pékin, au cours duquel Kuo Mo-jo, vice-président de la conférence politique consultative des peuples chinois, a porté au cours de son discours l'accusation suivante: "Certains prétendus marxistes-léninistes ont applaudi la soi-disant stratégie de paix de Kennedy et font de leur mieux pour faire paraître l'impérialisme américain et son chef Kennedy sous le meilleur jour. Ils trompent le peuple à des fins dans l'intention de soutenir les projets agressifs de l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis".

13 juillet - C'est pour la première fois que l'un des adversaires déclare publiquement que les entretiens entre partis sont en cours à Moscou. Cette déclaration est contenue dans un éditorial de 2.200 mots paru dans la Quotidien du Peuple qui reconnaît l'existence "de divergences de principe importantes et nombreuses" entre les deux partis, divergences "de nature sérieuse, et se plaignait que "les présenter comme étant soulevées entre le P.C. chinois d'un côté et tout le mouvement international communiste de l'autre est contraire aux faits et ne contribue pas à l'élimination de ces divergences". Malgré les agissements "navrants" des Soviétiques à la veille des entretiens, les Chinois "se sont abstenus de prendre des mesures qui s'imposaient" et ont envoyé leur délégation à la réunion. "Mais nous devons souligner maintenant, le cœur lourd, que les événements ont pris une tournure autre que celle que nous espérions. Au vu des agissements soviétiques, "les peuples sont pleinement justifiés à se demander si le comité central du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique a l'intention de pousser les relations sino-soviétiques jusqu'au seuil d'une rupture... Il est impossible d'imposer un blocus des idées et il est impossible de résoudre des différends idéologiques à coups de décrets et d'ordres... Bien des gens ont commis des folies pareilles dans le passé, et ils ont tous échoué." Mais les différends seront résolus, disent-ils "si vraiment l'on se traitait l'un l'autre en égaux au lieu que chacun essaye de s'imposer à l'autre. Si les différends

attendre jusqu'à demain. S'ils ne pouvaient pas être résolus cette année, ils peuvent attendre jusqu'à l'an prochain."

14 juillet - Le Quotidien du Peuple a reproduit un article de l'Observer qui se plaignait amèrement des efforts qu'accomplissent les Etats Unis dans le but de séduire l'Union Soviétique engagée à s'opposer à la Chine, et à empoisonner les relations sino-soviétiques". L'article accuse "l'imperialisme des Etats Unis" d'avoir "faussé à dessein les opinions révolutionnaires du P.C. chinois, affirmant que la Chine s'opposait à la coexistence pacifique, et belliqueuse, et prêche l'exportation de la révolution", (mais c'est exactement ce que fait le P.C. de l'Union Soviétique dans sa lettre publiée simultanément, - voir ci-dessous).

14 juillet - Un bref article par le Tokyo Mainichi concernant les observations faites par le ministère des affaires étrangères japonais sur les entretiens, déclare que d'après le ministère des affaires étrangères il y aurait 88 partis communistes dans le monde, dont 22 sont pro-soviétiques, 6 pro-chinois, "et le reste adoptant surtout une attitude d'opportunisme neutre. Le ministère des affaires étrangères déclare cependant qu'il y a un certain nombre de partis prétendus neutres qui penchent vers la Chine communiste, tels par exemple ceux du Japon et de la Roumanie. Par conséquent, le ministère des affaires étrangères prend note du fait qu'un certain leader communiste chinois a déclaré que la moitié des parties communistes du monde soutenaient la Chine communiste".

14 juillet - Pravda publie une lettre ouverte de 22.000 mots "du comité central du P.C. soviétique à toutes les organisations de partis et à tous les communistes de l'Union Soviétique," elle publie enfin également le texte de la lettre du 14 juillet du P.C. chinois à laquelle sa lettre ouverte constitue une réponse. Etant donnée la longueur et l'importance de cette lettre, nous en donnons l'analyse à la fin de notre chronologie. La lettre du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique a été reproduite en entier, avec le texte de la lettre du 14 juin du P.C. chinois, le 15 juillet dans le Rabotnichesko Delo, organe du parti bulgare, le Rude Pravo, organe tchèque, et le Neues Deutschland, organe de l'Allemagne de l'Est; elle l'a été le 16 par le Nepszabadsag, organe du parti hongrois. L'organe polonais Trybuna Ludu du 15 donnait en entier le texte de la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique mais ne donnait que des extraits de la lettre du P.C. chinois. (Cette information a été donnée par la presse de Pékin le 17, mais sans reproduire le contenu de la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique.) Les Roumains restent "différents des autres", et suivirent plus tard en publiant les deux lettres dans leur organe Scinteia la première moitié le 17 et la deuxième moitié le 18. Le 19 juillet, tous les journaux de la Mongolie publiaient le texte de la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique (mais ne semblent pas avoir publié celui de la lettre chinoise).

15 juillet - Un article de 2.000 mots signé "Observateur" dans le Quotidien du Peuple attaque violemment "le groupe de Tito" pour avoir "attisé les flammes avec frénésie, empoisonné les relations sino-soviétiques, détruit l'harmonie entre la Chine et l'Union Soviétique ainsi que celle du mouvement international communiste, et avoir offert sa marchandise qui, à la connaissance de tous, consiste de révisionnisme moderne".

15 juillet - La Pravda publie un éditorial de 2,500 mots concernant "la lettre ouverte" du P.C. soviétique et déclare que cette lettre a été publiée "le jour précédent" "en raison des agissements hostiles des leaders du P.C. chinois, de leur désir d'envenimer la discorde qui existe dans le mouvement communiste international et qu'ils ont eux-mêmes soulevé, la déformation intentionnelle qu'ils apportent à la position de notre parti et de l'interprétation incohérente des raisons qui nous ont poussés à nous abstenir temporairement de publier la lettre du P.C. chinois du 14 juin. Ayant confondu notre patience avec de la faiblesse, les camarades chinois se mirent à traiter notre désir d'éviter d'envenimer la controverse comme s'il constituait presque une intention de cacher aux communistes soviétiques et aux peuples soviétiques les opinions des leaders chinois." L'éditorial va jusqu'à accuser les Chinois de "établir et tenir des positions spéciales sur les questions raciales d'aujourd'hui". Le reste de l'éditorial consiste en une revue rapide de la position soviétique sur les questions importantes de la controverse, telles qu'elles ont été présentées dans la lettre ouverte. Izvestiya consacre un éditorial sur le même sujet, soulignant le soutien accordé au point de vue du P.C. soviétique par le peuple de l'Union Soviétique.

16 juillet - Un article de 2.000 mots signé "Observateur" dans le Quotidien du Peuple attaque "les réactionnaires de l'Inde dans le chœur anti-Chinois", se servant de phrases presque identiques à celles de leur attaque du 14 juillet dirigée contre les Etats Unis: "La tactique de Nehru, qui utilise le différend sino-soviétique et empoisonne les relations entre Chinois et Soviétiques consiste à approuver l'Union Soviétique et à dénigrer la Chine; à faire la cour à l'Union Soviétique et à attaquer la Chine."

16 juillet - La Pravda publie un éditorial de 1.400 mots sur "l'unité indestructible du parti et du peuple" qui décrit la manière dont "les communistes et tout le peuple soviétique ont réagi, avec ferme approbation à la lettre ouverte". Un éditorial de 1.000 mots dans Izvestiya, "un soutien puissant" alla même jusqu'à déclarer que "la presse des pays socialistes et des partis communistes dans les pays capitalistes partage entièrement la position prise dans la lettre ouverte", et elle cite le Rude Pravo tchèque et la Trybuna Ludu polonaise ainsi que l'Humanité et l'Unita en tant qu'exemples.

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jusque dans sa phraseologie. Attaquant la lettre du 14 juin du P.C. chinois dès le début, il déclare "tout le monde... se trouve non seulement surpris par son ton dédaigneux et son vocabulaire qui est loin d'être élégant, son manque de respect envers la réalité et les faits objectifs, sa rudesse en proférant les accusations les plus grossières contre le parti soviétique et d'autres partis communistes: ce qui frappe la vue... est le fait de souligner sans cesse la ligne révolutionnaire, opposée à la prétendue ligne opportuniste et révisionniste de certaines gens."

16 juillet - Nepszabadsag, organe du parti hongrois, fait suivre le texte des deux lettres d'un éditorial de 900 mots qui condamne les Chinois pour avoir "cherché à aiguïser encore plus le conflit de manière à pouvoir, au moyen d'interprétations arbitraires de déformation et de falsification de la ligne des partis communistes et travailleurs, discute conjointement et universellement, impose au mouvement communiste ses propres vues profondément erronées qui ont été réfutées aussi bien par l'histoire que par la réalité présente," et affirme que "les communistes hongrois sont entièrement d'accord avec la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique."

17 juillet - Tous les journaux de Sofia publient des éditoriaux soulignant l'importance de la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique. Rabotnichesko Delo, organe du parti, affirme que "les travailleurs bulgares étroitement unis autour du parti communiste bulgare, guidé par son comité central, expriment de nouveau leur soutien chaleureux au grand parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique,..."

17 juillet - Le Politika yougoslave déclare que "les leaders de Pékin se sont embarqués en une croisade contre tous les partis communistes, les mouvements démocratiques, les gens progressifs, contre les idées réelles du marxisme-lénisme qui ont été débarrassées avec le succès que l'on sait des résidus du stalinisme." Le journal conclut: "Il ne peut être question d'un compromis avec les idées réactionnaires et caduques des Chinois, puisque la moindre concession à leurs vues présentes entraînerait la défaite du socialisme dans son ensemble, puisque cela équivaldrait à renier les véritables idées du socialisme. Pour cette raison la résolution du P.C. soviétique avec Khrouchchev à sa tête, dans le conflit avec les dogmatistes de Pékin est non seulement soutenue par les partis communistes, mais également par tous les gens progressifs du monde." Komunist, l'organe du parti yougoslave, publiait un article analogue le jour suivant.

17 juillet - Le Trud de Moscou publiait un article de son correspondant en voyage en Chine après la célébration du premier mai 1963, dans lequel celui-ci se plaint de l'ingratitude manifestée par le P.C. chinois dans sa façon

manquant de sagesse de soulever parmi le peuple fraternel chinois des sentiments et un état d'esprit hostiles envers l'U.R.S.S. Ceci évidemment nous a fait de la peine. Nous avons pensé: Qui a besoin de cela et pourquoi faire?" Le même jour, Krasnaya Zvezda, journal des forces armées, publiait en première page des compte-rendus de rapports faits par des officiers supérieurs aux académies militaires supérieures sur la nature du différend et sur le point de vue du parti soviétique.

10 juillet - Trybuna Ludu, organe du parti polonais, publiait un éditorial de 2.100 mots qui, bien que plus modéré dans son opposition à la ligne chinoise que ne l'ont été les autres organes du bloc soviétique, assurait de son entier soutien de la ligne du parti communiste soviétique en termes les plus clairs.

18 juillet - La presse chinoise fait connaître, dans un reportage sur les obsèques, que l'ambassadeur albanais en Chine ainsi que six autres camarades albanais, et le secrétaire commercial de l'ambassade chinoise en Afghanistan avec deux courriers chinois, ont été tués dans la catastrophe de l'avion soviétique du 13 juillet, qu'un TU-104 qui les transportait de Pékin à Moscou s'écrasa à l'atterrissage à Irkutsk. Les funérailles prirent l'allure d'un événement d'Etat, avec couronnes du premier ministre Chou En-lai entre autres, et en présence du vice premier ministre Chen Yi.

18 juillet - La Pravda publie un article de 2.000 mots par Stépanov, défendant la conception soviétique d'aide au mouvement de libération nationale, et comportant l'accusation que "les camarades chinois se refusent essentiellement à reconnaître en tant que révolutionnaires une seule mesure, une seule action qui n'entraîne avec elle l'odeur de la poudre."

18 juillet - L'agence indonésienne Antara fait savoir que le président du parti communiste indonésien Aidit a déclaré: "Je voudrais affirmer de nouveau que les communistes indonésiens n'ont pas la prétention de devenir les médiateurs car ils n'ont pas l'impression d'être en dehors de la grande discussion présente qui a lieu dans le mouvement international communiste... Le P.C. indonésien estime qu'il serait bon de procéder à des entretiens bilatéraux... et de réunir tous les partis marxistes-léninistes." L'agence indonésienne poursuit en déclarant: "Les observateurs ont noté qu'une fois de plus Aidit a évité de prendre le parti des communistes chinois ouvertement et en public. Comme on le sait, les organisations et les leaders du P.C. indonésien avaient soutenu les Chinois aux réunions internationales et dans des articles de presse sur des problèmes variés."

18 juillet - Les journaux communistes de Sidney et de

Melbourne, d'après la Australian Overseas Service, déclara
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parti à Victoria en raison des différends entre Pékin et
Moscou atteint maintenant le total de 62. Le comité cen-
tral prétend que ceci est l'effet d'un effort concerté du
groupe à la tête duquel se trouve E. F. Hill, ancien se-
crétaire de Victoria, qui a rejeté la politique de coex-
istence pacifique, dans le but de créer la confusion et
une impression que le parti souffre d'une rupture majeure.

18 juillet - El Siglo, organe officiel du P.C. chilien,
affirme être d'accord avec le P.C. de l'Union Soviétique
contre "les divagations calomnieuses" des Chinois qui "sont
non seulement fausses mais qui falsifient et trahissent le
marxisme."

19 juillet - L'éditorial du Quotidien du Peuple "dévoilant
la fraude nucléaire des Etats Unis" conclut: "Nous espérons
que l'Union Soviétique ne tombera pas dans cette trappe."
Le même jour, la presse pékinoise publie d'une manière
provoquante en première page le compte-rendu concernant
un rassemblement de plus de 10.000 Chinois à Pékin, qui
accueillirent chaleureusement la délégation chinoise de
retour du congrès de la Fédération démocratique interna-
le des femmes tenue à Moscou. "Une résolution adoptée à
ce rassemblement, parmi un tonnerre d'applaudissements,
promettait un soutien complet des activités de la délégation
des femmes chinoises et de la ligne correcte qu'elles
ont constamment soutenue au cours du congrès. La résolu-
tion condamnait le chef de la délégation des femmes so-
viétiques et certains leaders de la Fédération démocratique
internationale des femmes pour avoir fait ouvertement
un choc anti-chinois au cours du congrès, et pour leur
arrogance et la façon arbitraire de porter atteinte à la
démocratie ainsi que pour leurs agissements sectaires et
semant la discorde." Teng Ying-chao qui a ouvert le ras-
semblement, a dit que la délégation chinoise "...souten-
nait la lutte commune contre l'ennemi, qu'elle avait pro-
tégé ses positions avec succès au cours d'une lutte vio-
lente et intense contre les attaques, les calomnies et
les manœuvres les plus basses." Le chef de la délégation
Yang Yun-yu a déclaré que "sous l'effet des manipulations
de Popova, chef de la délégation soviétique," le congrès
"se déroula d'une façon très peu satisfaisante." Ça été,
dit-elle, "le congrès le plus mauvais et le moins démoc-
ratique qui ait jamais eu lieu dans l'histoire de la Fé-
dération démocratique internationale des femmes."

19 juillet - L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle an-
nonce que le 18 juillet le gouvernement tchécoslovaque a demandé le
rappel de trois correspondants chinois de l'Agence de
presse de la Chine nouvelle qui se trouvaient à Prague,
(à l'époque, deux d'entre eux se trouvaient à Pékin),
prétextant que leurs communiqués contenaient de la po-
lémique chinoise. L'ambassadeur chinois "rejeta cette
requête déraisonnable sur place," et le 13 juillet l'am-
bassade protestait vigoureusement et rejetait catégorique-

ment cette demande déraisonnable." Toutefois, le 17 juillet n'ayant pas donné suite à leur requête de rappel. (D'autre part, l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle poursuit toujours les activités contre lesquelles nous avons protesté". Les Tchèques retirèrent la carte de presse au correspondant se trouvant en Tchécoslovaquie et lui donnèrent 48 heures pour quitter le pays. "De cette manière le gouvernement tchèque a provoqué un incident sérieux, sapant l'unité entre les peuples chinois et tchécoslovaque et portant atteinte aux relations sino-tchécoslovaques." Le 20 juillet, tous les journaux de Pékin publiaient une déclaration du ministère des affaires étrangères chinois concernant cette expulsion, ainsi que les commentaires de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle. Le 20 juillet, Prague faisait également paraître une déclaration du gouvernement tchèque sur l'incident, déclarant que le correspondant expulsé avait quitté le pays le 19 juillet.

19 juillet - Prenant la parole à une réunion au Kremlin en l'honneur de la visite du chef hongrois Kadar, Khrouchtchev, d'après le témoignage de correspondants occidentaux, fit éclater un barrage improvisé contre les communistes, cherchant ses mots, manifestement sérieux et appelant l'audience à son aide lorsqu'il se mettait à bafouiller à la recherche d'un mot. Khrouchtchev aurait dit: "Je déclare à ceux qui voudraient nous renverser: je vous défie, Messieurs. Camarades, prenons n'importe quelle usine ou n'importe quelle ferme collective. Vous y présenterez votre programme et nous y présenterons le nôtre. Laissons le peuple juger. Et vous pouvez être sûrs que vous n'aurez pas besoin d'armure ou de rembourrage pour vous protéger..."

19 juillet - Le comité central du parti tchèque a fait paraître une déclaration de 2.500 mots d'après laquelle la lettre ouverte du P.C. soviétique "s'harmonise entièrement avec les vues et les lignes de conduite de notre parti". Il déclare qu'une lettre envoyée le 20 juillet 1962 au comité central du P.C. chinois "précisait en détails les agissements extrêmement nuisibles des représentants chinois aux organisations internationales, ainsi que les opinions incorrectes des chefs du parti communiste chinois sur les questions politiques fondamentales;" mais, "les faits et les arguments de cette lettre n'eurent pas de réponse directe de la part des chefs du parti communiste chinois qui refusèrent d'en tenir compte." Une deuxième lettre fut envoyée le 9 juillet 1962. Les Tchèques prétendent également que la cause de l'économie nationale de la Tchécoslovaquie et d'autres pays socialistes a subi "des torts sérieux" du fait de la réduction abrupte des relations commerciales avec la Chine "par la faute des représentants chinois."

20 juillet - Tous les journaux de Pékin annoncent en première page la déclaration datée du 19 juillet d'un porte-parole du comité central du parti communiste chinois au

sujet de la lettre ouverte du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique. Sur l'une des autres pages, ils publièrent le texte en entier de la lettre soviétique (avec de nombreux passages en caractères gras) accompagné de commentaires éditoriaux du Quotidien du Peuple. Le Quotidien du Peuple publia aussi à nouveau le texte entier de la lettre du 14 juin du P.C. chinois "de manière à ce que le parti communiste chinois et le peuple chinois puissent connaître les opinions des deux côtés, les comparer et les étudier." La déclaration du P.C. chinois précisait que les journaux nationaux, provinciaux et urbains de la Chine publieraient également la lettre du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique, et que les deux lettres seraient radiodiffusées au monde entier en un grand nombre de langues. Les Chinois déclarèrent qu'ils reproduisaient leur propre lettre "afin de permettre à leurs adversaires d'avoir le matériel à leur disposition pour qu'ils puissent en faire une critique à la hauteur. Pour parler franchement, jusqu'à présent cette critique n'a été ni à la hauteur ni convaincante." Ils ajoutèrent: "Il n'y a qu'une raison pour nous faire radiodiffuser la lettre ouverte du 14 juillet émanant du comité central du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique: c'est un exemplaire de travail remarquable. Pour citer un poème chinois: un travail remarquable devrait être apprécié ensemble et les doutes devraient être analysés en compagnie... La lettre ouverte du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique constitue un document supérieur permettant d'apprendre par l'exemple négatif." La déclaration conclut: "Les impérialistes, avec les Etats Unis à leur tête, les réactionnaires indiens ainsi que la clique révisionniste yougoslave l'ont acclamé unanimement et ont dénigré le parti communiste chinois. De pareilles déclarations méritent qu'on s'y arrête. Nous sélectionnerons ceux qui méritent de recevoir un prix, et nous les publierons pour que tous les membres de notre parti et tout le peuple chinois puissent les apprécier."

Une note éditoriale du Quotidien du Peuple accuse la lettre de chercher à semer la confusion dans l'esprit du peuple et à verser du poison sur la question de la guerre nucléaire, au moyen de basses accusations telles que celle de l'esprit belligérant que manifesterait la Chine, et en particulier au moyen d'attaques dirigées contre le camarade Mao Tse-toung. En accusant les Chinois d'avoir fait un revirement de 180 degrés, dans l'évaluation du 20e congrès du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique "les leaders du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique savent parfaitement que le comité central du P.C. chinois n'a jamais considéré que le 20e congrès du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique ait été entièrement positif." Prenez un autre exemple, la question de faire étendre le désaccord idéologique au domaine des relations d'Etat. Le fait est que le 16 juillet 1960, le côté soviétique a notifié soudainement à la Chine sa décision de retirer les plus 1.300 experts soviétiques en Chine dans le courant du mois, d'annuler les centaines d'accords et de

breux articles importants d'équipement et de matériel... Et cependant le parti central du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique accuse la Chine... un départ aussi complet de la vérité et vraiment étonnant! La lettre ouverte est pleine d'exemples de ce genre - au moins 70 à 80 de ces exemples - et il est impossible ici de les citer tous. Nous allons donner le matériel nécessaire pour élucider ces questions dans des articles à venir."

20 juillet - Neues Deutschland, organe de l'Allemagne de l'Est, publie un éditorial de 5.000 mots qui exprime une approbation complète de la lettre ouverte du P.C. de l'Union Soviétique, y compris la déclaration que de bonnes relations entre la République Populaire chinoise et les autres pays socialistes "ont chagré avec l'avènement du grand bond en avant." Les Allemands soulignent également "qu'il est significatif que dans toute la lettre du comité central du P.C. chinois du 14 juin il n'y ait pas un seul mot au sujet de la démocratie socialiste... Peut-être cela a rapport au fait que les leaders du parti communiste chinois ont une conception spéciale de la démocratie socialiste. Nous rappelons par exemple, qu'ils avaient mené une campagne sous le slogan de "Laissez fleurir des centaines de fleurs, laissez des centaines d'écoles de pensée se faire concurrence." Mais, "les leaders du parti communiste chinois eux-mêmes ont fait le contraire... Alors que dans leur déclaration de 1960, les partis communistes et ouvriers sont partis du principe qu'à notre époque de transition du capitalisme au socialisme la lutte entre les deux systèmes constitue le problème principal, les leaders du parti communiste chinois renient ce fait et prétendent que la lutte du mouvement national de libération en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique Latine représente le front de combat principal, le contre d'attaque de la révolution mondiale...."

20 juillet - La délégation du parti communiste indonésien ayant à sa tête le président Aidit est arrivée à Moscou. L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle fait savoir qu'Aidit a déclaré à l'aérodrome de Djakarta: "Les impérialistes et les révisionnistes yougoslaves cherchaient de leur mieux à torpiller les entretiens entre le parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et le parti communiste chinois" et: "pour ma part, je crois que procéder à des consultations avec ces deux partis communistes constituera non seulement une action dans l'intérêt du mouvement international, mais également dans l'intérêt du développement des nouvelles forces qui se créent." Répondant à une question par un correspondant occidental, Aidit déclara: "Moi-même et le parti communiste indonésien nous nous sommes rangés du côté de la déclaration de Moscou parce qu'elle déclare en termes précis que tous les communistes doivent condamner et dévoiler le révisionnisme moderne."

20-21 juillet - Les entretiens bilatéraux entre le parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et le parti communiste chinois se sont poursuivies le 20 et 21 juillet.

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un banquet donné par le présidium du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique en l'honneur des délégués. Un bref communiqué public le 21 déclarait seulement que "au cours de la réunion les deux côtés ont présenté leurs vues et leurs positions sur un nombre important de questions de principe concernant les événements actuels dans le monde, le mouvement international communiste, et les relations sino-soviétiques. A la suggestion de la délégation du parti communiste chinois, l'entente a été faite de procéder à une interruption du travail de la délégation et de continuer la réunion à une date ultérieure. Le lieu et la date de cette nouvelle réunion seraient décidés après consultation supplémentaire entre les comités centraux du parti communiste soviétique et du parti communiste chinois." Pékin annonce que Mao lui-même "et d'autres leaders du parti et de l'Etat étaient parmi les 5.000 personnes présentes à l'énorme cérémonie de bienvenue en l'honneur de la délégation" à Pékin.

20-22 juillet - Le 20, Moscou annonçait que les chefs des pays du Conseil pour l'assistance économique mutuelle se réuniraient à Moscou le 24 juillet afin de "discuter d'un rapport du comité exécutif de ce conseil sur le travail accompli pour la mise en application des décisions de la conférence du conseil de juin 1962... ainsi que du travail à venir pour le développement de la coopération économique entre ces pays." Le Washington Post du 22 juillet publiait une interview accordée par Ilihai Ciobanu, "résident de la Chambre de commerce roumaine, qui récemment est ressorti en tant que porte-parole de son pays au sujet des relations avec les pays du bloc et ceux du monde occidental," dans lequel il condamnait le COMECON pour n'avoir pas respecté "les droits, les intérêts et la souveraineté" de son pays. Ciobanu a déclaré que "plus d'un tiers" du capital d'équipement pour l'industrialisation de la Roumanie depuis l'avènement en 1960 du plan de six ans de ce pays, provenait de l'Occident. Le reporter ajoute que "les économistes étrangers estiment ici que ce chiffre dépasserait réellement 60 pour-cent."

21 juillet - Tous les journaux de Pékin publient un communiqué de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle selon lequel le comité central du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique, dans une nouvelle vague d'opposition aux parti communiste chinois, "a mis en marche tous ses moyens de propagande pour se lancer en une débauche de calomnies." Pravda et d'autres journaux auraient fait des déclarations "qui cherchent nettement à inciter le peuple chinois et les membres du parti communiste chinois à se dresser contre les chefs bien-aimés du parti communiste chinois."

21 juillet - Nepszabadszag, organe hongrois, déclare que les partis marxistes-léninistes et les leaders "condamnent unanimement les agissements schismatiques des leaders chinois ainsi que leur déviation des principes directeurs léninistes." Il cite en particulier les partis français,

21 juillet - Rude Pravo, organe tchécoslovaque, publie un éditorial de plus qui soutient la ligne soviétique et "condamne la politique chinoise qui sème la division".

22 juillet - Tanyug fait savoir que la Yougoslavie et l'U.R.S.S. ont signé un protocole aux termes de leur accord commercial pour 1961-1965, qui prévoit l'envoi d'experts soviétiques en Yougoslavie pour conseiller au sujet de l'installation de l'équipement soviétique qui sera envoyé en Yougoslavie. D'autre part, des techniciens yougoslaves feront des stages en Union Soviétique. Des communiqués de presse émanant de Moscou concernant la nouvelle que Khrouchtchev a accepté une invitation de se rendre en Hongrie, déclaraient qu'il pourrait combiner ce voyage avec la visite projetée en Yougoslavie pour le mois d'août (annoncé par Khrouchtchev le 19 juillet à la réception de l'ambassade hongroise).

632. Communist Internationalism - Past, Present and Future.

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: The attached, UNCLASSIFIED 9-page study on subject provides background information (additional copies may be ordered from HQ). It traces the origin of Communist internationalism back to MARX' "Communist Manifesto," briefly outlines the facts of the first, second and third Internationals and of the COMINFORM and summarizes the role of the International Communist Fronts and of International party meetings in the WCM since World War Two. It describes the inexorable decline of Communist internationalism from Lenin through Stalin to the present and concludes by briefly discussing the principal current contradictions preventing a true internationalist policy or a true global organization of the WCM. At the end, 5 books are listed for recommended reading.

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683. East-West Trade: A False Issue

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: One favorite tactic of the Soviets is to seize a slogan which, in itself, almost everyone would support, then to maintain that this is a Soviet program and to claim that Western capitalist governments, in particular the United States government, are opposed to this program. "Peaceful coexistence" is one such slogan and another is "improving East-West trade." Sometimes American policies which are essential for free world security, such as the embargo on the export of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc, can be twisted to blacken the reputation of the United States. Also, for reasons of internal politics, moral indignation, and bureaucratic difficulties, Americans sometimes do things which lend color to Soviet accusations and which appear irrational to outsiders: for instance, boycotts of Polish ham sales. Armed with such cases, Soviet propagandists find it easy to convince various wishful thinkers that the Soviets offer wonderful things, and are only obstructed by selfish American interests.

International Trade Conference. Slogans of this kind are all the more useful when they can be aired in the atmosphere of an international conference, preferably one including as many underdeveloped nations as possible. In the field of trade, a conference is now planned to take place under UN auspices in March 1964: the World Trade and Development Conference (WTDC). The Soviets have pressed for an East-West trade conference for many years, and last year the United States accepted a modified conference proposal sponsored by 34 Asian, African and Latin American countries, and also by Yugoslavia; this proposal was adopted by the UN Assembly last December. The 34-nation proposal was acceptable to the US because it stressed the problem of helping developing countries, because it was limited to UN members (thus excluding Communist China and East Germany), and because it provided that measures would be taken up "leading to the gradual removal of tariff, non-tariff, and other trade barriers arising from industrialized countries which affect the exports of developing countries and expansion of international trade in general." Such barriers could include Soviet closed markets and state trade monopolies as well as western embargoes.

Even preparatory meetings provide sounding boards. In a first preparatory meeting for the WTDC, last February, the Soviets made a new effort to insert "obstacles to East-West trade" in the agenda, their vague formula being intended to open the way for propaganda attack. In a second preparatory meeting (at Geneva) in June, the Soviets urged long-term trade agreements (coinciding with Soviet five year plans), and tried to make development assistance contingent on disarmament, as well as attacking Western embargoes as usual.

More indicative of Soviet strategy were proposals at the June meeting for establishing a UN World Trade Organization, which would replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which the United States and 41 other countries adhere (as full partners; there are 10 others who participate under special arrangements), and which serves to settle economic differences between the major free world economic groupings, such as the US, the Common Market, and the European Free Trade Association. GATT is a multilateral contract which encourages the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of quotas, and above all, the equal treatment of all foreign partners in each market (most-favored-nation principle). In other words, GATT serves as an instrument for free world economic cooperation, and also for the spread of the classic principles of free trade, and its destruction would be a political as well as an economic setback to the United States and its allies. The Soviets accordingly attack GATT, and try to convince developing countries that the organization they propose would be more helpful. The Soviets would exercise a veto in their proposed World Trade Organization, along Troika lines, and would use it to impose a pattern of bilateral trade in which their economic superiority vis-a-vis many other countries would enable them to trade on their own terms. By its nature, the Soviet trade monopoly system is a highly discriminatory device which makes the USSR unfit for participation in a GATT-type system, and the logical western response to Soviet demands is to demand that the Soviets drop all import restrictions, use world prices as a base for internal prices, and in fact adopt a free market system. Soviet attacks on western embargoes are only red herrings designed to conceal the completely controlled character of Soviet foreign trade. But the Soviets apparently intend to launch a major attack on GATT, and also on the Common Market, at the WTDC, all the more so since the WTDC will meet two months before the opening of GATT negotiations under the "Kennedy round," in May 1964.

Soviet goals at the approaching WTDC help to explain recent Soviet efforts to convince Western businessmen that new markets are available in the Bloc, if only Western governments will remove restrictions. These Soviet efforts follow a typical pattern: first, it was made known that the Soviets are ready to contract for large amounts of steel pipe, large numbers of ships, or large-scale plants. Then it is found that the Soviet desires involve a conflict with Western embargoes or business secrets, and the Western businessmen, ready and anxious to trade, are encouraged to think that they are thwarted by Western governments or self-interested monopolies (e.g. oil). The Soviets hope and expect that pressure on Western governments will result.

Thus, Soviet delegations visited the United Kingdom last fall, and the US this spring, spreading stories that large orders might be placed. The British were led to think that they could sell ships (shipbuilding is a depressed industry in most countries, and especially in the UK), but it turned out that the Soviets wanted to pay in oil. Even though the UK was willing to consider such a deal, no Soviet order for ships came forward. Britain, Germany, and the US were much concerned early this year over the question of whether large-diameter pipe should be exported to the USSR, and although the

Germans agreed that this would be contrary to NATO security interests and cancelled their contracts, the British were apparently ready to violate NATO solidarity in order to sell the pipe (pipe is not on the COCOM list and its manufacture would have aided a depressed area). Yet the Soviets, while getting some pipe from Sweden, have left the British dangling; apparently they calculate that the disappointment will cause the British to agitate further against export restrictions, causing political-economic problems involving also allied policy.

In another case, the Soviets gave British engineering firms to understand that they were ready to buy a \$280,000,000 refinery, which would be the world's largest. It turned out that the Soviets not only wanted assurances that they were getting the most up-to-date equipment, they also wanted to "see for themselves" that they were getting it -- in other words, they wanted access to all the secrets of the big international oil companies, something which none of the engineers could possibly have obtained for them. (See The Statist, 21 June 1963) Yet the "offer" was later dangled again when Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party, visited Moscow in June. It may be that the Soviets will eventually place an order for such a refinery somewhere, since they need it and since it need not involve any trade secrets, but meanwhile they are using the proposal to tantalize British businessmen, and British politicians as well. Berthold Beitz, the General Manager of Krupp, was warmly received in Moscow in May, even having a long interview with Khrushchev. Possibly Beitz brought home some secret orders, but according to Der Spiegel (5 June), he failed to secure a ship contract he had sought.

As in the case of British business, the Soviets may be trying to use Beitz to bring pressure on his government. In England, a meeting was held from 11 to 15 March, with Soviet and World Peace Council participation, and passed a resolution urging governments to support the WTDC and to have the WTDC "seek the elimination of the cold war in trade." On 5 July, a report appeared, signed by 20 British industrialists calling themselves the East-West Trade Group; this report stated that the British Government could increase trade if it would review import licensing to end discrimination against East European products (read "Soviet oil"), begin discussion with these countries on a five-year trade expansion program (which would fit in with the next five year plans), and extend credit insurance covering contracts for capital equipment bought by East European countries (easing a current Soviet shortage of foreign exchange).

The possible benefits of trade with the Bloc are easily exaggerated. The East-West Trade Group claimed that British exports to the Bloc would be tripled in five years -- which if true would make them come to 9% of current British exports to non-sterling areas. This would not radically improve the British foreign trade situation, since some of these exports would otherwise be exported elsewhere. For all of Beitz's activity, Krupp's exports to the Soviets only come to DM 15 million out of a total product of DM 4 billion. West Germany is the largest exporter to the USSR outside the Bloc, with \$179.3 million in 1961: total West German exports that year were

\$12.7 billion. The fact that the West Germans can be the greatest exporters to the USSR sheds a strange light on Soviet claims that "cold war" considerations are an obstacle to trade; if this were true, West Germany should stand at the bottom of the scale.

Soviet Economic Needs. The Soviets are indeed interested in making purchases abroad; in particular, they want to obtain advanced western technology without doing expensive research (for industrial espionage) themselves. Recent Soviet purchases abroad include chemical plants (to produce fertilizers, synthetic fibers, and synthetic fuels), and they have also interested themselves in food processing equipment. These purchases seem to reflect a current crash program to make Soviet agriculture produce, and to get more food (for example, by fishing).

But the Western strategic embargoes are not the limiting factor in Soviet foreign trade. In volume, the results of ending such restrictions would be insignificant. The limitation, to put it baldly, is that the Soviets can't finance their purchases with enough of anything that anyone wants. Principal Soviet exports are oil, lumber, grain, and ores and metals, in that order. In the case of oil, much has lately been diverted to Cuba; in the case of lumber, neither Soviet supply nor Western markets are susceptible to major expansion; in the case of grain, there is ordinarily none to spare outside the Bloc; in the case of ores and metals, the values are low. The Soviets have discussed the export of machinery with various nations, especially the British, but it is doubtful that Soviet machines could be marketed in volume in any advanced industrial country, and there is always the problem of parts and service. Adequate marketing and service organizations are costly, and yet essential if sales are to be maintained. As a result of their lack of acceptable exports, the Soviets are now suffering from a shortage of foreign exchange, and their situation in the near future in this respect is likely to grow more difficult. Exporters who are offered contracts by the Soviets would be well advised to be sure that payment is fully guaranteed, as some creditors may find themselves offered the choice of some low-value barter commodity or nothing.

Soviet economic plans avoid foreign trade. The Soviets give no indication that they are seriously interested in making foreign trade a greater factor in their economic life. Their economic plans aim largely at self-sufficiency: the proportion and pattern of these plans leave no gaps which might indicate any expectation to import materials in question.

What are the true Soviet objectives in the foreign trade field?

1. They want to obtain easier credit and better conditions for barter in order to buy the things they need most urgently.

2. They want to obtain knowledge of advanced western industrial techniques. If western strategic controls are eased, and trade secrets are made more readily available,

the result might be a decrease rather than an increase in large scale orders, the buying of prototype plants being no longer necessary. Needless to say, Soviet purchases of prototype machinery are never the beginning of a long-term, continuing requirement; the machines are simply copied.


3. They want to turn Western businessmen against Western governments, making them believe that the governments are standing in the way of increased trade.

4. They want to weaken Western unity by pitting some countries (such as Britain and West Germany) against each other and against the United States over the issue of trade restrictions, also by attacking GATT.

5. They want eventually to establish a World Trade Organization which would obstruct rather than further free multilateral trade, and which would support Soviet efforts to organize trade on a bilateral basis, with Moscow at one end. They doubtlessly hope to get the support of underdeveloped nations in this effort, though these countries are not so unsophisticated on this subject as Moscow thinks.

Actually, the practical dangers of the Soviet trade offensive can easily be overestimated. Perhaps the most serious matter is the possibility that, in countries like Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany, the question of East-West trade may become a political football, with local politicians adopting demagogic anti-American policies. Such tactics, aimed at supposed US hostility to free trade, are completely misdirected. It is the Soviets who are opposed to free trade; it is only they who by a change in their economic policy, could bring about a major increase in their foreign trade volume.

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684 AF,g. Nkrumah's Political Extremism

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BACKGROUND: Although the African heads-of-state meeting at Addis Ababa turned down President Nkrumah's plan for the immediate, political unity of Africa, the unprecedented meeting of 30 of the 33 independent African countries reflects to some degree Nkrumah's own strenuous pan-African drive. For six years the Ghanaian leader has exhorted other leaders and their peoples to accept his concept of an Africa united under a strong central government and he has left little doubt that he envisions himself as the first President of a united African nation.

Nkrumah has also resorted to widespread subversion in other African countries by providing money and arms to radical nationalist groups; training and supporting potential opposition leaders and exiles from independent countries; and inveighing against other governments through an extensive propaganda program.

The Addis Ababa conference heard many public, though frequently veiled, references to Nkrumah's interference in the political life of other African countries. Mali's President Keita undoubtedly had Ghana in mind when he spoke against African countries which maintain exiles who are plotting "subversive activities in independent African states."

Organizations with supra-national responsibilities. Nkrumah has established several comprehensive organizations to further his efforts and provide the foundation for an all-African structure. The African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) is the executive for implementing Nkrumah's pan-African policies. Its official action arm, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), was established in 1959 ostensibly, according to the Ghana Yearbook, to concern itself with "political parties and movements....especially the dependent African states which are engaged in the fight to free themselves from foreign domination. It provides these parties, movements and similar organizations with necessary information to promote achievement of their objectives" (our underlining). The BAA is Nkrumah's most important organizational weapon for subversion and persuasion in African countries. For example, Ghana supported exiles from neighboring Togo who were plotting to overthrow the Prime Minister; one of the exiles was the leader of an unsuccessful assassination attempt. At the same time he urged that Togo be integrated into Ghana. In another case, witnesses at a Nigerian subversion trial in early 1963 testified to having received training in subversive techniques in Ghana (even including an unverified suggestion that some of the instructors were from the Communist bloc).

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The African Affairs Center (AAC) is responsible for exiles from dependent African countries and from those whose regimes are hostile to Nkrumah. Exiles from South Africa, Angola, Ivory Coast, Togo, Nigeria and Cameroon are among those who have fled to Ghana. The Center receives and houses them and arranges for their support and training.

The Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science at Winneba, Ghana, was established for the avowed purpose of providing "ideological education to activists and Freedom Fighters of the African Struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" and for training students in the "African Liberation Movement." (See staff study on "Nkrumaism and Communist Molding of Ghana Youth," sent to certain stations with Book Dispatch #3695, 18 March 1963). Here nationalist leaders from the dependent African countries are trained in the organizational and ideological principles of Nkrumaism -- principles which closely resemble those of the Communist world. The Institute's political science syllabus, for example, contains thirteen subheadings of which eight are identical with those in Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the basic ideological text published by the CPSU in 1959. Other course outlines correspond closely to those of Political Economy -- A Marxist Textbook written by John Eaton, a leading member of the British CP. The Institute's director is assistant to the Director of Press and Radio for advising the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation on "political interpretation and proper treatment of news items," -- insuring that Ghanaians also receive the proper political indoctrination.

The Ghanaian Trade Unions Congress (GTUC) has been active in supporting radical African trade union movements, the anti-Western All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) in particular, and in disaffecting affiliates of the free world international Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). GTUC brings trade union officials to the Kwame Nkrumah Institute for training and assists others to obtain scholarships for study in the Soviet bloc. The Lagos West African Pilot of July 5th reports that the GTUC is urging the AATUF to convene an all-African labor conference to decide "joint action within the spirit and requirements of the African situation," undoubtedly calculated to enhance Ghana's appeal to the increasingly powerful African trade union movement.

The Foreign Ministry has more than once been caught interfering in host country affairs through its diplomatic installations. Ghana's Charge in Leopoldville was forcibly expelled in 1960 when he tried to influence Congolese developments through Antoine Gizenga, as he had successfully done through the latter's predecessor, Patrice Lumumba. Ghana retaliated by recognizing Gizenga's Stanleyville "government", openly flouting the legally constituted central Congolese government. The First Secretary

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of Embassy at Mogadiscio, Somali Republic, was declared persona non grata in March 1962 for interfering in local affairs. Two Ghanaian diplomats were asked to leave the Ivory Coast in early 1963 following the arrest of citizens accused of plotting subversion against the government. Liberia asked for recall of the Ghanaian Second Secretary in September 1961, charging him with attempting to subvert Liberian youths.

Ghanaian news media. Spark, the weekly BAA paper and Ghana's principal propaganda instrument, is distributed clandestinely in an estimated 15,000 copies throughout the continent. Published since December 1962 under the editorship of Kofi Batsa, known as a Communist sympathizer, it closely follows the Communist line and reprints, often without attribution, articles from Communist publications such as the USSR's New Times, the Soviet-controlled international theoretical journal World Marxist Review, and the Chicom's English language Peking Review. Consistent with Nkrumah's stated belief that neo-colonialism and dependency are synonymous with Western power, Spark is violently anti-American. Nor are other African countries spared. Attacks on the Congo, Nigeria and the former French colonies are commonplace; one of the reasons may be that exiles such as the Nigerian Samuel Ikoku, once involved in a coup attempt at home, are now writing for Spark.

Although the largest newspaper, the independent Daily Graphic, is essentially moderate in tone, the government-owned Ghana Times and the Convention People's Party (CPP) Evening News are both adulatory of the President and scathing toward the West and the anti-Nkrumah powers. The same positions characterize the GTUC bilingual monthly, African Worker, distributed throughout Africa and the Voice of Africa beamed to other countries in several languages.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) and its subordinate bodies could be subject to strong Ghanaian influence if the interim Secretary-General, UN Ambassador Tesfaye of Ethiopia, who is believed to be pro-Nkrumah, should receive the permanent appointment. The membership of other standing committees of the OAU will of course affect the policies and actions of the organization.

PRESIDENT NKRUMAH. Supplementing organizational programs to spread the Ghanaian brand of African revolution, Nkrumah assiduously attempts to build his own image as the most revolutionary and most statesmanlike African personality and the inevitable leader of an Africa united according to his precepts. Calling himself a Christian Marxist-Leninist, he has attempted to propound a revolutionary ideology for African socialism to attract radical following from all Africa. However, some nationalist leaders realize that Nkrumah's assistance has a purpose. Holden Roberto, leader of a rebel group fighting for

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
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Angolan freedom from Portugal, said at Addis Ababa, "... the big disappointment for African nationalism has been Nkrumah. He talks big but does little. He does not want to help, he wants to give orders."

Internationally, Nkrumah prefers to be counted among the leaders of the non-aligned countries, although his public positions are certainly not neutral. He condemned as "reactionary" the Iraqi revolution of February 1963 which overthrew the Soviet-supported regime of General Karem Kassem. He castigated the MacMillan government for sending arms to India (a fellow member of the British Commonwealth) following the Chinese attack and subsequently joined five other neutral nations in urging Sino-Indian border negotiations without consideration for the merits of the dispute.

In Ghana, Nkrumah's personal popularity has suffered from the increasing repression of domestic political life and from the stringent measures necessary to support the sagging economy. Popular discontent burst into the open in August 1962 with an attempt at Kulungulu to assassinate Nkrumah followed by a series of bombing attacks. Two Cabinet Ministers and a prominent CPP official were arrested and accused of being "imperialist tools." Their trial has been delayed until August 1963, presumably for lack of evidence. He permits no political opposition and continues to exert his personal authority over most of the government's activities.

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COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM -- PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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INTRODUCTION.

In the last several years, the Communists have been encountering increasing difficulties in the international relations among their parties, governments and front organizations. Some people attribute these widening cracks in the once "monolithic" World Communist Movement (WCM) exclusively to the differences between Moscow and Peking. The significance of the latter shall not be denied or minimized, but it is essential for any realistic understanding of these growing Communist troubles to recognize the basic conflict between their internationalist ideology and the reality of their political, military and economic power interests. The present paper outlines some of the basic facts contributing to this understanding.

HISTORY.

Origins. The internationalist beliefs and organizational attempts which have characterized the Communist (and Socialist) movements of the 19th and 20th centuries originated in the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, in which Karl Marx

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and Friedrich Engels, on the eve of the revolutions of 1848, proclaimed their profound conviction that the internationalization of all coming human history was "inevitable" -- and, consequently, of the international character of the Communist movement -- in ringing, apodictic phrases:

"The workingmen have no country ("Vaterland" in the German original). We cannot take from them what they have not got."

"National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing. . . . The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster."

"The Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things . . . they labor everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries."

"Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries unite!"

The Three Internationals. Communists and Socialists accepted Marx' internationalism as a basic article of faith, both intellectually and emotionally, but all attempts to translate this faith into workable international organizations fell far short of their intentions:

The First International ("International Workingmen's Association"), founded by Marx in London 1864, was a loose federation of individuals and small groups, which broke up less than 10 years later, mainly because of the fundamental conflict between Marxists and Anarchists (Bakunin).

The Second International ("Labor and Socialist International") was founded in Paris 1889. Its members were mostly Social Democratic and Labor Parties in all industrial countries of Europe which grew into mass parties with numerous representatives in their countries' parliaments -- Lenin's underground Russian Bolsheviks being the only exception. World War One 1914 broke the Second International into three factions --

- a. the r i g h t wing or revisionists, such as the majority of the German SP, the British Labor party, and the Scandinavian SPs;
- b. the c e n t e r or Austro-Marxists, represented by the Austrian SP, the minority of the German SP, the French and Italian SPs;
- c. the l e f t wing or Zimmerwald (their first meeting place in Switzerland) movement, centered around Lenin and including the Spartacus League in Germany and other left-wing splinter groups.

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The Second International was reconstructed after World War I (Hamburg, 1923), broke up again during World War II and was rebuilt once more afterwards (Frankfurt, 1951).

The Third International ("Communist International" -- COMINTERN) was founded in Moscow 1919 and organized along Lenin's line of "democratic centralism." It was initiated and completely dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), then the only party in power. On paper, it had affiliates in 57 countries but actually very few parties outside Russia represented significant political strength. During World War II, Stalin dissolved the COMINTERN (1943).

International Communist Organizations since World War Two.

a. The Information Bureau of Communist Parties (COMINFORM) was founded in 1947 and had its headquarters first in Belgrade, then in Bucharest. It consisted of representatives of all European Bloc parties and of the French and Italian CPs. Its main visible activity -- apart from formalizing Stalin's decision to expel the Yugoslav CP 1948 -- was the publication of a weekly journal, FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY, in several languages. It was dissolved again in 1956.

b. International Communist Fronts (ICFs). Beginning even before the end of the war, a dozen new international organizations were set up, with varying initial degrees of Communist influence, but all ultimately serving the ends of the WCM. They include the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Students Union, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and several others. These organizations resumed certain functions of the dissolved COMINTERN, stimulated the creation and development of Communist fronts in non-Communist countries and engaged in a wide variety of global and regional activities, holding rallies and congresses, operating training centers, publishing periodicals and pamphlets in many languages, providing traveling instructors and organizers, and so forth. Even though far larger and more efficiently organized than any comparable Communist fronts before World War Two and quite active in many fields, including such spectacular propaganda events as the World Youth Rallies and the World Peace Congresses, they do, nevertheless, not constitute a true or comprehensive international organization of the WCM. At first, it appeared that the ICFs -- financially dependent upon Moscow and stage-managed by CPSU officials in key positions -- were more suitable to Soviet control than national CPs, especially where the latter were in power or represented sizeable strength in opposition. More recently, however, Soviet manipulation of ICFs has encountered increasing Chinese opposition and other difficulties and Moscow appears to switch increasingly to bilateral relations with national CPs, national fronts and (where practicable) governments.

c. International Communist Party Meetings. Even though frequent close contacts between all CPs, especially bilaterally between the CPSU

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and all other CPs, were maintained after the dissolution of the COMINTERN -- including meetings of "fraternal" delegates at national party congresses --, only two formal meetings of the leaders of all CPs of the world were held since World War Two, both in Moscow, in 1957 and 1960. It is significant that no such meetings were held while Stalin was still alive. Important as these two conferences and the resolutions unanimously adopted by them (considered, especially in Chinese Communist polemics against Moscow, as the "law" of the WCM) undoubtedly were, they did not lead to any new international organization. Moreover, the spirit and letter of their resolutions was soon submerged in the rising flood of dissensions in the Communist camp, especially between Moscow and Peking.

Symbols. The symbols of internationalism assumed a paramount role from the earliest days of Marx-inspired labor movements, even before World War One. All parties, socialist and communist, adopted the red flag as their banner, placed internationalist slogans -- especially the final words of the Communist Manifesto, "Workingmen of all Countries, Unite" -- on placards, in meeting halls and on the mastheads of their publications. Meetings ended --and demonstrators marched -- to the strains of the "Internationale" (which, incidentally, was written and composed in honor of the first International and was therefore "common property" of Socialists and Communists):

"Arise ye prisoners of starvation,
Arise ye wretched of this earth"

This song became the anthem of the movement: audiences rose from their seats, men took off their hats The Soviet union originally adopted the Internationale as its national anthem, but replaced it with a more traditionally Russian tune during World War Two.

Emotional Impact. The idea of a "world-wide revolutionary brotherhood" inspired the rank-and-file of first the Socialist and later the Communist movements far beyond any reasoned acceptance of the internationalist doctrines of Marx and Lenin. The feeling of having friends and fellow-militants in all parts of the globe, of belonging to an "irresistibly advancing" world-wide movement (in the concluding words of their anthem: "The International Party will be the human race"), encouraged the faithful, especially where the party was weak, undergoing persecution or suffering setbacks. This strong commitment to internationalism has been demonstrated over the years through innumerable activities, from collecting funds, clothing or medical supplies for strikers, political prisoners and other casualties of the common struggle in far away lands to the thousands who volunteered to risk their lives in revolutionary fighting, from the Paris Commune 1871 to the Spanish Civil war, 1934 - 1938.

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THE DECLINE OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM.

Lenin's Approach. Lenin was not an internationalist in the same cosmopolitan sense as Marx and Engels had been (it is no accident that under Stalin "cosmopolitan" became an ominous insult in the Communist dictionary): his thoughts and efforts were focused on revolution in Russia, first and foremost. However, his allegiance to Marx' doctrines led him to the conviction that a revolution in Russia alone had no chance to survive, until paralleled -- or, at least, quickly followed -- by revolutions in the more advanced industrial nations of Europe. He founded the Third International primarily as an instrument of promoting the world revolution elsewhere, if only because further revolutionary successes were imperative to safeguard the future of Communist Russia. He admitted bluntly:

"Of course the final victory of socialism in a single country is impossible." (At 3rd Council of Soviets, January 1918)

Thus, the COMINTERN in Lenin's days may be defined as a truly revolutionary, internationalist organization, even if primarily intended to save and protect the Soviet Union.

Stalin and "Socialism in One Country". When Stalin became supreme ruler, Europe had fully recovered from the severe shocks she had undergone in the wake of World War One and all hope for new Communist revolutions in other key countries had been abandoned. TROTSKY alone stuck to the original concepts of internationalism and of "permanent" world revolution -- but Stalin soon eliminated Trotsky and his sympathizers throughout the WCM. Stalin gradually reduced the COMINTERN to a mere tool of the CPSU's and the Soviet Government's foreign policy, changing its policies and tactics whenever he felt this necessary in Moscow's interest. This was most dramatically illustrated by the 7th and last COMINTERN Congress, Moscow 1935, which elected Bulgarian George Dimitrov, hero of the Reichstag fire trial, as Secretary General and adopted the "Trojan Horse strategy" of popular fronts which became particularly successful in France and -- at least temporarily -- in the Spanish Civil War. This was a complete reversal of the preceding strategy of "class against class," which had denounced the Social Democrats as "Social Fascists" -- a reversal dictated by Stalin's growing fear of Hitler's rapidly rising aggressive power. The anti-Fascist popular front strategy was just as suddenly abandoned in August 1939, when the Stalin-Hitler pact was signed -- with complete disregard of the interests of the Communist Parties in Central and Western Europe which were severely shaken by Moscow's totally unexpected "co-existence" with Hitler.

World War Two. The first two years of the German-Russian conflict, from Hitler's assault in June 1941, until the battle of Stalingrad, early in 1943, brought the Soviet regime close to the brink of total disaster. Stalin soon recognized that the appeals of Communist doctrine

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and internationalist enmity against Hitler Fascism did not at all suffice to bolster the morale of his armed forces and of his civilian populations. He, therefore, not only dissolved the COMINTERN (which may have been more a formal concession to the Western allies than a fundamental change of his thinking) but based domestic war propaganda and indoctrination increasingly on nationalistic, patriotic, traditionally Russian appeals, while at the same time enlisting the active help of the Russian Orthodox Church. The war was officially designated as "The Great Patriotic War" -- with little reference to its anti-fascist, internationalist aspects. Stalin, toasting the Red Army commanders in the Kremlin, on May 24, 1945, proclaimed:

"I drink primarily to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding of all the nations that constitute the Soviet Union. I drink to the health of the Russian people, because, during this war, it has earned universal recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. I drink to the health of the Russian people, not only because it is the leading people, but also because it is gifted with a clear mind, a staunch character, and patience."

(Stalin, "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union", pp. 241-42)

At Present: "Independence" and "Equality" of National Communist Parties.
The Moscow meeting of the 81 Communist Parties in November 1960, the last authoritative assembly of the entire WCM, solemnly reasserted the basic tenets of internationalism:

"The socialist (i.e. Communist) countries and the socialist camp as a whole owe their achievements to . . . their close fraternal cooperation and mutual internationalist assistance, and above all, to the fraternal, internationalist assistance from the Soviet Union."

Later on, the statement of the 81 parties exhorted all comrades:

"At a time when imperialist reaction is joining forces to fight Communism, it is particularly imperative vigorously to consolidate the world Communist movement. Unity and solidarity redouble the strength of our movement and provide a reliable guarantee that the great cause of Communism will make victorious progress It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement."

Nevertheless, the conference did not only fail to set up any new international organization, but even recognized formally the right to every national CP to determine its own course independently:

"All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights, they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each other."

The text also suggested procedures for consultations among parties:

"The Communist and workers' parties hold meetings whenever necessary to discuss urgent problems, to exchange experience, acquaint themselves with each other's views and positions, work out common views through consultations and coordinate joint actions in the struggle for common goals. Whenever a party wants to clear up questions relating to the activities of another fraternal party, its leadership approaches the leadership of the party concerned. If necessary, they hold meetings and consultations."

Actually, however, no further international Communist meeting has been held and differences between parties have been vented in public polemics rather than through the consultative method recommended.

CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS.

World Soviet Republic? According to the original Communist concept, all countries in which the Communists would seize power were to join the original Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, thus expanding the latter into a World Soviet Republic. Stalin, at the 10th All-Russian Soviet Congress, December 1922, proclaimed:

"Let us hope that by forming our confederate republic we shall be creating a reliable bulwark against international capitalism and that the new confederate state will be another step towards the amalgamation of the toilers of the whole world into a s i n g l e World Socialist Soviet Republic."

Actually, however, each additional country, taken over by the Communists, retained its sovereignty and national independence. This was initially primarily a concession to the nationalist and patriotic traditions of these nations, concealing the expansion of Stalin's empire: today, however, there can be no doubt about the true independence of China from Moscow. Even the European Satellites, though still dependent upon the Soviet Union in a variety of ways, have regained a large degree of autonomy. Poland changed its regime in 1956 very much against Moscow's wishes, Czechoslovakia paid only lip service to Khrushchev's Destalinization, Rumania still opposes

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Moscow-imposed economic "coordination" and Albania has completely defied the Kremlin's displeasure, siding aggressively with China against the Russian "neo-revisionists."

National Interests Vs. Internationalism. In every Communist country, the interests of the ruling Communist elite have merged gradually with the interests of the nation, including traditional claims of previous autocratic and imperialist regimes. The Soviet Union has obviously no intention to abandon the conquests of the Tsars, especially in Asia and celebrates Tsarist heroes, including even Ivan the Terrible. Communist China is reasserting imperial Chinese claims to Tibet, the Indian border regions and ultimately most of Southeast Asia, Communist Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have inherited the Balkan quarrels of their predecessors, notably in the feud over Macedonia. The Soviet Union is no longer capable of bending the services of all the Communist Parties of the world to its will, regardless of their own national interests, as Stalin did: but it is not willing to change its foreign policies in accordance with those interests of other CPs, either. Khrushchev's attempt to appease De Gaulle in the midst of the Algerian war, China's attack upon India and many other moves of the Communist powers were undertaken without any consultation with -- or consideration for the interests of -- the Communist Parties of France, Algeria, India or the other countries involved.

Contradictions. Genuine internationalism is intrinsically democratic: it requires cooperation of all nations on a basis of equality, free exchange of opinions and protection of minorities. Communists do not only not concede equal rights or freedom of opinion to non-Communists, they have also methodically curtailed and finally (under Stalin) eliminated all rights of minorities within their own ranks -- which they have condemned as "factionalism," "deviationism" and worse. Even if all areas under Communist control would have been consolidated into one "world Soviet Republic" (see above), its internationalist character would have been vitiated by the totalitarian methods of Communist dictatorship. Now, however, with a dozen separate Communist regimes and a number of free-world CPs increasingly intent upon their own courses of national action, the contradiction between professed internationalist creed and actual, national or regional, political and organizational practice has become wholly unbridgeable.

The Outlook. The developments summarized in the present paper must not make us jump to the conclusion that the WCM is about to disintegrate into national parties or even regional groupings. We must assume that -- at least in the foreseeable future, i.e. during the next 5 years or so -- Communists in all parts of the world, whatever their tactical, ideological or national differences, will still be held strongly together, at least by their common enmity against the non-Communist world, but also by their common origins. Any Communist country can presumably still expect military assistance from any other Communist country (even China from the Soviet Union), if attacked by an outside power. Illegal CPs and

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those engaging in guerrilla warfare and other forms of violent subversion will continue to depend on the Communist powers for arms, training, safe haven, diplomatic and propaganda support. But while these factors are likely to sustain some degree of cohesion in the WCM, it is equally safe to state that the traditional "monolithic" character of the WCM has irrevocably disappeared. The contradiction between lip service to orthodox internationalism in doctrine and propaganda, on the one hand, and increasing tactical adaptation to national interests (including even "great power chauvinism," at least in the cases of Russia and China), on the other hand, is likely to increase steadily. The older the WCM grows, the wider the chasm between its most advanced (or successful) and its most backward (unsuccessful) components, the less effective common ideological and historical ties, the more probable its ultimate splintering into different tendencies and factions.

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Recommended reading:

"From Lenin to Khrushchev" by Hugh Seton-Watson,
New York and London (a concise factual history of World Communism).

"Pattern for World Revolution" by Ypsilon, New York.
(Chapters of Comintern history written by two of its former
officials.)

"World Communism Today" by Martin Ebon, New York 1948.
(Largely information on the parties affiliated with the Comintern)

"The Communist International -- Documents" Edited by Jane Degras,
London & New York.

"International Communism and World Revolution" by Günther Nollau,
New York (translated from the German: "Die Internationale: Wurzeln
und Erscheinungsformen des Proletarischen Internationalismus.")