

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

(PLACE FORM 490 HERE)

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

WARNING

The attached document(s) must be safeguarded. It is the Agency's Official Historical Record and must be preserved in accordance with the Federal Records Act of 1976. For additional information, call the Chief, Agency Archives and Records Center, extension 7777.

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4
RETURN IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE TO THE
AGENCY ARCHIVES AND RECORDS CENTER

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

25X1C10b
25X1X4

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4



Significant Dates ▶

Nineteen-sixty-five

1965 brings the 20th Anniversary of several International Fronts: the Communists will organize special activities, e.g.

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Feb.)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) (Nov.)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) (Nov.)

1965 will also be the 20th Anniversary of

The Fall of Berlin (April), and the

Liberation of the Concentration Camps

JAN.

- 2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959 (Sixth anniversary)
- 6 Pres. Roosevelt enunciates Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and expression, of worship; from want and from fear, 1941
- 13 USSR "Doctors' Plot" arrests announced, 1953
- 15 Karl Liebknecht & Rosa Luxemburg, founders of German CP, killed in Spartacus uprising, 1919
- 21 Lenin dies (Born 22 April 1870), 1924
- 21 Chicom govt orders Tibet representatives to Peking to negotiate "peaceful solution Tibet's status," 1950
- 31 Leon Trotsky banished for life. 1929
- 31 OAS excludes Communist Cuba. 1962

FEB.

- 1 Pres. Lincoln signs resolution abolishing slavery (13th Amendment) U.S. Constitution. 100th Anniversary. 1865
- 1 UN General Assembly condemns Chicom aggression in Korea. 1951
- 10 Soviet Govt. repudiates all debts incurred by Tsarist regime. 1918

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

~~SECRET~~
GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#43

Commentary

25 Nov-8 Dec 1964

Principal Developments:

1. The "truce" in Sino-Soviet polemical warfare following the ouster of Khrushchev were very thin during this period. The Chinese belatedly publicized previously undisclosed bitter brawling at a closed IUS Executive Committee meeting in Prague November 14-17, and followed with an exultant description of railroading an "emergency resolution" on US "crimes of aggression in the Congo" over Soviet opposition at the subsequent IUS Congress in Sofia. Rejoicing in the "brilliant success" of the November 24-30 Japanese CP Congress (which left the JCP even more openly Chinese-aligned and anti-Soviet), Peking warned, in connection with the expelled pro-Soviet JCP dissidents who "peddled revisionism and splittism with the support of a foreign power": "their boss Khrushchev has fallen... (and) anybody who still tries to use such political scum... (as Shiga) will come to the same ignominious end." And on December 5 People's Daily devoted almost two pages to a November 28 report by Albanian boss Hoxha which attacked by name the four top figures in the new Soviet leadership.

2. Soviet media have been somewhat more circumspect: they avoided attacking the Chinese by name, and even deleted Tito's criticism of the Chinese when reporting his December 7 speech to the Yugoslav Party Congress. Nevertheless, a major Pravda editorial on December 6 rebutted (unnamed) "critics" on the "fundamental question" -- of the CPSU position on replacing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by a "state of the whole people" in the USSR. The Chinese have hotly attacked this position since their 14 June 1963 letter and included it in the 21 November Red Flag "Why Khrushchev Fell." Pravda taunted these critics that they "need to identify all leadership with dictatorship" to justify the "personality cult" in which they are, by implication, engaged.

3. Soviet media have continued their silence about Khrushchev, deleting Tito's friendly remarks about K's positive contributions in reporting his December 7 speech.

4. The CPSU and its supporters (Czech Novotny visiting Moscow, E. German Ulbricht in Berlin SED plenum, Belgian CP Congress in Brussels, Cypriot CP in Pravda article) continued to call for a world party conference, -- but with no mention of specific plans. The Peking correspondent of the Japanese agency Kyodo on December 1 reported that "authoritative sources" in Peking "categorically denied rumors that Soviet and Chinese leaders would hold a summit conference" there in December or January. Meanwhile, several clandestine reports from usually reliable European

Communist sources indicate that the CPSU sent letters during the last week of November proposing re-scheduling the 26-party preparatory meeting for March 1. Reportedly, the CPSU letter admitted that the Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Albanian, and Rumanian parties had declined to attend, and it said that the Indonesian and Japanese parties "requested additional information."

5. Most observers have commented on the increasing evidence of Rumania's growing independence, which was apparently confirmed by an "enlarged plenum" of the Party's CC November 30-December 1 giving "unanimous approval" to the Politburo's international activities. Particularly noteworthy was the role of the Rumanian delegates at the IUS meetings in Prague and Sofia, where (although published accounts are still inadequate) they seemingly lined up more often on the Chinese side in disputes against the Soviets and called for the preparation of a new statute to prevent the control and use of the IUS by any country for its own objectives.

6. The Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (CP) beginning December 7 brought high-level guest delegations from some 30 Soviet-sympathizing parties. Tito's 30,000-word opening report presents a very effective, reasoned case for Yugoslav views of socialism and for independence of all parties, with a brief tribute to Khrushchev's "great role in deStalinization and in promoting freedom of expression... safeguarding world peace... (and) normalizing and improving relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union." His icy criticism of the Chinese is devastating: their "ideological disagreement," he says, is "only a screen for the real Chinese aims," which are "to impose power politics on the world with the prospect of ultimately assuming a decisive role in the international workers movement and in the world."

Significance:

The ousting of Khrushchev appears to have brought thus far little lasting or basic change in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Both sides have reasserted their old positions on practically all points at issue -- often in more adamant terms than before. The "truce" in polemical warfare is already wearing thin. All indications are that the Chou En-lai mission to Moscow only emphasized the difference between the antagonists and that no bilateral talks are scheduled. On the other hand, Moscow's positions regarding Vietnam, the Congo and the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear fleet [MLF] are virtually identical.

Although nothing has been stated publicly, it appears that the CPSU has postponed the 26-party preparatory commission meeting scheduled for Moscow 15 December, probably largely because of the delays introduced by the Khrushchev ouster and related problems. However, the Soviets and their supporters repeatedly reaffirm their determination to go ahead with plans for a world conference, and the CPSU is reportedly now attempting to reschedule the preparatory meeting for 1 March 1965. Indications are that 7 of the 26 will not attend -- the 6 which espouse the Chinese

view of Marxism-Leninism (Albania, China, Korea, North Vietnam, Japan and Indonesia) and "independent" Rumania. The Italians have asserted that they will participate in order to oppose any action which should excommunicate the Chinese, and others may well line up with them in this effort.

Soviet prestige, influence, and authority as the leader of the Communist world appear to have declined, at least temporarily, under the combined impact of the mounting political/propaganda attacks by its Communist enemies, the growing assertion of independence and even open criticism by its friends, -- and its own inability to bring about its long-demanded and concretely scheduled preparations for a world party conference and its action in ousting Khrushchev, with the attendant admission of errors and failures over the past decade (added to the earlier revelation of the errors, failures and crimes of the Stalin period).

In the activities of the Communist front organizations may be seen perhaps the most damaging (from the Communist point of view) of all aspects of the mounting Sino-Soviet conflict and the progressive breakdown of Soviet authority over the WCM. Almost every international front meeting over the past year and more has brought bitter battling between the Soviet and Chinese forces, with the Chinese repeatedly publicly accusing the Soviets of using the fronts as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. A natural result has been a growth of a "plague on both your houses" attitude culminating in the Rumanian call -- at the current IUS Congress in Sofia -- for a new statute which will prevent control over and exploitation of the organization by any country for its own objectives.


On the other side of the ledger, a number of parties are trying -- some with considerable success -- or will try to exploit the crumbling of the monolith to enhance their own image and power. Outstanding among the ruling parties has been the Rumanian, and there are indications that the Czech may be following. A fair warning to the non-Communist world was served by the 22 November local elections in Italy, where, despite the turmoil attendant on the death of Togliatti and the ouster of Khrushchev, the Communist largely held their own and even advanced in some areas for an overall small increase.

The outlook for the WCM in 1965 depends primarily upon several factors, all of which contain unpredictable elements, as follows:

- a. the outcome of the continuing succession problem in the USSR;
- b. developments in China, such as Mao's demise, possible international or domestic setbacks or successes, etc.;
- c. the extent to which international developments, in which Moscow and Peking have certain common interests vis-a-vis the West, would throw conflicting Communist forces into some degree of tactical "unity of action against the forces of imperialism," in Southeast Asia, Africa, etc.

Although the Kremlin, which has lost face and influence through Peking's attacks, continues to call for a preparatory meeting for a world conference, the prospects for this meeting remain in doubt.

25X1C10b



25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#43

25 November-3 December 1964

October 26 (delayed): The first issue of a Greek-language pro-Chinese Communist monthly, Anagennisis (Renaissance), appears in Athens, with no attempt at "objectivity."

November 14-17: November 28 and continuing: The Executive Committee of the International Union of Students (IUS) met in Prague November 14-17 to prepare the agenda for an IUS Congress in Sofia. No reports of the proceedings were published at that time. Only a Rude Pravo editorial on the 18th indicated conflict, warning of the danger to unity from "the ill-considered leftist actions, often accompanied by loud, radical-sounding phrases, aimed at dividing students according to the color of their skins, or at setting up specifically Asian, African, Latin American, and other student associations."

On December 1, however, NCNA Peking described bitter brawling at the Prague meeting.

"Li Shu-cheng, leader of the ^{Chinese} delegation, pointed out that the draft report contained fundamental mistakes on a number of major questions of principle.... Some persons continue to insist on the erroneous line of capitulationism and splittism.... Moreover, the draft report also wrongly defined the road to the defense of world peace as through 'peaceful coexistence' and 'general and complete disarmament.' ... In the present international situation, the demarcation line between genuine and spurious opposition to imperialism is whether to oppose U.S. imperialism or not.... In defiance of the resolute opposition by a number of member organizations, the draft report reaffirmed the splittist statement concerning the tripartite treaty [on nuclear testing] issued by the IUS Secretariat in August last year and insisted on praising the Kiev summer school held in August last year and the Moscow World Youth Forum held last September. Both are known for their spurious opposition to imperialism and real opposition to China, their sham stand for unity and their real stand for split.... Opposing China will come to no good, and the attempt to use the IUS as a forum for anti-China activities and to split the unity of the students is doomed to failure."

Li Shu-cheng proposed an amendment to delete all favorable reference to the test-ban treaty. The Soviet delegate tried to interrupt her with a "procedural question" which the Chinese said caused great confusion in the session and was a slanderous attack on China.

"The meeting then discussed the amendment put forward by the Rumanian delegation, to remove the parts dealing with opposition to all nuclear tests and peaceful settlement of all territorial disputes from the report and replace it with the demand for banning all nuclear

(Chronology Cont.)

weapons.... But the Brazilian delegate proposed to add 'banning all nuclear tests' after 'banning all nuclear weapons.' ... The chairman arbitrarily put to vote the Brazilian amendment disapproved by many delegates together with the Rumanian amendment."

"At the 16 November session, the Rumanian delegation proposed that the paragraph concerning the Common Market be deleted [and replaced by one which, inter alia], declares opposition to the attempt to subjugate some countries politically by making use of economic relations. It was adopted with the Chinese, Korean, Rumanian, and the majority of delegates favoring it. Only five votes including the Soviet Union were against it.

"The Chinese delegation then moved that the parts praising the Moscow Youth Forum be deleted... It was seconded by the Rumanian and Korean delegations.... [However,] the Indian executive chairman of the session, in total disregard of the opposition of the delegates, put to a vote the proposal for not discussing the amendment and announced that there were 13 votes for and 11 against.... Delegates from Korea, South Vietnam, Haiti, Guadaloupe, Malagasy, and the Federation of Students of Black Africa in France condemned this anti-democratic and despicable practice, and the delegates from Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic exposed the chairman for his trickery in counting votes....

"Before the Chinese amendment was put to vote, a Chinese delegate in his speech made known the fact that certain people were acting behind the scenes, ... to turn the IUS into an instrument in the service of the foreign policy of a certain country...."

Not until the third day of the Congress in Sofia, the 30th, did Bulgarian media indicate that there was any quarreling: the Albanian delegate disagreed with the Secretariat's earlier support of the test-ban treaty; the Chinese delegate did the same; and "the Rumanian delegate expressed a wish for improvement in the methods of work of the IUS," calling for a new statute to "reflect the new situation of the international students movement."

On December 3, NCNA distributed its own account, datelined Sofia, 30 November, of the victorious battle against the Soviet-led forces on the 28th and 29th to push through an emergency motion adopting a statement of protest "resolutely condemning the crimes of aggression against Congo Leopoldville perpetrated by U.S. imperialism." Li Shu-cheng "said that the question now was whether or not to affirm ... that U.S. imperialism was the main enemy of the people of the world and the chieftain of imperialism." NCNA reports that the Rumanian delegate supported the Chinese draft [resolution] and "called on the Czechoslovak delegate to withdraw his amendment."

The Chinese statement was finally "unanimously adopted," after which Li thanked "many delegates" for their support and "pointed out with regret" that the obstructions raised by "some people" "stem from ulterior motives."

On the 5th, the "hushed-up" Bulgarian reportage acknowledged further ackimonious altercations, with the Chinese accusing the Indian delegate of "meddling in the domestic affairs of the CPR and "levelling groundless accusations at the Soviet Union." Sofia reports the Soviet delegate as replying "in a calm and argued manner" that the Chinese attacks are "groundless and unworthy" and that the Congress was not the place to level slanders, -- with which the Rumanian delegate agreed!

November 24-30: The Ninth Congress of the Japanese CP reelected Nosaka and Miyamoto as chairman and secretary general, respectively, and reaffirmed the Party's Chinese-attuned, anti-revisionist line. It repeatedly emphasized that, as Nosaka put it in his opening speech, "the dismissal of Khrushchev ... testified to the correctness of the line and the stand taken all along by our party."

The Congress approved the CC's earlier expulsion of Shiga, Suzuki, Kamiyama, and Nakano... Miyamoto, whose report was published in full in Akahata on November 25, was outspoken in describing the breakdown of relations with the CPSU. "By mid-May, when Yoshio Shiga and some others who had hitherto maintained secret contact with the CPSU leadership began their maneuvers to sabotage our party, the CPSU leadership immediately came out into the open to support and encourage them, thus setting out openly to undermine our party. This is an outrage unknown in the history of the ICM. By so doing, the CPSU leadership has disqualified itself for any talk about friendship between the CPs of Japan and the Soviet Union...."

On the question of an international conference, the Miyamoto report repeats the JCP view that the July Soviet summons to a preparatory meeting is "illegal" and again calls for an end to attempts to convene such a meeting.

Hailing the "brilliant success" of the JCP Congress, a Peking People's Daily editorial on December 3 points out that Miyamoto "exposed the modern revisionists' foul practice of great-nation chauvinism toward fraternal parties in the guise of 'creative Marxism.'" "With the support of a foreign power they peddled revisionism and splittism in the country. Now their boss Khrushchev has fallen. Anybody who still tries to use such political scum as Yoshio Shiga and his like will come to the same ignominious end as Khrushchev."

Meanwhile, in an appeal published at a press conference on December 2, the four expellees declared that all decisions taken at the JCP 9th Congress are invalid and that they will form a new party of other JCP ex-members and of unionists -- but they set no timetable for action.

November 27: French CP daily L'Humanite publishes a message from CPSU dated 25th thanking for November 7 greetings. It uses the phrase: "FCP, together with all M-L parties who hold dear..., is ... working for preparation of a new conference tending toward union of all Communists on basis of principles of M-L and declarations of 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences."

November 29: Hoxha in Albania, celebrating the 20th anniversary of WW II liberation, delivers the most direct attack on the new Soviet leaders thus far, charging that "Mikoyan, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov, and others" have continued "slandorous attacks" on the Albanian Party. Moscow (and Yugoslavia) avoids polemics and even sends a greetings message to Albania for the first time since 1961. Chinese representative in Tirana, Vice Premier of State Council Lu Ting-1, castigated the Tito revisionists so sharply that the Yugoslav Foreign Office December 3 delivered a "most energetic" protest to the Chinese Embassy "in connection with the slanderous and utterly insulting attacks on Yugoslavia and its leadership by ... Lu and the Chinese press."

November 30-December 4: A top-level Czech party-state delegation headed by First Secretary-President Novotny visits Moscow: a call for a world conference was repeated in Novotny's speech at a Kremlin rally on the 3rd (which also included thinly veiled criticism of the Chinese) and in their joint communique, -- but no specific plans were mentioned.

December 1: Peking correspondent Yamada of the Tokyo Kyodo agency reports that "authoritative sources in Peking have categorically denied rumors that Soviet and Chinese leaders would hold a summit conference in Peking this month or next January." Whether the proposed mid-December Moscow meeting will take place as scheduled "is the Soviet Party leaders' business, not China's," he reports them as saying.

December 3: NYTimes London correspondent Gruson reports that, "according to reliable information reaching London," the Chinese have rejected a new Soviet proposal for a world party conference which was contained in a letter which Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko tried to deliver to Mao or Chou last week. "Particularly galling to the Russians ... was the refusal of the Chinese even to accept the letter."

In an editorial criticizing the "recklessness and irresponsibility" and "resort to brutal means" which characterize the Chinese leadership, the Yugoslav Party weekly organ Komunist adds: "China really endeavors to acquire all the attributes of a great power according to the prevailing standard -- from the atomic bomb to subjugated partners who act under its instructions."

The North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun features a 5,000 word appeal to "Strengthen the Unity of the ICM and Intensify the Anti-imperialist, Revolutionary Struggle." Although thoroughly ChiCom in spirit, the treatise is remarkably "unaligned" (vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet conflict) in wording and names no names. Some passages are almost enigmatic in their thrust, such as:

"The indiscreet act of clinging to the old line which has gone bankrupt in life and yet egging on others to follow it must be resolutely rejected, and it is important to make a sober, scientific appraisal of developments, not beset by preoccupied (sic), subjective views, and seek unity in the practical struggle."

Similarly, it defines as the "main danger" to the ICM "revisionism and opportunism of all hues," and says that "our party has waged a staunch struggle against revisionism, rejected dogmatism, defended the purity of M-L, and exerted all efforts for the unity and solidarity...."

December 5: Peking People's Daily devotes nearly 2 pages to the international section of Albanian boss Hoxha's report on the 20th anniversary of liberation which attacks the new Soviet leaders -- Mikoyan, Kosygin, Brezhnev and Suslov -- by name (see November 29 above).

NCNA international service distributes a report of a meeting of "more than 8,000 people of a dozen nationalities" in Artush, capital of the Kezlesu Khalkas autonomous region in Sinkiang which again reaffirmed the determination of these peoples to struggle against (inter alia) modern revisionism and "declared that any infamous attempt to disrupt the national unity of the country and undermine the unity of the country's various nationalities, and any ambition to seize its territory by force are doomed to failure and will end in shame."

December 6: A long editorial in Pravda openly resumes the polemic with the Chinese (though they are still not named) over the important CPSU position on replacing the dictatorship of the proletariat by a "state of the whole people" in the USSR. The first, and most thorough, Chinese attack on this position was developed in the 14 June 1963 CCP letter, sections 18 and 19 -- see Chrono #6: the latest was in the 21 November 1964 Red Flag editorial, paragraph 12 -- see Chrono #42.) Pravda emphasizes that this dispute really involves "fundamental questions of the construction of socialism and Communism." "Our party knows from its own experiences," Pravda says, why the critics resort to such methods to insist on the need to identify all leadership with dictatorship, even after the exploiting classes are liquidated. "These are typical methods of justifying voluntarism, arbitrariness, and unlawfulness, which are characteristic of the ideology and practice of the personality cult."

December 7 and continuing: The Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (CP) in Belgrade brings guest delegations from some 30 pro-Soviet parties. In the part of his 30,000-word opening speech dealing with Communist relations, Tito begins by noting that the "international workers movement (IWM)," "gradually ridding itself of undemocratic methods of achieving unity of action typical of the period of Stalin and the Cominform," is "increasingly establishing independence of action in its respective countries as a generally valid principle and precondition for all unity and cooperation," which he terms a "historical reorientation."

Warning against "illusions" as to the possibility of overcoming conflict with the CCP leadership and its "pseudorevolutionary and sectarian positions" by "compromise and artificial reconciliation," Tito says it would be wrong not to counter the Chinese slander. He draws a distinction between the "legitimate rights" of China and the "justified aspirations of the Chinese people" on the one hand and the "great-power objectives and hegemonic methods" of the leadership, which desires "to impose power politics on the world with the aim of ultimately assuming a decisive role in the IWM and in the world."

"If we analyze CCP actions over the past years, we must reach the conclusion that it has deliberately and purposefully striven to transfer the center of the IWM to China and to achieve a dominant influence on world politics, regardless of the means it may have to use to attain this end. China's internal economic and political difficulties have merely increased the need to direct the main attention of Chinese public opinion to foreign events and to tighten the internal system of control as much as possible in the face of "danger from outside."

"...The fact that ideological disagreement, which is part of this conflict, is nevertheless only a screen for the real Chinese aims is best borne out by the fact that, notwithstanding the continual invoking of respect for the principles of M-L, the CCP leadership is prepared, in disregard for all principles and 'undogmatically,' to resort to any step that accords with its needs and ambitions. (It) ... has gone so far as to offer to set up a 'third force' together with some capitalist countries, to provoke frontier conflicts, and to voice territorial pretensions of vast proportions....

... Evidently overestimating their role in the world, the Chinese leaders expected ... (to) influence the Soviet government and party to change the whole of its internal and foreign policy and revert to the Stalinist period....

... Although in the last few years Comrade Khrushchev did have certain failures and made mistakes, ... he played a great role in deStalinization and in promoting freedom of expression, and also had great merits in safeguarding world peace.... I feel I must emphasize on this occasion that he deserves much credit for normalizing and improving relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Of course, he was not alone in this respect, but was supported by the CPSU CC, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and by the Soviet Government. Nor do the leadership and the people of the Soviet Union deny his merits in this respect.

Brief Soviet coverage of the speech deleted Tito's criticism of the CCP as well as his praise of Khrushchev.

857.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CONGO

25X1C10b



SITUATION: Fear, hatred, ignorance, deliberate distortion and political self-seeking all contribute to the woefully inaccurate picture many countries now receive of the insurgency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The true nature of the rebellion, the root causes of conflict, the roles of the USA and Belgium and of the foreign soldiers fighting with the Congolese Army have been ignored or twisted to further the propaganda goals and to cover the embarrassment and chagrin of various African countries. The same distorted versions are also being used as weapons in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and as fuel for ideological fires of international communism.

Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, motivated by hatred of Tshombe and by their own pan-African ambitions, describe the Congo rebellion as a patriotic war against a colonialist puppet. So saying, they provide arms and ammunition to the "revolutionaries" of the Congo National Liberation committee (CNL). East African countries, emotionally sensitive to "liberation" issues and frequently ignorant of facts of the rebellion, give aid and comfort to the rebels by their insistence on a political solution which would elevate the rebel movement to equal status with the legitimate central government of the Congo for a negotiated settlement of the rebellion. Communist-influenced governments of Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan and Burundi are sheltering rebels and admitting rebel supply and training missions which prolong and aggravate what is essentially an African tribal war. The OAU Secretariat under leadership of the Guinean extremist Diallo Telli propagandizes in favor of the rebels, in the name of the OAU but without consent of the organization's members. On the other hand, certain African governments (Liberia, Tunis among them) which recognize the legality of Tshombe government actions hesitate to speak out against what they believe to be the African consensus -- dominated by the vociferous voices of extremist leaders and ruling cliques.


The shifting complexities of the Congo scene lend themselves admirably to international propaganda exploitation which succeeds in direct ratio to world wide ignorance of the facts. Khartoum, for instance, provided a 3 December press conference for Gaston Soumialot, Defense Minister of the self-styled "Congolese Revolutionary Government." Soumialot produced a prodigious number of falsehoods and charges against everything Western and the International Red Cross. In addition to false propaganda from African and Communist states, Chinese financial and material support to the rebels is a proven fact. The Soviets, whose diplomatic missions were twice banished from the Congo for subversive activities,

are reportedly offering to supply arms to the rebels, to be delivered by Algeria and the UAR through Sudan. Both Algeria and the USSR have threatened to send "volunteers" to fight with the rebels (the former may actually be doing so now). An OAU meeting tentatively scheduled for 18 December and a UN Security Council meeting beginning December 9th will provide additional international settings for biased reporting and propaganda harmful to Congo stability.

References:

See Congo Government's White Paper on the rebellion, continuing Press Comment coverage and Biweekly Propaganda Guidance #809 on China in Africa.

25X1C10b



858.

MILITARIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMY

25X1C10b




* * *

SITUATION: Throughout 1964 the Chinese Communist Party has carried out a major propaganda campaign to infuse a new militancy into industrial and agricultural work. The crux of the campaign is the claim that there is a one-to-one parity between military methods and production tasks.

The Chicom leaders have always regimented social life but Chinese society is now moving toward complete militarization. This new effort extends to industry and agriculture a system of dual leadership that has been used in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) throughout its existence. Political commissars serve alongside military commanders at all levels of the army to insure political loyalty and ideological purity. Peking has now established a PLA-type political commissar system in China's economy. On 31 March 1964 the Party Central Committee magazine Red Flag declared that such a system must be used to fully command the economy and that "all economic, industrial, agricultural and commercial departments must establish and strengthen political work by emulating the PLA."

Thus the nation's industrial organizations have now joined the children, the women, the trade unions, the government bureaucrats, the scientists, and the writers and artists as members (without voting rights or even the right to self-expression) of a vast militarized apparatus whose purpose is to translate the policies (whatever they may be) of a small group of Chicom leaders into effective action. (See unclassified attachment and excerpts of Red Flag article.)

25X1C10b



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4


Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

860 WH,a.

THE ORDOQUI OUSTER:

CLUE TO A POWER STRUGGLE IN CUBA

25X1C10b



SITUATION: Late in the afternoon of 18 November 1964, Radio Havana announced that Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa had been relieved of his duties as Vice-Minister for Logistics in the Ministry of Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias - MINFAR) and ousted from his position on the national directorate of the United Party of Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista - PURS), the unified Cuban Communist Party, combining old-guard Communists and Castroites. The announcement went on to say that the action, taken unanimously by the party leaders, was motivated by certain aspects of his political conduct from 1957 to the present and that these would be the object of a complete investigation. Subsequent developments indicate that he was also placed under arrest.

This announcement not only recalls the important role Ordoqui played in the Marcos Rodriguez case, which dates back precisely to 1957, but comes in the wake of a spate of rumors that suggest the existence of a real struggle for power within the government of Cuba, most particularly between the old guard Communists and the former members of the 26 of July Movement.

Ordoqui first came into the limelight, and into Castro's public disfavor, last March, during the trial of Marcos Rodriguez Alfonso. [For more complete background on this cause célèbre, see BPG #139, 20 April 1964, Item #775: "Cuba: What's behind the Rodriguez Trial?", and attachments in English and Spanish.] Rodriguez was convicted of having betrayed to Batista's police four youths who had participated in an attack on the presidential palace on 1 March 1957. According to his own confession, he arranged a personal interview with a police officer on 20 April 1957 and told him where the fugitives could be found. That same day they were gunned down in their hideaway in an apartment at No. 7 Humboldt Street. Rodriguez took asylum in the Brazilian Embassy and was soon able to leave Cuba, fleeing from the wrath of the youth of the Castro underground rather than from Batista's police. In Mexico, he was befriended by Ordoqui and his wife, Edith Garcia Buchaca, both members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, then called the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The trial and retrial proceedings brought out facts indicating that Rodriguez was a regular informer for the Batista police and was probably acting under discipline of the PSP. Although Ordoqui was absent from Cuba at the time of the betrayal of the "martyrs of Humboldt 7," he did

later intercede in favor of Rodriguez, asking President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado for a reprieve of the sentence of death in the first trial. For this he was severely rebuked by Fidel Castro during the retrial, which ended 30 March 1964. Rodriguez was again found guilty, the original sentence was upheld, and he was executed on 18 April 1964.

Joaquin Ordoqui has a long career as a militant Communist. Born in 1901, he joined the party in 1926. In 1931 he spent eight months in the USSR. In 1933, he participated, with Sargent Fulgencio Batista, in the overthrow of dictator Gerardo Machado. Implicated in the machine-gun massacre of several members of the ABC party, he confessed and went into exile in 1934, traveling to the U.S. and the USSR, Mexico, and Spain, where he participated in the Civil War. After the Communist Party had been legalized by Batista, he returned to Cuba and was elected to three successive four-year terms in the House of Representatives: 1940, 1944, 1948. In 1953, following the attack on the Moncada Barracks, he went into exile again. Shortly after Batista's flight, 1 January 1959, he returned to Cuba and has been prominent in party and government activities ever since. He received publication of Hoy, official Communist daily, was given the rank of major -- the highest rank allowed in Communist Cuba -- in the Militia, and appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics in the Defense Ministry (MINFAR) in 1963.

On the personal side, Ordoqui has been since 1953 the common-law husband of Edith Garcia Buchaca, former wife of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, one of the top leaders of the old PSP and several notches above Ordoqui in the Communist hierarchy. Speculation is that Rodriguez has never forgiven Ordoqui for seducing his wife, having a child by her the same year, and then converting the affair into a permanent union. Following the Rodriguez trial, Garcia Buchaca was removed from her post as secretary of the Cuban National Cultural Society.

In Communist countries, embarrassing events are seldom announced immediately. There is good reason to believe that Ordoqui's ouster took place a good week earlier and was accompanied by acts of violence that have not become public knowledge. According to a rumor, confirmed by several sources, Capt. Jorge Risquet Valdez, aide to Raul Castro, was shot and killed in the Presidential Palace on or about 12 November, when he attempted to arrest Ordoqui. The arrest had been ordered, according to the same rumor, because Ordoqui and President Dorticos had called for impeachment proceedings against Prime Minister Fidel Castro before a full session of the Council of Ministers. When Risquet moved to arrest Ordoqui, Major Francisco Fernandez, also known as Pancho, or Panchon, chief of the Palace Guard, fired at Risquet. When Fidel learned of the incident, he went to Panchon and fired five shots at his head. According to another rumor, a high-level argument ended in the announced "suicide" of one Panchon, President Dorticos' chauffeur.

By the time Ordoqui's ouster was announced, rumors began to circulate in Havana concerning other aspects of what can only be termed a serious struggle for power within the ruling hierarchy, composed of an uneasy

coalition of old Communists and new revolutionaries. A significant and entirely new factor in this struggle is the suspicion, founded upon recent developments, that Fidel Castro's eccentric behavior has tended to alienate some of his former supporters. Behind the rumor, cited above, that Dorticos had called for Castro's impeachment, are more credible reports: Soviet leaders were pleased with Dorticos on his visit to Moscow and considered him more level-headed than Castro. Despite being so damned with faint praise, Dorticos gave the impression that he had more support from the Soviets than did Castro.

Although Castro holds the main levers of power in Cuba, Dorticos is no ordinary figurehead president. Before, 1959, he was for a time secretary to Juan Marinello, perhaps the most distinguished of the Communist old guard, has always been active in Communist causes, though not always a militant party member, and was hand-picked by Fidel Castro after the Cuban revolution began to take its obvious leftward plunge. In spite of rumors of friction between him and Fidel, he seems to be on good terms with Che Guevara and Raul. The day Che Guevara returned from Moscow, where he had gone to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution, he was met at the airport by both Raul and Dorticos. Since this happened to be the day after the announcement of Ordoqui's ouster, and since it is unusual for the President to go to the airport to welcome a subordinate back, observers assume that Dorticos had special reason to confer with Guevara before the latter reported to Fidel.

At this writing, it is not known whether or not the suicide attempt by Labor Minister Augusto Martinez Sanchez, announced 8 December, is connected with the Ordoqui case and the dissensions in the government. Martinez does not fit quite in either faction: He has been a Communist party member since 1944, but joined Castro in the Sierra Maestra in 1958. Hence the confusion in the press, some dispatches saying he was a member of the old guard and some saying he was not.

25X1C10b

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

859 AF,FE,NE. The Afro-Asian (II Bandung) Conference

25X1C10b

SITUATION: The Chicom-Indonesian backed II Afro-Asian Conference (II Bandung) is tentatively scheduled for 10 March 1965 in Algiers. Last April, at the Djakarta preparatory meeting, the Chicoms and the Indonesians abandoned their hope of holding II Bandung before the II Non-Aligned Nations Conference. They apparently yielded to the African contention that there were too many other meetings scheduled for last summer, and not sufficient time to adequately prepare for an Afro-Asian meeting. A weightier consideration was probably the need to resolve the issues of Soviet and, to a lesser degree, Malaysian participation.

Whether II Bandung opens on schedule, if at all this spring, will in large measure depend on how the protagonists deal with the problem of Soviet participation and on Sino-Soviet relationships within the next few weeks. Last April the Chicoms blocked immediate acceptance of India's proposal that the Soviet Union be invited. The Soviet Union's subsequent campaign for acceptance has been modified by its concurrent efforts to bring about a reconciliation with the CPR and to improve its own image in Africa and Asia. While Moscow is not likely to concede easily to Peking the opportunity to dominate II Bandung, Peking will not want to relinquish the chance to do so, particularly since a large percentage of the leaders attending will probably be Africans representing newly independent nations and national liberation movements who favor Peking's policies over those of Moscow on questions relating to underdeveloped areas. The Soviet Union and Communist China are competing for favor with these nations and groups, hoping eventually to extend their areas of influence and brands of Communism in Africa and Asia.

The preparatory meeting's choice of an African site for the conference fits Chicom objectives in Africa although co-sponsor Sukarno undoubtedly regards it as a setback to his plans. However, since the first conference was in Asia, both nations probably anticipated the African demand to host the second conference, especially in view of the tremendous growth since 1955 in numbers of independent African states. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) was asked to decide on a specific location in Africa and in July that body accepted Algeria's bid for the conference.

The Algerian offer stems from Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella's interest in furthering Algerian designs on the African continent and in enhancing his own prestige as a "third world" leader. Last spring the Algerians openly favored the II Non-Aligned Nations Conference over the II Afro-Asian Conference although they did not oppose the latter. At the

Non-Aligned Conference in October their position on national liberation movements paralleled the militant Chicom-Indonesian line, having always favored accelerating action in this area. On other issues, such as peace and disarmament, the Algerians still are more attuned to the Moscow line. With a foot in the camp of each of the two Communist antagonists, the Algerians are open to pressure from both sides.

Algeria's current policy on handling the problem of Soviet participation seeks to appease both the Chicoms and the Soviets, favoring a Foreign Ministers' decision on the issue at their meeting immediately prior to the Conference. No matter what is decided then, it will be rather late to call off the Conference. Chicoms and Indonesians support the Algerian position, insisting that the preparatory committee be concerned solely with administrative aspects of preparation for the conference. On the other hand, Soviet supporters, notably the Indians and Guineans, argued at the ambassadorial level preparatory meetings held in Algiers during October and November that this was the place to resolve the problems of who should be invited. It can be presumed that Soviet pressure on the Algerians will increase if a decision on their participation is held in abeyance too long. If forced to capitulate to Soviet demands, Algeria can always plead financial difficulties especially since everyone knows how much the Non-Aligned Conference cost the UAR. Financial considerations could, indeed, result in an indefinite postponement.

Soviet tactics since the Djakarta preparatory meeting have at times seemed to belie a firm stand against a II Bandung that excluded them. They have all along been faced with the precedent established in 1955, when on the basis that it is not an Asian state, the Soviet Union was not invited to Bandung. Undeterred, in May, Moscow launched an open campaign to get the Afro-Asians to invite them. They used the diplomatic venue; even extended what amounted to economic aid bribes. But on 14 August they appeared to reverse publicly their position. PRAVDA stated that the Soviet Union "cannot allow the question of its invitation to be embarrassing for these (friendly states) or other Afro-Asian countries and especially its use by anyone sowing discord among them and diverting their attention from the big tasks put before the conference...." The statement made it clear that "irrespective of participation in the planned conference," the USSR would support it and the Afro-Asian cause wholeheartedly. The Soviet's intent was undoubtedly to minimize the role of the Chicom adversary while taking credit for keeping the Sino-Soviet dispute out of an Afro-Asian gathering.

The ambiguity of the Soviet position has caused the Indians to question whether they should continue to agitate for Soviet participation. Shortly after Khrushchev's ouster they wondered if the Soviet Union might not be more interested in appeasing Communist China than in attending II Bandung. The period of actively seeking rapprochement with Communist China during October/November had undoubtedly tempered the Soviet Union's public pronouncements. However, since the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, Moscow can be expected to work through third parties to gain admittance.

For objectives, agenda, and participating countries (prospective invitees), see unclassified attachment.


References

BPG #135, Item 748 of 24 Feb 1964


BPG #140, Item 779 of 4 May 1964

BPG #144, Item 802 of 29 June 1964

25X1C10b



K1C10b



25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

858

25X1C10c

Fact Sheet

21 December 1964

The Militarization of Chinese Society

In August 1958 the Chicom authorities launched a mass movement called "Everyone A Soldier." The purpose of the movement was to enlist all elements of the population in militia units as a permanent feature of Chinese society. One province after another reported that all eligible people had enrolled in the movement and within one year over 230 million men and women were said to have been included in the movement. This "Everyone A Soldier" campaign was an integral part of the Great Leap Forward and the formation of the People's Communes. Mao Tse-tung himself said that the movement was "not a question of mobilizing manpower, but of having the masses militarize and collectivize their lives." The New China News Agency (NCNA), in discussing the communes and the militia movement, called for "army-style organization" and pointed out that

"the habit of unified rising, eating, sleeping, setting out to work together and returning from work together was encouraged. This greatly strengthened the collectivization of life and organizational discipline, and nurtured a fighting style in production and work."

Commune members were organized and drilled on military lines, rifles were carried to work and stacked beside the fields each day, families were broken up and children sent to nurseries, and everyone ate their meals in the barracks mess-halls. Production teams were actually formed as a militia company and each commune was classified, according to its size, as a militia battalion, regiment or division.

While this complete militarization of life for the entire populace was particularly stressed during the Great Leap Forward, it was by no means unique to that period. While the Great Leap Forward was finally abandoned as a dismal failure, the militarization of Chinese life is continued and is characteristic of the way the Chicom leaders seek to solve the problems facing the Chinese people.

Mao and his lieutenants lived most of their adult lives in guerrilla or military situations in which a completely militarized, barracks-style organization was essential to their existence and survival. When the Chicoms took power in 1949, the Party, the government bureaucracy and the Army were virtually one and the same thing. A small group of military men around Mao constituted a far more powerful and comprehensive system of interlocking directorates than was ever dreamed of even in the days of unrestrained monopoly capitalism, and their common denominator was that they had held high rank in the so-called People's Liberation Army (PLA). Although the concentration of military personnel among the top leaders has been watered down some in the past 15 years, even today not less than one-half of the Central Committee members have held high military rank.

These are not political commissars who were given honorary military rank, but professional military men who have been given political and ideological rank.

The Chicom leadership of course no longer operates under conditions of guerrilla warfare, but their old, outdated concepts continue to impede progress toward the solution of China's industrial and agricultural problems and a better life for the Chinese people.

Militarization of Industry: When the Party authorities outlined plans for a new industrial upsurge in early 1964, they once again demonstrated from the outset their essentially militaristic approach to the problem. The February 1, 1964 People's Daily (the main newspaper of Chinese CP) editorial "Learn from the Experience of the PLA in Political and Ideological Work," discussed the industrialization program and called on the entire nation to "learn from, study, and compare with" the achievements of the Chicom Army in the political field. The Party Committee at a factory in Shanghai, according to NCNA, pointed out that "in the PLA, everyone carries out ideological tasks, while only a few cadres in our plant do so." All industrial enterprises, government departments, trade unions and agricultural cadres were told to call in PLA cadres for consultation and demobilized army officers were given preferential assignments in industrial enterprises where they were expected to install "the fine tradition and working style of the PLA." When demobilized army cadres are not available for such assignments, troops on active duty are to be transferred to such activities.

Militarization in the Schools: In keeping with the usual pattern of dictatorships and totalitarian governments, the Chicoms pay particular attention to the early training of children and to preparing them to accept without question the militarization of their lives. The Peking newspaper Kuang-ming Jih Pao (Enlightenment Daily) of July 11, 1964 carried a long article denouncing "bourgeois" (as well as "revisionist" education systems for "corrupting" children by "drugging them with ideas about humanitarianism and pacifism.... They disseminate among children the erroneous theory that 'peace is existence while war is death.' They cry 'all men must love one another,' 'don't let children know what war is,' and 'it is a crime to talk about war to children.' They also propagandize children about the 'life of happiness....'" Kuang-ming Jih Pao concluded that children imbued with such ideas become men who "are afraid of death, difficulty, revolution and war..." and obviously not suited to the task of defending Communism.

These are but a few examples of the extent to which all aspects of Chinese life are militarized to serve the interests of the Chicom leaders. The purpose of this militarization is to tighten the Party's control over the people, to discipline them to react unquestioningly in whatever manner the Party requires, and to guarantee the Chinese people's continued submission to personal sacrifices and low living standards.

Fact Sheets

21 December 1964

ABUNDANT SIGNS OF POOR QUALITY
IN SOVIET HEAVY INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

Summary

The Soviet leadership often censures its heavy industry publicly for failing to provide the Soviet economy with equipment that possesses the degree of "longevity, durability, and trustworthiness" found in similar goods produced in the West. There is mounting independent evidence that the censure is richly deserved. In the Free World, respect for Soviet technological achievements was heightened by the notable successes of the Soviet space program, but it is clearly misplaced if it covers the whole range of Soviet heavy industrial products. Moscow's concern over the "quality" problem recently has resulted in a number of conferences, campaigns, and managerial changes at the shop level, and more of the same sort of thing seems to be in the offing. However, fundamental improvements are unlikely under the present Soviet system, which continues to reward volume of output before excellence of performance.

I. Evidence

For 3 weeks this past summer a Soviet economic delegation led by the hard-boiled chief of the Soviet construction industry, I.T. Novikov, crisscrossed the US visiting housing construction, irrigation networks, factories, and powerplants. By his initial attitude, Novikov gave the impression that he had come to boast of Communist achievements, but as the tour progressed, the Soviet group increasingly expressed amazement at the quality of the equipment and the construction that they observed and openly admired the US worker's "tender care" for machinery. They were especially interested in US construction of powerplant turbines and admitted that there was considerable debating in the USSR over the failure of their turbines to hold up under long periods of operation.

Examples of deficiencies in Soviet heavy industry cover a wide range of products, including some of those intended for the priority sectors of the economy. Although there is little doubt that the USSR is capable of producing machinery, in many cases comparable to the best available in the Free World, the record is both uneven and inconsistent. For example, at the recent international exhibition of construction and roadbuilding machinery held in Moscow some Soviet equipment displayed was quite impressive. During the last several years, however, Western engineers have had numerous opportunities to watch Soviet construction equipment at work, and the over-all assessment has been that it is generally less efficient, less durable, and more difficult to operate than equipment produced by the West. In the United Arab Republic Soviet equipment being used on the Aswan High Dam project was of inferior design and quality and was unsuitable for the Egyptian climate. As a result, a very large percentage was down for repairs.

In Burma, bulldozers and scrapers unloaded for projects in the Rangoon area became inoperable after a few weeks' use, and mechanical problems were chronic with Soviet jeeps, trucks, generators, and loading cranes. Similar occurrences have taken place at the Bhilai project in India -- forklift trucks used early in the project needed major repairs in less than 2 months.

In 1963 it was claimed that the blades of Soviet bulldozers in Cuba break at the slightest strain and 3 out of 10 bulldozers fail in the first 50 hours of operation.

The poorest performance of Soviet equipment has been in Turkey. For example, excavators imported from the USSR pumped raw gasoline through the engine exhaust, the welds of shovel booms broke on the first day of operation, shovel teeth wore smooth after 70 to 80 hours of use in earth excavation, and grader cutting blades wore out after 2,000 hours of work.

The situation is much the same with Soviet agricultural equipment. 80 of 120 Soviet tractors operating in Oriente Province broke down in less than 2 months; the blocks broke and the tires wore out prematurely. Soviet tractors in Iraq require a major overhaul after 400 to 500 hours of operation compared with the expected operation time between overhaul of Western-manufactured tractors of 2,000 hours. Moreover, Soviet combines break down a number of times every season primarily because the cutting bar is not strong enough.

Western experience with Soviet chemical equipment generally has been within the USSR itself, for little is exported outside the Bloc. Westerners generally have been unfavorably impressed with the level of Soviet chemical processes but have indicated that many of the deficiencies stem from a shortage of trained personnel and from the absence of preventive maintenance. However, the Soviet authorities themselves have been unusually candid about their chemical equipment industry in recent months, and, judging from press reports, the difficulties are more comprehensive. In March 1963, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta reported that production of fertilizers was stalled at a major chemical combine in 1962 because equipment supplied could not be used -- the welding had to be reprocessed, and subassemblies did not fit. Early this year a Ukrainian report indicated that last year 380 major units slated for priority chemical projects were rejected in that republic as being unfit for use. In August the Soviet national planning magazine admitted that the service life of some pumps slated for use by the chemical industry is measured in hours and that the valves and springs of some types of compressors must be replaced nearly every week.

These deficiencies, moreover, are not confined to the civilian economy. Although there has been considerable improvement in recent years, the quality problem continues to trouble even the high-priority program for military hardware. The situation with military aircraft may be judged by Khrushchev's admission in early 1964 that turboprop engines used in the IL-18 transports had only had an overhaul period of 500 hours, as compared with 2200-2500 hours for British engines; he claimed that this

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

condition had been rectified, but judging by remarks he made on 4 September, the improved engines are still not in production.

II. Background

Official Moscow has long decried the traditional fact that Soviet industry has been better at rough cuts than at fine adjustments, but the pinch in resources of the last few years has brought new interest to this problem. Khrushchev, at the 22d Party Congress in 1961, labeled the need for better quality machinery and instruments a "paramount economic and political task." Then in April 1963, shortly after the Soviet leadership took the decision to launch the costly new chemical program, he devoted part of a major speech to the question of improving reliability, working life, and technological excellence of Soviet machinery. Late last year a member of the Soviet State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research stated that "reliability" was now the most important field of research in support of Soviet industry. Recently, to underscore the importance of this emphasis, the Moscow Economic-Statistical Institute released the calculation that the Soviet economy loses 10 billion to 20 billion rubles* annually from spoilage and wastage in industrial production because an adequate statistical system does not exist in the USSR for monitoring quality of output.

III. Causes

Underlying the Soviet quality problem is the fundamental inability of the economy to muster the required materials, technology, and scientific know-how to satisfy the wide range of tasks set by Soviet policymakers. Apart from this condition, which is not likely to change, given the expansive nature of Communist aspirations, the Soviet authorities recognize that their systems of planning and incentive militate against improvements.

In recent years, one of the chief Soviet advocates for better quality of industrial output has been the aircraft designer O.K. Antonov. He is unmistakably a person who is qualified to talk on the subject in view of his own record as a successful production man. Antonov holds that the primary motivation of any plant manager is the accomplishment of the plan for gross output. If a plant produces an aircraft engine with a useful life of 1,500 hours and if it is known that to expend 20 percent more labor will double the life of the engine, no economic council or plant will do this on its own, for it would mean that output

* Ruble values are here given in new rubles. A nominal rate of exchange based on the gold content of the respective currencies is 0.90 ruble to US \$1. This rate should not be interpreted as a precise ruble-dollar relationship that will yield an equivalent dollar value for the ruble.

would fall a corresponding 20 percent or more. Antonov warns that the substandard machine turned out in haste today to meet the plan serves only to produce poor-quality goods in the years to come -- thus the problems accumulate.

Others tell much the same story. Recent national attention to the question of quality control has been accompanied with numerous examples of the failure of factory managers to insist on even the most elementary standards of excellence. As one Soviet authority has put it, the factory is expected first and foremost to fulfill its output plan, and, as a consequence, managers "put pressure" on inspectors to accept defective products. The inspectors in turn have few grounds for resisting such intimidation -- they generally have no special training for their job and little practical experience. One official complained that there was a general feeling among workers and officials alike that errors and defects in machinery were a "law of nature" that could not be avoided. Inspectors turn their backs as subassemblies pass from section to section until, in the final assembly process, production goes to "wreck and ruin" in a last-minute attempt to correct accumulated errors.

Finally, another point raised by the Soviet authorities themselves is that the quality program suffers from the lack of standardization. The Chairman of the National Committee for Standards and Measures recently complained in the press that in the automobile and tractor industry each plant virtually goes its own way, creating its own designs and specifications for machines. This lack of standardization understandably has led to a diversity of construction decisions and a multitude of "standard" dimensions. The chairman blamed the situation on the fact that his committee was unable to work out standards in a timely fashion -- in most instances taking 6 or more years to do so. Although an improvement would not necessarily lead directly to any changes locally, it is equally unlikely that over-all standards of quality can be raised without improvement would not necessarily lead directly to any changes locally, it is equally unlikely that over-all standards of quality can be raised without improvement in the national organs that guide the program.

IV. What Is Being Done?

First, the top Soviet leadership is aware of the problem. Raising the quality of industrial output is listed in directives for the next Five Year Plan (1966-70) as a priority task. In August 1964, Khrushchev told a Czechoslovak factory audience that he clearly understood that it is more economical to manufacture better machines, although it may mean lowering total output.

Positive action thus far, however, has been through administrative manipulations and exhortations. A series of lectures was given in Moscow in the fall of 1963 on the themes of reliability and long life of machines, the Leningrad Sovnarkhoz is setting up a system of laboratory tests on service reliability, a conference on a statistical measurement of quality was recently held in Moscow, and various plants throughout the country have undertaken to increase the working life of their product. Publicity

emanating from this campaign has been most revealing of the difficulties. The Volga-Vyatskiy Sovnarkhoz has pledged to double the useful life of truck engines produced in its jurisdiction to make them "comparable" to foreign makes!

The "Saratov" system of quality control and "nondefective manufacture" of machines introduced locally several years ago is receiving national acclaim -- Ekonomicheskaya gazeta recently devoted virtually an entire issue to the subject. Under this system the prime goal in machine building is quality rather than quantity, and the factory inspectors are given the responsibility and power to check each manufacturing operation. Quality requirements set up by the factory inspectors are said to be binding on both workers and management. Defective articles, when discovered, are to be returned immediately to the section that is responsible, and workers with three infractions are subject to dismissal. This system has now been approved by the central authorities and is now being introduced in more than 600 machine building plants in the RSFSR.

Finally, the problem of quality has been identified as one of the important issues in the current Soviet discussion of liberalizing central control of the economy.

V. Chances for Success

Although there is no reason to doubt that over time the Soviet authorities can raise the quality of their industrial product, Moscow's campaign almost certainly will not bring uniform results and, barring fundamental alternations in the Soviet system, will not lead to widespread improvement.

In spite of Soviet press publicity to the contrary, there is little to support the view that activities such as the "Saratov" system are producing any fundamental change in management attitudes. One Soviet official expressed this fact informally with the statement: "Oh, sure, quality on bottom, but quantity is still on top." There is evidence that plants treat the payment of fines imposed on them for defective products as a routine matter and as an expected part of the cost of operation. The workers themselves have no stake in the new effort, and Moscow has yet to work out a bonus system that places primary emphasis on quality of production, although several attempts have been made to do so.

Many Soviet industrial managers recognize the scope of the difficulties. At a recent industrial conference a regional economic official pointed out that to increase the longevity and reliability of output means additional expenses but that "planners have yet to work out any system for allocating these funds." Furthermore, studies of cost and economic effectiveness in connection with determining reliability and durability are equally scarce. It is not so apparent, however, that the top Soviet leadership, although quite vocal, really understands the complexity of the problem. In a typical oversimplification, Khrushchev recently said that a Soviet aircraft engine plant managed to increase the service life of its product fivefold after "we [the Party] had a pleasant debate" with the engineers, implying that encouragement and prodding is all that is needed.

December 17, 1964

The Truth About The Congo

Failure to understand Congo developments since the United Nations peace keeping mission departed in June 1964 has led to many false charges, some of them furthered by elements who profit by the continuing agony in this largest and richest of African countries. Charges most frequently encountered are listed below; each is followed by a statement of fact.

"The Congolese rebels are fighting a war of national liberation."

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been independent since gaining her freedom from Belgium in June 1960. Joseph Kasavubu is the elected president of the Congo and recognized as chief of state by the Organization of African Unity, the OAU. As President, he is obligated to appoint a Prime Minister. Mr. Tshombe, appointed Prime Minister by the President, is the head of government of the sovereign Congo and as such is attempting to defend the government and its people against unlawful insurgency which amounts to civil war.

The rebel leaders have labelled themselves the Committee for National Liberation but they consist chiefly of disgruntled tribal groups led by former opposition members of parliament. Instead of a revolutionary effort to establish a better order of society for the mass of Congolese people, this is a rebellion against legitimate authority (begun against the Adoula government); it is being carried on in the destructive and purposeless fashion of tribal feuds which Africa is trying to leave behind.

It is exactly because the rebels lack popular support that they need outside assistance. The Communist Chinese see this tribal warfare as the key to Communist control of Central Africa. Calling this a "peoples war," they have for months financed, trained, advised and armed rebels from their diplomatic posts in Brazzaville and Bujumbura.

"Congo Premier Tshombe should use Africans to protect his government -- not foreign troops."

When the UN troops departed in June 1964, the OAU made no move to assist the Congo although the unsettled insurgency problem and the need for training the Congolese army were well known to all. In August, Premier Tshombe appealed in vain to Nigeria, Ethiopia, Malagasy Republic, Liberia and Senegal for troops. When all African assistance was refused he then called for volunteers from other countries to augment his own forces.

President Nyerere of Tanganyika, Prime Ministers Kenyatta of Kenya and Obote of Uganda requested and received help from the UK, whom they trusted, in putting down the same type of threat to their own governments in January 1964. Had they not immediately done so they might be faced today with precisely the same dangers as the government of the

(Cont.)

Congo. The actions of these sovereign governments in protecting their own security were well understood by the other African nations.

"African countries must fight Western neo-colonialism in the Congo."

If seeking and accepting foreign assistance is in itself to be construed as evidence of "neo-colonialism," then the criterion must be applied equally to all. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, noted on December 15 during debate of the Congo matter: "there is hardly an African state which has not requested and received military aid, in the form of arms or training or both, from outside Africa. Certainly Algeria, for example, has received and is receiving massive foreign military aid in both these categories." Algeria, increasingly -- but probably unwittingly -- playing the role of Soviet cats-paw in Black Africa, is one of the first to cry "imperialism" against western aid.

Interference in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign nation of Africa was outlawed by all OAU members under Article III of the OAU charter. Furthermore, the OAU Extraordinary Council of Foreign Ministers passed a resolution on September 10, 1964 calling on all states to avoid any action likely to worsen the situation in the Congo. Even then Algeria, Ghana and the UAR were clandestinely assisting the rebels. The Soviet Union, whose refusal to support the UN peace-keeping mission helped speed UN withdrawal, is now openly providing assistance through its acolytes in order to regain influence lost through clumsy subversion efforts and also to outdo the Communist Chinese who are making a major effort to penetrate Africa through the Congo.

This massive assistance is seldom described as interference -- even though it is now being openly undertaken by enemies of the legal Congo government -- because the invaders have cloaked their efforts as "anti-imperialism" and "liberation." The ease with which they have thus fooled responsible African governments may set a dangerous precedent for similar action in other sub-Saharan African countries. At a minimum it makes a mockery of the non-interference clauses of the OAU charter and presages the radical states' refusal to be bound by other charter provisions which hamper their own pursuit of power.

"The Central Government of the Congo and the rebels should have agreed to a cease fire on appeal of the OAU commission under Prime Minister Kenyatta."

Such a move would be tantamount to calling for the policemen to refrain from chasing the murderer so that they might "negotiate" the results of the crime. Would Kenyatta have agreed to a "ceasefire" in order to negotiate with the Kenya rebels in early 1964? Would President Diiori agree to a "ceasefire" with the rebels in Niger? These legal governments have an obligation to their people to put down rebellions and maintain law and order in the country -- as Tshombe is doing today in the Congo and Ben Bella in Algeria.

"Belgium and the United States moved into the Congo only when the lives of the "whites" were endangered."

The joint paratroop operation was planned because of imminent danger to US and Belgian hostages but some 20 nationalities were also among the nearly 2,000 they rescued from the rebels. No African country, even those whose own nationals were among the victims of the vicious Congolese tribal warfare, made a move to assist the government in putting down the rebellion which had caused deaths of an estimated 10,000 Africans (source: Congo government white paper).

On the contrary, Ghana, UAR and Algeria who are anxious to weaken the largest country of sub-Saharan Africa in order to strengthen their own domination of the area, have increased material support to the rebels, prolonging and increasing African slaughter of Africans. Neighboring Congo (Brazzaville) and Sudan, both dominated by Soviet-trained personalities are providing training sites, refuge and transport points for Communist arms and ammunition.

"If the Belgians and USA had not sent in the paratroops, the hostages would not have been killed."

Rebel leader Christopher Gbenye said in the 14/15 November issue of rebel newspaper Le Martyr (10 days before the paradrop):

"We have in our claws more than 300 Americans and more than 800 Belgians under house arrest and in secure locations. At the least bombardment of our regions and of our revolutionary capital, they will be sent to the great beyond, that is, they will be massacred.... We will dress ourselves in the skins of the Belgians and Americans.... I also exhort all Congolese to hatred against the Americans. Do not accord hospitality to the Belgians and American."

Dr. Paul Carlson, an American missionary had already been sentenced to death on a false charge of being an army officer. Only Kenyatta's personal appeal stayed the execution (but did not prevent his murder later). Radio Stanleyville continuously called on Congolese people to hate foreigners. Survivors testified they were frequently beaten and threatened with death and that their rescue came just in the nick of time.

"Rebel leaders claim that the rescue mission killed thousands of Congolese."

Evidence that not all of the African countries are taken in by such blatant falsehoods is the fact that only 18 out of 35 African countries signed the petition to the UN which charged Belgium and the US with "intervention." (according to Nigerian Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku, speaking to UN Security Council on December 15.) The others either knew the true facts or refused to be intimidated by the irresponsible African Radicals.

Eye witnesses rescued from the rebels in Stanleyville and Paulis described the large scale rebel slaughter of Congolese, the extreme cruelty of these killings and the bestial nature of the torture practiced on Congolese and hostages alike. They also described the deliberate seeking out and killing of all educated Congolese and of those who held provincial administrative posts -- the potential leadership of any developing country. (Killing of intellectuals in northern Angola is a charge the Africans themselves have brought against Portugal.) The use of fetishes, of drugs and tribal magic increased the savagery of the rebel simba and jounesse. Survivors' revelations have astounded and horrified other African leaders who are trying to build dignity and self-respect for the African. They are becoming increasingly concerned that all Africa will be infected by this reversion to ancient savageries.

But rebel leaders (unquestionably with foreign advice) found a way to continue to rid themselves of their enemies while erasing the image of themselves as savages: blame the slaughter of innocent Congolese on "Europeans and mercenaries." If other Africans can be tricked so easily into disregarding the evidence of the hundreds of survivors of all nationalities, the rebels may subdue African protests and play into the hands of those who profit from continuing chaos in the Congo.

CONGO REPORT

21 December 1964

25X1C10b

African leaders, both in the Congo and elsewhere, are worried about the damage done to the African image as a result of the barbaric and senseless killing of thousands of civilians in the Stanleyville area.

One official of a neighboring African country said:

"We have worked for years to build our prestige at the United Nations. We had first to destroy the myths of colonialism that we lived by black magic and the law of the jungle. Now we are revealed as cannibals, brutes who rip out and eat the hearts of our enemies, who burn people alive, sew them in sacks and throw them into crocodile-infested rivers! What can our United Nations colleagues think of us?"

More than U.N. prestige is involved, however. There are fears that foreign technical assistance may be affected, because the experts, and the teachers, so badly needed in developing Africa will hesitate to go to a continent where they may face sudden and savage death. The Leopoldville newspaper, Le Progres, pointed this out in an editorial referring to the "loss of confidence" of countries which have sent "the best of their people" to help the Congo.

The Leopoldville government, however, is not likely to come down its accusations against the rebels led by Christoph Gbenye and Gaston Soumialot. It is enraged by the open support given the dissidents by such other African countries as Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, as well as help rendered by Communist China through bases in neighboring Brazzaville and Burundi.

Echoing the official view, L'Etoile du Congo, the largest circulation newspaper in the capital, declared that these supporters of the Stanleyville regime "share the acts of barbarism." They "are birds of a feather," L'Etoile said, all members of a "Pan-African Murder Incorporated."

The Tshombe government, under a continuing fire from these enemies within the Organization for African Unity (OAU), was certain to react with documented proofs of the wave of savagery let loose by Gbenye and his lieutenants since last August.

Black Congolese were the chief targets of the abuse, although the outside world focused most attention in the plight of the whites held as hostages at Stanleyville and other places, and on the dramatic rescue by Belgian paratroops.

Officials here point out that the rebels killed 200 Congolese for every white person: -- They say at least 10,000 Congolese were killed in late November at the height of the blood-letting.

Any educated person was considered an "imperialist," a survivor of the rebel occupation of Kinshasa.

another major Leopoldville newspaper. He told of scores being killed daily at Kindu, several weeks before Stanleyville was retaken. L'Etoile du Congo wrote that "one of the characteristics of a rebellion was the systematic massacre of the elite."

Officials here, continuing to stress the guilt shared by all who supported this brutality, point out that the rebels justified their acts under the banner of nationalism and anti-colonialism. They note, too, that the rebels proudly referred to themselves as "Communists."

In Leopoldville, officials say this was mad, insane rebellion, not truly revolution -- that Gbenye and his followers, hopped up by hemp and marijuana, were bent on destroying everything in the Stanleyville area that promised a better life for the people: the educated leadership, the schools and churches, plantations, even water systems and communications centers. They put a torch to everything that burned, and smashed machinery, electric motors, pumps and teletypes.

"Under the banner of progress and world revolution," one Tshombe supporter said, "they put this part of the Congo back in the 19th century. It will take years to rebuild what they've destroyed."

While not all African leaders completely agree with Tshombe, most find repugnant the brutality unleashed by Gbenye and his supporters. They regret no African solution could be found before Tshombe asked for foreign paratroops, but recognize that African nations turned a deaf ear to Tshombe's earlier pleas for help and that the OAU had the matter under consideration, without getting anywhere, for some two months. Gbenye forced Tshombe to act, it is generally believed, by his open and savage threats to hostages on Stanleyville radio, and his refusal to heed the pleas of such world leaders as U Thant and Pope Paul and from the International Red Cross.

* * * * *

The Congo exported to other lands in 1964 an estimated \$360 million worth of copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and other products -- providing the Leopoldville government nearly \$1 million a day in export earnings. With an unusual excess of exports over imports, the year-end balance sheet is more impressive than any other country on the continent with the exception of South Africa.

Copper, mined in Katanga Province, is the major export. It provides half the foreign exchange earned over the 12 month period. Katanga is also the world's largest known source of cobalt, which is a basic requirement for nuclear development.

The Congo covers a tremendous area -- some 900,000 square miles. This is about the same as all of Western Europe, or equivalent to all of the United States east of the Mississippi river.

There are only 15 million people living in this vast stretch of fertile land. Some population experts guess the country could support 10 times that many, possibly many more.

These are some of the factors which have made this former Belgian colony a prime cold war target. The Russians tried to get a foot in right after independence five years ago, by dealing with a secessionist regime in Stanleyville. Moscow gave up, partly because of the logistic problem of supplying its friends. Over the last year, the Communist Chinese have had a crack at it. Officials here believe Peking will continue the effort, even though the Chinese-backed forces suffered a major defeat in late November when they were thrown out of Stanleyville.

Experts here believe Chinese policy planners in Peking have circled the Congo on their global maps as Peking's prime target in Africa. The Chinese want the Congo for three major reasons, they say, and will continue an all-out drive to install a pro-Peking government, to the fullest extent possible within China's limited resources.

The three reasons are: (1) cobalt, (2) copper, and (3) lebensraum (living room).

Of the three, cobalt may currently have top priority, because of Peking's attempt to build up a psychological weapon of nuclear terror, a drive climaxed a few months ago, after great sacrifice, by explosion of China's first primitive nuclear device.

Communist China, reports agree, already has uranium in Sinkiang and Szechwan provinces, so it has no urgent need of the uranium which is also found in the Congo. Peking also has its own lead and nickel, also required in nuclear construction. The experts say China is almost totally lacking in cobalt, however, and is not getting any from the Soviet Union.

Cobalt can be used to build the "dirtiest" and deadliest of nuclear bombs, when used as a casing around an explosive device. Its concentrates also absorb slow neutron particles in a reactor and thus produce radioactive cobalt-60. This is a powerful source of gamma rays, which can be used to enrich uranium or manufacture plutonium.

Peking also lacks sufficient copper for its industrial development, the experts say, but they believe that, for the Chinese point of view, the need is not as pressing as for cobalt.

The vast amount of living space, coupled with the Congo's extremely fertile soil, is the other major reason for China's tactics of subversion and guerrilla war against the Congo. Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders have been extremely frank about China's need of living space for its mounting millions -- a population which will reach a billion in this generation.

The Congo has other riches, so vast that they continue to pour out of a cornucopia of abundance despite the departure of the Belgian colonialists and the harassment of rebel outbreaks in various areas. The country continues to produce 85 percent of the world's industrial diamonds. It ships out quantities of rubber, coffee, palm oil, mahogany and other tropical woods.

African experts say the Congo has more economic potential than possibly any other area in Africa. And more, it has the economic infrastructure in existence to permit a great expansion as soon as its cold war troubles come to a halt.

The Congo has, for example, probably the most efficient transport system in all of Africa. It has 300 airports capable of handling planes up to the C-47 in size. It has thousands of miles of all-weather roads, criss-crossing the country. It has good railroads, probably the best in black Africa. It has some 4,000 miles of navigable waterways. It has modern port facilities, capable of handling 10 ships at a time.

Despite the guerrilla warfare, the Congo's big plantations are producing at a record rate. Production would be much higher if smaller producers were not disheartened by a sense of insecurity. A land which once exported rice and cotton is now forced to import these items to fill local needs.

Given a period of economic and political stability, the Congo will forge ahead, experts agree, and be an example for all Africa to emulate, despite such inherent problems as 200 different tribal groups and the loss of thousands of tribal leaders and literates as a result of rebel brutalities and mass murder.

An election now scheduled for next February is expected to give Prime Minister Moise Tshombe a political mandate to move ahead with his development program. But observers agree the country also needs a period of internal peace and stability to make the most of its tremendous potential.

* * * * *

Independent and non-western sources here have confirmed the widespread atrocities committed by rebel forces in the Stanleyville area and say that they killed at least 5,000 Congolese.

Lebanese, Asian and non-Congolese African refugees all told the same dolorous story when they reached safety from Stanleyville, and those who heard them still remember them vividly. The stories all checked when a methodical search was made for the real account of bloody November in the Congo's guerrilla war.

Belgian paratroopers saved men, women and children of sixteen different countries when they snatched some 2,500 people from rebel territory in late November. The Africans and other non-westerners among them told their stories in detail.

As one Lebanese refugee put it, the rebels of Christopher Gbenye killed anyone who could read or write or wore pants or a tie.

From strictly non-western sources, this account emerges:

The killing began before Belgium gave any indication of moving paratroops into the war-torn country. Africans, mostly black Congolese, were first. Thousands were tortured and killed by the undisciplined, anti-government bands. Many were gutted alive and their internal organs pulled out and eaten on the spot. Hands, arms, ears, genital organs were cut off living persons who had displeased the rebels in one way or another.

The Lebanese refugee, among others, estimated that the death toll over the last several months was 200 black Congolese killed for each of the 50 Belgians and Americans slain or missing at the time of the paratrooper operation. This total of 10,000 Congolese dead is widely accepted here, although many officials say the exact death toll among Africans may never be known. The refugees insisted that the most conservative estimate would be at least 5,000 Congolese dead.

Non-westerners living in Leopoldville -- more than a thousand miles from Stanleyville--said that they were aware of the outlines of this grisly story while it was being enacted. Many of the "mass meetings" which condemned the Congolese leaders captured in Stanleyville by the rebels were broadcast by radio while they were underway, for one thing.

It was at such a meeting that Gbenye called for a verdict on the fate of Paul Carlson, the American missionary, while discussions on his fate were being conducted in Nairobi. The crowd chanted for death, and Gbenye himself said Carlson's life would be spared temporarily.

The sources said, however, other rebel broadcasts reported repeatedly that the prisoners would be killed. It was the threat of the tortures and death being meted out to Africans that placed hundreds of white hostages in double jeopardy and created great pressures for their rescue. The Leopoldville government then requested foreign troops. The paratroop operation was in response to this situation. The Belgians withdrew as soon as the mission was completed.

In fact, this military operation was accomplished more quickly and foreign troops removed faster than when the governments of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya requested British troops to put down mutinies in their armies several months ago. The British also withdrew promptly.

Priests and nuns serving missions in the guerrilla area reported that a number of their students had joined up with the "simbas," as the rebel forces called themselves. They participated in the indiscriminate raping of nuns and other white women. Many of those religious and other whites who escaped torture and death showed up in Leopoldville with scars of indiscriminate beatings.

Earlier, the refugees said, the "simbas" established and maintained in occupied cities a system for the organized raping of Congolese girls, some of them as young as 12 years. In some instances, the girls were merely snatched away from their families. In other cases, older women who were sympathetic to the rebels were prevailed upon to go from house to house, marking those with the most beautiful daughters. At night, armed "simbas" would come and force the women to take their daughters to the rebels.

African refugees told of instances when, for some perverse reason, armed rebels tried to force fathers to rape their own daughters.

Part of this was attributed by the refugees to senseless, wanton and hysterical killing, set off by tribal animosities, the excitement of the war and quantities of the dope, marijuana. The result was to set back the Congo to the savagery that existed a century ago.

It was also a period for settling old scores. Congolese refugees reported that Gbenye himself ordered the shooting of his father-in-law, a former territorial administrator, and made no effort to hide the act. Another rebel leader, Martin Kasongo, ordered the execution of his father-in-law, Jean Hanus, onetime president of the provincial Assembly in Stanleyville. The rebel commander, Nicolas Olenga, personally shot a Congolese who, years before, had refused to hire him for a job needing more qualifications, the refugees said, than the "general" then had.

The Lebanese refugee, who declined use of his name but who is widely-experienced and well-traveled, noted another pattern. The murder of those who appeared literate, he said, was extended into a more systematic purge of most of the non-Communist Congolese in Stanleyville who held positions of leadership or who might become future leaders.

He agreed with others, particularly Asian survivors of the massacre, that the bulk of the "simbas" were wanton, tribal killers and not "nationalists" in any sense but that the leaders apparently also were implementing a prearranged plan to kill all future enemies. This was done systematically in Communist China and has been a principal tactic of the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. The informants noted this parallel and said that it clearly showed the influence of the Chinese Communists.

REVOLT IN THE CONGO

(Summary)

Govt of Congo Leopoldville after the parachute operation published a 40-page pamphlet "La Rebellion au Congo" (Revolt in the Congo) giving the highlights of the efforts of Moise Tschombe and President Joseph Kasavubu to prevent massacres of Europeans and Congolese by appealing to rebel leader Gbenye and to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Included are details of demarches, photos and figures on atrocities. More complete account promised later as official white paper. Summary highlights follows:

One of first acts of Tschombe as prime minister was to invite rebel Conseil National de Liberation (CNL), operating in neighboring Brazzaville, to participate in a government of unity. Only one, Andre Lubaya, accepted. Appointed Minister Health. CNL set unacceptable terms, among them resignation President Kasavubu. Tschombe kept his promise and on 17 July freed 2,000 political prisoners, among them Antoine Gizenga.

Rebels operating out of sanctuary in Brazzaville had occupied Stanleyville, plus large area of interior, and massacres began. Seeking African solution to African problems, Kasavubu appealed to the OAU, which met 5-10 Sept at Addis Ababa in extraordinary session. Tschombe's proposal for series of bilateral military accords between Leopoldville and other African nations to speed pacification of Congo rejected 18 to 17 by council of ministers of OAU. An ad hoc committee of representatives of nine African nations was appointed and instructed to proceed to Congo. Despite Leopoldville's encouragement, committee never came.

Pamphlet makes clear that most of the atrocities occurred in August, long before the government appealed to Belgium and U.S. for aid and that overwhelming majority of the victims were Congolese. Europeans, being non-combatants and not parties to the dispute, thought they would be safe if they remained. It was they who were kept as hostages. Pamphlet details horrifying instances of torture, savagery, and even cannibalism. Pictures facsimile CNL newspaper 14 Nov. "Le Martyr" in which Gbenye declares: "We will make fetishes from the hearts of the Americans and Belgians and will make clothes from their skins."

Most significant aspect of killing of Congolese is that it is selective rather than mass murder: In town after town, beginning in late July, the rebels systematically murdered all native Africans who occupied positions of importance as intellectuals, political leaders, technicians, teachers, etc. The mayor of Stanleyville was dismembered alive by cannibal rebels in the public square, all the leading municipal functionaries were killed and three judges became victims of cannibalism. In Boende 600 workers in the rubber plantations were killed in one day, and 180 trained specialists, including 18 Malaysians brought to the Congo to train the youth in rubber culture, were slaughtered. The

(Cont.)

foremen and Congolese government employees were tied together, sprinkled with gasoline, and burned alive.

The pamphlet includes texts of pertinent documents: the telegram from rebel General Olenga ordering one of his garrison commanders to exterminate all Belgians and Americans in case of bombardment; facsimile of an unsigned letter in veiled language found among Gbenye's effects mentioning \$10,500 received from (Communist) China. Letter from Tschome to president of the International Red Cross requesting an observer be sent to Stanleyville; pertinent portions of Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning hostages, treatment of prisoners, wounded, etc. Photographs include: small boys armed with pistols and machine gun; instruction manual found on rebel on how to handle bazooka and rocket thrower; eight wooden cases marked "packages of TNT" in Russian; Chicom propaganda in French; heavy and light machine guns marked with Chinese characters; samples of .50 and .30 caliber ammo beside Chinese label.

21 December 1964

Extract of Speech Regarding the Congo

by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Senegal, United Nations General Assembly

December 8, 1964

In Asia, as in Africa, a colonizer withdrew so as to make room for new masters, often unofficial ones, to be installed. Sometimes, the colonizer himself has endeavoured to reopen the entire issue by a side approach. For some years the word neo-colonialism has been used. Alas, it must be recognized that the word has acquired a burning reality. However, we wish to be objective and to analyse the situation. While the colonialists bear a heavy responsibility, the peoples who were formally colonized are not wholly exempt from all blame. Very often it is we ourselves who start the cold war in our countries. Because of internal rivalries between men and different political tendencies, we invite others to interfere in our domestic affairs. Or, being in a state of conflict with a neighbour, we appeal to a third country, often a great Power, to intervene in the country. This leads our adversary to do likewise. We have created the Organization for African Unity, but within it we allow tendencies to take hold so that it becomes difficult to solve problems on an objective basis. Yet we make decisions in terms of alliances, sympathies, rivalries, and sometimes in terms of enmities. Frequently, there has been a wish to make the organization play a role which does not belong to it, making of it a supranational organization as though, by adhering to the charter of the Organization for African Unity, nations had abandoned their own sovereignty. Let us not go too fast. For the time being, African unity is a tendency, an aspiration; it is not yet an institutional reality. All these contradictions paralyse us and give the world outside the impression that we take action without having any principles or rules. The example of the Congo is characteristic in this respect.

Since 1960, that unhappy country has been struggling against innumerable difficulties. It is the least successful example of decolonization that one can think of. Of course, originally, the fault is that of the Belgian colonizers who were less concerned with the training of men than in exploiting the riches of the country. Undeniably, there was also the pressure of financial groups which did not wish to withdraw from the Congo and which went forward with the dislocation of the country. The Katanga session had its origin there. But have we other Africans really facilitated the solution of the problem by coherent and concerted action? We do not think so.

My delegation feels free to speak of the Congolese problem because we have, from the beginning, condemned the secession of Katanga and have sent troops to assist in halting it and to defend the territorial integrity of the Congo. Last year, even though we understood the financial reasons advanced in favour of the withdrawal of the United Nations troops from the Congo, it was not without apprehension that we awaited that event.

The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the activities of the Organization well confirms this apprehension. I quote from his report:

"The United Nations military advisers agreed that the Congolese army and police were still lacking the ability to assume full responsibility for law and order in the country and that therefore a case could be made for a need of military assistance from outside beyond 1964."

In other words, if the United Nations withdrew, the Congolese army would find it impossible to maintain public order and security in the Congo and, according to the report,

"There would appear to be little basis for optimism about the prospects for significant progress in the training and modernization of the ANC by June 1964."

This is what we read in the report of the Secretary-General concerning the Congo at the time when the United Nations troops were to be withdrawn. Since then, Mr. Adoula has retired from the Government. Mr. Tshombe has taken his place. It is not for us to assess the reasons and the conditions for this change which has taken place within the domestic policy of the Congo. Governments change every day in countries; sometimes according to constitutional procedures, sometimes because of a coup d'état. These are domestic questions in which we should not interfere.

What is astonishing is that in Africa there has sometimes been a systematic attempt to challenge the validity of the present Government of the Congo. It is a dangerous precedent which we, the Senegalese, cannot accept. If Mr. Tshombe has made mistakes, if he has acted in the interest of the Congo, it is the Congolese people alone who must judge. We, for our part, refrain from interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo.

Senegal wishes to remain faithful to certain principles, whatever happens. Any policy which is not based on respect for certain principles is condemned to failure. However, in this matter of the Congo, it must be said clearly, we fail to see what principles are at stake, although one may sometimes guess what interests are sought. The recent American-Belgian intervention in the Congo has given rise to impassioned and sometimes false indignation in Africa. Quite recently, some African Governments had requested the intervention of European Powers in order to crush rebellions, so there was silence. We must be consistent with ourselves. In any case, there cannot be two systems of weights and measures. I believe that, instead of precipitating ourselves into the Security Council chamber to stir up a question which is far from being unanimously agreed among ourselves, we would do better, we Africans, to begin by examining our own conscience. Have we done everything to help the people of the Congo? We have often brought to the Congo our own internal quarrels; we

have often helped, consciously or unconsciously, to establish anarchy there. We approve or condemn interventions, whether from the right or from the left, from Washington or from Moscow.

We wish to speak as a truly non-aligned country; non-aligned with any blocs, but also non-aligned within Africa. What binds the peoples of Africa together is solidarity, sometimes the identity of a situation. But solidarity does not mean subjection or submission. It postulates the equality of all African States and mutual respect for their own sovereignty. The Congolese problem is serious; but let us begin, we Africans, by forbidding ourselves to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo if we wish to be the authoritative judges and critics of other interventions.

We believe that it would be useless to say any more about it, and we hope that we have been fully understood. But should it be necessary to return to this question, my delegation will do so.

Be that as it may, there are precedents which it is dangerous to create in Africa, precedents that are all the more undesirable since the decolonization process is not yet completed. Foreign interventions, even when requested by ourselves, are often occasions for bringing into question our independence and our sovereignty. But for these interventions to cease, we ourselves must make an effort to solve our own internal troubles. We, in Senegal, feel quite free to say this because, since our independence, two very serious crises have shaken our country to the extent of bringing about changes in our government. We have made no appeals to other countries to settle our difficulties. We have settled them ourselves. There can be no doubt that no one can challenge the right of a country in the exercise of its sovereignty to appeal to a foreign Power to assist it in solving its difficulties. But a country does so at its own risk. We cannot condemn a country for this; we can only regret it. This is what we have done in the case of the Congo. But, in truth, the situation in the Congo is so exceptional that we must examine it with indulgence, sometimes with humility, because of our own shortcomings in this matter.

The Congolese problem calls for serious thinking. Tomorrow, in the Portuguese colonies, we run the risk of finding ourselves in a similar situation, especially if Portugal does not as of now take the necessary measures to train the required technical cadres and the administrative and political staff to take responsibility after Portugal has left.

For a long time, we have been calling on the United Nations to assume its responsibilities. Instead of battling about the impossible application -- not wholly desirable -- of Article 19, we would do better to stress the direct responsibility of Portugal and South Africa, and all those who endeavour to implant neo-colonialism, so that they may realize that the establishment of a new international order is beyond recall and that they may abandon an obsolete past. To deprive the Soviet Union of its right to vote would be to create a disequilibrium fatal to the United Nations and, finally, to peace. We believe that the application of Article 19 is not desirable and would be inopportune. The United Nations cannot live with the United States alone, nor with the Soviet Union alone. These two great Powers are condemned to live together and to co-operate,

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4

in the interests of peace. Our duty, we who belong to the "third world," is to advise, to conciliate, to help in finding an acceptable compromise. We believe further that once the compromise has been found in the present situation, we must not rest on our laurels. We must attack the basic problem, which is to find conditions in which the United Nations can undertake action in the interest of peace, on bases which would commit all its Members.

Again, we wish to speak as representing a non-aligned country consistent with itself. My delegation is all the happier that our country is not engaged in any conflict, that it practices a policy of peace and dialogue, a policy that will make it possible, without any obstacles, to bring about the new world which all of us desire with all our hearts.

25X1C10b

Fact Sheets

21 December 1964

II Afro-Asian Conference Proposed
for Algiers in March 1965

Annotated excerpts from the official communique issued in April 1964 by the ministerial preparatory meeting for the II Afro-Asian Conference.

Objectives

In accordance with the spirit of the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 and taking into consideration the significant increase in the number of free states and countries in Asia and Africa since the holding of that conference and their increasingly important role in international problems, the meeting decided that the objectives of the Second Afro-Asian Conference would be as follows:

- 1--To promote and strengthen mutual understanding and friendship among the nations and peoples of Asia and Africa and further to exchange experiences and information for their common benefit.
- 2--To attain common understanding of the basic problems arising out of the revolutionary changes which have been taking place in all fields in the lives of the peoples in Asia and Africa in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, for the achievement of full and complete national independence.
- 3--To search for appropriate methods to insure continuous and close cooperation among Afro-Asian countries for the development of Afro-Asian solidarity on the basis of equality, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
- 4--To make policies for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for the renunciation of threats or use of force in international relations.
- 5--To revive the spiritual heritage of the Asian and African peoples and to exploit fully their natural resources so as to utilize them for their moral and material advancement and the development of their national identities on the basis of political sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and cultural self-assertion.
- 6--To formulate guiding principles and to devise practical measures which will: A) further inspire the peoples of Asia and Africa in their continuing struggle against all forms of colonialism, racial discrimination,

and foreign economic exploitation; B) secure the restoration of their lawful rights of domicile to populations evicted from their ancestral homes as a result of imperialist and colonialist designs and also in violation of human rights; C) insure complete emancipation of countries which are still under foreign domination, thereby enabling Asian and African countries to play their legitimate role in this changing world in a constructive and progressive manner toward justice, prosperity, and peace among nations, based on respect for basic human rights and international law.

7--To strengthen economic, social, and cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries as a means of consolidating and strengthening their independence and raising the standards of living of their peoples.

Agenda

In accordance with the objectives referred to above, it was agreed to adopt the following provisional agenda for the Second Afro-Asian Conference:

1--General review of the international situation in the light of the first Afro-Asian conference and an appraisal of Panchshila of Bandung.

2--Decolonization and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. [If the conference is held, the Chicom, Indonesians and their supporters, particularly certain African states and liberation movements, will seek to focus on this item which, significantly, is high on the agenda.]

3--Human rights: A) racial discrimination and apartheid; B) genocide. [South Africa will probably be the foremost target.]

4--World peace and disarmament: A) strict international control; B) prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear tests; C) non-dissemination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; D) creation of nuclear free zones; E) complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. [The Chicom could experience some difficulty in reconciling their activities in this area with the established Afro-Asian posture on nuclear proliferation, especially since their arch Asian opponent, India, has renounced any possibility that it will join the nuclear race.]

5--The peaceful settlement of international disputes and the renunciation of threats or use of force in international relations: A) basic principles for the settlement of Afro-Asian disputes. [The Sino-Indian border dispute and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation should be the major considerations in this category.]

6--The strengthening of the United Nations: A) review of the U.N. Charter; B) observance of the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter; C) implementation of U.N. resolutions by its members.

7--Economic development and cooperation: A) review of the results of the U.N. conference on trade and development, particularly those concerning the position of Afro-Asian countries vis-a-vis the industrialized countries; B) guiding principles for cooperation among Afro-Asian countries toward economic emancipation.

8--Cultural cooperation.

9--Peaceful coexistence: A) guiding principles of peaceful coexistence.

10--The desirability of the establishment of a permanent secretariat to facilitate effective cooperation among Afro-Asian nations.

Composition

It was decided that the following countries be invited to the Second Afro-Asian Conference:

1--All the 29 countries in Asia and Africa which participated in the Bandung Conference.

2--Countries in Africa which are members of the Organization of African Unity. [The inclusion of this bloc of more than thirty African nations means that Africans will outnumber Asians suggesting that African interests may dominate.]

3--Countries in Asia and Africa which will become independent between now and the convening of the Second Afro-Asian Conference. [All these are African.]

4--The following: Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Cyprus, Kuwait, West Samoa, the Provisional Government of Angola.

Representatives of all national movements from non-selfgoverning territories recognized by the Organization of African Unity in Africa and from Asia which have not yet attained independence may attend the conference with the right to be heard and the host country is requested to provide facilities for their attendance. This provision also applies to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, Aden, and Palestine.

Concerning the composition of the Second Afro-Asian Conference:

1--It was proposed that an invitation be extended to the Soviet Union. Some delegations supported and others opposed the proposal to extend

an invitation to the Soviet Union. A number of delegations stated that they needed consultation with their governments. After discussion no consensus could be reached. Some delegations were of the view that the matter may be placed before the heads of states and governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Some other delegations were against submitting this matter to the heads of states and governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Therefore, no agreement was reached.

2--It was also proposed that an invitation be extended to Malaysia. In this case, it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching an agreement on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that recognized Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia is fully entitled to an invitation and should be invited. [The key obstacle, of course, is the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, which still rages.]