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
Briefly Noted


2 August 1965

Fanaticism Nkrumah's Unreal World
in
Africa

In a sympathetic but revealing portrait of Kwame Nkrumah, aspirant to the leadership of all Africa, J. Kirk Sale (lecturer in history at the University of Ghana 1963-1964) says that The Redeemer has an "obsession with ideology, and consequent departure from reality."

This supremely egotistical and ambitious man, believing in a socialism akin to communism, ignoring practical needs, and living in a world of his own imagination, has subjugated his country and led it to the verge of bankruptcy.

His ideology has been set forth most recently in a little book called Consciencism, "a philosophy and ideology for de-colonization and development, with particular reference to the African revolution." The burden of Nkrumah's philosophy of life is that facts will bend to support his ideology. [See attachment "The Loneliness of Kwame Nkrumah" from the NYTimes magazine section, 27 June 1965, which includes a review of his book. 

The attached article is a sober and believable assessment of the man, his illusions and ideology. It should 

be drawn upon, in sorrow more than anger, to alert the small elite groups of African leaders to character traits involved in Nkrumah's Messianic drive for power. In the unsettled conditions of the emerging nations, this willful man still has the capacity for serious trouble-making in the councils of Africa as he seeks to mold this world in his own image.

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Sensational Historians Discuss
Meeting in Hidden Past
Moscow


The May 1965 issue (No. 5/211) of the Polish-language journal Kultura, published in Paris, contained a report by foreign students who visited Moscow in 1964; this report describes discussions by historians (17 and 18 June) of the draft of a volume covering Soviet history from 1933 to 1941, the period of the worst of Stalin's purges. Several historians sharply criticized this volume, one of a series covering the whole range of Russian history, because it did not go far enough in revealing the truth about this period including such crucial facts as 50X1-HUM exploitation of the kolkhozniks by the state, the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the purge trials, and the number of Stalin's victims. One of the soundest comments--actually 50X1-HUM in an attempt to defend the draft--pointed out that it was wrong to use Stalin's methods in dealing with Stalin's cult; "we must write in such a way that we won't be ashamed of our work in ten years," and not describe people as either Gods or devils. A translation of the Kultura article is

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Significant Dates ▶

AUG.

- 16 USSR and Poland sign treaty establishing mutual frontier. Twentieth anniversary. 1945.
- 17 Alliance for Progress Charter signed by 20 American countries (all except Cuba) at Punta del Este. 1961.
- 19 Vietminh seizes power as Japanese troops withdraw; 2 Sept. declares country's independence 1945. 20th anniversary. (France recognizes 6 March 1946).
- 20 Leon Trotsky fatally assaulted at home near Mexico City. 1940.
- 23 USSR and Hitler Germany conclude Non-Aggression Treaty. 1939.
- 27 Treaty of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) signed: renounces war as national policy instrument. 1928. [Ratified by 62 nations by effective date (24 July 1929); 9 Feb 1929, the "Litvinov Protocol" mutually binds USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania to Treaty.]
- 30 II World Population Conference, Belgrade, 30 Aug-10 Sept.

SEPT.

- 1 Germany invades Poland: World War II begins. 1939.
- 8 10th Congress, Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe, Brussels, 8-12 September (pro-west).
- 9 III Arab Summit, Casablanca.
- 10 III annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra: postponed; no date set.
- 10 Continental Congress for Self-Determination of Peoples and of Solidarity with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Santiago, Chile 10-12 Sept. Government ban on foreign communist representatives.
- 13 International Memorial Day for Victims of Fascism, annually celebrated by communist Inter'l Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR).
- 14 UN GA calls for USSR "to desist from repressive measures" in Hungary and adopts report of Special Committee. 1957.
- 17 USSR invades Poland. 1939.
- 19 Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist).
- 20 USSR grants sovereignty to East Germany. Tenth anniversary. 1955.
- 21 People's Republic of China proclaimed. 1949.
- 28 Friedrich Engels born (145 years ago) 1820. Dies 5 Aug 1895.
- 28 First International founded, London. 1864. Disintegrates by 1872.
- 28 USSR and Germany conclude "Friendship and Boundary" Treaty. 1939.
- 28 USSR and Estonia sign 10-year pact which "shall not in any way infringe sovereign rights of parties..." 1939.

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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS




Commentary

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7-20 July 1965

Principal Developments:

1. Chinese and Albanians resume their anti-Soviet propaganda offensive, with harsh attacks pegged to the Tito visit to the USSR, an interview to Japanese reporters by Chairman Liao Cheng-chi of the Chinese A-A Solidarity Committee scornfully disparaging Soviet intent to aid North Vietnam, and an Albanian blast tied to Harriman's "mission to Moscow." The Chinese also publicize anti-Soviet materials from the Australian dissident CPA (M-L) and the Japanese CP.

2. The Helsinki World Peace Congress brings "fierce debates" and "sharp struggle" between the Chinese camp, spearheaded by the Albanians, and the Soviet-aligned majority before 1500 delegates: see separate guidance item for details.

3. Soviet spokesmen continue to maintain an "anti-polemics" posture, campaigning against the sin of "imperialist aggression" and repeating their call for unity in action, while the CPSU holds talks with delegates of the Belgian and Chilean CPs, and the Bulgarian with the French, all supporting the Soviet line. In addition to the general endorsements in reports of the above meetings, TASS publicizes a statement by the South African CP urging a new international meeting "at the earliest possible opportunity" and adding that the refusal of some elements to participate should not prevent the others from going ahead.

4. The International Preparatory Committee decides to postpone the Ninth World Youth Festival to an indefinite date and location next year, to the accompaniment of detailed Chinese accounts of a stormy battle by Chinese-Indonesian-Japanese forces to retain Algiers as the site while the Soviet "manipulators" "rammed through" their "scheme to prevent the festival from being held in Africa." Soviet youth boss Reshetov charges the "splitters" with "concocting a lie." See separate guidance item for details.

5. The Chinese-aligned (and supported) weekly organ of the dissident "Belgian CP," La Voix du Peuple, publishes a strong down-the-line denunciation of Castro's conduct over the past couple of years, pegged to his attack on the Algerian coup. Meanwhile, Guevara is still missing from public view (see #57), but the fresh appearance of posters bearing his portrait in Havana is taken to demonstrate that he is not in disfavor.

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6. [] analysts conclude from various events that, "during the last few months, Pyongyang seems to have reverted to a course of relative independence in bloc affairs, like that it pursued until late 1962 when it began to side heavily with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute." The North Korean regime ended its violent attacks abruptly with Khrushchev's fall and has since ignored crucial issues in the dispute. Meanwhile, a North Vietnamese economic delegation in Peking pays effusive tribute to Chinese "whole-hearted and all-out support and assistance."

7. The pro-Chinese dissident Italian Communists announce that they have organized in Milan a "National Committee of the Movement of Italian M-Ls" and decided to call a national congress at a place and time to be announced later.

8. As the period closes, the Rumanian Party Congress has drawn delegates of 55-60 parties of all persuasions in the schism -- believed to be the broadest representation since the 1960 81-party conference in Moscow (including even the Yugoslavs, excluded in 1960) -- but as of our deadline it appears that the hosts are successfully preventing any polemics or political conflicts at least in public.

Significance:

As the Chinese aggressively push their anti-Soviet political campaign at the sessions of the World Peace Congress and the World Youth Festival Preparatory Committee, along with public polemics, most Communists can find satisfaction only in the fact that their losses during this period were relatively contained. Despite the bitter fighting and the walk-out of Soviet and Indian delegates from one session, the WPC did avert permanent split and managed to compromise on a relatively satisfactory general statement and resolution on Vietnam. The WYF/IPC also averted a permanent rupture, although a post-voting Chinese statement warned that a break is close. And the remarkable Rumanians, effectively maintaining their neutrality and independence in action as well as in words, have apparently succeeded in suppressing public polemics and private infighting among the representatives of the wide spectrum of warring factions gathered for their Party Congress, thus averting a battle royal which could have amounted to a major step in the crumbling of the movement.

The crumbling process does continue, however, as witnessed by the sharp attack on Castro by the organ of the Chinese-supported dissident Jacques Grippa faction of Belgian Communists.

Meanwhile, the warfare in Vietnam continues as the most important focal point and touchstone of policy for all Communist parties, fronts, and other groups.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

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7-20 July 1965

April (delayed): "Following a period of forced suspension" -- as the journal itself puts it -- Nuova Unità, Milan-published "monthly organ" of the pro-Chinese dissident Italian Communists, resumes publication with No. 2, April. It features an appeal "To the Marxist-Leninist comrades in Italy":

"The National Committee of the Movement of Italian M-Ls, which was organized in Milan on 4 April 1965 with the participation of representatives from existing M-L groups throughout Italy, has decided to call a national congress of the movement at a place and at a time to be announced later...."

Another article entitled "Communique," states that: "... the Italian M-Ls, by way of general strategy, agree with the '25 points' of the Chinese CP and with the document issued by the Albanian Labor Party against the theses of the PCI 10th Congress." It gives the names of 11 members of the "Provisional National Committee," five of whom are identified as the "Board of Directors" of the monthly.

July 2 (delayed): La Voix du Peuple, Brussels weekly organ of the pro-Chinese dissident Belgian CP, carries a vitriolic attack on Cuban dictator Castro. Entitled "Where Is Castro Going?", it details a long list of grievances dated back to May 1963, when Castro visited Moscow and, it insinuates, sold himself to Khrushchev for a sugar contract. Within the past year, it says, Castro displayed his revisionism in supporting the Moscow test-ban treaty, offering (in a 6 July 1964 NYTimes interview) to withdraw his material support of revolutionary movements in Latin America if the U.S. would cease aiding anti-Cuban rebels -- "a Castroite re-edition of the deal proposed by Khrushchev to Kennedy: 'remove your missiles from Turkey and I shall remove my missiles from Cuba'" -- and sending a delegation to the "schismatic" March Moscow meeting of CPs. But its harshest attack is directed at Castro's new attitude toward the coup in Algeria:

"Since 23 June 1965, Castro has launched himself (or else has been launched) into the vanguard against the Algerian revolution. Whereas Moscow observed a hypocritical silence and Budapest criticized, Castro attacked. Does he realize that in this aggressive orientation against Algeria, in associating himself with all the imperialist forces linked with the counter-revolutionaries, he scuttles the prestige of the man who was the leader of the victorious Cuban revolution? ... It is the same role as played by the Asian 'spokesmen' of the Khrushchevites, the Mongolians, in the joint struggle of the imperialists and revisionists against the Second Bandung Conference A Castro, who ought to think about Escalante, ... distributes good points to Ben Bella, invective to Bouteflika,

(Chronology Cont.)

reproaches and threats to the Algerian revolution, going so far as to speak about breaking off diplomatic relations! All this incoherent aggressiveness can only bring joy to imperialism and revisionism...."

NCNA Melbourne publicizes a statement by E.F. Hill, Chairman of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), published in the 1 July issue of Vanguard. Urging struggle against revisionism to the very end, Hill says:

"Reports from the Soviet revisionists show that they are in a terrible hurry to complete their betrayal of the October Revolution. They are restoring the profit motive, private enterprise, abolishing state planning, and developing 'theories' that apologize for capitalism. Internationally, they are scheming with the U.S. imperialists and slandering the revolutionary peoples by whispers and intrigues"

July 4 (delayed): NCNA distributes a 3,000-word review of Akahata's 22 June denunciation of the CPSU leadership (Chrono #56).

July (delayed): Czech Party daily Rude Pravo carries a remarkably frank discussion of current Soviet economic problems pegged to an article by "leading expert of the Soviet Gosplan, A. Maltin," in Moscow's Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, entitled "The Great Maneuver."

"... There are still glaring social differences among the diverse strata of the population. According to general data, the average worker's monthly wage is about 90 rubles -- 900 korunas -- and the lowest wages drop to 40 rubles. Many families still live under poor housing conditions, even in one-room apartments...."

The seven-year plan did not bring a decisive change: many tasks for improving living standards have not been implemented. The gap between the growth in the means of production and that of consumers goods industry continues to be considerable...."

July 6 (delayed): Bulgarian Party daily Rabotnichesko Delo carries a communique on 22-28 June talks with a French CP delegation headed by Politburo member Leroy:

"... Inspired by the decisions jointly worked out at the 1957 and 1960 conferences, the two delegations confirmed their full agreement with the communique of the 19 fraternal parties adopted in March 1965 in Moscow and expressed the firm resolution of the French and Bulgarian Communists to take all measures together with the CPSU and with the other fraternal parties for strengthening the unity.... (They) are convinced that the organization of a new conference of Communists and workers parties fully corresponds to the interests of the ICM...."

July 7: TASS publicizes a statement by the South African CP supporting a new international meeting "at the earliest possible opportunity," adding that the refusal of any section, however important, to participate, should not prevent those who are willing to do so.

TASS also reports that an Indonesian CP delegation headed by Chariman Aidit was welcomed by CPSU officials Suslov and Ponomarev on arrival to Moscow.

An article in Moscow's New Times hails Tito's June visit (Chrono #57) as significant "far beyond the framework of relations between the two countries and parties."

NCNA distributes a comment on Tito's visit castigating the "new leaders of the CPSU" for their all-out reception ("no other foreign heads of state or government have been so received in the USSR since the downfall of K.") and for "flagrantly setting to naught the judgement made in the 1960 statement on the renegade Tito clique."

"Praising to the skies the Titoist revisionist line, they not only extolled the Tito clique's 'successes' in restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia, but expressed the desire to 'study' their 'experience' in 'socialist construction.' ... The new Soviet leadership has gone farther than K and stands completely on the side of the Titoite revisionist group.... (They also) took advantage of Tito's visit to provide him with a tribune to peddle revisionist wares and attack the M-L fraternal parties. In his speech at the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship meeting in the Kremlin 30 June, Tito made unbridled attacks on the principled stand of the fraternal M-L parties on peace and peaceful coexistence...."

July 8-10, 14, 20: A 3-day emergency session in Tampere (Helsinki) of the International Preparatory Committee for the Ninth World Youth Festival (originally scheduled to open 28 July in Algiers) concludes on the 10th with a decision to postpone the event until next year, no date or location specified. A TASS interview on the 14th with Chairman Reshetov of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations expresses Soviet support: it also exults that the IPC resisted "the efforts of representatives of certain youth organizations, who, as is known, opposed... and even resorted to subversion ... to split the youth movement," including a "lie they especially concocted for the occasion about a premediated intention to transfer the Festival to Europe." On the 20th, NCNA responds with a detailed account of the bitter battle to which Reshetov alluded, in reporting the comments of "a spokesman of the All-China Youth Federation" and in its version of events. "In spite of the opposition of the Chinese, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates," the Soviet manipulator "rammed through" the decision to reconsider the site, "a scheme to prevent the festival from being held in Africa." "The Rumanian delegate abstained from voting."

"After the voting, the Chinese delegation issued a statement stressing that the ... resolution forced through ... grossly interfered in Algeria's internal affairs. The scheme was to undermine the holding of the Youth Festival in Africa.... This nefarious practice by the Soviet delegate, manipulator of the meeting, could only further split the international youth movement and ... he should be held fully responsible for the serious consequences arising from his action."

[Detailed coverage in separate item.]

July 9: TASS reports on talks held by a delegation of the Soviet-aligned Belgian CP headed by Chairman Burnelle with CPSU officials including Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev, 25 June to 9 July. They "stressed the vital necessity of active struggle for the unity and cohesion of the international Communist and workers movement on the basis of the principles of M-L." Radio Moscow in French on same subject mentioned "the line of the Communist movement worked out at the conferences of 1957 and 1960 and confirmed by the communique of the consultative meeting of the representatives of 19 fraternal parties in Moscow."

TASS also reports that talks between a Chilean CP delegation headed by SecyGen Corvalan and CPSU officials Suslov and Ponomarev "revealed 'complete identity of views of both parties on problems of the IC&WM.'" "The urgent necessity of exerting every effort for the consolidation of unity of the ICM was stressed. A unanimous view was expressed that the Moscow consultative meeting was an important step in this direction."

July 10: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit carries a bitter 9,000-word comment on the Tito visit to Moscow. "... showing that the traitors and usurpers who are presently at the head of the party and the USSR have fully rehabilitated the Tito clique, and that not the slightest difference exists today" between them. Some of the more colorful passages in this diatribe are:

-- "The role of the Tito gang as mediating agent between American imperialists and K. revisionists is known, just as its role as adviser is known....

-- "One of the essential aims of Tito's trip to the Soviet Union was to search for a way to help U.S. imperialism suppress the heroic people of South Vietnam....

-- "Does not the attitude to the events of 19 June in Algiers, and the interference of the K. and Titoite revisionists and their allies in the internal affairs of the Algerian people indicate that all their declarations and sermons are but a bluff and pure demogogy?...

The revisionists measure others with their own yardstick. It is known how K and the present Soviet leaders in 1958, through a 'putsch,' liquidated the old Bolshevik leaders Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others. One also knows that the present Soviet leaders similarly liquidated N. Khrushchev himself. That is why, being themselves 'putschists,' they could only consider the action of the revolutionary council in Algiers on 19 June as a putsch.

-- "The K revisionists, in reinforcing the Titoist experience of the degeneration of socialism and the restoration of capitalism, are in point of fact taking their last step on the path of treason"

Djakarta Government-aligned newspaper Merdeka, in an article entitled "The Peking-Moscow Fever," says:

"(Maoism)... naturally satisfies the Chinese nationalist sentiment. It enables the CPR to free itself from the guardianship of the Soviet Union, which was formerly regarded as the mother country of all of the proletariat through the world. However, saying that the Chinese type of revolution is the general type in colonial and semicolonial countries, or, generally speaking, in the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the CPR can -- if we are not careful enough -- also call itself the mother country of those Asian, African, and Latin American countries which fight for political and economic independence. It is hoped that the CPR will not take over this former Soviet attitude....

... Apart from the fact that the differing views of these two anti-Nekolim champions have not helped to 'clear the minds of Afro-Asian countries,' the divergence of opinion on the problem of Soviet participation in the (Afro-Asian) conference -- with the CPR voicing disapproval of Soviet participation -- has adversely affected the monolithic unity of the Afro-Asian front...."

July 10-15: The World Peace Congress in Helsinki brought "fierce debates" and "sharp struggle" -- as NCNA puts it -- between the Chinese camp, spearheaded by the Albanian delegation, and the Soviet-aligned majority. [Detailed coverage in separate item.]

July 11: AP reports from Havana: "In an action without precedent, the walls of Havana have been plastered with posters bearing portraits of Major Ernesto Guevara, who has not been seen publicly for four months." (See #57 for account of Yugoslavia's attack on Guevara for his interview in an Egyptian journal critical of Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, and Soviet revisionism.) Noting also that Havana bookstores are filled with G's book, Guerilla Warfare, and another with a photo of G on the cover, AP says: "These honors were interpreted here as implementing a Castro decision to publicize the view that, although G has disappeared from the limelight since he returned from an Asian-African tour, he is not in disgrace."

July 13: TASS announces that UAR President Nasir will make an official visit to the USSR on 27 August. (AP Cairo on the 15th reports "official sources" there as saying that Nasser has asked to see Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow.)

July 14-15: Reuters reports from Algiers that a Soviet Embassy official speaking to correspondents there on the 14th denied "recent reports claiming that the Soviet Consulate had been closed down and Soviet technicians expelled on orders of the new Algerian leaders: he said that "the Soviet Consular service was functioning normally" and that Ambassador Pegov "paid a courtesy call on Col. Boumedienne yesterday." Next day Moscow accorded recognition to Boumedienne via a message of congratulations.

July 15: Reuters Tokyo reports that Liao Cheng-chi, Chairman of the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, told Japanese reporters in Peking that day that:

-- It is doubtful that the missile bases being built by the Soviet Union in North Vietnam are genuine.

-- China had rejected a recent Russian request to build an airbase in south China near the Vietnam border because it is doubtful if the Russians really mean to fight for the Vietnamese.

-- The Soviet Union sent only a small amount of weapons to North Vietnam, despite the fact that China had arranged transit for hundreds of rail cars at the request of the Russians.

July 16: The Austrian press (according to AP Vienna) reports that Bulgarian Premier Zhivkov told Austrian newsmen accompanying the Austrian Foreign Minister to Sofia on the 12th that the unsuccessful April coup against the regime was the work of "pro-Chinese elements -- people of primitive thinking."

July 17: A communique on the visit of a North Vietnamese economic delegation to Peking effusively expresses their "militant solidarity" in "ultimately defeating the common enemy, U.S. imperialism." The Vietnamese express "deep and sincere gratitude" for Chinese "whole-hearted and all-out support and assistance under all circumstances" and bow to the from the "beloved and respected Chairman Mao Tse-tung...."

July 18 and continuing: The Congress of the Rumanian CP brings together in Bucharest representatives of some 55-60 CPs ranging over the full spectrum of the Sino-Soviet schism, -- with advance reports that the Rumanian hosts had stipulated that no polemics would be permitted. All Rumanian speeches emphasize Rumania's stance of independence and neutrality in relations both within the ICM and with the non-Communist world, and they appear to have taken all possible measures to avoid any conflict or semblance of favoritism. The Soviet and Chinese delegations are described

as being seated on opposite sides of the hall in identical places of honor, and the Rumanian applause as being equally measured between them. Brezhnev and satraps Ulbricht and Zhivkov are the only party chiefs to head their delegations, but the Chinese are well represented by top polemicists headed by GenSecy Teng Hsiao-ping. The major protagonists (at least, as reported until we go to press) generally avoid polemics, limiting themselves to stating their respective lines, for example: the CCP message says -- "... revisionism is the main danger in the ICM the CCP, together with the fraternal parties, will carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end," and Teng adds "... and at the same time firmly combat modern dogmatism"; Brezhnev -- calls for "unity in action," repeatedly cites the "great slogan of our movement, 'Proletarians of all countries, unite!'"

July 20: In an attack aimed primarily at U.S. "aggressive war in Indochina," Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit takes off on the "particularly dangerous and mystifying role played by the Khrushchevite revisionists who, advocating their sorely remembered 'coexistence,' incite the imperialists to commit new crimes...."

"Harriman's mission to Moscow and his secret talks with Kosygin ... prepare the way for new imperialist-revisionist plots against the Vietnamese people....

In view of conclusive facts and the forceful unfolding of the new Soviet-American 'epic,' people cannot allow themselves to be duped by the pseudo-revolutionary poses and phrases of the treacherous revisionist Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin-Suslov quartet...."

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WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL "POSTPONED"

The International Preparatory Committee (IPC) for the World Youth Festival (WYF), meeting in Tampere, Finland on 8-10 July, announced that the Festival had been postponed until next year. A special committee was formed to recommend to the IPC a locale and date. Some 15,000 youth and students were reportedly planning to attend the meeting which had been scheduled for Algiers, 28 July to 7 August. This would have been the first WYF held outside Europe and only the third to take place outside the Soviet bloc.

The Algerian coup of 19 June had immediately dimmed the prospects for the WYF. Algerian authorities began arresting members of the Algerian National Preparatory Committee and within a week the Algerian members of the IPC were either in jail or hiding, while other IPC members mostly Eastern European, had fled Algeria. A few communist students demonstrated in Algiers against the new regime, with moral support from Communist and other Leftist youth and student groups in many areas of the world. According to news reports, the USSR had cut its credits for the Festival four days after Ben Bella's overthrow, and a number of Festival delegations (including Cuba) had decided not to go to Algiers.

At a meeting on 24 June, the IPC, without consulting the ostensible festival hosts, i.e., the Jeunesse de Front Liberation Nationale (JFLN), or the Algerian government, decided to withdraw the WYF from Algeria. A resolution issued 25 June and published in L'Unita, the Italian Communist daily, stated that the Preparatory Committee "cannot remain indifferent to developments in Algeria. Since June 19, members of the Permanent Commission [of the IPC] have been isolated inside Algeria with no opportunity to establish contact with other countries. In such conditions, the Commission cannot continue preparations for the 9th Festival."

The JFLN issued a communique on 3 July denouncing the IPC's "interference in Algeria's internal affairs. While Algerian youth were preparing to receive the youth of the whole world, the IPC took the grave unilateral decision of leaving Algeria on 25 June, thus abandoning work entrusted to it by the IPC General Assembly." If there had been any doubt before as to the actual power behind the Festival, the JFLN communique betrayed the emptiness of persistent Algerian claims that it controlled the WYF.

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Hardly coming as a surprise, the Sino-Soviet conflict also entered the decision to postpone the WYF. In a statement issued 2 July, the All-China Youth Federation condemned the IPC's 25 June resolution which they claimed was adopted through "Soviet manipulation behind the back of Algeria." The Chinese accused the IPC of attacking Algerian authorities and raising unreasonable demands flagrantly interfering in Algeria's internal affairs. They charged that "the Soviets, in trying to change the site to Europe, are trying to undermine the friendship between African youth and the youth of other countries and to split the unity of the movement." (On 20 July, the All-China Youth Federation launched an extraordinarily sharp attack on the decisions reached by the IPC and the statement to the press made on 14 July by the Chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations. The appropriate NCNA coverage is enclosed as an Unclassified Attachment. The Chicoms charge the Soviet youth organization with undermining the Festival, interference in Algeria's internal affairs for reconsidering the venue of the Festival, splitting the unity of the international youth and student movement, and trying to advance Soviet foreign policy aims. The account also exposes details of Soviet manipulation.) In support of the Chinese position, the Indonesian youth organization issued a demand on 4 July that the Festival be held in Algeria. It declared that any attempt to change the site to East Europe would be a provocation and it opposed holding the Festival anywhere outside Asia or Africa.

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CASTRO AND THE COUP IN ALGIERS

The missile crisis of October 1962 occurred at a moment when Ahmed Ben Bella was on a state visit to Havana. He had just been named premier of Algeria as a result of the September elections and was destined to become president for a five year term the following September. It was only natural for the highly temperamental rulers of two "revolutionary" countries -- one caught in flagrante between the two colossi -- to find that they had much in common. They issued a joint communiqué asserting, among other things, that Cuba "has the right and duty to defend its national independence and sovereignty."

In time, the rapport between these two "comrades in arms" blossomed into a friendship more personal and intimate than that which ordinarily exists between heads of state. During the border war that broke out in the fall of 1963 between Algeria and Morocco, Castro came to Ben Bella's aid with several hundred technicians and an unknown, but quite considerable, quantity of munitions. (BPG #129, 18 Nov 1963, Item #712: "Castro's Military Aid to Algeria Backfires") Already deeply involved in fomenting revolution in Africa, Castro made his embassy in Algiers the focal point for Cuban activities on the Dark Continent, further proof of the close collaboration between the two countries. (BPG #169, 5 Jul 1965, Item #920: "Cuban Subversion in Africa")

The foregoing serves to explain the shock which Castro apparently suffered when he learned, on 19 June 1965, that Ben Bella had been overthrown by his Vice-President and Minister of Defense, Col. Houari Boumedienne, and that there was no news of his safety or whereabouts. For a few days, Radio Havana treated the incident cautiously. On 22 June, newscasts began carrying reports that reflected unfavorably on the new regime, featuring pro-Ben Bella demonstrations and arrests of students. On 25 June, the Prensa Latina correspondent in Algiers reported that he had been denied permission to see Ben Bella. He was assured, however, that Ben Bella had been "ousted, not liquidated."

In the meantime, two important conferences were about to take place in Algiers: the Afro-Asian "Summit" Conference (Second Bandung) and the Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students. On 26 June, Castro cancelled Cuban participation in the Youth Festival and used the occasion of an address to the disappointed Cuban delegates (numbering 800) to make an official statement on Cuba's position, broadcast live by Radio Havana. In

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a two-hour, rambling harangue, much of which appeared to be ad-libbed, Castro declared emphatically his personal loyalty to Ben Bella and expressed his grief at the "treacherous" overthrow of "a government which was our closest friend." He reminisced emotionally over the moral support he had received from Ben Bella during the missile crisis, repeatedly condemned the "treacherous coup," but reserved judgment on Boumedienne. One of Castro's most hurtful remarks was his characterization of the overthrow as a military coup and not a revolution: "... The military insurrection that overthrew Ben Bella's government is not, nor can any one classify it as, a revolutionary insurrection."

Not content with airing such judgments via radio, Prensa Latina had its office in Algiers include Castro's speech in an information bulletin and give it wide distribution among the civilian population. The new Algerian government responded on 30 June by closing the PL offices. Meanwhile, Havana has withdrawn its ambassador and relations between the once friendly countries remain strained though not diplomatically broken.

Reactions by Moscow and Peking were much more cautious. Moscow reported the Algerian events without comment, carefully refraining from making any value judgments on the overthrow of an official "Hero of the Soviet Union." On 14 July, after four weeks of reticence, the Soviet Government congratulated Boumedienne. Much less restrained, Peking not only gave the initial events much publicity, but also offered Chinese government support for the new revolutionary Council. On 22 June, in a speech in Cairo, Chou En-lai dismissed the coup as an "entirely internal affair," and the next day, Foreign Minister Chen I, in Algiers for the preparatory meeting, reiterated personally to Boumedienne his government's support.

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RUMANIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION

At the end of June, the Rumanian government published the text of a new draft constitution, a document registering Rumania's change from a "People's Republic" to a "Socialist Republic," one of a number of changes accompanying the renaming of the "Rumanian Workers' Party" to "Rumanian Communist Party." The "Ninth Rumanian Communist Party Congress" (as the "Fourth Rumanian Workers' Party Congress" was rechristened at the last moment, counting pre-World War II RCP Congresses) has endorsed the current draft, and it will doubtless be approved by Rumania's parliament, the Grand National Assembly. Under Communist rule, Rumania has had two other constitutions, those of 1948 and 1952. The present document resembles its predecessors in many respects, but differs in being much more independent (from Moscow) and nationalist in tone, and also in expressing more concern for individual rights.

The 1952 constitution was preceded by a lengthy preamble, displaying spaniel-like admiration of the Soviet Union; the new constitution makes no mention of that country. Instead, the new document uses some of the language of Rumania's April 1964 "declaration of independence," saying in Article 14: "The foreign relations of the Socialist Republic of Rumania (SRR) are based on principles of respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality of rights and mutual advantages, and noninterference in internal affairs." The same article, while committing the SRR to "relations of friendship and fraternal collaboration with the socialist countries," also asserts that the SRR "fosters relations of collaboration with countries having other social-political systems." In general, the new constitution is much less a copy of the 1936 Soviet constitution than was the case with the Rumanian constitution of 1952.

A new note is struck with the declaration (Article 13) that "the purpose of all state activities is the development of the socialist system, constant improvement of the people's material and cultural well-being, the guarantee of man's freedom and dignity, and comprehensive affirmation of the human personality." References to human dignity and the affirmation of the human personality, while sometimes made by the young

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Karl Marx, have not hitherto been a feature of Communist constitutions. The new document sets a limit of 24 hours on investigative arrest (Article 31); the 1948 constitution had established a limit of 48 hours for arrest without warrant, and the 1952 constitution, while calling for a warrant, set no time limit whatever. Article 35 contains an interesting innovation: it provides that persons whose rights are violated by an illegal action of a state organ "may request the competent organs, under conditions stipulated by law, to annul the action and compensate for the damage." This article amounts to an admission of past injustices, and seems to be backed up by Article 96, according to which "courts hear the pleas of those whose rights have been violated by administrative actions, and can also decide on the basis of the law the legality of these actions." Article 104 is also noteworthy; it states that "in trial activities, judges and people's assessors are independent and accountable only to the law." (One of the issues in Yugoslavia's Mihajlov case was the charge that Tito in effect had directed the courts to find Mihajlov guilty.)

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The affirmations of individual rights in the new constitution lose some of their luster when it is realized that many of these provisions already existed in earlier constitutions, where they have often been dead letters. Thus guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assembly (Article 28); of freedom of religion (Article 30); against arrest without warrant (Article 31); against entry into homes without a warrant (Article 32); and of the inviolability of correspondence (Article 33) also appeared in Rumania's 1948 and 1952 constitutions, and in the Soviet 1936 constitution. All these constitutions have provided for "universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage" -- but there has been no real choice of candidates. Experience shows that it would be a grave mistake to take a Communist constitution at face value.

Even on its face, the new Rumanian constitution forbids any use of freedom of speech, press, meetings, and demonstrations for "purposes contrary to the socialist system" (Article 29); binds citizens to "contribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system" (Article 39), and makes "violation of the military oath, betrayal of the homeland, desertion to the enemy, and the damaging of the state's defensive ability ... punishable with the full severity of the law" (Article 41). In the past, such provisions have been used to rationalize the worst violations of human rights. The weakness of Communist constitutions is that they do not actually represent the supreme law of the land; Party rules and practices are decisive, and Party leaders arbitrarily establish the norms. Addressing the Ninth Congress on 19 July, Rumania's new party boss, Nicolae Ceausescu, made it clear that the new constitution means no abdication of control, saying that the document would ensure the "enhancement of the role of the Socialist state as the organizer of the whole activity of building the Socialist system."

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Nevertheless, affirmations of human rights are not without value, particularly when they are extended, and when past violations are implicitly recognized. If human rights are still sometimes violated, the violation is done with a bad conscience. In most of East Europe, respect for the law is on the increase, and officials can no longer be sure they can break it with impunity. Within the Party as well as outside it, the rights of human beings are gaining new recognition.



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SUKARNO AND THE PKI --
WHO CONTROLS WHOM?

Each year on 17 August, the anniversary of Indonesian independence, President Sukarno delivers a major policy address. Last August his speech was "A Year of Dangerous Living." This was a particularly prophetic title because each crucial step Sukarno took throughout the year drew him closer into the web of the PKI and through it to control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (See unclassified attachment for a detailed chronology of relevant developments -- i.e., increasing influence permitted the PKI and growing collaboration with the Chinese -- within Indonesia and between Indonesia and the Chinese Peoples Republic).

This trend was confirmed in the PKI's gigantic celebration of their 45th anniversary which began on 23 May and carried over into the first week of June. The Indonesian government provided trucks and other vehicles to transport everyone to and from the Bung Karno Stadium for the rally, schoolchildren were dismissed from classes, most shops were closed, and the general atmosphere gave the Communist anniversary the appearance of an official State occasion. President Sukarno was the principal speaker at the opening celebration. He praised the PKI and encouraged them to continue "their contribution to the Indonesian Revolution." He also admonished "Communist phobes" and warned them against upsetting the "unification of all national revolutionary forces within Nasakom." (Nasakom is Sukarno's name for what he sets forth as a new concept for his brand of government, namely a coalition Cabinet uniting all nationalist, religious and Communist elements). He closed his address by urging the PKI to "go onward, onward, onward, and never retreat!" (See unclassified attachment for excerpts of Sukarno's speech.)

The PKI, in its anniversary celebration, had set itself the dual objective of demonstrating that it is THE national party and that it is the exclusive official supporter, protector and interpreter of Sukarnoism. In summing up the themes and results of the celebration, PKI Chairman Aidit said that it "turned into a truly national celebration" demonstrating the "unity between the PKI and President Sukarno and his assistants."

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There was another noteworthy development during the PKI's anniversary celebration: Peng Chen, chief of the CCP delegation, was allowed by the PKI and by Sukarno to use this forum to make extremely insulting charges against the CPSU. This development has an element of poetic justice. Sukarno has taken over one billion dollars in credits from the USSR; and in earlier times, Sukarno allowed the Soviets to use their Djakarta visits to level insulting charges at the US from whom he had "borrowed" about the same amount.

Communist China demonstrated its approval of the entire PKI anniversary proceedings by carrying extensive laudatory accounts in People's Daily and in the newscasts of Radio Peking and the New China News Agency. Mao Tse-tung sent a message praising the PKI's achievements as a "glorious page ... in the annals of the Revolution in the East."

Sukarno used the celebration and the carnival atmosphere as another way of keeping the minds of the Indonesian people off their real troubles: the cost of living has risen over 2,000 percent in the past six years, and inflation has driven the actual rate of foreign exchange to 7,000 rupiahs to the US dollar, compared to the official rate of 45 to 1.

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2 August 1967

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WORLD PEACE COUNCIL BESET BY SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

The Seventh World Peace Congress in Helsinki, Finland from 10-15 July became one more forum for discord within the Communist world and its auxiliary peace movement. The Soviets, over the objections of several groups, retained control of the Congress sponsored by the Communist front World Peace Council (WPC). The Chicom clique took the most strenuous exception to Soviet leadership, challenging the Soviets' policy of disarmament and peaceful coexistence. The final resolutions of the Congress, which were accepted by the Chicoms, suggest that the Soviets compromised to a certain extent but did not change the basic precepts of their policy. They decried political intolerance that would erect barriers to unified and concrete actions for peace at the Congress and in official propaganda. However, the tone of their reply to the Chicoms' challenges was relatively restrained. Neither Sino-Soviet differences nor the power struggle within the WPC mitigated the combined assault on imperialism, specifically U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The International Preparatory Committee (IPC), gathering directly before the Congress, heard a report on the 22-23 May IPC meeting in Helsinki which outlined what the Congress would discuss and how it should go about doing so. The report drew rebuttal from the Chicoms who had abstained from participation in all preparatory activities. Debate on rules of procedure, reorganization of the WPC and substantive issues (e.g. Vietnam, peaceful co-existence) carried over into and throughout the Congress proper. World-wide, both the Communist and non-Communist press have focused on the Sino-Soviet exchanges. Ironically, the non-Communist Finnish media generally played down coverage of the Congress, suggesting that the Finns have been embarrassed by association with the dispute at the Congress or the Congress per se, or both. Over 15,000 delegates and observers from 98 countries either witnessed or participated in the arguments. The Africans seem to have been generally disturbed by the disrupting effects of the dispute, but depending on the point under discussion, national groups found themselves either more or less aligned with one or the other of the protagonists. However, the Soviets did receive active, across-the-board support particularly from the Indians while the Chicoms were able to launch vitriolic broadsides via their Albanian, Indonesian and Pakistani associates.

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The WPC secretariat's autocratic control over the procedures of the Congress were successfully challenged to the extent that an extraordinary plenary session gave 24 additional delegations the right to address the Congress for specified periods of time. While the Chicoms did not retreat from their unsuccessful demand for unlimited debate, the plenary session compromise afforded them an additional opportunity to attack the Soviets but also for small Afro-Asian nations to be heard.

WPC President Bernal's memorandum on reorganization, supported by the Chicoms principally as a means to attack the Soviets but also by others wanting a greater hand in the organization (i.e. Bernal's own British associates, the U.S. group and Afro-Asian organizations), was not brought before the Congress, on the grounds it would first have to go before the Council. Since the Presidential Committee had discussed the proposal on 8 July, Soviet ability to block it and also the selection of new executive bureau members testify to continued Soviet manipulation of the WPC. The Chicoms also lost another battle in their attempt to reduce the working committees from seven to four which would have allowed them to focus the Congress on the topics suiting their position.

Issues. On the subject of war vs "peaceful coexistence," the Chicoms insisted the Congress should focus on opposition to war, the liquidation of imperialism as the only premise for disarmament, and said that application of peaceful-coexistence to the U.S. with respect to Vietnam was "appeasement." Further, they said that to firmly oppose the imperialists in Vietnam does not threaten to escalate the conflict into nuclear holocaust -- the central point of contention between the protagonists. But the General Statement circumvented this controversial issue by saying that imperialist adventures in cases such as Vietnam strike "a grave blow at the aspirations of the people to detente and peaceful coexistence," calling for "action to isolate U.S. imperialism...to support the struggles of the peoples...against colonialism... Faced with the people's determination and their common front of struggle, the forces of oppression and war will not prevail."

The Congress rejected the U.S. delegation's proposal -- already strongly opposed by the Chicoms but applauded by the Soviets in the Committee -- to dispatch a peace delegation to Hanoi, the Viet Cong, Peking, Moscow, London, Washington and the U.N.

The primary Soviet objective was unity (i.e. the status quo in the World Communist Movement as against Chicom leadership ambitions). To attain unity, the Soviets were willing to make concessions of a sort to the Chicoms. They ignored attacks on their spokesmen and they limited themselves to a temporary walkout from the committee on disarmament, nuclear free zones and nonaligned countries. The unanimous endorsement of the General Statement does not mean that there was anything approaching a genuine meeting of the minds over grave disputes. The WPC continues to be in disarray, as just two examples will illustrate. The Soviets

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assembled over 400 of the participants in Leningrad immediately after the congress -- an unusual aftermath to a WPC meeting. There is no sign of rapprochement between the feuding elements of the Japanese peace movement.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
JUNE 27, 1965

The Loneliness Of Kwame Nkrumah

By J. KIRK SALE

AFTER two years they have now almost completed the wall around Flagstaff House, and once all the bars are in place and the gates installed the official headquarters of the President of Ghana will be a fortified 200-acre island in the middle of Accra. Behind three separate gates manned by armed guards Kwame Nkrumah will be able to look out over a private enclave that includes a battery of offices, an army camp, a military hospital, a radio station and his own personal zoo.

Flagstaff House tells much about the incredibly complex and indelibly fascinating personality of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's unquestioned leader for the last 15 years and one of Africa's most important figures. It reflects most obviously the single-minded concern for security of a man who has every reason to be afraid, since the political opposition he has driven underground has burst to the surface in two assassination attempts in the last three years. He seldom leaves the Flagstaff fortress, and then either without any warning or with hundreds of police and soldiers guarding his routes. On a trip last year to the port city of Tema, 20 miles away, the route through the capital was lined by guards stationed 50 feet apart and the open highway cluttered with armored cars and police cruisers.

Nkrumah's home is almost as well-guarded as his office, though he usually spends less time there. It is in a remodeled 17th-century castle on an isolated promontory overlooking the Gulf of Guinea, and to the earlier fortifications a high protecting wall has been added in recent years. Last

J. KIRK SALE has reported from Africa for several newspapers and was for a year (1963-64) a lecturer in history at the University of Ghana.

year, after an assassination attempt within Flagstaff itself, Nkrumah burrowed himself there and made it virtually unapproachable, with a dozen policemen guarding the entrance road, two small tanks lined up against the wall and a gunboat of the Ghana Navy cruising in the harbor.

I once drove up as far as the front gate while taking a visiting American on a sightseeing tour of the city, but at the wall a rifle-wielding soldier roughly turned us back and told us sternly that it was forbidden even to look at the castle. A group of Western newsmen who did manage to fast-talk their way past the main gate so upset Nkrumah that he had them clapped into jail—from which, incidentally, they managed to fast-talk their way out the next day.

NKRUMAH'S fear has led him to some extreme lengths. He distrusts both those nearest him—he is said to have shot a bodyguard with his personal revolver one jumpy day last February—and those farthest away, who are more suspect because less under watch. Passing around copies of Andrew Tully's spies-under-the-bed book, "C.I.A.—The Inside Story," was harmless enough, but he began to see C.I.A. machinations everywhere and to suspect all Americans on principle. Once he warned civil servants that they should stay away from those subversive cocktail parties at the American Embassy, and his puppet press even attacked "those Peace Corps spies, spies and saboteurs." He deported three absolutely innocent Americans from the University of Ghana on charges of "treasonable activities" which he never even tried to prove, and refused to listen to anyone who pointed out the absurdity of his accusations.

Flagstaff House also reflects the isolation of a man imprisoned by such fear. Its walls have served not only to protect him, but, in a deeper sense, to cut him off from the raucous, rhythmical world that is Accra and the common people whose life was once his own. Outside, on the broad macadam of Independence Avenue, passes a panorama of Ghana: "market mammals" with basins of fried fish impossibly balanced on their heads; members of the W.P.A.-style "Workers Brigade" clapping hands (the Ghanaian equivalent of the

raised thumb) for rides; bikes, buses, Volkswagens and Mercedes-Benzes—in ascending order, the transportation status symbols for Ghanaian workers—carelessly and loudly weaving past the white-jacketed traffic cop at the main gate; "mammy wagons," unbelievably ramshackle trucks whose wooden sides bulge with passengers and produce, clattering to the market. Inside, Nkrumah sits alone at a broad desk in a quiet, air-conditioned room.

Nkrumah's public appearances are rare and he usually chooses to communicate to his people through the press and radio; for any major pronouncement he uses not the public platform but the radio station within his walls. Few visitors get to see him and often his own advisers are kept away by his camp of secretaries; those who are likely to prove bothersome, like a delegation of disgruntled chiefs or non-Communist Western reporters, never get beyond the first gate. His personal life is kept almost completely shrouded; when his wife gave birth to their third child, the fact went unreported and publicly unknown for three months.

It is no accident that a zoo occupies a central spot at Flagstaff House, for as Nkrumah has increasingly isolated himself he has increasingly turned his attention to the animals around him. His menagerie now includes baboons, leopards, kangaroos, a hyena, a hippopotamus and two gawky camels, said to be a

gift from Nasser, which can often be seen grazing on the sparse fields opposite the main gate. Those who have visited him recently report that often the only real excitement and liveliness he displays is when showing off this collection.

Nkrumah has always been a lonely man. He was an only child, very close to his mother, in a society where large families are almost universal; he once wrote that "my happiest hours were spent alone. I used to wander off on my own for hours on end." At school he hated the regimentation of military drill and shunned team sports in favor of solitary running (and since his best efforts were at 220 and 440 yards, one Accra wag has since referred to this as "the loneliness of the short-distance runner"). During his difficult life in the United States in the thirties, cut off from home and family, he lived an almost pathetically isolated existence which he later described as producing "a most haunting feeling of loneliness."

Once back in Ghana and absorbed in the life of a politician, Nkrumah had little opportunity for solitude, but found that in many ways his 10 years of Western training separated him from the traditional life around him. He worked long hours and made it a point to withdraw for a week or two, once "to a quiet spot a hundred miles or so out of Accra in order to meditate." After his political position was secure—around 1960, when he was elected President of the new Republic of Ghana—he was able to turn more and more from being an active public figure into a secluded administrator. And today, behind his walls, he leads an existence very much alone.

UNDERSCORING Nkrumah's loneliness in the last few years has been his lack of male companionship, on the level of either friend or adviser. So many one-time friends have turned against him for one reason or another that he now seems reluctant to send out the tentacles of

friendship to anyone. Ako Adjei, whom he had known and trusted since his days in America and who had been Foreign Minister in several of his Cabinets, was found guilty this year of plotting to kill Nkrumah; Tawia Adamafio, former party leader and once the man closest to Nkrumah, was sentenced in the same plot; Komla Gbedemah, who engineered Nkrumah's first election and was a successful Finance Minister for many years, was kicked out of the Government in 1961 and later accused as the instigator of an attempted overthrow; and the list could go on.

All of this has made Nkrumah naturally suspicious about those he allows close to him, and one reason that he now works up to 20 hours a day may be that he is reluctant to trust anyone else with his burden of work. It is interesting that of those closest to him personally today—the three B's, Defense Minister Kofi Baako, personal trouble-shooter Geoffrey Bing and radical-left columnist H. M. Basner—the first is in poor health and the last two are whites with no chance to form a rival power structure, men from whose friendship, in short, there is no threat.

For some men, women might supply an outlet for loneliness, but not for Nkrumah. He has always been afraid, he has said, "to become too entangled with a woman," and even from his earliest days, he confesses, "my fear of women was beyond all understanding," a feeling "I have never outgrown." His closest attachment was to his mother—he reports that as a child "I used to be angry when my father came to sleep in our bed. . . . I told him that I was also married to her and it was my job to protect her"—and apparently no one has been able to take her place.

Today he is married to an Egyptian, Fathia Ritzk, but it was from the beginning a marriage of convenience rather than love (he probably had not even seen his bride before they got married) and it is doubtful that she shares enough of the Ghanaian ex-

perience or the political passion to be very close to Nkrumah.

ONE substitute for the lack of personal friendship may be the animals in his zoo, who can be released for a feeling Nkrumah dares not share with those around him and cannot share with the public, but of course this is not enough. A more effective and pervasive substitute is friendship in the abstract rather than the particular—that is, public adulation, on which Nkrumah seems to thrive.

He has no hesitation in having the party papers refer to him as "His Messianic Dedication," "The Nation's Pillar of Fire and Fount of Honor" or simply "The Leader"; his speeches on Radio Ghana are preceded with as much as 15 minutes of traditional "praise-singing," a privilege once reserved for chiefs alone. When a slight earthquake shook Accra on the day Nkrumah announced his new Seven-Year Development Plan, The Evening News report ran:

"After the Messiah had launched the people's program to build a socialist state . . . THE EARTH TREMBLED AND THE TREES SHOOK, THE WIND BLEW AND THERE WAS RAIN in Accra which had not seen a drop of water for a long time. . . . The second Messiah has arrived. Ye know not when he cometh, says the Bible, and we say to the world that HE is here."

And this is not extraordinary; it is daily fare. Such "unsobor adulation," as one Ghanaian intellectual wrote last year, "may unintentionally cut off the President from the people," thus increasing the isolation it is intended to overcome. But in the short run it seems to provide Nkrumah a very welcome manifestation that the people of Ghana are his friends (not to mention worshipers) en masse even if they so often turn out to be his enemies individually.

The intermingled fear and isolation, the one breeding the other, form an essential part of Nkrumah's personality. In

turn, they reflect what is perhaps the essential key to unlocking this complex man: his consistent self-centeredness, self-absorption, egotism — what in psychological terms might be considered narcissism.

The evidence to support a diagnosis of Nkrumah as narcissistic is not, of course, conclusive, but signals such as these occur too frequently to be overlooked.

An inordinate attachment to his own ideas. Nkrumah has continually thrust his own ideology on his country and the world in five turgid books, in half a dozen polemical newspapers, on his powerful broadcasting station—and has done this even knowing it has alienated many of his followers, angered many of his fellow leaders and offended many of his creditors.

A supreme conviction in the rightness of his actions. Nkrumah has always believed religiously that his way was the only way, a feature very effective in gaining supporters in his fight for independence, and neither bombs, betrayals nor abuse have shaken him; last year, for example, when moving to take over the University of Ghana, he blithely ignored even Conor Cruise O'Brien, then Vice Chancellor and one of his own appointees, who suggested that his action was improper.

An acute sensitivity to any kind of criticism. Nkrumah has found criticism so distasteful that he has eliminated the political opposition, reorganized the Legislature so that detractors can't lift their heads and clamped full control over all domestic news media and occasionally over foreign imports as well; he led a violent campaign last year against "rumor-mongers" who were said to be telling tales about him behind his back. In March one poor taxi driver was jailed for three years for passing on a rumor to his back-seat passengers, who happened to be high-ranking military men.

An unrelaxing desire to mold reality to fit his precepts. Nkrumah has sought to change what his ideas cannot admit of and has refused to admit of what his power

cannot change. He has actively supported left-wingers throughout the continent in hopes of proving that Africa is really socialist at heart, and at home he allows his papers to make up news and montage photographs that will match his preconceptions. Two years ago he decided that all drivers should immediately switch to the right-hand side of the road as a move of solidarity with the former French states around him, and only a last-minute burst of rationality halted the campaign and saved the lives of thousands.

A continual need for public reaffirmation of his value. Nkrumah has encouraged not only adulation from the press but sycophancy from those around him, and has held a steady stream of elections and referendums as evidence that he is really popular. His own words betray this need: "It is essential," he announced in 1962, "that once every five years [the people] shall have the opportunity to *renew* their faith and confidence in the party and its leader" (my italics).

IN view of such recognized symptoms as these, then, it does not seem too much to see Nkrumah as an example of a narcissistic personality, providing that this is understood as analysis and not condemnation. And what should we expect of such a personality? In Erich Fromm's words, a narcissist "has to increase his power, his ruthlessness and his narcissism." Nkrumah has done exactly that.

Since 1961 Nkrumah has increased his power steadily and relentlessly. He has taken over full executive direction of the all-powerful Convention People's party, of which he is life president, assumed full command of the armed forces, removed all possible political rivals from his inner councils, outlawed the opposition United party and jailed its leaders, made the legislature into a rubber stamp (in fact, he has ordered M.P.s to find outside jobs because there is not enough to keep them busy in the legislature), purged police and army ranks of possible dissidents, clamped ab-

solute authority over all weapons of propaganda, given himself veto power over top-level judicial decisions, and taken control of university education. Today Nkrumah reigns supreme.

He has also increased his ruthlessness. He has passed a steady series of harshly punitive laws allowing him to jail opponents up to 20 years without trial or appeal, used them to jail more than 100 (some even say 1,000) suspected dissidents including professors and students, used police interrogation and house arrests to cow both friends and foes, stationed soldiers with automatic rifles to guard key locations such as banks and communications centers, openly threatened military action against anti-Government demonstrations, condoned an uncontrolled mob invasion designed to intimidate university students, allowed party hacks remarkable freedom in bullying recalcitrant judges, Middle Eastern entrepreneurs and hesitant schoolmasters, and used courts at all levels to enforce executive orders.

In part, of course, Nkrumah has been forced to such harshness because of the threat of subversion, but his ruthlessness grows within a vicious circle common to many authoritarians: fearing those he oppresses, he oppresses those he fears.

Finally, there is what can only be described as Nkrumah's growing sense of unreality. It explains his inability to have close friends, his belief in his own rightness, his acceptance of "unsober adulation," his drive to remake Africa in his own image.

He has always been without the day-to-day balances that provide incursions of reality in other men—he has no hobbies, eats very little, drinks and smokes not at all. He has always plunged headlong into his fantasies, first his games, then his religion, later his nationalism; Peter Abrahams once reported that "he seemed consumed by a restlessness that led him to evolve some of the most fantastic schemes." And today fear, isolation and a growing authoritarianism have

worked to place Nkrumah in a special world of his own, not quite connected with the real world outside his private palace.

There are certain links with reality, of course, even beyond those common to every mortal man: his fear seems reasonable since there are in fact those who want to kill him; his isolation seems realistic as a way to preserve himself and his great works; his absorption of power seems reasonable, since everyone in the nation keeps telling him it is. Which is to say that there is a sufficiently realistic basis to Nkrumah's unreality to keep him on this side of sanity and to make him quite a different figure in degree from an Egyptian pharaoh, say, or Hitler.

But his unreality is unmistakable, and it is clearest of all in Nkrumah's excessive attachment to his own ideology, an attachment that leads him to some of the most senseless moves. He has set up something called the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Ideology, formed ideological "study groups" and started two propaganda newspapers, all of which concern themselves day in and day out with whatever Nkrumah has thought or is thinking.

He has also recently formed a committee to insure "ideological purity" in the land by purging libraries and bookstores of publications which do not conform to the "Nkrumahist" ideology. Now, of course, there are not going to be many volumes left in the Accra Public Library if this last move is seriously pushed—and it seems that it is being—but this only points up the depth of Nkrumah's unreality, for when the ideological steamroller runs up against the realistic mountain, it is the mountain that must give way or be run over.

Nkrumah's decisions today are based not so much on practical necessities as on ideological commitment; not on what actually is but on what ideologically *should be*. It is not too much to say that if Nkrumah were given the choice between ridding Ghana of all its ills on practical lines in a decade or on his own rigid ideological lines in three, he would unhesitatingly choose the lat-

ter. Such is the depth of his commitment.

There are three major examples of how in recent years ideology has won over practicality.

First, the ideology not only proclaims the necessity and rightness of Socialism but demands a unity of purpose among Socialist (i.e., Communist) countries. Hence Ghana has embarked on extensive trade agreements with the Eastern bloc, not because she wants Eastern goods (very few Ghanaians care for the hot Czechoslovak shoes or unpalatable Chinese pigs' knuckles that now crowd Accra's stores) and not because she finds the East a profitable trade partner (the Communists have so far failed to make good on \$5 million worth of commitments) but primarily to back up her ideological identity with the East by economic connections. The result has been that Ghana's industries and agriculture have been withering for lack of supplies, her consumers have been deprived of many common Western imports and faced with rationing of still others, and her finances have plunged to the point that she is in debt by perhaps as much as \$800 million.

Second, the ideology holds that "capitalism is but the gentleman's method of slavery" which uses "the cajolement, the wheedlings, the seduction and the Trojan horses of neo-colonialism" in undeveloped countries "to subordinate their interests to those of a foreign power." Hence Ghana has turned away as much as possible from the capitalist nations on which it would logically depend for foreign trade and economic assistance. The United States is continually depicted as putting bombs in the hands of Nkrumah's enemies, Britain is assailed for every real and imagined ill affecting its former colony, West Germany is castigated as a "running dog of imperialism." It is little wonder that when Ghana went around last month secretly soliciting desperately needed funds from these countries it was given the cold-shoulder at every stop. Yet there is no suggestion that Ghana has any intention of

giving up its ideological barrage in order to get economic sustenance.

Lastly, the ideology holds that a tight "Union of African States" under a Socialist banner is essential and that "we shall never relax our efforts to bring total independence and unity to this African continent." Yet Nkrumah's African Affairs Bureau has steadily alienated most of the continent's leaders with its free-wheeling interference (with anything from propaganda to guns) on behalf of left-wing causes even in sovereign nations; his "freedom fighters" village on the outskirts of Accra has provided a haven for all kinds of leftist dissidents kicked out of other countries; his insistence that "Africa must unite," pursued with all the subtlety of a jackhammer, has angered such realistic leaders as Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, who last year told him bluntly to mind his own business. But Nkrumah's ideology does not make allowances for any business in Africa not being his, nor does his mind appreciate the difference between persuasion and meddling.

And so it goes—ideology over practicality, illusion over reality no matter what the results.

THE latest demonstration of Nkrumah's obsession with ideology, and consequent departure from reality, has taken the form of a little book published last spring (and almost totally ignored in this country) called "Consciencism," a "philosophy and ideology for decolonization and development, with particular reference to the African revolution."

This book was pushed on Ghana with all the propaganda weapons available to the state, and they are considerable: mass meetings, public speeches, front-page news reports, lengthy (and impenetrable) commentaries, full-page advertisements, broadcasts and discussion groups—all running on for weeks. All of it seemed an acute example of loss of balance, especially since not more than 5 per cent of the country was able to read the incredibly complex prose and not more than 1 per cent was able

2 August 1965

Soviet Historians on Soviet Historiography
of the Period 1933 - 1941

(from the Polish journal Kultura, Paris, No. 5/211, 1965)

On June 17 and 18, 1964 there was an interesting discussion at the USSR Academy of Science's Institute of History on the "draft" of Volume IX in the series The History of the USSR from the Most Ancient Times, which covers the period 1933 - 1941. Some foreign students who were in Moscow at the time were present and wrote down, though perhaps not always accurately and in detail, the most striking excerpts from the discussion. Despite the possible inaccuracies, there can be no doubt that the discussion was unusually interesting: it testifies to a fairly broad range of "freedom of speech," to the personal bravery of the speakers, and to a general hatred of the supposedly revered "great Stalin."

Alexander Pavlovich Korushev began the discussion with a criticism of the "draft's" treatment of the period during the second five-year plan. When he said that in 1933, students standing in line to receive a bowl of soup fainted from hunger, cries of protest were heard in the auditorium. The speaker answered them by saying that he had seen this himself. He added that the "draft" ought to describe the conditions and system of food rationing in more detail. He continued:

Korushev: During the second five-year plan, many projects such as the White Sea Canal were built by the inhabitants of forced labor camps who have never been rehabilitated. Only the leaders have been rehabilitated, not the masses. The IX Volume should at least mention how many forced laborers took part in these projects. The condition of the peasants in the kolkhozes should also be described: in 1933 their condition was worse than in 1929, worse even than in 1913. ("If that is true, then why was the October Revolution necessary?" called Professor Genkina from the auditorium.) The slogans of collectivization were good only for export; there were no material incentives. The kolkhozniks each received two kilograms of grain per labor-day while producing 69 kilograms: the state took over the other 67. The "draft" should mention the distribution of agricultural produce between those who produced it and the state. And what about the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939? Were there any secret clauses? The western press says that there were such clauses on Poland and other questions. If this is true, it should be indicated in the "draft"; if it is not true, it should be shown that the western press is lying. And the war with Finland. What lessons did the Soviet army learn from it? It is stated in the draft that the defense industry increased its output by two to two and a half times in the years 1938 - 1940, but the production of tanks, arms, and airplanes did not increase at all. What called

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forth the "increase"? How many officers were liquidated during the purges? Thirty-three thousand or forty thousand? Our army was without commanders on the eve of the war. Was there any sort of plan for conducting the war? The IX Volume should explain why the commanders of the General Staff were changed so often in the years 1940-1941, and should tell what the strength of the army was in men and arms.

In the ensuing discussion, the following people made interesting comments:

Yekirim: Praise of the fanaticism with which Stalin built socialism is out of place in the IX Volume. There was fanaticism before the period of the "cult," but during the period of the "cult" Stalin only hindered the construction of socialism. The repressions reached their culmination in 1937. Why doesn't the IX Volume elucidate the origin of the repressive measures and why does it say nothing of the fact that torture was used to extract confessions from people? The names of the people who landed in prison during the "cult" should be enumerated.

Tomunov: It is not true that Hitler's coming to power brought the downfall of democracy in the Soviet Union. This was Stalin's fault. The period of the "cult" was a definite epoch in the history of the USSR, and the IX Volume should explain this, as well as why and to what extent the people believed in Stalin.

Nekrasova: The five-year plans were unrealistic. This should be indicated in the discussion of the third five-year plan.

Prof. Genkina: The previous speakers were too critically disposed. If the slogans of the collectivization were proclaimed only to deceive the west, and the structure of our state has remained the same as it was in the thirties, then what conclusions are people to come to? Why would the party have tolerated this for thirty years? The IX Volume provokes the reader too much. In the latest historical studies, Stalin is hardly mentioned. This is incorrect, because students will ask, "and where was Stalin?" In this respect, the IX Volume maintains the correct point of view. But it is often repetitive, and there are too many contradictions in it. It is also untrue to say that there is now no access to the archives.

Genkina's last assertion produced an animated argument among those present on the extent to which scholars can use the archives for their studies. Roshal stated that in the Museum of the October Revolution, the second and seventeenth sections are still closed. It developed that the second section contained documents on Lenin, but it was not explained what was in the seventeenth section.

Kurits: There are too many contradictions in the IX Volume. History should be written simply, just as it happened. The punitive agencies of the NKVD should be considered.

Ulyanovskaya: The IX Volume should explain our participation in the Spanish Civil War and state how many volunteers there were and how many tanks were sent. It is long since time to reveal these secrets and many more like them. Was Nikolayev (the assassin of Kirov) expelled from the party for being a partisan of Zinoviev? Were the purge trials secret or open? (Voice from the audience: "If they were open, it was only for agents of the NKVD!") And what about Gamarnik's suicide? He was buried as an enemy of the people, but arrested for being too popular. The names of the people who brought about Pokrovsky's downfall, especially those who are still active, should be published.

Aleksandr Vlamimirovich Snyegov's speech aroused particular interest. He arrived at the meeting late, after Genkina's speech, and spoke without notes. His speech met with the approval of those present on the whole, despite occasional protests.

Snyegov: We agree that the thirties was a period full of contradictions during which the Soviet Union both advanced and fell back at the same time. The IX Volume's half-truths in its description of that time still represent tremendous progress in comparison with the complete lies of previous historical works on the period. The question arises, "for whom is the IX Volume intended?" To judge from its composition, it is intended for those who already know a fair amount about the period. There should consequently be more names, not necessarily of all those rehabilitated, but certainly the greater part.

If the Volume does not speak the truth, then it is not history. In many works on the thirties, kow-towing is mixed with lies - and this is called history. The IX Volume should describe the artificial obstacles placed in the path of progress; Kaganovich's role should be explained. 1930 was the most difficult year for agriculture in our history. The IX Volume should indicate the difficulties which Stalin personally created during collectivization and explain why, despite these difficulties, collectivization was nonetheless able to move forward. On the "cult": was there much genuine opposition to Stalin during this period? In all probability, there was none whatsoever. Was the execution of Kamenov and Zinoviev for espionage necessary? (Voice from the audience: "No!") The IX Volume should also make clear who signed falsified documents for the trials. We all know that there will be other editions of this volume. The chief editor has an important problem, but words to express the whole truth ought to be found. The psychological riddle of Stalin should be resolved and an answer given to the question, "what did he give the country?" Stalin's provocations of various peoples should be explained. It should be proved that there was no opposition to Stalin at this time; the right words must be found to present this. What was

the significance of the battle with Trotsky? Was it senseless? If there were only twelve Trotskyites in the concentration camps, can we conclude that the other 80,000 were Leninists? Soviet historians have endlessly repeated Stalin's hackneyed phrases about lefts, rights, and Trotskyites; more sensible terms must be found. All this leads only to the profanation of our banner in the world; nothing has hurt the cause of socialism more than Stalin's actions in the thirties.

Was it really necessary to liquidate the Polish revolutionaries in 1938? Wasn't this valuable aid for Hitler? I hope you understand what I'm talking about. Why is the partition of Poland praised in the IX Volume? What did it contribute to the defense of the USSR? The eyewitnesses who are still alive should be consulted. This is a very difficult volume, and I'm happy that I'm not responsible for it.

Snyegov's speech concluded the first day's discussion, but its tone dominated the next day's session as well. The following speakers made the most interesting remarks.

Polikov: This book has many weak places, especially in its description of the events from 1938 - 1941. It is incorrect to assert that the trials of 1934-38 were directed solely against the opposition. The military trials were not trials at all and were conducted in complete secrecy. This must be explained. We have become accustomed to paint everything in black and white. We must learn to offer more complex evaluations. Snyegov's position on the Treaty of 1939 and the partition of Poland is not entirely correct. Stalin had grounds for his action, namely, the elimination of an evil perpetrated earlier; the Treaty returned part of Poland and Byelorussia to us.

Gessen: How are we to explain the rise of the "cult?" The IX Volume speaks only of repressions, but other sources must be examined. Nothing is said of the population's material condition; the volume should have shown what the socialist revolution has given the people. Nothing is said of Soviet armed might; the details of the repressions against the military should have been given. Much has already been written on this in military periodicals. What was the influence of the repressions on our military preparedness? The consequences were greater than the mere elimination of the higher commanders. Tukhachevsky clearly foresaw the development of the second World War, but since he had been condemned as an enemy of the people, all his ideas were cast aside. This should have been discussed, but nothing is said of it in the IX Volume. Finally, all aspects of the "cult of personality" should be clarified in detail. How did Stalin and his cohorts - Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov - attain their aims?

Chaadayeva, an Old Bolshevik, spoke very emotionally:

How do I personally explain the rise of the "cult?" Did we believe in Stalin? We did. We felt that Stalin didn't take into account certain aspects of the repressions. It is now time for us to speak out on the subject. There was a huge difference between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin was a great humanist, and this is what attracted us to him. Even the Menshevik opposition could not help but like him; Vladimir Ilich admitted his errors: he stated frankly that the Bolsheviks were making many stupid mistakes, but he justified them on the basis of the fact that this was their first attempt to govern a country and conduct a socialist revolution. People heard him, believed him, and followed him. Lenin listened to the opposition and learned from it. Before his death, Lenin failed to designate his successor. Svedlov, whom Lenin had treated as a son, had died. No one remained to him. He warned the party about Stalin and recommended the introduction of a collective government. (At this point, Chaadayeva began a sharp personal attack on Stalin, but the chairman requested her to limit her remarks to the book.) I sincerely confess that I don't know how to explain the rise of the "cult." It was as if the Central Committee had ceased to exist; Stalin became the only leader. The tragedy of this development was that when the most important decisions were being considered, the old tradition of turning to the people and listening to it was abandoned. From the end of 1929 on, the Cheka ruled the party, intimidated gatherings, etc. Stalin surrounded himself with people who set him on a throne and blindly surrendered all power into his hands. This was a great error: the party should always control the actions of its leaders.

Lopatov: This Volume is much better than other works on the same period, and its criticism is much more realistic. However, criticism of the "cult" must go deeper and it must be contrasted with Leninism. We cannot stop, as has hitherto been done, with superficial criticism. The facts must be set forth in greater detail and the complex personality of Stalin must be analyzed. This can be done as it has been done with Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Stalin trampled on all the accepted norms of conduct not only in his relations with capitalist countries, but with socialist countries as well. We must speak of his mistakes in this area, as well as the problem of collectivization. We have payed dearly for his innumerable mistakes. For example, highly trained and educated people went to work in the country, but they couldn't remain there because the conditions were too terrible. People arrived and fled. This should be mentioned. There are many distortions in the draft on the IX Volume, and they should be eliminated.

Gusev: The book's structure is incorrect, and there are many repetitions as a result. The contemporary structure of Soviet society should have been examined. Who, essentially was liquidated? What social organizations were destroyed, and what significance did this have? These questions must be answered in order to understand what happened in the thirties. The IX Volume should describe Stalin's role in the construction of a personal dictatorship and the transformation of social organizations and institutions into puppets. The IX Volume, however, should not limit itself to the description of errors; the Soviet economy developed powerfully, and this should be stressed.

A young aspirant, whose name was not recorded:

The rise of the "cult" should be described better and more extensively. After the XXII Party Congress, it became clear that the repressions were not accidents, but Stalin's conscious policy. Evidence should be given in exact figures. Announcements on the number of victims have varied from hundreds to millions. It should also be explained why a number of people have not been rehabilitated, despite the fact that evidence on which they were convicted has been discredited. The IX Volume also leaves important questions of foreign policy unexplained. Take the war with Finland. Why did the Soviet army suffer defeats at the beginning? This was, after all, the army that defeated Hitler.

Yukabovskaya, a member of the editorial board for the IX Volume:

Many specific problems are still insufficiently studied, a fact which complicated the preparation of the text. Only after the condemnation of the "cult of personality" has it become possible to begin the study of this period. During the period of the "cult," we were obliged to write about everything as either exceptionally good or exceptionally bad - white or black with nothing in between. But this tendency has remained with us to the present. In this respect we are still under Stalin's influence. Have we really been able to give an objective appraisal of any individual, with a delin-eation of both his good and bad features? (The audience agrees, "no.") But no one is either a God or a devil. Today we can no longer write this way; we must write in such a way that we won't be ashamed of our work in ten years. So we can't use Stalin's methods in dealing with the "cult." We must be objective. The party would not have tolerated Stalin if he had been a criminal and a villain. We have said everything that we could about the trials; they were not secret. Chervyakov, Ordzhonikidze, and many others committed suicide.

Danilov: I wish to return to the question about half-truths posed by Snyegov. It is not true that the entire truth was known to the authors and that they concealed some of it. Much of the IX Volume

is based on research conducted earlier. Many problems will have to be studied more deeply before the rise of the "cult of personality" is explained:

Verkhin: Before we can answer many of the questions which have arisen in the course of this discussion, we ought to consider the basic problem of the role of the individual in history. Similarly, we must determine the role of the masses before we can answer other questions. In my opinion, social forces are the most important. In the final analysis, the rise of the "cult of personality" did not alter the socialist character of Soviet society and has not hindered its subsequent development. Consequently, the victory of socialism in the USSR should be stressed rather than the rise of the "cult of personality."

On this note, the Soviet historians' discussion of the treatment of the treatment of the Stalin period in The History of the USSR from the Most Ancient Times came to an end. In closing the session, its chairman, Academician Kim, called the discussion fruitful in that it had uncovered many shortcomings in the draft of the IX Volume. Some of the speakers had gone too far, he continued, and made impermissible judgements, as, for example, Snyegov in his treatment of foreign policy. The chairman could also not agree with Snyegov's assertion that the authors of the IX Volume had knowingly written "half-truths": many questions remain unanswered to the present day so that such a reproach is completely unfounded.

"I always insist on the truth," said the chairman, "and the truth is that during the rule of Stalin and with Stalin, we built socialism in our country." As historians, we should write about what actually happened, and not about what might have happened or what should have happened. The question of the "cult of personality" should not cloud our vision of the fact that our country achieved outstanding successes. The IX Volume is not a monograph on the "cult of personality" or the repressions which occurred as a result of it.

Although it may be concluded from the chairman's closing words that the next (or final) reworking of the draft for the IX Volume will not differ greatly from the proposed text, the frankness of the speakers and the very fact that a public discussion of this sort took place in Moscow, indicates that far reaching changes have occurred in the nature of the Soviet intelligentsia.

COMMUNIST CHINESE DEPLORE SOVIET ACTIONS
ON YOUTH MEETING

New China News Agency, English Service,
20 July 1965

Peking, 20 July--The spokesman of the All-China Youth Federation in a statement today commented on the decision adopted at a recent meeting of the international preparatory committee of the ninth World Youth and Student Festival in Tampere, Finland, and on the press statement made by Petr Reshetov, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations, on 14 July.

He said: The international preparatory committee of the ninth World Youth Festival held a meeting in Tampere, Finland, from 8 to 10 July. In spite of the opposition of the Chinese, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates, the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations manipulated the meeting to pass a decision which interfered in Algeria's internal affairs and called for reconsideration as to the venue of the Festival. In a press statement in Moscow on 14 July, Petr Reshetov, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations, expressed full support for the decision and scurrilously attacked those youth organizations which differed with it. This is another serious move by the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations to undermine the festival, interfere in Algeria's internal affairs, and split the unity of the international youth and student movement.

It has already been decided that the ninth Festival will be held in Algeria. The Algerian side has repeatedly declared that the ninth festival would be held in Algeria as was decided earlier. Consequently, there is no reason whatever to have another discussion. Despite all this, the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations manipulated the international preparatory committee of the festival to pass the decision for "reconsideration" of the question of the venue of the festival.

In his statement of 14 July, Reshetov, while acknowledging that the youth of Algeria had contributed greatly to the preparatory work of the festival, once again declared his full support for the erroneous decision of the international preparatory committee. He, however, made no mention of the Algerian stand that there should be no change in the venue of the festival. This exposes the hypocrisy and double-dealing on the part of the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations.

After the Algerian event on 19 June, leaders of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations plotted in the international youth and student organizations under their control to transfer the ninth festival to be held in Africa for the first time to a place in Europe. Their activities are known to us and to many other youth organizations. It is no secret at all. To cover up their sinister activities which cannot bear the light

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of day, Reshetov actually said that what was said about these activities was a "lie" fabricated by others. In so doing, he made what he wanted to conceal more conspicuous. People who have enough common sense would ask: If they have no intention to transfer the festival from Algeria in Africa, why should they insist on "reconsideration" of the question of the venue of the festival, a question already settled? To speak the truth, they try to change the venue of the festival to suit the foreign policy of their own country.

It is obvious that the decision adopted on 25 June by the permanent commission for the festival was brazen interference in Algeria's internal affairs and was strongly opposed by youth organizations of many countries. The Algerian side in its two communiques issued on 3 July definitely pointed out this fact. Reshetov in his statement on 14 July once again supported this decision. Such persistence in crude interference in the internal affairs of another country is indeed rarely seen in the international youth movement.

In his statement, Reshetov actually called those who took exception to this erroneous practice "enemies" who allegedly wanted to "split the youth movement." The leaders of the Soviet youth organizations took the enemy as their friend and friend their enemy. They invariably took those anti-imperialist youth organizations which differed with them as their enemy and took U.S. imperialism--the real enemy of the youth of all lands--as their friend. People like them who take the enemy as their friend are the worst splitters.

It is no accident that the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations committed these errors. They have long been accustomed to wield the baton in the international youth movement, to manipulate and make the international youth and student organizations, including the World Festival of Youth and Students, serve their general line of "peaceful coexistence" which means Soviet-American cooperation for world domination.

It may be recalled that it was no other than the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations who had coerced the international preparatory committee to submit to the unreasonable demand of the imperialists that the Algerian delegation must not be allowed to carry the flag of the Algerian National Liberation Front at the seventh festival in Vienna in 1959. It was again they who prevented many delegations from carrying anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. placards in a demonstration and refused to allow the Palestine delegation to take part in the festival in the name of Palestine and under the Palestine flag at the eighth festival in Helsinki in 1962. It was they who stubbornly opposed having anything anti-imperialist among the slogans of the ninth festival; they who included in its program a series of activities, extremely preposterous in character, to extol the United Nations, a tool of U.S. imperialism, for its aggression; they who preach "peaceful coexistence" and "general and complete

disarmement," and they who spread the yellow culture and the American way of life at the meeting of the ninth festival's international preparatory committee held at the end of last year.

Now they have made use of the ninth festival to interfere in Algeria's internal affairs. No fine words can gloss over their features from sham unity and a real split, sham anti-imperialism and real capitulation, and sham revolution and real sabotage.

Chinese youth resolutely oppose the foul activities of the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations to undermine the unity of the international youth movement and the decision adopted at the preparatory committee meeting held in Tampere under their manipulation, for continued interference in Algeria's internal affairs and sabotage against the holding of the ninth festival in Algiers. However, the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations may prevaricate and slander, they cannot escape the responsibility for wrecking the festival, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and splitting the unity of the international youth and students movement.

Additional Details

New China News Agency, English Service, 20 July 1965

Peking, 20 July--The international preparatory committee for the ninth World Youth Festival held a plenary meeting 8-10 July at Tampere, Finland, according to a report from Helsinki. Under the manipulation of the Soviet delegate, the committee rammed through the meeting a resolution which is a new flagrant act of interference in the internal affairs of Algeria and a disruptive move to prevent the festival from being held in that country. This threw further light on the ugly features of the Soviet delegate in creating a further split in the international youth movement.

The meeting was hurriedly opened on the afternoon of 8 July in the absence of the Algerian delegate, the chairman of the international preparatory committee for the festival, and delegates of many other countries. It had neither a democratically elected leading organ, the presidium, nor an agenda.

The delegates of China and Indonesia said that the meeting must not be held without the participation of the delegate from Algeria, the host country of the festival. They demanded that the meeting be postponed until the arrival of the Algerian delegate, but the person who presided over the meeting, instead of heeding this demand, arbitrarily made the meeting vote and adopt an absurd procedural proposal advanced by the Yugoslav delegate. The proposal limited the speech of each of the members of the preparatory committee to 10 minutes, and in violation of the practice of international conferences, forbade the observers of the Belgian Communist Youth Union and other organizations from speaking at the meeting.

The meeting adjourned after brief morning and afternoon sittings on 9 July. During this time the Soviet delegate busied himself with conspiratorial moves behind the scenes and spread malicious rumors about the Algerian political situation. The Algerian delegate, who had just arrived, spoke at a sitting that lasted from the evening of 9 July to the early morning of 10 July. He renewed the demand that the ninth world festival be held in Algiers. He proposed, however, that its convocation be postponed until next year.

Chien Ta-wei, head of the Chinese delegation, said that the international preparatory committee meeting should discuss ways and means of holding the festival in Algeria so successfully that it would become a grand review of the anti-imperialist forces of the youth of all countries. It should not discuss the question of the venue of the festival because that had been decided on a year ago. He expressed firm opposition to the scheme to prevent the festival from being held in Africa. He reaffirmed the demand that the festival be held in Algeria as decided. He also cited facts to show how the permanent commission under the manipulation of a big power interfered flagrantly in the internal affairs of Algeria. He demanded that the erroneous resolution of 25 June be rescinded. When the Chinese delegate spoke a handful of people pounded the tables in an attempt to create a disturbance.

The delegates of Indonesia and Japan appealed to the youth of all countries to be vigilant against the scheme of imperialism and its agents to split the anti-imperialist front and wreck the festival. They demanded that the festival be held in Algeria as agreed. They exposed the various despicable schemes to interfere in Algeria's internal affairs. The Rumanian delegate said that only the Algerian people had the right to solve their own problems and no intervention in Algeria's internal affairs should be allowed.

Soviet Delegate Petr Reshetov failed to mention a single word about holding the youth festival in Algeria. Instead, he proposed the setting up of a subcommittee to reconsider the venue of the festival. This fully exposed the plot of the Soviet delegate to have the festival held outside Algeria. Reshetov also viciously attacked by insinuation the youth organizations which stood for holding the festival in Algeria.

Singing the same old theme of the Soviet delegate who manipulated the meeting, some delegates proposed a change in the venue of the festival, saying that Algeria had no qualifications for the festival. They suggested that a small group be formed to study a new venue and demanded that the meeting approve the erroneous resolution adopted by the dominant commission on 25 June.

Before the meeting adopted its resolution, the Chinese, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates put forth a joint draft resolution reaffirming that the youth festival should still be held in Algiers and demanding that the

meeting rescind the erroneous resolution of the dominant commission which interfered in Algeria's internal affairs and sabotaged the holding of the youth festival in Algeria. But the draft resolution was rejected by the Soviet and other delegates. The manipulator of the meeting forced through a resolution which approved the 25 June resolution of the dominant commission, and proposed the postponement of the youth festival and reconsideration of the so-called venue of the festival. When the resolution was put to a vote the Chinese, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates voted against it and made statements condemning the undemocratic proceedings of the meeting, pointing out that the resolution was wrong. The Rumanian delegate abstained from voting.

After the voting the Chinese delegation issued a statement stressing that the meeting was a very unseemly one. The resolution forced through the meeting was a continuation of the dominant commission resolution of 25 June which grossly interfered in Algeria's internal affairs. The scheme was to undermine the holding of the youth festival in Africa. The statement pointed out in conclusion that this nefarious practice by the Soviet delegate, manipulator of the meeting, could only further split the international youth movement and that he should be held fully responsible for the serious consequences arising from his action.

2 August 1965

Treaty Establishing the
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

This comprehensive treaty, signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, sets forth the policies, rules and the provisions for institutions for the European Economic Community. Articles 1 through 8, which establish the principles for the Community of the six members -- Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic, Italian Republic, Luxembourg and the Netherlands -- are as follows:

ARTICLE 1

By the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

ARTICLE 2

It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.

ARTICLE 3

For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty:

(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect;

(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries;

(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital;

(d) the inauguration of a common agricultural policy;

(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;

(Cont.)

(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market;

(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to co-ordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibria in their balances of payments;

(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market;

(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living;

(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank intended to facilitate the economic expansion of the Community through the creation of new resources; and

(k) the association of overseas countries and territories with the Community with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social development.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Achievement of the tasks entrusted to the Community shall be ensured by:

- an ASSEMBLY,
- a COUNCIL,
- a COMMISSION,
- a COURT OF JUSTICE.

Each of these institutions shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.

2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and Social Committee acting in a consultative capacity.

ARTICLE 5

Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims.

They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 6

1. Member States, acting in close collaboration with the institutions of the Community, shall co-ordinate their respective economic policies to the extent that is necessary to attain the objectives of this Treaty.
2. The institutions of the Community shall take care not to prejudice the internal and external financial stability of Member States.

ARTICLE 7

Within the field of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited.

The Council may, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, lay down rules in regard to the prohibition of any such discrimination.

ARTICLE 8

1. The Common Market shall be progressively established in the course of a transitional period of twelve years.

The transitional period shall be divided into three stages of four years each; the length of each stage may be modified in accordance with the provisions set out below.

2. To each stage there shall be allotted a group of actions which shall be undertaken and pursued concurrently.
3. Transition from the first to the second stage shall be conditional upon a confirmatory statement to the effect that the essence of the objectives specifically laid down in this Treaty for the first stage has been in fact achieved and that, subject to the exceptions and procedures provided for in this Treaty, the obligations have been observed.

This statement shall be made at the end of the fourth year by the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote on a report of the Commission. The invocation by a Member State of the non-fulfilment of its own obligations shall not, however, be an obstacle to a unanimous vote. Failing a unanimous vote, the first stage shall automatically be extended for a period of one year.

At the end of the fifth year, the Council shall make such confirmatory statement under the same conditions. Failing a unanimous vote, the first stage shall automatically be extended for a further period of one year.

At the end of the sixth year, the Council shall make such a statement acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a report of the Commission.

4. Within a period of one month as from the date of this last vote, each Member State voting in a minority or, if the required majority vote has not been obtained, any Member State, shall be entitled to require the Council to appoint an Arbitration Board whose decision shall bind all Member States and the institutions of the Community. The Arbitration Board shall be composed of three members appointed by the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission.

If the Council has not within a period of one month from the date of such requirement, appointed the members of the Arbitration Board, they shall be appointed by the Court of Justice within a further period of one month.

The Arbitration Board shall appoint its Chairman.

The Board shall give its award within a period of six months from the date of the vote by the Council referred to in paragraph 3, last sub-paragraph.

5. The second and third stages may not be extended or curtailed except pursuant to a decision of the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission.

6. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not have the effect of extending the transitional period beyond a total duration of fifteen years after the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.

7. Subject to the exceptions or deviations provided for in this Treaty, the expiry of the transitory period shall constitute the final date for the entry into force of all the rules laid down and for the completion of all the measures required for the establishment of the Common Market.

Draft Constitution Text
Socialist Republic of Rumania
June 1965

Article 1--Rumania is a socialist republic. The Socialist Republic of Rumania is a state of town and village working people. It is sovereign, independent, and single entity. Its territory is inalienable and indivisible.

Article 2--All power in the Socialist Republic of Rumania belongs to the people, who are free and masters of their destiny. The people's power is based on the worker-peasant alliance. In close unity the working class, the leading class in society, the peasantry, intellectuals, and other categories of working people, regardless of nationality, are building the socialist system and creating conditions for the transition to communism.

Article 3--The leading political force of the entire society of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is the Rumanian Communist Party.

Article 4--As the sovereign holders of power, the people implement this power through the Grand National Assembly and people's councils, bodies elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret vote. The Grand National Assembly and people's councils form the basis of the entire system of state organs. The Grand National Assembly is the supreme organ of state power, and all other state organs carry out their activities under its leadership and supervision.

Article 5--Rumania's national economy is a socialist economy based on socialist ownership of production means. In the Socialist Republic of Rumania, exploitation of man by man is abolished forever, and the socialist system of remuneration in accordance with the quantity and quality of work is being implemented. Work is a task of honor for each citizen able to work.

Article 6--Socialist ownership of production means is either state ownership of goods belonging to all the people or cooperative ownership of goods belonging to all cooperative organizations.

Article 7--All underground resources--mines, state land, forests, water, and natural energy sources--plants and factories, banks, state farms, MTS, communications, state transport and telecommunications means, the state building and apartments fund, and the material base of state social-cultural institutions belong to all the people. They are state property.

Article 8--Foreign trade is a state monopoly.

Article 9--The land of agricultural production cooperatives and livestock, implements, installations, and buildings belonging to them are cooperative property. Plots of land which, in accordance with the statutes of agricultural production cooperatives, are allotted for family farming by cooperative peasants are cooperative property. Living quarters and annex farm structures, the land on which they are situated, and, in accordance with the statutes of agricultural production cooperatives, productive livestock and small agricultural inventories are the personal property of cooperative peasants.

Tools, machines, installations, and buildings of artisan and consumer cooperatives are cooperative property.

Article 10--Agricultural production cooperatives, a socialist form of agricultural organization, insure conditions for intensive land cultivation and the application of advanced science. By increasing production, they contribute to development of the national economy and a constant improvement in the living standards of the peasantry and all people. The state supports agricultural production cooperatives and protects their property. The state also supports other cooperative organizations and protects their property.

Article 11--Under the conditions of cooperativized agriculture, the state guarantees by law for peasants who cannot associate themselves in agricultural production cooperatives ownership of the land that they themselves till with their families and ownership of implements used for this purpose. Ownership by artisans of their workshops is also guaranteed.

Article 12--Land and buildings can be expropriated only for projects in the public interest and against payment of just compensation.

Article 13--The purpose of all state activities is development of the socialist system, constant improvement of the people's material and cultural well-being, the guarantee of man's freedom and dignity, and comprehensive affirmation of the human personality. For this purpose, the Rumanian socialist state organizes, plans, and directs the national economy, protects socialist property, guarantees the full exercise of citizens' rights, insures socialist legality and protection under the law, develops education of all categories, insures conditions for the development of science, art, and culture, carries out health protection, guarantees the country's defense and organizes its armed forces, and pursues relations with the other states.

Article 14--The Socialist Republic of Rumania maintains and develops relations of friendship and fraternal collaboration with the socialist countries, fosters relations of collaboration with countries having other social-political systems, and works in international organizations in order to insure peace and understanding among people. The foreign relations of the Socialist Republic of Rumania are based on principles of respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality of rights and mutual advantages, and noninterference in internal affairs.

Article 15--The territory of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is organized in territorial administrative units known as regions, rayons, towns, and communes. Regions of the Socialist Republic of Rumania are Arges, Bacau, Banat, Brasov, Bucharest, Cluj, Crisana, Dobrogea, Galati, Hunedoara, Iasi, Maramures, Mures-Hungarian autonomous, Oltenia, Floesti, and Suceava. Capital of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is the city of Bucharest.

Article 16--Rumanian citizenship is acquired and lost in accordance with the law.

II--Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens:

Article 17--Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, regardless of nationality, race, sex, or religion, enjoy equal rights in all fields of economic, political, juridical, social, and cultural life. The state guarantees the equality of rights of citizens. No limitation on these rights and no discrimination in their exercise on the basis of nationality, race, sex, or

religion are permitted. Any manifestation intended to establish such limitations, nationalistic-chauvinistic propaganda, or the incitement of racial or national hatred are punishable by law.

Article 18--Citizens have the right to work. Each citizen is insured the opportunity of engaging, in accordance with his training, in activities in the economic, administrative, social, or cultural fields with remuneration according to quantity and quality. For equal work, the salary is equal. Measures for work protection and security and special measures for the work protection of women and youth are established by law.

Article 19--Citizens are entitled to rest. This right is guaranteed for those who work by stipulating eight hours as the maximum length of the working day, a weekly rest, and annual paid holidays. In sectors of heavy and very heavy work, the duration of the working day is reduced below eight hours without a reduction in wages.

Article 20--Citizens are entitled to material insurance for old age, illness, or work incapacity. The right of workers and employees to material insurance is achieved by pensions and sickness benefits granted within the framework of the state social insurance system and of members of cooperative organizations or other public organizations by forms of insurance organized by them.

The state insures medical aid through its medical institutions. Paid maternity holidays are guaranteed.

Article 21--Citizens are entitled to schooling. The right to schooling is insured through eight-year general and compulsory elementary schools, all categories of free education, and the system of state scholarships. Education in the Socialist Republic of Rumania is state education.

Article 22--Cohabiting nationalities are insured the free use of their mother tongue, as well as of books, newspapers, magazines, the theater, and all categories of education in their own tongue. In rayons also inhabited by a nationality other than Rumanian, all organs and institutions orally and in writing also use the language of the respective nationality and appoint employees from its ranks or other citizens who know the language and the way of life of the local population.

Article 23--Women have the same rights as men. The state protects (the sanctity of--ed.) marriage and the family and the interests of mother and child.

Article 24--Youth are insured necessary conditions for development of their physical and intellectual abilities.

Article 25--Citizens have the right to elect and be elected to the Grand National Assembly and people's councils. Voting is universal, equal, direct, and secret. All citizens 18 years and older are entitled to vote.

Citizens with voting rights who are 23 years or older can be elected deputies to the Grand National Assembly and people's councils. The right to nominate candidates is insured for all working people's and Rumanian Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth and women's organizations, cultural associations, and other mass and public organizations.

Voters have the right to recall a deputy at any time in accordance with the procedure on whose basis he was nominated and elected.

The insane and mentally retarded and persons deprived of their rights for a period determined by judicial sentence do not have the right to elect or be elected.

Article 26--The most progressive and conscious citizens from the ranks of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and other categories of working people unite in the Rumanian Communist Party, the highest form of organization of the working class and its vanguard detachment. The Rumanian Communist Party expresses and faithfully serves the people's aspirations and vital interests, fulfills the leadership role in all fields of socialist construction, and directs the activities of mass and public organizations and state organs.

Article 27--Citizens are entitled to join trade union, cooperative, youth, women's, and social-cultural organizations, creative unions, scientific, technical, and sports associations, and other public organizations. The state supports the activities of mass and public organizations, creates conditions for development of the material base of these organizations, and protects their assets in accordance with the law. Mass and public organizations insure the broad participation of the people's masses in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the Socialist Republic of Rumania and the exercise of public control, the expression of the democracy of the socialist system. The Rumanian Communist Party achieves an organized link with the working class, peasantry, intellectuals, and other categories of working people and mobilizes them in the struggle to achieve construction of socialism.

Article 28--Freedom of speech, press, gatherings, meetings, and demonstrations is guaranteed for citizens of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 29--Freedom of speech, press, gatherings, meetings, and demonstrations cannot be used for purposes contrary to the socialist system and the interests of those who work. Any association of a fascist or antidemocratic nature is prohibited. Participation in such associations and propaganda of a fascist or antidemocratic nature are punishable by law.

Article 30--Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all citizens. Everybody is free to have or not to have a religious faith. Freedom to practice religion is guaranteed. Religious cults are organized and operate freely. The mode of organization and operation of religious cults is regulated by law. The school is separated from the church. No religious faith, congregation, or community may open or maintain education institutions other than special schools for the training of religious staff.

Article 31--Citizens are guaranteed the inviolability of the individual. No one may be detained or arrested if no proof or solid evidence exists that he has perpetrated an act punishable by law. Investigative organs may order the detention of a person for a maximum duration of 24 hours. No one may be arrested except on the basis of a warrant issued by the court or prosecutor.

Article 32--Domicile is inviolate. No one may enter the residence of a person without his consent except in cases and under conditions specifically stipulated by law.

Article 33--The secrecy of correspondence and telephone conversations is guaranteed.

Article 34--The right to petition is guaranteed. State organs are obliged to solve in accordance with law citizens petitions regarding personal or public rights and interests.

Article 35--A person whose right is violated by an illegal action of a state organ may request the competent organs, under conditions stipulated by law, to annul the action and compensate for the damage.

Article 36--The right to hold personal property is protected by law. Personal property may consist of income and savings resulting from work, living quarters with an attached farm and the land on which both are situated, or goods for personal use and comfort.

Article 37--The right of inheritance is protected by law.

Article 38--The Socialist Republic of Rumania grants the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for their activities in defense of the interests of those who work or for participation in the struggle for national liberation or defense of peace.

Article 39--Each citizen is dutybound to respect the constitution and laws, protect socialist property, and contribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system.

Article 40--Military service in the armed forces is compulsory and a duty of honor for citizens.

Article 41--Defense of the homeland is the sacred duty of each citizen. Violation of the military oath, betrayal of the homeland, desertion to the enemy, and the damaging of the state's defensive ability are the most serious crimes against the people and punishable with the full severity of the law.

III--(Words indistinct) Grand National Assembly:

Article 42--The Grand National Assembly, supreme organ of state power, is the unique legislative organ of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 43--The Grand National Assembly has the following main duties:

A--It adopts and modifies the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

B--It controls the electoral system.

C--It approves the state national economic plan and the state budget and makes the general accounting at the end of the budget period.

D--It organizes the Council of Ministers, ministries, and other central organs of state administration.

E--It controls organization of the judiciary and the procuratura.

F--It establishes norms of organization and operation of people's councils.

G--It establishes administrative organization of the territory.

H--It grants amnesties.

I--It ratifies and abrogates international agreements which require modification of the laws.

J--It elects and recalls the State Council.

K--It elects and recalls the Supreme Court and prosecutor general.

M--It exercises general control over implementation of the constitutionality of laws.

N--It controls the activities of the State Council.

O--It controls other central organs of state administration.

P--It hears accountability reports on the activities of the Supreme Court and controls (controlleaza) its guidance decisions.

Q--It controls the activities of the procuratura.

R--It exercises general control over the activities of people's councils.

S--It establishes the general line of foreign policy.

T--In the interests of defense of the country, public order, and state security, it proclaims a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the entire territory of the country.

U--It declares partial or general mobilization.

V--It declares a state of war. A state of war can be declared only in the event of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Rumania or against another state with which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual defense obligations under international treaties, or in the event of a situation for which the obligation to declare a state of war is established.

W--It appoints and recalls the supreme commander of the Armed Forces.

Article 44--Grand National Assembly deputies are elected for electoral precincts with similar numbers of inhabitants. The delimitation of electoral precincts is done by State Council decree. One deputy is elected from each electoral precinct. The Grand National Assembly consists of 465 deputies.

Article 45--The Grand National Assembly is elected for a four-year legislative period determined from the date of the end of the mandate of the previous Grand National Assembly. The Assembly's mandate remains valid until expiration of the term for which it was elected. If it finds that circumstances make it impossible to hold elections, the Grand National Assembly may decide to extend its mandate for the period covering these circumstances.

Article 46--Elections to the Grand National Assembly take place on one of the non-working days of the last month of each legislature. The date of the elections is fixed at least 60 days beforehand. The newly elected Grand National Assembly is convened during the three months following expiration of the previous Grand National Assembly mandate.

Article 47--The Grand National Assembly checks the legality of the election of each deputy and decides on the validation or annulment of the election. If an election is annulled, the deputy's rights and duties cease at the moment of annulment.

Article 48--The Grand National Assembly adopts its own rules of operation.

Article 49--The Grand National Assembly annually fixes its budget, which is included in the state budget.

Article 50--For the legislative period, the Grand National Assembly elects the Grand National Assembly Bureau, which consists of the Grand National Assembly chairman and four deputy chairmen.

Article 51--The Grand National Assembly chairman presides over the sessions of the Grand National Assembly. He may designate any of the deputy chairmen to carry out some of his tasks.

Article 52--The Grand National Assembly elects deputies to permanent committees. Permanent committees make reports on or advise regarding draft laws on problems sent to them by the Grand National Assembly chairman for study in accordance with their competence. Upon the request of the State Council, the permanent committees submit advice on draft decrees having the force of law. The Grand National Assembly may set up temporary committees for any problems or fields of activity and stipulate the powers of and the mode of activities by each of these committees. All state organs and employees are dutybound to make requested information and documents available to Grand National Assembly committees.

Article 53--In exercising control over the constitutionality of the laws, the Grand National Assembly sets up a constitutional committee for the legislative period. Without exceeding one-third of the total number of committee members, specialists who are not deputies, members of the Supreme Court, and teaching cadres of the higher education and scientific research networks may be elected to the constitutional committee. The committee submits to the Grand National Assembly reports and advice on its own initiative or at the request of organs stipulated in Assembly operational rules.

Article 54--The Grand National Assembly works in sessions. Its ordinary sessions are convened two times each year. The Grand National Assembly is convened whenever necessary in extraordinary sessions on the initiative of the State Council or of at least one-third of the total number of deputies.

Article 55--The Grand National Assembly functions only if at least one-half plus one of the total number of deputies are present.

Article 56--The Grand National Assembly approves laws and decisions. Laws and decisions are considered approved if they receive a majority vote of the Grand National Assembly deputies. The constitution is adopted and amended with a vote of at least two-thirds of the total number of the Grand National Assembly deputies. Laws and decisions of the Grand National Assembly are signed by the Assembly chairman or the vice chairman who presided over the session.

Article 57--After approval by the Grand National Assembly, laws are published in the official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania within 10 days at the latest under the signature of the State Council chairman.

Article 58--Each Grand National Assembly deputy has the right to ask questions and interpellate the Council of Ministers or any of its members. Within the framework of control exercised by the Grand National Assembly, a deputy may ask questions of and interpellate the Supreme Court chairman and prosecutor general. A person asked or interpellated is dutybound to give a verbal or written answer within three days at the latest and, in any case, during the same session.

Article 59--For the preparation of Grand National Assembly debates or interpellations, a deputy has the right to demand necessary information from any state organ, addressing himself for this purpose to the Grand National Assembly Bureau.

Article 60--Each deputy is dutybound to periodically submit to voters accountability reports regarding his activities and those of the Grand National Assembly.

Article 61--No Grand National Assembly deputy may be detained, arrested, or sent for penal trial during a session without prior consent of the Grand National Assembly or between sessions without State Council consent. A deputy may be detained without such consent only in the event of a flagrant infraction.

Article 62--The State Council is the supreme organ of state power with permanent activity and subordinated to the Grand National Assembly.

Article 63--The State Council permanently carries out the following main duties:

A--It fixes the date of elections to the Grand National Assembly and people's councils.

B--It appoints and recalls leaders of central organs of state administration who are not members of the Council of Ministers.

C--It establishes military ranks and appoints generals, admirals, and marshals.

D--It establishes and awards the decorations and titles of honor and authorizes the wearing of decorations awarded by other states.

E--It grants pardons.

F--It grants citizenship, approves the surrender of citizenship, and withdraws Rumanian citizenship.

G--It grants the right of asylum.

H--It ratifies and abrogates international treaties except those whose ratification or abrogation is within the competence of the Grand National Assembly.

I--It establishes the ranks of the diplomatic missions and accredits and recalls the diplomatic representatives of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

J--It receives letters of credence and recall of the diplomatic representatives of other states.

K--In international relations, the State Council through its chairman represents the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 64--The State Council has the following main duties during periods between Grand National Assembly sessions:

A--It convenes Grand National Assembly sessions.

B--Without amending the constitution, it establishes norms with power of law. Norms with power of law are submitted to the first Grand National Assembly session for debate in accordance with the procedure for adoption of laws. The state national economic plan, state budget, and general accounting at the end of the budget period are approved by the State Council only when the Grand National Assembly cannot meet because of exceptional circumstances.

C--It appoints and recalls the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general when the Grand National Assembly cannot meet because of exceptional circumstances.

D--It gives laws in force their compulsory general interpretation.

E--It grants amnesty.

F--It controls the application of the laws and decisions of the Grand National Assembly, the activities of the Council of Ministers, ministries, other central organs of state administration, and the procuratura, hears the accountability reports of the Supreme Court and controls its guidance decisions, and controls the documents of people's councils.

G--It appoints and recalls members of the Council of Ministers at the proposal of its chairman.

H--It appoints and recalls the chairman and members of the Supreme Court.

I--In the interests of defending the Socialist Republic of Rumania and insuring public order and state security, it proclaims, in cases of urgency, a state of emergency in localities or throughout the entire territory of the country.

J--In cases of urgency, it declares partial or general mobilization.

K--In cases of urgency, it declares a state of war. A state of war can only be declared in the event of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Rumania or against another state with which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual defense obligations under international treaties, or in the event of a situation for which the obligation to declare war is established.

L--It appoints and recalls the supreme commander of the Armed Forces.

Article 65--The State Council is elected by the first session of the Grand National Assembly from among its members for the duration of the legislature. The State Council functions until election of the new State Council during the following legislature.

Article 66--The State Council consists of the chairman, three deputy chairmen, and 15 members. It elects a secretary from among its members.

Article 67--The State Council carries out its activities in accordance with the principle of collective leadership.

Article 68--The State Council issues decrees and adopts decisions signed by its chairman. Decrees with power of law are published in the official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 69--The State Council submits to the Grand National Assembly accountability reports on the implementation of its tasks and the observance and implementation in state activities of the laws and decisions of the Grand National Assembly. The State Council as a whole and each of its members are responsible to the Grand National Assembly. State Council members are responsible for their own activities, as well as for all State Council activities.

IV--Central Organs of State Administration:

Article 70--The Council of Ministers is the supreme organ of state administration. The Council of Ministers exercises general leadership of executive activities throughout the country and has the following main duties:

A--It establishes general measures for implementation of the internal and foreign policy of the state.

B--It organizes and insures implementation of laws.

C--It leads, coordinates, and controls the activities of ministries and other central organs of state administration.

D--It takes steps to insure public order and protect state interests and the rights of citizens.

E--It draws up the draft state plan and draft state budget and makes the general accounting at the end of the budget period.

F--It establishes measures for implementation of the state plan and budget.

G--It sets up enterprises, state economic organizations, and institutions of republican interest.

H--It sets the annual figure of citizens who will be called up for military service and takes steps for general organization of the Armed Forces.

I--It exercises general leadership in the field of relations with other states and takes steps to sign international agreements.

J--It suspends the decisions of regional people's councils which do not conform with law.

K--It exercises leadership, guidance, and general control of the activities of the executive committees of all people's councils.

Article 71--The Council of Ministers is elected by the first session of the Grand National Assembly for the legislative duration. The Council of Ministers functions until election of the new Council of Ministers by the next legislature.

Article 72--In fulfillment of its tasks, the Council of Ministers approves decisions on the basis of and for implementation of the laws. Decisions of a normative nature are published in the official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 73--The Council of Ministers consists of the chairman, the deputy chairmen of whom one or more may be first deputy chairmen, ministers, and leaders of other central organs of state administration as stipulated by law.

Article 74--The Council of Ministers carries out its activities on the basis of the principle of collective leadership and insures the political and administrative unity of action of ministries and other central organs of state administration.

Article 75--The Council of Ministers as a whole and each of its members are responsible to the Grand National Assembly and, during the interval between sessions, to the State Council. Each member of the Council of Ministers is responsible for his own activities, as well as for the entire activities of the Council of Ministers.

Article 76--Ministries and the other central organs of state administration implement state policy in branches of fields of activity for which they were set up.

Article 77--Ministers and leaders of other central organs of state administration issue, on the basis of and for implementation of the laws and decisions of the Council of Ministers, instructions and orders, as well as other documents stipulated by law. Their documents, which are of a normative nature, are published in the official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

Article 78--Ministers and leaders of other central organs of state administration are responsible to the Council of Ministers for the activities of the organs which they head.

V--Local Organs of State Power and Local Organs of State Administration:

Article 79--People's councils are local organs of state power in regions, rayons, towns, and communes. People's councils direct local activities, insuring the economic, social-cultural, and administrative development of the territorial administrative units where they have been elected, the maintenance of public order and socialist legality, and protection of citizens' rights. People's councils organize the participation of citizens in the solution of state and public affairs on a local level.

Article 80--A people's council has the following main duties:

A--It approves the budget, local economic plan, and the general accounting at the end of the budget period.

B--It elects and recalls its executive committee.

C--It sets up enterprises, economic organizations, and state institutions of local interest.

D--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of its executive committee, local specialized organs of state administration, and subordinated enterprises and institutions.

E--It controls the documents of the lesser ranking people's councils.

Article 81--People's councils consist of deputies elected in electoral precincts. One deputy is elected per precinct. Electoral precincts established for elections of people's council deputies have similar populations. The duration of the mandate of a people's council is four years with the exception of a communal people's council, which is two years. The duration of the mandate is determined from the date of expiration of the mandate of the previous people's council. New elections take place on one of the nonworking days of the last month of the people's council mandate.

Article 82--People's councils elect deputies to permanent committees which support the councils in fulfillment of their duties.

Article 83--People's councils work in sessions, which are convened by their executive committees. Extraordinary sessions are convened on the initiative of executive committees or at the request of at least one-third of the total number of deputies.

Article 84--People's councils function when at least one-half plus one of the total number of deputies are present. At each session, a people's council elects a presidium to direct its work.

Article 85--Each people's council deputy is periodically required to submit to voters accountability reports regarding his activities and those of the people's council to which he has been elected.

Article 86--People's councils adopt decisions by a majority vote of council deputies. Decisions of a normative nature are brought to the notice of citizens in the manner stipulated by law.

Article 87--The executive committee of a people's council is the local organ of state administration enjoying general competence in the territorial administrative unit in which the people's council has been elected.

Article 88--The executive committee of a people's council has the following main duties:

A--It implements the laws, decrees, and decisions of the Council of Ministers and other documents of higher organs.

B--It implements the decisions of the people's council which elected it.

C--It draws up the draft local budget and economic plan and makes the general accounting at the end of the budget period.

D--It implements the local budget and economic plan.

E--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of special local organs of state administration and subordinated institutions and enterprises.

F--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of executive committees of people's councils which are lesser ranking than the people's council which elected it.

G--It suspends decisions which do not conform with the laws of people's councils directly subordinated to the people's council which elected it.

Article 89--An executive committee is elected by the first session of a people's council from among its deputies for the duration of the people's council mandate. After expiration of the people's council mandate, the executive committee continues to function until election of the new executive committee.

Article 90--An executive committee of a people's council consists of the chairman, deputy chairmen, and a number of members established by law. The executive committee carries out its activities in accordance with the principle of collective leadership.

Article 91--In exercising its tasks, an executive committee of a people's council issues decisions on the basis of and for implementation of the law. Decisions of a normative nature are brought to the notice of citizens in the manner stipulated by law.

Article 92--An executive committee is responsible for its activities to the people's council which elected it. The executive committee is also responsible to the executive committee of the higher ranking people's council. The executive committee of a regional people's council is responsible to the Council of Ministers.

Article 93--Special local organs of state administration are organized and operate at executive committees of regional, rayon, and town people's councils in accordance with the law.

VI--Judiciary Organs:

Article 94--Justice is implemented through the Supreme Court, regional courts, people's courts, and military courts established in accordance with the law.

Article 95--By their trial activities, the courts defend the socialist system and people's rights, educating citizens in a spirit of respect for the law. By applying penal sanctions, courts seek to correct and reeducate violators and prevent new violations.

Article 96--Courts try civil, penal, and any other cases within their competence. In cases stipulated by law, courts exercise control over the decisions of administrative or public organs involved in jurisdictional activities. Courts hear the pleas of those whose rights have been violated by administrative actions and can also decide on the basis of the law the legality of these actions.

Article 97--The Supreme Court exercises general control over the trial activities of all courts. The method of exercising this control is established by law. For standardized implementation of law in trial activities, the Supreme Court issues guidance decisions.

Article 98--The Supreme Court is elected by the first session of the Grand National assembly for the legislative duration. The Supreme Court functions until election of the new Supreme Court of the next legislature.

Article 99--The Supreme Court is responsible in its activities to the Grand National Assembly and between sessions to the State Council.

Article 100--Organization of the courts, their competence, and trial procedure are established by law. The trying of cases of the first instance in people's courts, regional courts, and military courts is carried out with the participation of people's assessors. The exception is cases which the law disposes otherwise.

Article 101--Judges and people's assessors are elected in accordance with procedure established by law.

Article 102--Judicial proceedings are in the Rumanian language but insuring in regions and rayons inhabited by a population of a nationality other than Rumanian the use of the mother tongue of the respective population. Parties which do not speak the language in which judicial proceedings take place are insured the possibility of becoming acquainted with the dossier with the help of translators and the right to plead in court in their mother tongue.

Article 103--Trial is public with the exception of cases stipulated by law.

Article 104--In trial activities, judges and people's assessors are independent and accountable only to the law.

Article 105--The right of defense is guaranteed in trials.

VII--Procuratura Organs:

Article 106--The procuratura of the Socialist Republic of Rumania supervises observance of the law by ministries and other central organs of state administration, local organs of state administration, organs of penal prosecution, courts, officials, and other citizens.

Article 107--The procuratura is headed by the prosecutor general. Procuratura organs include the procuratura general, the regional, rayon, and town procuratura, and the military procuratura. Procuratura organs are hierarchically subordinated to one another.

Article 108--The prosecutor general is elected by the first session of the Grand National Assembly for the legislative duration and functions until election of the new prosecutor general by the first session of the next legislature. Prosecutors are appointed by the prosecutor general.

Article 109--The prosecutor general is responsible to the Grand National Assembly for procuratura activities and in the interval between sessions to the State Council.

VIII--Emblems of the Socialist Republic of Rumania:

Article 110--The emblem of the Socialist Republic of Rumania consists of mountains covered by forests above which the sun rises. On the left side of the emblem is an oil well. The emblem is framed by a garland of wheat. There is a five-pointed star on the upper part. At the bottom of the emblem, the garland is wrapped in a tricolor band bearing the inscription "Socialist Republic of Rumania."

Article 111--The state seal bears the national emblem encircled by the inscription "Socialist Republic of Rumania."

Article 112--The flag of the Socialist Republic of Rumania consists of vertical red, yellow, and blue bands with the blue innermost and the national emblem in the center.

Article 113--The state anthem will be approved by the Grand National Assembly.

IX--Final and Transitional Dispositions:

Article 114--The present constitution becomes valid on the date on which it is approved.

Article 115--The constitution of 24 September 1952 and any dispositions in laws, decrees, and other normative acts contrary to the provisions of the present constitution are abrogated as of the same date.

Article 116--Banknotes and metal coins bearing the current name of the state, the Rumanian People's Republic, and the bank of the Rumanian People's Republic, the State Bank, will continue to be fully valid. They will be withdrawn from circulation only as they become worn. Banknotes and metal coins to be placed in circulation in accordance with legal dispositions bearing the new name of the state, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, and the new name of the bank, the National Bank of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, will circulate with present currency.

Fact Sheet

Background Use Only
2 August 1965

Chronology of Events Related
to PKI Influence in Indonesian Government

August 17, 1964: President Sukarno indirectly denounced those who try to impede the growth of Communist power as "hypocrites" and accused them of sabotaging his Nasakom policy.

24 August 1964: Cabinet reorganization gave increased influence to PKI as pro-Communist was named Labor Minister and Njoto (Second Deputy Chairman of PKI) was brought into Cabinet as minister of state attached to the presidium.

November 1, 1964: Sukarno visited China and he and Chou En-lai issued a communique on their "complete unanimity" of views.

November 27, 1964: Chen Yi visited Indonesia and public statements stressed Indonesian-Chinese Communist community of interests.

December 3, 1964: Editor of Revolusi arrested and charged with causing internal disunity because he allowed attacks on the PKI to appear in his newspaper.

December 18, 1964: Sukarno bans the "Body for the Protection of Sukarnoism," an anti-Communist consortium, from public activity.

January 3, 1965: Sukarno withdraws from UN in spite of requests from other non-aligned nations not to do so. Only Communist China applauded his move.

January 5, 1965: Sukarno bans Murba Party, a nationalist party of Marxist orientation, from public activity. PKI was instrumental in bringing about the ban.

24 January 1965: Sukarno hails close ties with Communist China in welcoming General Kuang Jen-nung to Indonesia.

29 January 1965: Communist China and Indonesia announce agreement on China's extension of 100 million dollars in credits to Indonesia.

24 February 1965: Sukarno says Indonesia can no longer afford freedom of the press as he bans several anti-Communist papers.

1 April, 1965: Cabinet reshuffle demotes anti-Communist ministers Saleh and Malik and strengthens role of Subandrio and PKI.

(Cont.)

1 May 1965: Sukarno appoints pro-Communist minister to organize May Day celebration which PKI is allowed to turn into typical Communist demonstration.

23 May 1965: President Sukarno addresses PKI rally and warns against anti-PKI activities by other groups in Indonesia.

10 June 1965: In lecture to military leaders, Sukarno lends tactic support to PKI Chairman Aidit proposal for a Nasakom Board to advise the armed-forces leadership on political affairs.

Fact Sheet

Background Use Only
2 August 1965

Excerpts of Sukarno Speech
At PKI Anniversary Rally

What Brother Aidit said just now was true. He said that in the past weeks, there was commotion in the camp of the imperialists, first, because the PKI was going to observe its 45th founding anniversary on a large scale, and second, because at the PKI founding anniversary rally, the President of the Indonesian Republic, Sukarno, would be present and deliver a speech. There was a commotion within as well as outside the imperialist group.

In the framework of the policy we are pursuing, namely the policy which I have advocated since long ago, the policy of unifying all progressive revolutionary forces, it is no wonder that the Indonesian Republican Government embraces the PKI. That I, as mandatary of the MPRS embrace the PKI, and that I, as great leader of the Indonesian revolution, embrace the PKI. This is because the PKI is undeniably a strong element in the task of completing the revolution.

Just now Brother Aidit mentioned why the PKI has become a great party and why it has expanded. The PKI has become strong. The PKI is now a party with a membership of 3 million persons, with 3 million youths, and 20 million sympathizers. Why has the PKI become this kind of a party? It is because the PKI consistently has been a progressive revolutionary party. There is no doubt, brothers, that the Indonesian revolution cannot be completed if all progressive revolutionary forces are not unified into one force. I embrace the PKI.

Speaking of Nasakom, brothers, I once told the Indonesian public that all delegations to the recent 10th anniversary celebration of the first Afro-Asian conference were deeply impressed by Nasakom. They were surprised to see that Indonesia, which, according to what the imperialists used to say, was going to collapse in no time, was going to fall in no time, was a country whose people would die of hunger, was a country in chaos. On the contrary, is evidently a strong country whose people are evidently calm and whose people are evidently well and healthy. This is so, because Indonesia is following a Nasakom policy.

Nasakom has been admired by all delegations to the 10th anniversary celebration of the Afro-Asian conference. Nasakom has even served as an example to Afro-Asian conference. Nasakom has even served as an example to Afro-Asian nations in their struggle against imperialists. The moment the delegations understood this, it became much easier for me to explain to them why Indonesia has taken the initiative to hold Conefo, the Conference of the New Emerging Forces. In fact, the delegations first of all were impressed by the fact that it was Indonesia which came up with the idea of the new emerging forces. It was no other country but Indonesia. Now I am working hard to realize a union of all emerging forces. Now, Indonesia wants to hold Conefo, the Conference of the New Emerging Forces.

(Cont.)

Once the delegations to the 10th anniversary celebration of the first Afro-Asian conference had been impressed by Nasakom, it became so easy to explain to them that Conefo is actually an international Nasakom. Why can it be called an international Nasakom? Because in the projected Conefo we want to unify all anti-imperialist forces, no matter on which side they stand, as long as they are anti-imperialist in nature.

In Indonesia itself, there have been those who asked me: Bung, why do you call your policy of unifying all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces Nasakom? Why use "kom"? Why not, as in 1926, when Bung Karno for the first time broached the idea of unifying all revolutionary forces--nationalist, Islamic, Marxist, or nationalist, religious, Marxist forces--use, for instance, Nasamarx. Why use the expression Nasakom? Why use "kom" and not "Marx?" Why not use Nasamarx instead of Nasakom? How is it that Bung Karno uses Nasakom? Now listen carefully, brothers. The term which has been most abused by political scoundrels is "Marxist." You know that, for instance, the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party--ed.), which I have abolished, used to boast and claim: We, Marxists; we, Marxists; we, Marxists. But let me say here that they are not Marxists. They are the villains of Marxism. Therefore, I did not want to use the expression Nasamarx. If I use Nasamarx, I am afraid that former PSI members might join the movement, and all along they have been counterrevolutionary. They are villains of Marxism. Besides, I purposely chose the "kom" in Nasakom, because here in Indonesia, there are many people with "kom-phobia." They fear "kom." They are afraid of the PKI; they hate the PKI; they want to destroy the PKI completely.

Brothers, with regard to the forthcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algeria, if possible, we shall unite with Asian-African countries at the second Afro-Asian conference in Algeria. However, if this is impossible--for instance, there are countries which do not want to take part because they are pro-Malaysia--then it would be better for them not to take part in the conference. They had better stay outside the Afro-Asian conference, even if we have to hold the second Afro-Asian conference with a smaller number of countries which, however, are all anti-imperialist. This is better than holding a conference in which a large number of countries take part, but among which there are imperialist tools and lackeys.

Now, I would like to inform you that the majority of Asian and African countries do not want to accept Malaysia at the second Afro-Asian conference. It is true that there are one or two or three countries which accept Malaysia, brothers. However, as I said just now, thanks to God Almighty, the majority of Asian and African countries share Indonesia's stand and reject Malaysia's participation at the second Afro-Asian conference. There is no doubt, brothers, that Malaysia is an imperialist lackey.

At an earlier PKI congress I said: PKI, go onward! Now I say: PKI, go onward, onward, onward; never retreat! Brothers, that was my message at this 45th anniversary rally of the PKI. I thank you.

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Background Use Only
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Seventh World Peace Congress
Helsinki, Finland
10-15 July 1965

General Statement

The unanimously adopted statement issued at the conclusion of the Congress summarized its work:

"The questions before the congress were discussed concretely and in depth in seven commissions: 1) support for the people of Vietnam in their just struggle for independence, unity, and peace; 2) the liberation of peoples under colonial domination, the preservation of national sovereignty, the struggle against apartheid and racism, and the violation of human rights; 3) disarmament; 4) elimination of the vestiges of World War II and European security; 5) the economic sovereignty of nations; 6) the economic and social consequences of the arms race, the re-conversion from war production to peace production; 7) the creation of an atmosphere favorable to peace, cooperation of peace organizations, and problems of the U.N. organization."

It commented on the general situation of the world

"The Congress has met at a time when the world situation is very grave. U.S. political and military leaders have entered upon a policy of armed aggression and military adventures, as the cases of Vietnam, Santo Domingo, and the Congo clearly prove. This armed aggression and military adventures strikes a grave blow at the aspirations of the peoples for detente and peaceful coexistence. The spearhead of the imperialist attack is in southeast Asia, where American armed forces have unleashed aggression against the people of South Vietnam."

It cited other areas of conflict and "imperialist aggression" which included "Laos and Cambodia using the bases set up in Thailand and Japan"; Africa where "Portuguese fascist colonialists with the aid of NATO are stepping up oppression" and spoke of the "threat to peace and international security" caused by efforts "to impose a white minority government on the African majority" in Rhodesia. It cited other African countries where "genuine independence is threatened by neocolonialist practices," and "imperialist plots." It denounced tension in the Middle East resulting from "the existence of American and British military bases, the presence of an American fleet equipped with nuclear weapons, and the maneuvers of the imperialists and their supporters" against Arabs in Palestine, in the Arabian peninsula, and in Cyprus. It spoke of "American imperialists"

(Cont.)

and their efforts "to maintain their domination over the countries of Latin America, and resorting to military intervention." It cited "colonial domination in the Caribbean" and the "military occupation of the Canal Zone" in Panama. It spoke of the tense situation in Europe "as a consequence of rearmament instigated by NATO" and called for "the creation of a system of collective security in Europe" and the "Creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe." It also called for "the establishment of normal relations between the two German states at all levels, and the peaceful settlement of the German question." It said, "it is more and more necessary and urgent to ban nuclear weapons, to destroy them and preclude their use."

Finally,

"The Congress calls on all peoples to demand that their governments take action to isolate American imperialism and stop its aggression, to support the struggle of the peoples on every continent against colonialism, for genuine independence, freedom, and economic and social development, and in opposition to neocolonialism and exploitation. The congress calls on all people to take action to stop the arms race and obtain concrete disarmament measures, to demand the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign soil, and concrete measures for world security and the peaceful settlement of issues in dispute."

[Moscow, TASS, International Service
in English, 15 July 1965]

Resolution on Vietnam

At the conclusion of the meeting, a resolution on Vietnam, "the central question of the Congress," was adopted:

"Expressing the feelings shared by billions of people throughout the world, the congress is deeply concerned about the war provoked by the policy of armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists in contravention of the Geneva agreements of 1954, a war which is being intensified from day to day with the direct and increasing participation of the armed forces and even of U.S. strategic aircraft. The congress expressed deep indignation at the U.S. policy of escalation, which is dangerously extending the war beyond the borders of South Vietnam, including attacks and provocations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a sovereign and independent country, thus seriously endangering the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia and of the world."

The resolution continued by calling for: (1) "the immediate end of U.S. aggression in South Vietnam"; (2) "the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and their satellites from South Vietnam"; (3) "the removal of U.S. military bases from South Vietnam"; (4) "the immediate ending of bombing and other aggressive acts against the DRV." It also said: "the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is the only true legal representative of the South Vietnamese people." It continued: the people of South Vietnam must be allowed to settle their own affairs without foreign interference...."

It concluded:

"The congress makes an urgent appeal to the forces of peace and democratic organizations of the whole world to launch a broad, powerful, and uninterrupted movement embracing all sections of society, to give every possible support to the people of Vietnam in their just struggle against the U.S. aggressive war and for national independence, unity, and peace."

[Moscow, TASS, International Service
in English, 15 July 1965]

Support for Chicom Position

The Albanian press reported the 10 July dispute over procedural matters as

"a violent struggle between those delegations that want to see normal progress in the work of the congress and the Soviet delegation and some other delegations that follow its example, who want to use the congress to popularize and promote the general capitulationist line of the Soviet revisionist leaders."

It continued with a statement from Thanas Nado, head of the Albanian delegation, who demanded the right to present his delegation's views on the agenda and the proposed order of work:

"The true reason for these proposals, which may be called 'gagging' proposals, is the fear of the Khrushchevite revisionists, who are about to impose their line on our movement through the Soviet Peace Committee, who are afraid to let those people expressing points of view different from their own be heard in this hall. They fear being faced with world public opinion and, being pushed by the irresistible desire to impose the policy of their government on the peace movement, seek to make this movement a prop for a policy of theirs which is in flagrant

contradiction to the demands of millions of people from all continents fighting against the enemies of peace; they moreover demand support for these clauses, which are so damaging to the dignity of the honorable representatives present in this hall."

[Tirana, ATA, International Service
in French, 13 July 1965]

The next day, Foto Cami, an Albanian delegation member, charged that the Soviets "boast greatly about the aid and support they are giving the Vietnamese people" and asked, "what is this aid and what is this support?"

He continued:

"we cannot remain silent and fail to unmask and condemn here the noisy and wholly demagogical declarations by the Soviet delegate, who in order to dupe people, has tried to pass off the attitude of the Khrushchevite Soviet leadership as a "firm anti-imperialist stand" and one "supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people." Undeniable facts testify that the worsening and the extension of the struggle in Vietnam is not only the result of the policy and the aggression of American imperialism, but also the result of the policy of unprincipled concessions and capitulation to the imperialist aggressor, of the policy of betrayal of the vital interests of the peoples pursued by N. Khrushchev's followers, who have made common cause with imperialism. It is now clear that the American imperialists would not have acted with so much cruelty and arrogance had they not had the support of the Soviet leaders and their followers, whose supreme ideal is alleged peaceful coexistence and multilateral cooperation with American imperialism.... what preoccupies and worries the Soviet leaders more than any thing is not the fate of the Vietnamese people and their patriotic liberation struggle, but the fate of American imperialism, of the alliances and cooperation with it, the fate of the aggressor, whose defeat in Vietnam must be prevented, for this defeat would demolish their line of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful road, their club of superpowers, the all-powerfulness of atomic weapons, and the impossibility of victory by the national liberation struggles of the peoples in our era, and so forth."

[Tirana, ATA, International Service
in French, 14 July 1965]

The conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese was spelled out by a speech made by Chao I-min, head of the Chinese delegation, who attacked "certain people [who] are pushing an erroneous line in the world peace movement," and said:

"They do not genuinely oppose U.S. imperialism or support the oppressed nations in their struggle for emancipation. Instead they are actively preaching the settlement of world problems through Soviet-U.S. cooperation, general and complete disarmament, and an unprincipled peaceful coexistence in an effort to lead the peace movement astray. As a consequence, there have appeared a series of major differences of principle in the course of the preparation of this congress and in its proceedings, as well as in the world peace movement itself.

"Those who are pursuing this erroneous line in the peace movement are now raising a hue and cry about unity and concerted action, and asserting that we must not concentrate our main attention on what disunites us, but on what unites us, but it is they themselves who have destroyed the basis of unity and who are creating and enlarging the split.

"The struggle against the policies of aggression and war pursued by imperialism with the United States at its head, constitutes the basis of unity for the world peace movement. Without this basis, what can there be which unites us? We must distinguish between enemies and friends, unite real friends to oppose real enemies; and in no case should we reverse enemies and friends....

"Those who have their baton to implement their erroneous line are not practicing democracy at all. They do not allow consultation and discussion on an equal footing, and have consistently imposed their will on others. They have carried on all kinds of disruptive activities within the World Peace Council, such as suppressing democracy, manipulating meetings, and splitting organizations. These people have laid down quite a number of restrictive rules and regulations for this congress so that they can manipulate it at will and deprive others from addressing the plenary sessions. The Chinese delegation firmly opposes these practices, and as it has been proved by what actually happened, such undemocratic practices are most unpopular and cannot succeed...."

[Peking, NCNA International Service
in English, 14 July 1965]

Support for Soviet Position

A Soviet spokesman answered the Albanian charge by reminding the gathering "that the Vietnamese delegation appreciates the Soviet aid," and then walked out of the meeting. [Prague, CTK International Service in English, 13 July 1965] In support of the Soviet position, the Polish delegate called the Chicom pronouncement "damaging to the peace movement," and condemned it as an "attempt to split the congress." [Moscow, TASS, International Service in English, 13 July 1965, Helsinki dispatch] He elaborated his position by saying:

"The socialist countries are supporters of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the only alternative to nuclear war. For us the struggle for peaceful coexistence is tantamount to the struggle against U.S. aggression and is in active and full solidarity with the national liberation movement. The policy of the Soviet Union and of other socialist states does not leave any doubt as to this fact. Therefore, I do not understand how is it possible to come forth here with charges about yielding to imperialism and attempting to cooperate with it. Such charges introduce false lines of division into our movement and bring harm to its unity and the force of its influence."

[Warsaw, PAP, International Service
in English, 13 July 1965]

Other Communist media denounced the Albanian attack. A Czech dispatch called it "a slanderous and insulting attack on the Soviet Union and the world peace movement [which] did not meet any response from the crushing majority of the delegations." [Prague, CTK, International Service in English, 13 July 1965] A Rude Pravo correspondent spoke of the "constructive" discussions which were taking place at the meeting despite "the gross and impudent conduct of the Albanian delegate who constantly strays from the given theme." [Emil Sip, 13 July 1965 Rude Pravo]. Another Czech correspondent said that the Albanian delegate "devoted his entire speech to insulting the Soviet Union." The next day, Rude Pravo said "... the main thing is the prevalence of the spirit of unity and the effort to arrive at something practical and concrete. For this reason, it is regrettable that the Chinese and Albanian delegations do not overlook any opportunity to use the forum for attack against the Soviet Union...."

[Emil Sip in 14 July 1965 Rude Pravo]

TROTSKY



the defeated Victor

Harry Schulze-Wilde

Der BERLIN JUNI 1962
Monat

German text follows p. 32

TROTSKY, THE DEFEATED VICTOR

[Following is a translation of an article by Harry Schulze-Wilde in the German-language periodical Der Monat (The Month), Berlin, Vol XVII, No 201, June 1965, pages 39-61.]

The date was 24 May 1940. Three policemen stand chatting in front of the house at the corner of Wiener and Morelos Streets in the Coyoacan section of Mexico City. This house had been the home of the world famous Russian revolutionary leader and founder of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky, for the past 3 years. These three policemen were members of the 10-man police detail which the Mexican government had assigned the job of guarding the mansion which had been improved into a fortress. The police detail was organized in two groups of five men each who pulled an 24-hour tour of duty.

Shortly after 0300, two men wearing police uniforms and a third man wearing the uniform of an army lieutenant approached the group of chatting policemen. "What's cooking, fellows?" they asked, making as if this was an inspection. "Oh, nothing special," replied the policemen who were standing in front of the watchtower. At that very moment, however, the three men who had just arrived, pulled out their revolvers and shouted: "Hands up, you damned swine!" At the same time several men burst out of the darkness, some of them in civilian clothes and others wearing uniforms. They disarmed the five guards and took their weapons and tied them up.

After having knocked out the outside guards, they knocked on the iron gate, although not particularly loudly, in order not to alarm the guards in the machine gun-equipped towers along the concrete wall. The gate was opened and about 20 men sneaked inside. They penetrated into the garden and from there fanned out over the entire house. Immediately afterward, bursts of fire from submachineguns tore the stillness of the night. But before the inhabitants of the neighboring mansions can get their bearings, all is quiet again. The intruders disappeared in the dark streets and the last ones of them fled, taking the two cars in the garage of the mansion.

Half an hour later, the police, alerted by the neighbors, arrives on the scene. The policemen immediately begin an investigation. According to statements made by the guards, who had in the meantime been released, about 300 shots were fired but only Trotsky's grandson by the name of Esteban, who had arrived a few days ago from France, was hit in the left foot by a stray bullet. Leon Trotsky, who was the target of the attack, was merely scared, as was his wife, Nathalia Sedova, the four American secretaries, the German national Otto Schuessler, a French couple, and three servants, that is, the female cook, the chambermaid, and the houseboys.

In Trotsky's bedroom, the investigating police officers counted 73 bullet holes. The couple escaped this murderous crossfire through the doors and windows only because they immediately dove under the bed. Little Esteban had likewise hidden under his bed when he heard the shots. Although he was only 11 years old, he knew that someone was out to kill his grandfather at all costs. About a dozen assassination attempts had failed in the past. Trotsky's children, two sons and two daughters, had already been murdered or driven to death in the past. Of the grandchildren, only Esteban is still alive.

But it was not only the closest relatives who died of an unnatural death; many of his friends and seven of his secretaries likewise died unnatural deaths: in the USSR, in Spain, in Paris, in Switzerland, and in other countries. The murderers, who had been sent out by Joseph Stalin, managed to find their victims even in hospitals and in lonely mountain villages. This is also the reason why Trotsky had his house in Coyoacan converted into a fortress. All conceivable safety measures were included. The main gate was strengthened with two crossbars; when the main gate is open, a bright light goes on above the entrance. The windows are equipped with steel protective shields containing gun ports; a network of electric wires makes it impossible to climb over the walls. The slightest contact with these wires triggers alarm bells which make an infernal noise.

The riddle as to how the attackers were able to get into this heavily protected fortress without a fight and without setting off the alarm devices was soon solved: the American Robert Sheldon Harte, who was on night watch duty, had disappeared. It must have been he who opened the gate; according to the statements by the police officers, he fled with the attackers in the last of the two cars. But Trotsky considers it impossible that he was in cahoots with these assassins; he believed that Sheldon Harte was kidnapped.

A few days later, the corpse of the secretary was found in an isolated, uninhabited house. Investigation revealed quite definitely that Sheldon Harte had not been held there as a prisoner and that he was murdered while asleep, after some time had passed. The murderers then quickly hid his body under the clay floor of the room. They probably thought that this traitor could also betray them. Still, Leon Trotsky refused to believe that Harte had betrayed him.

The trial of the attackers -- who were discovered with astonishing speed and who were made to talk with rather severe methods -- took place early in July. But it was only the second team that sat on the bench; the foreign agents behind them, undoubtedly men working for the Soviet secret police, escaped. The international public reacted to the trial with moderate interest. Even in Mexico the war in Europe absorbs the attention of the people more than the dark machinations of Stalin's secret police -- a fact which the plotters of this assassination attempt certainly figured on.

About 2 weeks before the assassination attempt on Trotsky, the German army had launched its offensive in France. The Maginot Line, which was considered unbeatable, was broken, Paris was occupied, France was forced to ask for an armistice, and the British army was driven off the continent. But the Soviet Union had also been active. After the occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939, the Red Army occupied the hitherto independent countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the middle of June.

Trotsky is in agreement with the way the trial is being conducted there. Unmistakably he declares: "In no other country of the world, neither in France nor in Switzerland nor in Spain, has a crime of the GPU [Soviet Secret Police] ever been investigated and prosecuted with such care as this particular attempt on my life in Mexico!" But he also knows that the murderers will not give up just because they failed this time. He told a higher police officer the following: "Destiny has given me another extension but it won't be long." As he awakens in the morning he usually tells his wife: "Well, they didn't kill us last night. We have a little reprieve."

Who is this man who has so far escaped more than a dozen assassination attempts, whose four children have been murdered or were allowed to die because medical aid was refused them, whose house has been set on fire several times in order to smoke him and his followers out like rats and whom communists throughout the world have branded as a "traitor to socialism," as "servant of the capitalists," as "agent of fascism," and most recently also as "agent of American imperialism?"

Leon Davidovich Bronstein, called Trotsky, was born in Yanovka, Kherson Province (Ukraine) on 26 October 1879 (7 November according to the Gregorian calendar). He was the fifth of eight children, four of whom died young. His father, David Bronstein, was a prosperous farmer who had bought 400 Desyatinas of fertile farmland from a noble estate owner who had come upon hard times; through hard work, he succeeded in increasing his holdings. He built new workshops, new stables for the animals, and a big mill. After the revolution, which his son helped win, he lost everything. Embittered and at the same time proud of his son, he died in 1922 as manager of a government-owned mill.

When Leon Davidovich was born, Russia was under the rule of Tsar Alexander II, who in 1861 had freed the serfs. The progressive-liberal forces therefore had great hopes in him. But he was murdered on 1 March 1881

before he was able to crown his reform work through a constitution. His son, Alexander III, was completely under the influence of Pobedonostsev, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, a bigoted reactionary who would have loved to reintroduce serfdom.

The old Bronstein who -- like millions of Russian peasants -- could neither read nor write, sent his son to a Jewish school where he was taught in the Yiddish language which he was not familiar with. The language spoken at home was Ukrainian. Attendance at this Jewish school, however, was very important for little Bronstein: this is the place where he also learned Russian.

Back in Yanovka, he continues his education by himself. At the age of 6, he was able to make out bills for his father and he could even keep books. The parents were tremendously proud of their son. They were sure that this child prodigy had to go to college! The next place for him to go was therefore bound to be Odessa, a big port of the Black Sea, the Russian Marseille, and the "most notorious police city of this police state."

But the 7-year old boy was not admitted to a government school; instead he went to the "Saint Paul technical high school," founded by the German Lutheran community. Instruction was given in the Russian language and the students and teachers were of German, Swiss, Russian, Polish, Rumanian, and Greek origin -- a true cross section of the jumble of nationalities in this part of Russia. The student body also included a large number of religious denominations: in addition to students from Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, and Calvinist families, the school was even attended by children from various sects.

During the very first year, young Bronstein was the first in his class; he learned German and French as well as Italian and Greek and Latin. He did not engage in any kind of political activity. There were no revolutionary circles in the liberal "Saint Paul's school"; these revolutionary circles sprang up only in the government schools which were run like military barracks.

At the age of 17 he went to Nikolayev to attend the university there; this is where he came into contact with "Marxist" for the first time. But at first he only thought that they were ridiculous. In a toast at a new year's celebration in 1896 he said: "Curse all Marxists who bring so much harshness and desolation into life." His first political article was likewise against Marxism.

But this did not last long. When he graduated with the rating of "excellent" in 1897, he was already an enthusiastic supporter of the theories of Karl Marx which came from London and Germany. Old Bronstein ranted and raved and demanded that his son drop all of these revolutionary theories. But Leon Davidovich did not give in. He instead dropped his father's allowance and earned his living by private tutoring.

At the age of 19 he organized a revolutionary group in Nikolayev called the "South Russian Workers Federation"; this was almost like a party although it did have local limitations. When the situation got too hot for him there, he decided to return to Yanovka in 1898. On the way there he was arrested by the police. He was under investigative arrest for almost 2 years; at the end of 1899 he was exiled to Siberia for 4 years without a trial.

While in prison, he married Alexandra Sokolovskaya who had likewise been condemned to exile. In his book My Life, he devoted no more than 3 lines to this event: "Our common work created close bonds between us. In order not to be settled separately, we had ourselves married in the Moscow prison, while underway to our exile." This marriage produced two daughters. Before 4 years had passed, Trotsky left his family.

The fame of the young revolutionary, who had organized his own group at the age of 19 and who maintained contact with his likewise exiled comrades from the place of his exile in Verkholensk, had spread to Central Russia. The articles, which he published under the pseudonym of "Antid Oto" in the Eastern Review, published in Irkutsk, likewise attracted attention. He was urged to return. Equipped with a forged passport, in which he had entered the name of one of his prison guards, he reached Irkutsk. This quite accidentally selected "passport name" of Trotsky was to make world history.

In Irkutsk he took the train to Samara, today called Kuibyshev, headquarters of the illegally published newspaper Iskra (The Spark) and rallying point of the Marxist-oriented revolutionaries who were winning more and more supporters, in contrast to the terrorist groups which were so active in the past. From there he was sent to Kharkov, Poltava, and Kiev, in order to supervise the local underground groups of the Social Democratic Party. Back in Samara, he was invited to come to London which was the Western European headquarters of Iskra. This "invitation" -- which in effect was a command -- had been signed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Wherever Trotsky turned up, he quickly attracted attention; his outstanding intellectual capacity quickly earned praise; the analytical keenness of his articles and his brilliant talent as a speaker likewise earned him fame. After a few weeks he also played an important role in London. At the 2nd Congress in 1903, which had begun in Brussels and which was then moved to London, everyone noted his dash and his passion. Lenin thought that he had "unusual characteristics" and suggested that Trotsky be appointed to the editorial staff of the foreign edition of Iskra. Later on he was sent to France, Switzerland, and Belgium. On his travels he met not only the most important European socialists but also Nathalia Sedova, who was at the time studying art history in Paris. Without any formalities at city hall, she became his mate and from then on shared all triumphs and all suffering with him.

Trotsky and the 10 years older Lenin (who from time to time helped and

promoted him) had by no means infrequent clashes, mostly because of secondary issues; this is a fact which Stalin 20 years later made wide use of in order to accuse Trotsky of an "anti-Leninist" -- in other words, "anti-revolutionary" -- attitude. This of course was intentional slander. It has turned out, by the way, that it was Trotsky who was right in many of these issues, and not Lenin. It is not correct to say that these two men were enemies; instead, one might compare them to the two poles of a magnet who together produced a field of force. Today we know that it was not only Trotsky who was heavily influenced by Lenin (as a result of which numerous Russians living in exile called Lenin's "club"); we also know that Lenin took over many things contained in Trotsky's theories, such as for instance, the idea of the "permanent revolution." Of course, the father of this thesis was not Trotsky; it has been proved that it was his sometime patron, the Russian Emigrant Alexander Helphand who later on became known throughout the world under the name of Parvus. By "permanent revolution" he meant a revolution which would not be completed until all countries of the world had become communist -- and Trotsky of course took over this meaning.

The influence which Helphand exerted on many Russian and Western European socialists was to some extent based on the fact that he had predicted, as early as 1895, the Russian-Japanese war which did not break out until 10 years later and that he also predicted the Russian revolution which would come after that war as a "prelude to the world revolution." This prophecy is of course the exact opposite of the predictions of Marx; it was a rather eerie prophecy and constituted a considerable contribution to the consolidation of the reputation of "the dialectical concept of history."

When trouble broke out in St. Petersburg in January 1905, Trotsky left his safe position with the by then very prosperous Parvus-Helphand, who had given him an apartment and a job in Munich, and went to Russia -- a dangerous undertaking because exiles who had escaped were punished with extreme severity after they had been arrested again. Almost all of the other leading revolutionaries therefore continued to live abroad and waited in order to find out how the situation would develop.

But Trotsky courageously plunged into the whirlpool of events. He became the recognized leader of the heavily communist-colored revolution of 1905 which heavily shook tsarist Russia. But it was not only the many strikes that rattled the political structure of the autocratically governed country; a much more serious fact was that the fleet mutinied. It was extremely difficult to restore the old order.

Early in December 1905 Trotsky was arrested and 23 months later he was sentenced to lifelong exile in a Godforsaken village in the Polar region at the mouth of the Ob River. On the way there he managed to escape. With extraordinary energy and astonishing physical toughness, he fought his way through the Taiga [tundra] and reached Petersburg from where he returned to London after staying a few days in Helsinki. He arrived in time to participate in the 5th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Worker Party.

For the first time he developed his -- that is to say Parvus's -- theory of the "permanent revolution" in public. Lenin and other left-wing socialists, including Rosa Luxemburg, supported him and hailed him not only as a great revolutionary, whose courageous appearance in St. Petersburg and later during the trial had aroused worldwide attention, but also as an important theoretician. After that he went to Berlin where his mate Nathalia Sedova was waiting for him with his son Leon who had been born in 1906.

Trotsky was a celebrated figure also in Germany. Parvus introduced him to the leaders of German social democracy, such as Karl Kautsky, old Bebel, Georg Ledebour, Franz Mehring, and Hugo Hase. These were internationally known names because the German Social Democratic Party was the strongest and best organized in the world. But the years from 1907 until 1914 basically were only training years for Trotsky. He was not to find his historical mission in life until after the outbreak of World War I -- without of course having been aware of this at the time.

Leon Trotsky had never been interested in military matters; he did not come into contact with problems of strategy and tactics until he was a war correspondent during the two Balkan wars in 1911 and 1912. In his articles, he not only relentlessly exposed the atrocities committed by both sides and which reminded him "of the methods of the 30 Years' War"; he also became increasingly interested in military tactics and operations. It was not enough for him to describe the effect of certain measures or moves; he also wanted to find out what their causes and their interconnections were.

At the outbreak of World War I he happened to be in Vienna. After a short stopover in Switzerland, he went to Paris. As during the two Balkan wars, he once again worked as correspondent for a number of newspapers, changing his cover name from one place to the next. His 1915 and 1916 articles, in which he discussed the development of the war into a position war, attracted wide attention. It is primarily due to the subsequent systematic slander of Trotsky by Stalin that these journalistically brilliant and highly significant essays are just about unknown today.

During his stay in Paris, Trotsky was also a frequent visitor to the National Library. There he studied primarily military magazines and textbooks, probably without ever guessing how important the knowledge he gained there would be to him later: less than 5 years later, Leon Trotsky commanded a victorious army of more than a million men in numerous battles.

In September 1916, the French government deported this undesirable emigre to Spain. On 20 December, he and Nathalia Sedova and their two sons, Leon and Sergey, boarded a Spanish steamer in Barcelona which was to take them to New York. As the ship passed the Straits of Gibraltar, Trotsky wrote the following to a friend: "This is the last time I am looking at that old rascal Europe."

Upon his arrival in New York he was enthusiastically welcomed by

numerous Russian socialists who had found refuge there. Could they guess that they were hailing one of the great leaders of the coming revolution? Barely 2 months later there were red flags flying from many palaces of the nobility in the Russian capital of Petrograd (St. Petersburg).

In New York, Trotsky went from meeting to meeting and predicted the victory of socialism although during the first weeks it looked as if the bourgeoisie would keep control of the situation and the tsar was forced to abdicate only in order to step up the war effort. But Trotsky was sure of his cause. Triumphantly he declared: "The tremendous avalanche of the revolution is in full swing and no human force can ever stop it!" Like Lenin, he demanded not just the overthrow of the old system but also the termination of the war.

Boarding a Norwegian vessel, he left New York on 27 March 1917. During a stopover in Canada, the British picked him up. Under the pressure of numerous protests he was released after 3 weeks and was allowed to continue his trip. On 17 May, one month after Lenin, he reached Petrograd. A vast throng welcomed him. The workers lifted the hero of the revolution of 1905 to their shoulders and carried him through the streets in triumph.

A few hours after his arrival he hurried to the Smolny Institute, the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviets. Although he was admitted only as a member with an advisory vote, Trotsky was satisfied. No one else was as powerful a speaker; it was not his yes or no vote slip that would decide the issue; it was his words that would decide the issue. After a short time, he was the spokesman of the revolution. It was particularly the sailors on the warships and at the Kronstadt naval base who stuck with him through thick and thin -- a success which was to bring about the decision on 7 November 1917.

In July, Lenin and his supporters had failed to seize power; Trotsky was arrested at that time with many others but he was soon released. At the end of September the Petrograd Soviet elected Leon Trotsky -- now an official member of the Bolsheviks as its chairman. In the meantime the economic crisis had reached unexpected proportions. The supply of foodstuffs to the cities had broken down completely; this was due partly to the disastrous transportation situation and partly to the situation on the farms as such.

The government had not been prepared to launch a farm reform or even to promise it; this is why the landless farmers took matters into their own hands. The consequence of this arbitrary action was bound to be a drop in the farm output figures. Of course, the cities suffered the most as a result of this. In addition, there was a manpower shortage. More than 5 million farmers were in the army at the front, behind the lines, or in prisoner of war camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was one of the reasons why the demand of the Bolsheviks for an immediate peace treaty always found tremendous approval in the villages.

Parallel to this agitation among the workers and farmers, preparations were underway for a new Bolshevik uprising. Trotsky thought that the classical forms of revolution in the past were outdated. Storming such places as the Bastille, battles at the barricades, and emotional mass uprisings had become senseless. The modern state had to be captured through an organized coup d'etat. In developing this new revolutionary strategy, Trotsky was for the first time able to make practical use of the military science studies he has pursued in Paris.

He made his plans almost like a general staff officer. By means of propaganda, the position was softened up for the assault so that, after sufficient preparation, smaller, well-equipped assault squads were able to paralyze the nerve centers of the government. If you first capture the ministries, the electric power plants, and the telephone exchanges, the opposition is doomed to failure and your own victory is assured.

When the German army command went on the offensive again, Petrograd was threatened for a time. The government ordered the military units to march and prepared to move to Moscow. Trotsky sounded the alarm in the Soviet. The soldiers, whom he had propagandized in the meantime, refused to leave Petrograd. A military revolutionary committee distributed 5,000 rifles to the workers, allegedly only for the "defense of the capital." But when the German troops discontinued their advance on Petrograd, it was said that these weapons were to be used "in the defense of the gains of the revolution." But everyone in Petrograd knew that the Bolsheviks were now trying to overthrow the government.

Democratic Prime Minister Kerensky was determined to make a fight of it. On 6 November he outlawed the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda (Truth) which had been published under the name Rabotchiy Put (Worker Road) ever since the July coup d'etat. In response to this, Trotsky had the printing plants of the bourgeois newspapers occupied and issued a new edition of Pravda whose front page carried the famous Order No 1:

"Soldiers! Workers! Citizens!

"The enemies of the people have gone on the offensive during the night. They are planning a treacherous attack against the Petrograd Soviet of worker and soldier delegates.

"All regimental, company, and crew committees, along with the commissars of the Soviets and all of the revolutionary organizations must be permanently in session and must concentrate all news about the plans and actions of the plotters in their hands.

"No soldier may leave his unit without approval from the committee.

"The cause of the people is in firm hands. The conspirators will be wiped out.

"No hesitations, no doubts! Steadfastness, constancy, perseverance, and determination are needed. Long live the revolution."

This was the signal for general action. During the night of 7 November (25 October according to the old Russian calendar), the coup d'etat was carried out on the basis of plans worked out by Trotsky. Tough assault squads occupied the railroad stations, the electric power plants, the military rations warehouses, the water reservoirs, the bridges leading from the suburbs to the downtown section, the telephone exchange, the State Bank, and numerous other buildings. Around 1000 all access streets to the Winter Palace were blocked. The ministers were cut off from the rest of the world and this was in fact the victory of the Bolshevik revolution.

Prime Minister Kerensky had left the capital early on 7 November in a car made available to him by the American embassy in order to get help from the outside. His ministers were waiting in the Winter Palace for him to return. Around noon, revolutionary soldiers, with fixed bayonets, scattered the deputies of the "Provisional Council of the Russian Republic." About an hour and a half later, Trotsky opened a session of the Petrograd Soviet and declared in the name of the "military revolutionary committee" that the provisional government was no longer in existence.

Among the deafening cheers of the delegates he added: "A few ministers have been arrested. The others will be arrested in the next few days or hours. The revolutionary garrison, which is at the disposal of the military revolutionary committee, has already dissolved the meeting of the preliminary parliament. We were told that the uprising of the garrison would be drowned in rivers of blood. We do not know of a single victim or casualty. I know of no other example in history in which a revolution has been accomplished so completely without bloodshed."

This was indeed true. Never before had there been an overthrow of this kind which did not claim any victims and the Russian-French newspaperman Claude Anet stated with astonishment that the backward, illiterate Russians had made a revolution entirely different from any of the others reported in the history books. But there was no denying that the Bolshevik power seizure had taken place like an offensive based on plans made by the general staff. No one had heard any shooting anywhere; no where was there any insubordination of revolutionary workers and soldiers. The streets were empty and there was not even any looting.

Lenin -- who on the preceding evening, still in disguise, had come out of hiding to go to the headquarters of the revolutionary committee at the Smolny -- thought that this silence was rather ghostly. He, too, was still thinking of the classical image of the old revolution. Not until reports kept coming in from the individual assault squads did he realize that the revolution had succeeded. On the evening of this highly eventful 7 November, the spiritual leader of this revolution and Trotsky, who had fainted due to exhaustion, slept on the floor in a room next to the great hall of the Smolny.

The Winter Palace, headquarters of the government, had still not been taken. Now Trotsky's friendship with the sailors paid off. The Cruiser "Aurora" put to sea from Kronstadt and headed for Petrograd where it opened fire. But it only fired blank ammunition. The Winter Palace did not fall as a result of the attack by the sailors; it was stormed and carried by assault in the old style. The metropolis of an empire of 150 million inhabitants, in which 5 million soldiers and policemen were under arms, had capitulated without a fight to 10 thousand and perhaps 15 thousand largely illiterate peasants and workers, led by a man who had never before had a chance to test his military talents.

Lenin was the chairman of the new government of people's commissars. Trotsky was foreign minister. But after only 3 days he had to go "to the front" -- right at the gates of Petrograd: ousted Kerensky had succeeded in winning over a few regiments of Cossacks to his side. But before the fight could break out, Trotsky had defeated them through the power of his speech. The Cossacks surrendered after a brief skirmish. Along with this victory message the capital received the news that Moscow and other big cities had likewise joined the revolution and new governments were also established in the rural areas.

Trotsky himself was in charge of the peace negotiations with Germany and its allies, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, at Brest-Litovsk. The imperial German government missed a big chance here. Instead of concluding a reasonable peace with the Bolsheviks and thus setting an example, it imposed a very severe dictated peace. The Soviet government in the end accepted the very harsh conditions in order to get a breathing spell. In March 1918 Trotsky switched from the foreign ministry to the newly organized war commissariat. It was now his job to set up reliable Red units in order to be able to fight the White Guard armies, which were springing up all over the country.

What he had left in the way of military units did not look very promising, especially not when it came to winning a victory. The old anti-military propaganda had now turned against the Bolsheviks. In addition, foreign intervention armies penetrated into Russia from all sides. The Japanese had landed at Vladivostok and the Czech prisoners of war had organized their own legion in Siberia which now rose against the Soviets. On their march to the West they ran into hardly any resistance at all. In addition, Petrograd and Moscow increasingly felt the activity of tsarist agents who were more and more recovering from the blow they had taken on 7 November.

On 22 April 1918, Trotsky submitted a plan to the executive committee of the Soviets according to which former tsarist officers were to be accepted into the Red Army, now being founded. He prevailed over the opposition of extreme left-wing circles, although he was quite aware of the danger that many of these officers, who volunteered, did so only with the intention of attacking the Bolsheviks from the rear.

Early in August Moscow heard that the Czechs had taken Kazan; Trotsky immediately jumped on his train and went to the front; for 2 and a half years he and his closest collaborators lived in this rolling headquarters which was his very own invention and which soon became a legend. This armored train was pulled by two locomotives and carried automobiles, guns complete with shells, small arms, food and medication, a printing plant, a library, and a telegraph and radio station. Trotsky could always be found wherever the danger was greatest. But the tide turned when he stood in the very front line at Kazan. The revolutionary soldiers were swept along by the enthusiasm of their leader and launched a counterattack. And 6 weeks after the Czechs had captured Kazan, the Red Army recaptured this important city on the Volga. Lenin immediately sent a telegram:

"I enthusiastically hail the brilliant victory of the Red Army. May this be a sign that it will crush all resistance by the exploiters and assure the victory of world socialism."

This unexpected success changed the situation of the Bolsheviks over night. The Czechs and the tsarist units marching with them understood that they were no longer dealing with a few bunches of rebels; they realized that they were now facing units led by strategic experts. For the tsarist officers this was a tremendous surprise. Who was this Trotsky who managed to take a beaten army which would flee in panic everytime it faced its enemies and who could imbue it with a new aggressive spirit and lead it to victory?

After the collapse of the Central Powers in November 1918, new front lines developed. Besides, Trotsky, who was against any kind of intriguing and plotting, had made himself an enemy within his own party, an enemy whose cunning no one realized in the beginning; that man was Joseph Stalin, supreme political commissar of the 10th Army which was at that time under the command of ex-Cavalry sergeant Voroshilov. Upon request from Trotsky, Lenin called Stalin back to Moscow -- a humiliation which Stalin never forgot. The campaign of slander against the founder and organizer of the Red Army began during those days: Stalin charged the war commissar with being a "friend of tsarist generals."

When some of the old officers, who had been accepted into the new army, were exposed as traitors, Stalin struck his first blow. But Trotsky was saved again, thanks to the foolishness of such White Guard generals as Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and Krasnov, each of whom, on his own, and without coordination, now marched on Moscow. This required a new campaign in the field and the organizer of the Red Army was an indispensable man. In his train, he rode from one front to the other, from the Volga where he decisively defeated Kolchak, to the Southern front where he directed the fighting against Denikin, whom he defeated just as decisively as Yudenich who had advanced against Petrograd in the North. On his 40th birthday, the 2nd anniversary of the Bolshevik power seizure, Trotsky was able to report the victory of the Red Army in Moscow.

About 5 months ago in March 1920, the Poles and the Ukrainian dictator Petlyura, who had been driven out only the year before, penetrated into Soviet Russia. They captured Kiev. This new war quickly took on the character of a nationalistic and perhaps even religious war. Poland had been Russia's "arch-enemy" for many centuries; in addition, the inhabitants of this state, which had been revived in 1918, were Roman Catholic, in contrast to the Greek Orthodox Russians. Many former tsarist officers, who had refused to help in the past, now volunteered for the Red Army in order to defend the "legitimate church" against the "Roman church."

Once again Trotsky went to the front. Wherever possible, he stopped any kind of nationalistic or anti-Catholic propaganda in the army. In one of his orders of the day he wrote this: "Let every Red Army man, who raises his knife against a prisoner of war, against unarmed men, sick men, or wounded soldiers, have his hand chopped off." His presence always had an electrifying effect. A counterattack was launched in June and a few weeks later the Red Army, now grown to half a million, was at the gates of Warsaw. The fall of the Polish capital seemed to be a matter of days.

But then occurred the much debated "miracle on the Vistula," the counterpart to the "miracle on the Marne" in September 1914, when the French stopped the Germans. General Tukhachevskiy, the supreme commander of the Red Army appointed by Trotsky, had ordered the Red Army units operating in the South under the command of Budenny to screen the left wing of the advance on the Polish capital. But the political commissar of this army group, Joseph Stalin, who was jealous of Tukhachevskiy and his rapid climb to the rank of general at the age of 26, wanted to gather his own laurels. Instead of linking up with the Red Army units before Warsaw, he caused Budenny to move against Lemberg. His units were to move into that city at the same time as Tukhachevskiy moved into the Polish capital.

Polish Marshal Pilsudski, advised by General Weygand who had hurried in from France, pushed into this gap and rolled up the flank of the army that was pushing toward Warsaw. This meant that Poland, as good as defeated on one day, emerged victorious from this war. The Soviet Union was forced to conclude a peace treaty whose conditions were dictated by Warsaw. Trotsky and Tukhachevskiy, in verbal and written form, accused the political commissar of the 10th Army of having caused this disastrous defeat.

This fiasco explains a whole series of actions taken by Stalin. He not only had Tukhachevskiy and Trotsky and all of their supporters killed but he also transformed his hatred to the entire Polish nation. It was most probable that he gave the order to murder the 14,500 Polish officers in 1940 who had been captured by the Soviets. About 4,200 corpses were found in the forest of Katyn: these were the inmates of the camp at Kozielsk. The inmates of the camp at Starobielsk, almost 4,000 men, were likewise murdered. But their graves have not been discovered to this very day. The 6,567 inmates of the Ostashkov camp were loaded on two sailboats at Archangel and these boats were sunk in the White Sea -- allegedly during artillery firing practice.

Things calmed down to some extent after the Polish-Russian war. But there were still individual uprisings by generals loyal to the tsar; still, the Red Army always won. This result, which made the Bolsheviks very happy, of course, was offset by the terrible casualties of the 4-year civil war. The Soviets had seized power in November 1917 almost without bloodshed; but after that, during the battles of the following years, more than 3 million people died. The Russian famine of 1921-1922 also claimed about 5 million victims. It was a consequence of the economic break up caused by war, revolution, and civil war and it was also due to natural disasters.

Trotsky was most bitterly disappointed by the Kronstadt mutiny. The sailors at that naval base and fortress revolted and demanded a humanization of conditions. Their demands included the following: more personal freedom, in other words, a let-up in the dictatorship, and fraternization of the people. Among the rebels were many of the men who had followed Trotsky and who in 1917 had made a decisive contribution to the victory of the Bolsheviks when their ship shelled the Winter Palace. But the party ordered that ruthless measures be taken against the sailors. On 3 April 1921 Trotsky took the victory parade with a heavy heart: of all of the military operations which he had directed since 1917, the one against Kronstadt was the bloodiest.

At the end of 1923 he became seriously ill and had to go on convalescent leave in the South of the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter Lenin died on 21 January 1924. The secretary general of the party, Joseph Stalin, knew how to keep the founder of the Red Army from the funeral: he cabled his mortal enemy Trotsky, who was in Tiflis at the time, the wrong date for the funeral. Later on, Trotsky maintained that Stalin was afraid:

"He (Stalin) was afraid that I would ask the doctors about the possibility of [Lenin's] poisoning and that I would ask for a special autopsy."

The spectators did note that Leon Davidovich Trotsky was not among the leading comrades who carried Lenin's coffin; but they did not give it much thought. Still, the question as to whether and in what sequence a leader was to participate in official celebrations took on profound significance on that day.

Stalin advanced step by step. Systematically he manned all positions with comrades loyal to him and thus isolated Trotsky in the party and in the CC. Then he was ready to strike. At the 15th Congress on 2 September 1927 he proposed a resolution according to which all men who in any way propagated opposition views were to be thrown out of the party. Only a man who prostrated himself and who signs a statement of repentance could in the future expect any kind of mercy.

The resolution was adopted and this sealed the fate of Trotsky. He had already been forced to move his office out of the Kremlin; now the CC

threw him out of the party and on 16 January 1928 Stalin ordered the deportation of his arch enemy, who was intellectually so superior to him, and of his supporters to Siberia. For Trotsky he had selected the city of Alma Ata, the Kazakh capital, 4,000 km from Moscow. When Trotsky refused to go there, secret police dragged him and his family by force so that they would catch the regular train to Tashkent. At the terminal, there was a bus waiting for the exiles which took them to Alma Ata.

His supporters, who had been exiled to isolated little villages in Siberia, soon established contact with each other. But Trotsky's hope of building up an underground organization did not materialize. He realized that the Soviet GPU was considerably better organized than the old Okhrana, the secret police of the tsars.

With his arrival in Alma Ata, there began a bitter path of suffering for Trotsky, his wife, and his oldest son, Leon Sedov, such as there are very few in history. On 9 June 1928 he received a telegram in which a friend informed him of the death of his eldest daughter Nina. She might perhaps have been saved if her illness had been properly treated. But the pharmacy in the Kremlin refused to give her the necessary medication.

At the end of the year Stalin demanded that Trotsky be expelled from the territory of the Soviet Union. The members of the political bureau, who had been hand-picked and promoted by Stalin, agreed -- with one exception. The foreign commissariat was ordered to find a land that would be ready to give an entry visa to the founder of the Red Army. About 5 days later Trotsky was told that he would be deported to Constantinople. He refused to leave the Soviet Union and demanded to see his son Sergey and the latter's wife and children.

The family was then forcibly transported to Odessa where it was put on board a Russian freighter on 10 February. But Sergey and his wife, who had been allowed to go to the big port on the Black Sea, volunteered to remain behind in the USSR. This was the last time they saw each other. The ship entered the Bosphorus 2 days later. Trotsky handed a statement to the Turkish police officer who came on board the ship.

"To Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Republic. Dear Sir, at the gates of Constantinople I have the honor to inform you that I am crossing this border only in obedience to brute force. I ask you, Mr. President, to accept any such sentiments as I might have under these conditions."

The Russian consul, who likewise had come on board, gave Trotsky 1,500 dollars, so to say as "initial capital" for the establishment of a new life. Except for his files, this was all he had. He rented a house on the Island of Prinkipo. He never suffered any financial difficulties. He wrote articles and essays and he worked on a biography as well as on a history of the Russian revolution. All of these works were translated into many languages and he earned considerable royalties with which he was able to publish

his Bulletin of the Opposition which, after some time, became a self-supporting operation.

Very soon, however, he came to feel Stalin's hatred once again. A fire suddenly broke out in his home. The fire destroyed some of his files for whose preservation Trotsky has taken more precautions than for his own. He was barely able to save himself and his family and despite the great danger kept carrying files and documents out of the burning house. From that moment on he tried to flee to another country in which he might feel safer. But wherever he asked for refuge he was refused. Finally France agreed to accept him.

Before he left Turkey, he was informed that his second daughter Zinaida had died in Berlin on 5 January 1933 and he received a letter from the Soviet Union that both of his sons-in-law had been deported. Both of them perished miserably in Siberia. But their four children disappeared likewise. Stalin did not overlook any of the Trotsky clan, provided the particular member was in his power.

Trotsky left Prinkipo in the summer of 1933. For about 2 years he lived under various names in France; then he had to go to Norway whose socialist government in the meantime had given him permission to stay there. Shortly before his move in 1935 he learned that his youngest son Sergey and the latter's wife, who had remained behind in the Soviet Union, had been arrested. He never found out where they and their children died.

After the assassination of the Petrograd party secretary Kirov on 1 December 1934, numerous old Bolsheviks were arrested in Moscow because Stalin accused them of "complicity." He said that Trotsky had ordered this assassination. But the fact is that this crime -- as Khrushchev disclosed to the 20th Congress -- was carried out upon Stalin's orders or at least with his approval. The rather transparent accusation that Trotsky had planned Stalin's assassination likewise was a mere invention intended to put pressure on the Norwegian government. Minister of Justice Trygve Lie, later on the first secretary general of the UN, urged Trotsky to refrain from any kind of "current political activity." He said: "I ask your permission in restricting your residence permit and I further ask you to understand that your outgoing and incoming mail can only be handled through official channels."

"If it is your intention to arrest me," replied Trotsky, "then you cannot ask that I authorize you to do this likewise." Trygve Lie tried for a compromise: "After all, there is a condition between arrest and complete freedom." Trotsky would agree to nothing: "In that case I would prefer arrest."

He did not have to wait long. At the end of September 1936 he was interned in a house carefully guarded by 15 policemen.

This measure aroused great attention throughout the world but none of the critics was prepared to go his own government in order to offer Trotsky refuge in some other country. Besides, it is almost certain that internment at that time just about saved his life because Stalin's assassins at that time were busy killing many friends of Trotsky. Why would they omit him? On the other hand, this isolation had a very profound effect, not at all apparent to Trotsky: it cut him off from the rest of the world and a politician not in the midst of things is of necessity turned into a sectarian.

The man who replaced the classical "barricade revolution" with a general-staff-style coup d'etat suddenly was inclined to rather astonishingly mistaken analyses of the international situation and the situation in the Soviet Union. As we read the magazine Unser Wort -- Halbmonatszeitung der Internationalen Kommunisten Deutschlands (Our Word -- Semimonthly of the International Communist of Germany) which is published in the German language by the Trotskyites in Paris today, a magazine which very often published articles by Trotsky, we cannot help but wonder to what great extent he and his followers failed to understand what was going on.

The Trotskyites failed to see that not only the economic and sociological driving forces, which in the past had led to the unleashing of a revolution, had changed fundamentally; they also failed to see that the technique of a (successful) revolution had changed -- this partly due to Trotsky's work. But just as the "cabinet wars" of the 18th and 19th centuries, which were anything but "class struggles" as Marx asserted, had been replaced by the total or "popular" war of the 20th century, so did the world war of 1914-1918 prove that the workers in almost all countries -- whether they were right or wrong is completely unimportant here -- believed that they had to defend something: their homeland.

We must clearly understand this: in 1914-1918 the workers defended their "capitalist" homeland and not some kind of socialist homeland. In the meantime, the 8-hour day had become reality and the gradual integration of the socialist parties into the government after the world war had turned the "homeless apprentices" of old, the "proletarians," into citizens. It seems that Trotsky did not realize that this had taken place and that he did not understand what it meant; he wrote and thought and analyzed the situation as he did before 1914 in his articles in the Russian emigre newspapers -- and along with him his followers.

In the meantime, the first big "show trial" had been held in the Moscow House of Labor Unions; this trial was to be followed by another six "public trials" (and hundreds of others of which no one ever heard anything). All of the charges which could be investigated abroad turned out to have been false. For instance, one of the accused maintained that he had met Trotsky in a hotel which actually had burned down 20 years before the alleged meeting. Another said that he had been sent to Russia by the Gestapo [Nazi secret police] -- of course on orders from Trotsky -- in 1932. But the

Gestapo did not come into existence until the summer of 1933. One accused by the name of Lifshits really took the cake during the second trial: he accused himself of having organized no less than 10,380 attacks on railroad lines over a period of 5 years -- in other words, five attacks per day.

Anyone and everyone would have defended himself against the charges of being behind these acts of sabotage. But of Trotsky the government of the country that had given him refuge asked that he accept these insane statements in silence. Of course, he was not prepared to do that. He did not refuse, either; in his replies he also sharply attacked the Soviet Union and Stalin; these attacks culminated in the following classical statements:

"Of the 12 apostles, only Judas proved to be a traitor. But if he had come to power, he would have pictured the other 11 apostles as traitors and, with them, all of the other, lesser disciples, whose number Luke himself has given at 70."

These attacks found more and more attention and the world public was soon convinced that not a single word was true in any of the charges made at the so-called "trials of the enemies of the people." For the Norwegian government, these disclosures were just one more reason to watch Trotsky even more closely. These intolerable conditions ended when the President of Mexico, General Lazaro Cardenas, said that he was prepared to offer refuge to the founder of the Red Army whom Stalin had stripped of Soviet citizenship. A Norwegian tanker brought Trotsky and his wife to Tampico at the turn of the year 1936-1937. From there he took a special train of the Mexican government to Mexico City where he first of all found shelter with the painter Diego Rivera.

About 5 weeks after his arrival, Trotsky was informed that his oldest son Leon Sedov, the last of his four children, had suddenly died on 16 February 1937 in a Paris hospital, under mysterious circumstances following a successful removal of his appendix. For many days he and Nathalia Sedova shut themselves off in their room in the house in Coyoacan which they had just rented and would not allow anyone to see them. When Trotsky once again showed himself to his collaborators, his eyes were red and his beard was dissheveled. He knew now that he was "living on borrowed time" and that Stalin would try harder than ever before to have him assassinated.

Shortly thereafter his friends told him that a number of unknown persons had been spotted in the vicinity of his house in Coyoacan for several days. But his collaborators and the secretaries were likewise watched, as it turned out pretty soon. Moscow had probably learned that the American publishing house of Harper was planning to publish a biography of Stalin, written by Trotsky; the publication of this biography was to be prevented at all costs.

Upon advice from the police, Trotsky had the house converted into a

kind of fortress. The iron grills were replaced with a thick concrete wall which had only one entrance. Inside there was a second wall which surrounded the garden from which the house itself could be reached. The first room was used as library and office; this was the place where the bodyguards stayed and checked every visitor. The big dining room was then reached through a bullet-proof door and only from there could one reach Trotsky's personal study which was provided with numerous bookshelves, a big desk, and a phone. In the adjoining rooms, he lived with his wife, while the collaborators were billeted in another building which for some incomprehensible reason had only one exit. Despite these security measures, the hired assassins managed to penetrate into this fortress without a fight on 24 May 1940. It is just about a miracle that Trotsky, his wife Nathalia Sedova and his grandson Esteban Volkov, who had just arrived from Paris, survived this attack. There is no doubt as to who sent these assassins and Trotsky was quite outspoken about this. In a letter to the attorney general and to the Mexican foreign minister he makes himself quite clear:

"Over the past several years, Stalin had hundreds of my real or presumed friends executed or shot. Then he caused the murder of my entire family, with the exception of myself, my wife, and my grandson. In Switzerland he had his agents murder a fellow by the name of Ignaz Reiss, one of the GPU chiefs, when the latter publicly accepted my ideas. These facts were established without doubt by the French police and by the Swiss courts. The same agents who murdered Ignaz Reiss also pursued my son in Paris. Furthermore, on the evening of 7 November 1936, GPU agents broke into the scientific institute in Paris and stole some of my files. Two of my former secretaries, Erwin Wolff and Rudolph Klement, were murdered by GPU agents; the former was killed in Spain and the latter in Paris. The real objective of all of the show trials in Moscow in 1936 and 1937 was to get me handed over to the Soviet Union and into the hands of the GPU.

"This list of crimes and similar excesses could be supplemented with many other examples. All of them were aimed at my physical destruction. But Stalin is behind all of this. His weapon is the Soviet secret police which has its agents in every country, in other words, the GPU."

In the rest of this letter, Trotsky also mentions his suspicion that the German Gestapo might make common cause with the Soviet secret police which in July 1934 was renamed from GPU into NKVD. This is not as crazy as it sounds. In August 1939 Stalin had signed a pact with Hitler but it is quite obvious that there must have been a secret treaty in addition; the development of events and the way these two countries work together seem to prove this. After all, did not the publicly announced treaty provide for cooperation between the two secret police organizations? The German secret service and the NKVD helped each other already during the liquidation of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and about a dozen other high Soviet officers. When soon thereafter the Soviet authorities celebrated the entry of the German army into Paris by hanging out flags on public buildings in Moscow, Trotsky's suspicions became even more credible.

Of course, there is one thing that not even the suspicious Trotsky was able to guess: that his murderer was already inside the heavily guarded house at the corner of Wiener and Morelos Streets and that he was just waiting for the right moment, always urged on by his bosses, to perpetrate the deed.

The chief of the "Trotsky special division" and the man in charge of the assassination attempts against the founder of the Red Army was Dr. Gregory Rabinovich, a cover name concealing NKVD General Leonid Eitingon. In America, Rabinovich-Eitingon turned up as a "representative of the Soviet Red Cross" with headquarters in New York. In 1940 he temporarily lived in a mansion near Trotsky's house. But here again he played the role of a highly refined diplomat of the Jewish faith who on every occasion emphasizes his "purely humanitarian mission."

The public hears only about two attempts to assassinate Trotsky but this does not prove that other plans were not underway because Rabinovich-Eitingon undoubtedly has many other irons in the fire. After the successful second attack he was able to withdraw the assassination specialists, who were certainly still kept in readiness rather quickly or he could switch them to other persons who were unpopular in the Kremlin, such as for instance, General Krivitsky who defected in 1939 and who made some very embarrassing disclosures which the international press published widely.

Krivitsky moved to New York in 1940 because France at that time was a playground for NKVD agents and because he no longer felt safe there. Soon thereafter he was found dead in his hotel room, most probably a victim of Eitingon's agents. But the Soviet police also used the German Gestapo and the counterintelligence agencies of other countries. There are a number of cases in which we are sure that communists denounced their own comrades to the Gestapo in order that these comrades would be put in concentration camps where the dirty job of assassination could be accomplished for the NKVD. Or unpopular members found "special materials" of the CP on their persons or in their possession, after which the police is notified anonymously and then finds these compromising materials during a house search. This inevitably leads to sentencing for espionage and the particular victim then disappears for some time in some prison.

The number of opposition communists removed in this manner runs into the thousands if not tens of thousands. The Spanish civil war of 1936-1939 offered a particularly dirty possibility for getting rid of unpopular party members and perhaps even using their death as propaganda. Stalin had many critics of his policy enticed to Spain as "volunteers" where they were either allowed to die a "hero's death" or where they were shot down in rear areas as "agents of Franco." The henchmen who carried out these dirty jobs, however, were not only Soviet NKVD men; French, German, and especially Spanish communists also volunteered for these dirty details. The best of these professional murderers were brought back to the Soviet Union partly after the collapse of the Republican Army and partly even before; back in

the Soviet Union they were sent to schools in order to learn the very latest fine points of their trade.

Among these specially selected men there was probably also a Spanish citizen by the name of Ramon del Rio Mercader, son of the Spanish female NKVD agent Caridad Mercader. He was born in Barcelona on 7 February 1914. When his mother left her husband, del Rio, in 1925, she took along her children who, in addition to Ramon, included three sons and one daughter. She first went to Toulouse and then to Bordeaux and Paris. Nobody knows how she made a living at that time. One thing is certain: she was not yet in the service of the NKVD at that time. It is probable that she joined the French CP in France. It seems that she was recruited for the NKVD by a French air force officer with whom she was intimate.

After his graduation from school, Ramon del Rio Mercader attended a hotel management school in Lyon; but after one year, the 15-year old returned to Barcelona. Although his mother had brought him up as a communist, this did not stop him from working in the fancy hotels of the "capitalists" and adopting their living habits. This helped later on when he maintained that he was the son of a filthy-rich Belgian. His perfect behavior and comportment was considered as proof by everyone.

He served in the Spanish army from 1932 until 1934 and became an active communist during that time. There is no doubt that his mother contributed considerably to this; she had in the meantime returned to Spain, most probably on orders from the NKVD. But it seems that the decisive factor in the hiring of Ramon del Rio Mercader was the political situation.

After the 1931 elections, which were won by the Left, there were uprisings of farm workers who were living in misery on the big estates of absentee landowners. During the next elections in 1933 the right-wing parties were victorious under the leadership of Gil Robles, of the Catholic "Popular Action." The reactionary forces once again were victorious. Anyone from the Left who wanted to stay out of jail had to camouflage himself. In 1935, young Ramon was ordered to found a club of artists called "Cervantes" -- a kind of illegal party and propaganda cell of the communists. The place was quickly discovered and Mercader had to spend a few months in jail.

What he had so far lacked in the way of experience and toughness in the political struggle, he now learned quickly from other political prisoners. After the 1936 elections, which again brought a swing to the Left, he was released ahead of schedule and joined the communist militia, firmly determined to "repay" the reactionaries. When the civil war broke out soon thereafter, he was appointed political commissar with the rank of lieutenant in the 27th Division on the Aragon Front. Members of this military unit later on talked about his unscrupulous behavior. He was very much like his mother who has been described as a "gun moll" filled with fanatical hatred of anyone who was against Stalin.

No one knows whether she introduced her son Ramon to the highest officials of the NKVD in Spain or whether these men noticed him on their own. But it is certain that he was a member of the interstaff of the NKVD at the very latest in 1937. He had thus found his "mission" and lived the life of a Comintern agent who had unlimited money available to him.

Systematically educated by his superiors in this "sweet political life," he never managed to break away from it because serving in the NKVD meant prosperity and power for him. As NKVD man he was able to move people he did not like out of the way. All it took was one flick of the wrist, one anonymous accusation.

Soon his superiors thought that he was ready for a big mission -- the biggest mission which the NKVD could assign anybody to at the end of the 30's. First of all he was sent to Paris in the spring of 1938 with orders to pass himself off as the son of a Belgian millionaire diplomat. He did not have to be careful with the way he handled his money and in addition to the usual informer activity he was only asked to do one thing: he was supposed to establish intimate relations with a certain American woman who was not exactly a beauty and who was, on top of all this, several years older; he was to play the role of her enthusiastic lover.

This American woman by the name of Sylvia Ageloff, a convinced Trotskyite, had been working as an applied psychologist for the Board of Education of the city of New York. Her "girlfriend" Ruby Weil, secretary of Louis Budenz, the then chief editor of the communist central organ in the United States, the Daily Worker, had enticed her to Paris. Budenz, who was later on converted to Catholicism, in a book reciting his confessions, made certain statements which easily make it possible to reconstruct the diabolical game whose initiator undoubtedly was Rabinovitch-Eitingon.

In June 1938, Ruby Weil, quite by accident, introduced Sylvia to Ramon del Rio Mercader in Paris; at that time he called himself Jacques Mornard-Vandendreschd and maintained that he was the Teheran-born son of a Belgian diplomat. He said that he was born in 1904 in order to make it look as if he was older than Sylvia. There was indeed a man by the name of Jacques Mornard who had been born in Teheran in 1908 and whose mother's maiden name was Vandendriessche. No one ever found out whether the real Mornard ever knew about Mercader's double game.

Sylvia Ageloff fell for her new friend with the good manners who was able to say: "I love you" so convincingly -- just as Rabinovitch-Eitingon had figured she would. The 27-year old American woman, whose love life in the past had not been exactly satisfactory, at any rate was unable to realize whom she was facing, although there were quite a few things at that time which might have aroused her suspicion.

For instance, Mornard disappeared for a few weeks from Paris in July 1938. Writing Sylvia from Brussels, he said that his mother had been seriously

injured in an auto accident while his father had merely suffered shock. When Sylvia went to Brussels, her friend could not be found at the address he had given. After his return to Paris he told her that he suddenly had to go to Britain; the truth was that he probably simply wanted to get away from her for awhile or that he had to meet Eitingon. He also tried to corrupt her. One day he offered to sell a series of articles of hers to a so-called "Argus Publishing Company." Sylvia would write an article each week which was allegedly printed but she never was given any copies of the magazine.

But love had completely blinded this convinced female Trotskyite. She believed every word she was told by her boyfriend with whom she lived in a marriage-like relationship and who was ever so attentive. Evening after evening he picked her up in his impressive car, even when she participated in September in the strictly conspiratorial charter meeting of the 4th International for which Trotsky had issued a call and which he had been preparing since 1934. But even if she herself had been more careful -- the NKVD would still have found out what was going on without her. One of the most trusted friends of the murdered Leon Sedov, now a representative of Trotsky in Paris, the Soviet emigre of Polish-Ukrainian origin, by the name of Mark Szborovski, a student of medicine, was a spy of Moscow.

This is why Eitingon was able to instruct his agent Mornard to make no attempts whatever to attend the conference or to find out anything about it through questions. All he was allowed to do was to pick up Sylvia Ageloff who was hopelessly in love with him, partly also because he seemed so disinterested in her political activities. In the spring of 1939 Eitingon went one step further. Mornard was supposed to tell his fiance that a Belgian newspaper had offered him a job as a correspondent in the United States. He therefore suggested to Sylvia that she return to New York and wait for him there because he would follow her soon. But he did not turn up and drop in on her until September, after the outbreak of World War II.

To her great surprise he now called himself Frank Jacson. When she asked him how he had suddenly managed to obtain a Canadian passport, he said that he could not get an entry permit because he was a Belgian citizen and he therefore bought a forged passport for 3,600 dollars in order to be near her. It was found out later on with the help of the serial No 31377 that this passport had indeed been issued on 22 March 1937 to a Canadian by the name of Tony Babich who had been born in Lovinac in Yugoslavia on 13 June 1905 and who had been killed in action during the Spanish civil war in the summer of 1937. The NKVD, which handled all of the papers of the "International Brigade," had this passport forged. In the process, the forgery expert obviously forgot to put the letter "k" in the name Jackson.

In October 1939 "Jacson" went to Mexico City on his doctored passport. From there he wrote Sylvia that he felt lonely and that he missed her. Right away she took 3 months leave of absence and followed her fiance who thus took a big step closer to his objective because Sylvia would of course also visit

her sister who happened to be working as a secretary for Trotsky. Full of pride she introduced her bridegroom who made a tremendous impression on her sister because of his perfect manners. Mornard now had the "in" that would take him into the house in Coyoacan; the most important thing for him now was to have patience.

And Jacson did have patience. He was in no hurry because he had not met Trotsky in person as yet. But it would be wrong to credit him with this brilliant tactic of assassination which was worked out psychologically down to the last detail. The plans were certainly made by Dr. Rabinovich alias General Eitingon who was much more experienced in getting such plots hatched. It was he who managed to play on the feelings of the unfortunate Sylvia Ageloff with such great skill and it was he who guided all of the steps of Jacson after the assassination attempt of 24 May 1940.

On 27 February 1940 Trotsky changed his last will as if he knew that his days were numbered. The passages in which he talks about his wife Nathalia Sedova bear witness to his very tender feelings for her:

"It was my good fortune to be a fighter for socialism; in addition to this, destiny gave me the good fortune of being her husband. Over the almost 40 years of life together she has always been inexhaustible source of love, generosity, and tenderness. She suffered greatly but I am happy when I realize that she did have some days of happiness."

The 24 May 1940 attack on the house at the corner of Wiener and Morelos Streets had failed; Eitingon now moved up his second pawn, Frank Jacson, who in the meantime had managed to gain admittance to the fortress, without having asked for it. He had promised Sylvia Ageloff, who in the meantime had returned to New York in March, that he would never enter this house without her and he had given her his word of honor; but since the Rosmer couple, who had brought grandson Esteban to Coyoacan, one day asked Jacson to run a few errands for them, he automatically had a chance to drop in at the house in Coyoacan.

Later on the Rosmers, with whom the Trotskys had been closely connected for many decades, accepted Jacson's offer to drive them in his car to the ship which they were taking upon leaving Mexico. And now, 4 days after the first attack on 28 May 1940, he pulled up in front of the house in Coyoacan. The couple was still at breakfast and he was asked to join them at the table. This was the first time he met Trotsky in person. In his letter to Sylvia, Jacson told his fiance why he had broken his promise. This correct behavior of course had a positive effect in his favor.

After his return from Veracruz he very wisely did not try to meet the "great old man" right away again. He stayed in the background and did not show up, as we can see from the entries in the guard book which the secretaries kept with great accuracy. He did not turn up again in Coyoacan until 12 June in order to announce that he was going to New York and that he would

leave his car to the guards for their personal use. This again is a point in his favor especially since he allows one of the guards to accompany him to the plane.

In New York he received the last instructions -- and, considering the systematic operating procedure of Leonid Eitingon, we can certainly assume that a number of "dress rehearsals" were made. Jacson is fully aware of the danger of his mission and this is why all possibilities that might develop must be discussed in great detail. After his return he suggested to Trotsky that he accompany him on a mountain climbing trip. He said that he was a very seasoned mountain climber but when the suggestion is not immediately accepted he drops it. He is by far too cautious to force anything.

The various weapons which were later on found on him also indicated that he was thinking of all possible ways of assassination. In his right coat pocket he carried a 35-cm long and 3 cm wide dagger; as a second weapon he carried a caliber .45 pistol loaded with eight rounds. The instrument with which he finally perpetrated the deed -- an ice pick -- he bought neither in New York nor in France, as he said later; instead he probably stole it in April from the owner of a tourist hotel in which he had lived for a while before his New York trip.

The guard book records his longest visit on 29 July 1940: from 1440 until 1550. On that day Trotsky and his wife had invited him and his fiance, who was spending her annual vacation in Mexico, for tea. On 8 August he is again in the house and stays for more than an hour. The "dress rehearsal" for the assassination took place on this eleventh visit. He said that he had written an article and that he would like Trotsky to read it over. While Trotsky read the article, Jacson sat down on a table behind Trotsky's chair, something which the host thinks rather unpleasant.

After that Trotsky told his wife that he did not want to see this strange young man anymore; besides he noticed that Jacson kept his hat on all the time and held his overcoat close to himself. There was a good reason for this, as it turned out later: on that very day he carried the stolen ice pick and other weapons with him. Of course, Trotsky did not have the slightest idea about any of this but he had a rather unpleasant feeling, as if he was somehow threatened.

Perhaps Jacson wanted to carry out the assassination on that Saturday and perhaps he simply could not muster enough courage. But there are certain indications which lead to the conclusion that, despite all of his unscrupulousness, he resisted becoming a murderer -- deep inside himself -- until the very last. During the last days before the assassination, not only Sylvia Ageloff noticed that her fiance looked strange; Trotsky and his wife were also beginning to wonder about his strange behavior which began to look very bad compared to his former poise.

The 20th of August began very pleasantly for Trotsky. The weather was perfect and he felt better than ever before. Arising around 0700, he greeted his wife with the rather fatal words: "Well, they didn't kill us last night either. And I have not felt so good in a long time." The morning mail also brings happy news. Trotsky is informed that his files had arrived at Harvard University, without any of the secret services trying to interfere with the shipment. He had expected some sort of trouble because he had left his files and other documents to the university only on the condition that some of these files be placed under lock and key until 1980.

In the morning he dictated an article on the dictaphone. At 1300 he received his American attorney who advised him to take action against a certain slander case. After a period of rest, Trotsky returned to his desk. Shortly after 1700, as every day, he went to the stables in the courtyard in order to feed the rabbits and chickens. Taking care of these animals is a welcome alternative for him instead of walks and longer hikes in the vicinity or in the mountains which he had to give up for security reasons.

When Nathalia Sedova looked down into the garden, she saw young Jacson standing next to her husband. Once again she notices his nervous behavior. He looked as if he were seasick. Jacson greeted her with pronounced courtesy and called after her: "I am terribly thirsty. Could I have a glass of water?" She offered him tea but he replied: "No, thanks; I had a late lunch and it seems that some of it is backing up on me. I feel as if I am choking." Later on he makes excuses for his girlfriend Sylvia because she had not arrived as yet. He said that she would come any moment in order to say good-bye because both of them would leave for New York tomorrow.

But in reality he very cleverly kept her away. She was waiting for him in her hotel, as he told her to do, and since he is late, something which is quite unusual for him, she became more and more worried by the minute. Suddenly she is seized by an inexplicable anxiety. She calls the hotel in which both of them were living but no one knew where he was. At the very moment Jacson was already talking to Trotsky and showed him a few typewritten pages; this was the article which he had submitted to him three days ago and which he had revised in the meantime. Searchingly the old man looks at the visitor and as he notices that Jacson looks very bad he says full of sympathy: "You look sick. I don't at all like your looks. You're to watch your health more."

Slowly taking off the gloves which he usually wore when feeding the domestic animals, Trotsky walked around in his study. Jacson followed him. About two or three minutes later, shortly before 1800, Nathalia Sedova heard a terrible outcry. She ran outside -- and saw her husband lying at the balcony door in the dining room, covered with blood. "Jacson," groans Trotsky and immediately afterward: "Natasha, I love you so much." While she tried to take care of her seriously injured husband, there was much shouting in the study. The guards were beating down on the assassin with their pistol butts. He tries to defend himself and whimpers: "They had

me in their power; they have arrested my mother. Sylvia has nothing to do with this."

Despite his deadly head injury, Trotsky understood what Jacson said and asked one of his bodyguards: "No, no; don't kill him -- he must be made to talk." The guards stopped beating the assassin who in the meantime had regained control of himself. When the police arrived a few minutes after 1800 he gave them a letter; he did not have any other personal identity documents or other papers on his person; he maintained that he had destroyed them earlier. The letter, written in the French language, was probably written many days before on the typewriter; the date was entered in pencil, as was the signature "Jac."

In this letter Jacson first of all states that he is a member of an old Belgian family and that he was recruited for the 4th International by a friend who then caused him to go to Mexico. He continued as follows:

"After a few talks he (Trotsky) finally told me quite clearly what he wanted of me. At that moment all of the illusions collapsed and I felt great distrust toward this man in whom I had believed until then.

"I was to go to Russia and organize a series of assassinations of various personalities, first of all Stalin. This was against all of the basic rules of the struggle which so far had been an open and honest struggle and this destroyed my entire belief. I nevertheless did not agree at that time [sic] because I wanted to know how far the low character and hatred of this man would go."

This was the strategy of the NKVD. It is probable that Eitingon typed this letter himself when Jacson was in New York. But the general made the mistake of making the persuasion periods somewhat too short, perhaps because he was misinformed and perhaps also because he did not know that every visitor and every visit were carefully recorded. This means that Jacson was in Coyoacan for a total of eleven visits, totaling 4 hours and 27 minutes. During this time he had no more than 15 minutes with Trotsky, in private. But this is not long enough to get to trust a man to make him an offer such as this. Besides, all of this fitted only too well into the image of the "show trials" in Moscow.

In addition, Jacson stated that Trotsky was in the service of "American imperialism," in other words, that he was being paid by the government in Washington. In 1940 the Soviet Union was still maintaining friendly relations with Hitler Germany. In the trial, which only took place 3 years later, Trotsky is no longer an "American agent"; instead he is a "fascist bloodhound" in the pay of the Gestapo because now Hitler is fighting against the Soviet Union and Moscow has allied itself with the once dis-tained "American plutocrats."

Jacson made the following statement about the perpetration of the deed as such:

"After my talks with Trotsky I developed an unspeakable hatred of him. I clearly realized that I was one of those whom he had abused for his own personal advantage because he forced his supporters to sacrifice themselves for his own interests, without any pangs of conscience. This is why I decided to kill him and then to commit suicide only after I was sure that he was dead.

"On the day of the assassination I entered the house around 1830. Harold opened the door. In the courtyard I met several of Trotsky's secretaries. They told me something which I did not understand. I asked Harold whether Sylvia was there because she had said that she wanted to visit the 'old man.' But he said no. I said: 'Well, I suppose she will come later.' I found Trotsky feeding his rabbits. Then he asked me to go to his study with him. There he took my papers and sat down in a chair at the desk. I stood to his left and he turned his back to me. He was certainly not suspicious.

"I put my coat, into whose right corner [sic] a dagger had been sewed and in whose left side I had the ice pick, on some piece of furniture, I don't recall which one. I only know that it was on the East side of the room behind Trotsky. While he read the article I took the ice pick out of my raincoat, closed my eyes and hit him on the head. I struck him only once. He let out a terrible yell, threw himself at me at the same time, and bit me in the left hand. You can still see the impression made. Then he staggered back. After the first outcry, Harold was the first to appear; he went to work on me with his pistol butt and he was then joined by Charles and Hansen. I had been stunned by the deed itself and I made no attempt to flee. I do not know whether anyone else entered the room. The police came later and brought me here."

The Belgian consul who was brought in to look at him doubted Jacson's statement that he was really called Mornard-Vandendreschd. The Belgian consul maintained that there was no diplomat by that name and that there was no military academy at Dixmuiden and no Jesuit school in Brussels which the assassin maintained he had attended. But Jacson-Mornard persisted in his statement. It was impossible to check out his statement because in German-occupied Belgium there is no opportunity for investigations. Only the diplomatic yearbooks were available. The investigators did not get on the right track until years later when, as a result of certain indications and hints, the fingerprints of Ramon del Rio Mercader are found; as we remember, he had been sentenced to prison because of communist agitation in Barcelona in 1936. A comparison of the fingerprints definitely proved the identity of Jacson-Mornard.

His statement, which he shouted at a moment when he was afraid for his life and in which he maintained that he was being blackmailed because his mother was under arrest later on turned out to have been sheer invention after many years. At the time of the assassination she and her friend Eitingon were 500 m away from Trotsky's house, waiting for her son, in the

hope that he would succeed in escaping after the murder. She was fully informed on all of the preparations. Later on, Caridad Mercader told a Spanish party comrade by the name of Jesus Hernandez, who was minister of justice during the civil war (and who broke with the communists in 1950) that she had discussed the assassination of Trotsky directly with Stalin and Beria during her visits to the Soviet Union.

After the deed was done she and her son were awarded the Order of Lenin, one of the highest Soviet decorations. Evacuated to Ufa during the war and put up in the big-shot hotel "Bashkiriya" there, she lived later on in the Moscow "Lux" hotel from 1943 until she left the country in 1944, along with other Comintern big shots. Equipped with forged passports, she lived in Mexico from October 1944 until November 1945 where she established contact with the female communist Dr. Esther Chapa who until 1947 was the "head of the prison delegation for the prevention of crimes." Of all people, she picked Trotsky's assassin to be her contact man in the prison in which he is serving his sentence. This meant that Jacson was able to move about freely within the prison compound and that he had great influence upon the guards and prisoners because of his "job."

No one knows whether Caridad Mercader during her second stay in Mexico hoped to be able to make it possible for her son to escape, just as Eitingon was able to escape from New York before the 1943 trial, but there are some indications for this. When steps were taken for the first time to help him escape, Jacson-Mornard simply refuses to go along. And he had good reasons. He was scared by the example of what had happened to the other NKVD agents. So long as Stalin was alive, he was safer in prison.

A few minutes after the assassination, hundreds of people had gathered in front of Trotsky's house. Reporters arrived and an ambulance came along with the police. But the secretaries refused to allow their chief to be removed so long as police General Jose Manuel Nunuz [sic] was not present. They were afraid that other assassins might attack the convoy and kill the seriously injured man. They were still hoping that Trotsky could be saved. Only after Trotsky had been moved to the hospital is the assassin, half beaten to death by the secretaries, moved out. Quite by accident, he is put in a room right next to the one holding his victim.

Just 2 hours after the attack, seriously injured Trotsky, who in the meantime had lost consciousness, is on the operating table. The doctors realize that his condition is hopeless. Still, they try to save him -- although in vain. He died on 21 August 1940, at 1925, 25 hours and 35 minutes after the attack.

The news of his death pushes the war news off the front pages of the newspapers. Hundreds of thousands file past his bier in the Great Hall of the Alcazar, in the center of the Mexican capital, in complete silence. A vast throng of people followed the funeral procession and very soon the people in the streets sing the "Gran Corrida" about Leon Davidovich Trotsky.

This sad folk song whose author is unknown is on everyone's lips within a few days:

"Trotsky is dead -- slain between morning and night. Those who have loved him now wail. He who ordered this deed is laughing. He came to us in Coyoacan in order to find hospitality in peace after many years of struggle and suffering and Trotsky found death among us. The murderer posed as a friend who was trusted and sneaked into the house which Trotsky had built among us. And he pulled out his ax. He slew his host and friend who had not done him any wrong. All of Mexico cries for him now and all of Coyoacan is in mourning."

The murderer, who quickly recovered from his shock and the beating he had received, is interrogated constantly. He has an explanation and an answer for everything and whenever he gets caught in his own contradictions he suddenly manages to protect himself by maintaining that his memory has failed him. Only once did he lose self-control completely; that happened when he was confronted with his girlfriend Sylvia Ageloff, who was likewise under arrest.

On 20 August she had in vain waited for her friend at the Hotel Montijo until about 1900; she then phoned Coyoacan and heard what had happened. She immediately went to the scene of the crime and surrendered to the police. The authorities did believe her when she said that she had nothing to do with the assassination but the investigative agencies thought it wiser to take her along for the time being.

When she was put under arrest, the assassin was no longer there. As she now saw him before her, she shouted: "Take this murderer away. Kill him. He has killed Trotsky. Beat him to death."

One of the officers turned to Sylvia and said: "Jacson maintains that you are the only reason for his existence and that he killed Trotsky because of you because you were supposed to become a victim of his intrigues."

"Lies. Nothing but lies" replies Sylvia. "He is a hypocrite, a murderer. Kill him."

In her presence Jacson-Mornard does not dare repeat his statements. Sylvia Ageloff contradicts him on many points and everyone who witnessed this confrontation was convinced that she said the truth when she shouted in utmost excitement: "He is a traitor in love, in friendship, in everything. I know now that I have been the tool of this swine." She spat on him and when the police took him away she called after him: "You bastard. You bastard. You bastard."

Despite Sylvia Ageloff's statements there are many points which the police and the attorneys do not have answers for because it is difficult to check these statements in view of wartime conditions; the murderer and his

boss, Eitingon, who did such a fine job of preparing the assassination, certainly figured on this too. As a result, the investigation could not be as thorough as it should have been.

The longer the investigation lasts, the easier the murderer has it in prison. He has unlimited funds available; he can afford a phonograph, a radio, books, newspapers, wine, and even female companionship. By the time the trial is held in 1943 -- after the victorious battle of Stalingrad -- the international sympathy for Stalin reached a high point considered impossible in the past.

Quite by accident it was announced that the defense attorneys had received 20,000 dollars "from an unknown source." It is easy to guess where this money came from. The verdict is announced on 16 April 1943: Ramon del Rio Mercader alias Jacques Mornard alias Frank Jacson is given the maximum sentence allowed for murder under Mexican law: 20 years imprisonment. The verdict among others says this:

"From the beginning of his trip to Mexico until he established personal contact with Trotsky and even afterward, Mornard's behavior is full of untruths and trickery. The court must therefore conclude that Frank Jacson or Jacques Mornard undertook his trip to Mexico for the sole purpose of murdering Trotsky."

The American Trotskyites asked the government in Washington to be allowed to move the body of Leon Trotsky to the United States but the State Department refused to issue a visa to the dead man. On 27 August 1940 the corpse is cremated and the urn containing his ashes is buried in the garden of the house in Coyoacan. The spot is marked by a white rectangular stone over which waves a red flag.

Shortly before that, another grave had been dug right next to it. The marble slab reads: "In Memory of Robert Sheldon Harte, 1915-1940, murdered by Stalin." Harte, allegedly kidnapped after the 24 May attack, was indeed murdered by Stalin's agents but for an entirely different reason than Trotsky assumed: he was a spy who had to be silenced. But Trotsky kept believing in the loyalty of his bodyguard and awarded the dead man an honor which he had not earned.

The room in which Trotsky was fatally injured has been left in the same condition. His wife Nathalia Sedova, who was to live in that house for another 20 years, wanted to make sure that nothing was changed. She has become a lonely old woman; all she has left is one grandson -- and her memories. These memories are not to be touched. Every morning she greets the tomb of her husband. And she also looks at the marble slab and she likewise believes that Harte was not a spy. Admitting the theory of the police would be like treason to her murdered husband and her murdered sons and grandchildren.

After Khrushchev's disclosures to the 20th Congress, Nathalia Sedova petitioned the Soviet government that the victor of the 7 November 1917 revolution, the subsequent founder of the Red Army, Leon Davidovitch Trotsky, be rehabilitated; she received no reply to this petition. The doors of the prison opened for Mercader 10 years after Stalin's death. Czech communists were waiting for the murderer at the gates. They took him to Cuba by plane. We lost track of him in Czechoslovakia but we do have information to the effect that he is living in a small village near Prague. Of course, he has been stripped of his Order of Lenin and he is no longer a "hero of the Soviet Union."

HARRY SCHULZE-WILDE

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

Es ist der 24. Mai 1940. Vor dem Haus Ecke Wiener- und Morelosstraße im Stadtteil Coyoacan von Mexico City, in dem der weltbekannte russische Revolutionsführer und Gründer der Roten Armee, Leo Trotzki, seit drei Jahren lebt, stehen plaudernd drei Polizisten. Sie gehören zu jenen zehn Polizeibeamten, die von der mexikanischen Regierung mit der Bewachung dieser zur Festung ausgebauten Villa betraut wurden. Jeweils fünf von ihnen haben 24 Stunden Dienst.

Kurz nach drei Uhr morgens nähern sich ihnen zwei Männer in Polizeiuniform und ein dritter in der Uniform eines Armeeleutnants. „Was gibt's Kameraden?“ fragen sie, als handle es sich um eine Inspektion. „Nichts besonderes“, antworten die vor dem Wachturm stehenden Polizisten. Doch in diesem Augenblick ziehen die drei Ankömmlinge ihre Revolver und rufen: „Hände hoch, Ihr verdammten Schweine!“ Gleichzeitig tauchen aus dem Dunkel mehrere Männer auf, einige in Zivil, die anderen in Uniformen. Sie nehmen den fünf Wachtposten die Waffen ab und fesseln sie.

Nachdem sie die äußere Bewachung ausgeschaltet haben, klopfen sie an das eiserne Tor, doch nicht gerade sonderlich stark, um die Posten in den mit Maschinengewehren bestückten Türmen auf der Betonmauer nicht zu alarmieren. Das Tor öffnet sich sofort, etwa 20 Mann huschen in das Innere. Auch in den Garten dringen sie ein, und von dort aus verteilen sie sich über das ganze Haus. Unmittelbar danach zerreißen Feuerstöße aus Maschinenpistolen die Stille. Aber bevor die Bewohner der benachbarten Villen so recht zur Besinnung kommen, ist alles vorbei. Die Eindringlinge verschwinden in den dunklen Straßen, die letzten flüchten mit den beiden Autos aus den Garagen des Hauses.

Nach einer halben Stunde trifft die von Nachbarn alarmierte Polizei ein. Sie beginnt sofort mit der Untersuchung. Nach Aussage der von ihren Fesseln befreiten Bewacher wurden etwa 300

Schüsse abgefeuert, aber nur Trotzki's Enkel Esteban, der erst vor wenigen Tagen aus Frankreich gekommen ist, wurde durch einen Streifschuß am linken Fuß verletzt. Leo Trotzki, dem der Überfall geglückt hat, ist mit dem Schrecken davongekommen, ebenso seine Frau Nathalie Sedowa, die vier amerikanischen Sekretäre, der Deutsche Otto Schüssler, ein französisches Ehepaar und die drei Diensthilfen: die Köchin, das Stubenmädchen und der Hausbursche.

In Trotzki's Schlafzimmer zählt der untersuchende Polizeibeamte 73 Einschläge. Die Eheleute sind diesem mörderischen Kreuzfeuer durch Fenster und Türen nur entronnen, weil sie sich sofort unter das Bett geworfen hatten. Auch der kleine Esteban versteckte sich, als er die Schüsse hörte, unter seinem Bett. Trotz seiner elf Jahre weiß er, daß man seinen Großvater unter allen Umständen töten will. Rund ein Dutzend Attentate sind bisher fehlgeschlagen. Trotzki's Kinder, zwei Söhne und zwei Töchter, wurden bereits ermordet oder in den Tod getrieben. Von den Enkelkindern lebt nur noch Esteban.

Aber nicht nur die nächsten Angehörigen, auch zahlreiche seiner Freunde und sieben Sekretäre starben eines unnatürlichen Todes: in der UdSSR, in Spanien, in Paris, in der Schweiz und in anderen Ländern. Die von Josef Stalin ausgesandten Mörder wußten ihre Opfer selbst in Krankenhäusern und einsamen Gebirgsdörfern zu finden. Das ist auch der Grund, weshalb Trotzki sein Haus in Coyoacan zur Festung ausbauen ließ. Alle erdenklichen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen wurden getroffen. Das Haupttor ist mit zwei Querstangen verstärkt, und wenn es geöffnet wird, leuchtet eine helle Lampe über dem Eingang auf. Die Fenster haben stählerne Schutzschilder mit Schießscharten, und ein Netz von elektrischen Drähten macht es unmöglich, die Mauer zu überklettern. Bei der geringsten Berührung der Drähte werden Alarmglocken ausgelöst, die einen höllischen Lärm machen.

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Das Rätsel, wie die Attentäter in diese so gesicherte Festung kampflös und ohne die Alarmanlagen in Betrieb zu setzen, eindringen konnten, löst sich bald: Der in dieser Nacht mit der Wache betraute Amerikaner Robert Sheldon Harte ist verschwunden. Er muß das Tor geöffnet haben, und nach Aussage der Polizeibeamten ist er mit den Attentätern im letzten der beiden Autos geflohen. Aber Trotzki hält es für unmöglich, daß er mit den ausgesandten Mördern unter einer Decke steckte; er glaubt, Sheldon Harte sei entführt worden.

Wenige Tage später findet man die Leiche des Sekretärs in einem abgelegenen, unbewohnten Haus. Die Untersuchung ergibt einwandfrei, das Sheldon Harte dort nicht als Gefangener gehalten und erst nach einer gewissen Zeit im Schlaf umgebracht wurde. Die Mörder haben ihn dann unter der Lehmdecke des Fußbodens hastig verscharrt. Wahrscheinlich glaubten sie, daß der Verräter auch sie verraten könnte. Dennoch will Leo Trotzki nicht an den Treuebruch Hartes glauben.

Der Prozeß gegen die Attentäter, die erstaunlich schnell entlarvt werden konnten und die man mit rauen Methoden zum Sprechen brachte, findet bereits Anfang Juli statt. Doch nur die zweite Garnitur sitzt auf der Anklagebank; die ausländischen Hintermänner, zweifellos Beauftragte der sowjetischen Geheimpolizei, sind entkommen. Die Weltöffentlichkeit reagiert auf den Prozeß nur mit mäßigem Interesse. Selbst in Mexiko nimmt der Krieg in Europa die Aufmerksamkeit der Menschen mehr in Anspruch als die dunklen Machenschaften der Stalinschen Geheimpolizei, ein Umstand, den die Initiatoren des Attentats mit Sicherheit einkalkuliert haben.

Zwei Wochen vor dem Anschlag auf Trotzki hatte die deutsche Wehrmacht in Frankreich ihre Offensive eröffnet. Die für uneinnehmbar gehaltene Maginot-Linie wurde durchbrochen, Paris besetzt, Frankreich zum Waffenstillstand gezwungen und die englische Armee vom Festland vertrieben. Aber auch die Sowjetunion war aktiv gewesen. Nach der Okkupation Ostpolens im September 1939 besetzte die Rote Armee Mitte Juni die bis dahin selbständigen Staaten Litauen, Lettland und Estland.

Trotzki ist mit der Prozeßführung einverstanden. Unmißverständlich erklärt er: „In keinem anderen Land der Welt, weder in Frankreich noch in der Schweiz, noch in Spanien, ist je eines der Verbrechen der GPU mit solcher Sorgfalt untersucht und verfolgt worden, wie jetzt in Mexiko

der Anschlag auf mein Leben!“ Aber er weiß auch, daß die Mörder wegen des mißglückten Anschlags ihre Absicht nicht aufgeben werden. Einem höheren Polizeibeamten gegenüber erklärt er: „Das Schicksal hat mir noch einmal eine Frist gegeben, doch sie wird nicht von langer Dauer sein.“ Wenn er morgens aufwacht, pflegt er zu seiner Frau zu sagen: „Heute nacht haben sie uns nicht umgebracht. Wir haben noch einen kleinen Aufschub erhalten.“

Wer ist dieser Mann, der bis jetzt mehr als einem Dutzend Anschlägen entging, dessen vier Kinder man ermordete oder durch Verweigerung ärztlicher Hilfeleistung in den Tod trieb, dessen Haus man mehrere Male anzündete, um ihn und seine Anhänger wie Ratten auszuräuchern, und den die Kommunisten der ganzen Welt als „Verräter am Sozialismus“, als „Kapitalistenknecht“, als „Agenten des Faschismus“ und neuerdings auch als „Agenten des amerikanischen Imperialismus“ brandmarken?

Leo Davidowitsch Bronstein, genannt Trotzki, wurde am 26. Oktober 1879 (nach dem gregorianischen Kalender am 7. November) in Janowka, Gouvernement Cherson (Ukraine), geboren. Er war das fünfte von acht Kindern, von denen aber schon vier frühzeitig starben. Dem Vater David Bronstein, einem wohlhabenden Landwirt, der 400 Desjatinen fruchtbaren Ackerbodens von einem heruntergekommenen adligen Gutsbesitzer erworben hatte, gelang es durch harte Arbeit, seinen Besitz zu vergrößern. Er baute Werkstätten, neue Ställe für das Vieh und eine große Mühle. Nach der Revolution, der sein Sohn zum Siege verhalf, verlor er alles. Verbittert und gleichzeitig stolz auf ihn, starb er 1922 als Leiter einer staatlichen Mühle.

Als Leo Davidowitsch geboren wurde, regierte in Rußland Zar Alexander II. Er hatte 1861 die bäuerliche Leibeigenschaft aufgehoben. Die fortschrittlich-liberalen Kräfte setzten deshalb große Hoffnungen auf ihn. Aber bevor er sein Reformwerk durch eine konstitutionelle Verfassung krönen konnte, wurde er (am 1. März 1881) ermordet. Sein Sohn, Alexander III., stand gänzlich unter dem Einfluß Pobjedonossew, des Oberprokurators des Heiligen Synod — eines bigotten Reaktionärs, der am liebsten die Leibeigenschaft wieder eingeführt hätte.

Der alte Bronstein, der — wie Millionen russischer Bauern — weder lesen noch schreiben konnte, schickte seinen Sohn auf eine jüdische Schule, wo er in jiddischer Sprache, die er nicht

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

beherrschte, unterrichtet wurde. Zu Hause sprach man ukrainisch. Aber der Besuch dieser jüdischen Schule war für den kleinen Bronstein trotz allem von großer Bedeutung: Er lernte dort nämlich auch russisch.

Wieder in Janowka, bildete er sich selber weiter. Bereits mit sechs Jahren konnte er dem Vater die Rechnungen ausschreiben und sogar die Bücher führen. Die Eltern waren auf ihren Sohn unsagbar stolz. Für sie stand fest: Dieser Wunderknabe mußte studieren! Die nächste Station des Bildungsweges konnte deshalb nur Odessa sein, die Hafenstadt am Schwarzen Meer, das russische Marseille und „die berühmteste Polizeistadt dieses Polizeistaates“.

Doch nicht in einer staatlichen Schule fand der siebenjährige Knabe Aufnahme, sondern in der „Realschule des Hl. Paulus“, einer Gründung der deutsch-lutherischen Kirchengemeinde. Der Unterricht wurde in russischer Sprache erteilt, die Schüler und Lehrer waren deutscher, schweizerischer, russischer, polnischer, rumänischer und griechischer Herkunft, ein getreues Spiegelbild des Völkergemisches in diesem Teil des Zarenreiches. Aber auch dem religiösen Bekenntnis nach war alles vertreten: neben Schülern aus lutherischen, römisch-katholischen, griechisch-orthodoxen, jüdischen und calvinistischen Familien besuchten sogar Kinder verschiedener Sekten diese Schule.

Der junge Bronstein, schon im ersten Schuljahr Primus seiner Klasse, lernte hier vor allem deutsch und französisch, ferner auch italienisch und die klassischen Sprachen Griechisch und Latein. Politisch betätigte er sich nicht. In der vom liberalen Geist geprägten „Schule des Hl. Paulus“ gab es keine revolutionären Zirkel; sie entstanden nur in den wie Kasernen geführten staatlichen Schulen.

Erst in Nikolajew, wo sich der Siebzehnjährige auf den Besuch einer Universität vorbereiten sollte, trat er mit „Marxisten“ in Verbindung. Doch vorerst forderten sie nur seinen Spott heraus. Bei einer Silvesterfeier 1896 erklärte er in einem Trinkspruch: „Fluch allen Marxisten, die soviel Härte und Öde in das Leben bringen.“ Und der erste politische Artikel aus seiner Feder richtete sich gegen den Marxismus.

Diese Episode war jedoch nur kurz. Als er 1897 sein Abitur mit „ausgezeichnet“ bestand, war er bereits ein begeisterter Anhänger der aus London und Deutschland kommenden Lehre von Karl Marx. Der alte Bronstein tobte und verlangte von seinem Sohn, er solle sich mit revolutionären Theorien nicht mehr befassen. Leo Davidowitsch

gab nicht nach. Er verzichtete auf die materiellen Zuwendungen des Vaters und verdiente seinen Lebensunterhalt mit Privatstunden.

Noch in Nikolajew organisierte er, 19 Jahre alt, eine revolutionäre Organisation, den „Südrussischen Arbeiterbund“, beinahe schon so etwas wie eine Partei, wenn auch in lokalen Grenzen. Als ihm der Boden zu heiß wurde, wollte er 1898 nach Janowka zurückkehren. Unterwegs verhaftete ihn die Polizei. Fast zwei Jahre saß er in Untersuchungshaft, Ende 1899 wurde er ohne Gerichtsurteil für vier Jahre nach Sibirien verbannt.

Im Gefängnis hatte er die ebenfalls zur Verbannung verurteilte Alexandra Sokolowskaja geheiratet. In seinem Buch „*Mein Leben*“ widmete er diesem Ereignis nicht einmal drei Zeilen: „Die gemeinsame Arbeit hatte uns eng verbunden. Um nicht getrennt angesiedelt zu werden, hatten wir uns im Moskauer Etappengefängnis trauen lassen.“ Aus der Ehe gingen zwei Töchter hervor. Aber noch vor Ablauf der vier Jahre verließ Trotzki seine Familie.

Der Ruhm des jungen Revolutionärs, der mit 19 Jahren eine eigene Gruppe organisiert hatte und der von seinem Verbannungsort Wercholenk aus Verbindung mit seinen ebenfalls verbannten Kameraden hielt, hatte sich bis nach Zentralrußland verbreitet. Auch die Artikel, die er unter dem Pseudonym „Antid Oto“ in der in Irkutsk erscheinenden *Östlichen Rundschau* veröffentlichte, fielen auf. Man legte ihm deshalb nahe zurückzukehren. Mit einem falschen Paß ausgerüstet, in den er den Namen eines Gefängniswärters eingeschrieben hatte, erreichte er Irkutsk. Dieser zufällig gewählte „Paßname“ Trotzki sollte Weltgeschichte machen.

In Irkutsk bestieg er den Zug nach Samara, dem heutigen Kuibyschew, Hauptquartier der illegal erscheinenden Zeitung *Iskra* und Sammelbecken der marxistisch orientierten Revolutionäre, die gegenüber den früher so aktiven Terroristengruppen immer mehr Anhänger gewannen. Von dort aus schickte man ihn nach Charkow, Poltawa und Kiew, die geheim existierenden Ortsgruppen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei zu kontrollieren. Wieder in Samara, erhielt er die Aufforderung, nach London zu kommen, der westeuropäischen Zentrale der *Iskra*. Die einem Befehl gleichkommende „Einladung“ hatte Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin unterschrieben.

Wo immer Trotzki auftauchte, wurde man rasch auf ihn aufmerksam, rühmte man seine überragenden geistigen Fähigkeiten, die analytische

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Schärfe seiner Artikel und seine glänzende rednerische Begabung. Auch in London spielte er schon nach wenigen Wochen eine bedeutende Rolle. Auf dem II. Parteitag im Jahre 1903, der in Brüssel begonnen hatte und dann nach London verlegt wurde, registrierte man seinen Elan und seine Leidenschaft mit Aufmerksamkeit. Auf Lenins Vorschlag hin, der ihm „seltene Eigenschaften“ attestierte, wurde Trotzki in den Redaktionsstab der *Auslands-Iskra* gewählt. Später schickte man ihn nach Frankreich, in die Schweiz und nach Belgien. Auf seinen Reisen lernte er nicht nur die bedeutendsten europäischen Sozialisten kennen, sondern auch Nathalie Sedowa, die damals in Paris Kunstgeschichte studierte. Sie wurde, ohne standesamtliche Formalitäten, seine Lebensgefährtin, die fortan alle Triumphe und alles Leid mit ihm teilen sollte.

Daß Trotzki und der um zehn Jahre ältere Lenin (der ihn zeitweise förderte) nicht selten — meist wegen zweitrangiger Fragen — heftig aneinandergerieten, ist eine Tatsache, die Stalin 20 Jahre später weidlich ausnutzen sollte, um Trotzki einer „antileninistischen“ — und das hieß „antirevolutionären“ — Haltung zu bezichtigen. Das war eine bewußte Verleumdung. Es hat sich überdies erwiesen, daß in vielen dieser Fragen nicht Lenin, sondern Trotzki recht hatte. Nahegelegener als von Gegnerschaft zu sprechen, wäre es, die beiden Männer mit den zwei Polen eines Magneten zu vergleichen, die nur zusammen ein Kraftfeld erzeugen. Heute wissen wir jedenfalls, daß nicht nur Trotzki von Lenin stark beeinflusst wurde (so daß ihn zahlreiche, im Exil lebende Russen als dessen „Keule“ bezeichneten), sondern daß auch Lenin vieles von Trotzki's Theorien übernahm: zum Beispiel die der „Permanenter Revolution“. Der Vater dieser These war allerdings nicht Trotzki, sondern nachweislich sein zeitweiliger Gönner, der russische Emigrant Alexander Helphand, der später unter dem Namen Parvus weltbekannt wurde. Unter „Permanenter Revolution“ verstand er — und nach ihm Trotzki — eine Revolution, die erst dann beendet sei, wenn alle Länder der Erde kommunistisch geworden wären.

Der Einfluß, den Helphand auf viele russische und westeuropäische Sozialisten ausübte, gründete sich nicht zuletzt auf die Tatsache, daß er bereits 1895 den erst zehn Jahre später ausbrechenden russisch-japanischen Krieg und in dessen Folge die russische Revolution als „Vorspiel zur Weltrevolution“ vorausgesagt hatte. Diese den Prognosen von Marx entgegengesetzte Prophetie

schien unheimlich und trug nicht wenig dazu bei, den Ruf der „dialektischen Geschichtsauffassung“ zu festigen.

Als es im Januar 1905 in St. Petersburg zu Unruhen kam, verließ Trotzki seine gesicherte Position bei dem schon recht vermögenden Parvus-Helphand, der ihm in Münchener Wohnung und Arbeitsmöglichkeiten gegeben hatte, und reiste nach Rußland — ein gefährliches Unternehmen, denn entflozene Verbannte wurden, wenn man sie wieder faßte, außerordentlich hart bestraft. Fast alle anderen führenden Revolutionäre blieben dagegen im Ausland, um erst einmal abzuwarten, wie sich die Verhältnisse entwickeln würden.

Trotzki stürzte sich mutig in die Strudel der Ereignisse. Er wurde zum anerkannten Führer der stark kommunistisch gefärbten Revolution von 1905, die das zaristische Rußland schwer erschütterte. Nicht nur die zahlreichen Streiks rüttelten am politischen Gefüge des autokratisch regierten Staates, viel schwerer wog, daß auch ein Teil der Flotte meuterte. Nur mit Mühe gelang es, die alte Ordnung wiederherzustellen.

Anfang Dezember 1905 wurde Trotzki verhaftet und 23 Monate später zu lebenslänglicher Verbannung in ein gottverlassenes Nest im Polargebiet an der Mündung des Ob geschickt. Auf dem Wege dorthin gelang es ihm, zu entkommen. Mit außergewöhnlicher Energie und staunenswerter körperlicher Zähigkeit schlug er sich durch die Taiga und erreichte Petersburg, von wo er nach einigen Tagen Aufenthalt über Helsinki nach London zurückkehrte. Er traf gerade noch rechtzeitig ein, um am V. Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Rußlands teilnehmen zu können.

Zum ersten Male entwickelte er hier in der Öffentlichkeit seine, das heißt Parvus' Theorie von der „Permanenter Revolution“. Lenin und andere Links-Sozialisten, unter ihnen Rosa Luxemburg, unterstützten ihn und feierten ihn nicht nur als großen Revolutionär, dessen mutiges Auftreten in St. Petersburg und später im Prozeß weltweites Aufsehen erregt hatte, sondern auch als bedeutenden Theoretiker. Anschließend reiste er nach Berlin, wo ihn seine Lebensgefährtin Nathalie Sedowa mit dem 1906 geborenen Sohn Leon erwartete.

Auch in Deutschland wurde Trotzki gefeiert. Parvus machte ihn mit den Führern der deutschen Sozialdemokratie bekannt: mit Karl Kautsky, dem alten Bebel, Georg Ledebour, Franz Mehring und Hugo Hase. Ihre Namen hatten internatio-

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

nalen Klang, denn die deutsche Sozialdemokratische Partei war die stärkste und bestorganisierte der Welt. Aber die Jahre 1907 bis 1914 waren für Trotzki im Grunde genommen nur Lehrjahre. Erst nach Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges sollte er seine historische Aufgabe finden — ohne daß ihm das sofort bewußt geworden wäre.

Mit militärischen Fragen hatte sich Leo Trotzki bisher noch nicht beschäftigt, erst während der beiden Balkankriege 1911 und 1912 sah er sich als Zeitungskorrespondent mit den Problemen von Strategie und Taktik konfrontiert. In seinen Artikeln enthüllte er nicht nur schonungslos die Greuelthaten, die von beiden Seiten begangen wurden und die ihn „an die Art des Dreißigjährigen Krieges“ erinnerten, er beschäftigte sich auch zunehmend mit militärischen Unternehmungen. Nur die Auswirkungen irgendwelcher Maßnahmen zu schildern, genügte ihm nicht; er wollte auch die Ursachen und inneren Zusammenhänge erkennen.

Der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges überraschte ihn in Wien. Nach kurzem Zwischenaufenthalt in der Schweiz reiste er nach Paris. Wie während der beiden Balkankriege betätigte er sich auch jetzt — unter wechselnden Pseudonymen — als Korrespondent verschiedener Zeitungen. Aufsehen erregten vor allem seine 1915 und 1916 geschriebenen Artikel, in denen er sich mit der Entwicklung des Krieges zum Stellungskrieg beschäftigte. Der späteren, systematischen Diffamierung Trotzki durch Stalin ist es zuzuschreiben, daß diese journalistisch brillanten und hochbedeutenden Aufsätze auch heute noch nahezu unbekannt sind.

In den Pariser Jahren war Trotzki zudem ein eifriger Besucher der Bibliothèque Nationale. Er studierte dort vor allem militärische Zeitschriften und Bücher, wohl ohne zu ahnen, welche Bedeutung die dabei gesammelten Kenntnisse und Erkenntnisse einmal erlangen würden: Keine fünf Jahre später befehligte Leo Trotzki eine in zahlreichen Schlachten siegreiche Millionarmee ...

Im September 1916 schob die französische Regierung den unliebsamen Emigranten nach Spanien ab. Am 20. Dezember ging er mit Nathalie Sedowa und den beiden Söhnen Leon und Sergej in Barcelona an Bord eines spanischen Dampfers, der ihn nach New York bringen sollte. Als das Schiff die Straße von Gibraltar passierte, schrieb Trotzki an einen Freund: „Das ist das letzte Mal, daß ich der alten Kanaille Europa einen Blick zuwerfe.“

Als er in New York eintraf, wurde er von zahlreichen russischen Sozialisten, die hier Asyl gefunden hatten, begeistert begrüßt. Ahnten sie, daß sie einen der großen Führer der kommenden Revolution feierten? Zwei Monate später wehten in der russischen Hauptstadt Petrograd (St. Petersburg) auf vielen Adelspalästen rote Fahnen.

Trotzki fuhr in New York von Versammlung zu Versammlung und prophezeite den Sieg des Sozialismus, obwohl es in den ersten Wochen aussah, als ob das Bürgertum die Macht in der Hand behalten würde und der Zar nur deshalb zur Abdankung gezwungen worden war, um die Kriegsanstrengungen zu vergrößern. Aber Trotzki war sich seiner Sache sicher. Triumphierend erklärte er: „Die mächtige Lawine der Revolution ist in vollem Lauf, und keine menschliche Kraft wird sich ihr entgegenstemmen können!“ Wie Lenin verlangte auch er nicht in erster Linie den Sturz der alten Gesellschaftsordnung, sondern die Beendigung des Krieges.

Mit einem norwegischen Schiff verließ er am 27. März 1917 New York. Doch bei einer Zwischenlandung in Kanada holten ihn die Engländer von Bord. Unter dem Druck zahlreicher Proteste wurde er nach drei Wochen freigelassen und durfte seine Reise fortsetzen. Am 17. Mai, einen Monat später als Lenin, erreichte er Petrograd. Eine ungeheure Menschenmenge begrüßte ihn. Die Arbeiter hoben den Helden der Revolution von 1905 auf ihre Schultern und trugen ihn im Triumph durch die Straßen.

Schon wenige Stunden nach seiner Ankunft eilte er in das Smolny-Institut, den Sitz des Petrograder Sowjets. Obwohl man ihn nur als Mitglied mit beratender Stimme aufnahm, war Trotzki zufrieden. Kein anderer hatte eine derartige Redegewalt wie er, und nicht sein Ja- oder Neinzettel würde entscheidend sein, sondern das, was er zu sagen hatte. Die Rechnung ging auf. Schon nach kurzer Zeit war er der Wortführer der Revolution. Besonders die Matrosen auf den Kriegsschiffen und im Marinestützpunkt Kronstadt hielten fest zu ihm, ein Erfolg, der am 7. November 1917 die Entscheidung herbeiführen sollte.

Nachdem im Juli ein Versuch Lenins und seiner Anhänger, die Macht an sich zu reißen, fehlgeschlagen war, wurde auch Trotzki mit zahlreichen anderen verhaftet, aber bald wieder freigelassen. Ende September wählte der Petrograder Sowjet Leo Trotzki, nunmehr offizielles Mitglied der Bolschewiki, zu seinem Präsidenten. Die wirtschaftliche Krise hatte inzwischen ungeahnte Ausmaße erreicht. Die Versorgung der Städte mit

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Lebensmitteln war völlig zusammengebrochen, teilweise wegen der katastrophalen Transportverhältnisse, teilweise wegen der Zustände auf dem Lande.

Da die Regierung nicht bereit gewesen war, eine Bodenreform einzuleiten, oder auch nur zu versprechen, hatten die landlosen Bauern zur Selbsthilfe gegriffen. Die Folge dieser Eigenmächtigkeiten konnte nur ein Absinken der Produktionsziffern sein. Die Städte litten naturgemäß am meisten darunter. Außerdem mangelte es an Arbeitskräften. Über fünf Millionen Bauern standen an den Fronten, dienten in den Kasernen oder vegetierten in den Gefangenenlagern Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns. Das war einer der Gründe, warum die Forderungen der Bolschewiki nach einem sofortigen Friedensschluß auch in den Dörfern große Zustimmung hervorrief.

Parallel mit dieser Agitation unter den Arbeitern und Bauern liefen die Vorbereitungen für eine neue Erhebung der Bolschewiki. Trotzki ging dabei von der Überlegung aus, daß die klassischen Formen bisheriger Revolutionen überholt seien. Bastillensturm, Barrikadenkämpfe, emotionale Massenerhebungen waren sinnlos geworden. Der moderne Staat mußte durch einen organisierten Staatsstreich erobert werden. Bei der Entwicklung dieser neuen Revolutionsstrategie kamen Trotzki erstmals jene Erkenntnisse praktisch zunutze, die er bei seinen militärwissenschaftlichen Studien in Paris gewonnen hatte.

Er traf seine Anordnungen fast generalstabsmäßig. Mit propagandistischen Mitteln wurde die Stellung sturmreif gemacht, so daß nach genügender Vorbereitung kleinere, gut ausgerüstete Stoßtrupps die Nervenzentren des Staates lahmlegen konnten. Eroberte man zunächst die Ministerien, Elektrizitätswerke und Telefonämter, so war jede Gegenwehr von vornherein zum Mißerfolg verurteilt und der eigene Sieg gesichert.

Als die deutsche Heeresleitung wieder zur Offensive überging, war eine Zeitlang auch Petrograd bedroht. Die Regierung gab Marschbefehle an die Truppen heraus, und schickte sich an, nach Moskau überzusiedeln. Trotzki schlug im Sowjet Alarm. Die von ihm aufgeputschten Soldaten weigerten sich, Petrograd zu verlassen. Ein militärisches Revolutionskomitee verteilte 5000 Gewehre an die Arbeiter, angeblich nur zur „Verteidigung der Hauptstadt“. Als jedoch die deutschen Truppen ihren Vormarsch gegen Petrograd einstellten, hieß es, diese Waffen dienten „zur Verteidigung der Errungenschaften der Revolution“. Aber

jedermann in Petrograd wußte, daß es die Bolschewiki nunmehr auf den Sturz der Regierung abgesehen hatten.

Der demokratische Ministerpräsident Kerenski war zur Abwehr entschlossen. Am 6. November verbot er die bolschewistische *Prawda*, die seit dem Juliputsch unter dem Titel *Rabotschij Putj* erschien. Daraufhin ließ Trotzki die Druckerei der bürgerlichen Zeitungen besetzen und gab eine neue Nummer der *Prawda* heraus, auf deren Vorderseite der berühmte Befehl Nr. 1 stand:

„Soldaten! Arbeiter! Bürger!

Die Volksfeinde sind in der Nacht zum Angriff übergegangen. Man plant einen verräterischen Anschlag gegen den Petrograder Sowjet der Arbeiter- und Soldatendelegierten ...

Alle Regiments-, Kompanie- und Mannschaftskomitees mit den Kommissaren des Sowjets und alle revolutionären Organisationen müssen in der Permanenz tagen und alle Nachrichten über die Pläne und Aktionen der Verschwörer in ihren Händen konzentrieren.

Kein Soldat darf ohne Genehmigung des Komitees seine Einheit verlassen.

... Die Sache des Volkes ist in festen Händen. Die Verschwörer werden vernichtet ...

Keine Schwankungen, keine Zweifel! Festigkeit, Standhaftigkeit, Ausdauer und Entschlossenheit sind vonnöten. Es lebe die Revolution.“

Das war das Signal zur allgemeinen Aktion. In der Nacht zum 7. November (dem 25. Oktober nach dem alten russischen Kalender) wurde der Staatsstreich nach den von Trotzki ausgearbeiteten Plänen ausgeführt. Zu allem entschlossene Stoßtrupps besetzten die Bahnhöfe, die Elektrizitätswerke, die militärischen Proviantlager, die Wasserreservoirs, die Brücken von den Vorstädten zum Stadttinnern, die Telefonzentrale, die Staatsbank und zahlreiche andere Gebäude. Gegen zehn Uhr morgens wurden auch alle Zugänge zum Winterpalais abgeriegelt. Die Minister waren von der Umwelt abgeschnitten, und damit hatte die bolschewistische Revolution faktisch gesiegt.

Ministerpräsident Kerenski hatte die Hauptstadt am Morgen des 7. Novembers mit einem Auto der amerikanischen Botschaft verlassen, um Hilfe von außen herbeizuholen. Seine Minister warteten im Winterpalais auf seine Rückkehr. Am Mittag trieben revolutionäre Soldaten mit dem blanken Bajonett die Abgeordneten des „Provisorischen Rates der Russischen Republik“ auseinander. Anderthalb Stunden später eröffnete Trotzki eine Sitzung des Petrograder Sowjets und erklärte im Namen des „Militärischen Revolutionskomitees“, die provisorische Regierung bestehe nicht mehr.

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Unter dem brausenden Jubel der Delegierten fügte er hinzu: „Einige Minister befinden sich in Haft. Die anderen werden in den nächsten Tagen oder Stunden verhaftet werden. Die revolutionäre Garnison, die zur Verfügung des militärischen Revolutionskomitees steht, hat die Versammlung des Vorparlaments aufgelöst. Man hat uns gesagt, daß der Aufstand der Garnison in Strömen von Blut ersäuft werden würde. Uns ist auch nicht ein einziges Opfer bekannt. Ich kenne in der Geschichte kein anderes Beispiel einer Revolution . . ., die so unblutig verlaufen wäre.“

Das traf in der Tat zu. Noch nie hatte es einen Umsturz gegeben, der kein Opfer gefordert hatte, und erstaunt stellte der russisch-französische Journalist Claude Anet fest, daß die zurückgebliebenen analphabetischen Russen eine Revolution ganz anders machten, als in den Geschichtsbüchern nachzulesen sei. Aber es ließ sich auch nicht bestreiten, daß die bolschewistische Macht ergreifung wie eine nach den Plänen eines Generalstabes gestartete Offensive abgelaufen war. Nirgends hatte man Schüsse gehört, nirgends sah man Insubordinationen revolutionärer Arbeiter und Soldaten. Die Straßen waren leer, es wurde nicht einmal geplündert.

Lenin, der am Abend vorher, noch immer verkleidet, aus seinem Versteck in den Sitz des Revolutionskomitees, den Smolny, gekommen war, kam diese Ruhe unheimlich vor. Auch er hatte noch die klassischen Bilder früherer Revolutionen vor Augen. Erst als er die Berichte hörte, die laufend von den einzelnen Stoßtrupps eingingen, erkannte er, daß der Umsturz geglückt war. Am Abend dieses ereignisreichen 7. November schlofen der geistige Führer dieser Revolution und Trotzki, der vor Erschöpfung ohnmächtig geworden war, auf dem Fußboden eines Zimmers neben der großen Halle des Smolny.

Noch war das Winterpalais, Sitz der Regierung, nicht genommen. Jetzt bewährte sich Trotzki's Freundschaft mit den Matrosen. Der Kreuzer „Aurora“ dampfte von Kronstadt gegen Petrograd und eröffnete das Feuer. Doch es wurde nur mit blinder Munition geschossen. Das Winterpalais fiel nicht durch die Angriffe der Matrosen, es wurde regelrecht erstürmt. Die Metropole eines großen Reiches mit 150 Millionen Einwohnern, in dem fünf Millionen Soldaten und Polizisten unter Waffen standen, hatte vor zehn-, vielleicht auch fünfzehntausend zum großen Teil analphabetischen Bauern und Arbeitern, die von einem Mann geführt wurden, der noch nie Gelegenheit gehabt

hatte, seine militärischen Fähigkeiten unter Beweis zu stellen, kampfflos kapituliert.

Der neuen Regierung der Volkskommissare präsiidierte Lenin. Außenminister war Trotzki. Doch schon nach drei Tagen mußte er „an die Front“ vor den Toren Petrograds gehen: Dem gestürzten Kerenski war es gelungen, einige Kosakenregimenter für sich zu gewinnen. Aber bevor es zum Kampf kam, hatte Trotzki sie schon mit der Macht seiner Rede besiegt. Nach kurzem Geplänkel ergaben sie sich. Gleichzeitig mit dieser Siegesmeldung lief die Nachricht in der Hauptstadt ein, daß sich Moskau und andere große Städte der Revolution angeschlossen hatten und auch auf dem Lande setzte sich die neue Regierung durch.

Die Friedensverhandlungen mit Deutschland und seinen Verbündeten Österreich-Ungarn, Bulgarien und der Türkei in Brest-Litowsk leitete Trotzki selber. Die kaiserlich-deutsche Regierung verspielte dabei eine große Chance. Statt mit den Bolschewiki einen Verständigungsfrieden zu schließen und damit ein Beispiel zu geben, setzte sie einen Diktatfrieden durch. Die Sowjetregierung nahm die recht harten Bedingungen schließlich an, um eine Atempause zu gewinnen. Trotzki wechselte im März 1918 vom Außenministerium in das neugebildete Kriegskommissariat hinüber. Er hatte nun die Aufgabe, verlässliche Rote Einheiten zu schaffen, um die überall im Land entstehenden weißgardistischen Armeen besser bekämpfen zu können.

Was noch an Truppen vorhanden war, gab zu Siegeshoffnungen keinen Anlaß. Die antimilitaristische Propaganda von einst hatte sich gegen die Bolschewiki gekehrt. Dabei drangen von allen Seiten Interventionsheere in Rußland ein. Die Japaner waren in Wladiwostok gelandet, und die tschechischen Kriegsgefangenen hatten in Sibirien eine eigene Legion gebildet, die sich jetzt gegen die Sowjets erhob. Auf ihrem Marsch gegen Westen fand sie kaum Widerstand. Dazu spürte man in Petrograd und Moskau zunehmend die Tätigkeit zaristischer Agenten, die sich von dem Schlag, der ihnen am 7. November versetzt worden war, mehr und mehr erholten.

Am 22. April 1918 legte Trotzki dem zentralen Exekutivkomitee der Sowjets einen Plan vor, nach dem auch ehemals zaristische Offiziere in die zu gründende Rote Armee eingestellt werden sollten. Gegen die Opposition ultralinker Kreise setzte er seinen Willen durch, obwohl er sich der Gefahr bewußt war, daß viele dieser Offiziere, die sich

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

zur Verfügung stellten, nur mit der Absicht kamen, den Bolschewiki in den Rücken zu fallen.

Als Anfang August in Moskau die Meldung einlief, daß die Tschechen Kasan eingenommen hätten, fuhr Trotzki mit dem Zug an die Front. Zweieinhalb Jahre hausten er und seine engsten Mitarbeiter fortan in diesem fahrenden Hauptquartier, das seine ureigenste Erfindung war und bald zur Legende wurde. Dieser gepanzerte Zug, den zwei Lokomotiven zogen, beförderte Autos, Geschütze samt Granaten, Handfeuerwaffen, Lebensmittel und Medikamente, eine Druckerei, eine Bibliothek, eine Telegraf- und eine Radiostation. Trotzki war immer dort zu finden, wo es gefährlich war.

Als er bei Kassin in den vordersten Linien erschien, wendete sich das Blatt. Die revolutionären Soldaten ließen sich von ihrem Führer mitreißen und traten zum Gegenangriff an. Sechs Wochen nachdem die Tschechen Kasan eingenommen hatten, eroberte die Rote Armee diese wichtige Stadt an der Wolga zurück. Lenin schickte ein Telegramm:

„Mit Begeisterung begrüße ich den herrlichen Sieg der Roten Armee. Er möge uns ein Wahrzeichen sein, daß sie jeden Widerstand der Ausbeuter vernichten und den Sieg des Weltsozialismus sichern wird.“

Dieser unerwartete Erfolg veränderte die Situation der Bolschewiki schlagartig. Die Tschechen und die in ihrem Schatten marschierenden zaristischen Einheiten begriffen, daß sie es nicht mehr mit ein paar rebellierenden Haufen zu tun hatten, sondern mit Einheiten, die nach strategischen Gesichtspunkten geführt wurden. Für die zaristischen Offiziere war das eine ungeheure Überraschung. Wer war dieser Trotzki, der es fertig brachte, eine geschlagene Armee, die sich panikartig zurückzog, mit neuem Angriffsgestis zu beseelen und zum Siege zu führen?

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Mittelmächte im November 1918 bildeten sich neue Fronten. Überdies war dem jeder Intrige abholden Trotzki innerhalb der eigenen Partei ein Gegner erwachsen, dessen Verschlagenheit anfangs niemand erkannte: Josef Stalin, Oberster politischer Kommissar der 10. Armee unter dem Befehl des ehemaligen Wachmeisters Woroschilow. Lenin berief Stalin auf Wunsch Trotzki nach Moskau zurück, eine Demütigung, die dieser niemals vergessen sollte. Die Verleumdungskampagne gegen den Gründer und Organisator der Roten Armee begann in diesen Tagen: Stalin beschuldigte den

Kriegskommissar, ein „Freund zaristischer Generale“ zu sein.

Als einige der eingestellten alten Offiziere als Verräter entlarvt wurden, holte Stalin zum ersten Male zum Schlage aus. Aber Trotzki wurde noch einmal gerettet, dank der Unvernunft der weißgardistischen Generale Koltschak, Denikin, Judenitsch und Krassnow, die jeder für sich und nicht koordiniert gegen Moskau marschierten. Das machte neue Feldzüge nötig, für die der Organisator der Roten Armee unentbehrlich war. Mit seinem Zug fuhr er von einer Front zur anderen, von der Wolga, wo Koltschak vernichtend geschlagen werden konnte, zur Südfront, um die Kämpfe gegen Denikin zu leiten, der ebenso besiegt wurde wie Judenitsch, der im Norden gegen Petrograd vorgerückt war. An seinem 40. Geburtstag, dem zweiten Jahrestag der bolschewistischen Machtergreifung, konnte Trotzki in Moskau den Sieg der Roten Armee melden.

Fünf Monate später, im März 1920, fielen die Polen gemeinsam mit dem erst im Vorjahre vertriebenen ukrainischen Diktator Petljura in Sowjetrußland ein. Sie eroberten Kiew. Dieser neue Krieg nahm schnell einen nationalistischen, sogar religiösen Charakter an. Polen war seit Jahrhunderten Rußlands „Erbfeind“, dazu waren die Bewohner dieses 1918 wiedererstandenen Staates römisch-katholisch, im Gegensatz zu den griechisch-orthodoxen Russen. Viele ehemalige zaristische Offiziere, die ihre Hilfe bisher verweigert hatten, stellten sich jetzt der Roten Armee zur Verfügung, um die „rechtmäßige Kirche“ gegen die „Römischen“ zu verteidigen.

Trotzki eilte wiederum an die Front. Er unterband, soweit es möglich war, die nationalistische wie antikatholische Hetze in der Armee. „Möge jedem Rotarmisten die Hand abgehauen werden, der sein Messer gegen einen Kriegsgefangenen, gegen Waffenlose, Kranke und Verwundete zückt“, schrieb er in einem Tagesbefehl. Seine Anwesenheit wirkte elektrisierend. Schon im Juni kam es zum Gegenangriff, und wenige Wochen später stand die auf eine halbe Million angewachsene Rote Armee vor Warschau. Der Fall der polnischen Hauptstadt schien nur noch eine Frage von Tagen zu sein.

Aber da ereignete sich das vieldiskutierte „Wunder an der Weichsel“, Gegenstück zu dem „Wunder an der Marne“ im September 1914, das den deutschen Vormarsch in Frankreich stoppte. Der von Trotzki eingesetzte Oberbefehlshaber der Roten Armee, General Tuchatschewski, hatte den im Süden unter dem Kommando von Budjonny

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operierenden roten Einheiten befohlen, den linken Flügel des Vorstoßes auf die polnische Hauptstadt abzusichern. Doch der politische Kommissar dieser Heeresgruppe, Josef Stalin, der dem mit 26 Jahren zum General beförderten Tuchatschewski die steile Karriere neidete, wollte eigene Lorbeeren pflücken. Statt sich mit den vor Warschau stehenden roten Einheiten zu vereinigen, veranlaßte er Budjonny, gegen Lemberg vorzustoßen. Seine Einheiten sollten dort zur gleichen Zeit einziehen wie Tuchatschewski in der polnischen Hauptstadt.

Der polnische Marschall Pilsudski, beraten von dem aus Frankreich herbeigeeilten General Weygand, stieß in die Lücke und rollte die auf Warschau vorstoßende Armee von der Flanke her auf. Damit ging das schon so gut wie besiegte Polen als Sieger aus dem Krieg hervor. Die Sowjetunion mußte einen Frieden schließen, dessen Bedingungen Warschau diktierte. Trotzki und Tuchatschewski beschuldigten in Wort und Schrift den Polit-Kommissar der 10. Armee, diese katastrophale Niederlage verursacht zu haben.

Aus jenem Fiasko erklärt sich eine ganze Reihe der späteren Handlungen Stalins. Er ließ nicht nur Tuchatschewski und Trotzki samt ihren Anhängern umbringen, sondern übertrug seinen Haß auch auf die polnische Nation. Mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit hat er im Jahre 1940 den Befehl zur Ermordung der 14 500 polnischen Offiziere gegeben, die in sowjetische Gefangenschaft geraten waren. Etwa 4200 Leichen fand man im Walde von Katyn: die Insassen des Lagers Kozielsk. Die Insassen des Lagers Starobielsk, nahezu 4000 Mann, wurden ebenfalls ermordet. Ihre Gräber konnten bis heute noch nicht entdeckt werden. Die 6567 Insassen des Lagers Ostaschkow wurden in Archangelsk auf zwei Barken verladen, die im Weißen Meer versenkt wurden — wie es hieß, bei Artillerie-Schießübungen.

Nach dem polnisch-russischen Krieg trat eine gewisse Beruhigung ein. Wohl kam es noch zu einzelnen Erhebungen zarentreuer Generäle, doch die Rote Armee blieb immer siegreich. Dieser für die Bolschewiki erfreulichen Bilanz standen die furchtbaren Opfer des fast vierjährigen Bürgerkrieges gegenüber. Nachdem die Machtergreifung der Sowjets im November 1917 nahezu unblutig verlaufen war, starben in den Kämpfen der folgenden Jahre über drei Millionen Menschen. Noch mehr Opfer, etwa fünf Millionen Menschen, forderte die Hungersnot in den Jahren 1921/22. Sie war eine Folge der durch Krieg, Revolution und

Bürgerkrieg verursachten wirtschaftlichen Zerrüttung sowie von Naturkatastrophen.

Am bittersten berührte Trotzki der Aufstand von Kronstadt. Die Matrosen der Seefestung revoltierten und verlangten eine Humanisierung der Verhältnisse. Ihre Forderungen waren: mehr persönliche Freiheit, also Verminderung der Diktatur, und Verbrüderung der Völker. Unter den Rebellen befanden sich viele seiner einstigen Anhänger, die 1917 mit der Beschießung des Winterpalais entscheidend zum Sieg der Bolschewiki beigetragen hatten. Aber die Partei befahl, ohne Rücksicht „durchzugreifen“. Am 3. April 1921 nahm Trotzki die Siegesparade ab, unfrohen Herzens: Von allen militärischen Unternehmungen, die er seit 1917 geleitet hatte, war die gegen Kronstadt die blutigste gewesen.

Ende 1923 erkrankte er ernstlich und mußte Heilung im Süden der Sowjetunion suchen. Kurz darauf, am 21. Januar 1924, starb Lenin. Der Generalsekretär der Partei, Josef Stalin, verstand es, den Gründer der Roten Armee von den Begräbnisfeierlichkeiten fernzuhalten: Er telegraphierte seinem in Tiflis weilenden Todfeind Trotzki einen falschen Termin. Später behauptete Trotzki, Stalin habe Angst gehabt:

„Er [Stalin] hätte befürchten müssen, daß ich ... die Ärzte nach der Möglichkeit einer Vergiftung befragen und eine besondere Obduktion verlangen würde.“

Den Zuschauern fiel zwar auf, daß unter den führenden Genossen, die den Sarg Lenins trugen, Leo Davidowitsch Trotzki fehlte, sie dachten sich aber wohl nichts dabei. Doch seit diesem Tag sollte der Frage, ob und in welcher Reihenfolge jemand an offiziellen Feierlichkeiten teilnahm, eine tiefe Bedeutung zukommen.

Stalin ging Schritt für Schritt vor. Systematisch besetzte er alle Ämter mit ihm ergebenen Genossen und isolierte damit Trotzki in der Partei und im Zentralkomitee. Dann wagte er es zuzuschlagen. Auf dem XV. Parteitag am 2. September 1927 brachte er eine Resolution ein, nach der alle, die irgendwelche oppositionellen Ansichten propagierten, aus der Partei ausgeschlossen werden sollten. Nur wer sich unterwerfen und Reuerklärungen unterschreiben würde, durfte in Zukunft auf Nachsicht rechnen.

Die Resolution wurde angenommen und damit war Trotzki's Schicksal besiegelt. Bereits aus dem Kreml ausquartiert, schloß ihn das Zentralkomitee nun auch aus der Partei aus, und am 16. Januar 1928 ordnete Stalin an, seinen ihm geistig so über-

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legenem Todfeind und dessen Anhänger getrennt nach Sibirien zu deportieren. Für Trotzki hatte er die 4000 Kilometer von Moskau entfernte kasachische Hauptstadt Alma Ata ausgesucht. Da Trotzki sich weigerte, dorthin zu fahren, schlepp-ten Geheimpolizisten ihn und seine Familie gewaltsam zum fahrplanmäßigen Zug nach Taschkent. An der Endstation wartete bereits ein Autobus auf die Verbannten, der sie nach Alma Ata brachte.

Seine Anhänger, die in einsame Dörfer Sibiriens verbannt worden waren, nahmen bald Verbindung untereinander auf. Doch Trotzki's Hoffnung, einen illegalen Apparat aufbauen zu können, erfüllte sich nicht. Er erkannte, daß die sowjetische GPU erheblich besser organisiert war als die alte Ochrana, die Geheimpolizei der Zaren.

Mit seiner Ankunft in Alma Ata hatte für Trotzki, seine Frau und seinen ältesten Sohn Leon Sedow ein Leidensweg begonnen, wie die Geschichte nur wenige kennt. Am 9. Juni 1928 erhielt er ein Telegramm, in dem ihm ein Freund den Tod seiner ältesten Tochter Nina mitteilte. Sie hätte vielleicht gerettet werden können, wenn ihre Krankheit sachgemäß behandelt worden wäre. Sogar Medikamente aus der Kreml-Apotheke hatte man ihr verweigert.

Ende des Jahres beantragte Stalin die Ausweisung Trotzki's aus dem Territorium der Sowjetunion. Die Mitglieder des Politbüros, von Stalin ausgesucht und gefördert, stimmten dafür — mit einer einzigen Ausnahme. Das Außenkommissariat erhielt den Auftrag, ein Land zu finden, das bereit war, dem Gründer der Roten Armee ein Einreisevisum zu erteilen. Bereits fünf Tage später eröffnete man Trotzki, daß er nach Konstantinopel ausgewiesen werde. Er weigerte sich, die Sowjetunion zu verlassen und verlangte, seinen Sohn Sergej und dessen Frau und Kinder zu sehen.

Zwangsweise transportierte man die Familie nach Odessa, wo sie am 10. Februar ein russisches Frachtschiff besteigen mußte. Doch Sergej und dessen Frau, die man in die Hafendstadt am Schwarzen Meer hatte reisen lassen, blieben freiwillig in der UdSSR. Es war ein Abschied fürs Leben. Zwei Tage später fuhr das Schiff in den Bosphorus ein. Dem türkischen Polizeioffizier, der an Bord kam, überreichte Trotzki eine Erklärung.

„An Kemal Pascha, Präsident der türkischen Republik. Sehr geehrter Herr, am Tor von Konstantinopel habe ich die Ehre, Sie davon in Kenntnis zu setzen, daß ich diese Grenze nur der Gewalt gehorchend überschreite. Ich bitte

Sie, Herr Präsident, meine dementsprechenden Gefühle entgegenzunehmen.“

Der russische Konsul, der ebenfalls an Bord gekommen war, übergab Trotzki 1500 Dollar, sozusagen als „Anfangskapital“ für die Gründung einer neuen Existenz. Außer seinem Archiv war das alles, was er besaß. Er mietete sich auf der Insel Prinkipo ein Haus. Materielle Not litt er nicht. Er schrieb Aufsätze und arbeitete an einer Biographie sowie an einer Geschichte der russischen Revolution. Alle diese Arbeiten wurden in zahlreiche Sprachen übersetzt und trugen ihm recht beachtliche Honorare ein, mit denen er sogar ein *Bulletin der Opposition* herausgeben konnte, das sich mit der Zeit selber trug.

Bald aber bekam er erneut den Haß Stalins zu spüren. Plötzlich brach ein Brand in seinem Haus aus. Er vernichtete einen Teil des Archivs, für dessen Erhaltung Trotzki mehr Sorge getragen hatte als für sein eigenes Leben. Nur mit knapper Not konnten er und seine Familie sich retten, und trotz der Gefahr trug er noch Akten aus dem brennenden Haus. Von diesem Augenblick an bemühte er sich, ein anderes Land zu finden, wo er sich sicherer fühlen konnte. Doch wo immer er um Asyl bat, wurde er abgewiesen. Schließlich erklärte sich Frankreich bereit, ihn aufzunehmen.

Vor der Abreise erhielt er die Nachricht, daß sich seine zweite Tochter Sinaide am 5. Januar 1933 in Berlin das Leben genommen hatte, und aus der Sowjetunion schrieb man ihm, daß seine beiden Schwiegersöhne deportiert worden seien. Sie gingen in Sibirien elend zugrunde. Auch ihre vier Kinder verschwanden. Stalin vergaß keinen aus der Sippe Trotzki's, sofern das betreffende Mitglied in seiner Gewalt war.

Im Sommer 1933 verließ Trotzki Prinkipo. Zwei Jahre lebte er unter wechselnden Namen in Frankreich, dann mußte er nach Norwegen, dessen sozialistische Regierung ihm eine Aufenthaltsgenehmigung erteilt hatte. Kurz vor der Umsiedlung im Jahre 1935 erfuhr er, daß man seinen jüngsten Sohn Sergej und dessen Frau, die in der Sowjetunion zurückgeblieben waren, verhaftet hatte. Er sollte niemals erfahren, wo sie und ihre Kinder den Tod fanden.

In Moskau waren nach der Ermordung des Petrograder Parteisekretärs Kirow am 1. Dezember 1934 zahlreiche alte Bolschewiki verhaftet worden, die Stalin der „Beihilfe“ beschuldigte. Als Auftraggeber der Mörder bezeichnete er Trotzki. In Wahrheit geschah dieses Verbrechen, wie Chruschtschow auf dem XX. Parteitag ent-

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hüllte, in Stalins Auftrag oder zumindest mit seiner Billigung. Die fadenscheinige Beschuldigung, Trotzki habe auch seine Ermordung geplant, war eine Erfindung, um die norwegische Regierung unter Druck setzen zu können. Justizminister Trygve Lie, später erster Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen, legte Trotzki nahe, jeder „aktuellen politischen Tätigkeit“ zu entsagen: „Ich bitte um Ihre Billigung, daß wir Ihre Aufenthaltsbedingungen einschränken, und ich bitte ferner um Ihr Einverständnis, daß Ihre abgehende und ankommende Post nur auf dem offiziellen Wege erledigt wird.“

„Wenn Sie die Absicht haben, mich zu verhaften“, erwiderte Trotzki, „können Sie nicht verlangen, daß ich Sie dazu auch noch autorisiere.“ Trygve Lie suchte nach einem Kompromiß: „Es gibt doch einen Zustand zwischen Verhaftung und völliger Freiheit.“ Trotzki ließ sich auf nichts ein: „Dann ziehe ich die Verhaftung vor.“ Er brauchte nicht lange zu warten. Bereits Ende September 1936 internierte man ihn in einem von 15 Polizisten streng bewachten Haus.

Diese Maßnahme erregte in der Weltöffentlichkeit großes Aufsehen, aber keiner der Kritiker war bereit, sich bei seiner Regierung dafür einzusetzen, Trotzki Asyl zu gewähren. Außerdem darf man als fast sicher annehmen, daß ihm diese Internierung zu dem damaligen Zeitpunkt das Leben rettete, denn gerade in jenen Jahren brachten Stalins Mörder zahlreiche Freunde Trotzkis um. Warum hätten sie vor ihm selber Halt machen sollen? Andererseits hatte die Isolierung eine tiefgreifende Auswirkung, die am allerwenigsten Trotzki bewußt wurde: Sie schnitt ihn von der Umwelt ab, und ein Politiker, der nicht mitten im Leben steht, wird zwangsläufig zum Sektierer.

Der Mann, der die klassische „Barrikaden-Revolution“ durch den generalstabsmäßig ausgeführten Staatsstreich ersetzte, neigte auf einmal zu erstaunlichen Fehlanalysen der internationalen Lage, wie auch der Lage in der Sowjetunion. Wer heute die von den Trotzkiisten in Paris in deutscher Sprache herausgegebene Zeitschrift *Unser Wort* — *Halbmonatszeitung der Internationalen Kommunisten Deutschlands* liest, in der auch sehr oft Artikel Trotzkis erschienen, muß sich wundern, wie sehr er und seine Epigonen die Verhältnisse verkannten.

Daß sich nicht nur die wirtschaftlichen und soziologischen Triebkräfte, die bisher zur Auslösung einer Revolution führten, grundlegend geändert hatten, sondern auch die Technik einer (erfolgreichen) Revolution, und das nicht zum

wenigsten durch Trotzki, sahen die Trotzkiisten nicht. Doch wie die „Kabinettskriege“ des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, die durchaus nicht nur „Klassenkämpfe“ waren, wie Marx behauptete, durch die totalen oder „Volks“-Kriege des 20. Jahrhunderts abgelöst worden waren, so hatte der Weltkrieg 1914/18 bewiesen, daß die Arbeiterschaft in fast allen Ländern — ob zu recht oder zu unrecht, ist für die Beurteilung völlig nebensächlich — glaubte, etwas verteidigen zu müssen: das Vaterland.

Wohlgemerkt: Die Arbeiter verteidigten 1914/18 ihr „kapitalistisches“ und nicht irgendein sozialistisches Vaterland. Inzwischen war der Acht-Stundentag Wirklichkeit geworden, und die allmähliche Integration der sozialistischen Parteien in den Staat nach dem Weltkrieg hatte die „vaterlandslosen Gesellen“ von einst, die „Proletarier“, zu Staatsbürgern gemacht. Von dieser Entwicklung und ihrer Auswirkung nahm Trotzki offensichtlich keine Kenntnis; er schrieb und dachte und analysierte die Lage wie vor 1914 in seinen Artikeln in den russischen Emigrantenzeiten — und mit ihm seine Epigonen.

Inzwischen hatte im Moskauer Gewerkschaftshaus der erste große „Schauprozess“ stattgefunden, dem noch sechs weitere „öffentliche Prozesse“ folgen sollten (und hunderte, von denen man kaum etwas hörte). Alle Beschuldigungen, die im Ausland nachgeprüft werden konnten, erwiesen sich als falsch. So wollte zum Beispiel ein Angeklagter Trotzki in einem Hotel getroffen haben, das 20 Jahre vorher abgebrannt war. Ein anderer behauptete, 1932 von der Gestapo — natürlich im Auftrage Trotzkis — nach Rußland geschickt worden zu sein. Aber die Gestapo gab es erst seit dem Sommer 1933. Den Vogel schoß ein Angeklagter namens Lifschütz im zweiten Prozess ab: Er bezichtigte sich, in nur fünf Jahren nicht weniger als 10 380 Eisenbahnanschläge organisiert zu haben, also täglich fünf.

Gegen die Beschuldigungen, hinter diesen Sabotageakten zu stehen, hätte sich jeder verteidigt. Von Trotzki aber verlangte die Regierung seines Asyllandes, diese wahnsinnigen Behauptungen schweigend hinzunehmen. Dazu war er natürlich nicht bereit. Doch er widersprach nicht nur, er richtete in seinen Erwidierungen auch scharfe Angriffe gegen die Sowjetunion und gegen Stalin, die alle in der klassischen Formulierung gipfelten:

„Von den zwölf Aposteln erwies sich nur Judas als Verräter. Aber wenn dieser die Macht erlangt hätte, würde er die anderen elf Apostel

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als Verräter hingestellt haben, und auch alle die geringeren Jünger, deren Zahl Lukas mit siebzig angibt.“

Diese Angriffe fanden zunehmend Gehör, und bald war die Weltöffentlichkeit überzeugt, daß von den in den sogenannten „Schädlingsprozessen“ vorgetragenen Anklagen kein einziges Wort stimmte. Für die norwegische Regierung waren diese Enthüllungen ein Grund mehr, Trotzki noch schärfer zu kontrollieren. Die unhaltbaren Zustände fanden erst ein Ende, als der Präsident von Mexiko, General Lazaro Cardenas, sich bereit erklärte, dem Gründer der Roten Armee, dem Stalin die sowjetische Staatsbürgerschaft abgesprochen hatte, Asyl zu gewähren. Ein norwegischer Tanker brachte Trotzki und seine Frau um die Jahreswende 1936/37 nach Tampico. Von dort fuhr er in einem Sonderzug der mexikanischen Regierung nach Mexico City, wo er zunächst bei dem Maler Diego Rivera Unterkunft fand.

Fünf Wochen nach seiner Ankunft erhielt Trotzki die Nachricht, daß sein ältester Sohn Leon Sedow, das letzte seiner vier Kinder, am 16. Februar 1937 in einer Pariser Klinik nach einer gut verlaufenen Blinddarmoperation unter geheimnisvollen Umständen plötzlich verstorben war. Tagelang schlossen er und Nathalie Sedowa sich in ihre Zimmer in dem gerade erst gemieteten Haus in Coyoacan ein und ließen niemanden vor. Als sich Trotzki seinen Mitarbeitern wieder zeigte, waren seine Augen gerötet und sein Bart verwildert. Er wußte jetzt, daß er nur noch „ein Toter auf Urlaub“ war, Stalin würde noch mehr als bisher bestrebt sein, ihn ermorden zu lassen.

Kurz danach meldeten ihm seine Freunde, daß sich schon seit Tagen unbekannte Personen in der Nähe des Hauses in Coyoacan herumtrieben. Aber auch seine Mitarbeiter und die Sekretäre wurden überwacht, wie sich bald herausstellen sollte. Wahrscheinlich hatte man in Moskau erfahren, daß der amerikanische Verlag Harper eine Biographie Stalins aus der Feder Trotzkis herauszubringen gedachte, und deren Erscheinen sollte unter allen Umständen verhindert werden.

Auf Anraten der Polizei ließ Trotzki das Haus zu einer Art Festung ausbauen. Die Eisengitter wurden durch eine dicke Betonmauer ersetzt, die nur einen Eingang hatte. Im Innern gab es noch eine zweite Mauer, die den Garten umschloß, von dem man in das Haus gelangte. Der erste Raum diente als Bibliothek und Sekretariat, hier hielten sich aber auch die Leibwächter auf, die jeden Besucher überprüften. Durch eine kugelsichere Türe erreichte man das große Eßzimmer, und erst

von da aus gelangte man in das Arbeitszimmer Trotzkis, das mit zahlreichen Bücherregalen, einem großen Arbeitstisch und einem Telefon ausgestattet war. In den Räumen nebenan wohnte er mit seiner Frau, während die Mitarbeiter in einem Nebengebäude untergebracht waren, das aber unbegreiflicherweise nur einen Ausgang hatte.

Trotz dieser Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gelangt es den gedungenen Mördern am 24. Mai 1940 kampflös in die Festung einzudringen. Daß Trotzki, seine Frau Nathalie Sedowa und der gerade aus Frankreich angekommene Enkel Esteban Wolkow den Überfall überleben, kommt einem Wunder gleich. Wer die Mörder ausgesandt hat, steht außer Zweifel, und Trotzki nimmt auch kein Blatt vor den Mund. In gleichlautenden Schreiben an den Generalstaatsanwalt und an den mexikanischen Außenminister stellt er unmißverständlich fest:

„... Während der letzten Jahre hat Stalin Hunderte meiner wirklichen oder vermeintlichen Freunde erschießen lassen. Sodann hat er meine gesamte Familie, mit Ausnahme von mir selbst, meiner Frau und eines Enkelsohnes, umbringen lassen. In der Schweiz ließ er Ignaz Reiß, einen der Chefs der GPU, durch seine Agenten ermorden, als er sich öffentlich zu meinen Ideen bekannte. Diese Tatsachen wurden einwandfrei durch die französische Polizei und die Schweizer Gerichtshöfe festgestellt. Dieselben Agenten, die Ignaz Reiß ermordeten, waren es auch, die meinen Sohn in Paris verfolgten. Ferner erbrachen am Abend des 7. November 1936 Agenten der GPU das wissenschaftliche Institut in Paris und raubten einen Teil meines Archivs. Auch wurden zwei meiner alten Sekretäre, Erwin Wolff und Rudolph Klement, durch GPU-Agenten ermordet; der erste in Spanien und der zweite in Paris. Und das eigentliche Ziel der ganzen Schauprozesse in Moskau in den Jahren 1936 und 1937 war, meine Auslieferung an die Sowjetunion zu erreichen und mich der GPU in die Hände zu spielen.

Die Liste dieser und ähnlicher Verbrechen könnte beliebig ergänzt werden. Alle zielten auf meine physische Vernichtung ab. Dahinter aber steht Stalin. Seine Waffe ist die sowjetische Geheimpolizei, die in jedem Land ihre Agenten unterhält — die GPU ...“

Im weiteren Verlauf dieses Schreibens spricht Trotzki auch den Verdacht aus, daß die deutsche Gestapo mit der sowjetischen Geheimpolizei, seit Juli 1934 nicht mehr GPU, sondern NKWD genannt, gemeinsame Sache machen könnte. Das

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ist durchaus nicht so unsinnig, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Im August 1939 hat Stalin mit Hitler einen Pakt geschlossen, aber es liegt auf der Hand, daß es darüber hinaus noch einen Geheimvertrag gegeben haben muß; die Entwicklung der Ereignisse und das Zusammenspiel bewiesen es. Sah dieser nicht veröffentlichte Vertrag auch die Zusammenarbeit der beiden Staatspolizeien vor? Bereits bei der Liquidierung von Marshall Tuchatschewski und rund einem Dutzend weiterer hoher sowjetischer Offiziere haben sich der deutsche Sicherheitsdienst und der NKWD die Bälle zugeworfen.

Als bald darauf die sowjetischen Behörden den Einzug der deutschen Wehrmacht in Paris mit dem Beflaggen der öffentlichen Gebäude Moskaus feiern lassen, werden Trotzki's Vermutungen noch glaubhafter.

Eines allerdings ahnt nicht einmal der mißtrauische Trotzki: daß sein Mörder bereits in dem so streng bewachten Haus an der Ecke Wiener und Morelos-Straße verkehrt und nur noch auf eine günstige Gelegenheit wartet, gedrängt von seinen Auftraggebern, die Tat zu vollbringen.

Oberster Chef der „Sonderabteilung Trotzki“ und damit Leiter der Mordversuche gegen den Gründer der Roten Armee ist Dr. Gregory Rabinowitsch, ein Deckname, hinter dem sich der NKWD-General Leonid Eitingon verbirgt. In Amerika tritt Rabinowitsch-Eitingon als „Repräsentant des Sowjetischen Roten Kreuzes“ auf, mit Sitz in New York. 1940 bewohnt er jedoch zeitweise eine Villa in der Nähe von Trotzki's Haus. Aber auch hier spielt er den vornehmen Diplomaten jüdischen Glaubens, der bei jeder Gelegenheit seine „rein humanitäre Mission“ betont.

In der Öffentlichkeit werden nur zwei Versuche bekannt, Trotzki zu ermorden, aber das beweist nicht, daß nicht noch andere Vorbereitungen laufen, denn zweifellos hat Rabinowitsch-Eitingon noch etliche andere Eisen im Feuer. Nach dem geglückten zweiten Anschlag kann er dann die noch in Bereitschaft stehenden Mordspezialisten, die es mit Sicherheit gibt, sofort zurückziehen, beziehungsweise auf andere im Kreml mißliebige Personen ansetzen, zum Beispiel gegen General Krivitzki, der 1939 absprang und recht peinliche Enthüllungen machte, die von der Weltpresse nachgedruckt wurden.

Krivitzki siedelte 1940 nach New York über, da er sich in Frankreich, zu dieser Zeit einem Dorado für NKWD-Agenten, nicht mehr sicher fühlte. Bald darauf findet man ihn tot in seinem Hotel-

zimmer, höchstwahrscheinlich ein Opfer der Agenten Eitingons. Aber die sowjetische Polizei bedient sich auch der deutschen Gestapo und der Spionageabwehrorganisationen anderer Länder. Einige Fälle sind verbürgt, daß Kommunisten ihre eigenen Genossen der Gestapo denunzierten, damit diese in ihren Konzentrationslagern für den NKWD das schmutzige Geschäft der Ermordung besorgte. Oder man steckt mißliebige Mitglieder der KP „Spezialmaterial“ zu, das dann die anonym benachrichtigte Polizei des jeweiligen Landes bei einer Haussuchung findet. Eine Verurteilung wegen Spionage ist dann sicher, und das betreffende Opfer verschwindet für einige Zeit in einem Zuchthaus.

Die Zahl der auf dieses Weise beseitigten oppositionellen Kommunisten geht in die Tausende, wenn nicht Zehntausende. Eine besonders perfide Möglichkeit, mißliebige Parteimitglieder umzubringen und mit ihrem Tod gegebenenfalls noch Propaganda zu machen, bot der spanische Bürgerkrieg 1936/39. Stalin ließ zahlreiche Kritiker seiner Politik als „Freiwillige“ nach Spanien locken, wo sie entweder den „Heldentod“ sterben durften oder im Hinterland als „Agenten Francos“ fusiliert wurden. Die Handlanger dieser schmutzigen Methoden waren jedoch nicht nur sowjetische NKWD-Männer; auch französische, deutsche und vor allem spanische Kommunisten stellten sich dafür bereitwillig zur Verfügung. Die bewährtesten dieser berufsmäßigen Mörder wurden nach dem Zusammenbruch der republikanischen Armee, teilweise auch schon früher, in die Sowjetunion geholt, wo sie in besonderen Schulen die letzten Feinheiten ihres Gewerbes lernten.

Wahrscheinlich befand sich unter diesen Ausgewählten auch ein spanischer Staatsbürger namens Ramon del Rio Mercader, der Sohn der spanischen NKWD-Agentin Caridad Mercader. Er wurde am 7. Februar 1914 in Barcelona geboren. Als seine Mutter 1925 ihren Mann del Rio verließ, nahm sie ihre Kinder, außer Ramon noch drei Söhne und eine Tochter, mit. Zuerst ging sie nach Toulouse, später nach Bordeaux und Paris. Wovon sie damals lebte, konnte nicht geklärt werden. Sicher ist nur, daß sie zu jener Zeit noch nicht im Dienste des NKWD stand. Wahrscheinlich trat sie erst in Frankreich der KPF bei. Für den NKWD dürfte sie von einem französischen Fliegeroffizier, mit dem sie intime Beziehungen unterhielt, angeworben worden sein.

Nach seiner Schulentlassung besuchte Ramon del Rio Mercader eine Hotelfachschule in Lyon, aber schon nach einem Jahr kehrte der Fünfzehn-

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jährige nach Barcelona zurück. Die ihm von der Mutter anezogene kommunistische Gesinnung hinderte ihn nicht daran, in vornehmen Hotels den „Kapitalisten“ zu dienen und sich deren Lebensgewohnheiten anzueignen. Später kam ihm das zugute, als er behauptete, der Sohn eines schwerreichen Belgiers zu sein. Sein tadelloses Benehmen wurde von allen als Beweis angesehen.

Von 1932 bis 1934 diente er in der spanischen Armee, und erst während dieser Jahre wurde er ein aktiver Kommunist. Zweifellos trug die Mutter erheblich dazu bei, die inzwischen — höchstwahrscheinlich im Auftrage des NKWD — nach Spanien zurückgekehrt war. Doch die politischen Verhältnisse dürften das entscheidende Engagement Ramon del Rio Mercaders bewirkt haben.

Nachdem in den Wahlen des Jahre 1931 die Linken gesiegt hatten, kam es zu Aufständen der durch die Latifundienwirtschaft verelendeten Landarbeiter. Bei den Neuwahlen 1933 siegten die Rechtsparteien unter Führung von Gil Robles von der katholischen „Accion Popular“. Die Reaktion feierte noch einmal Triumphe. Wer von der Linken nicht mit den Gefängnissen Bekanntschaft machen wollte, mußte sich tarnen. Der junge Ramon erhielt 1935 den Auftrag, in Barcelona einen Künstlerklub „Cervantes“ zu gründen, eine illegale Partei- und Propagandazelle der Kommunisten. Die Sache flog schnell auf, und Mercader mußte für einige Monate ins Gefängnis.

Was ihm bisher im politischen Kampf an Erfahrung und Härte gefehlt hatte, wurde ihm jetzt von den anderen politischen Gefangenen beigebracht. Nach den Wahlen 1936, die wieder einen Linksruck brachten, vorzeitig befreit, trat er der kommunistischen Miliz bei, fest entschlossen, es den Reaktionären „heimzuzahlen“. Im bald darauf ausbrechenden Bürgerkrieg wurde er zum Politischen Kommissar im Range eines Leutnants bei der 27. Division an der Aragon-Front ernannt. Angehörige dieser militärischen Einheit erinnerten sich später seiner Skrupellosigkeit. Er glich darin seiner Mutter, die als ein von fanatischem Haß gegenüber allen Gegnern Stalins erfülltes „Flintenweib“ geschildert wurde.

Ob sie ihren Sohn Ramon mit den höchsten Funktionen des NKWD in Spanien in Verbindung brachte, oder ob diese von sich aus auf den jungen Mann aufmerksam wurden, ist nicht bekannt. Sicher aber ist, daß er spätestens im Jahre 1937 zum engsten Mitarbeiterstab des NKWD gehörte. Er hatte damit seine „Aufgabe“ gefunden und führte das Leben eines Komintern-

agenten, dem unbeschränkte Geldmittel zur Verfügung standen.

Systematisch von seinen Vorgesetzten zu diesem „süßen politischen Leben“ erzogen, kam er nicht mehr davon los, denn dem NKWD zu dienen, bedeutete für ihn Wohlstand und Macht. Als NKWD-Mann konnte er ihm unbequeme Menschen verschwinden lassen. Ein Wink, eine anonyme Anzeige genügte.

Bald hielten ihn seine Befehlshaber für reif, eine große Aufgabe zu erfüllen — die größte, die der NKWD gegen Ende der dreißiger Jahre zu vergeben hatte. Zunächst schickte man ihn im Frühjahr 1938 nach Paris, mit dem Befehl, sich als Sohn eines millionenschweren belgischen Diplomaten auszugeben. Mit Geld brauchte er nicht zu geizen, und außer der üblichen Spitzeltätigkeit verlangte man von ihm nur eines: Er sollte mit einer gewissen Amerikanerin, die nicht gerade eine Schönheit und noch dazu einige Jahre älter war als er, intime Beziehungen aufnehmen und den feurigen Liebhaber spielen.

Diese Amerikanerin namens Sylvia Ageloff, eine überzeugte Trotzkinistin, war als praktische Psychologin im Amt für Schule und Erziehung der Stadt New York tätig gewesen. Ihre „Freundin“ Ruby Weil, die Sekretärin von Louis Budenz, des damaligen Chefredakteurs des kommunistischen Zentralorgans der USA *Daily Worker*, hatte sie nach Paris gelockt. Budenz, der später zum Katholizismus übertrat, hat in einem Bekenntnisbuch Mitteilungen gemacht, mit deren Hilfe sich das teuflische Spiel, dessen Inspirator zweifellos Rabinowitsch-Eitingon war, einwandfrei rekonstruieren ließ.

Ruby Weil vermittelte im Juni 1938 in Paris auch die, natürlich rein „zufällige“, Bekanntschaft Sylvias mit Ramon del Rio Mercader, der sich jetzt Jacques Mornard-Vandendreschd nannte und behauptete, der in Teheran geborene Sohn eines belgischen Diplomaten zu sein. Als Geburtsjahr gab er, um älter als Sylvia zu erscheinen, 1904 an. Tatsächlich existierte ein Jacques Mornard, der aber 1908 in Teheran zur Welt gekommen war und dessen Mutter den Mädchennamen Vandendriessche führte. Ob dieser echte Mornard von dem Doppelspiel Mercaders wußte, konnte bisher nicht geklärt werden.

Sylvia Ageloff verfiel dem neuen Bekannten mit den guten Manieren, der so überzeugend sagen konnte: „Ich liebe dich“, ganz wie es Rabinowitsch-Eitingon berechnet hatte. Die 27jährige Amerikanerin, bisher in Liebesdingen nicht gerade verwöhnt, vermochte jedenfalls nicht zu erkennen,

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wen sie vor sich hatte, obwohl ihr mit der Zeit manches hätte auffallen, manches sie zur Vorsicht hätte mahnen müssen.

Beispielsweise verschwand Mornard im Juli 1938 für einige Wochen aus Paris. In einem Brief aus Brüssel teilte er Sylvia mit, seine Mutter habe bei einem Autounfall schwere Verletzungen erlitten, während sein Vater mit dem Schrecken davongekommen sei. Als Sylvia ebenfalls nach Brüssel fuhr, war ihr Freund unter der angegebenen Adresse nicht aufzufinden. Zurückgekehrt nach Paris, erklärt er ihr, er habe plötzlich nach England verreisen müssen, während er wahrscheinlich nur Urlaub von ihr nehmen wollte oder sich mit Eitingon treffen mußte. Er versuchte auch, sie zu korrumpieren. Eines Tages erbot er sich, laufend Artikel von ihr an eine „Argus-Verlags-Gesellschaft“ zu verkaufen. Sylvia schrieb jede Woche einen Beitrag, der angeblich gedruckt wurde, aber nie erhielt sie Belegexemplare.

Doch die Liebe machte sogar diese überzeugte Trotzkin blind. Sie glaubte ihrem Freund, mit dem sie in einem eheähnlichen Verhältnis lebte und der so aufmerksam war, jedes Wort. Abend für Abend holte er sie mit seinem pompösen Auto ab, selbst als sie im September an der streng konspirativen Gründungsversammlung der IV. Internationale teilnahm, für die Trotzki den Aufruf geschrieben und die er seit 1934 vorbereitet hatte. Aber selbst wenn sie vorsichtiger gewesen wäre — der NKWD hätte auch ohne sie genau gewußt, was vorging. Einer der Vertrautesten des ermordeten Leon Sedow, nunmehr der Vertreter Trotzki in Paris, der sowjetische Emigrant polnisch-ukrainischer Abkunft Mark Sborowski, Student der Medizin, war ein Spitzel Moskaus.

Deshalb konnte Eitingon seinen Agenten Mornard anweisen, keinerlei Versuch zu machen, der Konferenz beizuwohnen oder durch Fragen etwas darüber in Erfahrung zu bringen. Nur Sylvia Ageloff, die ihm unrettbar verfallen war, nicht zum wenigsten gerade wegen des offensichtlichen Desinteresses ihres Freundes, durfte er abholen. Im Frühjahr 1939 ging Eitingon einen Schritt weiter. Mornard mußte seiner Verlobten eröffnen, daß ihm eine belgische Zeitung den Posten eines Korrespondenten in den USA angeboten hätte. Deshalb schlage er Sylvia vor, zurück nach New York zu gehen und dort auf ihn zu warten, denn er werde bald nachkommen. Doch erst im September, nach Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges, tauchte er bei ihr auf.

Zu ihrer Überraschung nannte er sich jetzt Frank Jacson. Auf ihre Frage, wieso er plötzlich

Besitzer eines kanadischen Passes sei, erklärte er, als belgischer Staatsbürger hätte man ihn nicht einreisen lassen, deshalb habe er sich für 3600 Dollar einen falschen Paß gekauft, um bei ihr sein zu können. Später stellte man an Hand der Nummer 31 377 fest, daß dieser Paß am 22. März 1937 dem Kanadier Tony Babich, geboren am 13. Juni 1905 in Lovinac in Jugoslawien und im Sommer 1937 im spanischen Bürgerkrieg gefallen, ausgehändigt worden war. Der NKWD, der alle Papiere der „Internationalen Brigade“ verwaltete, ließ diesen Paß fälschen. Dabei vergaß der zuständige Spezialist offenbar, bei dem Namen Jackson das „k“ einzufügen.

Im Oktober 1939 reiste „Jacson“ mit dem frisierten Paß nach Mexico City. Von dort schrieb er Sylvia, er fühle sich einsam und sehne sich nach ihrer Gesellschaft. Flugs nahm sie einen dreimonatigen Urlaub und folgte ihrem Verlobten, der damit seinem Ziel ein großes Stück näher kam, denn Sylvia besuchte natürlich auch ihre Schwester, die bei Trotzki als Sekretärin arbeitete. Voller Stolz stellte sie ihren Bräutigam vor, der auf die Schwester wegen seines vollendeten Benehmens großen Eindruck machte. Die Brücke zu dem Haus in Coyoacan war geschlagen, nunmehr hieß es nur noch Geduld zu haben.

Jacson hatte sie. Er überstürzte nichts, denn noch hatte er Trotzki selber nicht kennengelernt. Aber diese hervorragende, psychologisch bis ins letzte durchdachte Taktik des Mörders seinen eigenen Überlegungen zuzuschreiben wäre falsch. Die Pläne stammten mit Sicherheit von dem im Einfädeln solcher Intrigen viel erfahreneren Dr. Rabinowitsch alias General Eitingon. Er war es, der mit den Gefühlen der unglücklichen Sylvia Ageloff so raffiniert zu spielen verstand und der auch nach dem Attentat vom 24. Mai 1940 alle Schritte Jacsons lenkte.

Am 27. Februar 1940 änderte Trotzki sein Testament, als ahnte er, daß seine Tage gezählt waren. Die Passagen, die von seiner Frau Nathalie Sedowa sprechen, zeugen von großer Zartheit des Gefühls:

„Zu dem Glück, ein Kämpfer für den Sozialismus zu sein, gab mir das Schicksal das Glück, ihr Mann sein zu dürfen. In den nunmehr fast vierzig Jahren unseres gemeinsamen Lebensweges blieb sie eine unerschöpfliche Quelle der Liebe, der Großmut und Zärtlichkeit. Sie erduldet große Leiden ... Aber ich empfinde doch Erleichterung bei dem Gedanken, daß sie trotzdem Tage des Glücks genossen hat ...“

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

Da der Überfall vom 24. Mai 1940 auf das Haus an der Ecke Wiener und Morelos-Straße sein Ziel verfehlt hat, bringt Eitingon nunmehr seinen zweiten Bauern, Frank Jacson, ins Spiel, dem es inzwischen gelungen ist, ohne selbst darum ersucht zu haben, in die Festung eingelassen zu werden. Zwar hat er Sylvia Ageloff, die im März nach New York zurückfuhr, ehrenwörtlich versprochen, dieses Haus ohne sie nicht zu betreten, aber da das Ehepaar Rosmer, das den Enkel Esteban nach Coyoacan brachte, Jacson eines Tages um einige Gefälligkeiten bat, ergab sich dessen Besuch in Coyoacan von selbst.

Später nehmen die Rosmers, mit den Trotzki seit Jahrzehnten eng befreundet, Jacsons Angebot, sie mit seinem Auto zum Schiff zu bringen, mit dem sie Mexiko verlassen wollen, erfreut an. Vier Tage nach dem ersten Attentat, am 28. Mai 1940, fährt er vor dem Haus in Coyoacan vor. Da die Eheleute noch beim Frühstück sind, wird er aufgefordert, mit am Tisch Platz zu nehmen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit begegnet er Trotzki zum ersten Male. In einem Brief an Sylvia teilt Jacson seiner Verlobten mit, warum er sein Versprechen gebrochen habe. Diese Korrektheit wirkt sich natürlich positiv für ihn aus.

Nach seiner Rückkehr aus Veracruz drängt er sich klugerweise nicht danach, dem „großen Alten“ sofort wieder zu begegnen. Er macht sich rar, wie die Eintragungen im Wachbuch, das die Sekretäre mit minutiöser Genauigkeit führen, beweisen. Erst am 12. Juni taucht er wieder in Coyoacan auf, um mitzuteilen, daß er nach New York fahre und sein Auto inzwischen den Wachtposten zur freien Benutzung überlasse. Auch das spricht sehr für ihn, um so mehr als er sich von einem der Wächter zum Flugzeug begleiten läßt.

In New York erhält er die letzten Anweisungen, und bei der Systematik, mit der Leonid Eitingon vorgeht, darf man als sicher voraussetzen, daß auch verschiedene „Generalproben“ gemacht werden. Jacson ist sich der Gefährlichkeit des Unternehmens wohl bewußt, und schon deswegen müssen alle Möglichkeiten, die sich ergeben können, gründlich erörtert werden. Nach seiner Rückkehr schlägt er Trotzki vor, ihn bei einer Bergtour zu begleiten. Er empfiehlt sich als geübter und versierter Bergsteiger, doch da man nicht sofort darauf eingeht, kommt Jacson nicht mehr darauf zurück. Er ist zu vorsichtig, um etwas zu forcieren.

Auch die verschiedenen Waffen, die man später bei ihm findet, deuten darauf hin, daß alle möglichen Tötungsarten erwogen wurden. In seiner

rechten Manteltasche trägt er einen 35 cm langen und 3 cm breiten Dolch mit sich, als zweite Waffe eine mit acht Patronen geladene Pistole Kaliber 0,45. Das Tatwerkzeug, einen Eispickel, hat er aber weder in New York noch in Frankreich gekauft, wie er später behauptet, er entwendete ihn wahrscheinlich bereits im April dem Besitzer eines Touristenhotels, in dem er vor seiner New Yorker Reise einige Zeit wohnte.

Das Wachbuch notiert seinen längsten Besuch am 29. Juli 1940: von 14.40 Uhr bis 15.50 Uhr. An diesem Tage haben Trotzki und dessen Frau ihn und seine Verlobte, die ihren Jahresurlaub in Mexiko verbringt, zum Tee eingeladen. Am 8. August ist er wieder im Hause und bleibt etwas über eine Stunde. Die „Generalprobe“ für den Mord findet bei diesem elften Besuch statt. Er erklärt, einen Artikel geschrieben zu haben, um dessen Begutachtung er bitte. Während Trotzki liest, setzt sich Jacson auf einen Tisch hinter dessen Stuhl, ein Umstand, den der Gastgeber als unangenehm empfindet.

Hinterher sagt Trotzki seiner Frau, daß er diesen merkwürdigen jungen Mann nicht mehr zu sehen wünsche; außerdem sei ihm aufgefallen, daß Jacson die ganze Zeit über den Hut auf dem Kopf behielt und seinen Mantel fest an sich preßte. Das hatte, wie sich später herausstellte, seinen guten Gründe, denn schon an diesem Tage trug er den gestohlenen Eispickel und die anderen Waffen bei sich. Trotzki ahnte davon natürlich nichts, aber er hatte ein ungutes Gefühl, wie von einer drohenden Gefahr.

Vielleicht wollte Jacson bereits das Attentat an diesem Samstag ausführen, und es gebrach ihm nur an Mut. Gewisse Anzeichen lassen jedenfalls den Schluß zu, daß er sich, trotz aller Skrupellosigkeit, innerlich bis zuletzt dagegen wehrte, zum Mörder zu werden. So fällt in den letzten Tagen vor dem Anschlag nicht nur Sylvia Ageloff das Aussehen ihres Verlobten auf, auch Trotzki und dessen Frau wundern sich über sein fahriges Wesen, das gegenüber seiner früheren souveränen Ruhe sehr unvorteilhaft wirkt.

Der 20. August beginnt für Trotzki recht angenehm. Es herrscht strahlendes Wetter, und er fühlt sich wohler als vorher. Als er um sieben Uhr aufsteht, begrüßt er seine Frau mit den fatalistischen Worten: „Sie haben uns diese Nacht wieder nicht umgebracht. Und ich habe mich schon lange nicht so wohl gefühlt wie heute.“ Auch die Morgenpost ist erfreulich. Trotzki erhält die Nachricht, sein Archiv sei in der Harvard-

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Universität angekommen, ohne daß irgendwelche Geheimdienste versucht hätten, sich einzuschalten. Nachdem er seine Akten und sonstigen Unterlagen der Universität nur unter der Bedingung überlassen hatte, daß ein Teil des Archivs bis zum Jahre 1980 unzugänglich bleiben solle, war ein Gewaltakt zu erwarten gewesen.

Den Vormittag über spricht er einen Artikel in das Diktaphon. Um 13 Uhr empfängt er seinen amerikanischen Anwalt, der ihm rät, gegen bestimmte Verleumdungen vorzugehen. Nach einer Ruhepause sitzt Trotzki wieder an seinem Schreibtisch. Kurz nach 17 Uhr geht er, wie jeden Tag, zu den Ställen im Hof, um die Kaninchen und die Hühner zu füttern. Die Pflege der Tiere ist ihm willkommener Ersatz für die Spaziergänge und größeren Wanderungen in der Umgebung oder in die Berge, die er aus Sicherheitsgründen hat aufgeben müssen.

Als Nathalie Sedowa in den Garten hinunterblickt, sieht sie neben ihrem Mann den jungen Jacson stehen. Wiederum fällt ihr sein nervöses Benehmen auf. Er hat die Gesichtsfarbe eines Seekranken. Jacson grüßt sie betont zuvorkommend und ruft ihr zu: „Ich bin schrecklich durstig. Könnte ich wohl ein Glas Wasser haben?“ Sie bietet ihm Tee an, aber er antwortet: „Nein, ich habe zu spät gegessen und das Essen will nicht recht rutschen. Es würgt mich im Hals.“ Später entschuldigt er seine Freundin Sylvia, daß sie noch nicht da sei. Aber sie werde jeden Augenblick kommen, um sich zu verabschieden, fügt er hinzu, denn morgen würden beide nach New York abreisen.

In Wirklichkeit hat er sie listig ferngehalten. Sie wartet, wie verabredet, im Hotel auf ihn, und da er ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit unpünktlich ist, wird sie von Minute zu Minute unruhiger. Unklärliche Angst hat sie befallen. Sie telefoniert mit dem Hotel, in dem sie beide wohnen, doch dort weiß man nichts. Zur selben Zeit spricht Jacson bereits mit Trotzki und zeigt ihm einige maschinengeschriebene Blätter: den schon vor drei Tagen vorgelegten, jetzt umgearbeiteten Artikel. Forschend betrachtet der alte Mann den Besucher, und als er bemerkt, daß Jacson recht schlecht aussieht, sagt er mitfühlend: „Sie scheinen krank zu sein. Ihr Aussehen gefällt mir gar nicht. Sie müssen mehr auf Ihre Gesundheit achten!“

Langsam die Handschuhe abstreifend, die er beim Füttern der Haustiere zu tragen pflegt, geht Trotzki in sein Arbeitszimmer. Jacson folgt ihm. Zwei oder drei Minuten später, kurz vor 18 Uhr, hört Nathalie Sedowa einen furchtbaren Schrei.

Sie läuft nach draußen — ihr Mann liegt blutüberströmt an der Balkontür im Eßzimmer. „Jacson“, stöhnt Trotzki, und gleich darauf: „Natascha, ich habe dich so lieb.“ Während sie sich um ihren schwerverletzten Mann kümmert, dringen aus dem Arbeitszimmer Schreie. Die Wächter schlagen mit Pistolengriffen auf den Attentäter ein. Er versucht sich zu wehren und wimmert: „Sie haben mich in ihren Händen, sie haben meine Mutter eingesperrt ... Sylvia hat nichts damit zu tun ...“

Trotzki versteht, trotz der tödlichen Kopfwunde, was Jacson sagt und bittet einen der Leibwächter: „Nein, nein, man soll ihn nicht töten — er muß zum Sprechen gebracht werden!“ Die Wächter lassen von dem Attentäter ab, der sich schon wieder in der Gewalt hat. Der Polizei, die wenige Minuten nach 18 Uhr eintrifft, übergibt er einen Brief; Personalpapiere und sonstige Hinweise auf seine Identität besitzt er nicht, er will sie vorher vernichtet haben. Der Brief, in französischer Sprache abgefaßt, ist wahrscheinlich schon vor Tagen mit der Maschine geschrieben worden; das Datum wurde mit Bleistift eingetragen, ebenso die Unterschrift „Jac“.

Jacson erklärte darin zunächst, er gehöre einer alten belgischen Familie an und sei von einem Bekannten für die IV. Internationale angeworben und veranlaßt worden, nach Mexiko zu fahren. Er fährt fort:

„... Nach einigen Unterhaltungen sagte er [Trotzki] mir endlich klipp und klar, was man von mir wollte. In diesem Augenblick waren meine Illusionen verflogen, und ich fühlte größtes Mißtrauen dem Manne gegenüber, an den ich bis jetzt geglaubt hatte.

Ich sollte nach Rußland gehen und dort eine Reihe von Attentaten gegen verschiedene Personen und an erster Stelle gegen Stalin organisieren. Das widersprach jeglichen Prinzipien des Kampfes, der bis jetzt offen und ehrlich gewesen war, und zerstörte all' meinen Glauben. Trotzdem sagte ich nicht zu, denn ich wollte wissen, wieweit die niedrige Gesinnung und der Haß dieses Mannes gehen würden ...“

Das ist die Strategie des NKWD. Wahrscheinlich hat Eitingon diesen Brief geschrieben, als Jacson in New York war. Der General beging dabei aber den Fehler, die Überredungszeiten zu niedrig anzusetzen, vielleicht weil er falsch informiert war, vielleicht auch, weil er nicht wußte, daß über jeden Besucher genau Buch geführt wurde. Elfmal war Jacson in Cayoacan, insgesamt 4 Stunden und 27 Minuten. In dieser Zeit sprach er mit Trotzki unter vier Augen höchstens 15 Mi-

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nuten. So schnell wird man aber mit einem Menschen vertraut genug, um ihm derartige Angebote zu machen. Außerdem paßt alles zu gut in das von Moskau verbreitete Bild der „Schauprozesse“.

Bei der Vernehmung erklärt Jacson überdies, Trotzki habe im Dienste des „amerikanischen Imperialismus“ gestanden, sei also von der Regierung in Washington bezahlt worden. 1940 unterhält die Sowjetunion noch freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu Hitlerdeutschland. Im Prozeß aber, der erst drei Jahre später stattfindet, ist Trotzki kein „amerikanischer Agent“ mehr, sondern „ein faschistischer Bluthund“ im Solde der Gestapo, denn Hitler führt inzwischen gegen die Sowjetunion Krieg und Moskau hat sich mit den einst geschmähten „amerikanischen Plutokraten“ verbündet.

Über den Hergang der Tat gibt Jacson zu Protokoll:

„... Nach meinen Gesprächen mit Trotzki hegte ich einen unsagbaren Haß gegen ihn. Es wurde mir klar, daß ich einer von denjenigen war, die er für seine persönlichen Vorteile mißbraucht hatte, denn ohne jegliche Gewissensbisse zwang er seine Anhänger, sich für seine eigenen Interessen aufzuopfern. Deshalb beschloß ich, ihn zu töten, und erst Selbstmord zu begehen, wenn er nicht mehr weiterlebte.

Am Tage des Attentats kam ich gegen halb sieben in sein Haus. Harold öffnete mir die Tür. Im Hof traf ich verschiedene Sekretäre von Trotzki. Sie sagten etwas zu mir, was ich aber nicht verstand. Ich fragte Harold, ob Sylvia dort sei, denn sie hatte geäußert, daß sie ‚den Alten‘ aufsuchen wollte. Aber er verneinte. Ich sagte: ‚Dann wird sie wohl später noch kommen.‘ Ich fand Trotzki bei der Fütterung seiner Kaninchen ... Dann ... bat er mich in sein Arbeitszimmer. Dort nahm er meine Papiere und setzte sich in seinen Stuhl vor dem Schreibtisch. Ich stand links von ihm und er kehrte mir den Rücken zu. Er war keineswegs mißtrauisch.

Ich legte meinen Mantel, in dessen rechter Ecke der Dolch eingenäht war und in dessen linker Seite sich der Eispickel befand, auf irgendein Möbelstück — ich weiß nicht mehr worauf. Ich weiß nur, daß es an der Ostseite des Raumes hinter Trotzki war. Während er den Artikel las, nahm ich den Eispickel aus meinem Regenmantel, schloß die Augen und schlug ihm auf den Kopf. Ich schlug nur einmal zu. Er stieß einen gellenden Schrei aus, warf sich gleichzeitig auf mich und biß mich in die linke Hand. Sie können jetzt noch die Druckstellen sehen. Dann stolperte er zurück. Nach dem Schrei tauchte zuerst Harold auf, der mich mit der Pistole bearbeitete, dann Charles und

Hansen. Ich war schon durch die Tat betäubt und machte keinerlei Versuch zu fliehen. Ob sonst noch jemand das Zimmer betrat, weiß ich nicht mehr. Später kam die Polizei und brachte mich hierher ...“

Der belgische Konsul, der ihm gegenübergestellt wird, bezweifelt die Angaben Jacsons, daß er in Wirklichkeit Mornard-Vandendreschd heiße. Einen Diplomaten dieses Namens gibt es nicht, so wie es in Dixmuiden keine Militärakademie und in Brüssel kein Jesuitenkolleg gibt, die der Mörder besucht haben will. Aber Jacson-Mornard bleibt bei seiner Behauptung. Überprüft werden kann sie nicht, denn in dem von Deutschland besetzten Belgien sind Nachforschungen nicht möglich. Nur die diplomatischen Jahrbücher liegen vor. Erst nach Jahren kommt man auf die richtige Spur, als man, dank entsprechender Hinweise, die Fingerabdrücke Ramon del Rio Mercaders findet, der 1936 in Barcelona wegen kommunistischer Agitation zu einer Gefängnisstrafe verurteilt worden war. Ein Vergleich mit denen Jacson-Mornards beweist einwandfrei die Identität.

Auch seine in scheinbarer Todesangst herausgeschrieene Behauptung, man habe ihn erpreßt, weil man seine Mutter festgesetzt habe, erweist sich Jahre danach als frei erfunden. Zur Stunde des Attentats wartete sie, zusammen mit ihrem Freund Eitingon, 500 Meter entfernt von Trotzki's Haus auf ihren Sohn, in der Hoffnung, daß es ihm gelingen werde, nach dem Mord zu entkommen. Auch über die Vorbereitungen war sie genau informiert. Dem spanischen Parteigenossen Jesus Hernandez, während des Bürgerkrieges Justizminister (er sagte sich 1950 von den Kommunisten los), erzählte Caridad Mercader später, daß sie während ihrer Besuche in der Sowjetunion direkt mit Stalin und Berija über die Ermordung Trotzki's verhandelt habe.

Nach der Tat verleiht man ihr und ihrem Sohn den Leninorden, eine der höchsten sowjetischen Auszeichnungen. Während des Krieges nach Ufa evakuiert und dort im Prominentenhotel „Baschkirija“ untergebracht, wohnt sie von 1943 bis zu ihrer Ausreise im Jahre 1944 im Moskauer „Lux“, zusammen mit anderen Kominterngrößen. Mit falschen Pässen versehen, lebt sie vom Oktober 1944 bis November 1945 in Mexiko, wo sie Fühlung mit der Kommunistin Dr. Esther Chapa aufnimmt, die bis 1947 „Chef der Gefängnisdelegation zur Vorbeugung von Verbrechen“ ist. Ausgerechnet den Mörder Trotzki's ernannt sie zu ihrem Vertreter im Zuchthaus, in dem er

Harry Schulze-Wilde

seine Strafe absitzt, das heißt, Jacson kann sich innerhalb der Gebäude frei bewegen und hat kraft seines „Amtes“ großen Einfluß auf die Wärter und Gefangenen.

Ob Caridad Mercader bei ihrem zweiten Aufenthalt in Mexiko hoffte, noch einmal eine Fluchtmöglichkeit für ihren Sohn vorbereiten zu können, wie Eitingon von New York aus schon vor dem Prozeß im Jahre 1943, ist unbekannt, aber manches spricht dafür. Als man sich das erste Mal für seine Flucht einsetzte, machte Jacson-Mornard nicht mit. Er hatte dafür seine guten Gründe. Das Beispiel anderer NKWD-Agenten schreckte. Im Gefängnis war er zu Stalins Lebzeiten sicherer.

Schon wenige Minuten nach dem Attentat haben sich vor dem Hause Trotzki Hunderte von Menschen versammelt. Reporter sind gekommen, und mit der Polizei ist auch ein Krankenwagen eingetroffen. Doch die Sekretäre verweigern den Abtransport ihres Chefs, solange nicht der Polizeigeneral José Manuel Nuñez zugegen ist. Sie befürchten, weitere Mordschergen könnten den Transport überfallen und den Schwerverletzten töten. Noch hoffen sie auf Trotzki's Rettung. Erst nachdem Trotzki ins Krankenhaus gefahren worden ist, wird auch der von Sekretären halbtot geschlagene Attentäter abtransportiert. Der Zufall will es, daß man ihn in dem Zimmer neben dem seines Opfers unterbringt.

Zwei Stunden nach dem Anschlag liegt der schwerverletzte Trotzki, der inzwischen das Bewußtsein verloren hat, auf dem Operationstisch. Die Ärzte erkennen, daß sein Zustand hoffnungslos ist. Dennoch versuchen sie, ihn zu retten, aber es ist alles vergebens. Am 21. August 1940 um 19.25 Uhr, 25 Stunden und 35 Minuten nach dem Attentat, stirbt er.

Die Nachricht von seinem Tod verdrängt die Kriegsmeldungen von den ersten Seiten der Zeitungen. An seiner Leiche, im Großen Saal des Alcazar inmitten der mexikanischen Hauptstadt aufgebahrt, defilieren Hunderttausende in stummer Trauer vorüber. Beim Begräbnis folgt eine ungeheure Menschenmenge dem Kondukt, und bald singt man in den Straßen den „Grand Corrida“ über Leo Davidowitsch Trotzki. Dieses traurige Volkslied, dessen Dichter niemand kennt, ist innerhalb weniger Tage in aller Munde:

*„Trotzki ist tot — erschlagen
zwischen Morgen und Nacht.
Die ihn geliebt haben, klagen.
Der es befohlen hat, lacht.“*

*Gastfreundschaft und Frieden zu suchen
Nach Jahren voll Kämpfen und Not,
Kam Trotzki zu uns nach Coyoacan
Und fand bei uns seinen Tod.*

*Als Freund, dem man herzlich vertraut hat,
Schlich sich der Mörder ins Haus,
Das Trotzki bei uns sich gebaut hat,
Und zog seine Axt heraus.*

*Er erschlug seinen Wirt und Freund,
Der ihm nichts Böses getan!
Ganz Mexiko weint nun um ihn,
Und es trauert ganz Coyoacan.“*

Der Mörder, der sich von seinem Schock und den Schlägen schnell erholt, wird pausenlos verhört. Er weiß für alles eine Erklärung, und wenn er sich in Widersprüche verwickelt, schützt er Gedächtnisschwund vor. Nur einmal verliert er völlig seine Fassung: als man ihn seiner ebenfalls verhafteten Freundin Sylvia Ageloff gegenüberstellt.

Nachdem sie am 20. August bis gegen 19 Uhr in ihrem Hotel Montijo vergeblich auf ihren Freund gewartet hatte, rief sie in Coyoacan an und hörte, was geschehen war. Sie eilte sofort zum Tatort und stellte sich der Polizei zur Verfügung. Zwar glaubte man ihr, daß sie an dem Attentat nicht beteiligt gewesen sei, doch die Untersuchungsbehörden hielten es für richtiger, sie vorläufig festzunehmen.

Den Attentäter hatte man bei ihrer Festnahme schon abtransportiert. Als sie ihn jetzt vor sich sieht, schreit sie: „Bringt den Mörder weg! Tötet ihn! Er hat Trotzki ermordet! Schlagt ihn tot!“

Einer der Beamten wendet sich Sylvia zu und sagt: „Jacson behauptet, daß Sie sein einziger Lebenszweck seien und daß er Ihretwegen Trotzki getötet habe, da Sie das Opfer seiner Intrigen werden sollten.“

„Lauter Lügen!“ widerspricht Sylvia. „Er ist ein Heuchler, er ist ein Mörder! Tötet ihn!“

In ihrer Gegenwart wagt Jacson-Mornard nicht, seine Behauptungen zu wiederholen. Sylvia Ageloff widerlegt ihm vieles, und jeder, der dieser Gegenüberstellung beiwohnt, ist überzeugt, daß sie die Wahrheit sagt, wenn sie in höchster Erregung herausschreit: „Er ist ein Verräter in der Liebe, in der Freundschaft, in allem. Ich weiß jetzt, daß ich das Werkzeug dieses Schuftes gewesen bin.“ Sie spuckt ihn an, und als er hinausgeführt wird, ruft sie hinter ihm her: „Du Kanaille! Du Kanaille! Du Kanaille!“

Für die Kriminalisten und Anwälte bleiben trotz der Aussagen von Sylvia Ageloff ungezählte

Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger

Fragen offen, denn wegen der kriegsbedingten Verhältnisse lassen sich zahlreiche Behauptungen nicht nachprüfen, ein Umstand, den der Mörder und sein Inspirator Eitingon, der ihn so hervorragend präparierte, sicher einkalkuliert haben. So kann die Untersuchung nicht mit der gebotenen Gründlichkeit geführt werden.

Je länger die Untersuchung dauert, desto mehr spielt sich das Leben des Mörders im Gefängnis ein. Ihm stehen unbeschränkte Geldmittel zur Verfügung, er kann sich ein Grammophon, einen Radioapparat, Bücher, Zeitungen, Weine und sogar Damenbesuch leisten. Als der Prozeß 1943 stattfindet, hat — nach der siegreichen Schlacht von Stalingrad — die internationale Sympathie für Stalin einen nie für möglich gehaltenen Höhepunkt erreicht.

Wie durch Zufall bekannt wird, haben die Verteidiger „von unbekannter Seite“ 20 000 Dollar erhalten. Die Herkunft des Geldes läßt sich erraten. Am 16. April 1943 wird das Urteil verkündet: Ramon de Rio Mercader alias Jacques Mornard alias Frank Jacson wird zur Höchststrafe verurteilt, die das mexikanische Strafbuch für Mord kennt: 20 Jahre Zuchthaus. Im Urteil heißt es:

„Vom Beginn seiner Reise nach Mexiko bis zur Herstellung persönlicher Beziehungen zu Trotzki und auch danach ist Mornards Verhalten voller Unwahrhaftigkeit und Tücke. Das Gericht muß daraus schließen, daß Frank Jacson oder Jacques Mornard seine Reise nach Mexiko zu dem ausschließlichen Zweck der Ermordung Trotzkis unternahm ...“

Die amerikanischen Trotzkiisten baten die Regierung in Washington darum, die Leiche Leo Trotzkis in die Vereinigten Staaten überführen zu dürfen, aber die State Department verweigerte auch dem Toten ein Visum. Am 27. August 1940 wird der Leichnam eingäschert und die Urne mit der Asche im Garten des Hauses in Coyoacan bei-

gesetzt. Ein weißer rechteckiger Stein, über dem eine rote Fahne weht, bezeichnet die Stelle.

Daneben ist kurze Zeit vorher noch ein anderes Grab ausgehoben worden. Auf der Marmorplatte steht: „*In Memory of Robert Sheldon Harte, 1915—1940, murdered by Stalin.*“ Harte, nach dem Überfall am 24. Mai angeblich zwangsweise verschleppt, wurde in der Tat von Agenten Stalins ermordet, doch aus ganz anderen Gründen als Trotzki: Er war ein Spitzel, der mundtot gemacht werden mußte. Aber Trotzki glaubte unerschütterlich an die Treue seines Wächters und erwies dem Toten unverdiente Ehre.

Das Zimmer, in dem Trotzki tödlich verwundet wurde, beläßt man in dem Zustand. Seine Frau Nathalie Sedowa, die noch 20 Jahre in dem Haus leben wird, legt Wert darauf, daß man nichts verändert. Es ist einsam um sie geworden; nur ein Enkel blieb ihr — und die Erinnerung. Sie soll nicht verwischt werden. Jeden Morgen grüßt sie das Totenmal ihres Mannes. Auch die Marmorplatte sieht sie, aber sie glaubt ebenfalls, daß Harte kein Spitzel war. Die These der Polizei anzuerkennen, käme ihr wie Verrat an ihrem ermordeten Manne und den ermordeten Söhnen und Enkelkindern vor.

Als Nathalie Sedowa nach den Enthüllungen Chruschtschows auf dem XX. Parteitag die Sowjetregierung ersucht, nunmehr auch den Sieger der Revolution vom 7. November 1917, den späteren Gründer der Roten Armee, Leo Davidowitsch Trotzki, zu rehabilitieren, erhält sie keine Antwort. Zehn Jahre nach Stalins Tod öffnen sich für Mercader die Tore des Zuchthauses. Am Tor erwarten tschechische Kommunisten den Mörder. Sie bringen ihn zum Flugzeug nach Kuba. In der Tschechoslowakei verliert sich seine Spur, doch liegen Nachrichten vor, daß er in einem kleinen Dorf bei Prag lebt. Den Lenin-Orden hat man ihm allerdings wieder abgenommen, und er ist auch kein „Held der Sowjetunion“ mehr.

In defending their position, the Soviet delegate said:

"The hearts of 225 million Soviet people are beating in unison with the hearts of our Vietnamese friends, the speaker declared. We are doing everything to provide not merely moral and political, but material assistance to the Vietnamese people, to strengthen their defense capacity. No one must remain neutral in this just struggle against barefaced aggression. Our people are ready to further extend their assistance to the people of Vietnam and provide it on any scale that might be required."

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in English, 12 July 1965]