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10 February 1964

Briefly Noted

Kwame Nkrumah's Soviet-style "Legality."

Ghana's government-appointed polling officials obediently turned in a 99.9 per cent score for "yes" votes in the significant February first referendum. The Convention People's Party is now designated the "vanguard of the people in their struggle to build a Socialist society," an almost verbatim copy of the clause from Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution. No attempt was made to conceal the coercive nature of the registered ballots system and the frequent unavailability of the "no" ballot box. This predicted "victory" gives Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's President-for-life, the trappings of legality for future dictatorial decisions, foreshadowed by the December dismissal of the Chief Justice who acquitted three former officials of a treason charge. The elimination of an independent judiciary removes the last facade from Nkrumah's totalitarian "socialist" state.

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(Briefly Noted)

**DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST**

- 2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore capitalism by Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda et al, (18 sentenced to death) 2-13 March 1938.
- 5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1879), 1953.
- 8 Mar Russia -- February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917.
- 13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai Lama, 1959.
- 14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1818), 1883.
- 18 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921.
- 1 Ap Berlin Blockade begins, 1948.
- 4 Ap North Atlantic Treaty signed in response to Soviet imperialism in Europe, 1949 (15th anniversary).
- 11 Ap Liberation from Fascism - "Day of Remembrance" celebrated annually by Commie resistance fighters, FIR
- 17 Ap Nikita Khrushchev born 70 years ago, 1894.
- 18 Ap European Coal and Steel Community (Europe's first federal community) -- Treaty signed, 1951
- 18 Ap Bandung Conference -- 29 Afro-Asian countries call for self-determination, 18-27 April 1955
- 22 Ap Lenin born, 1870, Chicoms issue "Long Live Leninism" statements, challenging Khrushchev, 1960.
- 29 Ap India and Chinese People's Republic enter 8-year pact for "peaceful coexistence." 1954

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#21

18-31 January 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. While a Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow was reporting that people there have come to realize that Peking will not cease its anti-Soviet polemics, and thus Sino-Soviet relations "have entered a new phase" (Chrono, Jan. 20), the Soviets undertook some new moves against Peking. They began mass distribution (domestically, in Russian only, as far as reported) of a new book (signed to the press in October but evidently withheld because of the moratorium on polemics) by top CPSU ideologists vigorously attacking "the anti-Marxist doctrines of the CCP" (Chrono, Jan 21). A Pravda editorial on the 19th omitted mention of any Asian party (other than Soviet-aligned Mongolia) when listing 1963 contacts among "the socialist countries" and "their Marxist-Leninist parties." On the 20th, TASS branded an NCNA report as "absolutely groundless and nothing but misinformation," and on the 30th a Pravda article entitled "Why Mislead?" condemned the Chinese for trying to distort the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in exchange for guaranteed sugar purchases, Castro signed a joint communique which confirmed "a complete unity of views" on all questions, including international affairs and problems of the world Communist movement (Chrono, Jan 23).

2. The December and January issues of the Soviet-captive, multilingual, international monthly journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review in English edition), which has posed as the organ of the World Communist Movement, published several articles signed by Communists from various countries which clearly support Soviet and attack Chinese positions (Chrono, Jan. 27). (The Chinese and North Koreans withdrew completely from the PP&S operation and the Japanese decided to edit their own edition locally during the past year.)

3. The Chinese, rejoicing in the "tremendous welcome" given to Chou in 4 more African countries and in the agreement with the French establishing diplomatic relations, hardly mentioned the terms of their dispute with Moscow during this period. Then in the first few days of February they released several blockbusters. People's Daily and other Peking press on the 3rd printed the text of the Pravda "Why Mislead?" editorial plus a sardonic reply to it; excerpts from the new Soviet "anti-China book;" an NCNA announcement of the first of a series of volumes of "anti-China material from the Soviet press;" and a slashing

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"editor's note" with the latter, asserting that "over 2000 items of anti-China material" were printed in Russian publications by Nov. 30. The following day appeared the seventh in the joint People's Daily/Red Flag series pegged to the 14 July CPSU open letter, entitled "The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times." This 18,000-word blast is the most direct, insulting challenge yet to Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership. (See Chrono, Addendum, for description of these post-deadline items.)

4. In two more non-Communist countries, Ceylon and Peru, pro-Chinese factions set themselves up in formal opposition to the old "revisionist leadership." In Ceylon, the dissidents held their own "Seventh Party Congress" Jan. 19-21, formed a new "Central Committee," and adopted resolutions repudiating Soviet-line resolutions of the old Party (Chrono, Jan. 25). Much the same thing happened on Jan. 18 in Peru, where the continuing struggle between the factions led to the proclamation of a new Party organ, Bandera Roja (Red Flag), and the storming of the offices of the old-line Party daily Unidad by the pro-Chinese forces on Jan. 27, with demolition of its installations (Chrono, Jan. 18-27).

5. A new communique by the North Vietnamese Party confirmed its solidly pro-Chinese orientation (Chrono, Jan. 21) -- although the Party also dispatched a top-level delegation for Party talks in Moscow (Jan. 27). Italian CP boss Togliatti reiterated the PCI's opposition to an early world party conference and support of a meeting of the parties of Western Europe (Chrono, Jan. 21). Meanwhile, additional reports from Bucharest demonstrate the long strides taken by Rumania in the direction of independence from Soviet domination -- and apparently in a somewhat Westerly direction (Chrono, Jan. 20 and 22).

6. An interesting note of yet undetermined significance was introduced after the end of the period when Chou was reported by Edgar Snow as saying in their interview that "we have reached an agreement with the Soviet Union that negotiations be held on the Sino-Soviet boundary questions."


#### Significance:

The Sino-Soviet conflict flared to a new intensity as the Soviets -- their plea and unilateral moratorium on polemics having failed to win Chinese reciprocity -- published a few new propaganda thrusts, ---- only to encounter the most savage Chinese attacks of all, including a taunting dare to the Soviets to carry out their "threats and intimidation." This new Chinese onslaught would seem to represent a "last straw," a point of no return in the degeneration of relations between the two parties and states, ---- except that relations have survived a series of previous attacks which looked like "last straws" in their turn!

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
The Soviet polemical thrusts were comparatively mild, hackneyed and defensive, and their most spectacular political success -- the joint communique in which Castro testified to "complete unity" with them -- was of doubtful value and durability: not only was it obviously paid for by economic concessions, but at one point it uses the formulation "complete identity of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban statement of 23 May 1963," almost as if to remind us of how freely the Cubans interpreted their "identity" with the Soviets in the period immediately following Castro's earlier mission to Moscow. On the other hand, the Chinese gains -- not only in the free world, with Chou's further personal conquests and de Gaulle's recognition, but also in the Communist movement, with the establishment of organized pro-Chinese parties in Ceylon and Peru -- are concrete and probably irreversible, seemingly supporting the monumental arrogance of their latest polemical blasts. Moscow's problems in trying to handle relations with the rampaging Chinese are truly staggering.

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


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(#21 Commentary Cont.)







## CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#21

18-31 January 1964

Throughout period - The Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lai rolls on through Africa (see Chrono, Dec. 14 and continuing), but plans and prospects for further visits are upset in wake of revolts and mutinies in Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Chou's charm reportedly won warm response during the remainder of his tour of Mali (15-21), in Guinea (21-27), in the Sudan (27-30) and in Ethiopia from the 30th. He is expected in Somalia on Feb. 1 for a 3-day stay, but scheduled visits to Kenya and Tanganyika have been "postponed." It was announced that the postponements were decided by the Chinese, -- but Tanganyika President Nyerere also canceled his proposed visit to China, and observers saw the changes as tied to Chinese broadcasts attacking the use of British troops to put down the mutinies and to indications of Chinese complicity in the turbulent events. Moscow continued to avoid direct comment on the Chou trip.

January 18 - An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial commenting on the 8 January joint Albanian-Chinese declaration capping Chou's visit coined a new phrase in the polemics: "The failure of the plans of N. Khrushchev against our country proved to the world that modern revisionism, like imperialism, is a 'paper tiger.'" Khrushchev's "revisionist group" has stopped at nothing, it says: "it has gone so far as to plot against our country, sometimes in a hidden or indirect manner and sometimes directly. It has acted in the same manner against the CPR." Etc.

January 18-27 - On January 18-19, the pro-Chinese faction of the Peruvian CP held its own congress at which they "expelled" several old guard pro-Soviet Party leaders and "elected new leadership." At a press conference several days later, Dr. Saturnino Paredes, "newly elected First Secretary," states that his group "will staunchly defend Marxist-Leninist principles" and supports Fidel Castro. At the same time, Victor Acosta, Secretary General of the old PCP issues a statement belittling the importance of the rebel group. On January 27 the pro-Chinese storm the building housing the old Party's daily Unidad and demolish the installations. (Local press and radio reports, plus NCNA.)

January 19 - A Pravda editorial pegged to the continuing Castro visit extolls the visits of delegations and the personal meetings and talks between leaders as "the good tradition furthering the strengthening of friendship" of "the socialist countries, their Marxist-Leninist parties, and fraternal countries." It then recounts such fraternal contacts during the past year, including specific reference to all contacts involving, in addition to Cuba, the CEMA countries -- including Mongolia -- and Yugoslavia -- but with no mention of any parties of Asia. On the same day the major Chinese papers publish a long excerpt from the December issue of the Japanese CP's theoretical and political journal Zenei entitled "Sino-Soviet Polemics and Revisionism in Japan" which is intended to "refute the slanderous attacks on the Chinese CP by Noboro Sato and other renegades of the JCP."

(#21 Chronology Cont.)

January 19-21 - Pro-Chinese expellees from the Ceylon Communist Party hold their own "Seventh National Congress" in Colombo January 19-21, elect a new "Central Committee," declare themselves to be the CCP, and repudiate several resolutions of the old Party leadership which had favored the Soviet, Yugoslav, anti-Stalin line and had condemned the Albanians and the Chinese line. All Chinese papers prominently feature the story on the 25th.

January 20 - Belgrade Borba carries an article by its Moscow correspondent Bayalski stating that people in Moscow think that relations between the USSR and China have entered a new phase, that they realize by now that Peking is unwilling to give up its anti-Soviet polemics, that they sharply criticize Chinese behavior, and they believe that the dispute will continue for a long time to come. Bayalski goes on to say that the Soviet leadership is not yet decided whether it should continue to refrain from countering the Chinese attacks, explaining that "this, of course, is an intricate problem ... and one must always consider not only the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, but those of all socialist countries and of the international Communist movement. This is how people here explain the fact that the Soviets have refrained from polemics." Tass takes exception to a 12 January NCNA report on the return to China of Chou Hung-ching, the interpreter of a Chinese delegation who had defected in Tokyo in October, which "contends that Chou was forcibly detained for several hours at the USSR Embassy in Japan, despite alleged appeals ... by representatives of the Japanese public and also by the Japanese authorities." This statement, Tass declares, "is absolutely groundless and is nothing but misinformation of public opinion." At the same time, Tass announces that "a new group of Chinese specialists has arrived at Dubna .. to work at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research.... The group of Chinese workers at the Institute is now the most numerous of all the groups of people's democratic countries."

January 20 and 22 - New York Times carries two articles by its Bucharest correspondent Binder summing up numerous developments in Rumania's "Independence Drive," which "a Western observer describes as 'de-Russification' but the discreet official of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime prefer to term 'Rumanification.'" The biggest single change came last autumn with the abolition of the Maxim Gorky Institute of Russian Language and Literature, which had been a center of Soviet educational influence," and Russian was eliminated as a compulsory language in the schools. 90 percent of the contents of Lumea, the weekly magazine which replaces the Rumanian edition of Moscow's New Times (see Chrono, Dec. 27-30), are said to be reprints from Western publications. A guide pointed to a razed area filled with rubble and said simply: "That was the Russian bookstore." The Russian names of several shops and movie houses have been changed to Rumanian. Foreign trade statistics disclose that Rumania's commerce with Western countries grew from 20% to 33% of the total during the last 4 years, and the press is publicizing the presence of Western concerns in the country. Etc.

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January 21 - Italian CP boss Togliatti concluded his 7-day visit to Yugoslavia with a press conference in which, according to Tanyug, he said: "We have found a common attitude and pointed to the path along which one should go towards unity. We expect to follow the path and thus attain favorable results." Both agree that "the Chinese CP attitude toward questions of peace and peaceful coexistence is wrong" and "harms the international labor and Communist movement." Togliatti reiterated the Italian CP's opposition to a world conference of CP's at this time and its approval of "the proposal for convening a meeting of the CP's of Western Europe."

The 40th anniversary of Lenin's death serves as a peg for a series of comments by the world's Communists reflecting their current stance in the "great conflict." Pravda's editorial was largely an ode to magnificent Soviet achievements and majestic prospects -- mainly in a material sense. "Supplementing Lenin's well-known formula," Pravda coined a new slogan: "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the entire country plus the chemicalization of the national economy!"

East German CC Secretary Honecker issued a statement obsequiously praising "the Soviet Union (which) has become the basis of the whole world socialist system." On the other extreme, the Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial included some of the most vitriolic attacks to date on "the splitting and sapping activity engaged in by the N. Khrushchev group to revise and discredit Marxism-Leninism," on its "demagogy and intrigue," its "capitulation," "treason," and "blackmail." The only Rumanian comment we have seen was by a Prof. Bugnaru who never once mentioned the CPSU, although the views he set forth were generally in tune with the Soviet line.

The Chinese did not even mention the anniversary in any report seen by us. The North Korean Nodong Sinmun's editorial was only mildly anti-revisionist, but the North Vietnamese chose this date to publish in Nhan Dan the communique of the Party CC's ninth plenum in December on "the international situation and the Party's international tasks," together with an editorial pegged to it. The Party appears ever more strongly opposed to "modern revisionism" but in an interesting departure the communique states:

"Our Party draws a clear political distinction between the Tito revisionist clique, lackey of imperialism, and people within the international Communist movement who commit the error of revisionism or rightwing opportunism. Our attitude with regard to the Tito revisionist clique is to expose it consistently, and, with regard to the mistaken people within the ICM, to struggle for the sake of unity...."

The editorial specifically speaks of "consolidating and strengthening unity between the Soviet Union and China" and expresses

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sincerely thanks for both their priceless support and assistance." All Chinese papers carried full text of this North Vietnam communique on the 23rd.

Meanwhile, correspondents in Moscow reported (Radio Belgrade on the 21st, Reuters on the 23rd and UPI on the 24th) that a new book, appearing quietly under the innocuous title Conversations on Political Topics, vigorously attacks the anti-Marxist doctrines of the CCP. It was prepared by a group of nine under general editorship of chief CPSU ideologist Ilyichev and released for publication on 23 October, but apparently held up due to the Soviet moratorium on polemics. Observers saw in its appearance a signal that Soviet patience with the Chinese was exhausted and the CPSU has decided to hit back once more. The first printing is in 200,000 copies, apparently in Russian only.

January 23 - Castro's 10-day visit with Khrushchev concluded with a long-term agreement covering Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar at guaranteed prices and a joint communique which declared that "a complete unity of views was confirmed on all the questions discussed," which included "international problems of interest to both sides and urgent question on the world Communist and workers movement." Later in the communique, the formulation was: "complete identity of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban statement of 23 May 1963." In amplifying on this "identity of views," the communique states that Cuba "considers the success achieved by the Soviet Union in the struggle for the cessation of nuclear tests... is a step forward toward peace and disarmament," thus contradicting the strong Chinese attack on the test-ban treaty and possibly indicating Cuba's intent to sign. It also says that Castro "stated the support" of Cuba for Khrushchev's new proposal for a treaty renouncing the use of force in territorial disputes. The Soviet press exulted: Pravda's editorial on the 24th called the communique "a document of enormous significance ... impregnated from beginning to end by the complete unity of views" of the two parties and governments.

January 25 - An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial, "The Voyage to Africa and Albania by Comrade Chou En-lai and the Reaction of the Titoists," begins by denouncing the Tito gang for its violent reaction to the Chou visit but soon goes on to its main thrust: "While the Tito gang launched open attacks against the CPR and its peace policy with the aim of obscuring ... the great international role of China, the other modern revisionists organized a conspiracy of silence regarding the historic visit by the Premier of the CPR State Council. Why this silence...?" ZIP's answer: they cannot reconcile themselves to Chinese policy which "unmasks their anti-Leninist pacifist concept of peaceful coexistence.... Furthermore, the revisionists cannot inform public opinion in their countries, about the great success of the visit of the Chinese Government delegation to Africa, for this would cause new troubles and new anxieties. It would show how defamatory, untruthful and absurd is their propaganda against the CPR...."

January 27 - Brief releases from Hanoi and Peking announce the departure of a top-ranking delegation of North Vietnamese Communists, led by First Secretary Le Duan, for party talks with the CPSU in Moscow. Hanoi says only that they would "exchange views... on problems of common concern." 4

The North Korean Party organ Nodong Sinmun carries a 15,000-word article entitled "Hold High the Revolutionary Banner of National Liberation," which, like their similar effort on October 28, comprehensively presents Chinese views tailored to represent the interests of a smaller nation. It goes out of the way to denounce "the Dange group of the CPI" and "some people calling themselves Communists" who support and praise them.

New York Times writer Harry Schwartz reviews an article in the December issue of World Marxist Review (English-language edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism, the Soviet-supported, Prague-based, multi-lingual monthly journal, by Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Chilean CP, which sharply attacks the Chinese Communists for trying to force the Castro type of revolution on the Chileans who are dedicated to a policy of non-violent revolution. The letter reveals that the Chinese CP sent "a recent letter" to the Chilean CP with this aim, which included the statement:

"In Latin America the 'peaceful way' which you advocate stands in sharp contrast to the revolutionary way of Fidel Castro and the other comrades who led the Cuban people to victory."

The last issue of our Chronology reported a Reuters Moscow dispatch (Jan. 8) reporting that the lead article in the January issue of PP&S, signed by a Czech, a Canadian and a Syrian, attacking the Chinese press for recognizing dissident splinter groups as "genuine Communist revolutionaries," and a subsequent report has described another anti-Chinese article in the same issue by Jaime Peras, CC Secretary of the Uruguayan CP.

January 30 - Pravda features an "Observer" article entitled "Why Mislead?" which protests that, while the Khrushchev proposal for an international treaty renouncing the use of force in territorial disputes has been published, welcomed and given serious study in most countries of the world, the Chinese press organs have not published it or any of the world reaction to it but "take it upon themselves to comment on these documents and even to make an assessment of them." It asks: "Why mislead the Chinese people and turn them against the Soviet people?" Observer complains: "It is as if in China they prefer to hand newspaper readers ready-made assertions and assessments...." On the same day, the Chinese press features a harshly taunting article from the December issue of the Malayan Monitor, London-published organ of the Malayan CP, which says that "everywhere the modern revisionists have suffered a crushing defeat in the great debate, thanks to the staunch and well-prepared efforts of the anti-revisionist leadership and ranks of the Communist and workers parties of the world, in particular the CCP, the Albanian Workers Party the CP's of Korea, Indonesia, the DRV,' etc. It taunts Khrushchev directly:

"In their agony of impending total defeat, they (the modern revisionists) cry 'no polemics' and 'no split!' Coming from them, such cries are like the insults of an arsonist who, having set fire to your house, urges you not to bother about putting out the flame but to use it to light the 'pipe of peace.' Marxist-Leninists are not exponents of polemics for the sake of gaining a debating point, nor are they to be fobbed off with placatory gestures of 'unity.' Unlike the modern revisionists, they do not regard principle and expediency as synonymous and interchangeable."

Lest anyone have doubts as to whom it means by "modern revisionists," the article states clearly: "It is no accident that both Khrushchev and Tito are now in the same ideological camp -- openly and even defiantly."

#### CHRONOLOGY -- ADDENDUM

(In view of the importance of several developments in the four days immediately following the close of our reporting period, we are attaching this Addendum to include some reference to them.)

February 2 - In an interview granted in Conakry, Guinea, to sympathetic correspondent Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai is quoted as saying: "We have reached an agreement with the Soviet Union that negotiations be held on the Sino-Soviet boundary questions."

February 3 - Peking People's Daily features a number of items on the Sino-Soviet conflict:

- The text of the 30 January Pravda article "Why Mislead?"
- An article replying to Pravda, entitled "A Blow at Lyndon Johnson Stings Pravda." It begins sarcastically: "Once upon a time there was a story of the Siamese twins. It was said that when one of the pair was hit the other felt the pain. What puzzles one now is that this curious kinship should appear between the leaders of the CPSU and the President of the U.S." It asks: "What sort of a 'conditioned reflex' is this?... Does it mean that the Soviet leaders intend to reach an agreement with Johnson under which they would join hands in forbidding the peoples to oppose imperialism and start revolution? If so, Pravda has good reasons for its nervousness...."
- Excerpts from the new Soviet book, Conversations on Political Topics (see Chrono, Jan.21), under the headline "All-out Malicious Attacks on the CCP."

An NCNA announcement that "the first volume of 'Anti-China Materials from the Soviet Press' goes on sale throughout China today," together with the text of the preface to the volume by the editorial board of the World Culture Publishing House. It says that, "according to incomplete statistics, by 30 Nov. over 2000 items of anti-China material of all descriptions... had been printed in 26 national papers and periodicals and 23 local papers and periodicals in the Soviet Union."

- A People's Daily "editor's note" which says that, "since N.S. Khrushchev, leader of the CPSU, proposed 'an end to polemics' on 25 October 1963, the Soviet press has continued its anti-China propaganda right along." It points particularly to excerpts from the "more than 300-page" book and the "Why Mislead" Pravda article published on these pages. "People can see from this material that the CPSU leader's proposal for 'an end to public polemics' is only a fraud, perpetrated for ulterior motives." The propaganda in the book, it says, "is nothing but stale, trite phraseology," and the Pravda article "is even more ridiculous."

"As for the reprimand in Pravda to the effect that the Chinese press has not published Khrushchev's letter of 31 December to the heads of governments, we can candidly say to the CPSU leadership, what is your hurry? We will deal with it, and will comment on it, too. A Chinese publishing house is already making up volumes of your anti-China articles for successive issuance. A road must be traveled step by step, and a bill of accounts must be settled item by item. We still have not finished answering the open letter you published last 14 July. What makes you so impatient?"

February 4 - The seventh in the series of joint People's Daily/Red Flag articles replying to the 14 July CPSU open letter is published by the Chinese. Inasmuch as we received only an English language NCNA summary by our deadline, we will comment on it only tentatively now and follow up with a more complete analysis in our next installment. Entitled "The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," the article begins by declaring unequivocally that "the leaders of the CPSU headed by Khrushchev have become the chief representatives of modern revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the international Communist movement." It defines splittism as follows: "Splittism means 'a split with Marxism-Leninism.' Anyone who opposes and betrays Marxism-Leninism and undermines the basis of proletarian unity is a splitter.... Anyone who persists in a revisionist line and turns a revolutionary proletarian party into a reformist bourgeois party is a splitter.... The splitters in the Communist ranks are those who, to meet the needs of the bourgeoisie, split with Marxism-Leninism,... and they remain splitters even when for



a time they are in the majority or hold the leading posts.  
Further, "if the CPSU leaders insist on marking off the 'majority' from the 'minority,' we would like to tell them quite frankly that we do not recognize their majority."

Wallowing deeper in murky "clarifications," the article says that "opportunism and revisionism are the political and ideological roots of splittism, and splittism is the organizational manifestation of opportunism and revisionism. It can also be said that opportunism and revisionism are splittism as well as sectarianism. The revisionists are the greatest and vilest splitters and sectarians in the Communist movement."

In direct incitement to revolt in the USSR, the article recalls the many errors in domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU leadership and says: "The actions of the leaders of the CPSU have brought deep shame upon the great Soviet Union and the CPSU and seriously damaged the fundamental interests of the Soviet people. It is none other than the leaders of the CPSU headed by Khrushchev who are anti-Soviet."

Before closing, the article predicts "the eventual burial" of the revisionists, taunts Khrushchev on his fraudulent call for an end to polemics ("What sort of games are you playing, saying one thing at one time and another thing at another?"), and dares the Soviets to make good on their "outright threat and intimidation" in the Soviet Government statement of 21 September which declared that the Chinese face "the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and the Soviet people" if they continue the polemics: "Do you really believe that other people are bound docilely to obey your orders and tremble at your roar? To be frank, ever since 21 September we have been eagerly waiting to see what the most resolute rebuff would be."

## CRONOLOGIA - DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

#21

18-31 Enero 1964

En todo el período: La delegación china encabezada por Chou En-lai prosigue su correría por Africa (ver Cronología 14 y seguido) pero los planes y perspectivas de otras visitas se echan a perder a raíz de revueltas y motines en Zanzíbar, Tanganika, Kenya y Uganda. La simpatía de Chou se dice que consiguió cálida respuesta por el resto de su gira por Mali (15-21), Guinea (21-27), el Sudán (27-30) y Etiopía desde el 30. Se le espera en Somalia el 1º para una visita de 3 días, pero las visitas programadas a Kenya y Tanganika han sido "pospuestas". Se anunció que habían sido pospuestas por los chinos -- pero el presidente Nyerere de Tanganika canceló también su propuesta visita a China, y los observadores interpretaron los cambios como relacionados con emisiones chinas atacando el empleo de fuerzas británicas para sofocar los motines y con indicios de complicidad china en los borrascosos acontecimientos. Moscú continuó evitando comentar directamente sobre el viaje de Chou.

18 Enero: Un editorial del "Zeri i Popullit" de Albania, comentando sobre la declaración conjunta chino-albanesa del 8 de enero que coronó la visita de Chou, inventó una nueva frase en las polémicas: "El fracaso de los planes de N. Kru-schev contra nuestro país demostró al mundo que el revisio-nismo contemporáneo, como el imperialismo, es un 'tigre de papel'." El "grupo revisionista" de Kru-schev no se ha de-tenido ante nada, declara: "ha llegado al extremo de complotar contra nuestro país, a veces de modo oculto e indirecto y otras directamente. Ha actuado del mismo modo contra la RP china". Y así por el estilo.

18-27 Enero: El 18 y 19 de enero, la facción prochina del PC peruano celebró su propio congreso en el cual "expulsa-ron" a varios líderes prosoviéticos de la vieja guardia y "eligieron una nueva directiva". En una rueda de prensa unos días más tarde, el doctor Saturnino Paredes, "recién electo primer secretario", declara que su prupo "defenderá con entereza los principios marxistas-leninistas" y apoya a Fidel Castro. Al mismo tiempo, Víctor Acosta, secretario general del viejo PC peruano, expide una declaración des-preciando la importancia del nuevo grupo. El 27 de enero los elementos prochinos atacan el edificio del diario "U-nidad", del antiguo partido, y destrozan los equipos. (In-formes locales de prensa y radio más Agencia Nueva China).

19 Enero: Un editorial de "Pravda" con respecto a la visi-ta actual de Castro ensalza las visitas de delegaciones y las reuniones y conversaciones personales entre dirigentes como "la buena tradición que adelanta el fortalecimiento de la amistad" de "los países socialistas, sus partidos mar-xistas-leninistas y los países fraternos". Luego hace un

recuento de tales contactos fraternos durante el pasado año, haciendo referencia específica a todos los países incluyendo, además de Cuba, los países del Consejo de Asistencia Económica Mutua, entre ellos Mongolia -- y Yugoslavia -- pero sin referirse a ningún partido de Asia. El mismo día los principales periódicos chinos publican un largo fragmento de la edición de diciembre de "Zenei", el órgano teórico y político del PC japonés, con el título de "Las polémicas chino-soviéticas y el revisionismo en el Japón", con propósito de "refutar los ataques calumniosos contra el PC chino de Noburo Sato y otros renegados del PCJ".

19-21 Enero: Los expulsados prochinos del PC ceilanés celebran su propio "VII Congreso nacional" en Colombo en 19-21 de enero, eligen un nuevo "Comité central", se autodenominan el PCC y repudian varias resoluciones del liderato del PC antiguo que habían favorecido la línea soviética, yugoslava, antistaliniana y habían condenado a los albaneses y la línea china. Todos los periódicos chinos destacan la noticia el día 25.

20 Enero: El "Borba" de Belgrado publica un artículo de Bayalski, su corresponsal en Moscú, en que declara que la gente en Moscú cree que las relaciones entre la URSS y China han entrado en una nueva fase, que ya comprenden que Pekín no está dispuesto a renunciar a sus polémicas antisoviéticas, que critican severamente la conducta china y que creen que la disputa va a continuar por mucho tiempo más. Bayalski declara además que el liderato soviético no ha decidido aún si deberá continuar exiniéndose de responder a los ataques chinos, explicando que "esto, por supuesto, es un problema intrincado... y uno debe siempre tener en cuenta no sólo los intereses del PCUS y la Unión Soviética, sino los de todos los países socialistas y del movimiento comunista internacional. Así es como la gente aquí explica que los soviéticos se hayan eximido de las polémicas". Tass toma excepción de un despacho de la Agencia del 12 de enero sobre el regreso a China de Chou Hung-ching, intérprete de una delegación china que había defecionado en Tokio en octubre, despacho al cual "pretende que a Chou lo detuvieron por la fuerza varias horas en la Embajada de la URSS en el Japón, a pesar de supuestos ruegos... de representantes del público japonés y también de las autoridades japonesas". Esta declaración, Tass afirma, "es absolutamente carente de fundamento y no es otra cosa que dar información falsa a la opinión pública". Al mismo tiempo, Tass anuncia que "un nuevo grupo de especialistas chinos ha llegado a Dubna ... a trabajar en el Instituto Conjunto de Investigación Nuclear... El grupo de trabajadores chinos en el instituto es ahora el mas numeroso de todos los grupos de los países de democracia popular".

20 y 22 Enero: El "New York Times" publica dos artículos de su corresponsal Binder en Bucarest resumiendo numerosos acontecimientos en la "Campana Independentista" de Rumania

la cual "un observador occidental describe como 'desrusificación' pero que los discretos funcionarios del régimen de Gheorghiu-Dej prefieren llamar 'rumanificación'." El cambio individual mayor ocurrió el otoño pasado con la abolición del Instituto Máximo Gorki de Lengua y Literatura Rusas, que había sido centro de influencia educacional soviética, y se eliminó el ruso como lengua obligatoria en las escuelas. El 90 por ciento del contenido de "Lumea", el semanario que desplaza la edición en rumano del "Nuevos Tiempos" de Moscú (ver Cronología, 27-30 diciembre), se dice que es reproducido de publicaciones occidentales. Un guía señaló un solar rasado y lleno de escombros y dijo sencillamente: "Eso era una librería rusa". Los nombres rusos de varias tiendas y cines han sido cambiados por rumanos. Las estadísticas de comercio exterior señalan que el comercio de Rumania con países occidentales creció del 20 al 33 por ciento del total durante los 'últimos cuatro años y la prensa está dando publicidad a la presencia de compañías occidentales en el país, y así por el estilo.

21 Enero: El caudillo Togliatti del PC italiano concluyó su visita de 7 días a Yugoslavia con una conferencia de prensa en la que, según Tanuyg, declaró: "Hemos hallado una actitud en común y hemos señalado el camino por el cual deberá uno ir hacia la unidad. Confiamos seguir dicho camino y así obtener resultados favorables". Ambos están de acuerdo que "la actitud del PC chino hacia las cuestiones de la paz y la coexistencia pacífica está errada" y "perjudica el movimiento internacional obrero y comunista". Togliatti reiteró la oposición del PC italiano a una conferencia mundial de PCs por ahora y su aprobación de "la propuesta de convocar una reunión de los PCs de Europa Occidental".

El 40º aniversario de la muerte de Lenin sirve de percha para una serie de comentarios por los comunistas mundiales que reflejan su actitud actual sobre el "gran conflicto". El editorial de "Pravda" fue mayormente una oda a las magníficas realizaciones soviéticas y a sus majestuosas perspectivas -- principalmente en sentido material. "Como suplemento a la bien conocida fórmula de Lenin," "Pravda": inventó una nueva consigna: "El comunismo es el poder soviético más la electrificación de todo el país más la quinificación de la economía nacional."

El secretario Honecker del CC del partido de Alemania Oriental expidió una declaración obsequiosa elogiando "la Unión Soviética (que) se ha tornado en la base del sistema socialista mundial íntegro". Al otro extremo, en el editorial del "Zeri I Popullit" de Albanis se produjeron algunos de los más vitriólicos ataques hasta hoy contra "la actitud de escisión y debilitamiento a que se dedica el grupo de N. Krushev para revisar y desacreditar el marxismo-leninismo", contra su "denagogia e intriga", su "capitulación", "traición" y "chantaje". El único comentario

comentario rumano que hemos visto fue el de un tal profesor Bugnaru que en ningún momento nombró al PCUS, aunque las opiniones que expuso eran generalmente acordes con la línea soviética.

Los chinos ni siquiera mencionaron el aniversario en ningún informe que nosotros hayamos visto. El editorial del "Nodong Sinmun", de Corea del Norte, tuvo solamente un leve tono antirrevisionista, pero los vietnamitas escogieron esta fecha para publicar en su "Nhan Dan" el comunicado del noveno pleno del CC del partido celebrado en diciembre con respecto a "la situación internacional y las tareas internacionales del Partido" así como un editorial sobre este tema. El Partido aparece más y más opuesto al "revisionismo contemporáneo" pero la declaración presenta una interesante diferencia:

"Nuestro Partido establece una clara distinción política entre la camarilla revisionista de Tito, lacayo del imperialismo, y la gente dentro del movimiento comunista internacional que comete el error del revisionismo u oportunismo de derecha. Nuestra actitud con respecto a la camarilla revisionista de Tito es denunciarla consecuentemente, y en cuanto a los equivocados en el seno del movimiento comunista internacional, luchar en bien de la unidad..."

El editorial se refiere específicamente a "consolidar y fortalecer la unidad entre la Unión Soviética y China" y expresa sinceras gracias a ambas "y a los otros países fraternos por su inapreciable apoyo y asistencia." El día 23 todos los diarios chinos publicaron el texto íntegro de este comunicado norvietnamés.

Entretanto, los corresponsales en Moscú informaron (la radio de Belgrado el día 21, Reuters el 23 y UPI el 24) que un nuevo libro, aparecido sin alboroto bajo el inofensivo título "Conversaciones sobre tópicos políticos" lanza un vigoroso ataque contra las doctrinas antinarxistas del PC chino. Fue redactado por un grupo de nueve bajo la dirección editorial del ideólogo principal del PCUS, Ilyich, y expedido para ser publicado el 23 de octubre pero aparentemente suspendido debido a la moratoria soviética de las polémicas. Los observadores vieron en su publicación el indicio de que la paciencia soviética con los chinos se había acabado y el PCUS había resuelto contraatacar otra vez. La primera tirada es de 200.000 ejemplares, parece que en ruso solamente.

23 Enero: La visita de 10 días de Castro a Krushev terminó en un acuerdo a largo plazo sobre las compras soviéticas de azúcar cubano a precios garantizados y un comunicado conjunto que declaraba que "se confirmó una completa unidad de pareceres en todas las cuestiones discutidas", que in-

El escritor Harry Schwartz del "New York Times" comenta sobre un artículo del número de diciembre de "World Marxist Review", (edición en lengua inglesa de "Problemas de la Paz y el Socialismo", mensuario multilingüe subvencionado por los soviéticos y con sede en Praga), escrito por Luis Corvalán, secretario general del PC chileno, atacando fuertemente a los comunistas chinos por tratar de imponer a los chilenos que están dedicados a la revolución incruenta el tipo castrista de revolución. La carta revela que el PC chino dirigió "una carta reciente" al PC chileno inspirada en tal propósito, conteniendo la declaración:

"En América Latina, la 'vía pacífica' que Vds propugnan está en agudo contraste con la vía revolucionaria de Fidel Castro y los otros camaradas que llevaron al pueblo cubano a la victoria".

El último número de nuestra Cronología decía de un despacho de Reuters desde Moscú (8 de enero) con respecto al artículo principal de la edición de enero del "PP&S", suscrito por un checo, un canadiense y un sirio, en que se atacaba a la prensa china por reconocer a grupitos rebanados como "legítimos revolucionarios comunistas", y más tarde se ha informado otro artículo antichino en la misma edición escrito por Jaime Peras, secretario del CC del PC uruguayo.

30 Enero: "Prayda" resalta un artículo de "Observador" titulado: "¿Por qué despistar?" en el que se protesta el hecho de que, mientras que la propuesta de Krushev por un tratado internacional renunciando al empleo de la fuerza en las disputas territoriales ha sido publicada, bien recibida y estudiada seriamente en la mayoría de los países del mundo, los órganos chinos no la han publicado ni tampoco la reacción mundial a ella pero "se permiten comentar sobre dichos documentos y hasta hacer una valoración de ellos". Hace la pregunta: "¿Por qué despistar al pueblo chino y volverlo en contra del pueblo soviético?" Se lamenta el "Observador": "Es como que en China prefieren poner en manos de los lectores afirmaciones y valoraciones fabricadas de antemano..." El mismo día la prensa china publica un artículo provocador de la edición de diciembre del "Malayan Monitor", órgano del PC malayo publicado en Londres, que declara que "en todas partes los revisionistas contemporáneos han padecido una aplastante derrota en el gran debate, gracias a los esfuerzos resistentes y bien preparados del liderato antirrevisionista y los miembros de los partidos comunistas y obreros del mundo y en especial del PC chino, el Partido Albanés de Trabajadores y los PC de Corea, Indonesia, la RDV, etc. Le hala las barbas a Krushev directamente:

"En la agonía de su próxima derrota total (los revisionistas contemporáneos) claman

'que no haya polémicas' y 'que no haya es-  
cision'. En boca de ellos, semejantes grit-  
os son como los insultos de un incendiario  
que, habiéndole pegado fuego a la casa del  
prójimo, le aconseja no apagarlo sino utili-  
zar las llamas para encender 'la pipa de la  
paz'. Los marxistas-leninistas no son expo-  
nentes de polémicas por ganarse un tanto en  
el debate, ni se les va a engatusar con ges-  
tos aplacantes de 'unidad'. En contraste con  
los revisionistas contemporáneos, no conside-  
ran los principios y la conveniencia como si-  
nónimos e intercambiables".

Por si alguien tiene dudas de a quién se refiere como  
"revisionistas contemporáneos", el artículo afirma claramen-  
te: "No es accidental que tanto Krushev como Tito están  
ahora en el mismo campo ideológico -- abierta y hasta desa-  
fiadoramente".

#### CRONOLOGIA - ADITAMENTO

(Por la importancia de varios acontecimientos  
ocurridos en los cuatro días inmediatamente  
después de nuestro período actual, ofrecemos  
este Aditamento para dar alguna cuenta de los  
mismos.)

2 Febrero: En una entrevista en Conakry, Guinea, concedida  
por Chou En-lai al corresponsal bien dispuesto Edgar Snow  
se le atribuyen estas palabras: "Hemos llegado a un acuerdo  
con la Unión Soviética en el sentido de que se lleven a ca-  
bo negociaciones sobre las cuestiones fronterizas chino-  
soviéticas."

3 Febrero: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pekín publica algunos  
artículos sobre el conflicto chinosoviético;

- El texto del artículo de "Pravda": "¿Por qué des-  
pistar?" de 30 de enero.
- Un artículo contestando a "Pravda" titulado: "Un  
golpe a Lyndon Johnson le duele a "Pravda". Empie-  
za con sarcasmo: "Había una vez un cuento de los  
nellizos siameses. Se decía que cuando a uno se le  
pegaba al otro le dolía. Lo que me extraña ahora  
es que esta curiosa relación haya de aparecer entre  
los líderes del PCUS y el presidente de los EE.UU."  
Pregunta: "¿Qué especie de 'reflejo condicionado'  
es este? ...¿Significa que los dirigentes sovié-  
ticos tienen intención de llegar a un acuerdo con  
Johnson mediante el cual se unirían para prohibir  
a los pueblos oponerse al imperialismo y lanzarse  
a la revolución? En tal caso, "Pravda" tiene buenos

motivos para estar nerviosa..."

- Fragmentos del nuevo libro soviético, "Conversaciones sobre tópicos políticos (ver Cronología, 21 enero) bajo el encabezamiento, "Ataques malignos sin mesura contra el PC chino."
- Anuncio de la Agencia Nueva China de que "el primer tomo 'Materiales antichinos (tomados) de la prensa soviética' sale a la venta hoy, junto con el texto del prefacio al tomo por la junta redactora de la Editorial Cultura Mundial. Dice que de acuerdo con estadísticas incompletas, para el 30 de noviembre más de 2.000 piezas contra China de todas las variedades... habían sido impresas en 26 periódicos y revistas nacionales y 23 periódicos y revistas locales en la Unión Soviética."
- Una "nota editorial" del "Diario del Pueblo" que dice que "desde que N.S. Kruschev, líder del PCUS, propuso 'un fin a las polémicas' el 25 de octubre de 1963, la prensa soviética ha continuado sin cesar su propaganda antichina." Señala en especial el libro de "más de 300 páginas" y el artículo "¿Por qué despistar?" de "Pravda" publicado en dichas páginas. "La gente puede ver de estos materiales que la propuesta del líder del PCUS de 'poner fin a las polémicas' no es más que un fraude, perpetrado por móviles ulteriores." La propaganda del libro, afirma, "no es más que fraseología pasada, recalentada", y el artículo de "Pravda" es "aún más ridículo".

"En cuanto al regaño en 'Pravda' en el sentido de que la prensa china no ha publicado la carta de Kruschev de 31 de diciembre a los jefes de gobiernos, podemos decir con candidez al liderato del PCUS: ¿Por qué la prisa? De ella nos ocuparemos y también la comentaremos. Una editorial china está ya preparando tomos de sus artículos antichinos para entregas sucesivas. Un camino hay que viajarlo paso a paso y un estado de cuentas hay que pagarlo artículo por artículo. Todavía, no hemos acabado de contestar la carta abierta que publicaron el último 14 de julio. ¿Por qué se impacientan tanto?"

4 Febrero: Los chinos publican el séptimo artículo conjunto de "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" de la serie en contestación a la carta abierta del PCUS de 14 de julio. Habiendo recibido solamente un resumen en inglés publicado por la Agencia Nueva China al cierre de este número, por ahora comentaremos provisionalmente y volveremos en nuestro



próximo con un análisis más completo. Bajo el título de "Los dirigentes del PCUS son los escisionistas más grandes de nuestra época", el artículo empieza declarando sin equívoco que "los dirigentes de PCUS encabezados por Kru-schev se han convertido en los principales representantes del revisionismo contemporáneo así como los más grandes es-cisionistas en el movimiento comunista internacional". Define el escisionismo como sigue: "Escisionismo quiere decir 'escisión respecto al marxismo-leninismo'. Cualquiera que se oponga y traicione al marxismo-leninismo y socave la base de la unidad proletaria es un escisionista... Cualquiera que persista en una línea revisionista y convierta un partido proletario revolucionario en un partido burgués reformista es un escisionista... Los escisionistas en las filas comunistas son aquellos que para atender a las necesidades de la burguesía se escisionen del marxismo-leninismo... y siguen siendo escisionistas aun cuando por un tiempo estén en mayoría o detenten los puestos de dirección." Además, "si los dirigentes del PCUS insisten en delimitar la 'mayoría' de la 'minoría', queremos decirles muy francamente que no reconocemos su mayoría."

Enredándose más en turbias "aclaraciones", el artículo afirma que "el oportunismo y el revisionismo son las raíces ideológicas del escisionismo, y el escisionismo es la manifestación orgánica del oportunismo y el revisionismo. Se puede también decir que el oportunismo y el revisionismo son escisionismo así como sectarismo. Los revisionistas son los mayores y más viles escisionistas y sectarios del movimiento comunista."

Incitando directamente a la revolución en la URSS, el artículo recuerda los mismos errores de política interna y exterior del liderato del PCUS y declara: "Las actuaciones de los dirigentes del PCUS han aparejado profunda vergüenza a la gran Unión Soviética y el PCUS y perjudicando seriamente los intereses fundamentales del pueblo soviético. No son otros que los dirigentes del PCUS encabezados por Kru-schev los que son antisoviéticos."

Antes de concluir, el artículo predice "el sepultamiento al fin y al cabo" de los revisionistas, se burla de Kruschev por su solicitud fraudulenta de dar fin a las polémicas ("¿Qué clase de partidas está jugando, diciendo esto en una ocasión y aquello en otra?") y reta a los soviéticos a cumplir su "intimidación y amenaza declarada" en la declaración del gobierno soviético de 21 de septiembre que declaraba que a los chinos les espera "el más resuelto rechazo del PCUS y el pueblo soviético" si continúan las polémicas: "¿Creen realmente que otros pueblos tienen dócilmente que obedecer las ordenes de ustedes y temblar ante sus rugidos? Francamente, desde el 21 de septiembre hemos estado esperando para ver en qué consistiría el más resuelto rechazo."

bourgeois est un divisionniste... Les divisionnistes parmi les rangs des communistes sont ceux qui pour satisfaire aux besoins de la bourgeoisie, rompent avec le marxisme-léninisme... et qui restent divisionnistes même lorsqu'ils ont une majorité temporaire ou qu'ils détiennent des postes de dirigeants. Plus loin, "si les leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique insistent à faire une différence entre la majorité et la minorité, nous leur dirons très franchement que nous ne reconnaissons pas leur majorité."

S'enfonçant plus avant dans des "clarifications" ténebreuses, l'article déclare que "l'opportunisme et le révisionnisme sont les racines politiques et idéologiques du divisionnisme, et le divisionnisme est une manifestation au sein d'une organisation de l'opportunisme et du révisionnisme. On peut dire également que l'opportunisme et le révisionnisme constituent le divisionnisme aussi bien que le sectarisme. Les révisionnistes sont des divisionnistes de l'espèce la plus grande et la plus basse ainsi que des sectaires dans le mouvement communiste."

Incitant directement à la révolte en Union soviétique, l'article rappelle le grand nombre d'erreurs commises dans les politiques internes et étrangères par les chefs du P.C. de l'Union soviétique, et déclare: "Les actions de ces leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique ont couvert de honte le grand pays de l'Union soviétique et son parti communiste et ont porté un préjudice sérieux aux intérêts fondamentaux du peuple soviétique. Ce n'est nuls autres que les leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique, avec Khrouchtchev à leur tête, qui sont anti-soviets".

Avant de terminer, l'article prédit que les révisionnistes seront éventuellement "enterrés" et couvre Khrouchtchev de sarcasmes pour son appel frauduleux en faveur d'une fin des polémiques ("A quelle sorte de jeu jouez-vous lorsque vous déclarez quelque chose, puis l'opposé l'insistant d'après?"), et défie les Soviets de mettre en pratique leurs "menaces d'intimidation" contenues dans la déclaration du gouvernement soviétique du 21 septembre selon laquelle les Chinois se trouvent en présence "de la rebuffade la plus résolue de la part du P.C. de l'Union soviétique et du peuple soviétique si le peuple chinois prolongeait la polémique: "Croyez-vous réellement que les autres peuples sont tenus à obéir docilement à vos ordres et à trembler lorsque vous rugissez? Pour être francs, depuis le 21 septembre nous avons attendu avec impatience pour voir ce que cette rebuffade des plus résolues pouvait être".

## CHRONOLOGIE - DISSENTIONS COMMUNISTES

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Période entière: La délégation chinoise emmenée par Chou En-lai roule à travers l'Afrique (voir Chronologie du 14 décembre et la suite), mais les plans et les possibilités pour les visites à venir sont dérangés par suite des révoltes et des mutineries à Zanzibar, au Tanganyika, au Kenya et en Uganda. Le charme de Chou a, paraît-il, obtenu des réponses chaleureuses au cours du reste de sa tournée: en Mali (15-21), en Guinée (21-27), au Soudan (27-30), et en Ethiopie, à partir du 30. Il est attendu en Somalie le 1er janvier pour un séjour de 3 jours, mais les visites prévues au Kenya et au Tanganyika ont été "remises à plus tard". Il a été annoncé que cette remise a été décidée par les Chinois mais le président Nyéréré du Tanganyika a annulé également la visite qu'il projetait en Chine, et les observateurs estiment que ces changements sont en rapport avec les attaques menées par le radio chinoise contre l'utilisation des troupes britanniques chargées d'étouffer les mutineries et contre les références à la complicité des Chinois dans ces désordres. Moscou continue à éviter les commentaires directs sur le voyage de Chou.

18 janvier: Un éditorial du journal albanais "Zeri i Popullit" commentant sur la déclaration albano-chinoise du 8 janvier à la fin de la visite de Chou a produit cette nouvelle formule dans la polémique: "L'échec des plans de N. Khrouchtchev dirigés contre notre pays démontre au monde que le révisionisme moderne tout comme l'impérialisme n'est qu'un 'tigre de papier'". "Le groupe révisionniste de Khrouchtchev" ne s'est arrêté devant rien, déclare-t-il. "Il est allé jusqu'à comploter contre notre pays, parfois d'une manière cachée et indirecte, et parfois directement. Il a agi de même contre la République populaire chinoise", dit-il. Etc...

18-27 janvier: Les 18-19 janvier, la faction pro-chinoise du P.C. péruvien a réuni son propre Congrès au cours duquel elle "expulsa" plusieurs leaders de la vieille garde pro-soviétique du parti et "procéda à l'élection de nouveaux leaders". A une conférence de presse, plusieurs jours plus tard, le Dr Saturnino Paredes, "premier secrétaire nouvellement élu", a déclaré que son groupe "défendra fermement les principes marxistes-léninistes", et soutiendra Fidel Castro. Au même moment, Victor Acosta, secrétaire général de l'ancien P.C. péruvien fait paraître une déclaration cherchant à réduire l'importance du groupe rebelle. Le 27 janvier, les pro-chinois attaquent le bâtiment où se trouve le quotidien de l'ancien parti, "Unidad", et en brise les installations. (Presse locale et nouvelles de la radio, plus Agence de presse Chine nouvelle).

19 janvier: Un éditorial de "Pravda", à l'occasion de la visite de Castro qui se poursuit, chante les louanges des visites de délégations et des contacts personnels et des conversations entre leaders en disant que ceci est "dans la bonne tradition qui renforce l'amitié" parmi "les pays socialistes, leurs partis marxistes-léninistes, et les pays fraternels". L'éditorial parle ensuite de ces contacts fraternels qui eurent lieu l'année dernière, mentionnant particulièrement tous les contacts auxquels participaient en dehors de Cuba les pays du Conseil d'assistance économique mutuelle, -- dont la Mongolie -- et la Yougoslavie -- mais sans mentionner aucun des partis de l'Asie. Le même jour, les principaux journaux chinois publiaient un long extrait du numéro de décembre du journal politique et théorique du P.C. japonais "Zenei", article intitulé "Polémiques sino-soviétiques et révisionnisme au Japon", dont le but est de "réfuter les attaques calomnieuses dirigées contre le P.C. chinois par Noburo Sato et d'autres renégats du P.C. japonais".

19-21 janvier: Les membres pro-chinois expulsés du P.C. de Ceylan réunissent leur propre "7e Congrès national" à Colombo du 19 au 21 janvier, élisant un nouveau "Comité central", se déclarent être le parti communiste ceylanais, et répudient plusieurs résolutions des leaders de l'ancien parti qui préconisaient la politique soviétique, yougoslave et anti-stalinienne, et qui condamnaient les Albanais et la politique chinoise. Tous les journaux chinois donnèrent de grands compte-rendus sur cet événement le 25.

20 janvier: Le "Borba" de Belgrade publie un article de son correspondant de Moscou Bayalski qui déclare que le peuple de Moscou pense que les relations entre l'Union soviétique et la Chine sont entrées dans une nouvelle phase, qu'ils comprennent maintenant que Pékin ne veut pas abandonner ses polémiques anti-soviétiques, qu'ils critiquent violemment la conduite des Chinois et qu'ils estiment que la dispute continuera pendant longtemps. Bayalski va jusqu'à dire que les leaders soviétiques ne savent pas encore s'ils doivent continuer à s'abstenir de répondre aux attaques chinoises, expliquant que "ceci très certainement est un problème compliqué... et on doit toujours considérer non seulement les intérêts du P.C. de l'U.S. et de l'Union soviétique, mais également ceux des pays socialistes et ceux du mouvement communiste international. C'est ainsi que le peuple soviétique explique le fait que les Soviétiques se sont abstenus de poursuivre la polémique". Tass s'élève contre un rapport du 12 janvier de l'Agence de presse Chine nouvelle sur le retour en Chine de Chou Houng-ching, l'interprète de la délégation chinoise qui a déserté à Tokyo en octobre, cet article prétendant "que Chou a été détenu contre son gré pendant plusieurs heures "à l'ambassade soviétique au Japon malgré de soi-disant protestations... par des représentants du public japonais et aussi par les autorités japonaises...".

Cette déclaration, annonce Tass, "est absolument sans fondement et ne fait que déranger l'opinion publique". En même temps, Tass annonce que "un nouveau groupe de spécialistes chinois est arrivé à Dubna... pour travailler dans l'Institut de recherches nucléaires... Le groupe de travailleurs chinois à l'Institut est maintenant le plus nombreux de tous les groupements venant des pays de démocratie populaire".

20-22 janvier: Le "New York Times" publie deux articles par son correspondant de Bucarest Binder qui résume ce qui s'est passé en Roumanie pendant le mouvement "pour l'indépendance" que "un observateur occidental qualifie de 'dé-russification' mais qu'un officiel discret du régime Gheorghiu-Dej préfère appeler 'roumanification'. Le plus grand changement est survenu en automne dernier avec l'abolition de l'Institut Maxime Gorky de langue et de littérature russes, qui a été un centre d'influence soviétique", la langue russe étant supprimée comme langue obligatoire dans les écoles. Quatre-vingt-dix pour-cent des textes contenus dans "Lumea", l'hebdomadaire qui remplace l'édition roumane des "Temps nouveaux" de Moscou (voir Chronologie, décembre 27-30), seraient, paraît-il, des reproductions d'articles de publications occidentales. Un guide attira l'attention sur un terrain rempli de débris et dit simplement: "Là se trouvait la librairie russe". Les noms russes ont été supprimés pour plusieurs magasins et cinémas et ont été remplacés par des noms roumains. La statistique sur le commerce extérieur montre que le commerce de la Roumanie avec les pays occidentaux est passé de 20 pour-cent à 33 pour-cent du total au cours de ces 4 dernières années, la presse de son côté parle de la présence de compagnies occidentales dans le pays. Etc...

21 janvier: Le chef du P.C. italien Togliatti a terminé sa visite de 7 jours en Yougoslavie par une conférence de presse dans laquelle, d'après Tanyug, il a déclaré: "Nous avons défini une attitude commune et indiqué la route que l'on doit suivre vers l'unité. Nous avons l'intention de suivre ce chemin et parvenir ainsi à des résultats favorables". Togliatti et le journal sont d'accord que "l'attitude du P.C. chinois à l'égard des questions de pays et de coexistence pacifique est erronée" et "fait du tort au mouvement ouvrier international et au mouvement communiste". Togliatti confirma l'opposition du P.C. italien à une conférence mondiale du parti communiste en ce moment ainsi que l'approbation par le parti "de la proposition pour convoquer une réunion des partis communistes de l'Europe Occidentale".

Le 40e anniversaire de la mort de Lénine est un prétexte pour une série de commentaires par les communistes du monde, commentaires qui indiquent leur position présente dans le "grand conflit". Un éditorial de "Pravda" était

surtout un panégyrique des magnifiques résultats obtenus par les Soviétiques et des perspectives majestueuses, principalement d'un point de vue matériel. "Ajoutant à la formule de Lénine bien connue," "Pravda" produisit un nouveau slogan: "Le communisme c'est la puissance soviétique plus l'électrification de tout le pays plus l'introduction de la chimie dans l'économie nationale."

Honecker, secrétaire du C.C. de l'Allemagne de l'Est, a fait une déclaration louant obséquieusement "l'Union soviétique qui est devenue la base de tout le système socialiste mondial". A l'autre extrême, un éditorial du journal albanais "Zeri i Popullit" contenait les attaques les plus violentes jusqu'à présent contre "l'activité destructrice engagée par le groupe de Khrouchtchev cherchant à réviser et à discréditer le marxisme-léninisme", contre sa "démagogie et ses intrigues", et contre "sa capitulation, sa trahison et son chantage". Le seul commentaire roumain que nous ayons eu était du professeur Bugnaru qui ne mentionna jamais le P.C. de l'U.S. bien que les opinions qu'il défendait étaient généralement d'accord avec la politique soviétique.

Les Chinois n'ont jamais mentionné l'anniversaire dans les rapports que nous avons eus. L'éditorial du "Nodong Sinmun" de la Corée du Nord n'était que modérément anti-révisionniste, mais les Nord-Vietnamiens choisirent cette occasion pour publier dans le "Nhan Dan" un communiqué du 9<sup>e</sup> plénum du C.C. du parti tenu en décembre sur "la situation internationale et sur les tâches internationales du parti" en même temps qu'un éditorial sur le même thème. Le parti semble être encore plus opposé au "révisionnisme moderne" mais déclare cependant qu'une digression intéressante:

"Notre parti fait une distinction politique précise entre la clique révisionniste de Tito, laquais de l'impérialisme, et les gens du mouvement communiste international qui se rendent coupables de révisionnisme et d'opportunisme de droite. Notre attitude à l'égard de la clique révisionniste de Tito est de la dénoncer constamment, tandis que celle à l'égard des gens dans l'erreur au sein du mouvement communiste international est de lutter pour l'unité..."

L'éditorial mentionne spécifiquement "la consolidation de l'unité entre l'Union soviétique et la Chine" et exprime des remerciements sincères aux deux pays "et aux autres pays fraternels pour leur soutien et leur assistance de valeur". Tous les journaux chinois reproduisaient le 23 le texte entier de ce communiqué du Nord Viet-nam.

Entre-temps, les correspondants de Moscou font savoir (Radio-Belgrade du 21, Reuters du 23 et United Press International du 24) qu'un nouveau livre paru sous le titre inoffensif de Conversations sur des sujets politiques, attaquent vigoureusement les doctrines anti-marxistes du P.C. chinois. Ce livre a été préparé par un groupe de neuf personnes sous la direction du chef idéologue du P.C. de l'Union soviétique Ilyichev et envoyé à la publication le 23 octobre, mais dont la vente a été retardée sans doute en raison du moratoire soviétique sur les polémiques. Les observateurs voient dans sa parution un signal indiquant que la patience des Soviétiques à l'égard des Chinois se trouvait épuisée et que le P.C. de l'Union soviétique avait décidé une fois de plus de rendre coup pour coup. La première édition est en 200.000 exemplaires, en langue russe seulement à ce qu'il semble.

23 janvier: La visite de 10 jours de Castro à Khrouchtchev s'est terminée par un accord à long terme portant sur les achats soviétiques de sucre cubain à des prix garantis, et par un communiqué qui déclarait que "une unité complète de vues était confirmée sur toutes les questions discutées", dont "les problèmes internationaux intéressant les deux côtés et les questions urgentes intéressant le communisme mondial et le mouvement ouvrier". Plus bas, le communiqué disait: "Une identité complète de vues a été exprimée par la déclaration soviéto-cubaine du 23 mai 1963". En élaborant sur cette "identité de vues" le communiqué déclare que Cuba "considère les succès obtenus par l'Union soviétique dans la lutte pour la cessation des expériences nucléaires ... comme un pas vers la paix et le désarmement," s'opposant ainsi à l'attaque vigoureuse des Chinois contre le traité interdisant les expériences nucléaires et indiquant probablement l'intention des Cubains de signer ce traité. Le communiqué déclare également que Castro "avait promis le soutien" de Cuba en faveur de la nouvelle proposition de Khrouchtchev pour un traité renonçant de recourir à la force dans les disputes territoriales. La presse soviétique exulte: un éditorial de "Pravda" du 24 qualifiait ce communiqué "de document d'une signification énorme... imprégné du commencement à la fin par une identité de vues complète" des deux partis et des deux gouvernements.

25 janvier: Un éditorial du "Zeri i Popullit" albanais "Voyage en Afrique et en Albanie du Camarade Chou En-lai et réaction des Titoïstes" débute par une dénonciation de la bande de Tito pour sa réaction violente à la visite de Chou mais passe rapidement à son coup principal: "Alors que la bande de Tito lançait des attaques contre la République populaire chinoise et sa politique de paix, avec l'intention de dénigrer... le grand rôle international de la Chine, les autres révisionnistes modernes organisaient une conspiration du silence à l'égard de la visite historique du premier ministre du Conseil d'Etat de la République po-

populaire chinoise. Pourquoi ce silence...?" "Zeri i Popullit" répond: ils ne peuvent se réconcilier à la politique chinoise qui "démasque leur conception pacifiste et anti-léniniste de coexistence pacifique...". D'autre part, les révisionnistes ne peuvent informer l'opinion publique dans leurs pays au sujet du grand succès remporté par la visite de la délégation du gouvernement chinois en Afrique, car cela occasionnerait de nouveaux désordres et de nouvelles anxiétés. Cela démontrerait à quel point leur propagande contre la République populaire chinoise est diffamatoire, fautive et absurde..."

27 janvier: Courts communiqués de Hanoi et de Pékin annonçant le départ d'une délégation importante de communistes du Nord Viet-nam sous la direction du premier secrétaire Le Duan, pour procéder à des entretiens avec le P.C. de l'Union soviétique à Moscou. Hanoi déclare simplement qu'ils "procéderont à des échanges de vues... sur des problèmes d'intérêt commun".

Le "Nodong Sinmun", organe du parti de la Corée du Nord, publie un article de 15.000 mots sous le titre: "Faites flotter la bannière révolutionnaire de libération nationale" qui, à l'instar d'un article analogue du 28 octobre, présente en détail le point de vue chinois arrangé de manière à représenter les intérêts des petits pays. Il s'attache à dénoncer "le groupe Dange du P.C.I." et "certaines personnes qui prennent le nom de communistes" et qui le supportent et le soutiennent.

Harry Schwartz, du "New York Times", passe en revue un article du numéro de décembre de la "Revue marxiste mondiale" (édition de langue anglaise) et Problèmes de la paix et du socialisme, journal mensuel multilingue soutenu par les Soviétiques se trouvant à Prague, article par Luis Corvalan, secrétaire général du P.C. chilien, qui attaque violemment les communistes chinois pour essayer d'imposer une révolution du genre Castro aux Chiliens qui sont voués à la politique de révolution non violente. La lettre fait savoir que le P.C. chinois a envoyé récemment une lettre au P.C. chilien avec cette intention, et que la lettre comprenait la déclaration suivante:

"En Amérique Latine, le 'moyen pacifique' que vous préconisez contraste violemment avec la méthode révolutionnaire de Fidel Castro et d'autres camarades qui ont conduit le peuple cubain à la victoire".

Le dernier numéro de notre Chronologie mentionnait un communiqué de Reuters de Moscou (8 janvier) indiquant que l'article de fond dans l'édition de janvier du PP&S, signé par un Tchèque, un Canadien et un Syrien, attaquait la presse chinoise pour avoir reconnu à des groupements dis-



sidents: la qualité de "véritables communistes révolutionnaires". Plus tard, un communiqué parlait d'un autre article anti-chinois dans le même numéro, signé Jaime Peras, secrétaire du C.C. du P.C. uruguayen.

30 janvier: Un article de "L'observateur" dans "Pravda", intitulé: "Pourquoi induire en erreur?" article qui proteste contre le fait que, alors que la proposition de Khrouchtchev de conclure un traité international renonçant de recourir à la force dans les disputes territoriales a été publié, bien reçu et étudié sérieusement dans la plupart des pays du monde, des organes de la presse chinoise se soient abstenus de le publier ou de mentionner les réactions dans le monde à cette proposition mais qui "s'arrogent le droit de commenter sur ces documents et même à les évaluer". L'article de "Pravda" demande: "Pourquoi induire en erreur le peuple chinois et le dresser contre le peuple soviétique?" "L'observateur" se plaint: "C'est comme si ils préféraient en Chine donner aux lecteurs des affirmations et des évaluations toutes faites..." Le même jour, la presse chinoise publiait un article du numéro de décembre du "Malayan Monitor", organe du P.C. malais publié à Londres, qui déclare que: "Les révisionnistes modernes ont souffert partout une défaite écrasante dans le grand débat grâce aux efforts vigoureux et bien préparés des chefs anti-révisionnistes et grâce aux partis communistes et travaillistes du monde, en particulier le P.C. chinois, le parti travailliste albanais, les partis communistes de la Corée, de l'Indonésie, de la République démocratique du Viet-nam, etc... Il s'attaque directement à Khrouchtchev:

"Dans leur agonie d'une défaite totale imminente, les révisionnistes modernes crient: 'Pas de polémiques,' et 'Pas de division.' Venant de leur part, des exclamations de la sorte sont comme des insultes proférées par des incendiaires qui, ayant mis le feu à leur maison, vous demandent de ne pas vous mêler d'éteindre le feu mais de s'en servir pour allumer le calumet de la paix. Les marxistes-léninistes ne sont pas des interprètes de polémiques pour le plaisir de marquer un point dans un débat, et ils ne sont pas également dupés par des gestes conciliatoires d'unité. A l'encontre des révisionnistes modernes, ils ne considèrent pas que principe et opportunité soient synonymes ou interchangeables."

Pour qu'il n'y ait aucun doute au sujet de ceux qu'ils qualifient de "révisionnistes modernes", l'article déclare clairement: "Ce n'est pas par accident que Khrouchtchev et Tito se trouvent actuellement tous les deux dans le même camp idéologique, ouvertement et même d'une façon provocante."

CHRONOLOGIE - ADDENDUM

(Etant donnée l'importance de plusieurs événements qui se sont produits dans les quatre jours qui ont immédiatement suivi la fin de la période couverte par notre rapport, cet addendum est destiné à en donner un aperçu.)

2 février: A Conakry, en Guinée, dans une interview accordée à Edgar Snow, correspondant sympathisant, Chou En-lai aurait déclaré: "Nous sommes parvenus à un accord avec l'Union soviétique de procéder à des négociations sur les questions de frontières sino-soviétiques."

3 février: "Le Quotidien du peuple" de Pékin publie un certain nombre d'articles sur le conflit sino-soviétique:

- Le texte de l'article de "Pravda" du 30 janvier "Pourquoi induire en erreur?"
- Un article répondant à "Pravda" intitulé: "Un coup porté à Lyndon Johnson atteint la 'Pravda'", L'article débute d'une manière sarcastique: "Il y avait une fois une histoire concernant des jumeaux siamois. Elle disait que lorsque l'un des jumeaux était frappé, l'autre éprouvait une sensation de douleur. Ce qui étonne maintenant c'est que cette parenté curieuse existe entre les leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique et le président des Etats-Unis". L'article demande: "Quel genre de réflexe conditionné cela représente-t-il?... Cela veut-il dire que les leaders soviétiques ont l'intention de conclure un accord avec Johnson aux termes duquel ils s'accorderaient à interdire aux peuples de s'opposer à l'impérialisme et à procéder à des révolutions? Si cela est le cas, 'Pravda' a de bonnes raisons de se sentir nerveuse..."
- Passages d'un nouveau livre soviétique: "Conversations sur des sujets politiques" (voir Chronologie du 21 janvier) sous le titre: "Attaques malveillantes contre le P.C. chinois."
- Un communiqué de l'Agence de presse Chine nouvelle d'après lequel "le premier volume de matériaux anti-chinois tirés de la presse soviétique est mis en vente aujourd'hui dans la Chine toute entière", avec le texte de la préface à ce volume par les éditeurs des Editions de la culture mondiale. Il déclare que "d'après des statistiques incomplètes en date du 30 novembre, plus de 2.000 articles de matériaux anti-chinois de tous genres... ont été publiés dans 26 journaux nationaux et dans 23 journaux et périodiques locaux de l'Union soviétique".

- Une Note de l'éditeur dans "Le quotidien du peuple" qui déclare que "Depuis que N.S. Khrouchtchev, chef du P.C. de l'Union soviétique, a proposé de mettre un terme aux polémiques le 25 octobre 1963, la presse soviétique a continué sa propagande anti-chinoise". L'article souligne particulièrement les extraits d'un livre "de plus de 300 pages" intitulé: "Pourquoi induire en erreur?" publié par la "Pravda". Ces matériaux indiquent que la proposition du leader du P.C. de l'Union soviétique de cesser les polémiques publiques ne constitue qu'une fraude, perpétrée dans des buts tendancieux. La propagande contenue dans ce livre, déclare l'article, "n'est rien d'autre qu'une phraséologie défraîchie et rebattue" et l'article de la "Pravda" n'en est "que plus ridicule".

"En ce qui concerne la réprimande contenue dans "Pravda" adressée à la presse chinoise pour ne pas avoir publié la lettre de Khrouchtchev du 31 décembre aux chefs de gouvernement, nous pouvons demander au P.C. de l'Union soviétique les raisons qu'ils ont pour se dépêcher? Nous également nous traitons de cette lettre et nous commenterons dessus. Une maison d'édition chinoise constitue déjà des volumes de vos articles anti-chinois qui paraîtront ultérieurement. Le chemin doit être parcouru pas à pas et la note devra se régler article par article. Nous n'avons pas encore fini de répondre à la lettre que vous avez publiée le 14 juillet dernier. Qu'est-ce qui vous rend aussi impatients?"

4 février: Le 7e d'une série d'articles publiés en commun par "Le quotidien du peuple" et "Le drapeau rouge" en réponse à la lettre ouverte du 14 juillet du P.C. de l'Union soviétique, a été publiée par les Chinois. Etant donné que nous n'avons reçu que le résumé en anglais de l'Agence de presse Chine nouvelle, nous ne ferons maintenant que des commentaires provisoires et nous en donnerons une analyse plus complète dans notre numéro suivant. Sous le titre: "Les leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique sont les plus grands faiseurs de division qui aient existé", l'article débute en déclarant sans équivoque que "les leaders du P.C. de l'Union soviétique emmenés par Khrouchtchev sont devenus les principaux représentants du révisionnisme moderne ainsi que les plus grands faiseurs de division dans le mouvement du communisme international." Il définit le divisionnisme comme suit: "Le divisionnisme signifie rupture avec le marxisme-léninisme. Quiconque s'oppose au marxisme-léninisme et le trahit et quiconque sape les fondements de l'unité prolétarienne est un divisionniste... Quiconque persiste dans la politique révisionniste et transforme un parti révolutionnaire prolétaire en un parti réformateur

738. The Lot of the Soviet Citizen

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: Economic development requires investment in plants and machines, and this means saving, i.e., foregoing a certain amount of immediate consumption in the expectation of greater returns in the future. But the ratio of saving to consumption is not fixed or automatic, and is not determined by purely economic forces. In some places, the pressures against saving (or reckless consumption) have hampered development. In others, saving has been exalted into an article of faith and a tool of power: such is the case with the USSR.

Communist slogans suggest that the goal of Marxism-Leninism is the welfare of the ordinary citizen. In practice, however, the main goal of Soviet planning has been to maintain and to enhance the power of the CPSU and its leaders. By any objective standard, the collectivization of agriculture has been a failure; some Soviet experts foresaw the difficulties, even before collectivization was introduced. But Stalin wanted to rule the peasants, not negotiate with them. Now the prestige of the Party, as well as a large part of its power, is linked to the collective system.

In industry, the policy of developing capital goods and military production has served the power interests of the Kremlin. Stalin preferred to rely on secret police and tanks rather than appease popular demands or reach accommodations with foreign powers (except Nazi Germany). Stalin's terrorism was too vicious and self-defeating to last, and steel production is (as Khrushchev has admitted) no longer the yardstick of political power: there are other weapons now besides the steel-eating cruisers, tanks, howitzers, and HE shells. But CPSU prestige is still invested in Stalin's system of plans, quotas, and norms, and the new weapons require vast new investments in materials and technical skills. Also, the planners continue to bow before the old idols of dams and blast furnaces, partly out of habit. Khrushchev tries to appease the Soviet consumer with words and sometimes even with deeds, but his plans and programs still provide for industrial output to grow faster than consumer goods. As shortages continue, he explains that consumers must defer to the needs of national defense against the supposedly aggressive imperialists.


Years of neglect of consumer goods, housing, and services cannot be remedied overnight. As the attached materials show, Soviet housing is behind schedule and shoddy in quality; cuts in working hours and increases in take-home pay have been postponed; the growth rate in consumer goods is falling off; and bread is getting grayer. On 1 June 1962, even before the 1963 crop failure, prices for meat and butter increased 30 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. The failures of agriculture

~~SECRET~~ (738. Continued)

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hamper the production of textiles and other consumer goods, as well as that of food. It is noteworthy that although the October Revolution is now 47 years behind us, the Soviet citizen has yet to enjoy his share of his nation's production. The production of consumer goods fell from 60.5 per cent of total production in 1928 to 31.2 per cent in 1950, less than 28 per cent in 1960 and 25 per cent in 1963; at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev promised that henceforth industrial growth would only be 20 per cent more rapid than growth in consumer goods production -- instead of being 70 per cent higher, as heretofore.

25X1C10b



25X1C10b

739. Chicoms Seek to Break Isolation

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BACKGROUND: Communist China has recently taken several steps to break out of a self-imposed isolation characterized by a hard, inflexible attitude and by aggressive actions toward neighbors. This Chicom change of tactics is apparently based on conclusions drawn from the Sino-Soviet dispute and her position vis-a-vis the non-Communist world. Tactical decisions of the Chinese Communist regime are intimately affected by the nature and extent of her ambitions and also by her arrogance. Communist China aspires not only to leadership of the world Communist movement and not only to a prominent role in world affairs, but to the dominant position in both worlds. There is ample evidence of this aspiration in the Great Leap Forward -- an attempt to convert, in a few short years, a backward, inefficient, undisciplined agricultural society with practically no industrial base, into the most powerful nation on earth. That they should attempt it at all is testimony of their driving ambition; that they should persist in the attempt, despite warnings of their friends and overwhelming economic knowledge and experience accrued by Marxist and non-Marxist countries alike, provides an accurate gauge of their arrogance. While the whole effort failed miserably, they have never renounced it and have even shown signs that they may try it again some day.

CCP Gains Against the CPSU. The Chinese Communists have made headway in their quarrel with the Soviet Union. They have successfully captured the initiative in the Communist Parties of Asia (See guidance item 730, 13 January 1964); they are now ready for an intensified attack against the CPSU's hegemony within the other Communist Parties of the world, having already had some success in these activities. The Italian CP newspaper, L'Unita, has said that Peking "supports fractionist groups in Belgium, France, Greece, Switzerland and Italy." There are pro-Chinese splinter groups in the British and Austrian Communist Parties and Chinese sympathizers in Scandinavia. In Latin America there are dissidents in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, and there is a dissident CP in Brazil. The Chinese Communists have also been active in the Communist international front groups: they first try to take over the front and, failing this, attempt to split it (see guidance item 711, 13 November 1963). All of these activities are aimed at displacing the CPSU as leader of the world Communist camp.

To this end, the Chicoms have created a vast propaganda apparatus. They have expanded their international radio broadcasting facilities: Radio Peking now uses 27 short wave

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transmitters to carry daily programs even in such languages as Swahili, Tamil and Hausa, in addition to extensive programming in all the major languages of the world. There are reports that the Chicoms are paying the bill to expand Radio Tirana (Albania) into a large international broadcasting center to carry the Chinese line to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The New China News Agency has more than 50 offices in all parts of the world and is still expanding. The Peking Review, which started life as a simple vehicle to inform fraternal parties of domestic Mainland developments, has become an organ supporting Communist China's campaign for leadership of the Communist bloc. It is printed in English, French, Spanish and Japanese (See guidance item 708, 4 November 1963).


The second conclusion apparently drawn by the Chicoms concerns their position and relationships with the non-Communist world. The CPSU and its adherents (as well as the non-Communist world) have used China's hard line in general and her position on the nuclear-test treaty in particular to isolate China and publicize her image as an implacable advocate of violence and nuclear war. To change this image and to gain access to denied areas, the Chinese Communists have undertaken an extensive campaign supported by the propaganda network mentioned above and supplemented by such other tactics as Chou En-lai's recent tour of Africa. Chou, in his public appearances, is impressing the Africans with his "reasonableness" and his "understanding" of Africa's problems (See guidance item 734, 27 January 1964). It is safe to guess that in some of his private conversations he is discussing China's correctness in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

At this juncture, the CPR's most prominent success is deGaulle's recognition and agreement to exchange ambassadors. It is to be expected that, in the near future, Communist China will intensify her efforts to get recognition from other Western and uncommitted governments and to snow-ball herself into admission into the United Nations. One tactic that can be anticipated is the bait of China's "vast market of 700 million people," coupled with the threat that those who come first will receive the most favors in negotiating trade agreements.


It is too early to predict what will happen on the question of China's admission to the United Nations or even how many countries will follow France's lead and grant Peking diplomatic recognition. It seems probable, for the immediate future, that Communist China will continue all activities contributing to her dual image as best suited to leadership of the world Communist movement and, at the same time, as destined to become the leader of an alliance of Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

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


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10 February 1964

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BACKGROUND: Khrushchev Slows Down. On 17 April 1964, Khrushchev will be 70 years old, and overdue for retirement. The Communist custom of celebrating multiple 5th and 10th anniversaries and their unprecedented propaganda ballyhoo on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday (21 December 1949) make this an apt occasion for another major effort. Khrushchev has outlived the expected life span of Soviet males (64.0 years) and has reached the decades where the incidence of death is highest. Only one US President has served in the White House past his 70th birthday --Eisenhower in his last year. That Khrushchev is slowing down is shown by the record of his speech-making. He made formal speeches 24 times in 1958, 29 times in 1959, 21 times in 1960, 33 times in 1961, 15 times in 1962, and 14 times in 1963. His latest pictures show an older, thinner man than the hard-drinking, shoe-banging activist of the late 1950's. On 24 April 1963, shortly after his last birthday, Khrushchev gave a speech in which he suggested that perhaps he was considering retirement--or perhaps that others had suggested it, and he had refused to agree. (Texts of this and other statements referred to in this guidance are contained in an unclassified attachment, "Khrushchev Speaks," The texts are referred to in this section by parenthetical numbers. For treatment of the related topic of Khrushchev's succession, see [redacted]

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The Ends Justify the Means. All politicians occasionally contradict themselves, or fail to carry out promises. Khrushchev has, however, an almost unparalleled record for inconsistency and failure to perform. In 1961, in the midst of a denunciation of Stalin, Khrushchev approved of a "proposal" for a monument to the victims of Stalin, including the former Ukrainian leaders, Postyshev and Kosior. (2) Actually, Khrushchev himself had been a member, together with Molotov and NKVD chief Yezhov, of a Special Commission sent by Stalin in August 1937 to wipe out Ukrainian nationalism. In January 1938, it was Khrushchev who replaced Postyshev as alternate member of the Politburo, and Kosior as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. On 26 May of that year, Khrushchev stated that "the peoples of the Soviet Union rejoice that they have uprooted this foul, abominable, treacherous gang, the loathsome Trotskyite-Bukharinite bandits, that they have eradicated and exterminated them under the leadership of our great Stalin, under the leadership of our Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov." (also 3,4) On 19 June 1938, a new Central Committee was elected for the Ukraine; only three men (less than three per cent) remained unpurged from the 1937 Central Committee. Khrushchev's Ukrainian purge outdid Stalin's purge of the All-Union Central Committee: there 16½ per cent of the Central Committee members elected in 1934 were re-elected in 1939,

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Some grisly remnants of the Ukrainian purges were discovered during the World War II German occupation: in 1943, a Ukrainian doctor at Vinnitsa uncovered 95 mass graves containing 9,439 victims, shot in the back of the neck. Relatives identified some of the bodies as persons arrested for "nationalism" in late 1937 and 1938, and medical experts concluded that the deaths occurred between 1938 and 1940, that is during the period of Khrushchev's rule.


It is charitable to assume that Khrushchev acted only to save his own neck, and it is pleasant to note that he has repudiated Stalin's methods. It is not true, however, that he rejected Stalin as soon as the old man was dead. While Premier, Georgi Malenkov pioneered in urging more emphasis on consumer goods, and in saying that a new world war would mean "the destruction of world civilization." But Khrushchev took up the cudgels for heavy industry, attacking "right deviationists" (i.e., Malenkov) in the old Stalinist style. (5) At that time, Khrushchev did his best to identify himself and his allies (such as Molotov and Bulganin) with Stalin, so that a biographical article described him in March 1955 as "one of the closest comrades-in-arms of J.V. Stalin," and Khrushchev himself praised Bulganin in the same terms in a speech of 8 February 1955. One year later, as everyone now knows, Khrushchev denounced Stalin in a secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress; within four years, Khrushchev revealed that Bulganin was a member of the "anti-Party group."

Prophecies and Promises: An Economy of Abundance for the People. Since 1955, Khrushchev has made many promises about catching up with the West. On 22 May 1957, in Leningrad, he promised to catch up with the United States in milk production by 1958, involving an increase of 40 per cent. (6) Thanks to the excellent 1958 conditions, an increase of 19 per cent was actually achieved; in the four years after 1958, only a further 5 per cent was gained, according to Soviet statistics. When this speech was republished in a series of collected speeches in 1962, the specific prophecy was omitted, and he was only said to have stated that the USSR could overtake the US "in the next few years." Reporting on the CPSU program at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 Khrushchev predicted that industrial output would increase six-fold, and agricultural output two and one half times by 1980. Thus industrial output, the star performer of Soviet statistics, was to increase by an average of 9 to 10 per cent throughout the period. Yet industrial output, according to a Soviet economist (Valentin Kudrov), was down to 8.5 per cent in 1963 from a 1962 9.5 per cent. (Western analysts believe that all Soviet industrial output figures are inflated by double counting -- e.g., counting both a machine and the steel used to make it -- and in other ways, and that non-military industrial output for 1963 was about 7 per cent. See also Peter Wiles, "Western Research into the Soviet Economy," Survey, January 1964, p. 76; Wiles believes most private Western analysts would put the annual average for 1959 and 1961 at 7 per cent.) Despite this 1963 drop, and de-

spite a decline in industrial investment since 1959, twenty-year industrial growth could still--in terms of Soviet statistics--reach an average of 9 to 10 per cent per year. But in agriculture, the twenty-year program must already--in its third year--be regarded as a lost cause. A Pravda article of 13 January stated that agricultural output for 1963 was 50 per cent higher than in 1952: this "good-sounding" statistic, when compared with other Soviet figures, indicates that the 1963 harvest was 9 per cent below the 1962 level, which was itself a mediocre year. In fact this 1963 harvest is below any year since 1957, when Khrushchev gained full control of the Soviet government. Although nearly half of Khrushchev's 1958-63 speeches have been on agriculture and related affairs, agriculture has not advanced. Since Stalin's death, the plowed and sown area in the so-called Virgin Lands increased 410 per cent, but output for this area for 1963 was only 48 per cent greater than in 1953; the yield per hectare fell from 8.7 quintals to 3.1 quintals. Over the decade, yields averaged 6.3 quintals, while the target set by Khrushchev and the Central Committee had been 10 to 11 quintals. Actually, it is largely Khrushchev's campaign approach to agriculture, his peddling of one panacea after another and in particular, his attempt to gain rapid results by plowing without fertilizing, that have brought about the current agricultural difficulties.

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10 February 1964

741. AF, FE, WH Made in Czechoslovakia: New Meaning for an Old Trademark

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BACKGROUND: Between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia became known throughout the world as a prosperous and orderly country with a government based on Parliament and elections by secret ballot. Through the inherent diligence of its people, the trademark "Made in Czechoslovakia" became known and respected in all corners of the globe. Heavy and precision machinery, textiles, shoes, glass, costume jewelry, as well as the excellent Pilsen beer and Prague hams, were as easily found in Hong Kong as in Buenos Aires.

Following the years of Nazi occupation, the people of Czechoslovakia were delivered into the "Soviet sphere of influence" as a result of WWII developments. The implied threat of Soviet military intervention greatly helped the Czechoslovak Communist Party in seizing control in 1948. After a period in which the Communists consolidated their power, condemning 60,000 people to exile and additional thousands to prison and to the gallows, Czechoslovakia became totally subjugated to the Soviet Union, in domestic affairs as well as in international relations.

Once the Czechoslovak Communists had been placed in control, the Soviet Union lost no time in exploiting the country. Not only were there valuable natural resources and a highly developed industry, but its pre-war reputation as a democratic, orderly nation and a producer of fine goods made Czechoslovakia an excellent carrier for the export of Communism by the Soviet Bloc. Czechoslovakia became a spearhead for Communist subversion of underdeveloped areas. Latin America was given high priority because Soviet representatives are barred in many of these countries and where the Soviets do maintain diplomatic relations they are unpopular and closely watched.

The majority of Czechoslovak trade representatives stationed overseas resigned after the Communist takeover and sought asylum abroad. Under orders from Moscow the New Czech regime replaced the former trade representatives, diplomats and military attachés with reliable Party cadres. Many individuals sent abroad, even in a semi-official capacity, had to undergo special training. The former Czech Military Attaché in Washington, Frantisek Tisler, testified in 1960 that about 45 percent of Czech officials abroad are trained in espionage and political warfare, and are actually employed and controlled not by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade, but by the Ministry of Interior (in charge of secret police and espionage).

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The overall scope of Czech efforts in underdeveloped world areas has grown conspicuously out of proportion to normal economic or diplomatic activities of so small a country, especially with domestic economic difficulties publicly admitted by Party Secretary, Antonin Novotny, and other regime officials. The Czech regime has followed the universal Communist pattern of failure in agriculture and industry. Not only have these failures been visited heavily on the Czech consumer, but the country's outstanding reputation for reliable products has been clouded by the export of shoddy goods and resulting complaints from buyers worldwide. In the face of this, the Czech regime has continued to give high priority to foreign programs. For example, the Czechs are believed to have more personnel in Latin America than the Soviet Union and other Satellites combined; the demonstrable Czech per capita contribution to political activity abroad is more than twice that of the Soviet Union.

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**BACKGROUND:** Fidel Castro's trip to the Soviet Union, 13-23 January 1964, has resulted in a trade pact that will have far-reaching effects on Cuba's economy. Under the terms of the agreement, Russia will buy the bulk of Cuba's sugar production for a period of six years at a guaranteed price of six cents a pound. Cuba, in turn, pledges to deliver a total of 24.1 million tons, as follows: 2.1 million tons in 1965; 3.0 million tons in 1966; 4.0 million tons in 1967; 5.0 million tons each year in 1968, 1969, and 1970. In order to meet these quotas, Castro hopes to increase the production of sugar to 10 million tons a year by 1968. This ambitious program contrasts sharply with last year's production of 3.8 million tons and even with Cuba's highest production: 7.2 million tons attained in 1952.

In spite of much speculation, largely stimulated by the apparent suddenness of his departure and the unusual secrecy surrounding the preparations, Castro's trip to the USSR did not come about as a result of the Panama riots. That Cuban agents participated in them, there can be little doubt. But it is almost equally certain that Castro was as much surprised as the local Panamanian Communist Party at the sudden manner in which the riots escalated in magnitude and violence. Castro had probably arranged for this trip some time before: he is reported to have told a European visitor late in December that the two could not get together again until after January, since he was going to be absent from Cuba during most of that month.

On balance, Castro's trip was something of a diplomatic triumph, both for him and for Khrushchev. For Castro, Cuba will be assured a stable price for its sugar over a period of six years. While six cents a pound is only a little over half the current market price, it is higher than the average of the last ten years. Castro argues that it is better for Cuba to be assured of a stable price for sugar over a long period of time than to try to make a few quick profits from momentarily high prices at the risk of losing later when prices drop.

Sugar prices, since World War II, have fluctuated disproportionately -- by comparison with metals, cotton, beef, grains, or even coffee -- ranging from less than three to over eleven cents a pound.

One of the things that Latin American countries have been crying loudest for, especially the one-crop countries, is a stable price for their key commodities. They angrily accuse the United States of paying low prices for raw materials and selling the finished products at high prices; they claim that manufactured products have steadily risen in price while raw materials


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
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have remained the same. Of course there is enough truth in this argument to make good propaganda against the U.S. Susceptible Latin American audiences will be impressed by this aspect of the trade pact.

The quid pro quo in the deal, at least at the moment, for Khrushchev, was Castro's support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict as spelled out in a joint communique issued at the end of the visit. Castro endorsed the Soviet interpretation of the pronouncements of the Moscow Communist Party conferences of 1957 and 1960, and specifically approved Soviet measures to strengthen the unity of the international Communist movement. He further agreed that Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy has brought about "a certain easing of international tensions" and somewhat belatedly sided with the Soviets on the nuclear test ban treaty.

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743 AF, g. Lessons of Zanzibar

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**BACKGROUND:** A far-seeing training and indoctrination program and assiduous attention to exploitable political weaknesses have again paid off for international communism. The new government of Zanzibar (which includes the nearby island of Pemba), dominated by the leaders of the bloody coup of 12 January, now looks strongly pro-Communist although under the nominal leadership of a veteran nationalist. Some of the subversive efforts which led to the Communist success in Zanzibar had been apparent for many months and are present and increasing in other states with weak political traditions and poor economic bases.

**Methods of Subversion.** Large numbers of Zanzibari students went abroad -- mainly to East Europe and China but also to Cuba -- for education of the Communist variety. Abdurrahman Mohamed "Babu," kingpin of the revolution and now Foreign Minister, personally selected many of the students who travelled through Cairo -- many illegally -- to the Communist training schools. Trade union officials and scores of potential leaders tapped by the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions received special training courses; the Secretary of the Zanzibar Federation of Progressive Trade Unions was trained in Peking. The Havana office of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) received "students," trained them in guerrilla warfare tactics and later directed them against the legally elected government of the newly independent Zanzibar which included the ZNP. The youth arms of the Afro-Shirazi (ASP) and the Umma parties, the shock troops of the revolution, did the actual fighting under the leadership of self-styled Field Marshall John Okello and some 40 hotheads trained -- and perhaps armed -- by Cuba. (For specific training and Communist ties of the coup leaders, see the biographic sketches attached).


**Propaganda.** Anti-western literature poured into Zanzibar at a rate perhaps exceeding that of any other country in Africa. Lacking the continent-wide propaganda facilities of the front groups so useful to Moscow, the Chinese Communists shipped in quantities of reading material, such as the Peking Review, at give-away prices. The New China News Agency (NCNA) is Peking's propaganda machine in Zanzibar as it is elsewhere (see Ref 1.), and Babu was the local representative. The NCNA chief is Kao Liang, based in Dar es Salaam and once expelled from New Delhi for his aggressive "unjournalistic" activities on behalf of Peking.

**Financing.** Babu, who founded the radical Umma party, received as much as \$50,000 per year from the Communist Chinese through the mechanism of NCNA and possibly through his position


on the board of the Peking-financed Revolution, published in France (see Ref. 3). On January 16th, while news reporting from Zanzibar was at a virtual standstill and the nature of the revolt unclear, France Observateur carried an article by Jacques Verges, Revolution's publisher, titled "Chinese Victory in Zanzibar."


Political Moves included familiar united front tactics whereby Babu's Umma party cooperated with the trade unions and the ASP in opposition to the coalition government of mid-1963. By so doing, they not only strengthened the anti-government opposition but played upon -- and ultimately directed toward revolution -- both the genuine nationalism and the African racialism of the ASP. Following the coup, Karume of the ASP was installed as President of the People's Republic, probably because of his popular following. A power struggle still appears undecided but Babu is believed to be the strongman of the government. Soviet-sponsored Communist fronts have provided means of contacting, training and financing individuals for seizing organizational power, for spreading thinly-disguised propaganda and for increasing local front memberships. The Cairo ZNP office had close contacts with the Cairo AAPSO office which in turn had direct ties with Moscow and Peking. (See Ref 4).

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744 AF,g. AAPSO Interest in the Organization of African Unity

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BACKGROUND: Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), an offshoot of the Communist-controlled World Peace Council, was established in 1957 with Headquarters in Cairo ostensibly to coordinate the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries in developing their economic and cultural resources. By 1960 the control of the Organization was firmly in the hands of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Representatives of the Soviet Union and Communist China supported by Communist party members from Asian countries and Communist lining members of African revolutionary movements have since that time held working majorities on all policy-making and action bodies of the Organization (i.e. the Executive Committee, the Fund Committee, and the Permanent Secretariat).

The Permanent Secretariat is funded almost entirely by equal annual contributions from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the UAR. Small donations from other members are inconsequential. The Fund Committee, responsible for doling out material aid to revolutionary movements, is under the direction of three officers: Ismail Toure, President, Chu Tzu-chi of China and Mehdi Ben Barka of Morocco, Vice Presidents. Inasmuch as both Ismail Toure and Mehdi Ben Barka have consistently followed the Chinese line at both the Committee and Secretariat level, the Fund Committee is in fact under Chinese control. At the October 1963 meeting of this Committee, Ismail Toure thanked the Chinese for their contributions and singled them out as the only members that had completely fulfilled their obligations to the Fund Committee.

Since the Communists took over control of the Organization, the major AAPSO objective has been to liquidate all traces of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa and Asia. To this end, AAPSO material and propaganda support has been directed toward militant revolutionary groups in still dependent countries and toward radical pro-Communist opposition parties in countries whose governments are not willing to line up with the Communist Bloc. The AAPSO has supported among others the exiled pro-Communist Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC) in its efforts to overthrow President Ahidjo in the Cameroun Republic, the Sawaba Party against President Diiori of Niger, and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) against King Hassan of Morocco. It has promoted the Oginga Odinga wing of the Kenya African National Union, Oscar Kambona in Tanganyika, Congress Party for Independence of Madagascar and the Communist-controlled African National Congress in South Africa.

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


During the period from 1960 to 1962, a working arrangement existed between the AAPSO and the All African People's Conference (AAPC) (an all-African organization aimed at aiding liberation from colonial government). This arrangement enabled the Communist-dominated AAPSO to direct the policy of the AAPC (although there were no Bloc members in the AAPC) through: first, influence on individual African leaders who held positions on the steering Committee of the AAPC and also on the Executive Committee or Secretariat of the AAPSO; second, Abdoulaye Diallo, Secretary General of the AAPC who attended all important AAPSO meetings; and third, funds passed from the AAPSO to the AAPC (which included such large sums as five hundred thousand pounds sterling in March 1961.)


Due to the decreasing number of dependent African states, the non-governmental AAPC became obsolete in 1963 and the Organization of African Unity, an organization of governments of independent African states, was established. Within the framework of the OAU, the Committee of Nine is now the main instrument for aiding liberation movements in Africa. As such it has become an object of major interest to the AAPSO. Discussions of how best to collaborate with the Committee of Nine have taken place at all levels in AAPSO policy circles. The matter has received careful attention at Secretariat meetings, at Fund Committee meetings, and at the Executive Committee meeting of September 1963. These discussions have resulted in an AAPSO decision that "collaboration" is essential between the two organizations interested in aiding liberation movements in Africa, that is the AAPSO and the Committee of Nine.

It is too soon to see whether the AAPSO will be successful in effecting a liaison with the Committee of Nine but indications are that the AAPSO will certainly press in this direction in the coming months. Further, some AAPSO leaders (e.g. Oscar Kambona, Ismail Toure) hold key positions in the Committee of Nine, a circumstance facilitating contact between the two organizations.

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745 WH,F. Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC)  
Santiago, Chile, 9 - 14 March 1964

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**BACKGROUND:** The Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC or Congreso Latino-Americano de Juventudes), a Castro-Communist inspired and controlled vehicle to attract the youth of Latin America to the Fidelista team, is slated to begin on March 9, 1964 in Santiago, Chile. The Communist-front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) are counted as sponsors of the five-day scheduled rally. If disagreements which hampered preparations for the Congress and forced an earlier postponement have been sufficiently smoothed over, the Conference is likely to get underway on or about the appointed date. If and when the Communist youth of Latin America bring down the gavel in Santiago, it will be against a background of conflict within the Communist movement in the hemisphere. Should the Sino-Soviet dispute be kept in the background, a LAYC in Chile could be rewarding for Fidelista goals among the hemisphere's youth as well as produce propaganda adversely affecting the Chilean electoral campaign, which starts in the early spring.

The idea of a conclave, specifically designed to bear the Communist message to Latin American youth, was originally started by the WFDY at the World Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959. In August of that year at a meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Santiago, Chile, the Central Union of Chilean Workers (CUTCH) presented the scheme and Raul Castro publicly backed it. The Cuban delegation at the 1959 Santiago meeting then offered its country as headquarters for the Congress. So Castro's Cuba became the prime exponent of WFDY's plan and set the stage for eventually gaining control of the LAYC.

Initial Failures. As a vehicle for establishing Cuba as the revolutionary leader of Latin American youth, the LAYC has been markedly unsuccessful. The first LAYC, held in Havana in July 1960, was judged a net loss for the Fidelistas, primarily because:

1. It failed to attract a wide range of politically conscious youth organizations. Representatives of the three dominant political movements in Latin America, Socialism, Communism, and Christian Democracy, were expected to attend. But only 339 of the anticipated 1500 delegates arrived. The Christian Democratic youth organizations, non-Communist National Student organizations and the youth sections of most of the

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popular parties boycotted this first Congress. Venezuelan President Betancourt's Accion Democratica (AD) youth, who did go to Havana, were recalled after Che Guevara and Raul Castro viciously attacked the Venezuelan Government during the Congress. The small turnout that the Cubans were able to sustain was undoubtedly almost exclusively Communist.

2. It was badly organized, and failed to create permanent bodies to wage the revolutionary struggle -- a prime objective. The initial week of the LAYC was spent in a disorganized series of tours, cocktail parties and visits with government officials. Efforts to grapple with the real tasks of the Congress were begun on the last day. Some shrill anti-US pro-Castro propaganda statements were rammed through the plenary session. However, a walkout of delegations disrupted the proceedings and the meeting ended without fulfilling Castro's desire to establish a Latin American Youth League with a permanent secretariat in Havana.

Just before the adjournment of the Havana Conference, a Communist-dominated eighteen member preparatory committee for the Second LAYC was elected, insuring for Fidelista Communism a future entree to Latin American youth. Although Cuba has maintained its role as chief protagonist throughout the preparations for the second Congress, the road to Santiago has been frequently blocked with argument from the Left.

Reflections of Sino-Soviet Dissensions. Opposition from within the Communist ranks, as early as 1960 in Havana, may have hampered Cuba in realizing its goals. More recently in 1963, fear of open confrontation between the proponents of the Soviet and Chicom ideological positions undoubtedly provoked the postponement of the Second Congress. There has been a flurry of preparatory committee meetings since August when the Congress was to have been held. These gatherings may have been convened to resolve in advance conflicting opinions among the Communist youth of Latin America.

Even if the Latin American Communists have been able to submerge their tactical disagreements, the specter of the Sino-Soviet controversy will complicate behind-the-scene machinations at the Congress if, indeed, it does not appear openly. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China will send observers although it seems probable that the Soviet Union will make every effort to deny the Chicoms another forum for their antagonistic views. The IUS and WFDY representatives, always notably pro-Soviet, will again be on hand. In the host country, the Chilean Socialist Youth (JS or Juventud Socialista) and the Communist Youth (JC or Juventud Comunista) which both have representatives on the International Coordinating Committee and on the Chilean Organizing Committee, have been staunchly in favor of the Soviet position. Argentine, Bolivian, and Uruguayan Communist youth join

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them in favoring a peaceful path to revolution in Latin America, denuclearization and no foreign (including Communist) intervention in any Latin American country. All these groups consistently clash with the Fidelista by insisting that the success of the Congress depends on securing non-Communist participation. The Castro Communists, pressing for the extreme violent-revolutionary line of the Chicoms, favor an exclusively Communist Congress -- with the support of the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Ecuadorean Fidelista Communists.

Preparations for Congress in Chile. Preparations for a March LAYC in Santiago have picked up considerable momentum during recent weeks. Several Communist youth leaders have traveled to various countries in Latin America to push formation of national committees. Joaquin Mas, chairman of the International Coordinating Committee and vice-president of the Cuban national union of students (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria - FEU), has been in Santiago since October working on the preparations for the site. Although undoubtedly opposed by the Chilean Communists and Socialists, the Government of Chile has been reluctant to take any action to impede the organization of the event. Without positive interference from the Government, the second LAYC could take place on schedule with the preparatory committee paving the way by convening in Santiago for twenty-one days prior to the opening.

The importance of the September 4th presidential elections and the attractiveness of a Chilean headquarters for a Latin American Youth League are no doubt in the background of the decision to hold the LAYC in Chile, since:

1. A continent-wide youth rally which can be used as a forum for extreme leftist views to give a boost to the Communist-backed presidential candidate, Salvador Allende.
  2. Chile's Latin American reputation as a democracy increases the possibility that non-Communist youth groups will attend, blurring the otherwise clear Communist nature of the meeting.
  3. A Santiago headquarters for the Latin American Youth League can develop seminars, congresses, newsletters, information bulletins, solidarity campaigns and other forms of propaganda calculated to aid extreme left causes throughout the hemisphere. More importantly, Santiago could be used as the site of a regional training institute for Communist youth and student leaders -- a need mentioned several times in the last four months by Communist youth leaders such as Oscar Zamora of the IUS.
- Alternative sites, including Brazil, have been elected and a last minute change of plan could switch the Congress.


Outlook for the Second Congress. The pro-Communist, Fidelista nature of the first LAYC and its full support of Cuba will

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presumably be duplicated by the second LAYC if it actually takes place in Chile. The proceedings will strongly resemble the Havana Congress.

1. The participation of non-Communist youth groups will be sought to give the event a less partisan image. An estimated five hundred delegates from political, labor and student groups are expected but it is doubtful that the Christian Democratic groups (Juventud Democrata Cristiana de America) will attend.
2. The Congress will attack the U.S. and other democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere, while the government of Venezuela, the Alliance for Progress, and the Panama Canal Treaty will probably be special targets.
3. Communist and possibly Castroite control is again insured since:
  - (a) Fidelistas dominate the eighteen-member preparatory committee;
  - (b) national screening committees, which accredit full voting delegates, are Communist-controlled; and
  - (c) Congress organizers have made preparations for transporting at least three hundred delegates to Chile on Peruvian Airlines (Aereolinas Peruanas S.A.) and expect Cuban and Brazilian delegates to be transported by the Cuban Air Force.

With a tighter rein on the controlling mechanics and a more efficient organization of the agenda, the Fidelistas may this time achieve their prime objective, the establishment of a Latin American Youth League with a permanent secretariat outside Cuba in a non-Communist country.

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


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
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International Conference of Youth and Students for  
Peace, Disarmament and National Independence;  
Florence, Italy, 26 February-1 March, 1964

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BACKGROUND: For several years the Communist front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) has sought to hold a major international meeting on peace and disarmament. The Sino-Soviet conflict has increased the desire of the Soviet-controlled WFDY secretariat, in Budapest, to hold such a meeting to propagate the Soviet position on these issues. At the same time, the ideological rift has made the WFDY secretariat extremely cautious about the nature of the meeting and the delegates who should participate.

Following an early November 1962 meeting of the WFDY executive committee in Budapest, the Communist Youth Federation of Italy hastily constructed a paper committee in Florence. This committee, it was claimed, had the support of all factions in the Florence student and youth community, except the extreme right; in addition, the committee stated it had the support of the Mayor of Florence. The date for the International Youth and Student Conference for Peace and Disarmament was originally announced by the Florence committee as May 1963.

Proposed Agenda. The WFDY executive committee meeting had urged that the international meeting should discuss such topics as (1) ending nuclear testing, (2) the creation of nuclear free zones, and (3) the solution of the German problem within the framework of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty. Significantly, the Florence Committee, while including the first two topics which the WFDY had listed, dropped the third and substituted "Disarmament and the Struggle for National Liberation."

United Front Facade. In an attempt to improve the image of the projected meeting, the Florence group, early in 1963, invited various national parties and organizations to participate in the planning. Once a national committee had been established, the formal International Preparatory Committee (IPC) would come into being. The only national groups to accept the local committee's invitation were the Communists, the left-wing Socialists, and the Radicals. The major parties which formed the governing coalition (Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists and the Republicans) as well as their youth sections refused to participate, stating that it was clear that the meeting would be under partisan control.

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The International Preparatory Committee. With the creation of the IPC and its first major meeting in June 1963, the direction of the conference was already apparent. The IPC was dominated by Eastern European youth organizations; two international Communist fronts -- the International Union of Students (IUS), and the WFDY; various Italian Communist fronts, such as the "New Resistance"; and representatives of various other world youth or student organizations under tight Communist control, or willing to work with them on nearly all issues. Included in the latter group were the national student organizations of Brazil, France and Argentina.

Not included in participation lists for the IPC were such major non-Communist international organizations as the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), and the Coordinating Secretariat of the National Unions of Students (COSEC). Also absent and presumably not invited, or unwilling to be outvoted, were the All China Student Federation, the Albanian Youth League, or any other ally of the Chicoms in the ideological and power struggle with the Soviets.

Struggle for Control. WFDY's struggle to control the meeting was not finished. The Florence group had opened the door to potential unwelcome ideological support by including the national liberation topic, but the WFDY managed to gloss over this issue temporarily by postponing the meeting from October 1963 until early 1964. However, at the November 1963 IPC meeting, WFDY, IUS and the Soviet Komsomol delegate (Silin) found themselves outmaneuvered by various Italian members of the IPC, and a few others over whom they did not have complete control: from a planned meeting on peace and disarmament it became an International Conference of Youth and Students on Peace, Disarmament and National Independence. The Chicom-oriented forces seemingly had a foot in the door.

In an attempt to regain control, the Soviet-controlled WFDY announced that a "secretariat" would be set up in Florence to actually arrange the meeting; three members of the IPC were asked to participate. Conveniently, the British Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (YCND) representative could not devote full time to the work, neither could the Florentine student. This left only Silin, who agreed to remain for two months to make all necessary arrangements.

Financial Support. The financing of the Conference also reveals its Communist nature and cannot but have repercussions on the issues and deliberations. Non-Communist organizations such as COSEC, WAY, IUSY, etc. were "assessed," pro forma no doubt, as expected substantial contributors to the total budget estimate of almost \$30,000. The Communist sponsors undoubtedly knew from the onset that these organizations, which were not to be given any influence on the Conference preparations, would not be willing to pay the assessed or any other amounts. Also, the budget does not provide transportation costs for organizations which cannot pay for travel to Florence; this will prove


to be a major handicap for proper Asian, African and Latin American representation. It can be assumed, however, that front organizations -- including perhaps the World Peace Council which is supporting the Conference -- will provide grants to selected delegates or delegations and thus reinforce the Communist composition of the Conference.

Although the conference is for young people, the organizers proposed to invite also "well-known personalities in political, scientific and cultural fields engaged in actions for peace and disarmament." According to available information, the conference commissions will discuss in the main:

- (1) questions of disarmament and peaceful co-existence (test ban treaty, nuclear free zones, foreign bases and military pacts);
- (2) disarmament and problems of the struggles for national liberation (and the cultural and economic development of newly-independent territories); and
- (3) disarmament and economic and social problems.

The Conference has now been scheduled for 26 February through 1 March. It still may be postponed.

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### Summary and Conclusion

The serious shortfall in grain production and the need for large grain purchases abroad have caused the Soviet leadership to take a number of actions to reduce grain consumption. Foremost among these actions are (1) an increase in the yield of every ton of grain by raising the extraction rate in milling grain into flour, thus degrading the quality of bread; (2) restrictions on the sale of bread and flour in retail stores; (3) a step-up in the drive against feeding of bread to livestock; (4) a revival of campaigns against waste and theft of bread and grain products; and (5) a cutback in the need for feed grains by the slaughter of more livestock than usual.

Campaigns to carry out these measures have been underway since late September -- after agreements had been signed with Canada and Australia for purchases of about 8 million tons\* of grain and before a serious bid was made to negotiate for grain with the US. It is likely that these campaigns were prompted both by the desire to hold down the level of grain imports, thereby limiting the already heavy drain on gold reserves, and by the need to reduce consumption pending receipt of grain from overseas and returns from next year's summer harvest. This suggests that the Soviet leaders, having considered the low level of their grain reserves and gold supplies, have decided that further reductions in either of these stocks would be dangerous, and that they would prefer at this time to restrict consumption even at the risk of popular discontent. This decision also shows the importance that the Kremlin attaches to current imports of grain and to the harvest beginning next June.

The consumer continues to suffer from inflationary pressures. For example, free (collective farm) market prices in October 1963 for the city of Moscow were 14 percent above prices for the same period in 1962. The heavier rates of slaughtering of livestock in the fall of 1963 will relieve some of the pressure in consumer markets, but the full impact should be felt in the spring of 1964, when there will be less meat, more money in the hands of consumers, and probably no white bread.

#### I. Measures Taken to Conserve Grain Products

##### 1. Degrading the Quality of Flour

Of all the actions taken to conserve grain products, the most irritating to the Soviet people is the degradation of the quality of bread by raising the extraction rate when grain is converted into flour. The extraction rate in milling grain

\*Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout.

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mines the volume of flour that can be obtained from a given volume of grain. For example, if 72 kilograms of flour are obtained from 100 kilograms of grain, the extraction rate is said to be 72 percent. The quality or desirability of the bread baked from flour is inversely related to the extraction rate -- the higher the extraction rate in milling the grain, the lower the "quality," or consumer satisfaction. Bread and other products made from flour remain today, as over the past centuries, the basic staple of the Soviet diet and account for more than one-half of the daily caloric intake of the average citizen. In the postwar years the regime has improved the quality of this portion of food consumption by substituting (preferred) wheat flours for rye flours and by raising the quality of bread by lowering the extraction rate.

The table indicates the trend since 1940 in the proportions of flour produced for each of the seven extraction rates used in state milling enterprises. By 1961 the average extraction rate had fallen to 81 percent, compared with about 70 percent in the US and UK.

In an effort to save grain during the 1963-54 consumption year (August 1963 to July 1964), the regime has reversed this trend toward lower flour extraction rates. Evidence of this decision to employ higher extraction rates can be seen in a number of actions taken by the regime.

"White" bread, the Western symbol of a more affluent society, has all but disappeared from urban bread stores. Observers in Moscow report that this type of bread has disappeared from state retail outlets and has been replaced by "brown" or "dark coarse" rye and wheat breads. These reports are consistent with a statement by the Minister of Trade of the RSFSR that there will be "less white bread this year" but that flour of 96 percent extraction (oboynaya) will be sufficient to "completely satisfy the requirements of the population." (Sovetskaya Rossiya 17 Oct. 63) Another official has stated that wheat and rye flours used for bread will be adulterated by a large mixture of oat and maize flour.

Macaroni, noodles, and other grain products that require a high-quality wheat flour in their manufacture reportedly have been absent from many stores, although not to the same extent as flour.

When Soviet officials view a ton of grain as representing an absolute number of calories, the great temptation on the part of the regime to conserve gold reserves by raising flour extraction rates is apparent. For every percentage point raised in the average extraction rate in state milling enterprises, about 370,000 tons of grain, or roughly 30 million dollars in hard currency in terms of wheat imports foregone,

## Table

## USSR: Production of Flour, By Extraction Rate

Used in Milling Grain a/

1940, 1950, 1955, and 1961

| <u>Extraction Rate</u> | <u>1940</u>                      | <u>1950</u>  | <u>1955</u>  | <u>1961</u>    |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|
|                        | <u>Percent of Flour Produced</u> |              |              |                |
| Wheat flours           |                                  |              |              |                |
| 60 percent             | 2.4                              | 2.7          | 6.7          | 5.8            |
| 72 percent             | 13.6                             | 16.7         | 27.2         | 30.3           |
| 85 percent             | 28.1                             | 19.0         | 22.6         | 32.4           |
| 96 percent             | 26.3                             | 13.3         | 13.3         | 13.4 <u>b/</u> |
| Rye flours             |                                  |              |              |                |
| 63 percent             | 0.3                              | 3.0          | 1.8          | 4.6            |
| 87 percent             | 3.6                              | 4.2          | 3.0          |                |
| 95 percent             | 23.2                             | 35.1         | 21.6         | 13.5 <u>b/</u> |
| Other flours           | 2.5                              | 6.0          | 3.8          | Negl.          |
| Total                  | <u>100.0</u>                     | <u>100.0</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>100.0</u>   |

- a. State miller enterprises only.  
b. Estimated.

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are saved.\* (About one-third of total flour production in the USSR is carried out in nonstate enterprises, primarily collective farm mills that mill grain for peasant households. The authorities probably have little or no control over the extraction rates of flour processed in these mills.)

The "white" bread flours are produced from wheat milled at the lower extraction rates of 60 and 72 percent, respectively. If, as has been suggested by the evidence to date, these two grades are eliminated during this present consumption year and production of flour by state enterprises is distributed evenly between the two highest extraction rates -- 85 and 96 percent -- a savings of \$250 million in foregone wheat imports could be attained.

## 2. Restricting the Sale of Grain Products

As indicated above, the Soviet government has removed flour from retail shelves and has reduced the quantities of macaroni and noodles available for purchase. These moves have a dual purpose. Not only has the consumption of flours of low extraction rate been reduced, but also by withholding flour and other nonperishable grain products the government has shut off the main avenue for hoarding.

Thus far the regime has avoided formal rationing or raising prices in its effort to reduce consumption of grain products. The spotty revival of the 2-kilogram limit per customer on the sale of bread in a given store appears to be designed more to discourage feeding of bread to livestock than to limit human consumption.

In the past the maintenance of low prices for bread has been fixed Soviet policy; it is unlikely that the leadership would raise prices unless the economic gains were considered to be extremely favorable. In the face of this potential for widespread public disaffection, the probable gains from raising prices are small. In any case the physical demand for bread products for human consumption would be quite unresponsive to a rise in price. But although direct human consumption of grain products would be little affected by a rise in prices, a significant price increase would do much to correct the imbalance in relative prices of bread and livestock products. The long-standing distortion in these relative prices has consistently

\* This saving assumes the maintenance of total flour production in the present consumption year at approximately the same level as previous years. Furthermore, it does not allow for the loss of the residual in milling grain into flour, part of which can be processed into livestock feed. The cost in dollar exchange is based on the proposed purchase of 3 million tons of wheat from the US for \$225 million, including transportation costs. (Dollar values are given in current US dollars throughout this article).



induced individuals to feed bread to livestock. In May 1963 a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, RSFSR, provided up to 1 year of corrective labor or 1 to 3 years of confinement (with or without confiscation of livestock) for misusing state bread and other processed grain products. The decree was directed against "certain city workers, collective farms, and state farm workers who feed their cattle and fowl bread, groats, and meal which they buy in state and cooperative stores."

### 3. Revival of Campaigns Against Waste and Theft

Last August, when a poor harvest appeared certain, a campaign began against waste in the consumption of bread. Factory cafeterias and restaurants usually provide bread without charge on a help-yourself basis. Now, however, teams of indignant reporters decry the wastefulness of this system. As early as 1962, some cafeterias had begun to charge for the bread, and this practice has become more widespread since the summer of 1963. In one dining hall trust, the saving in bread leftovers was reported as more than 25 percent.

The ferocity of the campaign against theft of grain and illegal use of grain products, however, dwarfs the warnings given about waste of bread. The press reported various sentences ranging from 1 to 10 years for stealing grain and grain products. Chairmen of consumer cooperatives and collective farms have been expelled from the Party for winking at pilferage. In exasperation the Deputy Prosecutor of the RSFSR complained that the "gathered harvest is poorly kept in certain state farms and even in entire production administrations, and the road to it is open for rogues and embezzlers."

### 4. Evidence of Distress Slaughtering

Another aspect of the Soviet effort to conserve grain supplies is above-normal slaughtering of livestock. Soviet authorities have admitted openly that large numbers of livestock are being killed because of a poor fodder harvest. During the first nine months of 1963, meat output in the state sector increased by 18 percent above that of the first nine months of 1962. Moreover, the corresponding increase was 28 percent in the Ukraine but only 6 percent in Kazakhstan. These figures suggest that distress slaughtering was involved, as the Ukraine specializes heavily in pigs, which consume large quantities of grain. Also, because of their short breeding cycle, it is easier to recoup if, in an emergency, pigs are slaughtered rather than other livestock. Unless the USSR elects to carry out distress slaughtering on a sufficiently wide scale, however, the authorities may have to import feed grains and thus put further pressure on their tight foreign exchange position.

## II. Popular Demonstrations Related to Shortages of Grain Products

Without a formal rationing system, any shortages of bread in general, or high-quality bread in particular, could be

expected to lead to inequities and queuing. Such queuing has in fact been widespread, and there have been news reports from Vienna that riots have occurred. The regime is concerned over the possibility of unrest as is shown by the following statement by a Moscow lecturer to his audience:

"There are rumors in queues which you hear about; there is criticism of Soviet power. In the time of the cult of the personality these would not have occurred. But people now are abusing their freedom. Propagandists must not condone this, they must fight it. In fact there is ample grain and meat on sale."

### III. Bread Shortage Added to Other Irritants

If bread prices are not increased, shortages of bread would add to the inflationary pressures already existing in the USSR because of the excess of money purchasing power in relation to supplies of consumer goods. If the better kinds of bread are replaced by lower grades, the "savings" to consumers from the purchase of cheaper bread will add to excess purchasing power. For example, a pattern of retail bread and flour sales similar to that prevailing in 1940 would release 1.4 billion more rubles of purchasing power. This autumn the heavier rates of slaughtering will relieve some of the pressure in consumer markets, but the full impact should be felt next spring, when there will be less meat, more money in the hands of consumers, and probably no white bread.

Even before the grain shortage, the regime had been concerned to check the citizen's income, and had decided to renege on major promises that had been repeatedly broadcast as advancing the well-being of the Soviet worker. Measures calling for shorter working hours, a higher minimum wage, the elimination of the income tax, and a rise in minimum monthly pensions have all suffered a substantial setback over the past year or two.

Most Soviet workers in 1964 and in 1965 will continue on a 6-day, 41-hour workweek (seven hours weekdays, six hours Saturdays) in spite of an earlier promise to reduce the workweek to 40 hours in 1962 and to 35 hours in the period 1964-68. A boost in minimum monthly wages -- from 27 to 40 rubles -- scheduled for 1962 has now been postponed to 1965, and a further increase to 50 rubles originally scheduled for 1965 has been dropped. The planned elimination of the income tax during 1960-1965 was halted in 1962 and has not been resumed. Finally, a rise in minimum monthly pensions from 25.5 to 34 rubles in 1963 has been postponed indefinitely. It would seem that a situation is developing in which there might be a repetition of the 1962 Novocherkassk riots, only on a larger scale.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM  
Nov-Dec 1963

# And What of the Consumer?

*By Imogene Erro*

THREE YEARS AGO Nikita Khrushchev surprised the Soviet people with promises of rapid increases in consumer production and a rapidly rising standard of living. The Soviet consumer industries, he said, would successfully fulfill the goals of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) and within five more years would outstrip the United States in production per capita. Then the USSR would enjoy the highest standard of living in the world.<sup>1</sup> However, despite Khrushchev's efforts throughout this period to make good his promise, no outstanding achievements toward this goal can be counted. Indeed it now appears that the promise has been virtually abandoned; perhaps it has been shelved for use at a more opportune time in the future.

To begin with, Khrushchev's concern for consumer welfare in recent years presents a striking contrast to his position at the start of his regime in 1954, when he denounced Malenkov's pro-consumer policy and supported instead an overriding priority for heavy industry. His apparent about-face in 1960 was all the more interesting in view of the fact that just the summer before Khrushchev had made his first visit to the United States. Obviously impressed by the enormous gap in the levels of consumption in the two countries, he began almost immediately to alter his earlier position by paying serious attention to Soviet living standards.

To implement the program, a series of official actions were taken to increase the production and assortment of a whole range of consumer goods. The first steps included issuance of a textile decree, a consumer durables decree, and other such measures. Khrushchev also sponsored actions to step up the modernization of retail

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, May 6, 1960.

*Mrs. Erro is an American analyst of Soviet economic policies and development. She previously appeared in this journal as author of "Catching Up and Outstripping: An Appraisal" (July-August issue, 1961).*

trade facilities, to expand consumer services, and to increase the rate of investment in consumer production.<sup>2</sup> He even went so far as to suggest that depriving the people of material goods for so long a time had retarded the country's industrial development.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps the peak of the Premier's enthusiasm was reached about mid-1961, as reflected in his suggestion at the British Trade Fair in June that it was now possible for the rates of growth of light industry to equal those of heavy industry in future development.<sup>4</sup> Shortly thereafter the mood began to change. Either because of strong political opposition or because of conflicting demands on the economy—or perhaps both—some modification of Khrushchev's consumer policy appeared to be taking place. By the end of 1961 the impetus toward acceleration of consumer production had been lost and an eclipse of the consumer program was clearly apparent. The 22nd Party Congress, which convened in October, moved to reestablish the old priorities by the adoption of resolutions favoring heavy industry. Even worse for consumers were warnings that demands for the nation's defense might further limit light industrial production if "complications in the international situation" should arise.<sup>5</sup> In what apparently had been a sincere effort to narrow the gap in consumption between the Soviet Union and Western countries, Khrushchev had been overzealous, and efforts to speed up improvements in the consumer's lot had fallen short of the goal.

Consumer policy thereafter remained unclear until early this year, when the Soviet people were told outright that often-promised increases in consumer goods would be delayed. On February 27, 1963, Khrushchev gave a dispirited speech in his home constituency of Kalinin in which he made an emotional appeal for popular understanding about failures in consumer production, linking them directly with the demands of the defense industry. Had the international situation been different, he contended, he could have made good his earlier promises to consumers.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For further discussion see I. Erro, *Trends in the Soviet Production of Consumer Goods*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the U.S., Washington, D. C., 1962.

<sup>3</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1961, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Reported in the *New York Times*, June 29, 1961.

<sup>5</sup> *Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1961.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1963.

Declining Rates of Growth

Official data for Soviet light industry indicate, however, that despite the blunt and rather sudden admission of failures to the public, the troubles in consumer production in fact had been accumulating for some time, particularly since the end of 1960. The rate of growth for almost all major commodities of light industry have declined each year since 1959, scarcities of raw materials have resulted from the failure of agriculture to keep pace with the demands of industry, and restraints on capital investments have slowed the construction of new facilities. In view of these multiple strains on light industry, Khrushchev may have been giving notice that goals for some important types of consumer goods will not be reached.

Fulfillment of the seven-year goals for major consumer commodities is, indeed, virtually impossible without a major push, in view of the performance of light industry and other related industries thus far in the plan period. After four years of work toward the achievement of these goals (i.e., through 1962) total production of textiles, for example, had increased in physical quantity by only 14 percent, whereas an increase of 40 percent during the entire period 1959-65 would be required to meet the goals. Furthermore, only very small increases over 1962 production are projected in the 1963 plans for key commodities in light industry making it clear there is no immediate improvement in sight for Soviet consumers.<sup>7</sup> Indexes of physical production for some of the major commodity groups of light industry actual and planned, are as follows:

|             | Textiles |      |       |       | Total |
|-------------|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|
|             | Cotton   | Wool | Linen | Silk* |       |
| 1958        | 100      | 100  | 100   | 100   | 100   |
| 1959        | 106      | 108  | 110   | 95    | 106   |
| 1960        | 110      | 113  | 116   | 96    | 111   |
| 1961        | 111      | 117  | 110   | 97    | 112   |
| 1962        | 111      | 121  | 108   | 111   | 114   |
| 1963 (Plan) | 114      | 121  | N.A.  | 112   | N.A.  |
| 1965 (Plan) | 133      | 165  | 132   | 176   | 140   |

\* Including fabrics of rayon, synthetic fiber, and natural silk.

|             | Footwear and Clothing |                |                |         | Sewn Garments |
|-------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|---------|---------------|
|             | Leather Footwear      | Knit Outerwear | Knit Underwear | Hosiery |               |
| 1958        | 100                   | 100            | 100            | 100     | 100           |
| 1959        | 109                   | 107            | 110            | 104     | 110           |
| 1960        | 118                   | 115            | 118            | 109     | 119           |
| 1961        | 124                   | 121            | 122            | 113     | 127           |
| 1962        | 128                   | 128            | 130            | N.A.    | 132           |
| 1963 (Plan) | 129                   | N.A.           | N.A.           | N.A.    | N.A.          |
| 1965 (Plan) | 144                   | 164            | 195            | 146     | 168           |

SOURCES: Derived from production data in *Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu, passim.* and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1962 godu, passim.* Plan data are from *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1963, and Feb. 8, 1959.

Insufficient Capital Investment

Paralleling the decline in the rates of growth of production, light industry has shown a poor performance in its capital investment program. Achievements in investment for the first three years of the Seven-Year Plan were notably unimpressive. In 1959, actual investment in light industry increased by only 1 percent. The following year a reported increase of 9 percent reflected a short-lived attempt by Khrushchev to boost allocations to "speed the development of light industry," but this effort was not sustained. Because of mounting difficulties, particularly in procuring machinery and setting it in operation, there followed in 1961 an absolute decline in the amount of funds invested, as shown below:

|      | Reported Annual Investment<br>(Million Rubles*) | Index<br>(1958=100) |
|------|---|---------------------|
| 1958 | 625   | 100                 |
| 1959 | 631   | 101                 |
| 1960 | 681   | 109                 |
| 1961 | 671   | 107                 |

\* Ruble values are given in new rubles as established by the Soviet currency reform of January 1, 1961. A nominal rate of exchange based on the gold content of the respective currencies is 0.90 ruble to US \$1.

SOURCE: *Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, p. 545.

A further indication of the failures in light industry is the rise in investment in construction projects that have been begun but have not been completed. According to official data, investment tied up in unfinished projects in light industry rose from 282 million rubles at the beginning of the plan period to 420 million in 1961, an increase of almost 50 percent.<sup>8</sup> To cope with this problem of increasing investment without payoff in terms of production, the number of plants scheduled for construction was reduced, and emphasis was shifted to the expansion of existing plants and to the modernization of machinery and production processes.<sup>9</sup>

Shortages of Raw Materials

Expansion of the production of textiles and clothing has been limited by shortages of raw materials—mainly agricultural but to a lesser degree chemical. While in

<sup>8</sup> *Kapitalnoie stroitelstva v SSSR*, Moscow, 1961, p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> *Ekonomicheskaja gazeta*, May 12, 1962, p. 26.

1961 Soviet output of all types of textile fibers was 6 percent above the output level of 1958, production in 1962 dropped to a level only 2 percent greater than in 1958, as shown below:

|      | Production of Textile Fibers<br>(Thousand Metric Tons) | Index*<br>(1958=100) |
|------|--|----------------------|
| 1958 | 2,380  | 100                  |
| 1959 | 2,450  | 103                  |
| 1960 | 2,420  | 102                  |
| 1961 | 2,530  | 106                  |
| 1962 | 2,430  | 102                  |

\* Primarily because the base year (1958) was an unusually good crop year, the index for production of textile fibers shows a smaller increase than does the index for production of fabrics shown above.

SOURCE: Production data are from *SSSR v tsifrakh* for 1961 and 1962, *passim*.

The principal problem in light industry results from an insufficient production of the basic fiber, cotton, which makes up almost 60 percent of the total output of textile fibers.<sup>10</sup> Lags in production of rayon and synthetic fiber compound the problem. The use of these chemical fibers as substitutes for natural fibers has fallen far short of planned achievement, and at present they account for only about 10 percent of the total production of fibers.<sup>11</sup> Soviet officials recently have made efforts to stimulate both of these lagging programs, although measures appear to be too little and too late to affect the seven-year goals for light industry. Production of cotton received special attention in the recent decision to increase the delivery price to cotton-growing collective farms by an average of 20 percent and to state farms by about 12 percent.<sup>12</sup> Whether this increase in cost will be passed to consumers in the form of higher prices for cotton textiles or be absorbed within the industry or within the turnover tax is not known. A retail price increase to cover this cost, if levied equally on all cotton textiles, would be comparatively small—probably less than 5 percent.

TO SUM UP, the Soviet record in light industry suggests that Khrushchev's consumer program reached its climax in 1961 and has since undergone a continuing decline in priority, even though consumer production continues to achieve modest gains. Since Khrushchev's speech of February 27, 1963, official policy relating to consumption has shifted heavily toward subjects of welfare and consumer services, whereas references to production of consumer goods show an element of restraint. For example, May Day solgans this year dropped the "Catching Up with the US" theme and instead promised continued improvement in welfare. Shortly afterward, a lengthy report on consumer welfare, addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, emphasized the role of public services but touched only briefly on consumer goods, and then mainly in reference to improvements in quality and assortment.<sup>13</sup> In turn, the republic Supreme Soviet issued a resolution exhorting officials of light industry to seek out "hidden reserves" and to utilize existing machinery and equipment more efficiently; the resolution also called for a greater effort by heavy industry to support the needs of consumer production.<sup>14</sup>

In brief, recent Soviet developments, viewed against achievements in light industry during the last four years, suggest that consumers can expect little in the way of substantial gains in the near future. Although there are indications that the regime is attempting to find ways to improve the consumer outlook without cutting into the defense program and/or heavy industry, most of these measures are in the nature of bootstrap operations.

In the future as in the past, such efforts undoubtedly will be accompanied by a barrage of official propaganda designed to reassure the consumer that all possible is being done on his behalf. It must be obvious to the Soviet citizen, however, that hopes born of official promises of the "highest living standard" in the world must ~~once again be displaced by prolonged waiting.~~

<sup>10</sup> *SSSR v tsifrakh*, Moscow, reports for 1961 and 1962.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, March 28, 1963.

<sup>13</sup> As reported by Radio Moscow, April 8, 1963.

<sup>14</sup> *Sovetskaiia Rossiia*, April 6, 1963.

## Khrushchev's About-Face on Consumer Goals: 1960-63

## PROMISES

We are setting the following task: after implementation of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to catch up within five years, and then to outstrip, the United States in per capita consumption of consumer commodities including textiles and footwear . . . ; we shall in the immediate future reach the production and consumption level of the United States, the wealthiest country of the capitalist world, . . . and then we will enter the open sea in which no comparisons with capitalism will anchor us.—*Speech to the Supreme Soviet, May 5, 1960 (Pravda, May 6).*

. . . we shall transfer part of the capital investment to agriculture and light industry. Communism cannot be built only by offering machines and ferrous and nonferrous metals. It is necessary for people to be able to eat well, dress well, and have housing and other material and cultural conditions. This is not a revision of our general line but rather a sensible use of our material potentialities. When we were in an encirclement of our enemies . . . we economized everything. . . . Now the situation is different.—*Speech to the Academy of Social Sciences, Jan. 6, 1961 (Pravda, Jan. 25).*

Now we consider our heavy industry as built; so we are not going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same rate.—*Statement to correspondents at the British Trade Fair in Moscow, May 20, 1961 (quoted from the New York Times, June 29).*

## RETRACTIONS

Our enemies [want us] to channel additional big allocations for the development of animal husbandry at the expense of industry . . . and defense. . . . We cannot do this.—*Speech to Cuban students in Russia, June 3, 1962 (Pravda June 4).*

We must live like a good housewife, who ably decides what to buy and when. . . . Naturally it is not pleasant for us to waste the labor of many people . . . on the production of means of destruction. . . . [But if we reduce funds for defense] . . . will the people praise us for this?—*Speech at the Grivita Rosie Plant in Rumania, June 19, 1962 (Pravda, June 20).*

Of course, had the international situation been better, had it been possible to achieve agreement and to shake off the burden of armament, that would have multiplied the possibilities for a further improvement of the economy and for raising the welfare of the people. . . . On the one hand, one would like to build more enterprises producing consumer goods. . . . On the other hand, life dictates the need to spend enormous sums on maintaining our military might. . . . The time will come when . . . we shall have clothes for every occasion . . . , but you must be patient; wait awhile and you will have everything. We can't make everything at once. It is impossible. The wish alone is not enough.—*Election speech in Kalinin, February 27, 1963 (Pravda, Feb., 28).*

SOVIET HOUSING CONSTRUCTION CONTINUES TO LAG

Khrushchev has not made good so far on his pledge of a rapid and continuing improvement in urban housing, as construction plans have been allowed to lag substantially in 1960-63, while at the same time more than the anticipated number of people have moved from farm to town. The Soviet government continues to agree with Soviet public opinion that housing is a most pressing domestic problem. Since mid-1960, however, the government has not been willing to commit adequate economic resources to meet its own plans. Obstacles to a significant expansion of housing construction are as follows: heavy demands on construction for industrial and, presumably, military programs; technological difficulties in the housing program; and the state's repugnance toward the resumption of private housing construction on a massive scale.

1. Trends in Housing Construction

In 1963, for the fourth year in a row, urban housing construction in the USSR fell far short of the annual plan, declining 4 per cent below the volume of housing built during 1962. Soviet plans now call for 155 million square meters of total space to be built during 1964-65, an annual average virtually identical to the volume of housing construction in 1963. Thus, urban housing construction during 1959-65 is now planned at about 556 million square meters compared with the original Seven Year Plan of 650 to 660 million square meters, a shortfall of 15 per cent. (See table) Although the exact distribution between public and private construction is not known, it is clear that most, if not all, of the decline in housing construction in 1963 was in private construction, and that private construction will suffer further declines.

|      | Plans per the Housing Decree<br>of 1957 and the original<br>Seven Year Plan, 1959-65 | Actual 1958-63 and<br>Present Plans 1964-65 |
|------|--|---|
| 1959 | 61   | 71.2  |
| 1960 | 30   | 30.7  |
| 1961 | 101  | 82.8  |
| 1962 | 95   | 80.2  |
| 1963 | 95   | 80.2  |
| 1964 | 95   | 80.5  |
| 1965 | 95   | 77  |
|      |  | 77.5  |
|      |  | 77.5  |

2. Improvement in the Level of Housing

It also is likely that the urban population in 1965 will exceed earlier Soviet expectations by at least 15 million residents. Annual increases in the urban housing stock have been declining, from 7.7 percent in 1959 to 6.9 percent in 1960, 6.2 percent in 1961, 5.6 percent in 1962 and to about 5 percent in 1963, while

At this rate the USSR would not move until well beyond the target year of 1970 from its present level of about 6.5 square meters (sq m) of living space per capita to the goal of 9 sq m that is referred to as the minimum sanitary norm.

Soviet propaganda makes continued attempts to obscure the shortfalls in the planned construction of floorspace by emphasizing -- and somewhat exaggerating -- the large number of new dwelling units that have been built during the last few years. Nevertheless the need, particularly for newcomers to the city, has outstripped the large increase in the supply of new dwelling units. Furthermore, although many Soviet families have welcomed the greater privacy afforded by their new apartments, they have regarded the cramped unattractive quarters with increasing disfavor. In the new units, residents are allocated an average of a little more than 6 sq m of living space. In the US the average living space per capita is approximately 25.23 square meters.

Such inadequacy in the USSR undoubtedly will produce mounting pressures from the populace which could cause the regime considerable trouble but which, in some cases, might be turned into a weapon for management. For example, recent Soviet reports have reemphasized ways in which management could use housing to further the objectives of individual plants. With adequate housing, plant management could reduce excessive labor turnover, provide additional incentives for "over-fulfillment," and use the housing as a lure to attract workers from other areas to increase the number of shifts in order to operate productive equipment more effectively. Presumably the threat of eviction is also effective.

### 3. State Housing Construction

Although central authorities undoubtedly are aware of both the mass demand and the potential benefits to industrial production of more housing, both planners and executives recently have treated housing generally as a low-priority objective in state construction. The share of state construction funds allocated to housing has declined annually since the 1960 plan. Similarly, indications are that local decisions have tended to defer housing construction in favor of conserving resources for other kinds of construction. The result has been a decline in housing's share of state construction to 27 percent or less in 1968 from the alltime high of 32.6 percent in 1958.

Another expression of the low priority for state housing in recent years has been the slow technological transition to the large-panel method of construction. In this method, reinforced concrete panels of story height are factory-produced, trucked to the site, and hoisted by crane and fitted into place by small crews of specialists. Large panels are intended rapidly to replace brick as a major wall material in state housing construction. The government failed, however, to provide sufficient



coordination and technical assistance so as to get the program quickly underway. The factories for production of the panels have been built far later than scheduled -- sometimes by 2 or 3 years -- and also have not been completely equipped. In some locales, builders have been reluctant to switch from brick to large-panel construction. The quality of the panels often has been poor, and many more workers have been required than anticipated. Costs of large-panel housing have not been reduced as much relative to the cost of brick structures as the planners had hoped. These difficulties caused Soviet planners to lower the goal for large-panel housing in 1963 to 10 million sq m of living space, a goal estimated to be roughly one-half of the amount of such housing that had been contemplated for 1963, earlier in the Seven Year Plan.

#### 4. Private Housing

The overriding factor in private housing continues to be the government's -- and particularly Khrushchev's -- repugnance toward the development of "a private property philosophy ... deeply hostile to socialism." Although in recent years the government has not openly restricted or hampered private builders, the effect has been much the same, for the volume of private housing has declined every year since 1959 and the private sector's share of urban housing has dropped to about 20 percent in 1963 from its peak of 34 percent in 1958 and 1959.

Probably because of its awareness of the popularity of private housing, the government has hesitated to state flatly and officially its opposition to such construction. The most forthright statement, made in the inside pages of Izvestiya for 16 October 1960, was that state loans were no longer to be made for private housing construction. (Approximately one-half of the individuals who built private housing required state loans for part of their financing. The other half used only their own savings.) More private housing certainly would have been built, if the government's policy had been more permissive, inasmuch as there was or could have been available for use substantially more resources -- labor, materials, land, and money -- than actually were used by private builders. Resource requirements of private construction are not closely competitive with the requirements of state construction.

As a sop to the popular urge for private ownership and to absorb some of the available savings, the government has tried to promote cooperative apartments, which are to be paid for by private individuals but built by state construction organizations.

Cooperatives are scheduled to amount to 25 percent of private housing in 1963-65, and eventually they are to replace the single-family residence in the private sector. There is as yet no evidence that private individuals will buy these cooperatives, the attractiveness of which suffers by comparison with other kinds of housing. Cooperative apartments cost as much as or more than individual homes, and they lack the privacy of the latter. Besides being expensive to buy, cooperative units probably will be

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so Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 may  
be greater than would be the cost of rent of similarly built  
state apartments. State apartments are heavily subsidized so  
that they rent for about 5 percent of a worker's pay.

##### 5. Soviet Criticism of Poor Construction.

Two recent Soviet articles imply that, in large structures such as the state housing projects, construction of poor quality is both widespread and current. The first article, from the December 1962 issue of Na stroikakh Rossii (At the Construction Sites of Russia), discusses six structural failures of apartment houses in 1961 and five such failures in 1962 at widely scattered locations in the RSFSR. The second article, from the April 1963 issue of Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura (Construction and Architecture), gives details of the structural failure of an apartment house in Odessa and refers to the failure of industrial buildings in more than three locations in the Ukrainian Republic.

The first article attributes the structural failures mainly to incorrect practices in laying brick in the winter time, to a series of poor construction practices, and to substandard materials. The failure occurred in the spring because of the poor quality of the mortar and because of inadequate temporary shoring of the load-bearing members. But deficiencies mentioned are just as applicable to year-round construction as they are to winter work: poor joining of structural units, close load tolerances, revision of design on the site, inadequate use of cement in the mortar, and brick that failed in 30 to 40 percent of the checks to meet specifications. The article also noted laxness in on-site testing of materials and in supervision of construction.

Although the second article deals with only one failure, that article is more significant because it suggests that the failure discussed should serve as a lesson to builders, clients, and quality-control personnel; because the failure was not related to construction in winter time; and because of the connection pointedly drawn with the several "serious collapses" of industrial structures. The article summarizes the reason for the apartment house collapse as "the flagrant violation of the technical conditions and regulations in construction and the divergence from the design." "Taken together," the article continues, "these factors led to the sharp reduction of the load-bearing capacity of the pillars of the first floor, which collapsed and caused the subsequent collapse of the central section of the building." Specific charges revealed weak organization and supervision, the use of brick that was more than 25 percent below specification, extremely poor masonry work, careless reinforcing work, and shimming with weak materials of the bearing surface of major structural members.

Backing up these two articles concerning structural failures are many more articles from the Soviet press that are critical of the quality of selected aspects of construction in the USSR. From these articles it can be concluded that the general level of Soviet construction is poor.

In the past the Soviet leaders have acknowledged that the quality of construction in their country was poor and have recognized the need to effect improvement. They decided, however, that there was an overriding short-run need for industrial structures and housing, and, therefore, they allowed the continuance of construction of poor quality. Low standards are rationalized privately as in stop-gap, to be filled in ten years by immensely increased output.

6. Prospects for Urban Housing Construction in 1963-65.

In contrast to the bright prospects of 4 years ago, current prospects for Soviet housing construction are not good. Under the impetus of a high priority, housing construction experienced  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years of plan overfulfillment and an annual average growth of 25 percent. Then officials were optimistic enough to predict a substantial overfulfillment of housing in the Seven Year Plan. Now, after  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years of underfulfillment and stagnation, the Soviet government plans an urban housing construction program for 1964-65 that will entail a shortfall of 15 percent from the original Seven Year Plan.

The goal of the Seven Year Plan for state housing, however, largely because it was set at an extraordinarily low level, will probably not be underfulfilled more than 5 percent, and might be slightly overfulfilled.

A Small Collection of Statements  
Spanning the Years 1938-1963

1. Address to RSFSR Conference on Industry and Construction,  
24 April 1963 (Excerpts):

"I believe no one will suspect that in stating this I have in mind any special standing of my own in the Party. I am already 69 years old and have the right to say so. For everyone understands that I cannot hold for all time the position I now have in the Party and State."

.....

"In our country the majority of people know nothing about life in the so-called free society. My age is the age of retirement, one could say, but the new generation of workers in the Soviet Union does not know what it means to be unemployed."

.....

"Anyway, what does one consider young or old? In our opinion he who is young lives by the most progressive ideas of the eternally young--life-affirming Marxist-Leninist doctrine."

2. Concluding remarks at 22nd Party Congress, 27 October  
1961 (Excerpts):

"Comrades! The Presidium of the Congress has received letters from old Bolsheviks in which they write that in the period of the cult of the individual outstanding Party and state figures, such loyal Leninists as Comrades Chubar, Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Eikhe, Vosnesensky, Kuznetsov and others, died guiltless.

"The comrades propose that the memory of the outstanding Party and state figures who fell victim to completely unjustified repressions in the period of the cult of the individual be perpetuated.

"We believe this proposal to be a proper one. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) It would be advisable to charge the Central Committee that will be elected by the 22nd Party Congress with deciding this question positively. Perhaps a monument should be erected in Moscow to the memory of the comrades who fell victim to arbitrary rule. (Applause.)"

3. Speech at Fourth Kiev Party Conference, 5 June 1938 (Excerpt):

"We got rid of a considerable number of enemies. But as Party workers of the Ukraine, and particularly of the Kiev province, we should not be conceited. We must

not relax, for the enemies will never, under any circumstances, cease carrying out their subversive work against our state. Comrades, we have annihilated quite a few enemies, but not all of them. That is why we should be vigilant. We should not be lulled either by applause, or by approval, or by unanimous votes. We should always keep in mind Comrade Stalin's word that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists, spies and diversionists will be sent to our country. We should carefully ponder these words of Comrade Stalin."

4. Speech at 14th Ukrainian Party Congress, June 1938 (Excerpt):

"Our cause is a holy cause. And he whose hand trembles, who stops half-way, whose knees shake before annihilating ten, a hundred enemies, exposes the Revolution to danger. It is necessary to fight the enemies without mercy. Let us erase from the surface of the earth everybody who plans to attack the workers and peasants. We warn that for every drop of honest workers' blood, we will shed a bucketful of the enemy's black blood."

5. Speech opening the plenary session of the Central Committee, 25 January 1955 (Excerpt):

"In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing the output of consumers goods, some comrades have confused the question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country...These pseudo-theoreticians try to claim that at some stage of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism--nothing but slander of our Party. This is a belching up of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their like once preached."

6. Original text of address to a meeting of agricultural workers of the oblasts and autonomous republics of the North-West RSFSR, Leningrad, 22 May 1957 (Excerpts):

"In 1957 we will already have as much butter or even a little more than the USA had in 1956. This means that we will have a total amount of butter that is equal to or greater than that of the USA. But because our population is bigger than that of the USA, we will have to make an effort. In per capita production of milk, we can not only catch up with the USA but even surpass it as early as 1958. (Applause.)"

.....

"Let us return to the figures I mentioned earlier. In 1955 the USA produced 99 kg. of meat per capita, and in 1956 102.3 kg., that is, it increased production 3 per cent in one year. Now in the USA they are cutting production and limiting the crops. They do not have a market for their products. Since we are considering the prospects for, say, a four-year period, it is possible that they will increase their output of meat and milk a little. Why do I say this? If the collective and state farms review their potentialities and decide that they can surpass the USA by 1960, it will be necessary to plan some reserves for 'good measure,' that is, to aim at increasing meat output not by 200 per cent but, let us say, by 250 per cent for the country as a whole. We should start with 1956 and then estimate the years 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960 so that at the end of these four years we arrive at a volume which is 250 per cent more than the actual 1956 level. Then we can surpass the USA in per capita meat production by 1960.

"The milk question is quite clear. We can and must surpass the United States of America in 1958, and this we will do. (Stormy applause.)

"But it will not be a tragedy by any means if for some reason we are not able to surpass America in meat production by 1960. We can permit some postponement. It would not be bad if we accomplished this task in 1961. However, 1961 must be the year in which we 'finish up the odds and ends'; the basic work must be done by 1960. We must pluck up boldness and meet this goal. Evidently, not all republics and provinces will make the same contribution in this important matter. Some collective farms may triple or quadruple their production of meat while others may increase it ten or fifteenfold. In this great movement which is beginning, it is very important that the level of production in average and backward collective farms be raised sharply."

Note: the foregoing are four paragraphs from a translation published in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. IX, No. 21, 7-12. This translation was based on an original published in Pravda and Izvestia, 24 May 1957. A text for this speech also appears in a collection of Khrushchev's speeches published in Moscow in 1962: Stroitel'stvo Kommunizma v SSSR i Razvitie Sel'skovo Khozyaistva, Vol. II, 441-461. The first short paragraph above was retained virtually intact in the 1962 version; the only significant change was that instead of concluding "as early as 1958," the 1962 version ends "in the next few years." But the second long passage above, comprising three paragraphs, was completely omitted in the 1962 edition. The reason for the omission and the change at the end of the short paragraph, is obvious: these predictions never came close to fulfillment. But since the USSR has now overtaken the USA in butter production--US per capita: butter consumption fell from an annual average of 7.7 kilograms in 1935-1939 to 3.4 kilograms in 1961, due to a consumer switch

to margarine (1935-1939 average-1.3 kg., 1961-4.3 kg)--the editors were able to retain the idea contained in the first part of the short paragraph. Actually, however, the surpassing did not take place even in this restricted area until 1959.<sup>7</sup>

7. Article by Khrushchev: "Stalinist Friendship of Peoples --Guarantee of our Motherland's Invincibility," Pravda, 21 December 1949 (special Stalin 70th Birthday issue, containing similar contributions by all Politburo members) (Excerpts):

"All peoples of the Soviet Union and progressive mankind throughout the world are observing a precious date--the 70th anniversary of our inspired leader and teacher, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin. Millions of persons turn to Comrade Stalin with the most profound feelings of love and devotion because he enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and raised it to a new higher level...

"The despised enemies of our people have more than once tried to shatter the unity of the Bolshevik party, to ruin Soviet rule. A great service of Comrade Stalin is that he, in mortal combat with the enemies of the people--Mensheviks, S.R.s, Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists--upheld the purity of Lenin's teaching, the unity and iron solidarity of our party's ranks...

.....

"The Bolshevik party has trained an army of 700,000 Soviet intellectuals, Party members, Soviet officials, engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors and other specialists in the Ukraine. The formation of national cadres in the Ukraine, as in all other fraternal republics, is proof of the depth and scope of the cultural revolution which has taken place under Comrade Stalin's leadership.

"Like a careful gardener, Comrade Stalin cultivates and trains this personnel in a spirit of ardent Soviet patriotism. He has taught and is teaching them the Bolshevik mode of work and sharp implacability toward the slightest manifestation of bourgeois nationalism, rootless cosmopolitanism, and servility before decadent bourgeois culture.

.....

"The successes and gains of the Stalinist friendship of peoples of the USSR inspire the oppressed peoples of colonial and dependent countries in the struggle for freedom and independence, against the imperialists. The victory of the Chinese People's Republic is a triumph of the all-conquering ideas of Lenin and Stalin.

"Loyalty to the great cause of Lenin and Stalin, to the cause of internationalism, is determined and verified by the attitude toward the Soviet Union, which stands at the head of all forces of democracy and socialism. Treachery toward the Soviet Union and treachery toward proletarian internationalism inevitably lead into the camp of nationalism, fascism, and imperialist reaction. An example of this is the Tito-Rankovic band of murderers and spies, which completed the transition from nationalism, became its weapon in the struggle against socialism and democracy..."



CONTROVERSY AMONG COMMUNISTS  
OVER ECONOMIC PRACTICE

Excerpts from a speech by Otto Sik at the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee meeting 18-19 December 1963. Broadcast by Prague Rude Pravo and published in the Czech press. Otto Sik is chief of the economic section of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.<sup>#7</sup>

...It is not by chance that recently so many discussions of economic problems have occurred....

At present, however, it is not only the current little arguments and discussions associated with theoretical development that matter. A very fundamental controversy among Marxist economists in which two opposite fronts with very clean-cut opposite views are emerging has begun to assume shape in substance in all the socialist states. It is the controversy about the concept and importance of commodity relations in the socialist economy and of their role in planned development. It might appear to laymen not versed in economics that this is a purely theoretical problem which the economists must solve among themselves and which is not important to the entire party. However, there could be no more incorrect attitude than this.

What matters today is a cardinal problem for our economic practice, a problem which in substance is common to all socialist countries and whose inadequate study and solution represents one of the major reasons for shortcomings in planned control, shortcomings which have become more or less urgent in all socialist countries and so unpleasantly urgent in our country.

Viewed as a Rigid Management System. To speak very briefly, the following two opposite points of view have now assumed shape. Those on one side consider socialist planned development as a management system in which the central organs of society should, if possible, define and determine item by item, and by means of an entire scale of indexes, all the aspects and changes in the process of creating usable material assets in the entire society so that production can be made to conform to the development of demand as specifically, fully, and as directly as possible on a scale which includes the entire society.

This is how the so-called directly social nature of work under socialism is being understood. Under this concept, commodity relations and their value categories and instruments are features alien to socialism, features which are only relics of capitalism and which must be eliminated from a socialist economy as quickly as possible.

In this system prices, profits, prime production costs, and so forth--and this applies particularly uncompromisingly to the

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\*Underlining and subtitles added - ed.

state sector--are degraded to mere instruments of registering and control. They are denied all genuine commodity functions and are viewed as mere measuring quantities in the process of direct social distribution. In conformity with this view, for example, prices should change as little as possible and the entire financial system be viewed more or less as a passive fiscal affair.

"To receive as much as possible in the state coffers, to spend as little as possible, and to tie up production with as many financial regulations as possible," regardless of whether this promotes or adversely affects economic development and scientific and technical progress, the creation of the required reserves and the elimination of superfluous supplies, a flexible reaction to changes in the markets, adjustment of conflicting interests, and so forth--such a simplified fiscal point of view, which today has become intolerable even in modern capitalist states, has for many years been the ruling principle in our financial system, and I only hope that it will really be overcome.

Advocates of these views propose that, to overcome present difficulties, the number of regulations, indexes, norm systems, and controllers be expanded so that production is even more tightly controlled from above, so that all enterprise interests --which according to them are impermissible--are extirpated. Thus, so they say, the present conflicts will be eliminated. This is, roughly speaking, the substance of one group's views, views which, by the way, I consider untenable and pernicious to the economy.

Viewed As Natural Commodity Relations. The other group's view looks at socialist planned development as the development of communist society's very first stage, the socialist stage, a stage in which commodity relations between all relatively independent economic units are organically natural features. These relations, although developing within the overall social planned development, at the same time are essentially playing their own important role within the planned development in insuring a socially necessary, balanced, and qualitatively advancing production development.

Value categories such as prices, gross and net incomes, wages, bonuses, and so forth not only have functions more important than those of registry and direct distribution, but are the expression of quite definite conflicts in social production which, for objective reasons, cannot yet be eliminated, and hence they must facilitate a solution of these conflicts. These value categories must be more flexibly changed in conformity with changes in the economic conditions so that they will constantly promote solution of conflicts between economic interests, between social, group, and individual interests, between the interests of the suppliers and customers, and producers and consumers.

Thus, all commodity categories and instruments must contribute toward directing the economic activities of individuals and various economic groups--factories, enterprises, enterprise com

binations, and the like--in a direction necessary to society. This effect, unfortunately, cannot be achieved by one or several state planning and managing centers in a detailed and all-round manner, flexibly, and with a proper knowledge of things.

...  
Urgency of Economic Problems. The problem is so basic in our society that we as communists must very carefully study the methods by which both sides are conducting their arguments, confront them with our practical life experience, and begin to reflect very profoundly on the problem.

It must even be realized that we must eventually take the lead and begin to solve a fundamental issue which has not yet become so urgent in other socialist countries--for example, not even in the Soviet Union--in a practically and theoretically very bold manner.

Natural Wealth Delays Soviet Union's Recognition of the Problem. Although this problem is maturing even in the Soviet Union, that country's enormous natural wealth, huge labor reserves and other reserves, its almost complete lack of dependence on foreign trade, and so forth have made it possible so far to insure a constant and rapid increase in production with the present forms of planning and management. But even here, sooner or later basic changes in the implementation of commodity relations will become necessary, as is proved by many statements by Comrade Khrushchev and particularly by passages in the CPSU Program.

Basic Errors. Were we to favor some halfway, compromise solution instead of weighing and studying all the problems and arguments involved very profoundly, it would be the gravest mistake. This was exactly what happened, for example, in 1958. We were afraid to make profits the basic index for the assessment of the economic activity by an enterprise and of linking profits to the basic material interest of the enterprise. Most likely this was also done because we still--and many people are doing it even now--viewed profits as a basically capitalist concept. Hence the norms of labor productivity and wages became the fundamental norms. At the same time, however, gross output remained the decisive index--with all the well-known harmful consequences.

...

To expose the un-Marxist, dogmatic basis of the theoretical views of some comrades, it suffices to take note of the abstract manner in which they argue....

...I shall cite an example: You explain that, in view of certain specific conflicts between state enterprises as suppliers and customers, prices should be changed more flexibly in a certain way. Immediately, a dogmatist rises to his feet. However, he does not proffer a specific argument why such a price move might eventually be harmful to production, but reasons that this is impossible since it would amount to recognition of the commodity nature of the relations between state enterprises. This

amounts to the abstract concept that commodity relations must not exist between state socialist enterprises--and this settles all other problems for them.

Then you go further and explain why certain conflicts cannot be solved in detail by central authorities and why the emerging conflicts of interest must be solved by means of commodity relations. They do not answer your arguments specifically, but resort to the abstract concept that commodity relations can exist only among group owners and that hence such relations would create group ownership.

Then you go even further and explain the essence of ownership, and you quote a heap of arguments against the erroneous, simplified concept of ownership. But even here they will not cite one single specific counterargument, but on the contrary produce the even more general concept that you have not used the dialectic and structurally genetic methods of Marx, but the methods of the young, still immature Marx.

...Unfortunately, hundreds and thousands of college students are still being educated in a dogmatic approach to theory and are ignoring new views. This represents a terrific difficulty and obstacle and acts as brake on new, bold theoretical and practical solutions.

How many comrade-practitioners realize the necessity for some fundamental changes in the whole planned management system but are frightened when they hear that this conflicts with socialism, that this amounts to restoration of capitalist relations, that it is technicism, revisionism, and so forth? A priori compartmenting, branding, and pillorying, and not specific, factual evidence and arguments, and convincing refutation of certain views--these are the methods of discussion--or more correctly, of killing a discussion--which sometimes still threaten us from the past in some places.

...

Unfortunately overcoming antiquated and simplified views often entails...an unwillingness to accept new findings. This unwillingness has been caused by various interests, ambitions, prestige factors, and so forth...people who are afraid that if the new methods and proposals are put to use, they could lose their present positions and comfortable lives. Or there are people who for years have disseminated certain theoretical views, have written about them and established their fame on them; today for reasons of prestige they cannot retreat....

...

It is true that the views which militate against commodity relations appear at first somehow more socialist, whereas those voices which clamor for a wider and more consistent use of these commodity relations appear, so to say, to be returning us to capitalism. This is only a very superficial approach, however, which we must thoroughly refute. Actually it is the old simplified views, striving to restrict commodity relations and eliminate them from our economy as quickly as possible, which are sectarian views and views which have departed from the real conditions of the socialist stage of development.

The goal is to get a maximum number of Czech representatives into target countries under different "covers." Concentrated efforts are first made to establish formal diplomatic relations on the Legation level, after which pressure is applied to raise them to Embassy status with larger staffs. This is paralleled by the opening of trade missions which provide opportunities for "commercial cover."

Then "friendship societies" and "cultural circles" spring up, followed by the all-important opening of a branch office of the Czechoslovak Press Bureau (CTK). Antonin Buzek, chief of the CTK London office until his 1961 defection, testified that the CTK plays an important part in subversive penetration, since the Czech Ministry of Interior frequently sends its representatives abroad in the guise of journalists, radio commentators and the like.

Later there is a huge influx of outwardly attractive and politically reserved propaganda material which the Czechs print in 12 major languages. These include journals devoted to trade unions, youth, women, art, sports, cinema and theater. Thousands of pieces of propaganda from Prague are known to be openly shipped into Latin America every year by regular post, plus unknown quantities by indirect means.

When the host government has been sufficiently "softened up," the Czech Ambassador produces his blueprint of "exchanges." Usually local students are the first target. Attractive scholarships in Prague are offered, with all expenses paid. The Czechs calculate that after two or three years of such indoctrination, the youths will return to their countries as apostles of "scientific Marxism-Leninism."

In the meantime the host country is being wooed with offers of "economic aid." The Czechs magnanimously offer long-term credits. They propose to build plants, mills, dams; they readily provide farm machinery, buses and passenger autos. All this is given initially at attractive rates and in return the Communists ask only to introduce Czech "technicians" to install and service the equipment. Local businessmen too seldom realize that they are dealing with representatives of a system which would destroy them first, should it succeed in seizing power in their country. The Czech trade representatives or "cultural delegations" meanwhile work with local subversive elements for just such a seizure by shipping them weapons in crates marked "Czechoslovak crystal glass" or "Bohemian garnets."

At the opportune moment, the Czechs encourage an exchange of delegations, for which they will offer to pay all expenses. These are frequently (1) PARLIAMENTARY (the Czech Communist regime seized power by subversion of Parliament), (2) CULTURAL (Czech artists who do not espouse "socialist realism" are

harrassed), (3) AGRICULTURAL (working even a fraction of an acre independently is a crime in Czechoslovakia), (4) COMMERCIAL (a Czech barber employing one helper is an "exploiter" and is summarily run out of business) or (5) HEALTH (the Czech Minister of Health, Josef Plojhar, is an excommunicated Catholic priest).

While Czech Communist representatives stationed abroad are well-mannered, well-dressed, mild-spoken and ingratiating, they finance and direct demonstrations, and they give moral and material support to subversive elements in the name of "supporting the freedom-loving, progressive, democratic elements" of the given country. Paralleling widespread complaints of inferior Czechoslovak exports, there have been recent public exposures of Czech-directed espionage and subversion in West Germany, Switzerland, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, and even Iceland. Since the Communist subversion of Cuba, the Czechs in Latin America need no longer turn to Prague for personnel, supplies and directives. The Latin American offensive can now be run directly from their major base in Cuba, where the Czechs are believed to number as many as 4,000.

There is no sign that the Czech Communists intend to decrease their overseas subversive activities in the future. On the contrary, they arrested and jailed their Interior Minister, Rudolf Barak, when he was apparently not aggressive enough in this respect and when they needed a scapegoat for the excess of Czech espionage failures in the West. Any who still believe that the Czech Communists are willing to cooperate with other political parties "for the benefit of working people" or who are inclined to accept "unselfish, fraternal aid from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," should be encouraged to read a booklet intended only for the Czech Communist Party's inner sanctum but smuggled out of the country and reprinted in the West. Originally entitled "How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism," it was published in London as "The Role of Parliament In A Communist Revolution," in the United States as "And Not a Shot is Fired" and in Spain as "El Asalto Al Parlamento." In it a high-ranking Communist official, Jan Kozak, revealed the methods by which the present Communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia seized power and the principles under which Czechoslovakia operates as the agent of Communist aggression abroad.

Zanzibari Coup Leaders

Abaid Amani Karume is president of the nationalist Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and president of the newly installed Republic of Zanzibar. He was born in the Congo in August 1905 and came to Zanzibar when very young. A man of little education, considerable popular appeal, he became president of the African Association (AA) in 1954 and became president of the ASP when it was formed from a merger with the Shirazi Association in 1957. He was elected a member of the legislative council in 1957 and in 1961 became a cabinet minister in the coalition government dominated by the Arab Zanzibar National Party. He is one of the few political figures in Zanzibar with an island-wide following and has the additional advantage of representing the Africans in an anti-Arab political climate. As long-time opposition leader, he was willing to accept support from any source in his efforts to put the ASP in power.

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Abdulrahman Mohamed "Babu" the revolutionary government Minister of Foreign Affairs, was apparently the moving figure in the revolution. Like many of the revolutionary leaders, he was not a native of Zanzibar but born in Somali in 1924. He was a sometime journalist student and communist sympathizer in England from 1951 - 1957.

On his return to Zanzibar he became propagandist for the ZNP, and later, the communist-dominated WFTU. Following a visit to the Prague WFTU headquarters in 1959 he established a ZNP office in Cairo through which Zanzibari students were processed enroute to Iron Curtain countries for Communist scholarships. The following year Babu visited both the USSR and Communist China -- the former twice. On both occasions he assisted the Soviets' anti-Western propaganda efforts. In 1961 he attended a conference of the Communist-controlled International Organization of Journalists in Austria and an anti-bomb conference in Japan. After returning to Zanzibar he was appointed East African correspondent of the New China News Agency (NCNA).

In December 1961, he was arrested by the Zanzibar Government and charged with sedition. He served about a year of the fifteen month sentence and was released in April 1963. After his release from prison he broke away from the ZNP, taking the pro-Communist faction to form the Umma (Peoples) Party. When the ZNP coalition government started, in the summer of 1963, to crack down on subversive publications (such as Babu's Communist-line Zanews), the Umma Party, the trade unions and the ASP formed a united front of opposition. In September 1963, Babu was denied a passport for a trip to London at the time of the constitutional conference so he made his way to Tanganyika and thence to London on Tanganyikan travel documents. From London he travelled to China, returning to Zanzibar only after independence in mid December 1963.

The newly independent coalition government (ZNP and ZNPP)

banned his radical Umma party -- an act which may have sparked the coup and the subsequent slaughter of government officials and their sympathizers. Babu is a member of the editorial board of Revolution, the Chinese subsidized magazine, published in Switzerland and France.

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Abdullah Kassim Hanga, the current vice president of the revolutionary government and originally the prime minister, is a self-styled Marxist with extensive ties to Moscow. Born in Zanzibar in 1932, he became a teacher, then a seaman and in 1953 went to London to study at the London School of Economics. He failed to obtain a degree and moved to the USSR where he obtained a scholarship at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. In about one year's time he was awarded a "doctorate."

He returned to Zanzibar in late 1961, became active in the ASP; first as foreign affairs committee chairman and later as deputy general secretary of the Party. In these two capacities he traveled frequently to the Soviet Union and East European countries. His trips included attendance at the World Peace Congress in Moscow in 1962. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1963. Hanga is reputedly strongly racist and given to rabid outbursts. His wife is a Russian citizen formerly employed by the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science.

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John Okello, who calls himself "field marshal," led the fighting forces of the January coup. His background is not as well known as the other revolutionary leaders, but he is believed to have been born in Kenya in the mid 1930's and to have been a member of the Mau Mau organization. He became a Zanzibar policeman in 1957, and subsequently went to Cuba on a trip financed by the ZNP for more than two years education and training in Havana. He is believed to have returned from Cuba in December 1963 with thirty or forty followers who had been given Cuban guerrilla warfare training. As head of the military arm of the loose grouping which overthrew the coalition government, he is reportedly responsible for a great deal of the bloodshed which followed. His uncontrolled actions and inflammatory public statements are apparently also a danger to the new government.

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Hassan Nasser Moyo, the general secretary of the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labor (ZPFL), is the Junior Minister of Works, Communications and Power of the new Zanzibar government. An ambitious and outspoken politician, Moyo is also a member of the ASP, a frequent traveller to the Soviet Union and frankly sympathetic with communism. He went to Peking for the 1960 May Day celebrations, then to Moscow and East Germany, and on returning to Zanzibar stated that the ZPFL should become a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions. In 1961 he went to the May Day celebrations in Moscow at the invitation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and later the same year received a



scholarship from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, USSR. During this stay in Moscow, the Soviet Union financed his trip to the Zanzibar Constitutional Conference in London, March 1962. He returned to Zanzibar in May 1962, attended the Freedom Fighters' Conference in Accra in June and then pulled the ZPFL out of the ICFTU. A few months later he went to Poland at the invitation of the Central Council of Polish Trade Unions.