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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

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Briefly Noted

Soviets Purchase Grain to Meet Shortage

On 16 September, the Canadian government announced that the Soviets had agreed to buy \$500,000,000 worth of Canadian wheat, some 198,000,000 bushels, for delivery by July 1964. A Soviet negotiator, Sergei A. Borisov, stated that weather had adversely affected the Soviet wheat crop, compelling the Soviets to purchase wheat elsewhere. The Soviets had bought substantial quantities of grain in Australia a short time before. Borisov said that future purchases of Canadian grain would "depend on how much Canada is able to enlarge its purchases of Soviet goods," but the current deal is to be paid for in hard dollars, obtained by Soviet gold sales. The degree of Soviet need is marked by their willingness to pay hard dollars for grain to the Canadian government, a practice which Communist China has had to follow for several years now.

Of the Soviet purchase, \$33,000,000 worth will be delivered to Cuba, and an unknown quantity will go to the bloc countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet purchase is the largest grain purchase for delivery in one year ever recorded; the previous postwar annual high in total Canadian grain exports was 386,000,000 bushels in 1952-3. The United States has made a foreign aid sale to India of \$500,000,000 worth of wheat, but this is spread over a three year period, ending 30 June 1964.

We use this story, in conjunction with BPG #123, item 690, to illustrate the failure of collectivization, propaganda campaigns, and the exploitation of virgin and fallow lands to solve Soviet agricultural problems. We point out that while weather may be partly to blame, it is a well-worn alibi used to cover other causes, and that countries like Canada and the United States have enough surplus store away to cover any temporary harvest shortcomings. This story is particularly recommended for underdeveloped countries which may be attracted by the Soviet economic model.

International Architects Meeting in Cuba


Cuba will host the 7th Congress of the International Union of Architects (UIA, 29 September-3 October). The UIA Assembly, where officers are elected and organization business conducted, follows in Mexico City in conjunction with a Symposium on architecture, 6-15 October.

The UIA Congress will be the first bona fide international professional meeting in Cuba since Castro took over the government. The Havana site was selected three years ago -- before Castro's open embrace of Communism. Cuba claims that 3,000 delegates from 30 countries will attend. In an attempt to fulfill that claim, Cuba has scheduled a meeting of students and professors of architecture a few days before the UIA Congress, underwritten travel costs and expenses of selected delegates and students, dispatched ships and airplanes to collect delegates and supplemented widely distributed written invitations by personal solicitations.

~~SECRET~~ (Briefly Noted Continued)

UJA officials maintain that their organization is nonpolitical and that they will not permit political subjects to be discussed or the Congress to become embroiled in any cold war arguments. Nevertheless, the UJA president, vice president and secretary-general have agreed to serve on a committee to judge a Cuba-sponsored contest to design a Bay of Pigs "victory" monument (arms captured at the Bay of Pigs will be one of the Cuban displays at the UJA Congress). The monument contest and Castro's speech ending the Congress are likely to be the focal points of Cuban propaganda. The presence of delegates from Soviet Russia and Communist China may lead to polemical exchanges judging from their performance at other recent international meetings.

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AAPSO Executive Committee Meeting Plagued by Sino-Soviet Rift

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive committee meeting, held in Nicosia, Cyprus from 9 to 12 September, was split between Sino-Soviet factions on the following issues: the limited nuclear test ban treaty (the Chicom delegation, reportedly, threatened to walk out if a resolution supporting the treaty should be passed; the chief Soviet delegate stated that "some of our friends insist on all or nothing"); and the Colombo Conference proposals for settling the Sino-Indian border dispute. The meeting did adopt a compromise resolution "appreciating" the signing of the treaty by 30 nations and expressing hope that other steps toward peace and disarmament would follow. NCNA stated that the Soviet delegation and its followers forced the meeting "hastily" to accept a resolution on disarmament and peace on which reservations were voiced by many delegations, including those from Morocco, Guinea, Algeria, Ceylon, Indonesia, the DRV, the South Vietnam liberation front, Japan, Korea, and China.

After the close of the conference, TASS charged that: the Chicoms' activities boiled down to attempts to sabotage the meeting, to split Afro-Asian solidarity, and to use the session as a platform for "more foul attacks" on the USSR; the Chicoms brought to Nicosia a tremendous amount of anti-Soviet propaganda material and paid slanderers whom they tried to pass as representatives of the peoples

of certain Afro-Asian countries, and are trying to bring AAPSO under their control so as to make it serve their own selfish interests. The Indonesian delegation was embittered over the Soviets' questioning "on whose behalf" they were speaking and "whose interests" they were defending.

The chief Chicom delegate attacked: the Soviets for adhering to a policy of "big-nation chauvinism" and collaborating with imperialism; and India for aggression against Pakistan, ideologically and materially supported by the Soviet Union.

The Soviets outplayed the Chicoms and Indonesians in the political committee resolution to convoke an A-A workers conference in Africa under the auspices of the permanent secretariat of AAPSO. The Indonesian delegation issued a statement that plans for a preliminary /Chicom/Indonesian-backed/ A-A workers conference in Djakarta at the end of October will go ahead, declaring also that "we are not responsible for and not bound by this decision which is not in favor of cooperation between our movement and the workers' movement."

The conference passed without a formal vote 18 resolutions, pro-Communist in tone and almost predictable in content on issues such as Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, American negroes, etc.

We continue to use this and all similar developments to stress in all suitable media that AAPSO and its subsidiary organizations are tools of Communist propaganda and subversion, and are increasingly becoming the battleground in the Sino-Soviet feuding.


Splinter Party Obstruction in Norway.

On 24 August, the Norwegian Labor government of Einar Gerhardsen resigned, and on 27 August a non-socialist coalition government took power headed by John Lyng. Labor, which had been in power since 1935, was charged with negligence in the operation of the state coal mines in Spitzbergen, where 21 miners perished last November; many Norwegians are said to have felt generally that Labor had become complacent, and that it was time for a change. But the change could not have occurred if the two-member leftist-and-neutralist Socialist People's Party (SPP) had not held the balance of power in the Storting, Norway's parliament, and if they had not voted against the Labor party. The SPP promptly declared that it would also overthrow the Lyng government at the first opportunity, and on 20 September, Labor and the SPP combined to vote the Lyng coalition out of power.

Since the 1961 elections, the Storting has had 74 non-socialist members (Liberals, Christian People's Party, Center Party, and Conservatives), 74 Labor members, and two SPP members. Under current Norwegian law, the next elections will not take place until 1965, and until that date -- unless the law is changed -- the SPP is in a position to break any government which does not bow to its demands. It may be that Labor has now made promises to the SPP;

it is also possible that Labor will press for a revision of the law to permit new elections. In any case, the SPP has been able to exert a veto power out of keeping with its numerical strength, while avoiding responsibility.

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23 September 1963

DATES

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- 13 Oct Honduras first national election under its 1957 democratic constitution (after 25 years of rightist control).
- 20 Oct Chinese Communist troops begin advance into India, escalating border war, 1962.
- 22 Oct US forces USSR to remove offensive missiles from Cuba (22-28 Oct. 1962).
- 23 Oct Hungarian revolution fails under force of Soviet brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov 1956.
- 23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926.
- 28 Oct Czechoslovakia proclaims independence after collapse Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1918.
- 7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power from the Provisional Government, 1917.
- 10 Nov World Youth Day (Communist)
- 10 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEF), Djakarta 10-17 Nov.
- 11 Nov International Student Week 11-17 November, concluding with International Students Day on the 17th (International Union of Students, Communist)
- 12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927.
- 14 Nov (China-Russia) (Unequal) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese "Great Northeast" to Russia, 1860.
- 15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination to peoples of the former Empire, 1917.
- December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi during December 1963.

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[REDACTED] COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#12

31 August-13 September 1963

CommentaryPrincipal Developments:

1. The Chinese commenced the publication of a series of articles, designed to demolish the Soviet position by careful argument and judiciously selected documentation. The first two of these articles appeared within this period. In the first (see Chronology, 6 September; text published in New York Times, 14 September), the Chinese surveyed the history of the dispute, attempting to prove (with documents) that they have consistently opposed Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line since 1956, and that the Soviets have tried to impose military control over China and have conducted subversive activity among the people of China's Sinkiang province. In the second article (see Chronology, 13 September), the Chinese, (with minor reservations) defended the memory of Josif Stalin, contrasting that "great Marxist-Leninist" with Khrushchev, who once (as they show by quotation) praised Stalin, and who now maligns and vilifies him while "regarding Eisenhower, Kennedy and the like 'with respect and trust.'" The Soviets did not publish these articles, though some of their propaganda shows that they are well aware of them.
2. Most Soviet propaganda has been kept on a more down-to-earth level. Both Soviets and Chinese used the technique of printing phony letters from notional citizens of the other country, and the Soviets "exposed" the Chinese efforts. On 2 September, a "spontaneous" demonstration took place outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, recalling similar demonstrations in the past against the American and other western embassies.
3. The Soviets also prodded at an established Chinese vulnerability by pointing out that the Chinese militants have failed even to liberate Hong Kong (Nedelya, 7 September; Izvestiya 2 September); these articles were not republished by NCNA.
4. But the most striking Soviet effort was their 9 September story of Chinese rioting and "violation of the basic norms of human decency" at the border station of Naushki. The Soviet public (and other bloc publics too) have strong feelings about such "uncultured" behavior as urinating in public, and the stories served to portray the Chinese as sub-human and bestial.
5. The Soviets did not totally forego the higher things, though; a theoretical article in the 11 September Pravda argued that the Chinese were confusing and losing sight of the main conflict, to wit, that between socialism and capitalism. While quoting Lenin, the author (Glezerman) appeared to be outflanking the Chinese appeals to Lenin's theses by turning to a fundamental thesis of the founder of "scientific" socialism, Karl Marx himself. Meanwhile,

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(#12 Commentary Cont.)

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day in and day out, the Soviets repeated their claim that they were for peace and that the Chinese were for war - the claim that gives them a great propoganda advantage outside the small world of fanatic revolutionaries.

6. Neither disputant had much success in enlisting further support in the rest of the movement. Highly significant in this respect were speeches by Indonesian CP leader D.N. Aidit in Peking and Pyongyang, on his way back from Moscow. When speaking in Peking (reported 2 and 4 September), Aidit did not commit himself to either side but described his policy of "Indonesianizing" Marxism-Leninism for local purposes. In Peking and even more in Pyongyang (11 September), Aidit accompanied passing references to "modern revisionism" (identified only with Yugoslavia) with other references to "modern dogmatism," which he claimed was the Indonesian CP's term for the position of tailing "one of the parties." Aidit was in Pyongyang to help celebrate the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; although Peking tried to use this anniversary as an occasion for claiming the faithful support of the North Koreans, the references to such support came mostly from Chinese sources, or from such atypical Koreans as Han Su-tong, head of a delegation of the Korea-China Friendship Association visiting Peking.

7. In the world of the front organizations, the Chinese -- evidently realizing that they would have no chance to dominate the proceedings -- announced on 4 September that they would boycott the third World Meeting of Journalists, sponsored by the International Committee for the Cooperation of Journalists (ICJ). This Soviet-front meeting is to commence in Naples on 20 September and then proceed eastward by ship to a number of ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, ending at Beirut on 4 October; presumably the Soviets see this unusual meeting procedure as a means of maintaining control and also of countering Chinese influence in the Near East. On 10-13 September, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization executive committee met at Nicosia; the session was prolonged an extra day by debates between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet delegates over the question of endorsing the test ban treaty, and a compromise resolution was finally placed on record without an actual vote. Other Sino-Soviet quarrels arose at this meeting over the Sino-Indian border dispute, the right of delegates from Eastern Europe to attend, and the right of the (pro-Chinese) Indonesian delegation to represent Indonesia.

Significance:

The first part of September marked a new stage in the Sino-Soviet conflict, characterized by:

- a. Much greater stress on problems of national honor and sovereignty: e.g., border disputes, military control versus military independence, and importation of subversive propoganda.

(#12 Commentary Cont.)

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- b. Sharpened attacks on individuals, especially Khrushchev.
- c. An increase in propaganda directed to mass audiences, and based on emotional, "gut-feel" issues.

Ideology by no means disappeared from the debate, but its importance decreased.

Each side resorted to the Communist practice -- now against each other rather than against the "capitalist" enemy -- of staging support for itself and opposition to its antagonist. And the Soviet attempted to expose this fraudulent practice on the part of the Chinese.

The Chinese sought to prove that they had consistently opposed Khrushchev's policies from as early as 1956. They also sought to prove that the Soviets were attempting to impose their control over China by military means as well as through subversion. Their series of articles promises to provide new source material on Communist weaknesses, comparable to that provided by Khrushchev's 1956 and 196 attacks on Stalin.

In withdrawing from a meeting of the ICCJ, the Chinese implicitly recognized their own inability to influence left-wing European journalists, and through such journalists, left-wing European opinion. The Chinese hope for support outside the Communist ranks lies in the underdeveloped areas.

The Soviet exploitation of the Naushki incident represents a shift in emphasis from what Communists consider "propaganda" (the spreading of doctrine and ideology, largely among elite audiences) to "agitation" (the use of emotional appeals to arouse mass audiences). Such enlistment of popular support makes a subsequent reversal much more difficult to carry out.

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31 August-13 September 1963

August 31 - The Council of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, meeting in Geneva, passes a Japanese resolution urging the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. According to Tass, the Chinese delegate "and his Albanian yes-man" slandered the test ban treaty during the debate, forcing the chairman to have the Albanian statements stricken from the record. The Chinese Communist and Albanian delegates abstained in the vote.

September 1 - Peking broadcasts a "statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government," replying to the Soviet statement of 21 August; the two statements are published simultaneously in China. The Chinese statement is mainly an attempt to rebut Soviet charges that China only seeks nuclear weapons and is indifferent to the dangers of world war. The Chinese say that they will continue to criticize the USSR whether or not China is backward, as the Soviets say, "in any case, and even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the US imperialists." The statement quotes from Mao's 18 November 1957 speech and from the 1960 "Long Live Leninism" article, trying to show that the Soviets have distorted the sense of these sources by lifting quotations about the death of half of mankind and rapid reconstruction on the ruins out of their contexts. The Chinese charge:

"In the opinion of the Soviet leaders, in this nuclear century to remain alive is everything, and there is no aim in life... they submit to the tender mercies of imperialism.... It is a truly bestial conception."

The statement notes that "universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated," shedding new light on recent Chinese disarmament proposals.

September 2 - The Czech government demands the recall of two more Chinese, a commercial official in the Embassy and a student, for spreading material criticizing Soviet and Czech policy. Pravda's correspondent in Bonn reports that "the militarist propagandists here are already beginning to express sympathy openly for the hitherto hateful 'Red Chinese,'" and Izvestiya points out that Hong Kong and Macao, unlike Goa (India) and West Irian (Indonesia), are still not liberated. In Moscow, a group of Soviet citizens demonstrates outside the Chinese Embassy, shouting anti-war slogans (NCNA). In Peking, Indonesian CP leader D.N. Aidit is welcomed effusively (in contrast to an absence of Soviet publicity while he was in the USSR), but he makes a non-committal speech at the CCP Higher Party School, briefly condemning both "modern revisionism" and "modern dogmatism."

September 3 - Khrushchev leaves Belgrade for the USSR, ending a two-week visit. According to NCNA, Ko Htay, a Burmese CP politburo member negotiating for peace with the Burmese government,

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states his opposition to Indian policy and the test ban treaty, and comments: "I cannot understand Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence." In Peking, Aidit makes another speech on the subject of revolution and communism in Indonesia, at a welcome rally stressing that the PKI is compelled to "Indonesianize" Marxism-Leninism; he again opposes "modern dogmatism" as well as "modern revisionism." In a Moscow broadcast in Japanese, the commentator (Ilinsky) states specifically that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty is still in effect; hence there is no need for the Chinese to have their own nuclear weapons.

September 4 - The Chinese announce that, since the International Committee for the Cooperation of Journalists refuses to change its agenda or meeting arrangements for the Third World Meeting of Journalists, the All-China Journalists Association will boycott the meeting. People's Daily having published a "letter from the USSR" extolling the Chinese leaders and signed "The Soviet Union, V. Ye.," Trud denounces this as a forgery "designed for gullible readers." (In a broadcast to China of 29 August, Moscow Radio read a letter allegedly from a Chinese resident in the Soviet Union, denouncing the Chinese leaders as belonging in "the same category" as the imperialists)

September 6 - The editorial departments of People's Daily and Red Flag publish "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," the first of a series of articles replying to Open Letter of the CPSU of 14 July 1963. In this article, the Chinese trace the origin of the dispute of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, and deny Soviet claims that they turned 180° in April 1960. In line with earlier Chinese polemics, the article denounces the Soviet leaders for their negation of Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat; their failure to consult with other CP's, exemplifying their "great power chauvinism;" their indifference to the national liberation struggle; and their espousal of "peaceful coexistence." Apparently seeking to reduce the semantic handicap they face as opponents of "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese bracket it with "peaceful transition" (the view that domestic revolutions are unnecessary) and "peaceful competition" (competition in the economic sphere). More novel is the Chinese account of:

-- the Soviet role in the Polish and Hungarian disturbances in 1956:

"By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force it /the leadership of the CPSU/ committed the error of great power chauvinism. And at the critical moment when the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied Budapest, for a time it intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to counterrevolution....We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary....and we firmly opposed the erroneous methods of great power chauvinism."

-- their own position at the 1957 meeting of the parties:

"In the present /1957/ situation of the international communist movement, It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition. But it would be inappropriate to over-emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition.... To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a single country where this possibility is of any practical significance....To obtain a majority in parliament is not the same as smashing the old state machinery (chiefly the armed forces)."

-- the Soviet attempt to impose military control on China:

"In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control.... Not long afterward, in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."

-- and of Soviet subversion on Chinese borders:

"In April and May 1962, the leaders of the CPSU used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union.... the Soviet government refused to repatriate these Chinese citizens.... To this day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in relations between socialist countries."

Appended to the article are documents purporting to be: an outline of Chinese views presented at the November 1957 meeting of the parties; a statement by the Chinese delegation at the Bucharest meeting in June 1960; and proposals for settling inter-party differences advanced by the Chinese in September 1960.

Also on 3 September, a Chinese cultural delegation arrived in Rumania for a one-month's tour as guests of the Rumanian Writer's Union, and an Albanian French-language broadcast of a Zeri I Popullit article calls on "revolutionary communists" to "form organizations which will know how to preserve themselves from the treachery of opportunists, which will know how to fight against the revisionist leaders..."

September 7 - Tass relays another article (in Nedelya, weekly supplement to Izvestiya) pointing to the Chinese tolerance of British rule in Hong Kong, where the US Seventh Fleet finds haven, where foreign businessmen exploit cheap labor, and where espionage flourishes. 3 (#12 Chronology Continued)

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September 7-11 - Naushki border incident: On 10 September, Izvestiya publishes a first account of an incident at the Soviet border station at Naushki on 7 September when Soviet customs officials sought to confiscate publications "hostile to our country in the possession of Chinese travellers." On 11 September, Komsomolskaya Pravda reports that 92 Chinese citizens sank to the lowest ebb by turning the customs hall into a lavatory. Another train was used to carry the non-Chinese passengers on to Moscow, and in the early morning of 10 September, the Chinese train was returned to China; it proceeded to Peking, where the Chinese travellers received a hero's welcome with "drums and gongs."

It appears that copies of the Information Bulletin of the NCNA Russian service containing the 1 September statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government (see above) were seized by customs officials from train crew members and students, despite claims that these were "for their own reading." (NCNA does not reveal why they chose to study the statement in Russian translation.) According to Soviet reports, the Chinese tried to lock the customs officers onto the train, and refused to proceed without their publications; they also used the train radio to broadcast the contents of the publications, and to complain of Soviet mistreatment.

September 8 - A Moscow Radio roundtable discussion implies that there will be no attempt to answer the 6 September Chinese article, also saying

"It would be a vain occupation even to try to list the articles, ... published this week by ... press organs of China.... It would be undignified to fall into the quarrelsome, hysterical tone which Peking is obviously trying to impose upon us."

However, in a speech at the National Harvest Festival in Warsaw, Wladyslaw Gomulka attacked, "more in sorrow than in anger," the Chinese refusal to sign the test ban treaty; this might have been a reply to the 6 September article, in which the Chinese claimed to have intervened on behalf of Poland in 1956. Also on 8 September, a Moscow broadcast quotes an article in Liturnaya Gazeta pointing out that, for all the Chinese boasting that they publish the views of their opponents, the publication of an item in People's Daily only brings it to the eyes of the middle and higher ranks of the CCP; the Chinese masses are only fed the Chinese line.

September 9 - Red Flag compares the alleged alignment of the Soviet Union with the imperialists, exemplified by the test ban treaty, with the "Holy Alliance" formed by Metternich in the early nineteenth century: "It can be said with assurance that the new 'Holy Alliance' will come to no better end than the old." In another article, Red Flag quotes again a part of the text of the 1960 "Long Live Leninism" article.

September 10 - Responding to the Chinese tactic of quoting from the record, a Moscow broadcast to Yugoslavia quotes articles

from the People's Daily of 1956-1959, praising the USSR for assisting the oppressed nations. (Similar broadcasts were made on 6 September to the United Kingdom, and on 3 September to Albania.)

September 11 - D.N. Aidit, now in Pyongyang at the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, continues to maintain an independent position:

"The easiest position, but not the safest position, is the position to tail one of the parties,... It does not need much thinking....called by the Indonesian Communists modern dogmatism, /it/ is not a correct position. It is a bureaucratic position, the position of a bull whose nose is already tied so that it is easy to draw him hither and thither."

September 11 - Pravda prints an article by Glezerman, accusing the Chinese of being revisionist, in that

"They have subjected to revision the thesis of the /1957/ declaration and the /1960/ statement that the basic contradiction of the age is the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, putting this into the background in their documents and putting it on a level with other considerations...Marx and Engels based the inevitability of a socialist revolution of the proletariat chiefly on an analysis of the basic contradiction of a capitalist society, the contradiction between the public character of production and the private character of profit.... /Today/ the contradiction between the perishing capitalist social-economic formation and the communist formation which is establishing itself becomes the basic contradiction of the modern age, being the age of transition from capitalism to socialism."

September 12 - Pravda publishes a statement from the exile Spanish CP, strongly endorsing the test ban treaty, and noting that, in contrast to Communist China, "even the government of Franco intends to sign." A member of the Czech National Assembly is reported as denouncing the "megalomaniacal, nationalist irresponsibility" of the Chinese. Pravda also publishes an article by two leaders of the Martinique CP, adding to the attack on the CCP.

September 13 - The editors of People's Daily and Red Flag publish the second in their announced series of articles, "On the Question of Stalin." While admitting that Stalin "made some mistakes.... gave some bad counsel in the international communist movement.... /and thereby/ caused some losses to the Soviet Union and the International communist movement" (possibly a reference to Stalin's policy of trusting Chiang Kai-shek in 1927), the Chinese maintain that he was "a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary." Khrushchev has completely "negated"

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Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress and since, although he "was in the leadership of the party and state in Stalin's period and... actively supported and firmly executed the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries." The Chinese quote from Khrushchev's statements made in the 1930's, including the following:

"Our party will mercilessly crush the band of traitors and betrayers, and wipe out all the Trotsky-Right dregs.... The guarantee of this is the unshakable leadership of our Central Committee, the unshakeable leadership of our leader Comrade Stalin.... We shall totally annihilate the enemies -- to the last man -- and scatter their ashes to the winds." (6 June 1937, 5th Party Conference of Moscow Oblast)

Moreover, the article maintains that Stalin knew how to admit his mistakes, that "after the victory of the Chinese Revolution he admitted his mistake," while Khrushchev does not: "He simply does not know what self-criticism is; all he does is to shift the entire blame on to others and claim the entire credit for himself." By his 20th Congress secret speech, which he still fears to disclose to the Soviet people, Khrushchev "provided the imperialists and the reactionaries of all countries with exceedingly welcome anti-Soviet and anti-communist ammunition." In attacking "the cult of personality," the Soviet leaders actually violate Lenin's teachings, including the principle of democratic centralism. A revolutionary party should "have a fairly stable nucleus of leadership, which should consist of a group of long-tested leaders who are good at integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution"; here the Chinese leaders seem to have themselves in mind. After a ringing statement that Khrushchev, "try as he may, ...can never succeed in overthrowing Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended" the article ends rather surprisingly:

"We would like to offer a word of sincere advice to Comrade Khrushchev. We hope you will become aware of your errors and return from your wrong path to the path of Marxism-Leninism. Long live the great revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin!"

CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES

No. 12

31 août-13 septembre 1963

31 août: Le Conseil des sociétés de la Ligue de la Croix Rouge et du Croissant Rouge, qui s'est réuni à Genève, adopte une résolution japonaise réclamant la prohibition complète des essais d'armes nucléaires. Selon TASS, le délégué chinois "et son acolyte albanais" se livrèrent à des calomnies au sujet du traité pendant le débat, obligeant le président de faire rayer du procès-verbal les déclarations de l'Albanais. Les délégués de la Chine communiste et de l'Albanie se sont abstenus de voter.

1 septembre: Pékin diffuse à la radio "une déclaration du porte-parole du gouvernement chinois" en réponse à la déclaration soviétique du 21 août; les deux déclarations ont été publiées simultanément en Chine. La déclaration chinoise constitue surtout une tentative de réfuter les accusations soviétiques d'après laquelle la Chine ne cherche qu'à obtenir des armes nucléaires et qu'elle se désintéresse des dangers d'une guerre mondiale. Les Chinois déclarent qu'ils continueront à critiquer l'Union Soviétique, que la Chine soit ou non un pays retardataire, ainsi que le déclarent les Soviets; "en tout état de cause, et même si nous, peuple chinois, nous étions incapables de produire une bombe atomique au cours des cent ans à venir, nous ne ramperons pas sous la direction du bâton des leaders soviétiques et nous ne nous agenouillerons pas sous l'effet du chantage nucléaire des impérialistes des Etats-Unis". La déclaration cite un passage du discours de Mao du 18 novembre 1957, ainsi qu'un autre de l'article publié en 1960, "Vive le léninisme", et cherche à montrer que les Soviets avaient déformé le sens de ces sources en citant en dehors de leur contexte les passages au sujet de la mort de la moitié de l'humanité et de la reconstruction rapide sur les ruines. Les Chinois déclarent:

"De l'opinion des leaders soviétiques en ce siècle nucléaire, le tout c'est de rester vivant, et quant à la vie elle n'a aucun but... Ils s'en remettent à la grâce de l'impérialisme... Cela est une conception vraiment bestiale".

Il est souligné dans la déclaration que "le désarmement complet et universel ne peut avoir lieu qu'après que l'impérialisme, le capitalisme et tous les autres systèmes d'exploitation auront été éliminés", ce qui place sous un jour nouveau les offres de désarmement faites récemment par les Chinois.

2 septembre: Le gouvernement tchèque exige le rappel de deux autres Chinois, un attaché commercial de l'ambassade et un étudiant, qui avaient disséminé une documentation critiquant les Soviets et la politique tchèque. Le correspondant de la "Pravda" à Bonn fait savoir que "les propagandistes militaristes commencent ici à exprimer ouvertement leur

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

sympathie pour ceux qui auparavant étaient des Chinois rouges haïssables", "Izvestiya" souligne que Hong Kong et Macao, à l'encontre de Goa (Inde), et l'Irian Occidental (Indonésie), n'ont toujours pas été libérées. A Moscou, un groupe de citoyens soviétiques manifestent autour de l'ambassade chinoise en hurlant des slogans contre la guerre (Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle). A Pékin, le leader communiste indonésien D.N. Aidit est accueilli avec effusion (en contraste avec le manque de publicité de la part des Soviétiques lorsqu'il se trouvait en Union Soviétique), mais il fait un discours sans s'engager à l'Ecole supérieure du parti communiste, condamnant brièvement aussi bien "le révisionnisme moderne" que le "dogmatisme moderne".

3 septembre: Khrouchtchev quitte Belgrade pour l'U.R.S.S., terminant une visite qui a duré deux semaines. D'après l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle, Ko Htay, membre du Politburo du parti communiste birman, qui est en train de négocier la paix avec le gouvernement birman, déclare son opposition à la politique de l'Inde et au traité interdisant les essais nucléaires; il commente: "Je ne peux comprendre la coexistence pacifique de Khrouchtchev". A Pékin, Aidit prononce un autre discours au sujet de la révolution et du communisme en Indonésie à un ralliement de bienvenue; il souligne que le parti communiste indonésien est forcé d'"indonésianiser" le marxisme-léninisme. Il s'oppose de nouveau au "dogmatisme moderne" ainsi qu'au "révisionnisme moderne". Au cours d'une radio-diffusion en langue japonaise à Moscou, le commentateur (Ilinsky) déclare notamment que le traité d'alliance sino-soviétique est toujours en vigueur; par conséquent, les Chinois n'ont pas besoin d'avoir leurs propres armes nucléaires.

4 septembre: Les Chinois annoncent qu'étant donné le refus du Comité international pour la coopération des journalistes de modifier son ordre du jour ou les dispositions prises pour la 3^e réunion mondiale des journalistes, l'Association pan-chinoise des journalistes boycottera cette réunion. Le "Quotidien du Peuple" ayant publié une "lettre de l'U.R.S.S." exaltant les leaders chinois et signée "Union Soviétique, V. Ye.", le "Trud" la qualifie de faux "à l'usage des lecteurs crédules". (Dans une radio-diffusion à la Chine le 29 août, Radio-Moscou a donné lecture d'une lettre adressée soi-disant par un Chinois résidant en Union Soviétique, lettre dans laquelle les leaders chinois étaient dits appartenir "à la même catégorie" que les impérialistes.)

6 septembre: Les éditoriaux du "Quotidien du Peuple" et du "Drapeau Rouge" publient "L'origine et le développement des différences entre les leaders du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et nous-mêmes", le premier d'une série d'articles répondant à la lettre ouverte du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique du 14 juillet 1963. Dans cet article, les Chinois situent l'origine de la dispute au XX^e Congrès du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique en 1956, et démentent l'affirmation des Soviétiques qu'ils ont fait volte-face de 180° en avril 1960. Dans le ton des polémiques chinoises précédentes,

l'article dénonce les leaders soviétiques pour avoir renié Staline et la dictature du prolétariat; pour n'avoir pas consulté les autres partis communistes, montrant ainsi "leur chauvinisme de grande puissance"; pour leur indifférence envers la lutte de libération nationale; et pour avoir adopté "la coexistence pacifique". Cherchant apparemment à réduire le handicap sémantique qui est le leur en tant qu'adversaire de la coexistence pacifique, les Soviétiques la placent dans la même catégorie que "la transition pacifique" (opinion que les révolutions nationales ne sont pas nécessaires) et que "la compétition pacifique" (concurrence dans le domaine économique). Récit inédit chinois sur:

-- le rôle soviétique dans les désordres en Hongrie et en Pologne en 1956:

"En ayant recours aux troupes pour dompter les camarades polonais par la force armée, ils [les leaders du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique] commirent l'erreur de pratiquer le chauvinisme de grande puissance. Et au moment critique où les contrerévolutionnaires hongrois occupaient Budapest, ils eurent l'intention pendant un moment d'adopter une politique de capitulation et d'abandonner la Hongrie socialiste à la contrerévolution... Nous insistâmes à ce qu'ils prissent toute mesure nécessaire pour écraser la rébellion contrerévolutionnaire en Hongrie... et nous nous opposâmes fermement aux méthodes erronées du chauvinisme de grande puissance."

-- leur propre position à la réunion des partis de 1957:

"Dans la situation présente [1957] du mouvement communiste international, il est avantageux du point de vue tactique de se référer au désir de transition pacifique. Mais il serait malvenu d'exagérer la possibilité de transition pacifique... D'après ce que nous savons, il n'y a pas encore un seul pays où cette possibilité puisse avoir une signification pratique... Obtenir une majorité au Parlement est autre chose que de démolir le vieil appareil gouvernemental (principalement les forces armées)."

-- la tentative soviétique d'imposer un gouvernement militaire à la Chine:

"En 1958, les leaders du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique présentèrent des requêtes déraisonnables tendant à placer la Chine sous contrôle militaire des Soviétiques... Peu de temps après, en juin 1959, le gouvernement soviétique dénonçait unilatéralement les accords sur la nouvelle technologie pour la défense nationale, conclue entre la Chine et l'Union Soviétique en octobre 1957, et refusèrent de fournir à la Chine un échantillon de

la bombe atomique et les informations techniques concernant sa fabrication".

-- et sur la subversion soviétique le long des frontières chinoises:

"En avril et mai 1962, les leaders du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique utilisèrent leurs organismes et leur personnel à Sinkiang, Chine, pour se livrer à des activités subversives à grande échelle dans la région de l'Ili; ils attirèrent ou obligèrent par la force plusieurs dizaines de milliers de citoyens chinois de se rendre en Union Soviétique... Le gouvernement soviétique a refusé de repatrier ces citoyens chinois... Jusqu'à ce jour, cet incident n'a pas été réglé. C'est en effet un événement étonnant, sans précédent dans les relations entre pays socialistes".

Ajoutés à l'article se trouvent des documents qui représentent soi-disant: un résumé des vues chinoises présentées à la réunion des partis de novembre 1957; une déclaration de la délégation chinoise à la réunion de Bucarest en juin 1960; et des propositions pour régler les différends entre partis soumise par les Chinois en septembre 1960.

Egalement du 6 septembre, une délégation culturelle chinoise est arrivée en Roumanie pour une tournée de un mois, invitée par l'Union des écrivains roumains; une radio-diffusion en langue française par les Albanais d'un article de "Zeri i Popullit" faisant appel "aux communistes révolutionnaires" de "former des organisations sachant se protéger contre la trahison des opportunistes, et sachant combattre les leaders révisionnistes..."

7 septembre: TASS reproduit un autre article (dans "Nedelya", supplément hebdomadaire de "Izvestiya") qui souligne que les Chinois tolèrent la présence des Britanniques à Hong Kong, où la 7^e flotte des Etats-Unis trouve en mouillage, où les hommes d'affaires étrangers exploitent une main-d'oeuvre à bon marché et où fleurit l'espionnage.

7-11 septembre: Incident de frontière à Naushki: le 10 septembre, "Izvestiya" publiait un premier rapport sur l'incident ayant eu lieu à la gare-frontière soviétique de Naushki le 7 septembre, alors que les douaniers soviétiques cherchaient à confisquer des publications "hostiles à notre pays et qui se trouvaient en possession de voyageurs chinois". Le 11 septembre, "Komsomolskaya Pravda" annonçait que 92 citoyens chinois étaient tombés au-dessous de tout en transformant la salle des douanes en w.c. Un autre train fut utilisé pour transporter à Moscou les passagers non-Chinois, et au début de la matinée du 10 septembre, le train chinois fut retourné en Chine; il se rendit à Pékin où les voyageurs chinois furent reçus en héros avec "tambours et gongs".

Il semble que les copies du bulletin d'information publiées

par le service russe de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle, et contenant la déclaration du 1er septembre d'un porte-parole du gouvernement chinois (voir ci-dessus) furent enlevées par les douaniers aux équipes de service du train et aux étudiants, malgré leurs assertions que ces copies étaient destinées "à leur propre usage". (L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle ne dit pas pourquoi ils décidèrent d'étudier cette déclaration dans sa traduction russe.) D'après les rapports soviétiques, les Chinois tentèrent d'enfermer les douaniers soviétiques dans le train et refusèrent de continuer leur voyage sans leurs publications; ils se servirent également de la radio du train pour diffuser le contenu de ces publications et pour se plaindre des mauvais traitements que leur infligeaient les soviétiques.

8 septembre: Une discussion à la radio de Moscou fait croire qu'il n'y aura aucune tentative de faite pour répondre à l'article chinois du 6 septembre et déclare également:

"Ce serait du temps perdu que d'essayer de dresser ne serait-ce qu'une liste des articles... publiés cette semaine par... les organes de presse chinois... Il serait indigne de prendre le ton querelleur et hystérique que Pékin très certainement essaye de nous imposer".

Toutefois, dans un discours au festival national de la révolte à Varsovie, Wladyslaw Gomulka attaqua "dans un esprit de peine plutôt que de colère" le refus des Chinois de signer le traité interdisant les expériences nucléaires; cela aurait pu être une réponse à l'article du 6 septembre, dans lequel les Chinois prétendirent être intervenus en faveur de la Pologne en 1956. Également le 8 septembre, une radio de Moscou citait un article de "Liturnaya Gazeta" soulignant au sujet des assertions chinoises qu'ils publient les opinions de tous leurs adversaires, que la publication d'un article dans le "Quotidien du Peuple" ne tombe que sous les yeux des officiels supérieurs et moyens du parti communiste chinois; quant aux masses elles ne sont nourries que de propagande chinoise.

9 novembre: Le "Drapeau Rouge" compare le prétendu alignement de l'Union Soviétique sur les impérialistes, mis en évidence par le traité interdisant les expériences nucléaires, avec la "Sainte Alliance" formée par Metternich au début du 19^e siècle. "On peut dire avec certitude que la nouvelle 'Sainte Alliance' ne donnera pas de meilleurs résultats que l'ancienne. Dans un autre article, le "Drapeau Rouge" cite de nouveau une partie du texte de l'article "Vive le léninisme", datant de 1960.

10 septembre: En réponse à la tactique chinoise d'avoir recours à des citations, une radio de Moscou destinée à la Yougoslavie cite les articles du "Quotidien du Peuple" datant de 1956 - 1958, dans lesquels l'Union Soviétique est félicitée pour son assistance aux nations opprimées. (Des diffusions analogues furent faites le 6 septembre à destination du Royaume-Uni, et le 8 septembre de l'Albanie.)

11 septembre: D.N. Aidit, se trouvant à Pyongyang pour la célébration du 15^e anniversaire de la République populaire démocratique de Corée, continue à garder une position indépendante:

"La position la plus facile mais non pas la moins dangereuse est de se mettre à la traîne de l'un des partis... Cela ne demande pas beaucoup de réflexion... et c'est ce que les communistes indonésiens qualifient de dogmatisme moderne, qui ne rectifie pas la position. C'est une position bureaucratique, une position d'un taureau ayant déjà la corde au museau et qu'il est facile de tirer de tous les côtés".

11 septembre: "Pravda" publie un article de Glezerman, accusant les Chinois d'être des révisionnistes, parce que:

"Ils ont fait reviser la thèse de la déclaration [1957] et du compte-rendu [de 1960] qui spécifiait que la contradiction fondamentale de cet âge est une contradiction entre le socialisme et le capitalisme, rejetant cela dans l'ombre dans leurs documents, et le plaçant au même niveau que d'autres considérations... Marx et Engels basaient l'inévitabilité de la révolution socialiste du prolétariat sur l'analyse principalement des contradictions fondamentales de la société capitaliste, des contradictions entre le caractère public de la production et le caractère privé du bénéfice... [Aujourd'hui] la contradiction entre la formation sociale et économique du capitalisme en perdition et la formation communiste en train de s'établir devient la contradiction fondamentale des temps modernes, qui est l'âge de la transition du capitalisme au socialisme."

12 septembre: La "Pravda" publie une déclaration d'un membre du parti communiste espagnol en exil, qui approuve fermement le traité interdisant les essais nucléaires, et qui souligne que contrairement à la Chine communiste, "même le gouvernement de Franco a l'intention de le signer". Un membre de l'Assemblée nationale tchèque aurait exposé "l'irresponsabilité nationaliste négalomaniacque" des Chinois. "Pravda" publie également un article de deux leaders du parti communiste martiniquais qui s'associent aux attaques contre le parti communiste chinois.

13 septembre: Les éditeurs du "Quotidien du Peuple" et du "Drapeau Rouge" publient le 2^e article de leur série annoncée, "sur la question de Staline". Tout en admettant que Staline "a fait certaines erreurs... a donné quelques mauvais conseils au mouvement international communiste... [et par conséquent] a provoqué certaines pertes en Union Soviétique et dans le mouvement communiste international" (il est possible que ce soit une allusion à la politique de Staline de faire confiance à Chiang Kai-shek en 1927), les Chinois soutiennent qu'il était "un grand marxiste-léniniste, et un

grand prolétaire révolutionnaire". Khrouchtchev a complètement "dénigré" Staline au cours du 20^e Congrès du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique, et depuis cette époque, "bien qu'il fit partie des dirigeants du parti et de l'Etat à l'époque de Staline et... qu'il ait soutenu activement et exécuté avec fermeté la politique d'anéantissement des contre-révolutionnaires". Les Chinois citent des passages des déclarations faites par Khrouchtchev en 1930, dont le suivant:

"Notre parti écrasera impitoyablement la bande de traîtres, et liquidera toute la lie des trotskistes et des a-droite... La garantie en est donnée par la direction inébranlable du comité central, par la direction inébranlable de notre chef le camarade Staline... Nous annihilons complètement nos ennemis, jusqu'au dernier homme, et nous répandrons leurs cendres au vent." (6 juin 1937, 5^e Conférence du parti du district de Moscou)

D'autre part, l'article affirme que Staline savait admettre ses erreurs, "qu'après la victoire de la révolution chinoise il admit son erreur", alors que Khrouchtchev ne le fait pas: "Il ne sait simplement pas ce que auto-critique veut dire; tout ce qu'il fait c'est de rejeter le blâme tout entier sur les autres et de prétendre à tout ce qui est méritoire". Dans son discours secret du XX^e Congrès, qu'il craint toujours de révéler au peuple soviétique, Khrouchtchev "a donné aux impérialistes et aux réactionnaires de tous les pays des munitions anti-soviétiques et anti-communistes extrêmement utiles". En attaquant "le culte de la personnalité", les dirigeants soviétiques portaient enfreinte aux enseignements de Lénine, et notamment au principe de centralisme démocratique. Un parti révolutionnaire "doit avoir un noyau de chefs suffisamment stables, composé d'un groupe de leaders éprouvés de longue date qui savent intégrer la vérité universelle du marxisme-léninisme à la pratique concrète de la révolution"; à ce point il semble que c'est eux-mêmes que les leaders chinois sous-entendent. Après la déclaration retentissante que Khrouchtchev "quoiqu'il fasse... ne réussira jamais à renverser le marxisme-léninisme que défendait Staline" l'article se termine d'une façon plutôt surprenante:

"Nous aimerions donner un conseil au camarade Khrouchtchev. Nous espérons que vous vous rendrez compte de vos erreurs et que vous abandonnerez la mauvaise voie pour revenir sur la voie du marxisme-léninisme. Vivent les grands enseignements révolutionnaires de Marx, Engels, Lénine, et Staline!"

CROFOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

No. 12

31 Agosto-13 Septiembre 1963

31 Agosto: El Consejo de la Liga de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y la Cre-
ciente Roja, reunido en Ginebra, aprueba una resolución del Japón reco-
mendando la prohibición absoluta de los ensayos de armas nucleares. De
acuerdo con Tass, el delegado chino "y su albanés del amén" calumniaron
el tratado contra los ensayos durante el debate, obligando al presidente
de la asamblea a excluir del acta las declaraciones albaneses. Los de-
legados de China Comunista y de Albania se abstuvieron de votar.

1 Septiembre: Pekín difunde por radio una "declaración del portavoz del
Gobierno chino" en respuesta a la declaración soviética de 21 de agosto;
en China se publican ambas declaraciones simultáneamente. La declara-
ción china es principalmente una tentativa de refutar las denuncias so-
viéticas en el sentido de que China quiere solamente armas nucleares y
es indiferente a los riesgos de guerra mundial. Los chinos dicen que
continuarán criticando a la URSS, esté China retrasada o no, como dicen
los soviéticos; "en todo caso, y aún cuando nosotros el pueblo chino no
podamos en cien años producir una bomba atómica, ni nos arrastraremos
bajo la batuta de los líderes soviéticos ni nos arrodillaremos ante el
chantaje nuclear de los imperialistas norteamericanos". La declaración
contiene citas del discurso de Mao de 18 de noviembre de 1957 y del ar-
tículo "Viva el Leninismo" de 1960, tratando de demostrar que los so-
viéticos han tergiversado el sentido de ambos extrayendo de su contexto
citas acerca de la muerte de media humanidad y la rápida reconstrucción
sobre las ruinas. Los chinos denuncian:

"En opinión de los líderes soviéticos, en este siglo nuclear
permanecer con vida lo es todo, y no hay propósito en la
vida... se someten a la dulce misericordia del imperialismo
... Es un concepto verdaderamente bestial."

La declaración apunta que "el desarme universal y completo se puede
poner en práctica solo después que el imperialismo, el capitalismo y to-
dos los sistemas de explotación hayan sido eliminados", poniendo más
en claro las recientes proposiciones chinas sobre el desarme.

2 Septiembre: El Gobierno checo exige el retiro de otros dos chinos,
un funcionario comercial de la embajada y un estudiante, por distribuir
material de crítica de la política soviética y checa. El corresponsal
de "Pravda" en Bonn informa que "aquí los propagandistas militaristas
empiezan ya a expresar abiertamente su simpatía con los hasta ahora
odiosos 'chinos rojos'," e "Izvestiya" apunta que Hong Kong y Macao,
al contrario de Goa (India) e Irián Occidental (Indonesia) están a'un
sin libertar. En Moscú, un grupo de ciudadanos soviéticos hacen una
manifestación frente a la embajada china, gritando consignas antibéli-
cas (Agencia Nueva China). En Pékin, al líder del PC indonesio D. N.
Aidit le hacen un recibimiento efusivo (en contraste con la ausencia
de publicidad cuando estuvo en la URSS), pero él pronuncia un discurso
sin compromiso en la Escuela Superior del Partido Comunista chino con-
denando brevemente tanto el "revisionismo contemporáneo" como el "dog-
matismo contemporáneo".

3 Septiembre: Krushev parte de Belgrado hacia la URSS, concluyendo
una visita de dos semanas. De acuerdo con la Agencia Nueva China,

Ko Htay, miembro del politburó del PC birmano que está haciendo negociaciones de paz con el Gobierno birmano, declara su oposición a la política de la India y el tratado contra los ensayos, y comenta como sigue: "No entiendo la coexistencia pacífica de Kruschev". En Pekín, Aidit pronuncia en una manifestación de recibimiento otro discurso sobre el tópico de revolución y comunismo en Indonesia, poniendo hincapié en que el PKI está obligado a "indonesianizar" el marxismo-leninismo; de nuevo se opone al "dogmatismo contemporáneo" así como al "revisionismo contemporáneo". En una emisión de la Radio de Moscú, en japonés, el comentarista (Ilinsky) declara específicamente que el tratado de alianza chino-soviético está aún en vigor; por lo tanto no tienen los chinos necesidad de sus propias armas nucleares.

4 Septiembre: Anuncian los chinos que, como el Comité Internacinnal Para la Cooperación de los Periodistas rehusa cambiar el temario o los arreglos para la convocatoria del Tercer Encuentro Mundial de Periodistas, la Asociación de Periodistas de Toda China va a boicotear dicha reunión. Una "carta de la URSS" publicada por el "Diario del Pueblo" en alabanza de los líderes chinos y firmada "La Unión Soviética, V. Ye.," es condenada por "Trud" como falsificación "ideada para los lectores crédulos". (En una difusión a China el 29 de agosto, la Radio de Moscú leyó una carta que se decía ser de un residente chino de la Unión Soviética condenando a los líderes chinos como pertenecientes a "la misma categoría" que los imperialistas.)

6 Septiembre: Los departamentos editoriales del "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" publican "El origen y desarrollo de las divergencias entre el liderato del PCUS y nosotros", el primero de una serie de artículos en respuesta a la Carta Abierta del PCUS de 14 de julio de 1963. En dicho artículo los chinos trazan el origen de la querrela del XX Congreso del PCUS en 1956 y niegan los asertos soviéticos de que en abril de 1960 habían dado una vuelta de 180 grados. Como las anteriores polémicas chinas, el artículo condena a los líderes soviéticos por haber negado a Stalin y la dictadura del proletariado; por no haber consultado con otros PC, dando ejemplo de su "chovinismo de gran potencia"; por su indiferencia a la lucha por la liberación nacional; y por su apoyo a la "coexistencia pacífica". Aparentemente tratando de reducir la desventaja semántica que encaran como opositores de la "coexistencia pacífica", los chinos la ponen en el mismo cuadro que la "transición pacífica" (la opinión de que las revoluciones internas son innecesarias) y la "competencia pacífica" (la competencia en la esfera económica). Más novedosa es la descripción china de:

-- el papel soviético en los disturbios en Hungría y Polonia en 1956:

"Adelantando tropas en una tentativa de someter a los camaradas polacos por la fuerza armada ellos [los líderes del PCUS] incurrieron en el error del chovinismo de gran potencia. Y en el momento crítico en que los contrarrevolucionarios húngaros habían ocupado Budapest, por un tiempo tuvieron intención de adoptar una política de capitulación y abandonar a la Hungría socialista a la contrarrevolución... Nosotros insistimos en que fueran tomadas todas las medidas necesarias para aplastar la contrarrevolución en Hungría... y firmemente nos opusimos a los erróneos métodos del chovinismo de gran potencia."

-- su propia posición en la reunión de los partidos en 1957:

"En la actual situación [en 1957], en el movimiento comunista internacional es ventajoso desde el punto de vista táctico referirse al deseo de la transición pacífica. Pero sería impropio poner demasiado énfasis en la posibilidad de la transición pacífica... Por todo lo que nos consta no hay aún un solo país donde dicha posibilidad sea de significación práctica... Obtener una mayoría parlamentaria no es lo mismo que destrozarse la vieja maquinaria del estado (principalmente las fuerzas armadas).

-- la tentativa soviética de imponer su control militar sobre China:

"En 1958, el liderato del PCUS adelantó demandas irrazonables con intención de poner a China bajo el control militar soviético... No mucho después, en junio de 1959, el Gobierno soviético unilateralmente destrozó el acuerdo sobre nueva tecnología para la defensa nacional concluido entre China y la Unión Soviética en octubre de 1957 y rehusó suministrar a China una muestra de bomba atómica y datos técnicos sobre su fabricación."

-- y la subversión soviética sobre las fronteras chinas:

"En abril y mayo de 1962, los líderes del PCUS emplearon sus órganos y personal en Sinkiang, China, para llevar a cabo actividades subversivas en gran escala en la región de Ili y engatusaron y coaccionaron a varias decenas de millares de ciudadanos chinos para que fueran a la Unión Soviética... el Gobierno soviético se negó a repatriar a estos ciudadanos chinos... Hasta hoy, permanece este incidente sin resolver. Esto es en verdad un acontecimiento sorprendente, nunca visto en las relaciones entre los países socialistas."

El artículo lleva apéndices en forma de documentos que aparentan ser: un bosquejo de las opiniones chinas presentadas ante la reunión de los partidos de noviembre de 1957; una declaración de la delegación china en la reunión de Bucarest de 1960; y proposiciones para arreglar las divergencias entre los partidos ofrecidas por los chinos en septiembre de 1960.

También el 6 de septiembre, una delegación cultural china llegó a Rumania para llevar a cabo una gira de un mes como invitados de la Unión Rumana de Escritores, y una emisión albanesa en lengua francesa de un artículo de "Zeri i Popullit" pide a los "comunistas revolucionarios" que "formen organizaciones que sepan permanecer a salvo de la traición de los oportunistas, que sepan luchar contra los líderes revisionistas..."

7 Septiembre: Tass pasa otro artículo (en "Nedelya", el suplemento semanal de "Izvestiya") que apunta la tolerancia china del dominio británico en Hong Kong, donde la Séptima Flota norteamericana encuentra abrigo, donde los comerciantes extranjeros explotan la mano de obra barata y donde florece el espionaje.

7-11 Septiembre: Incidente fronterizo de Naushki: El 10 de septiembre,
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

"Izvestiya" publica una primera versión de un incidente en la estación fronteriza soviética de Naushki el 7 de septiembre cuando funcionarios aduaneros soviéticos trataron de confiscar publicaciones "hostiles a nuestro país en manos de viajeros chinos." El 11 de septiembre "Komsomolskaya Pravda" informa que 92 ciudadanos chinos descendieron al nivel más soez haciendo de la sala de aduanas un excusado. Otro tren fue empleado para llevar a los pasajeros no de nacionalidad china hasta Moscú y el tren chino fue devuelto a China en las primeras horas del 10 de septiembre; siguió hasta Pekín, donde los viajeros chinos gozaron de un recibimiento triunfal con "bombos y platillos".

Ejemplares del Boletín de Información del servicio en ruso de la Agencia Nueva China, conteniendo la declaración de 1º de septiembre del portavoz del Gobierno chino (vea más arriba), parece que fueron confiscados a la tripulación del tren y a estudiantes, a pesar de que decían tenerlos "para su propia lectura". (La Agencia Nueva China no explica por qué lo estudiaban en la versión rusa.) Dicen los informes soviéticos que los chinos trataron de encerrar bajo llave a los funcionarios de aduana en el tren, y se negaron a seguir sin sus publicaciones; también utilizaron la emisora del tren para difundir el contenido de las publicaciones y para quejarse de maltratos soviéticos.

8 Septiembre: Una discusión de mesa redonda por Radio-Moscú da a entender que no habrá contestación al artículo chino de 6 de septiembre, diciendo también:

"Sería vano empeño siquiera tratar de hacer una lista de los artículos, ...publicados esta semana por ... órganos de prensa de China... Sería indigno caer en el tono rencilloso e histérico que Pekín está evidentemente tratando de imponernos."

Sin embargo, en un discurso en el Festival nacional de la Cosecha en Varsovia, Wladislaw Gorulka atacó, "más con pena que con ira", la negativa china de formar el tratado contra los ensayos; esto puede haber sido respuesta al artículo de 6 de septiembre, en el cual los chinos pretendieron que habían intercedido por Polonia en 1956. También el 8 de septiembre una emisión de Moscú cita un artículo en "Literaturnaya Gazeta" que apunta que, con todo y echarse los chinos de que publiquen las opiniones de sus opositores, la publicación de un artículo en el "Diario del Pueblo" lo pone a la vista de los sectores medios y superiores del PC chino; a las masas chinas se les ofrece solo la línea china.

9 Septiembre: "Bandera Roja" compara la alineación que dice existir entre la Unión Soviética y los imperialistas, ejemplo de la cual es el tratado contra los ensayos, con la "Santa Alianza" formada por Metternich el siglo 19: "Se puede decir con seguridad que la nueva 'Santa Alianza' no llegará a mejor fin que la anterior". En otro artículo "Bandera Roja" de nuevo cita parte del texto del artículo "Viva el Leninismo" de 1960.

9 Septiembre: Respondiendo a la táctica china de citar los archivos, una emisión de la Radio de Moscú a Yugoslavia cita artículos del "Diario del Pueblo" de 1956-1958, encomiando a la URSS por ayudar a las naciones oprimidas. (El 6 de septiembre se hicieron transmisiones parecidas al Reino Unido y el 8 de septiembre a Albania).

11 Septiembre: D. N. Aidit, ahora en Pyongyang asistiendo a la conmemoración del 15º aniversario de la República Popular Democrática de Korea, continua manteniendo una posición independiente:

"La posición más fácil, pero no la más segura, es la de ir de rabo a una de las partes, ... No requiere mucho pensar... llamado por los comunistas indonesios dogmatismo contemporaneo, no es una posición correcta. Es una posición burocrática, la posición de un toro al que ya se ha amarrado por la nariz y se hace fácil hacerlo venir a este o al otro lado."

11 Septiembre: "Pravda" publica un artículo de Glezerman en el que acusa a los chinos de revisiónismo porque

"Han sometido a revisión la tesis de las declaraciones [de 1957 y 1960] de que la contradicción básica de la época es la contradicción entre el socialismo y el capitalismo, poniendo esto en el contrafondo de sus documentos y colocandolo al nivel de otras consideraciones... Marx y Engels basaron la inevitabilidad de una revolución socialista del proletariado principalmente en un análisis de la contradicción básica de una sociedad capitalista, la contradicción entre el carácter público de la producción y el carácter privado del lucro... [Hoy] la contradicción entre la moribunda formación socioeconómica capitalista y la formación comunista que se va estableciendo se convierte en la contradicción básica de la época moderna, siendo la época de la transición del capitalismo".

12 Septiembre: "Pravda" publica una declaración del PC español en el exilio suscribiéndose fuertemente el tratado contra los ensayos, y apuntando que, por contraste a la China comunista, "hasta el Gobierno de Franco tiene intención de firmar." Se informa que un miembro de la Asamblea Nacional checa ha condenado la "irresponsabilidad megalomana nacionalista" de los chinos. "Pravda" también da a la luz un artículo de dos líderes del PC de Martinica añadiendo al ataque contra el PC chino.

13 Septiembre: El "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" publican el segundo artículo de la serie, "Sobre la cuestión de Stalin". Reconociendo que Stalin "cometió algunos errores... dió algunos malos consejos en el movimiento comunista internacional... [y por ende] ocasionó algunas pérdidas a la Unión Soviética y al movimiento comunista internacional" (refiriéndose posiblemente a la política de Stalin de fiarse de Chiang Kai-shek en 1927), los chinos mantienen que fue "un gran marxista-leninista, un gran revolucionario proletario". Khrushchev ha "negado" completamente a Stalin, en el XX Congreso del PCUS y desde entonces, "aunque estaba en la dirigencia del Partido en la época de Stalin y... activamente apoyó y

trarrevolucionarios". Los chinos hacen citas de declaraciones de Krushev en el decenio de 1930, entre ellas:

"'Nuestro Partido aplastará sin piedad la banda de traidores y borraré toda la borra trotskista-derechista... La garantía de ello es la dirigencia incommovible de nuestro Comité Central, la dirigencia incommovible de nuestro líder el camarada Stalin... Totalmente aniquilaremos al enemigo -- hasta el último hombre -- y esparciremos al viento sus cenizas.'" (6 junio 1937, Quinta Conferencia del Partido, oblast de Moscú)

Además, sostiene el artículo que Stalin sabía reconocer sus errores, que "después de la victoria de la Revolución China admitió su error", pero no así Krushev: "El sencillamente no conoce lo que es la autocrítica; todo lo que hace es pasar la culpa íntegra a otros y reclamar para sí todo el mérito." Por su discurso secreto en el XX Congreso, que aún teme revelar al pueblo soviético, Krushev "suministró a los imperialistas y a los reaccionarios de todos los países municiones antisoviéticas y anticomunistas muy bien recibidas." Al atacar el "culto a la personalidad" los líderes soviéticos realmente violan las enseñanzas de Lenin, incluso el principio del centralismo democrático. Un partido revolucionario deberá "tener un núcleo más bien estable de liderato que deberá constar de un grupo de líderes comprobados por largo tiempo hábiles en la integración de la verdad universal del marxismo-leninismo con la práctica concreta de la revolución"; aquí los líderes chinos parecen tenerse a sí propios en mente. Luego de un vibrante aserto de que Krushev, "por mucho que trate, ...no podrá jamás conseguir el marxismo-leninismo que Stalin defendió", el artículo concluye, de manera un poco sorprendente:

"Quisiéramos ofrecer al camarada Krushev una palabra de sincero consejo. Esperamos que se dé cuenta de sus errores y vuelva de su camino equivocado al camino del marxismo-leninismo. Vivan las grandes enseñanzas revolucionarias de Marx, Engels, Lenin y Stalin."

693. Communism's Zig Zag Line in India

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... using India as an example, that

BACKGROUND: The contradicting lines which the Communist Party of India (CPI) has been forced to take toward the government of its own country over the past twenty-five years provide a striking example not only of the subservience of national Communist parties to the Soviet Union's policies, but of the transitory nature of any Soviet policy favorable to a free nation.

The Stalin-Hitler pact of August 1939 required the first of many 180-degree turns in policy and propaganda which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) demanded of the CPI, as of the other fraternal parties. Totally committed to an anti-Hitler line (as part of a general anti-fascist strategy) in the late thirties, the CPI was stunned by the pact which overnight changed Hitler into a friend of peace and of the Soviet Union and thus, by extension, of all Communists. France and England, following the outbreak of war in early September 1939, were treated as warmongers for bearing arms against the USSR's new friend Hitler, and their own Communist parties had to oppose their national governments to suit Soviet convenience.

Imperialist War. Great Britain declared India a belligerent, a role opposed by the Congress Party of Nehru and Gandhi who put Indian freedom first, declaring that a "slave India could not fight for the freedom of other countries." Instead of the Congress Party's moderate opposition to the Allies, the CPI played the role of the real revolutionary party, advocating strikes and sabotage against the "imperialist war" efforts.

Peoples War. When Hitler invaded Russia in June 1941 the CPI obediently but reluctantly reversed its line for the second time in less than two years. The British Communist party brought the CPI into line, after six months of foot-dragging, in support of what then became the "peoples war." The Congress Party and the Socialists, whose minimum demands for freedom were not met by the British, continued their struggle through underground leaders while the Communists battled on the side of the British -- even to the extent of spying and informing on the nationalist leaders. Previous campaigns of sabotage against the war effort were abandoned, the class struggle was relaxed and the Communist cry changed from "strike" to "work." The British finally lifted their bans and permitted the CPI to function as a legal party in July 1942 -- nearly ten years after their proscription.

Post-War and independence. By the war's end, when Nehru and the other nationalist leaders were released from prison, the Communists' anti-patriot wartime activities in India had almost completely discredited them. Soviet pronouncements on India and Asian colonialism provided little clear guidance for the CPI. In August 1947, following independence and partition, Nehru led his government into a neutralist stance which the Indian Communists enthusiastically supported -- until the Soviet Union again ordered a new tack.

Cold War. In September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, a CPSU Secretary, signalled the end of the Soviet-Allies honeymoon in a speech before the Cominform which divided the world into a "democratic" and an "imperialist" camp. The bourgeoisie, he held, were inevitably in the imperialist camp. The CPI, once again, had to turn about and attack Nehru's "bourgeois" government in obedience to Moscow's line. The four years which followed showed an internal CPI split which persists to the present time.

One faction, believing it to be Moscow's policy, launched violent, insurrectionary tactics against the Nehru government in an effort to overthrow the imperialists and Indian bourgeoisie and establish a Communist government. A minority group took China's revolution as a model for a two-stage revolution which would first get rid of the imperialists, the English, and secondly get control of the government. Eventually the CPSU adopted the policy of alliance with bourgeoisie (in this case, the Nehru government) and the two-stage revolution -- again catching the Soviet-line CPI group in a position contrary to Soviet foreign policy interests.

Soft line on Nehru. 1951 to 1955 were years of increasing Soviet friendliness toward Nehru, marked by Moscow's having to push the CPI into accepting their view that Nehru's domestic as well as his foreign policy had some good aspects vis-a-vis Soviet strategic objectives. A large portion of the membership was reluctant to abandon the attacks on Nehru which were advancing the cause of Indian communism and believed themselves sacrificed for the sake of Soviet foreign policy interests. The Bandung conference in early 1955, Nehru's visits to Soviet Russia and China, followed by the beginning of Soviet economic assistance to India, demonstrated the new look toward India.

CPSU authority within the CPI withered under the impact of deStalinization, the attack on Hungary and the Twentieth CPSU Congress call for a peaceful transition to socialism. Meanwhile the Chinese revolution became newly important as a model for attaining socialism in Asia.

Kerala and after. In early 1957 the Communists came to power in the state of Kerala, India by electing their first -- and to date, only -- government -- a not unmixed blessing. The Party suffered from the strain of attempting to maintain the Kerala government in office while coping with the Chinese-influenced militants who objected to the lack of Marxist orthodoxy and to reliance on constructive parliamentary tactics.

The Soviet line again moved temporarily around to hostility against Nehru in late 1958, apparently responding to Nehru's criticisms of the Kerala (state) government. Early 1959, in a return to the Soviet line of restraint toward Nehru, which prevented Communist demonstrations against the ousting of the Kerala government, the CPI took a neutral stand in the Sino-Indian border dispute and demonstrated friendship for Nehru.

CPI split. While the Soviet Union professed friendship with India, the CCP was attempting to sell its hard line in the CPI, and its harsh criticism of Khrushchev's moves in the West were echoed by the Chinese-leaning CPI faction. Dissension increased in 1960 and 1961, despite apparent CPSU efforts to prevent an open split. As the Sino-Soviet feud heated up, so did the internal CPI fight.

Sino-Indian War. The Chinese border sorties into Indian territory which erupted into a major, but so far brief, armed conflict in October 1962 further aggravated dissensions within the CPI. The Soviet Union took no stand on the conflict until it became clear that India, somewhat disillusioned about the value of its traditional neutralism in the face of the Chinese attack, was turning to the west for assistance. The CPI "rightists" were loyal to the Soviet decision to support and arm Nehru against the CPR -- the first Communist party in a capitalist country to attack a Communist government. The "leftists" who hailed China and denounced India's defense against attack were put in jail.

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particularly elites

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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

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23 September 1968

699 FE,NE,a. The Trotskyite Movement in Ceylon

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BACKGROUND: While the name of the man who after Lenin himself was most responsible for the accomplishment and consolidation of the Russian Revolution is still anathema in the official world of Soviet and Chinese communism, there is one small country where for almost thirty years he has been identified with a peculiar brand of national communism which has appealed to both workers and intellectuals in a way that orthodox Stalinism has not. Well organized, sensitive to popular aspirations and led by able and experienced politicians, the Trotskyite LSSP (Lanka Sama Samaja Party) of Ceylon, founded in 1935, has acted as one of the principal opposition parties to the government since Ceylon obtained its independence in 1948.

To the patriotic and idealistic young students seeking some form of organization for their protest against social injustice and foreign rule, Trotsky appeared not only as the great theoretician of communism but also as an ideal untainted either by the unromantic realities of communism in practice, (having been expelled from the CPSU in 1927) or by identification with Russian nationalist aspirations, and therefore as someone with whom the young Ceylonese radicals could readily identify themselves. Politically, too, the adoption of Trotsky as their inspiration rather than Stalin was advantageous since it permitted them to formulate a program which was responsive to the interests of Ceylon rather than those of the USSR. This, in an area of ethnic, religious and linguistic disparity, in which nationalism was the most important unifying factor, was vital to the LSSP attempts to win mass support. As an indigenous Communist party which owed its allegiance to no foreign power, it could don the garb of Ceylonese nationalism and avoid the condemnation which has been the bane of orthodox CPs throughout the world,-- that of being the instrument of a foreign power.

From the start, the LSSP rather than the regular Communist Party (which was established in 1940 following the ejection of the Stalinists from the LSSP) controlled the trade unions and still today retains paramount influence among the working class. /LSSP trade unions members number 70,000 as opposed to 12,000 of the CP/. Because of the ability and national orientation of the LSSP leaders, the party has generally been successful in attracting important elements of the intelligentsia. Many persons who favor greater social progress but who shied away from the extreme program promulgated by the Communist Party, were attracted by the more nationalistic and constructive-appearing platform of the Trotskyites.

Since Ceylon became independent in 1947, the Trotskyite parties have had sizable contingents in the House of Representatives, however, their influence has consistently been reduced by internal polemics. The LSSP was formed by four men any one of whom could with equal plausibility claim credit for founding the party:

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N.M. Perera, Colvin R. de Silva, Dr. Wickremasinghe and Philip Gunawardena. The pluralism which from the very beginning characterized the LSSP and the fact that no one of the leaders stood out above the others, while preventing any one person from dominating the party, also prevented it from having the unity and cohesion provided by a Mao Tse-tung or a Ho Chi-minh. Today, each of these men, except de Silva, is head of his own Marxist Party. Eschewing the traditional Communist organizational principle of democratic centralism, the LSSP has operated instead by discussion, compromise and decentralization. The Trotskyites' preoccupation with ideology, the pluralistic leadership and the decentralized and highly personal organization encouraged dissent and factionalism from the start.

At the time of World War II, the LSSP agitated against supporting Great Britain and as a result the party was outlawed and its leaders arrested by the local British authorities. What organizational unity the party had hitherto enjoyed was destroyed when the party went underground and each of the principal leaders, after escaping from prison, formed a separate organization around himself. From the end of World War II until 1960 the Trotskyite movement, with its inherent party tendencies toward decentralization and disunity, was divided into two parties: the LSSP led by Gunawardena and Perera, and the Bolshevik-Leninist Party led by de Silva. In the early years of independence, these parties constituted the only effective opposition to the government of the United National Party. In 1949 they had merged briefly in an effort to increase the effectiveness of their opposition. In 1950, however, they split in a new alignment: Gunawardena withdrew and formed the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) LSSP; the majority of the Trotskyite movement remained with Perera and de Silva and formed the Nava (New) LSSP. In 1960 the two groups merged again. While the VLSSP had entered into a brief coalition with the Communist Party in 1954 and while Gunawardena had returned with favorable impressions from his extensive travel to the USSR in 1957, under his leadership the VLSSP retained its independent Trotskyite orientation. The NLSSP, for its part, was anti-Stalinist, more concerned with doctrinal purity and even less inclined to compromise. The stronger of the two parties, it stood for a program of "democratic socialism" which blended Marxism and nationalism but which at this time insisted on political freedom. Like the VLSSP, the NLSSP favored nationalization of the banks, large plantations, export-import firms etc. but, both in degree and in pace, Perera and de Silva have been more moderate than Gunawardena. Moreover, its differences with the Communist Party of Ceylon were such that while on occasion for tactical reason the NLSSP would join the CP in a united front, it steadfastly refused to consider a merger.

Meanwhile the growth of Mrs. Bandaranaike's SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) into a majority party consigned the Trotskyites to the role of a minority party obliged to base its political strategy on gaining the balance of political power in parliament and eventually controlling the government in coalition with one of the major parties. At the same time the less radical temper of the country after 20 years of independence, is obliging the Ceylon Trotskyites to present more moderate stands in order to maintain their influence

Currently the situation of the three Marxist parties is the following: First, and most important, the LSSP, the self-styled Trotskyite party which claims adherence to the Fourth International, has a membership of approximately 1,500 and through its labor federations controls some 160,000 workers. The party is now split in two opposing wings: a right wing which seeks to attain power through parliamentary means, favors cooperation with leftist elements of the ruling SLFP and the united front tactic, led by President N.M. Perera and Secretary General Leslie Gunawardena; a left wing which seeks power through direct agitation among the working masses; an important leader of the faction is P. Rajasuriya, Secretary General of the LSSP-controlled Ceylon Federation of Labor. The LSSP remains one of the best organized parties in Ceylon. Party Youth Leagues are particularly zealous and aggressive. The LSSP has received some financial and logistic support from Yugoslavia. The Ceylon Communist Party, whose principal electoral strength lies in Colombo and the southern urban areas, has a membership of approximately 4,000 and controls some 65,000 trade union members. CCP leadership is divided in its orientation between Moscow and Peking. The Moscow-oriented group is headed by the party president and founder Dr. S.A. Wickremasinghe and the General Secretary, Pieter Kevneman, while the Peking-oriented faction is led by M.G. Mendis and N. Shanmugathasan, President and Secretary respectively of the CCP's Trade Union Federation. The Moscow-oriented group professes willingness to achieve its goals through parliamentary means in a coalition with progressive elements of the SLFP and other Marxist parties, while the Peking faction advocates seizure of power through extra-legal means with emphasis on direct mass struggle. In the past the CCP has supported the SLFP in parliament but now, claiming that the SLFP has abandoned its progressive attitude, has publicly withdrawn its support. Finally, there is the MEP (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna), an indigenous Marxist party which maintains no ties with international Marxist organizations. The MEP was founded in 1960 by Philip Gunawardena after he and his followers had been expelled from the coalition cabinet of the MEP. After the demise of the MEP coalition, Gunawardena took its name for his new party. MEP policies correspond to the views of its founder and leader who maintains that Communism can be adapted to fit the needs of a particular country. Gunawardena also believes that Marxism and Buddhism are compatible and has found political support among extremist elements of Buddhist nationalist groups. All three Marxist parties are in a period of transition in which the old leaders, for the most part of a nationalistic political orientation, are being challenged increasingly by a more radical left wing, less inclined to compromise its principles and tending to favor revolutionary means of attaining power. This left wing has become increasingly oriented toward Peking and some members are apparently responsive to Chinese Communist direction.

On 12 August 1963, the two Trotskyite parties and the CP of Ceylon signed a formal agreement outlining a common program which adds substance to the United Left Front announced on 1 May. However, the three parties have remained independent and have not yet worked out joint leadership. Meanwhile, Mrs. Bandaranaike's recent moves to appease the left wing of her own SLFP -- including nationalization

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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5

27 September 1963

700 WH, e. Latin American Labor Union Scene

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BACKGROUND:

"The trade unions are the closest assistants of the Communist Party in its struggle for the full victory of Communism." -- Trud.

"Trade unions are the reservoirs of state power, a school of communism. . ." -- Lenin.

"Every party that desires to affiliate to the Communist International must carry on systematic and persistent work in the trade unions . . . it is necessary to form Communist nuclei which . . . must win the trade unions to the cause of Communism . . ." -- Lenin.

"We must make the trade unions a genuine Leninist school . . . a school of communism . . ." -- Khrushchev.

On the night of 12 September, Chile's cabinet resigned in protest over congressional plans to settle a strike of public health workers by granting each worker a 200-escudo loan. It was an "illegal strike," the cabinet maintained, and the congressional response to strike pressures "openly contradicts the firm attitude taken by the executive to safeguard the public interest."

In sharp contrast is the harmony which prevails in government-labor relations in Mexico. In his 1 September "state-of-the-union" address, President Agolfo Lopez Mateos cited the recognition Mexico's advanced labor legislation received from hemisphere labor ministers at a recent conference in Bogota. "We have fully respected the autonomy of labor union organization," he declared.

The government of pro-Communist Premier Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana, on the other hand, is showing considerable disrespect for the autonomy of labor union organizations. His attempts to force legislation to give the government control of the labor movement was bitterly resisted in a three-month general strike. The present truce is only temporary, for the government has announced it intends to re-introduce the controversial legislation. In the meantime, it is attempting to split the labor movement along racial lines by wooing East Indian agricultural workers, who comprise about 40% of the labor movement, into a government-sponsored union.

While the strikers in British Guiana were resisting efforts of a pro-Communist government to control their unions, strikers in Bolivia's important mining industry have been accepting

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direction and support from Communists to resist government efforts to rehabilitate the mines. In hopes of calling a halt to annual losses in the mines, the government of Bolivia announced sweeping reorganization plans. The miners went on strike 1 July -- a move the government declared illegal. Considerable evidence of Communist agitation has been cited. A move to sever relations with Cuba followed exposure of the latter's involvement in the strike and the Senate approved a resolution urging the government to declare the ranking Cuban diplomat in Bolivia persona non grata.

In Argentina, the role labor will play during the administration of Dr. Auturo Illia (to be inaugurated 12 October) is not yet clear. While the 7 July national elections splintered the followers of exiled dictator Juan Peron, Peronist forces in the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT), the newly reunited national center and traditional stronghold of the Peronist movement, continue to search for a firm ideological foundation to replace the mystique of Justicialism, i.e. Peronism. Although the Communists, who have sided with the Peronists on many occasions, are particularly zealous in encouraging the efforts of top Peronist labor leader Andres Framini to press for civil war, and have attempted to infiltrate the Peronist labor movement, they are not represented in the new executive secretariat of the CGT. Although the reunited CGT has thus in effect consolidated non-Communist labor elements, the opportunistic hard-core Peronist elements in the CGT continue to present a clear target for Communist subversion and manipulation, and Communist efforts to harness the political potential of the labor movement as a whole are likely to increase if Dr. Illia legalizes the Communist Party as he has promised.

Although the variety and diversity revealed in the above examples of organized labor activity underscores the need to judge Latin American labor movements individually, one can make some valid generalizations. As in other underdeveloped areas, Latin American trade unions have had to face the fact that the industrial worker is a minority group. Unemployment and underemployment -- antithetic to the cause of unionism but stimulating to the cause of communism -- are prevalent. Also prevalent is a highly political form of unionism. Unions participate directly in politics, are wooed by rival politicians since they often represent the largest bloc of semi-organized voters, and call strikes more often for political reasons than they do for economic ones.

Communist exploitation. Their political role has made Latin American trade unions a special target for Communist exploitation (as well as for left-wing extreme nationalists manipulation). In implementing the Communist doctrine revealed in the quotations cited above, Communist Parties have mined the unions for members, manipulated Communists into key positions from which they could direct the unions in support of Communist objectives and fanned unrest and militancy in attempts to gain political power, create confusion and advance revolutionary aims. The Communists have attempted to take over the general strike from non-Communist organized labor and to "patent" it as a tool of ultimate revolution. Some observers

maintain that they have been so skillful that there is fear on the part of non-Communist labor leaders that any general strike, called for no matter what reason, will be wrecked or subverted to serve the Communist Party line.

Communist interest in the general strike and in the organized labor movement is in support of its over-all efforts to seize power. Its identification with the working class and its propaganda portrait of the "worker's paradise" have far-reaching impact among Latin American workers. By the same token, their incessant anti-imperialist, anti-Yankee, anti-US propaganda -- echoed by radical nationalistic extremists -- also has its effect.

In addition to efforts in individual countries, the Communists are attempting to form regional groups of trade unions to advance their cause in the manner of their international front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In Latin America, this has taken the form of an effort to organize a Central Unica de Trabajadores de America Latina (CUTAL -- Single Central of Workers of Latin America), probably to replace the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) now affiliated with the WFTU. CUTAL is weak and has hardly any mass support but its backers persist in trying to expand and strengthen it. Leaders of the movement have revealed they hope to make CUTAL the foundation for a new united Latin American anti-US front. But organizational difficulties have been encountered in the Communists' attempt to cut the Latin American labor movement to its new pattern. As a result, the "constituent assembly" designed to launch CUTAL scheduled for September in Rio has been postponed until January. However, a campaign to raise funds for the January meeting is scheduled for the second week of October and while it is yet to get off the ground, it is still trying.


Cuban Influence. CUTAL's major aim, as stated by the Cuban who is described as the executive secretary of the forming coordinating committee, will be the "defense of Cuba." It is ironic that Cuba should share the leadership in trying to form CUTAL and be one of the major reasons for the organization. While understandable in the context of Cuba's position as the "vanguard of Communism" in Latin America, Cuba's record of "achievements" for the worker do not recommend it as his champion or spokesman. Prior to 1959, Cuban labor legislation was hailed by many as the most advanced in the hemisphere. It was enforced and free trade unions were alert to protest any violations of the guaranteed rights. But Communist Cuba has followed the Red norm -- strikes have been outlawed and unions made tools of the state charged with the primary mission of maintaining discipline and increasing productivity. As a result, the worker's benefits have dwindled as government controls and restrictions increased (see unclassified attachment, "Cuban Worker's Balance Sheet").

Growth of independent unionism. In sharp contrast to the Cuban experience culminating in the declaration of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Cuba's Minister of Industries, "The eventual fate of the trade union is to disappear" (Revolucion, 2 Feb 1963), trade unionism is

growing in most Latin American countries. And in contrast to the general Communist image, there is an effort to build trade unions basically independent of state or employer influence which will militantly defend collective bargaining, reinforced by the ultimate right to strike, as their classic modus operandi.

Latin American governments are taking a greater interest in the labor union movement. This stems, in part, from the fact that the unions represent a powerful political influence, but is also influenced by widespread emphasis upon social and economic reforms as supported by the Alliance for Progress. This trend is reflected in the comprehensive principles adopted by a joint conference of 19 Latin American Ministers of Labor and 49 area trade union leaders sponsored by the Organization of American States in Bogota in May (see unclassified attachment, "Ministers of Labor Conference Adopt Thirty-Nine Articles"). Implementation of the 39 articles adopted at the conference will increase the democratic trends in Latin American unions as well as insure continued improvement of social and economic conditions. These progressive steps will also insure a strong bulwark against Communist attempts to pervert and capture the trade union movement.

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The Significance of Trade Unions in
Latin America

"Communist activities in the labor movements of Latin America have had several purposes during the first 37 years of Communist history. First of all, the trade union movements under Communist control were fertile recruiting grounds for the Communist Parties themselves. Through trade union activities, the Communists were often able to win the confidence of the workers, first in economic matters, and eventually in political affairs as well.

"It is certainly historically true that the times and places in which the Communists have achieved considerable political influence have been those in which they have either controlled important labor movements or have had great influence in non-Communist labor movements. In Chile the key to Communist influence has been the Party's trade union work. The period during which the Party's influence was least was in the early 1930's, when the Communist-controlled Federación Obrera de Chile was at a low ebb. With the merging of the Communist unions and the more influential Socialist-controlled organizations to form the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile, the Communists made rapid increase in political influence in the nation at large. Communist power in Chile has been based on the great Communist influence in the coal and nitrate unions and, to a lesser degree, in the copper workers' organizations.

"In Guatemala, again, the Communists' rise to influence and power came through their control of the trade union movement. First the Confederación de Trabajadores de Guatemala and then the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala were under Communist influence. With the labor movement firmly in its control, the Communist Party was able to make promises and threats to the governments of Presidents Arévalo and Arbenz, both of whom took them seriously. Through this trade union power, the Communists were able to work their way into important government positions and to gain considerable influence among the general public.

"In Cuba there is little doubt that the rise of the Communists to influence in the late 1930's and the early 1940's was due to their deal with Batista, whereby they were given complete freedom of action and positive government aid in the trade union field in return for political support for Batista's presidential ambitions. With the destruction of their control of the trade unions in the late 1940's, the Cuban Communists lost very heavily in popular support and ceased to have any significant influence in governmental circles.

"In Brazil, too, the sudden rise of the Communists in 1945 and 1946 was the result of their great activity in the labor movement. The fact that they were able to keep a solid core of support in the late 1940's and early 1950's, even in the face of great hostile pressure by the government, was due to their strong influence in the ranks of organized labor.

"The second purpose of Communist trade union activity in Latin America is closely connected with the Parties' role as sections of the international Communist movement and, in the last analysis, as agents of the Soviet Union. The possible use of key positions in the trade union movement for furthering the purposes of the international Communist movement has always been a primary consideration with the Latin American Communists.

"As early as 1933 the agenda for the Second Congress of the Confederación Sindical Latino Americana included discussion of "concentration of forces in the fundamental branches of the economy of each country." During the second World War, the Communists first used their trade union influence to sabotage the delivery of goods to the Allies, and then, during the second part of the war, used it to get the largest possible contribution in effort and production from the Latin American workers for the cause of the Soviet Union and the powers associated with her. Since the outbreak of the Cold War the Communists again have made no secret of their desire to use the unions as a basis for ideological attack on the United States, and in case of war as a weapon to sabotage the delivery of needed supplies to this country.

"Thus their relations with the trade unions have been a fundamental factor in the history of the Latin American Communists. Where they were strong in the unions, they were strong in the country. Where they had little influence in organized labor, they had little influence in the nation as a whole.

"The same thing is likely to remain true for a long time to come. Although there is a tendency abroad to deprecate the Latin American trade unions, the fact is that they remain the most powerful mass organizations in Latin America today. They are a vital part of the Latin American social revolution and are perhaps the only institution in the region which can challenge the role of the military as the principal determinant of public policy and government. The Communists do not underrate their importance. It is essential that anyone trying to understand the role of the international Communist movement in Latin America be equally aware of their significance." Underlining added

--Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, Rutgers University Press, 1957.

CUBAN WORKER'S BALANCE SHEET

To get this:

1. The State has established an enterprise-monopoly, and for all practical purposes, has become the only employer;
2. The worker depends exclusively on the State, which decides what type of work he shall do, controls his movements, arbitrarily orders his transfer, and may discharge him for political or production reasons;
3. Forced labor is imposed;
4. Unemployment, instead of being reduced, has increased;
5. The work-day has been considerably extended;
6. The State has imposed "voluntary" labor and has militarized production;
7. The worker is compelled to meet minimum standards of production in connection with quality, quantity and time in order to receive his standard salary; and he is subject to pressures exerted by the State and the union in order to equal or surpass these minimum standards;
8. Public authority establishes wage scales in an arbitrary manner;
9. Salaries have been frozen, and subsequently reduced;
10. Salary deductions have been tripled;
11. The unions no longer have as their main objectives the defense of the workers but now are primarily concerned with supporting the interest of the State even to the detriment of their members;
12. Unions are now ideologically subservient to the Communist Party, and union democracy no longer exists;
13. The right to strike has been prohibited; and
14. Collective bargaining no longer has as its purpose the protection of the working class and the regulation of industrial relations, but now serves only to reiterate the obligation of workers towards the productive process.

--Outstanding characteristics of the Communist-imposed labor regime.

The Cuban worker was forced to give up this:

1. Freedom of contract, including the selection, change or quitting of work;
2. The maximum work day;
3. Non-paid leisure time during lunch-breaks and night rest; and paid leisure time on a weekly basis and for holidays, summer days-off and annual vacations;
4. Paid sick leave;
5. Minimum wages;
6. The determination of such minimum wages by tripartite commissions composed of workers, employers, and the government;
7. The prohibition of making salary discounts not imposed by law;
8. The right to salary increases resulting from promotions;
9. A Christmas bonus;
10. The prohibition of the payment of wages in other than legal tender;
11. Special payment for overtime work;
12. Advances against salaries;
13. Protection against arbitrary discharge or lay-off with extraordinary juridical guarantees;
14. The right to join or not to join a union along with protections designed to ensure democratic unionism;
15. The right to strike; and
16. The right to bargain collectively.

--Substantive rights of labor guaranteed by the 1940 Cuban constitution and other laws and agreements existing prior to 1959, all of which have been either totally abrogated or severely undermined.

(Adapted from Labor Conditions in Communist Cuba, Cuban Economic Research Project, University of Miami Press, 1963.)

"Before the Castro regime, organized labor in Cuba, including 500,000 sugar workers, were protected by the most modern labor code in Latin America.

"They worked eight hours a day with double pay for overtime, received one month's paid vacation a year and nine days' sick leave, got 43 hours' pay for 44 hours of work a week, and were given time off during the hot months of the year.

"Minimum wages were fixed by law. Workers had the right to strike and to demand collective labor contracts, and they received workmen's compensation, pensions and retirements.

"Now working hours have been extended and workers do militia duty after hours. There is no extra pay for overtime. Thousands are forced to work 'voluntarily' without pay cutting cane, gathering the coffee crop, picking cotton and doing other jobs.

"Vacations have disappeared and most of the other benefits have been annulled by the Castro regime.

"It has been calculated that wages in Cuba have dropped 50 per cent compared with pre-Castro days, and taxes amounting to about 17 per cent of their gross wages are deducted."

--R. Hart Phillips, New York Times, 19 May 1963.

* * * * *

"The measures of labor discipline and increased state control over the workers were quietly instituted by the Cuban Labor Ministry . . . and include the following:

"An emulation campaign under which workers have to compete with one another.

"Governmental direction of labor.

"A 'labor book' to be carried by every worker on which pensions are based according to comments written in by employers.

"Punishments, including loss of wages and holidays, for minor absenteeism.

"A complete wage-freeze.

"A 'norm' system under which workers failing to reach set targets will suffer a wage deduction.

. . .

"That the Cuban workers themselves are not showing marked enthusiasm for the new legislation has been admitted by the Havana radio, which said in a recent broadcast:

"Some time must pass before all our people acquire that understanding spirit of self-discipline. . . . That is why for those who have not yet understood and have not known how to respond to the just and humane work of our Socialist revolution . . . there is the justice of the revolution."

--Darius S. Jhabvala, New York Herald Tribune,
11 November 1962.

Inter-American Labor Bulletin
Issued by ORIT—the Inter-American
Regional Organization of the ICFTU
April-June 1963

MINISTERS OF LABOR CONFERENCE ADOPT THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES

Bogota, Columbia—The OAS-sponsored Ministers of Labor Conference held here in Colombia May 5-May 11 terminated with the adoption of 39 positive articles which constitute the basis of the Declaration of Cudinarca.

Besides the 19 Ministers of Labor who headed their respective delegations at the Conference, a total of 49 trade union leaders participated either as members of the delegation or as members of the ORIT and International Trade Secretariat delegations.

The Conference was called by the OAS to give impetus to the Alliance for Progress and the two main subjects on the agenda were "the role of the Ministers of Labor in the development of economic programs within the Alliance for Progress" and "the role of the trade union movement in the devel-

opment of socio-economic programs within the concepts of the Alliance for Progress.

The following are the 39 concrete proposals included in the Declaration of Cudinarca and which are to be submitted to the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Council at its next meeting.

The U.S. delegation was headed by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz and included AFL-CIO Vice President Joseph A. Beirne and the AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative, Andrew C. McLellan.

1. That ministries of labor not limit themselves to technical matters, but should promote social policies in accordance with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.
2. That in the execution of all programs by the ministries of labor priority be given to the development of human resources and their full utilization.
3. That ministries of labor participate actively in formulating and implementing economic and social development plans in coordination with the activities of other agencies in their respective fields and collaborate with the international organizations. To this end, planning units will be established within the ministries of labor.
4. That standing committees representing both labor and management be established to advise the ministries of labor on all programs related to economic and social development, thereby ensuring the active participation of workers in the planning and implementation of such programs.
5. That labor legislation and in particular minimum wage systems be accompanied by an effective system of inspection that would guarantee compliance and enable the workers to share in the benefits of economic development.
6. That labor, management and government be represented in the setting of minimum wages.
7. That government, management and labor organizations assume their primary responsibility for the training of the labor force. The ministries of labor should see that training is available to all workers, organized and unorganized, in both rural and urban areas, and especially to the great mass of unemployed and underemployed workers.
8. That on-the-job training be encouraged.
9. That training be provided in accordance with a program carefully adjusted to both the present needs and the projected future needs of the country.
That the Council of the Organization of American States make representations before the agencies that administer Alliance for Progress funds, for technical and financial assistance for the Inter-American Vocational Training, Information and Research Center (CINTERFOR) and for national vocational training institutions.
10. That ministries of labor establish employment services to assist workers in finding suitable employment, and employers in finding best qualified workers, and to disseminate information on labor needs and employment opportunities.
11. That the ministries of labor of the Latin American countries intensify their statistical research activities and endeavor to establish a body of basic data, through standardized methods of compilation, preparation and presentation, that will make it possible to record labor statistics more accurately and will facilitate the dynamic evaluation of problems arising from economic

12. That consideration be given to the establishment of a regional pilot project for labor statistics. That the activities of CIENES, which has headquarters in Santiago, Chile, be expanded to include research, training, and the comparative study of labor statistics systems.

13. That ministries of labor seek to speed the adoption, extension and improvement of social security systems.

14. That plans for social security systems be integrated with national plans for economic and social development.

15. That international technical assistance resources be expanded in the field of social security, and that increased support be furnished to the Centro Interamericano de Estudios de Seguridad Social, with headquarters in Mexico City, sponsored by the Inter-American Social Security Institute and the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social.

16. That organizations concerned with carrying out the Alliance for Progress be asked to facilitate financial assistance for constructing and equipping of social security hospitals, and to provide technical and financial assistance for social security programs, especially those of preventive medicine.

17. That the member states of the Organization of American States collaborate in the creation of a technical consultation center for research, planning and training for personnel of the ministries of labor. The proposed center would direct studies on a wide range of subjects in the labor field, both national and international; it would serve as consultant on promotion of cooperation among the member states in this field and would furnish direct technical assistance on such matters to the countries at their request. That the Council of the Organization of American States be asked to request that the International Labour Organisation, in consultation with the other appropriate international agencies, prepare draft bylaws for the center, together with a draft plan for financing it which shall be submitted to the ministers of labor of the member states 30 days before the next meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and included in the agenda of that meeting.

18. That the ministries of labor formulate clearly and precisely the objectives of their labor policy within plans for economic and social development, and attempt to make them as uniform as possible; and that this policy be formulated in consultation with organizations representing the sectors concerned.

19. That labor programs formulated by ministries of labor in consultation with the sectors concerned establish an appropriate policy designed to strengthen democratic trade unionism, minimum wages, social assistance, social security systems, collective bargaining, employment, vocational training, and services for the recreation and cultural improvement of the workers; and promote the institutional and legal reforms necessary to achieve the desired goals.

20. That members of the Organization of American States should endeavor to harmonize their labor and social security legislation in such a manner that the rights of the workers will be uniformly protected throughout the area of the member countries.

21. That Alliance economic and technical assistance be provided for social welfare programs aimed at improving the living conditions of marginal sectors of the society not included in the wage-earning sector.

22. That a technical meeting be held, on the level of directors of government planning agencies, to exchange information and experience, with particular attention to the social aspects of development, especially the utilization of human resources and the specific problems directly or indirectly affecting the labor sector.

23. That the ministries of labor be duly represented on their countries delegations to the annual meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

24. That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council create a seventh special committee to deal specifically with labor matters.

25. That periodic meetings of the ministers of labor be held for the purpose of improving and providing continuity for inter-American activities in the social field, proposing specific social goals and how and when they shall be attained within the terms of the Charter of Punta del Este.

26. That participation by the workers in the formulation, execution and evaluation of national development programs include the representatives of democratic trade unions in the collaboration of such programs.

27. That the national governments recognize that the full and active participation of labor in all stages of national planning and in their development efforts is an important element in securing for their plans the full support of the Alliance and related international agencies.

28. That the member countries of the Alliance, through their representatives on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, provide that one of the criteria for evaluation of national development programs shall be that such plans be prepared in effective consultation with the representatives of the democratic trade union organizations and implemented with their participation.

29. That trade union freedom, guaranteed internationally by the rules embodied in Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation, including the right of association, the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike, be considered as the essential basis for securing for workers an effective role in national development activities.

30. That labor legislation be revised to assure trade union organizations the right to complete freedom and independence.

31. That trade union education preferably be entrusted to the trade union organizations themselves in cooperation with national and international agencies.

32. That the governments of Latin America recognize same rights for agricultural workers that legislation guarantees other labor sectors, especially their right to free trade union organization.

33. That governments make available specialized training for agricultural workers, in such manner as to assume them participation in the benefits of economic and social development.

34. The promotion of cooperatives, including such fields as housing, production, distribution, credit, transportation, consumption, etc., which would greatly contribute to accelerated development and the strengthening of the role of the people as producers and consumers. Ministries of labor should view as a basic part of their task the encouragement of cooperative activities by workers in collaboration with other national and international agencies. A fundamental part of this effort is the assistance to training activities designed to build a corps of qualified administrators of cooperatives and the implementation of other measures of technical assistance.

35. That worker's banks be developed to promote savings by that sector, satisfy their credit needs, protect them against usury, and enable them to participate directly in the development process. Most of the capital of such banks should be owned by workers and without prejudicing the use of funds obtained from national and international sources.

36. That the provision of adequate financial facilities should be promoted with respect to amortization terms and interest rates for workers' housing.

37. That national and municipal governments facilitate the acquisition of land for workers' housing.

38. That programs of housing and related public services for workers be undertaken in the centers of economic activity.

39. The Conference, fully aware of the vital importance of the deterioration in the terms of trade and of its direct relationship to the standard of living of the workers of Latin America, takes note of the draft resolution presented by the Delegation of Colombia (which is included as an Appendix to this Final Report) and, recognizing that it deals with a technical subject which is the primary responsibility of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, transmits the said draft resolution to the next meeting of the IA-ECOSOC for consideration in the terms of trade, and especially since it is consistent with point 4 of the Declaration of Cundinamarca.

THEREFORE:

The Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor on the Alliance for Progress requests of the Council of the Organization of American States that these recommendations be transmitted to the next meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.