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13 September 1965

Briefly Noted



Power Sixth WFTU Congress
 Fight
 Brewing Soviet Communists will be put to a severe test at the Sixth WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) Congress, to be held in Warsaw from 8 to 22 October. Moscow-directed policy, present and future, will be seriously contested, especially on the grounds of WFTU failure to capture the interest of labor organizations in Europe and developing areas, notably in Africa and Latin America.

The Chicoms and their followers will remain openly opposed to the Soviet planned focus on "united action" or penetration of non-Communist labor movements. Rather than exclude them from the Congress, Moscow will more subtly use their (and others) failure to pay dues as the excuse for economy moves. Actually, the reduction of activities is designed to remove opposition to Soviet control and to cover the basic switch in the Soviet approach to the labor target. These economy measures include: personnel reductions at WFTU headquarters in Prague, closing of some information offices, discontinuation of publication of the WFTU organ, World Trade Union Movement, notably in Japan and Peking.

Rumania is stressing the role of the labor union in economic planning in a Socialist state and perhaps in response to this the WFTU has recently been invited to take some part (probably token) in CEMA affairs. But the Italians pose the biggest problem for continued Soviet control

because their reasons for cooperation with non-Communist labor differ markedly: the CGIL wants to concentrate on occupational matters; the Soviet on ideological and political. While the Soviets have led the WFTU into greater efforts to join non-communist organizations (ILO, UNESCO), and invite non-commies to occupational union meetings (e.g., several Trade Union Internationals), and have extended their interest in regional and national trade union activity in Europe and the developing areas, the WFTU is still stridently political [e.g., at the ILO Geneva meeting (2-24 June), the II Conference of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and People of Vietnam (Hanoi 2-7 July)]. There is no indication that the Communist faction (PCI) in the CGIL will bolt, but the Socialist (PSI) faction could well revolt against Soviet intransigence.

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"World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)," noting especially the concluding emphasis on exacerbation of dissensions within European Communist labor circles, East and West. We add these points: what the Italians say about Socialist countries as models for workers should be drawn to the attention of labor in developing areas, the implication being that there are other models; WFTU economy measures should be interpreted, in dissident Communist media, to mean that the Soviet funds

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for labor activity are now funneled into other channels, in effect aiding the "imperialists"; in non-Communist labor groups, this should come as a warning of possible Communist penetration attempts.

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Refuses to Cuban Ambassador
Represent Resigns
Castro's Cuba

Your attention is invited to the article from the London Times of 28 August 1965 (see Press Comment of 1 September) which carries lengthy extracts from the letter of resignation of Cuban Ambassador to London, Dr. Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez. In an eloquent plea he asks Cuban President Dorticos: "... why not build [in the words of the intellectual author of the Cuban Revolution, José Martí] 'a republic with all and for all, whose first law should be respect for the dignity of man'?" Watch for further material in Press Comment on this very important defector from Communist Cuba.

* * *

L.A. Apprehension OAS Reports on
Documented Communist Sub-
version

The United States Senate's Committee on the Judiciary has just published a reprint of various reports originally issued by the Organization of American States. There are five documents reproduced in the Senate study, four relating to the general pattern of Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere, and a fifth report dealing with the outbreak of revolt in the Dominican Republic and the OAS decision to intervene.

According to the study, the first report contained therein was widely circulated by the OAS in Spanish, Portuguese, and English, but the others received only limited distribution.

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A copy of the Senate document is available upon request. We think it will prove to be a useful source of facts and especially of quotations demonstrating the nature of the Communist menace to Latin America, the concern of the governments of the hemisphere, and their determination to cope with the problem.

* * *

USSR Lauds Does Moscow Really
Rumanians Mean It?

Moscow Radio broadcast to Rumania on 22 Aug 65 "the most cordial greetings on the occasion of your national day ... The Rumanian people are welcoming the 21st anniversary of the country's liberation with a great political and economic upsurge."

Rumania's longstanding resistance to the Moscow-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), which body sought to keep Rumania in the role of pastoral breadbasket (and producer of raw materials, notably oil) for the Communist Bloc, culminated in a 22 Apr 65 "declaration of independence" by the Rumanian CP Central Committee. This declaration rejected the suggestion that Moscow was the center of world communism and stated that USSR-Rumanian relations must be based on "national

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independence and sovereignty, equal rights, reciprocal gain, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity." Bucharest's anti-Sovietism was so vigorous at this stage that there was widespread fear of the Soviets being actually provoked to forcible intervention. Certainly Rumania led the way in reducing CEMA to impotence.

It is therefore possible to believe that Moscow's applause of Rumania's political and economic policies is less than wholehearted or sincere. Moscow's attempt to paint "Socialist Rumania's" progress as a triumph of "Leninist principles" also has a hollow ring. Rumania's progress has been in direct proportion to the degree of her escape from Soviet domination and her abandonment of orthodox Communist ideology.

* * *

Postponed II Afro-Asian Conference
or

Canceled? In its most recent effort to ensure high level attendance at the II Afro-Asian Conference (AAC) scheduled for 5 November in Algiers, the Algerian Government held consultations in Asian capitals, notably Peking, and then dispatched (in late August) seven new diplomatic teams into the Afro-Arab world. A major problem is Ghana's move to postpone the OAU Summit in Accra to 21 October, just before the AAC. Algerians feel that this would steal some of the thunder from the AAC and argue that the OAU should come after it. Even if a sizable proportion of Africans concur with the Algerians, Ghana is not likely to yield.

Those Africans who agree with Algeria may just be interested in avoiding the OAU meeting. The Entente states (former French colonies

of the OCAM group), for example, remain disinterested in the AAC while others -- including Arab states at this time -- seem inclined to favor only low level representation. No matter what Foreign Minister Bouteflika's teams urge, most Arabs will follow Nasser's example.

Although Soviet-Algerian relations are not overly warm (e.g., the Soviet press publicized the fire at the Club des Pins, where the AAC is supposed to be held, implying that the security situation there remains questionable; an official Algerian visit to Moscow has been indefinitely postponed), the Soviets will want to be present if the AAC convenes. It may be assumed that further efforts were made to induce Nasser to support Soviet participation during his recent visit to Moscow and Belgrade.

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PKI's Sukarno Sponsors Another
Front Chinese Communist Conference
Man

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) newspaper Harian Rakjat has announced that the Indonesian Peace Committee, one of the PKI's front organizations, will sponsor an "International Anti-Foreign Military Base Conference" in Djakarta October 10-15, 1965. The conference is being held under the patronage of President Sukarno who will deliver the opening address. It will reportedly be attended by representatives of Communist Front groups from more than 50 countries. The Indonesians and Chicoms have teamed up for several similar conferences in Djakarta over the past few years and they have developed smooth

techniques for controlling and manipulating the delegates to the conference. It is anticipated that one of the main objectives of this conference will be to denounce the U.S. role in Vietnam and the "British colonialist project," Malaysia. It may also serve as a dress rehearsal for the Afro-Asian "Bandung" conference scheduled for Algiers at the beginning of November. The conference will not discuss the fact that both Peking and Moscow, whose own vast territories are contiguous with that of multitudinous countries, have subversive bases in almost all countries of the world in the form of local Communist Parties and front groups, with their own guerrilla or paramilitary capabilities.

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
Communist Blueprint for World Aggression

Wolfgang Leonhard's Child of the Revolution is a detailed account of the manner in which the State apparatus of a Communist country trains exiled rebels of other lands in techniques, tactics and ideology against the day when they may be returned to lead "civil wars" against legitimate governments.

The graduates of these Stalin days still rule in many East European countries; and they together with the USSR, ComChina and Cuba carry on the tradition of training foreign rebels to subvert their homelands.

Shao-T'ang Liu's Out of Mao's China gives an autobiographical account of a more limited experience -- the year 1949-1950 in a military-propaganda office in Red China. It is again pertinent reading for current affairs.

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Significant Dates ▶

OCT.

- 3 20th anniversary, adoption of statute of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at founding congress, Paris, 3 Oct 1945. (Communist)
- 8 6th WFTU Congress, Warsaw, 8-22 Oct.
- 10 International Meeting for Opposing Foreign Military Bases (Kiapma), Djakarta, 10-15 October, sponsored by Chicom oriented Indonesia Peace Committee (Communist)
- 14 Russia signs treaty with Finland, recognizing Finnish independence and sovereignty. 1920.
- 17 22nd Congress of CPSU. Khrushchev and Chou En-lai clash on Stalinism and Albania. 17-31 Oct 1961.
- 19 Political upheaval in Poland defies Kremlin and places Gomulka at head of party and government. 1956.
- 20 Chicom troops begin advance into India, escalating border war. Withdrawal announced 21 November. 1962.
- 21 III Annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra, originally scheduled for early Sept.
- 21 UN condemns Chicom suppression of Tibet. 1959.
- 22 President Kennedy calls for OAS and UN Security Council meetings over offensive missile site build up in Cuba. Soviet's agree to withdraw missiles 28 Oct. 1962
- 23 UN General Assembly convenes first session (part two) at Lake Success, 1946.
- 23 Orderly student demonstration in Hungary becomes national anti-Soviet uprising when Soviet tanks fire. (See 1 Nov). 1956
- 26 Chinese Communist "volunteers" intervene against UN forces sweeping through North Korea. 1950
- 29 KOMSOMOL (Communist Union of Youth) established. 1918

NOV.



- 1 Hungarian Revolt 1-4 (see 23 Oct above). 1956
- 4 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established, 1946.
- 4 Greek Civil War ends with Communist acknowledgement of defeat. 1949
- 7 UN Emergency Force established, ending Suez Crisis. 1956

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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

Commentary

18-31 August 1965

Principal Developments:

1. Polemics are restrained. The Chinese publish Volume 8 of Khrushchev's Statements without editorial comment and publicize a long, harsh anti-CPSU editorial from Japanese CP organ Akahata. Soviet Kom-munist and Pravda articles repeat the call for unity and -- indirectly -- deplore Chinese conduct.

2. A series of top-level bilateral CP meetings are announced, mostly on the Soviet side. CPSU leaders in Moscow met the chiefs of the Italian, French, East German and West German parties, all announced as being in the Soviet Union on vacation: the Czech and Rumanian bosses are due in September on official party-state visits. All are said to have "exchanged opinions" on questions of mutual interest: only in the case of West German Reimann is there reference to "unanimity." In the opposing camp, two Japanese CP leaders and wives are feted in Peking.

3. Pro-Chinese factionalism advances in two West European parties. Nuova Unità, monthly organ of the Italian Communist dissidents, calls for the constitution of "a new Marxist-Leninist Party" and carries a statement by one of the PCI local sections resigning unanimously to "adhere to the new M-L Movement." And Swedish dissident leader Holmberg begins publishing a new organ, Marxist Forum.

4. Around the world, the Indonesian CP takes a new initiative in a message to the Burmese CP prodding it to "launch efforts to crush the modern revisionists," who, together with the imperialists, "are the principal enemy of the ICM."

5. A clandestine report says that a group of West European Communists met in Luxemburg 7 August in response to the Swiss CP initiative to discuss the founding of a new "Internationale Revolutionnaire" -- as had been forecast by earlier reports (see #59). Reportedly, they drafted and mailed to various Communist elements around the world a "manifesto" which denounces both the Soviet and Chinese Parties and calls for a renaissance of revolutionary theses on a national Communist basis. It includes a strong denunciation of the Belgian Jacques Grippa, who has been the most active and successful pro-Chinese Communist in Western Europe. Text not yet available here.

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(Commentary Cont.)

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Significance:

The pattern of international Communist activity during this period befitted the summer vacation time, the uncertain leadership in the Kremlin, possibly also Peking's preoccupation with Vietnam. A continuing lull in polemics, but considerable personal contacts by Party leaders. We note further evidence of the trend toward fragmentation, especially in Western Europe, where pro-Chinese elements have apparently made some advances and the Swiss CP initiative toward forming a new "third force" alignment between the Soviets and Chinese seems to have moved a first step forward. (The latter seems to be a small-scale move by a group of independent opportunists or malcontents which may not go far: nevertheless, it could add significantly to the confusion, ferment, and fragmentation already rampant in Communist and left socialist circles.)

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

18-31 August 1965

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June (delayed): Nuova Unità, monthly journal of the pro-Chinese dissident "Italian Marxist-Leninist Movement" carries an article by Alberto Bucco attacking PCI discussion of creating a new unified party of the left as a "plan for the liquidation of the Party" which demonstrates clearly that "the situation of the Party is grave and the relations with the masses very weak."

"At present, the modern reformists are seeking, not very skillfully, to mask their political failure and the liquidation of principles with the 'discovery' of the 'unified party.' As the prestidigitator, to enchant the public, draws a rabbit out of the hat, so the leadership of the PCI, in order to deceive the masses once more, draws from its worn revisionist hat the 'little rabbit' of the organic unity of all socialist forces. Rabbits, as is known, are prolific, and the leadership of the PCI is dreaming up millions and millions of revisionist rabbits which will meet in the great rabbitry of the 'unified party.' And thus the plan for the liquidation of principles will be decisively advanced....

.... This signifies that one is ready to join a fake unity with all and abandon openly the M-L conception of the state, the central Leninist idea to destroy the bourgeois state machine and create a new one, the Leninist theory of the conquest of power, and the conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the indispensable condition for the Leninist transformation of society. These principles are established points of thought and of revolutionary experience, and to modify and abandon them implies inevitably ... the transformation of the PCI into a social democratic rubbish heap....

It is necessary to constitute a new M-L Party...."

This issue also carries a statement signed by Secretary Dallaguda of the PCI Piacenza Section announcing that "we have decided unanimously to resign from the PCI and to adhere to the new M-L Movement," inasmuch as

"It has now become clear to all of us that the bureaucracy and leadership of the PCI, faithful to the bitter end to

(Chronology Cont.)

Khrushchevian policy, are sliding even farther down the slope of revisionism and opportunism...."

July 17 (delayed): Finnish CP daily Kansan Uutiset, which in recent months has carried an increasingly open discussion of Party policies, publishes a sharp challenge to the leadership by Toivo Ryhanen under the heading "Clarification Is Wanted."

"... If we as a party adopt peaceful transition as the main orientation, then that principle ought to be clearly recorded in the programs of the Party.... Of the matters on which a new and clear standpoint is needed, I list the following:

(1) The Number of Parties. ... the Finnish CP should state that ... there obviously will be several political parties in Finland and that freedom of opposition will be guaranteed.... A monopoly of a single party can readily lead to bureaucracy and intellectual lifelessness, and it impedes progress.

(2) Dictatorship of the Proletariat. ... The FCP should therefore make it known, even in its program, that we do not pose the establishing of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Finland as one of our goals.

(3) Vanguard Position of the Party. ... The responsibility of leadership in a peaceful transition to socialism does not rest alone with the CP; it is basically a form of operational unity between socialists and Communists

(4) The Content of Socialism. ... Is it to be a form of Stalinist rule by force, or democratic socialism? ...

(5) Party Internal Democracy.

(6) Reforms. ... the political struggle will be waged mainly in the sphere of reform policies. Its value must not be diminished through the expounding of false revolutionary premises....

July 23-29 (delayed): Swedish CP weekly Ny Dag article signed PF reveals that pro-Chinese Swedish Communist dissident leader Nils Holmerg is now publishing a newspaper (sic) entitled Marxist Forum which "is all through extremely hostile to the SKP, and naturally above all to its Chairman C. H. Hermansson."

August 18: TASS reports that Italian CP Gensecy Longo, "who is now spending his vacation in the USSR," held a "comradely exchange of views" with Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev in Moscow on the 17th "on questions of interest in both parties and on urgent international problems and the ICM."

August 19: The CPSU again urges unity and -- indirectly and in a low key -- deplores Chinese conduct in an editorial in Kommunist No. 12 and a Pravda article signed by I. Pomelov. The Kommunist editorial, entitled "Soviet Foreign Policy and Social Progress," acknowledges that "temporary differences ... may arise in the socialist community, which consists of countries with different historical conditions of development and different initial levels from which they started their socialist construction," saying that "the Soviet Union takes account of this in its policy" and "respects the sovereignty of the fraternal countries and the national dignity of the peoples." "The CC of our Party continues and will go on exerting persistent efforts to rally together the countries of the socialist community.... Our Party and people believe that in the present situation it is necessary not to bring the differences to a head artificially, but to do everything possible for joint actions...." Pomelov, whose article is pegged to the 30th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, quotes from its resolution to convey his message:

"... It is of prime importance to follow a principled M-L policy and flexible tactics, taking into account the concrete conditions, to wage a resolute struggle against right-wing opportunism, dogmatism, and sectarianism. To achieve a united front in reality, Communists must overcome complacent sectarianism in their own ranks, which at the present moment in a number of instances is no longer an infantile disease but an ingrained vice...."

A Yugoslav Kommunist commentary on Chinese policy toward the developing countries accuses the Chinese leaders of "trying to impose their influence and concepts" on these countries to serve China's "interests of great-power policy" and to "bring about its hegemonistic projects."

NCNA Djakarta reports on an 18 August Indonesian CP [PKI] release covering a press conference of PKI Chairman Aidit with "50 Afro-Asian and Latin American journalists" on the 16th. In reply to a question on polemics, Aidit is quoted as saying: "I think it would have been a pity if the polemics had been discontinued. From the open polemics the Communists of Indonesia have come to realize what modern revisionism actually is.... If the open polemics had not taken place, we might now have become revisionists without knowing it."

August 22: Inozemtsev in Pravda (according to a TASS summary) "rebuffs bourgeois propaganda which claims that capitalism and socialism are varieties of the same 'industrial civilization' and that the process of development tends to bring socialism and capitalism 'closer together'".

TASS announces that Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev met on 21 August with French CP GenSecy Rochet, "who is resting in the

Soviet Union." "In a friendly conversation, opinions were exchanged on questions of interest to both parties."

Radio Bucharest announces that Italian CP GenSecy Longo left for home after a two-day visit, during which he had a meeting in "a warm, comradely atmosphere" with Ceausescu, Maurer, and Niculescu-Mazil "on problems of interest to both parties."

August 24: East German ADN reports that SED First Secy Ulbricht, "who is in the Soviet Union on a vacation," met "in an atmosphere of cordial and fraternal harmony" with Brezhnev and Suslov. "Opinions were exchanged on questions concerning both parties."

Peking announces publication of Volume 8 of Statements by Khrushchev, containing 84 items "made public from January to April 1958."

August 26: Radio Bucharest announces that a Party-Government delegation headed by SecyGen Ceausescu will make "an official visit" to the USSR in September.

August 27: TASS announces that Brezhnev met with First Secy Reimann of the CP of (West) Germany, "who is now spending a vacation in the USSR," "marked by an atmosphere of friendly unanimity."

Pravda publishes a statement by the Brazilian CP reaffirming support of the decisions of the 19-party March meeting in Moscow, advocating an end to open polemics, and endorsing "another international meeting at an appropriate time."

UAR President Nasir arrives in Moscow on a state visit.

August 28: Prague Radio announces that a Novotny-led party-state delegation will visit the Soviet Union "at the beginning of September."

Djakarta ANTARA announces that PKI Chairman Aidit sent a cable of congratulations to the Burmese CP on the occasion of the latter's 26th anniversary. He "expressed hope that the BCP would be in a position to launch successful efforts to crush the modern revisionists," who, as he put it, "constitute the twin of the imperialists and are the principal enemy of the ICM."

August 28-29-30: Close ChiCom relations with the Japanese CP are reflected in: an NCNA Peking report on the 28th of a warm reception by GenSecy Teng Hsiao-ping, Politburo Member Peng Chen and other high CCP officials for JCP Presidium and Secretariat Member Hakamada, Secretariat Member Sunama and wives; and Peking's publication of a 14 August Akahata/Japanese CP daily article entitled "The Modern Revisionists' Theory of War and Peace and Its Judgement by History," with an NCNA summary on the 29th and the full text (half a page) in People's Daily on the 30th. As NCNA says, "the article exposes the moves made by the new leadership of the CPSU to remedy Khrushchev's absurd excesses, and its new maneuvers to carry on the policy of opportunism, splittism, and big-nation chauvinism."

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REFUGEES: A TOOL IN VIET CONG AGGRESSION

The Refugee Problem in South Vietnam

President Johnson has announced that he is sending Dr. Howard Rusk to South Vietnam to survey the needs and requirements of refugees with the purpose of developing plans to expand U.S. assistance to the South Vietnamese government in this area. Dr. Rusk, Director of New York University Medical Center's Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, performed a similar service for the United Nations in Korea when the Chicoms and North Koreans attacked South Korea and drove millions of people from their homes.

The refugee problem has plagued South Vietnam since its earliest days. In 1954 when the country was partitioned at the 17th Parallel with a Communist government to be installed in the North and a non-Communist government in the South, close to a million people fled their homes in the North rather than remain and face life under Communist rule. The South Vietnamese government undertook to resettle these people and assist them in building a new life for themselves. It was not an easy task, particularly since the South Vietnamese authorities were confronted with other complex problems at the same time. Steady progress was achieved, however, and by about 1960 the refugees from the North were mostly resettled and self-supporting.

No sooner had that refugee problem been settled than another one began to assume major proportions. As the Viet Cong stepped up their insurrection against the Vietnamese Government, they increased their use of terrorism, maiming and killing peasants and villagers, expropriating their rice and property, and threatening the people in diverse ways. Word of Viet Cong actions spreads through the rural areas and the peasants flee their homes in increasing numbers to seek refuge in areas controlled by the central government. It is estimated that there are over 400,000 such refugees at this time and that the number is increasing at the rate of 70,000 per month. If this rate continues some 840,000 refugees per year will have to be cared for. If Viet Cong terrorism continues to increase, the number will go even higher.

The South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare has been made responsible for administering the government program to provide for these refugees. They have allocated about 25 kilos [approx. 55 lbs] of rice

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per month to every refugee over two years old. After the food requirement, the Vietnamese government has made housing the number one priority and an extensive construction program has been started.

In addition to the daily needs of the refugees, a recent survey indicates that 35 schools must be built to take care of the refugee children and that a suitable teaching staff must be assembled; sanitation facilities in the refugee camps are inadequate and must be improved; water wells must be dug; orphanages must be built; and medical services must be provided. All of these tasks would be difficult enough under normal circumstances. They place a monumental burden on a government and people forced to defend themselves against Communist attack.

Recently completed studies indicate that over \$8.5 million has already been spent in providing for the refugees from the Viet Cong terrorism. The US government is currently allocating some \$12 million to provincial Vietnamese authorities for their use in this field. It is estimated that the current plans of the US and Vietnamese Governments to expand their efforts to meet the needs of the refugees will come to well over \$20 million. But the cost is not in money alone: scarce resources of trained leadership and material are being expended.

The Communist forces are not burdened by such considerations. On the contrary, they gain from the additional drain they place upon their adversary. In times of danger, people do not flee to, but f r o m Communist controlled areas for they have come to learn that the Communists have no tolerance for nor interest in their problems, nor are they willing to divert any of their funds or other resources to the comfort or rehabilitation of war refugees. (See unclassified attachments for statements by Leo Cherne and Donald Luce on the Vietnamese refugee problem. These statements were made to the US Senate Judiciary Committee, but need not necessarily be attributed as such because Cherne's and Luce's organizations have published the statements independently.

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THE KOMSOMOL -- THE SOVIET UNION'S MONOPOLY
ON YOUTH ACTIVITIES

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The Komsomol is not an organization created to help students in their various problems. It is an organization created by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the purpose of getting and keeping the Soviet youth within the Party's control. It accomplishes this by maintaining a monopoly control over the paths to advancement in every field; and it also accomplishes this by virtue of its power to punish those who get out of line. The Komsomol also fulfills a vital role in Soviet economics: it recruits youth corvées to develop the virgin lands and to build fertilizer factories and it provides the organizational capability to oversee their performance. A further important function of the Komsomol is its role in selecting, training and testing future cadres for the Party and the government. Finally, the Komsomol is in charge of all relationships of Soviet youth with foreigners. It controls the chief international Communist youth fronts, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the International Union of Students (IUS).50X1-HUM

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THE REPORTER
July 1, 1965

The New Communist Propaganda Strategy

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS
"THE POET Robert Lowell has refused to attend a gala at the White House," a front-page editorial in the Communist *l'Humanité* exulted recently. "... Six other Pulitzer Prize winners, painters, composers, critics, and twenty writers or artists have associated themselves with his gesture. . . . These twenty intellectuals not only do America honor; they are humanity's chances for peace. And we on our side do not begrudge them our admiration." This unusual testimonial to the non-Communist protest movement in the United States, signed by André Wurmser, one of the French Party's leading journalistic hatchet-men, was naturally balanced with attacks on the Johnson administration's foreign policy. Even so, a hasty reader might have been impressed by the apparent sincerity of Wurmser's disclaimer of any anti-American intent. Impressed, that is, until he turned to the third page, which featured reports on demonstrations or meetings organized throughout the country by the Communist-controlled Peace Movement. In Marseilles, the newspaper noted, a crowd of several hundred persons demonstrated on the Canebière against the arrival in port of a United States warship. Another street demonstration at Ivry in the Paris suburbs was punctuated, according to the paper, with cries of "Peace in Vietnam," "U.S. Assassins," "Out with the Ricains (Americans.)"

A Concerted Attack

Talking out of both sides of the mouth is not exactly a new accomplishment for *l'Humanité* or for Communist propaganda in general. In recent years, however, the hate-America line, the basic theme of Soviet psychological warfare during

the Korean war, has been so muffled under layers of Khrushchevian coexistence that a number of supposedly hard-minded western policymakers thought it had disappeared for good. Its recent vicious revival is a phenomenon that does not yet appear to have received adequate attention either from the United States's allies abroad or from campus critics of the Johnson administration at home or from the administration itself.

It is only within the last month or so that signs of a coherent offensive strategy have become apparent behind Communist propaganda and subversive tactics in Europe. There was, naturally, some ranting in the Communist press about the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch of marines to Santo Domingo; there were meetings and street demonstrations in various countries, including France. But to experienced students of Communist propaganda the campaign, if it could be called that, had an essentially defensive character: All the party really seemed concerned about was to show the European masses that its heart still bled for the victims of imperialism, despite Peking's insinuations to the contrary. Sophisticated European leftists were not taken in. "The Sino-Soviet split has paralyzed the international Communist movement," declared the weekly *Nouvel Observateur*. "... Its inability to react is creating a kind of vacuum in history."

Gradually Moscow's anti-U.S. line toughened. Borrowing a favorite tactic of certain Gaullist publications, the official Communist organs in France and elsewhere in Europe repudiated anti-Americanism while stuffing their columns with written or pictorial matter calculated to make the United States look odious and contemptible. The Soviet-con-

trolled rumor-mills and forgery plants in western Europe which had been idling in the last few years began to step up their output. One hitherto unheard-of literary agency has been calling up prospective clients in Paris to offer documents allegedly filched from official archives and said to prove that President Roosevelt's State Department helped finance the Franco revolution in 1936.

THE STRATEGIC GOAL of this new propaganda offensive emerged in an editorial signed by Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch, Maurice Thorez' widow, which appeared in *l'Humanité* on June 2. "By the admission of the American leaders themselves," the editorial declared, "their [foreign] military bases are not . . . intended to insure peace, to defend the countries in question against an eventual aggression, but to impose on them by violence governments subject to the United States. . . ." The recommended counter-strategy for French patriots was summed up in the article's title: U.S. Go Home.

The familiar slogan has some new trimmings that promise to give it—at least in France—a far greater potential for subverting the Atlantic Alliance than it has possessed in the past. For one thing, Mme. Thorez-Vermeersch's editorial, reflecting current Kremlin policy directives, was peppered with catchwords borrowed from Gaullist propaganda and seemingly addressed more to the nationalist than to the revolutionary sentiments of *l'Humanité's* readers. It appeared, moreover, precisely at the moment when Paris was buzzing with rumors that President de Gaulle would soon demand the withdrawal of American troops from French soil or that of SHAPE headquarters. The Communist intent apparently is at once to force de Gaulle's hand and to sow suspicion of him in the minds of his allies by creating the false impression that his nationalist policies are secretly inspired by Moscow. Anything that can be exploited by Communist propaganda to exacerbate French suspicion or disapproval

of the United States obviously helps increase the pressure for the elimination of American bases here, which in turn strengthens American doubts about Gaullist France as an ally.

NATO observers are convinced that the campaign is being directed from Moscow on a European, or even worldwide basis. Recent dispatches from a special correspondent of *l'Humanité* in the Soviet Union make this clear. Late last month a meeting took place in Geneva between Waldeck Rochet, Thorez' nominal successor as head of the French Communist party, and Luigi Longo, secretary of the Italian party, to coordinate the anti-American activities of their respective organizations. From June 1 to 3, delegations from eighteen Western European nations held an extraordinary conference in Brussels which among other actions called for the launching of "an immense effort" to promote the campaign. Significantly, the final resolution of the conference called special attention to those western European countries "most of whose governments are continuing to support in fact the aggressive policies of American imperialism."

Despite the allusion to the NATO governments that have refrained—unlike the French one—from criticizing U.S. policies in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, there is reason to believe that France has actually been selected by the Kremlin strategists as the most promising theatre in Europe for a major political breakthrough. The choice is understandable when one remembers that the Gaullist high command here is waging, for quite different reasons, a parallel anti-American campaign that inevitably reinforces the one directed from Moscow.

Moreover, the pro-Chinese, Castroist, and Yugoslav Communist factions all have significant bridgeheads in the French intellectual world, and however much they may insult one another, they still pitch in with a common accord to blacken the United States image whenever possible. And then there is the strongly entrenched French neutralist contingent which is always ready to examine a situation from any an-

gle, provided it is an anti-American angle. An editorial in *Le Monde* on the success of Gemini IV must have seemed to Communist and Gaullist anti-American specialists a masterpiece of its kind. Was there not, the editorial asked, "some kinship between the Big Stick which the U.S. is brandishing here and there and the brutal acceleration of the space program?"

Anxiety and Forecast

Viewed against this background, the danger of the Atlantic Alliance being gravely damaged by cultivated doubts of American leadership seems greater than Washington realizes, and the need for counter-measures of various kinds more urgent. The aid the enemies of America are getting from irresponsible, hysterical, and misinformed domestic criticism of the administration's foreign policy is illustrated by the editorial in *l'Humanité* that has been cited. But there can be no doubt that the administration itself has supplied the anti-American propagandists in Europe with some of their most effective ammunition. Any resolute opposition to Communist expansionism is, of course, bound to draw psychological fire from the enemy and arouse apprehension among the more faint-hearted of our allies. Brash declarations of what the London *Times* has called "American omnipotence" are not likely to improve matters. To be sure, the more sophisticated European observers realize that much of the tough talk out of Washington is often mere bureaucratic opportunism on the part of officials who used to profess just as loudly how much we loved the Russians and vice versa, but that does not make it any less unpleasant to their ears.

We likewise appear to suffer, at least in Europe, from a consistent inadequacy in the presentation of our policies. As a consequence, there is a good deal of doubt about both our motives and our capabilities. To thoughtful Europeans one of the most disturbing things about a number of our mistakes is the impression that they stem basically from the absence of any broad political

Communist threat. Since in their judgment the threat lies primarily in the field of political warfare rather than in the military or economic sector, they cannot help having misgivings about the quality of American leadership of the free world. These doubts are aggravated by what the Europeans consider to be our unimaginative counter-guerilla doctrine in Vietnam, by the administration's failure to impose more effective verbal discipline on U.S. officers and officials abroad, by the lack of any effective machinery for coordinating press statements in Washington and in the field, and by the apparent failure of the FBI and the CIA to keep up with the ever-growing sophistication of Communist political-warfare techniques.

Even without some of the errors of execution that have been committed, it is certain that our intervention in Santo Domingo would still have aroused the wide moral and political disapproval that both Communists and Gaullists have been vigorously exploiting against us. One encounters Europeans—even Frenchmen—who can find excuses for President Johnson's decision, or who honestly believe that it may turn out on balance to the advantage of the West, but this reporter at least has yet to meet one who believes that it was absolutely necessary or wholly justifiable. What especially disturbs the sincere friends of the United States about our Santo Domingo policy is the fear that it will tend to weaken our position in Vietnam, which is considered a more important and a more dangerous theatre in the struggle against Communist expansionism.

ONE of the most significant and constructive French comments

on U.S. policy comes from General André Beaufre, former deputy chief of staff at SHAPE, who has held important combat commands in Vietnam and Algeria. Writing early this month in *Le Figaro*, Beaufre did not condemn the American policy of increased military commitment in Vietnam or argue that victory is hopeless. He voiced some fear, however, that too much reliance on conventional military doctrines and too little imagination in seeking political solutions may lead us into a costly impasse. He depicted Chinese strategy as being primarily aimed at inflicting a political or psychological defeat on the United States in order to discredit Soviet leadership in the Communist world. The Soviets on their side, Beaufre believes, are waiting for Peking to over-reach itself and provoke the United States into direct attacks on China. There would be little risk of such a conflict escalating into a general nuclear war, in Beaufre's opinion, but it would not end the guerilla menace in Asia, and regardless of what material damage the United States inflicted on China it would be a disaster for the West. "The present world equilibrium would be profoundly upset," he concluded. "The system existing since 1945 with the United States and the USSR forming its two poles would probably give way to one opposing a nuclear U.S. to a virtually non-nuclear China, while the USSR would tend to become the leader of a third-force neutralist bloc englobing a large part of the 'third world' and of Europe. . . . I hope that our American friends in directing their effort toward the Far East will not lose sight of the possible consequences of their decision for Europe and for the world."

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Z. K. Brzezinski

Peaceful Engagement

A Plan For Europe's Future

THE COLD WAR in Europe has lost its old meaning. It had vitality and passion as long as either side had reason to believe that it could prevail and felt genuinely threatened by the other. Neither condition truly exists today. The West feels that it cannot remove the Communist régimes in East Europe, re-unify Germany, or, most important of all, eliminate the Soviet presence on the banks of the Elbe by direct political action. The Communists, and particularly the Soviet leaders, now privately discount the likelihood of Communist revolutions in the West. The two Soviet rebuffs suffered in Berlin—in 1948-49 and again in 1958-62—have had much the same effect on Communist expectations as the passivity of the West during the East German uprising of 1953 and during the Hungarian revolution of 1956 had on Western hopes.

Yet the *status quo* in Europe is far from satisfactory. The division of Europe on the Elbe

is unnatural, unhistorical, and contrary to present trends favouring not only European economic and then political unification, but also the rapidly spreading psychological sense of European unity. Hardly anyone in Europe, on either side of the river Elbe, is willing to argue that the division is in the interest of Europeans, and this includes even the Russians. It certainly is not in the interest of peace.

Yet policies derived from past illusions, fears, and aspirations freeze both sides on the dividing line. Meanwhile, the danger mounts that the East, frustrated ideologically, torn by internal divisions, will turn against itself, with the possibility of bitter political explosions. The West at the same time becomes increasingly divided. Its former unity of purpose, born largely out of fear of Russian aggression, is dissipated in a destructive feud over priorities, objectives, and interests. Western spasms of resolve reinforce Soviet insecurity while Western irresolution reawakens Soviet offensive hopes. Both postures serve to perpetuate artificially and pointlessly the European partition.

THE READER of the two comprehensive articles by Richard Lowenthal on "Has the Revolution a Future?" (ENCOUNTER, January and February) could scarcely help putting a question—in view of these radical changes in the present political situation what, then, can and must be done? With this new study of the tragic East-West partition, we offer for discussion a bold and dramatic plan for the future of Europe. Professor Brzezinski, a well-known member of Columbia University, has been travelling extensively in Eastern and Western Europe. His most recent books are *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Pall Mall, London), and *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Chatto & Windus and Viking); his article on "How to Control a Deviation" appeared in the September 1963 ENCOUNTER.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE is still wedded to the expectation that West Europe will fragment, and accordingly Soviet policy in Europe still makes the achievement of that fragmentation its principal objective. German policy, influenced by narrow national perspectives, remains committed to the pursuit of basically contradictory goals, "reunification" and (formally, at least) frontier revision, with the latter having the effect of stimulating Polish and Czech support for the division of Germany. The French envisage a "Europe to the Urals," but by seeking simultaneously to exclude America from Europe,

are fragmenting Western unity, re-awakening Soviet offensive hopes, and denying themselves the necessary Western wherewithal for the pursuit of this grand goal. The British seem to speak simultaneously in terms of the Anglo-American alliance and European disengagement. The United States, having abandoned "liberation," is tending to pursue "bridge-building" to the East almost as an end in itself, thereby confusing means with ends of policy. Thus no major power is effectively addressing itself to the problem of European partition.

How to bridge the gap dividing Europe without either side seeming to capitulate? How to achieve the restoration of Europe without creating new tensions in the process? These questions pose the central problem of the coming decade in Europe. With the internal pressures for change (accelerated by the Sino-Soviet dispute) surfacing in the Soviet Union and in East Europe, and with West Europe increasingly preoccupied with its identity, the division on the Elbe becomes more intolerable and the questions more urgent. To-day Europe is still, to borrow de Gaulle's striking phrase, "without soul, without backbone, and without roots." But more and more Europeans, both eastern and western, are coming to resent this condition.

Indeed, the time has passed when Germany could be satisfied with a purely declaratory Atlantic policy on the issue of German reunification. The present internal trends in Germany, as well as general change in the European relationship to America, point clearly to the re-emergence of "the German issue" as the key problem for Western policy, and the nature of the American response to it may determine the future American relationship to Europe. To be meaningful and effective, the response will have to be based on a broader evaluation of the European scene, particularly with regard to the changes in the eastern bloc. The problem of the German partition has become critically linked to the problem of the European partition, and neither can be resolved without the resolution of the other.

TO BE SURE, since that partition is the outcome of a historical process spanning two world wars, the European restoration accordingly cannot be accomplished by a single political settlement. Neither will it come about by American or Russian disengagement from Europe. America and Russia will not abandon Europe, for neither

could be certain that its departure will not mean the extension of the power of the other—no matter what formal guarantees were seemingly provided. Moreover, in spite of de Gaulle's oratory, Europe in the foreseeable future will not be powerful enough to end its own partition. This partition can only be ended if the American-Soviet confrontation in Europe is gradually transformed into co-operation. That requires both patience and imagination. And it does not exclude an occasional bold initiative, designed to make the gradual process take a qualitative step forward.

DE GAULLE once wrote that great leaders are remembered "for the sweep of their endeavours." This is true of great nations as well, for their leadership is measured not only by their power but also by the scope of their goals. Commitment to a grand goal by itself can generate the power of attraction and mobilise adherents. Leadership is a dynamic—not a static—condition, and it expands with the tasks undertaken.

To-day, the West faces a great and growing challenge: to take the initiative towards ending the partition of Europe. In present circumstances, merely to strive to tie Western Europe to America in order to defend it from Russia will only awaken European suspicions of "American hegemony," especially as the European fear of Russia wanes and the European sense of dependence on America declines. New security schemes (e.g., some form of MLF), even if otherwise desirable, will not solve the problem of the American-European relationship for the problem is now less one of European security than of the *purpose* of the relationship. There is widespread evidence of growing European feeling that America is becoming irrelevant to the future of a divided, safe, but somehow frustrated Europe. The fact that de Gaulle's appeals for a "European Europe," including a "Europe to the Urals," have been evoking an increasingly sympathetic reaction among a growing number of Europeans and the fact that German politics give every sign of mounting restlessness, are testimony to the proposition that a new era is dawning in Europe, that a new European mood is shaping. This new condition has special implications for America's relations to Europe.

By taking the initiative in developing policies designed to bring both Russia and East Europe into a closer relationship with the West, and

thereby to end the European partition, America would be furthering its own basic interests. First of all, the very fact of such commitment would do much to revive America's waning relevance to Europe. Secondly, it would provide a framework for restoring the East European nations to independence without simultaneously creating new instabilities or stimulating narrow nationalisms. Finally, by laying the foundations for a broader East-West settlement, it would eliminate the persisting European fears of an American-Soviet power duopoly. All that would be consistent with domestic American values and the American quest for world order.

IT IS SOMETIMES SAID that a Europe "free from America" would be in a better position to solve the problem of its partition. Such a Europe would seem less threatening to Russia and East Europe, and hence they would be more inclined to accept a closer relationship with it. But this view overlooks the probability that the process of achieving such an "independent" Europe, detached from America, would cause conflicts and instabilities which the Russians would be tempted to exploit. Secondly, and just as important, such a Europe would probably be dominated by Germany, and hence would be unlikely to offer an appealing magnet to the East Europeans and to the Russians. Because the U.S. has no claims beyond the Elbe, its continued association with Europe offers the best guarantee to the Russians and the East Europeans that the West poses no direct political threat to them.

As far as the West Europeans are concerned, American commitment to the goal of peaceful reunification of Europe is more likely to command European support than either past calls for "liberation" or present attempts to develop a more equitable control of nuclear weapons, not to mention efforts to involve Europe in the rather remote problems of Asian or African development. Such a broader design could displace the Gaullist appeal, or even preempt eventual Gaullist approaches to Russia. Moreover, it would mitigate the danger that the disintegration of Western unity would leave the American-German alliance as the sole bond between America and Europe.

A bilateral German-American relationship could only be defensive; it would have no appeal in East Europe and no constructive Eastern policy could be based on it alone. Such

a relationship could perhaps provide a shield for West Europe, but its effectiveness in this respect would paradoxically contribute to further divisions in the West. European dissensions would flourish in the protected haven provided by American-German power. There would be little room for America in such a Europe, and eventually even the German-American ties might crumble as their insufficiency in assuring German reunification became more evident.

Three Assumptions

THREE CARDINAL assumptions should guide U.S. and Atlantic policy in the pursuit of the goal of European restoration: First, *Western military strength must be maintained and Western interests vigorously protected*. This point may seem self-evident. But military strength is a prerequisite as much for policies of increasing co-operation and eventual reconciliation, as for those of pressure and hostility. Precisely because both the objectives and the means of the policy advocated here are *peaceful*, it is important that there be no uncertainty on the other side as to the West's determination to protect its interests. If the *status quo* is to be the starting-point for an eventual reconciliation, it follows that the West must remain vigilant in protecting it.

The Soviets have provided much evidence over the last two decades that they consider Berlin to be an exposed Western outpost, vulnerable to pressure. Occasional acts of Soviet pressure may, therefore, be expected. These ought to be resisted, for even a few hours' interruption of the lines of access to Berlin undermines the Western position. The final release of a Western convoy after a fifty-hour delay represents not a Western victory, but proof of the Soviet capacity to interrupt access. More vigorous responses than those heretofore applied are needed in the future. Since the United States has indicated that it will not invade Cuba, Cuba could perhaps serve as a useful hostage for Berlin. Soviet-engineered delays in the Allied right of access to Berlin should perhaps be immediately reciprocated by similar harassment of Soviet shipping on the international waters around Cuba. Exactly because that action would be arbitrary, it would drive home the lesson to the Soviet leadership that the West will not tolerate impairment of its present position.

The fundamental point is that no Western policy of conciliation is possible in a context which allows the other side opportunities for

effective military blackmail. The historical significance of the Cuban confrontation was its deflation of the confidence of Soviet leaders in their ability to extort concessions from the West by military threats. We must never allow them to think they can.

SECONDLY, *any basic change in the East-West European relationship will have to involve East Europe jointly with Russia.* A policy based on the assumption that individual East European states can be encouraged to defect to the West is not likely to succeed because in the final analysis the ruling Communist élites have no interest in becoming absorbed by the West, even though pushed in that direction by economic and popular pressures. The Soviet Union is likely to exert every effort to prevent open defections either from COMECON or from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Moreover, the experience of Yugoslavia and Poland suggests that the ruling Communist élites gravitate back towards a closer relationship with Moscow, once the more objectionable aspects of the relationship with the Soviet Union have been eliminated. Their defections were thus limited and revocable.

Indeed, defections of the East European countries individually, even if possible, might not be in the interest of peace. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain for a long time to come the two leading competitors for global power. Dramatic change either way—the defection of the East European states to the West or the fragmentation of West Europe and the expulsion of America—would directly threaten the present balance of power and set in motion dangerous reactions and counter-reactions. In addition, individual defections, especially if the result of encouragement from the West, would reduce the moderating influence of East Europe on Russia, and thus decelerate the ultimately crucial process of Russian evolution.

The more desirable sequence of change would begin with the internal liberalisation of the East European societies and lead towards their gradual evolution into a Greater Europe jointly with the Soviet Union. This obviously does not mean a synchronised evolution. East Europe, given its historical links with the West and in some cases more advanced internal conditions prior to Communist take-over, is likely to evolve more rapidly than Russia. This is especially true of Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser

extent of Hungary and Poland. While it would be unrealistic to expect these East European countries soon to become democratic societies, or leave the Communist orbit, their more rapid evolution may be more effective in bringing similar evolution of the Soviet Union, precisely because of their continuing links with it. In its turn, change in the Soviet Union may stimulate further changes in those East European states which (also for historical reasons) may lag behind even Russia. Thus East Europe, while not breaking away, may pull the Soviet Union forward while moving ahead of it, thus cumulatively preparing the ground for a better East-West relationship.

Not that we should actively discourage the occasional acts of nationalist self-assertion, as, for instance, in the case of Rumania. Bucharest's nationalist self-assertion automatically reduced the restrictive influence of the Soviet Union on East Europe. To the extent that Moscow was compelled to reconsider its own heavy-handed economic nationalism in dealings with the East European states, the development was all to the good. Its importance, however, should not be overrated. It is doubtful that a healthy Europe can be built by promoting anti-Soviet nationalist dictatorships. They could bring in their wake all the traditional territorial and ethnic conflicts, providing temptations for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. again to become involved. It would be short-sighted for the West to ride the tiger of nationalism in the hope that it will threaten only the Soviet dominated world; the tiger could endanger all of Europe.

THIRDLY, *the end of the division of Germany will come only as a consequence of a gradual but qualitative change in the relationship between both Russia and East Europe and the West.* In all likelihood, German reunification will be the last and not the first act in the evolutionary unification of the European continent. It will come about through a process of change, and it is not likely to be the outcome of some far-reaching diplomatic settlement around a green table. At long last, both German and American policies have come to recognise this reality. But this recognition carries with it additional implications for our perspective on such problems as the Berlin Wall and the issue of the eastern frontier.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the Wall has increased the long-range prospects for German reunification. As long as East Germany was

drained by massive defections of its population, the situation became increasingly unstable and the front-line confrontation on the German demarcation line was intensified. Since the Soviet Union was far from ready to resign itself to the dismantling of the East German régime, this merely forced a further assertion of the Soviet presence in East Germany and the reinforcement of Soviet domination throughout the adjacent regions. Moreover, the events of 1953 and 1956 show the improbability of Western intervention in support of a major rebellion in Eastern Germany. Accordingly, the tensions and the massive flights merely increased the hostility between the East and the West without in any way increasing the prospects that the dividing line could be erased.

The Berlin Wall, however, provides the West with a striking symbol of the basic artificiality of the East German régime but without the dangers inherent in the daily exposure and exacerbation of that artificiality. More important, the relative quiet on the German front-line permitted Western activity in East Europe designed to stimulate evolutionary changes; the East Europeans were more responsive because of the seeming security provided by the buffer East German state. The cumulative effect was clearly in the West's (including Germany's) long-range interest, despite the anguish and demoralisation it caused.

Moreover, the shifting of the central focus of the European problem from Germany to East Europe has created more favourable conditions for a more genuine enlistment of British and French support for the cause of European reunification. Although paying lip-service to the proposition that Germany should be reunified, neither could look forward with equanimity to the prospect of a reunified Germany 70 million strong, and by far the preponderant power in Europe. But though a mere shift of the European partition from the Elbe to the Oder River, with East Europe in the Russian sphere and West Europe dominated by Germany, was not very appealing to many non-German Western Europeans, a broader solution involving East Europe and Russia could mobilise the support even of those who are fearful of Germany, and make their commitment to German reunification more than a hollow ritual. This broader solution, however, requires a normalisation in Germany's relationship with East Europe, particularly on the critical issue of the German eastern frontier.

WESTERN POLICIES IN EUROPE thus should be based on three main premises: the maintenance of Western military power, the joint involvement of Eastern Europe and Russia in any ultimate solution, and the interdependence of German reunification with evolutionary change in the East. These premises are interdependent and the policy goals they imply should be pursued simultaneously. The West cannot solve the German problem without developing policies which transcend it to encompass the whole range of problems associated with the division of Europe. The five policy goals that follow are designed to meet that need.

The Problem of Eastern Germany

1. *To convince the East Europeans, particularly the Czechs and the Poles, that the existence of East Germany limits their freedom without enhancing their security.* Otherwise, the Czechs and the Poles will continue to support the Soviet presence in East Germany as a convenient and reassuring buffer against West Germany. To undermine the East European stake in East Germany, the West will have to differentiate sharply in its attitude towards East Germany and towards the rest of East Europe. For East Germany, the policy must be one of isolation; for East Europe, one of *peaceful engagement*—economic, cultural, and eventually political. Only then will East Germany become a political anachronism on the map of Europe, a source of continuing embarrassment to Moscow, and no longer a source of security to the East Europeans.

The efforts so far undertaken by the West German government to establish closer relations with the East European states have already contributed greatly to isolating the East German régime. To further this process, the West German government should be encouraged to find some formula freeing it from the self-imposed limits on relations with the East European states inherent in "the Hallstein doctrine." Perhaps excluding from the application of the doctrine those states which are members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (or possibly those that border on Germany) could provide a loophole, without encouraging other states to recognise East Germany. In any case, it is only through better relations with West Germany that the East Europeans can eventually become convinced that the reunification of Germany opens to them the doors to the West that are now

shut by the Soviet occupation forces in East Germany.

Only the Communist fanatics attach any ideological importance to the continued existence of a Communist East Germany. Otherwise, East Germany is valuable to the East Europeans primarily in terms of their national interests, largely defensive since the East European states are themselves small and cannot entertain any aggressive designs. But with the progressive evolution of the East European states, skilfully abetted by a conciliatory West, East Germany eventually may lose even its appeal as a buffer, and begin to resemble a Soviet Mozambique—a source of irritation to the East Europeans and of embarrassment to Moscow. Only then will the Kremlin consider the possibility of liquidating East Germany, and it is only the Kremlin, not the German Communists, who *can* consider its liquidation. Creation of conditions for this should be the goal of Allied and German policy—not merely the transformation of the East German régime into a more moderate Communist régime, more acceptable to the West and to its own people.

THE OSTRACISM OF East Germany can be further advanced by treating the East European states as if in fact they were fully independent states, unlike East Germany doomed to remain a mere Soviet puppet. The East European states can gradually evolve because they are national states. Their nationalism inherently works in the direction of increasing the independence of these states from *the* one state that now limits this independence—the Soviet Union. Therefore, the United States and Western Europe ought to respond seriously to any East European foreign policy proposals, and even encourage the East Europeans to make more.¹ Our response to these proposals need not be affirmative, but more of an effort should be made to engage the individual East European states in prolonged negotiations and discussions. These breed national pride, expose East European leaders to Western counter-arguments in relative privacy and with

¹That this is becoming a more sensitive issue among the East Europeans was suggested to the author by the reaction of a high East European official when he was asked why his country, unlike Communist Poland, did not take any foreign policy initiatives. After an embarrassed silence, he agreed that perhaps his country had been remiss on the international scene and hoped that perhaps in the near future it would become more active in taking international initiatives.

freedom from Soviet supervision, and stimulate an awareness of their own national interest. It is counter-productive to Western interests to simply dismiss (as has often been the case) the East Europeans as proxies for the Soviet Union even when, in fact, they are acting as such.

Poles and Germans

2. *To promote a German-Polish reconciliation*, somewhat on the model of the Franco-German reconciliation of the 'fifties. Such a reconciliation should be a proclaimed goal of the United States, the closest ally of Germany and the home of many millions of Americans of both German and Polish parentage. Just as peace and stability in Western Europe could not have been achieved unless the old Franco-German quarrel was ended, so a German-Polish reconciliation is the *sine qua non* of peace and stability in the East. The U.S. could benefit greatly in terms of moral prestige from proclaiming such a reconciliation as one of its principal objectives, in contrast to the Soviet Union and the Communists who find it convenient to keep alive the bitter Polish-German hatred.

The pursuit of this goal inevitably raises the difficult and sensitive issue of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Perhaps some day frontiers will cease to be important in Europe, but that day will come only after the European frontiers have become secure and accepted. A sense of insecurity as to frontier issues keeps alive national hatreds and fears. At the present time, since "anti-Germanism" is the principal asset of a weak and unpopular Polish régime, it may not be in the interest of the Polish government to reach any substantial agreement with Germany, which would include the frontier issue. Indeed, the ideal situation for that government would be to obtain Western economic aid while *not* obtaining but persistently demanding the recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Moreover, it is certainly in the Soviet interest to keep the issue alive. Accordingly, Western moves will have to be designed to dispel the widespread Polish popular fears of the Germans, even in the absence of a formal German-Polish agreement.

In seeking this goal, the U.S. will have to be careful not to rupture the American-German relationship, on which both the unity of the West and internal German democracy much depend. A German feeling that America has "betrayed" them will certainly not serve the

cause of German-Polish reconciliation. The Poles ought to realise this, just as the Germans should perceive that the propitiation of Polish fears would deprive Moscow of a major asset and represent a major step towards German reunification. The Germans increasingly realise that it is politically self-defeating to demand German reunification without defining precisely the location of the eastern frontiers of Germany. But since sudden recognition of the present frontier would provoke bitter resentment in Germany, one can only proceed by stages, designed to convince the Poles that no one in the West either expects or favours a change in the present frontiers.

A preliminary step would be an immediate opening of American consulates either in Szczecin or Wroclaw: this would be useful both politically and symbolically. Further, a NATO pledge to oppose the use of force to change the existing European frontiers would also go far in creating the preconditions for a German-Polish reconciliation (it would fortify the unilateral 1954 German declaration to the same effect). Having made such a declaration itself, the West German government could hardly object to NATO doing the same. Yet an international Western pledge would certainly be more convincing to the Poles than one coming from Germany alone, given the possible German interest in changing the frontier.

A similar declaration by the American President at some appropriately symbolic occasion (but *not* during an electoral season), with specific reference to the desirability of ending the Polish-German feud, would also serve to put to rest an issue which simply keeps alive old hostilities, primarily to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Such a statement could perhaps even be modelled on the several French statements on the frontier issue, made without harm to the Franco-German relationship. This declaration would have special significance to the Poles, given the popularity and prestige of America in Poland. Finally, the Western powers could pledge in advance their intention to recognise formally the present frontiers at the moment that Germany

is reunified, thereby stimulating a Polish national interest in that reunification, even if the Polish Communist government should initially oppose it.

FROM THE STANDPOINT of advancing German reunification, such assurances to Poland would be more productive if made at a time when the Poles feel so insecure on the frontier issue. Eventually, the sense of insecurity may fade; the Poles may come to care less for Western guarantees and may derive greater security from the existence of the two German states. German policy should strive to prevent the development of a lasting Polish vested interest in the partition of Germany; it should strive to rekindle the bonds of sympathy and co-operation that at different times in history did link these two neighbouring states. Only then will the foundation be laid for an eventual settlement. Without this foundation, the Poles can hardly be expected to see any interest in having any settlement of the German issue.

On the West German side, this may require a non-partisan political approach, since it has been said that neither of the two major parties could afford to give the other the opportunity of charging that German interests have been sacrificed. A non-partisan stand, which explicitly links the solemn renunciation of claims to territories lost in the aftermath of World War II to German reunification, and which is presented to the German people as a historical contribution to the reconciliation of the German and Polish peoples, could overcome much of the inevitable resistance from the more nationalistic elements.² The cause of German-Polish reconciliation is growing increasingly popular among German youth. Moreover, prior adoption of that stand by the Western allies would reduce the risk of charges that German politicians are precipitately "betraying" German interests.

In addition, the U.S. could promote specific undertakings, designed to forge bonds of mutual understanding between the Germans and the Poles, thereby also re-emphasising America's own constructive relevance to Central Europe. To the extent possible, three-way meetings could be sponsored, in addition to the various bilateral German-Polish activities already in progress. Special emphasis should be put on youth activities; collaborative humanitarian efforts could perhaps help to erase the recent memories of conflict and restore some of the fraternal atmosphere that prevailed among the

²This would be in keeping with the recent pledge made to East Europe by Chancellor Erhard (October 15th, 1964): "We shall therefore leave nothing untried to demonstrate to these countries again and again that the only hindrance to a mutual reconciliation is the unsolved German question, and that for this reason an early settlement for this issue would be in their own best interests."

Germans and the Poles as recently as during "the spring of nations" of 1848.

The Russian Obsession

3. *To minimise the Russian obsession with Germany.* It is probably impossible to eradicate the deeply-grounded Russian fears of the Germans, especially in view of the relatively recent memories of the war. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Soviet leaders find it convenient to use Germany as a bogey, and accordingly will take advantage of every opportunity to portray West Germany as "militaristic" and "revanchist." Nonetheless, given the slow but still discernible evolutionary trends in Russian society, it is desirable not to stimulate counter pressures or to provoke needless and pointless irritations. It is essential to bear in mind that the solution for the partition of Europe (and hence German reunification) is not to be found either in the context of worsening relations between America and Russia, or intensified Russian and East European hostility towards Germany.

The kind of approach to *avoid* is exemplified in the proposal, occasionally voiced in West Germany, that China be aided as a form of pressure on the Russians. The political argument on behalf of aiding China (leaving aside the purely economic interest of some business circles in obtaining Chinese trade), is based on the thesis that the Soviet Union can eventually be induced to seek an accommodation with the West if it becomes fearful of a new, hostile encirclement. A weak and isolated China (so goes the argument) cannot effectively threaten Russia. Furthermore, a Chinese-West German trade agreement, containing the Berlin clause (which includes West Berlin as part of the West German *mark* area), will mean the further isolation of East Germany and hence be a step towards eventual reunification. Although in deference to the U.S., the matter was postponed until after the 1964 elections, Germans apparently have considered exploring the possibility of concluding with the Chinese first an informal trade agreement, signed perhaps by a consortium of German firms, to be followed

³ Nervous editorials in *Neues Deutschland* suggest that the East German régime was quite uneasy about this possibility. On October 29th, 1964, a commentary concludes with the hope that West German calculations "will not succeed because the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic is not interested in supporting West German monopoly capitalism."

later by a more formal arrangement, with the Berlin clause in it, and even including credits.

An even more extreme point of view has been taken with regard to China by those Germans (fortunately a minority) who fear a reduction of tensions between Moscow and Washington and who see in China an instrument for upsetting the existing territorial arrangements in Europe. The notion of a "second intermediate zone," directed at both Washington and Moscow, has a special appeal to those who chafe under the apparent restraints of the American-German alliance and who would like to pursue a policy of revision with regard to the territorial *status quo*.

Yet to follow this course would be to re-awaken the relatively dormant European border disputes. This would have a highly divisive effect in the West, where there is a universal lack of support for any change in the existing European frontiers. In Germany itself it would serve to strengthen the extreme right wing and eventually contribute to Germany's isolation in the West. Moreover, it still involves a "political warfare" approach to the problem of German reunification. It could only have the effect of intensifying East Europe's dependence on Russia and of stimulating a new wave of anti-German Russian nationalist sentiments. Such pressure would merely confirm to Moscow what it tends to assume anyway: that West Germany is unalterably hostile and perhaps even dangerous. It is difficult to see how this would contribute either to the cause of German reunification or to that of peace. Indeed, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, it could help to produce an implicit Russian-American alliance dedicated to the preservation of the European *status quo*, thereby consummating the division of Germany. The road to East Berlin seems hardly shorter by way of Peking.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS suggest why West Germany ought to be very cautious in even exploring trade ties with China. The objective of further isolating East Germany is desirable and perhaps an agreement with China (containing "the Berlin clause") would serve that end.³ But it should not be forgotten that China once before, in 1957, signed such an agreement (which later was not renewed), and that this inherently reduces the political import of any new arrangement. More important, to generate real "pressure" on the Soviet Union a German-Chinese trade agreement would have to involve a very major effort to underwrite Chinese industrial

development and hence also military potential. Such an undertaking is hardly possible now, without introducing strains in the German-American relationship, given the continued conflict between the U.S. and China. And of course the inherent economic obstacles to any single-handed Western effort to sustain the development of as large and backward a country as China are close to insuperable.

The effect would be the opposite from that achieved by limited collaboration with East Europe. Since East Europe does not represent a hostile and competitive challenge to Moscow, closer contact with the West can serve also to bring the West closer to Russia; Western and particularly German aid to China, Russia's

⁴ "For us, Central Europe is vital because it is a matter of life and death. It is a question of our survival. We think that neutrality would be a great danger in Central Europe, because neutrality means a vacuum, and it would be a vacuum between the immense mass of Soviet military might and what would be left of Western Europe, that is, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy." Couve de Murville, Interview, *U.S. News and World Report* (March 16th, 1964).

American disengagement from Europe would also be politically self-defeating, "for nothing thrusts Germans more rapidly towards a Gaullist view of the world—or towards thoughts of a deal of their own with Russia—than fear of American disengagement from Europe." Robert Kleiman, *The Atlantic Crisis* (1964). For a good review of the various disengagement plans, see E. Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (1959).

More recently, some warmed-over versions of the plan rested on the premise that the American role in Europe is finished and that a joint Soviet-American disengagement would restore both European stability and unity. For example, see the somewhat obscure and pontificating attack on NATO by Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance* (1964).

⁵ In this connection, there is an illusion shared by some that a West German military build-up may some day become a useful basis for bargaining with the Soviet Union: East Germany for the denuclearisation of West Germany. The fact is, however, that the development of armed forces creates a vested interest. Subsequently, it becomes inconceivable that these forces be sacrificed, *in toto* or even in part, in return for Soviet political concessions, because then the argument is raised that unity is purchased at the price of dependence. Since (in the meantime) the Soviet defensive stake in East Germany would have been increased, rearmament as a bargaining device is an illusion.

It is also wrong to think that the U.S. might be able to trade German participation in an MLF or in nuclear planning for Soviet concessions. Nothing is more likely to undermine Western confidence in American protection than the thought that Western collective security measures may be subject to bilateral American-Soviet negotiations.

growing challenger, could hardly induce in the Russians a pro-Western orientation. Thus if trade develops between Germany and China, as well it might for purely economic reasons, the Germans would be well advised not to give it a political flavour or to strive to expand it artificially for political purposes.

A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM in the Russian attitude towards Germany is raised by the issue of military security. In facing it, certain basic facts must be recognised: Germany is now re-armed conventionally; it is not going to be disarmed; no one in the West would contemplate that task and it could not be undertaken without fragmenting the West. Thus all schemes advocating the "military neutralisation" of West Germany are politically unrealistic. The Central European problem cannot be solved by drastic changes in the existing security structure—faulty and tense though it may be—for the problem is basically a political one, and the military situation is its consequence. Political changes will have to precede the military changes; and political changes, as both sides have now learned, can only come gradually. The creation of a "neutral" or disengaged vacuum through the co-operative efforts of the two adversary super-powers—leaving aside its general improbability, given West German and even French opposition to it—would simply mean the creation of new "hunting grounds" for the two opposed sides, unless that step was preceded by profound changes in their political goals. By that time the scheme would no longer be necessary.

Rejecting disengagement is not tantamount to standing pat on the present division of Europe, nor does it justify the argument for the independent development of a militarily powerful West Europe. The legitimate Western interest in Germany's defensive forces ought not to obscure the fact that under certain circumstances it may increase the Soviet military stake in East Germany. Again, this is not a matter for "either/or" solutions. It is now probably idle to speculate whether Germany should have been denied rocket weapons or kept out entirely from the nuclear club (especially given the complications of the Franco-American rivalry). However, the possibility should not be excluded that under certain conditions it might be desirable for Germany to limit its further military build-up, in view of the historically founded Russian fear of Germany.⁶

It is therefore not too late to note that the cause of German reunification is not likely to be served by the development of an independent German national nuclear force. To the extent that the Russians and the East Europeans strongly suspect that the MLF—or some Atlantic nuclear force—is a first step precisely in that direction, it is in the interest both of Germany and the West to disabuse them of that impression. Accordingly the United States might be well advised to reiterate formally and more explicitly the position taken in this regard by President Kennedy in his *Izvestia* (November 1961) interview. Germany might also derive political advantages from filing a formal declaration with the U.N. to the effect that under no circumstances will it seek an independent nuclear deterrent outside of multilateral control and management.⁶

Similarly, more thought should be given to the political implications of providing West Germany with rockets capable of striking directly at the Soviet Union. While still subject to the "two-key" system of control, the availability of such rockets to the West German armed forces brings Russia directly within reach of German striking power for the first time since World War II. This cannot but intensify the Russian, Polish, and Czech feelings that a divided Germany is preferable to a united one. In this situation West Germany stands to lose little—and perhaps to gain a great deal—by repeatedly offering to conclude bilateral non-aggression treaties with the East European states and by reiterating past pledges never to use force against the security and territorial integrity of its neighbours.

⁶ See my "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1964). This suggestion was subsequently seconded by Senator J. William Fulbright in November 1964.

⁷ Those who advocate the development of the power of the West without much regard for its impact on the East inadvertently perpetuate the division of Germany. See, for example, Dean Acheson, "Withdrawal from Europe? An Illusion," *The New York Times Magazine* (December 15th, 1963). That is also why the opposite point of view as expressed by George Kennan, namely, that East Germany should at least transitionally be accepted ("Polycentrism and Western Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964) is also undesirable. Formal acceptance of the *status quo* would inevitably prompt dissension among the West Germans and the Americans and permit the Russians to have their cake and eat it too.

IN A NUTSHELL, Western military policy should always strive to meet three basic requirements: to provide an adequate defence of West Europe; to develop a satisfactory distribution of responsibility in order to cope with the political problems of the Alliance; and, without sacrificing either of the preceding, to avoid a negative political feedback to the East. The last consideration has been most often neglected, even though it has become all the more important since the West is now increasingly inclined to promote "evolutionary changes in the East." In our preoccupation with Western security we often tend to forget that the world looks quite different from the Russian and East European perspective, and that the history and psychology of the adversary must be taken into account, especially when our policy has as its ultimate objective the peaceful resolution of existing differences and a peaceful change in the *status quo*.

It cannot be stressed too often that no basic change in the division of Germany can be expected until such time as the Russians and the East Europeans are prepared to accept the reunification of Germany. Such acceptance will require at some point a qualitative change in their outlook. The way to it is by gradual, marginal steps, carefully calculated to bring about a situation whereby some day Moscow and the East Europeans discover that they no longer have any stake in East Germany (as in 1955 in the case of Austria).⁷

At this stage the basic preconditions for a German reunification that involve *neither* a Communist take-over (a maximum Soviet goal) *nor* a unilateral Soviet pull-out (a maximum Western goal) can be outlined only in very general terms:

(a) The Soviet position in East Europe must have changed to the point where the East European states are no longer pliant tools and East Germany has become an isolated Soviet colony, still entirely dependent on Soviet garrisons. It is clearly within the power of the West to exert some influence to bring about this condition.

(b) Poland and Czechoslovakia, at least on the broad popular level, must have ceased to view Germany as a territorially revisionist power; they must no longer feel the need of a Soviet presence in East Germany, and must have ceased to be responsive to Soviet manipulation of the German bogey. Here, too, the West can exert influence by providing explicit guarantees

of East European national and territorial integrity.

(c) The Soviet Union and the East European states must have been guaranteed that East Germany, once united with the rest of the country, will not become an outpost of NATO. This the West could certainly promise in advance. For example, commitments and arrangements could be made for an agreed period of time to keep East Germany a demilitarised area. While one German government would exercise sovereignty in all of Germany, only the present western part would remain in NATO (assuming the organisation still existed), while in the present eastern part U.N. peace-keeping forces would temporarily be stationed. From the Soviet point of view, a more acceptable alternative could involve the transitional retention for some years of Soviet garrisons in East Germany, even though the country will have been reunited under one political authority (in effect, the Austrian precedent). Furthermore, the residual Polish and Czech fears of Germany would provide reassurance to Moscow that a new *cordon sanitaire* was not being created on its frontiers.

(d) The economic benefits now flowing from East Germany to COMECON and to the Soviet Union must be maintained. This too is within the power of the West to assure. East Germany is the Soviet Union's principal economic partner and the Soviet Union's economic stake in East Germany is considerable. Substitute arrangements could be made bilaterally by Germany, or if such should develop, within a broader framework of European economic co-operation. However, for all of this to happen, more general changes in the East-West economic relationship will be required.

Economics and Culture

4. To relate the expansion of economic ties to more extensive cultural and social contacts. In the expansion of East-West trade, the West should attempt to erode the narrow ideological perspectives of the ruling Communist élites and to prevent them from restricting closer contact exclusively to the economic realm, thus resolving their economic difficulties while consolidating their power and perpetuating the present partition of Europe. The Communist leaders, with their public pleas for closer commercial relations (including Western credits), have been successful in representing themselves

as the apostles of international co-operation. Western statesmen should be as vocal in stressing that concrete improvements in cultural relations, more intellectual dialogue and freedom of expression are as important as trade in creating genuine co-operative relationships. The two should always be related in every East-West negotiation.

The economic situation in East Europe and (to a lesser extent) in the Soviet Union has arrived at a rather critical point. These countries desire closer economic relations with the West and in some cases even large Western credits. This makes East-West trade a potential Western asset, and it should be used to advantage. Those in the West who oppose the expansion of such trade on the grounds that it helps the Communist governments overlook the fact that, first of all, such trade will grow in spite of American objections and that, secondly, to the extent that such trade and credits are badly needed by the Communists, they could be useful as sources of leverage.

The Communist leaders have made it plain that they see in the "eventual economic superiority" of their system the way to victory. Helping their economic development can be justified only if at the same time other consequences follow, resulting in the erosion of the Communist commitment to domination, in structural reforms in the Communist economic systems, in the growth of closer contacts, in an increasingly free flow of ideas and people.

These changes will not take place spontaneously, but as a result of steady pressure. Economic difficulties in the East stimulate intense power conflicts and tend to loosen the Communist structure. It should not be forgotten that the strongest impulses towards liberalisation—the Malenkov period in Russia and the later Khrushchev period of economic decentralisation, the first Nagy period in Hungary and the recent reforms in Czechoslovakia—came because there were severe economic crises. They strengthened the hands of those who argued on behalf of liberalising the system; they undermined the position of those who wished to avoid making a choice between political totalitarianism and economic reforms. It is no accident that foreign trade officials of the Communist countries are foremost among those who advocate structural reforms in their economic system. An indiscriminate Western approach to trade and credits merely plays into the hands of those ruling Communist officials who would

like to avoid making substantial internal changes.⁸

Precisely because acceptance of Western aid and development of trade with the West is no longer proscribed as heretical by the Communists, the West needs to define for itself a clearer political perspective on the problem of East-West trade. It will not do to view it, as often is the case among otherwise conservative and staunchly anti-Communist businessmen, as merely an opportunity for profit-making, the more so because once the gates have been opened it becomes increasingly difficult to control economic appetites. Advance precautions will have to be taken to preserve a proper political perspective. Perhaps trade can be considered to be purely an economic issue when it takes place spontaneously, on the basis of reciprocal needs and advantages of the trading parties. But when such trade has to be artificially stimulated by Western governments, when such trade is fostered in the context of continued political and ideological conflict, and when the Western businessmen who wish to extend credits to the East at the same time desire their governments to underwrite these credits, such commercial relations cease to be purely an economic matter.

IN VERY BROAD TERMS, American and West European economic assistance policy with respect to East Europe should be guided by two criteria: whenever a country increases the scope of its external independence from Soviet control, or liberalises appreciably its domestic system, it should be rewarded. And similarly whenever an opposite trend develops, the West should be prepared to discontinue its assistance, withdraw special privileges (such as the U.S. "most-favoured-nation" clause, a matter of vital importance to the East Europeans), and should not hesitate to indicate the real reasons involved.

⁸ Giving aid to individual Communist states and letting them use it as they see fit is exactly what Molotov proposed in 1947, in response to the Marshall Plan invitation. It was unacceptable then and there is no reason to feel that it should be acceptable now. For details, see Harry B. Price, *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning* (Ithaca, 1955).

⁹ However, the use of surplus food for this purpose is ill-advised, for it creates the impression that the U.S. is playing politics with people's hunger. Accordingly, the U.S. would be wise to avoid making surplus food the principal commodity extended to countries to be influenced politically. Once granted, it becomes almost impossible to withdraw (e.g., the difficulties with Nasser).

Given East Europe's acute need for foreign capital investment, the flexible use of American long-term credits in this regard could be an important factor for change.

That is why it is cause for regret that the U.S. Congress has been so rigid with regard to the "most-favoured-nation" clause and to the application of Public Law 480 to Communist countries. Legislative restrictions on economic policy towards the Communist states automatically restrict the power of the executive to negotiate with the Communist states. Increasing the executive's room for manoeuvre would increase its ability to negotiate concessions from the Communist states in exchange for more trade and credit.⁹

To be sure, it is difficult to use economic relations simply as a spigot, turning them on and off. Applied too obviously, such leverage could become self-defeating, making trade relations with the West seem undesirable to the East European countries. Furthermore, it would be pointless to react to every unfavourable domestic turn in East Europe, given its political flux, by turning on economic pressures. Indeed, there is some long-range advantage in developing a relatively stable level in trade relations with East Europe as that inescapably helps to widen the range of its contacts with the West.

Unlike the case of East Europe, it is difficult at the present to see any political advantage in granting long-term credits to the Soviet Union. The West has no political interest in promoting Soviet economic development, or indirectly subsidising Soviet economic aid programmes, designed to reduce Western influence and to increase Soviet prestige in the developing countries; not to mention Soviet arms exports and efforts to encourage subversion. The argument that "a fat Communist is a good Communist" is too patently specious to be taken seriously. One need only speculate what the Soviet attitude would be if a Western economy needed Soviet credits for further development and what conditions then the Soviet Union would try to impose. Therefore, limits on long-term credits to the Soviet Union should be maintained. Private enterprises which are permitted under special circumstances to extend longer term credits should do so at their own risk and not be entitled to government guarantees. The recently concluded trade agreements between West Germany and some of the East European states demonstrate that marginal political concessions can be sought and obtained

in exchange for trade. The West Germans were wise at the same time not to demand too much (e.g., a rupture of relations with the Ulbricht régime).

Examples of marginal concessions which could be sought in exchange for a liberalised trade policy and for Western credits include rules governing access to Berlin, thereby minimising Soviet opportunities for mischief-making arising out of the absence of formal rules guiding that access; binding and applicable consular agreements with all the Communist states; the admission and free circulation of the Western press; more extensive and less regimented cultural exchanges; relaxation of Communist controls on travel of their citizens to the West.¹⁰

IN THE CASE of actual aid to the East European states, either by grants or credits, it is important that symbolic items of a lasting nature be also included. This facet of the problem has been almost entirely neglected. Few Russians remember to-day that millions of Russian lives were saved in the early 'twenties by the Hoover missions. Decades from now few Egyptians might remember the free distribution of American food, but the Russian-built Aswan dam will remind them of Russian aid. Accordingly, at least some of the assistance extended occasionally ought to be earmarked for undertakings which represent a lasting investment in popular good-will. For example, the reconstruction of the Royal Castle in Warsaw with American funds (like the Rockefeller-financed restoration

¹⁰ To promote such travel, the Americans and West Europeans might be well advised to consider lifting existing visa restrictions, especially with regard to the East European youth. It might be possible to consider a scheme whereby East European students are freely admitted for visits to the West and benefit from special arrangements designed to overcome the East European shortage of hard currency. For example, thought could be given to a plan under which the East Europeans would be permitted to exchange their currency at the frontier for convertible Western funds with the East European currency thus acquired then used by the West to finance common East-West undertakings designed to establish closer contacts: fellowships for worthy students, perhaps funds for West European tourists travelling in the East, highway systems, waterways, all of which would have the desirable effects.

¹¹ The American-built children's hospital in Cracow, scheduled for completion in 1966, is a good precedent. This venture, however, was conceived and executed by a private individual, who had to overcome obstacles on both sides of the ocean.

of Versailles) would be a fitting symbol, contrasting favourably with the generally unpopular Soviet-built Stalin Palace of Culture that dominates the Warsaw skyline. Better yet, the offer to construct a modern housing district in the war-devastated Polish capital would certainly have a major impact, regardless of official response. Joint American-West German financing of such a scheme might also be beneficial, given the desirability of healing the Polish-German hostility.¹¹ In Czechoslovakia or Hungary the offers to construct and operate schools of business administration and/or agricultural colleges have a real impact, given the present difficulties faced by the Communist governments in these areas. Similar gestures elsewhere would provide symbolic proof of the West's desire to bridge the political and ideological partition of Europe.

Western scholarships have already made a considerable contribution to bringing closer together the intellectual communities of the two sides. In this connection it is important to make certain that scholarships for study in the West, especially in the U.S.—an opportunity most eagerly sought in the Eastern states and one providing enormous personal prestige to the recipients—are not misused as awards for loyalty to the Communist régimes and ideology. This danger is implicit in arrangements that leave the nominating process entirely in the hands of the Communist governments concerned. Obviously, no Communist government will permit foreign institutions to reward its political opponents; the point is that more of a systematic effort should be made in the West to be aware of those scholars and intellectuals who have demonstrated both creativity and intellectual integrity and to insist that Western-financed fellowships not be awarded on the basis of other criteria. Unfortunately, departures from this standard have occasionally occurred, with some demoralising effects within the East European intellectual community. To the extent that the Communist governments are gradually becoming more sensitive to their own public opinion (and to the extent that the intellectual community certainly has been pressing for closer contacts with the West), the West should become more vigorous in asserting its own standards, while continuously and openly insisting that closer economic contacts must be paralleled by closer and freer cultural relations.

A special issue arises with respect to the role of East European public opinion. The present

diversity in the Communist world has made the Communist leaders more responsive to the attitudes of the people. It would be counter-productive to focus U.S. and Western policy on the sole goal of improving relations with the present governments and to abandon efforts both to inform and to shape East European public opinion. The 1964 trip by Robert Kennedy to Poland, with its direct access to the masses, provided a good illustration of how relationships with the people can occasionally be established. It is incorrect to dismiss this as merely an empty gesture or to argue that it complicates relations with the governments in power. Cultivation of these relations, it should always be remembered, is a means to an end and not the end in itself. A certain amount of direct popular appeal is desirable to keep alive pro-Western popular sentiment and stimulate it anew. The Communist leaders, especially Khrushchev, have done this on their trips to the West; there is no reason for Western leaders to be more reticent in appealing directly to the people.

East and West

5. *To promote multilateral ties with West Europe and East Europe.* As direct Soviet control wanes, as East European nationalism (even under Communist leadership) reasserts itself, as the East-West dichotomy becomes less sharp, it should be an explicit goal of U.S. and Western policy to promote multilateral political and economic relations, lest East Europe—and even all of Europe—become Balkanised.

Closer multilateral European ties would eventually render superfluous the present semi-totalitarian East European régimes which thrive on isolation; involvement in all-European undertakings would mellow their ideology and would inhibit the tendency already noted for some of them to become more autonomous national-Communist technocratic dictatorships. A Rumanian-style external independence with a semi-Stalinist dictatorship at home is not enough; a Hungarian-style internal liberalisation with almost complete external dependence on the Soviet Union is also not enough. The two processes should be linked, but the West cannot encourage that to happen from the positions of the Cold War. That is why economic assistance is important, but employed constructively with a long-range goal in mind. Had more of an effort been made in the early 'fifties to draw Yugoslavia into all-European activities,

perhaps some of its recent drift towards more regimentation at home and closer identification with the Communist world abroad might have been averted.

Therefore, in subsequent relations with states that have nationally asserted themselves, it is essential to emphasise their gradual internal liberalisation and the creation of more binding multilateral links with the developing European community. The response to such Western approaches is likely to be twofold: an effort to achieve a compromise with the West, thereby meeting some of its concerns; and, to prevent absorption by the West, avoidance of a complete break with Moscow. This would contribute to the desirable evolutionary trends in the region as a whole, both with regard to more autonomy and evolutionary liberalisation.

A policy of bilateral differentiation made political sense in a period when Soviet control in East Europe was solid, because it weakened Soviet hegemony. In the period of greater East European diversity, bilateral relations of individual East European states with the West cease to have the same desirable effect. And just as in the West multilateral economic relations became the first step on the long road towards a broader political solution, so in the East-West European relationship the beginnings of a multilateral economic approach could pave the way to an eventual political reconciliation. Economic assistance to the East European countries inevitably has to begin on a bilateral basis, in conjunction with the expansion of other relationships. However, it should be clear that it is neither in the interest of East Europe nor of Europe as a whole to assist the economic development of individual East European states entirely on a bilateral basis, for this will resolve neither their specific economic problems nor the basic political issues dividing Europe.

THE TIME MAY HAVE COME to create a special fund for underwriting multilateral East-West economic projects. Hungary, for example, has been eager to undertake common industrial enterprises with Western partners. The creation of a special fund to assist such endeavours would encourage greater economic multilateralism. Also, to the extent possible, the multilateral West European institutions could make it a matter of policy to hire the quite numerous East European specialists now resident in West Europe in order to train a *cadre* of "European

technocrats." Similarly, the East European states should be invited to permit their surplus working force to participate in the European labour market. Some East European countries suffer from hidden unemployment, while France, Switzerland, and Germany badly need labour and import it from afar. Greater East-West labour mobility could be beneficial to all concerned while also undermining the existing European division. The exposure of many thousands of East Europeans to West Europe would have in time a profound effect on the East.

Some East European states are beginning to engage in limited regional co-operation outside of COMECON, the membership of which is determined ideologically and includes even Mongolia. This development also deserves Western encouragement. East European regional economic co-operation helps to overcome the national antipathies still very strong in the area, and inevitably will soften Soviet political control. So far, the East European states have not taken advantage of the facilities of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Other developing nations have derived great benefits from such assistance, which, unlike many bilateral arrangements, is given on a continuing, long-term basis. Perhaps widely publicised offers by the World Bank and the IMF to assist East European regional economic undertakings might arouse both the interest of the Communist government in joining the institutions and East European popular pressure on behalf of more regional ventures.¹²

As a preparatory measure, it would be desirable for Western multilateral economic organisations to review, from a more political perspective, the character of East-West economic relations. The Common Market's headquarters do not have a regular political planning organ. The creation of such an office, charged with re-

sponsibility for analysing the long-range political implications for East Europe of West European economic development, should be undertaken without delay, before the Common Market is in a position to shape a common commercial policy.

On their side, the Communist states eventually will have to abandon their ideologically motivated hostility towards Western multilateral economic organisations, and it is to be hoped that they will do so as economic relations between the East and West develop. To encourage such evolution the Western states should continue urging them to join GATT and to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Common Market as a supranational Western institution. The designation of Communist ambassadors to the EEC would have considerable ideological significance: it would mean a change in a doctrinaire position. From a practical point of view it would mean that, on some issues, the Communist states would be able to negotiate directly with the EEC instead, as now is the case, of having to deal indirectly with the various member states. It would mean greater contacts with a major supranational European organisation and hence it would have the effect of drawing the Communist states into a more involved relationship with Europe.¹³ Perhaps as a preliminary step, some third institution (*viz.*, the Ford Foundation, which has sponsored many East-West conferences) may find it desirable to sponsor special conferences on the subject of the Common Market to which Eastern European and Soviet economists would be invited.

A more flexible and less ideological Communist attitude towards Western multilateralism may pave the way to other measures that could be economically beneficial to the Communist states and could serve to unite Europe. The domestic acceptance by the Communist states of world prices as a basis for their pricing system would facilitate multilateral trade, now in part inhibited by the arbitrary and incalculable Communist pricing system. Consideration could be given to special arrangements providing for the accession of Communist states to some sort of association with the OECD, or at least of inviting them into particular phases of work that concern them. The advantages of East European participation in OECD would be: (1) They would be allowed to take part in preliminary and private discussions of measures that some member states may intend to take and that affect states that do not belong to the OECD: this would

¹² In a stimulating article on "World Bank Credits," in *Kultura* (Paris, 1964), W. A. Zbyszewski discusses the extensive long-term credits obtained by Spain in modernising its railroad network and by India for its economic development, and proposes that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania should formulate joint proposals for their further development, to be assisted by the World Bank and the IMF.

¹³ Since the EEC is a supranational organ and COMECON is not, Communist diplomatic recognition of the EEC should not be equated with Western recognition of COMECON. There is no formal or structural equivalence between the two.

give them an indirect share in the economic decision-making of greater powers; (2) they would benefit from a certain amount of pooling of information, both economic and technical, that is of importance to their economic planning and development; (3) they could take advantage of the limited technical assistance that oecd provides to less developed states. Some members of the oecd have insisted on being categorised as less developed states so that they could benefit from such technical aid.¹⁴ East European participation in the oecd would thus symbolise the triumph of the Western conception of European multilateral development, while also benefiting the East European nations economically.

THE DEVELOPMENT on a multilateral basis of economic relations between the East and the West could gradually pave the way for progress in the more sensitive field of politics. It would minimise the fear of the East European ruling élites that the West's intent is to absorb the East European states one by one. It would work against the revival of historically retrogressive inner-oriented nationalist states. With progress in increasing economic, cultural, and human contacts, consideration in turn could be given to more formal steps on the political level. For example, the formation could be explored of a standing committee of prominent East and West Europeans (also with Soviet and American participation) for the purpose of periodically examining and discussing East-West relations.

¹⁴ Finland, which for political reasons must be extremely careful not to offend the Soviet Union, participates in oecd through observers and specifically in regard to matters affecting its basic industries. Yugoslavia, which has recently become associated with comecon, is a full member for confrontation of economic policies, scientific and technical matters, agriculture and fisheries questions, technical assistance and productivity, and participates through observers in other matters. Yugoslavia and Finland could both serve as useful precedents for the other East European states.

¹⁵ Whereas in many places in the world the United States seems to be losing its hold on popular imagination, in East Europe it is still viewed in highly idealised terms as the society of to-morrow, a feeling strengthened by personal bonds with many millions of Americans of East European origin. Symptomatic of the feeling of the youth was the finding of a survey conducted in Warsaw during the Communist May Day Youth Celebration: when asked where they would like to go if all restrictions were lifted, the universal answer was "America." (See Z. Bauman, *Kariera*, Warsaw 1960.)

A formal standing committee, on the model of the various precedents that paved the way for the West European unification efforts, would have an advantage over the occasional *ad hoc* bilateral and multilateral East-West conferences, for it could gradually develop into a working body with a professional staff, in effect creating the first nucleus of functional all-European bodies.

It is to be expected that the Soviet Union would wish to take advantage of any multilateral forum to enhance the status of its East German régime. However, with the passage of time and with progress in the areas of policy already discussed, it may be expected that not all of the East European states would give Moscow complete and unilateral backing on that issue. Some of them may be tempted to become involved in all-European undertakings, even if it does mean that East Germany is excluded from them, provided some face-saving device could be found.

The development of multilateral ties also *within* East Europe would be desirable as a stepping stone towards a larger European community. Since much of the tragic history of East Europe can be traced to its internal divisions, there may be a special merit for the United States, which continues to enjoy unequalled prestige among the East European peoples,¹⁵ to go on public record as favouring the eventual formation of an East European confederation, thereby emulating the West European development. Historically all the foreign efforts to "organise" East Europe have been associated with hostile designs to dominate the region. No one in East Europe could suspect hegemonistic designs on the part of the United States if, at some appropriately historic and symbolic occasion, the President was to outline in bold terms the hope for an East Europe that would rise above its traditional divisions and assume a more prominent role in the shaping of the future Europe. With the decline in Soviet control and with the weakening of the ideological commitment of the ruling East European élites, the resulting East European void could be filled by an idea that is in keeping especially with the widespread but often unarticulated aspirations of the younger generation to surmount the old divisions. Otherwise, there is the danger that as the Communist élites become "nationalised," the old antagonism will be rekindled and even exploited by internal and external forces.

Such a U.S. statement might be particularly timely because many East Europeans (including even officials) are concerned that the new American-Soviet stability might result in East Europe becoming again a backyard of international politics—an area to be occasionally exploited in order to put pressure on the Soviet Union, but otherwise left to its own devices and to its own more powerful neighbours, including eventually also Germany. That is why a constructive policy statement defining the hopes for the future development of East Europe would have more than merely a propaganda effect. Even if initially criticised by the Communist press as “interference,” it would inevitably give a new sense of direction to many East Europeans who are concerned about their future but see no one providing them with a constructive alternative to the present.

From Confrontation to Co-operation

UNTIL NOW, most East-West agreements have been negotiated during periods of tension and crisis. Since most of the crises were initiated by Soviet efforts to change the *status quo*, the initiative has tended to rest with Moscow. The settlements (with the exception of the Austrian Treaty and the Test Ban Agreement) involved merely the restoration of the previous situation. In the present post-Cuba *détente* there is a broader opportunity for the West to come to grips with the basic problem of East-West relations. By taking the initiative America would point up the wider European scope of Western policy and also accelerate the tendencies in the East which are favourable to closer East-West relations. The appropriate content of such an initiative would be economic, since this is the most sensitive point in Eastern Europe, and since the possibility of East-West economic co-operation has achieved a certain ideological respectability in Eastern Europe.

To that end, a proposal should be addressed to the European powers, including Russia, to join with America and Western Europe in formulating a joint all-European economic development plan. The Plan would be designed to cut across the present European partition, to narrow existing disparities in European living standards, to reduce the economic and political significance of existing frontiers, and to promote East-West trade and human contacts by the development of an all-European system of communications. The proposal would be a

fitting climax to past American efforts to foster the unity of Western Europe, to bring about closer contacts between East and West, and in this context to build a stable relationship between Germany and East Europe. In such a plan American financial participation would be conditioned on complementary efforts by Western Europe. Britain and Europe could participate as an entity by creating a special fund to finance East-West trade and common European investment projects, or by extending the scope and the size of both the Development Fund and the European Investment Bank. Working out new trade agreements with the East in the context of a larger plan of East-West economic activity would accelerate also the process of West European co-operation.

A venture of this kind would take advantage of the West's economic strength, of economic pressures in the East, and of the growing appeal of “the European idea” in Eastern Europe in contrast to the waning attraction of Communist ideology. There is reason to hope that West Europeans would be ready to make the contributions necessary to bring this collective enterprise into being. For example, a 1962 poll showed a large majority of the West Europeans in favour of using national taxes to promote the development of the poorer regions of Europe (while a small majority opposed the same for Africa). That West Europe could contribute substantial capital is suggested by the present size of West German commitments to international development: \$1,050 million to the capital stock of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, \$200 million to the development fund of the EEC, \$300 million to the European Investment Bank. Together with contributions from the other Western European states and from the United States, a proposal of this kind would have a dramatic appeal in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The proposal would be premised on a phased reunification of Germany and on an implicit acceptance by the East of the principle that the reconstruction of Europe would involve in time the reunification of Germany. A general plan of European economic co-operation, involving multilateral Western participation and open both to Russia and to East Europe, would be more acceptable in the East than any bilateral attempt by West Germany “to buy” East Germany in exchange for credits to Russia, as has at times been proposed in the West German press and repeatedly rejected by the East. A

direct German-Russian relationship would create fears and opposition in East Europe, not to speak of suspicions of "a new Rapallo" in the West. Only a solution of the German problem in the context of broader East-West co-operation could reasonably assure both that the consequence of unification will not be the fragmentation of one side or the other.

No doubt the Soviet Union would try to take advantage of a proposal of this kind to legalise the existence of the two German states by insisting that East Germany should formally participate in any all-European undertaking. Yet it is by no means certain that, if the West takes the steps already suggested to reassure the East Europeans on the German question, the Soviet Union would be able to count on the solid support of the East European states. The idea of "rejoining Europe" would generate popular enthusiasm in East Europe. The economic opportunity thereby presented would doubtless be attractive to the harassed East European economic cadres. The economic character of the proposal would diminish the suspicions of the political élites. Increasingly concerned with their own well-being, these governments might be receptive to a formula excluding East German participation on the grounds that East Germany benefits already from advantageous bilateral economic arrangements with West Germany.

If actually launched, and in operation for a period of years, such unprecedented multilateral economic co-operation would sooner or later create a favourable context for resolving peacefully the many outstanding European political and security problems. In the new atmosphere, it might be possible to find solutions for the more intractable problems of arms control; to achieve perhaps a freeze on nuclear weapons; and even to explore again various regional security schemes. In the present hostile confrontation it is unavoidable that each side assumes that any security scheme proposed by the other has ulterior motives.

Of course, the Soviet Union may reject any such co-operative venture; or, more likely, it may equivocate and attempt to shift the focus of the proposal to direct grants to individual Communist states, thereby frustrating the underlying purpose of the initiative. Yet at least some of the East European states would surely be attracted, and there would be great popular pressure in East Europe for participation. It is by no means certain that a Soviet refusal would

be automatically followed by East European refusals, as happened with the Marshall Plan. Indeed, one should not assume that the Soviets will reject it indefinitely.

In assessing possible Soviet reaction, one must recognise that the general evolutionary trend in Russia towards a more European orientation is counterbalanced by increasing Russian nationalism and even chauvinism, and by the power interests of the bureaucratic technocratic dictatorship which is likely to continue to dominate the Soviet political scene. It is quite possible that the ruling élite may justify their power by emphasising the global competition with the United States, building on the desire of many Russians to become "the Number One world power." It is therefore quite possible that the Soviets may be unwilling to participate in any scheme which would involve eventual reunification of Germany and lessening of Russian control over East Europe. For this reason, Western policy must reckon both with the possibility of a favourable Soviet evolution, and with persisting Soviet hostility.

The proposed initiative for all-European economic co-operation does just this. If the favourable Soviet evolution, foreseen in this article, comes to pass, the proposal opens the way for the Soviet Union and East Europe to move towards a grand settlement and reconciliation with the West. If Soviet hostility persists, the proposal would put increased strain on the Soviet control of East Europe. It would magnify the cost of Soviet domination by giving the East Europeans new leverage to extract greater Soviet economic assistance in return for their rejecting the Western initiative. Thus, the initiative is desirable on either assumption about the trends of Soviet developments. Once made, the proposal would become an objective force, just as Khrushchev's bold disarmament proposals gave Soviet foreign policy a certain positive momentum, though they were never implemented. The initiative could revivify the West and attract the East, irrespective of formal acceptances or refusals. Its positive appeal would doubtless create at least some divisions of opinion in Moscow and might help the moderate forces in Soviet society.

THE READER WILL NOT HAVE failed to note the historical connection between the proposal here made and the original proposal of the Marshall Plan. The immense political force of a far-reaching initiative, made at the right time, was

never more clearly demonstrated. In the eloquent words of its chronicler, Harry Price:

The Marshall Plan demonstrated that the free nations can seize the initiative in the East-West struggle if goals are set which exert a wide and potent appeal and if enough intelligence, energy, and resources are devoted to the attainment of these goals.

The Plan began with an idea. It was an idea which satisfied a widely felt yearning and fired the imaginations and hopes of millions. Its conception and projection was a creative event. Yet the uniqueness of the concept was less extraordinary than its historic timing, the way in which it entered into and became a part of existing currents of thought and feeling. . . . To usher in a new era in relations between peoples—an era in which the energies released in co-operative enterprises eventually outstrip those dedicated to defence or destruction—not one or two ideas but a whole sequence of new concepts is needed. One of the lessons of the Marshall Plan appears to be that for an idea to be effective in the international sphere, as has been true in the industrial sphere, it must be addressed to a situation that is ripe for it.

Recall the starkness of the European situation in 1947. The Marshall Plan was born of the frustration and failure of the Moscow Conference and was designed to be "a broad and dramatic effort." To-day, in the context of nuclear proliferation, the rise of West European nationalisms, the decline of U.S. influence on the European continent, the growing frustration in West Germany, and the increasing opportunities in the more divided East, there is again a need and an increasingly ripe historical opportunity for a bold and creative idea.

As long as the West is militarily strong and clear about its goals, we need not fear to extend to the Communist world a sincere offer of economic co-operation designed neither to strengthen nor to weaken those who have made themselves our adversaries, but to bind us all together so

that we cannot consider warring against each other. Even in the darkest days of the 'forties, the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department felt (and rightly so) that "American effort in the aid to Europe should be directed not to the combating of Communism as such, but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European society."

THE IDEA OF THE Atlantic community was a creative and effective response to a challenging Russia. The challenge we face is no longer the same. The Atlantic idea alone is not an adequate response to the opportunity presented by a weakening Soviet bloc and to Europe's quest for identity. The proposed initiative would have the merit of creating a larger context for continued American-European co-operation, somewhat subsuming the inherent tendency for European processes to become also an expression of the European desire for autonomy from the United States. A larger conception of a co-operative community, involving eventually four major units, America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and West Europe and East Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time perhaps becoming even more closely linked), would provide a more constructive and politically appealing image of to-morrow than a troubled Western partnership implicitly based on the notion of continued European partition.

A broader conception, of which the Atlantic partnership could be one component, would be more likely to keep the United States relevant to Europe's future, to prevent the recrudescence in Europe of narrow nationalisms or the perpetuation of xenophobic national Communisms, and to create a new political context in which the legacies of World War II can at last be settled. The West can set itself no nobler or more timely task than to end the partition of Europe.

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FURTHER CHINESE COMMUNIST
EFFORTS IN AFRICA

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Although the Chinese Communists have experienced several setbacks in their African campaign and encountered some resistance among the leaders of the "Afro-Asian Bloc" (e.g., postponement of II Afro-Asian Conference, the Chicoms major propaganda effort of the last three years), her subsequent activities demonstrate once again both the fanaticism of her leaders and their ability to adjust their tactics swiftly and abruptly to the prevailing political winds. In addition to direct approaches on the highest levels, Peking has been trying recently to improve her image in Africa through the cooperation of third countries, especially Indonesia, North Vietnam and to some extent Pakistan.

Recent Chicom setbacks. Since the beginning of the year, the Chicoms have been expelled from Burundi for interfering in its internal affairs - the first time this has happened to them in Africa. They have been strongly criticized by President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, President Hamani Diori of Niger and President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta for "teaching Africans to kill Africans" and coveting Africa's "empty spaces" for their own overflowing population.

President Diori has had special cause to complain for, aside from the terrorist attacks in Niger by the Sawaba Party which he said were "organized, financed and directed by Communist China," an attempt in April 1965 was made on his life by a Chinese-trained Sawaba terrorist. As a result of reports in July 1965 that the Chinese were involved in a plot to assassinate President Senghor of Senegal, he is expected to expel the NCNA representative in Senegal and to refuse to establish diplomatic relations with the CPR.

The diplomatic forays of Chou En-lai in June 1965 highlighted his miscalculation of African revolutionary prospects. While in Dar-es-Salaam, Chou reiterated that an "exceedingly favorable" revolutionary situation still prevailed. Although he received a warm initial welcome in Tanzania, enthusiasm waned steadily under the impact of Chou's repetitive and ill-conceived attacks on "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism." President Nyerere then made it clear that Tanzanians were determined to assert their non-alignment and independence. The

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Kenya government also reacted to Chou's remarks by issuing an official statement that it intended to avert "all revolutions, irrespective of their countries of origin."

When Chou returned to Africa, two days after the Algerian coup, it was clear that his lobbying to hold the Afro-Asian Conference on schedule and China's precipitate recognition of the new Algerian regime, untempered by any concern for the fate of China's erstwhile fraternal ally, Ben Bella, profoundly shocked other African leaders. It was a striking example of China's indifference to African views and interests when pursuing her own ends.

The decision of the Government of Kenya to expell the New China News Agency (NCNA) correspondent, Wang Teh-ming, in July 1965, focused attention again on the unprofessional activities of China's official news service. Wang, whose presence in Kenya was said to be "against the interests of national security," was known to have been in touch with dissident groups, including left wing elements in the ruling KANU. The expulsion of Wang was welcomed by the Nairobi brance of KANU, which urged the government to make a full investigation into the activities of those embassies "which are causing misunderstanding and confusion to Kenya people." At the same time, Defense Minister Mungai stated that Kenyan citizens would not be recruited into the armed forces if they underwent unauthorized foreign military training - a warning clearly intended to apply to trainees sent to communist nations.

Although expressing sympathy for the views of moderate officials, President Jomo Kenyatta has refused, at least for the time being, to agree to their request that the Chicom embassy be closed and its staff expelled.

New "official" Chicom efforts. Faced with the need to do some fence-mending in Africa, the Chicoms have stepped up their efforts, concentrating on those countries that appear most ready to accept the wares they offer. In August 1965, for example, Peking concluded a commercial pact with Guinea, a cultural cooperation treaty with the Somali Republic, and reached agreement with the Congo-Brazzaville on a plan to implement the cultural accord signed earlier this year. (See unclassified attachment for major Communist moves in specific African countries.)

The Chinese have found that while a number of African countries will not accept aid directly from them, they will accept it from Indonesia. One of the main purposes of the visit of Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Indonesia, in mid-August 1965, reportedly was to discuss the channelling of Chicom economic assistance to Africa through Indonesia. It was further reported that during First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio's tour through Africa in July 1965, he committed Indonesia to a total of 50 million dollars in economic assistance to African states; this sum will be supplied by the Chicoms.

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Chicom strategy. Peking appears to divide African nations into four general categories and tailors its program to fit the Chinese conception of the situation and circumstances which apply to each case. The First group, composed of the radical states with which close cooperation is possible, include Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Congo/B, and prior to the June 1965 coup, Algeria. (There are encouraging indications, however slight, of a less radical trend in the policies of both Mali and Guinea and some disillusion with Communist China.) The Chinese maintain cordial ties with the leaders of these countries and work closely with them to establish bases for operation against third countries.

The Second category of states includes those which have recently become independent and where the political orientation of the government is still in the process of development. Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania fall into this group which Peking is attempting to steer towards the left.

The Third category consists of conservative states, vulnerable to revolutionary efforts in the long run, but not targets ripe for active subversion at present. Tunisia, Morocco and Ethiopia are in this group. Peking has diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Morocco and makes periodic overtures for the exchange of diplomatic missions with Ethiopia.

The Fourth category is composed of "reactionary" regimes -- those which do not recognize Peking and have been resisting Chicom blandishments. Included in this group are Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Gabon, Congo/L, and Rwanda. All are targets for active subversion at the present time. Other conservative governments - Liberia, Ivory Coast, Malawi and the Malagasy Republic - appear to be on the list for future attention.

Peking now maintains diplomatic ties with 17 African nations. (See attachment) Many conservative African governments, however, including Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta, and the Ivory Coast, are genuinely suspicious of the Chinese potential for subversion and are not anxious to see them established locally.

Propaganda mechanisms and media. All Chicom posts abroad serve as major propaganda outlets. Chinese diplomats and press representatives throughout Africa, as well as Chou En-lai and other lesser figures touring the continent, assiduously echo the line that Peking is Africa's best friend, overflowing with understanding of African problems and sharing a common experience of foreign exploitation.

The Chinese now beam more than 100 hours of radio propaganda to Africa each week, as compared with about 50 hours three years ago. Languages include English, French, Arabic, Cantonese, Portuguese,

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Swahili and Hausa. The Cantonese-language broadcasts are directed toward the more than 40,000 overseas Chinese in East Africa, about half of whom inhabit Mauritius.

High-quality pamphlets and periodicals in both English and French are widely distributed in Africa. The NCNA, Peking's principal agency for dissemination of propaganda, now maintains offices in 15 African countries, and has numerous effective and often influential local stringers. Tanzanian Minister Babu formerly served as an NCNA representative in East Africa.

Economic aid and infiltration. There are over 1,500 Chinese technicians and laborers in Africa. This figure is likely to increase substantially in the future.

The Chinese aid programs have stressed assistance for agricultural development and the establishment of small-scale industries for food processing and consumer goods. Chinese schemes to grow sugar, rice and tea in Mali apparently are working out well and several hundred Chinese technicians continue to be employed on these projects. In Ghana, Chinese technicians are providing assistance in growing swamp rice; others are to initiate similar projects for the production of vegetables, cotton and peanuts.

Total Chinese trade with Africa has been small, amounting to approximately \$120 million in 1963, but is growing. During the first half of 1964 total Chinese trade with Africa was 50 per cent larger than that in the comparable period of the previous year.

Since Peking is unable to afford economic and technical assistance programs on the same scale as those offered by the West and by the Soviet Union, it relies heavily on the propaganda effect of its more modest efforts. For example, Chou En-lai gained respect for the CPR by offering aid as one poor country to another. Offers of economic assistance amounted to a total of about \$335 million. Agreements negotiated in 1964 alone came to approximately \$195 million. As in other parts of the world, however, Chicom economic assistance to Africa has remained largely a paper proposition. Only about one-fourth of the funds have been obligated (as of April 1965) and less than 10 per cent - about \$20 million - have been drawn.

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Fact Sheet

For Background Use Only
13 September 1965

The KOMSOMOL -- The Soviet Union's Monopoly
on Youth Activities

Non-Communists are at a serious disadvantage in attempting to understand Communist organizations such as the Komsomol when they view it from their own background and experience. A youth organization, for example, is normally conceived of as an organization formed and run by youths for their own purposes. But the Soviet youth organization, Komsomol (properly the Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi -- All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth), can only be described as an organization of, not for the youth of the nation. An organization of the youth by the Party for the State.

Somehow the idea persists that the Komsomol is, to some degree at least, "independent" of the CPSU. True, at the founding First Congress of the Komsomol, October 29 to November 4, 1918, a motion was passed that "The League is an independent organization." This was for the deliberate purpose of permitting the Komsomol to reach beyond Party members to attempt to gather in other youth not yet in the Party. Lest this word "independent" cause confusion, however, the Central Committee of the Komsomol abandoned the term at a Plenum meeting five months later, and adopted in its stead the word "autonomous." Further to clarify matters, a joint resolution of the Central Committees of both the Party and the Komsomol proclaimed on August 8, 1919, that "The Central Committee of the Komsomol is directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the Party.... The local organizations of the Komsomol work under the control of the local committees of the Party." And this has become the standard pattern for Party control of mass organizations; the Central Committee controls the leadership, the lower Party echelons control the lower levels of the organization.

There are other facts which convincingly demonstrate the fact and nature of CPSU control of the Komsomol: Fifty percent of the voting delegates to the First Congress of the Komsomol were Party members; this figure rose to 97.8% at the Sixth Congress (1924), and fell to 59% at the Thirteenth Congress in 1958. Although the normal age of Komsomol members is supposed to be limited to the 14 to 26 year bracket, 52% of the delegates to this Thirteenth Congress were over 26 years of age, and 14 percent were even over 30. And the largest single category of delegates consisted of full-time, paid, professional Komsomol employees (they formed 87% of the delegates in 1924; the percentage fell to about 45% in 1954). All of which proves that the Congress of the Soviet youth organization is controlled by Party members over 26 years old who are professional employees of the organization itself. But it still professes to represent Soviet youth!

(Cont.)

The basic function of the Komsomol, it is obvious, is to control the youth of the Soviet Union. And it does this both with a carrot and a stick. As a carrot, the Komsomol offers practically the only path to advancement in those things to which youth aspire. If a young person desires to get an advanced education, to join an athletic team, to travel abroad, even to go to a night club, the path is via the Komsomol. And the Komsomol carries a big stick too. It organizes the "druzhiniki," groups of young activists who patrol the schools, the night clubs, and the beach resorts to assure that the youth dress properly, stay sober, say the right things, and generally avoid the dissolute ways of "hooligans." By way of punishment, the druzhiniki can send a wayward lad to a "Comrades' Court" where he can be severely reprimanded. Or they can arrange for him to "volunteer" for service in the "new lands." A classic illustration of the size of the stick wielded by the Komsomol appeared in the organization's daily newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, on March 29, 1962: A malingerer named Potapov was sentenced to three years' deportation to Siberia because "in the morning he went out into the courtyard and indolently ruminated 'what can I do with myself,' and then came to the invariable conclusion that the best thing would be to devote his attention to a tin can with which one can amuse oneself to one's heart's content in place of a ball, and to chase pigeons."

Of course sending youth to the "new lands" serves a second purpose in addition to providing a punishment which helps keep people in line; it provides a steady flow of manpower for areas which could not otherwise hope to recruit sufficient workers to fulfill their plans. And indeed support to agriculture and industry is a very major function of the Komsomol. An indication of the scope of activity involved has been given by the current First Secretary of the organization, Sergey Pavlovich PAVLOV: over a period of 4 years 2 million youths were recruited to work on farms (700,000 of them for the virgin lands) and many sectors of Soviet industry are organized around 5½ million Soviet youths directed by the Komsomol. In connection with the current stress on agricultural chemicals, Komsomol was called on to assist in the completion of more than 50 mineral fertilizer plants. The Soviet news agency Tass compared the size of the call-up with Khrushchev's mammoth "new lands" campaign of the 1950's.

Another important function of the Komsomol in the Soviet scheme of things is its role in selecting, training, and testing future cadres for the Party and the government. By and large the Komsomol members are divided between those who join because it is a sine qua non for their schooling or other interests, and those who become activists in the Komsomol for the purpose of making a career in the ruling class. This

is readily reflected in the statistic quoted earlier to the effect that the largest group of delegates to Komsomol Congresses consists of professional workers in the Komsomol. These activists receive excellent training in Communist ideology, Party organization, strategy and tactics, and in the various other matters necessary for the Soviet elite. Two current examples of the value of this background may be cited which are not only to the point, they are devastating indictments of the Komsomol. The first case is that of Alexander Nikolayevich SHELEPIN, born in Voronezh in 1918, who rose through the Komsomol to the heights of the Soviet system. In 1940 he began his career in the Moscow City Komsomol Committee. In 1943 he became a Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol and advanced to Second Secretary in 1949 and First Secretary (i.e., boss) in 1952. He graduated from the Komsomol to become Chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB) in 1958. After three years with the KGB (the Soviet Secret Police organization) he was elected to the Secretariat of the Central Committee (October 1961), and was named Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee in 1962. Following Khrushchev's fall, Shelepin was elected a full member of the Presidium of the CPSU in November 1964 -- at the age of 46.

Shelepin's replacement as First Secretary of the Komsomol was Vladimir Yefimovich SEMICHASTNIY, born 1924 at Grigoryevka in the Ukraine. He had worked up through the ranks of the Ukrainian Komsomol organization and had also been elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party in 1949 (he arose while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party). In 1956 he made the Central Committee of the CPSU and in 1958 was elected to the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. That same year he became boss of the Komsomol. He distinguished himself during his tenure as First Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol by being one of the first to attack Boris Pasternak following the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature to the author of Doctor Zhivago in October 1958. Addressing the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol at a meeting commemorating the organization's 40th anniversary, in the presence of Khrushchev and facing a television camera, he said Pasternak was worse than a pig since he had "defiled the place where he has eaten, ... defiled those by whose toil he lives and breathes...." After a year as head of the Komsomol he was transferred to Azerbaydzhan to try to straighten out messes in the oil and cotton industries. A year later, however, he was back in Moscow as ... Chairman of the KGB, replacing Shelepin. And he's still there.

The current First Secretary of the Komsomol -- Semichastniy's successor -- is Sergey Pavlovich PAVLOV, born January 1929 in Kalinin. He rose through the Moscow City committee of the Komsomol, having been Secretary (1955), Second Secretary (1956) and First Secretary (1958). In April 1958 he moved over to the All-Union Komsomol as a secretary and became First Secretary of the latter organization in March 1959 at the

age of 30. He became a full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in October 1961. He has been an active campaigner against the liberal writers and poets, having been a principal speaker during the meetings held with the intellectuals by Khrushchev in December 1962, and in March and April 1963.

A final point to make in discussing the Komsomol is its role in international youth affairs. Naturally the Komsomol is the organizer and leader of the international Communist youth fronts. Shelepin was Vice-President of the International Union of Students from 1947 to 1952 and was Vice President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) from 1953 to 1959. (That is, for a period he was simultaneously head of the Soviet Secret Police and vice president of the chief international Communist youth front!! Bogdan Stashinskiy, the self-admitted KGB assassin of the Ukrainian exile leader Stepan Bandera, has testified that during this period he was awarded the Soviet Red Banner for the assassination by Shelepin himself.) Shelepin was succeeded in the WFDY by Pavlov who became its First Vice President in 1959. Pavlov was also leader of the Soviet delegation of some 800 "youths" at the Eighth World Youth Festival in Helsinki in the summer of 1962.

The Komsomol is also charged with selecting all delegations of Soviet youth which attend the myriad meetings around the world each year and it receives all youth delegations visiting the USSR. It has a very special role to play at the "People's Friendship University named after Patrice Lumumba" (known as PFU or Lumumba U.), where the students from Africa, Asia and Latin America are generally segregated from the bulk of Soviet and European students. In order that these foreigners not be entirely segregated from Soviet life, a certain number of Soviet students are assigned to PFU to be friendly with them, assist them ... and indoctrinate them. Of course these Soviet students are almost exclusively Komsomol activists. And of course they are in close touch with the pro-rector of the University, Pavel Dimitriyevich YERZIN, a General in the KGB according to the London Daily Telegraph of 17 April 1963.

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