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Significant Dates ▶

APR

- ? Afro-Asian Scientists Conference, New Delhi, sponsored by World Federation of Scientific Workers (Soviet) [previously scheduled for February].
- ? Continental Congress for Defense of Self-Determination of Peoples and Non-Intervention, Santiago, Chile, sponsored by left-wing labor in Uruguay and Chile [previously scheduled for September 1965].
- 26 Geneva Conference: agrees to armistice and partition of Vietnam; recognizes neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Conference ends 21 July. 1954
- 29 India and Chinese People's Republic conclude 8-year pact for "peaceful coexistence." 1954.
- 30 9th Inter-American Conference, Bogota, adopts resolution "Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America," condemning International Communism and all totalitarian forms as incompatible with American principles. Name changed to Organization of American States (OAS). 1948.

MAY

- 1 May Day -- International Workers' Day, designated by Second International (Socialist) Congress 1889.
- 1 Castro proclaims Cuba socialist nation, states no more elections will be held. 1961. Fifth anniversary.
- 2 Eighth Congress, International Federation of Journalists, Berlin, 2-7 May.
- 5 Karl Marx born. (Dies 14 March 1883.) 1818.
- 5 Socialist International Congress, Stockholm, 5-8 May.
- 5 Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr. USN, becomes first US sub-orbital space traveler. 1961. Fifth anniversary.
- 12 Soviet forces lift land blockade of Berlin. 1949.
- 15 Third International (Comintern) dissolved. 1943.
- 16 Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties" signed by China-USSR. 1858.
- 22 Charter of the Organization of Africa Unity signed at 22-25 meeting in Addis Ababa. 1963.
- 28 World Buddhist Conference, Colombo, Ceylon. Previously scheduled for January, sponsored by United World Buddhists Association, 28 May- 4 June.
- ? International Youth Conference for Solidarity with Vietnam, Pyongyang, North Korea, sponsored by World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students (Soviet) [previously mentioned for February].
- ? Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Council Meeting, Zanzibar, Tanzania, May or June. [An important question may arise: shifting the venue of the 5th AAPSO Conference now set for Peking, 1967].

28 March 1966

Briefly Noted



Set-backs to science Soviet Concern with "spectaculars."

Unconvincingly, the Soviets announced on 5 March that the craft that hit Venus on 1 March has been sterilized before launch and that its mission had been a soft landing (later corrected to say: to land on the planet). This announcement was a feeble response to the concern and confusion expressed earlier by US and European scientists. (See Press Comment 3 and 4 March 66) Sterilization of spacecraft destined for other planets is a complex, expensive matter and a burning issue among US scientists; yet Soviet scientists at international conferences cannot be drawn into meaningful discussions of this subject. Hence, it is believed that the Soviets have probably failed to take the fullest possible precautions against the contamination of Venus and consequently they could have jeopardized future scientific research in the environment of Venus. Also, the announcement contradicted a Soviet report of 28 Nov 65 that the craft, Venus-3, and its companion, Venus-2, would pass the planet on different sides and report back.

Some questions piquing the curiosity of Western scientists are:

--Why does Soviet publicity consistently cast doubt on the validity of Soviet technological feats which deserve praise?

--Why can't Soviet scientists share fully in the world's dialogue concerning the conquest of space?

Part of the answer is found in the pathological secrecy underlying Soviet society, as seen once more in connection with the successful Luna 9 (see BPG #994).

* * *

The trickery of words.

"Socialist" -- but Really "Communist"

Among the 21 conditions for admission to the COMINTERN, Lenin specifically prescribed the use of the name Communist Party and also required applicants to agree to identify themselves as a "Section of the Communist International." But communist strategists have long since attempted to appropriate the term socialist to gain the advantage of appearing associated with liberal and progressive forces throughout the world.

Bona fide established socialist parties and the various types of socialism evolving in the underdeveloped countries of the world differ basically from communism; but the limited comprehension of this fact has failed to counter, generally, the favorable nomenclature the communists have sought.

In our output, we should never call communists anything but communists -- and we should avoid using proper names of countries which have appropriated the word socialist (or people's democracy), or of groups

which have adopted names such as labor or workingmen's organization or party for the same propaganda purposes. Where such misleading words occur in a title or a quotation, we should either put them in quotation marks or add the true identity in parentheses or in a footnote. Our goal is to deny communists the favorable image attached to socialism (or the left): we can start by resisting any further extension of its use -- e.g., in new organizations, in agreements, etc. where they attempt to insert phrases such as "the socialist countries"; and we can give greater currency to their proper title in a concerted movement to supplant their use of misnomers.

We can also, for example: note that they downgrade "socialism" in all their doctrinal works as the last phase (of undesirable societies) before the ultimate achievement of communism; or we can lampoon them for being so obviously ashamed of their proper name.

[See BPG #185: Briefly Noted "Socialism" and "Capitalism" An International Misunderstanding" which draws attention to an article on that subject by Ralph White in the January 1966 issue of Foreign Affairs (reprints available); and Item #991 "Communism and the Myth of the Left." Also, BPG #186 item #997 "Socialist International Congress..." which shows the differences between communism and socialism and carries a note as to the use of terminology.]

* * *

<i>Latin</i>	<u>Will the Soviets Disavow</u>
<i>America</i>	<u>Their Support of Tri-</u>
<i>insistent</i>	<u>Continent Conference?</u>

According to the Uruguayan press, the Uruguayan Government presented the Soviet Ambassador in that country a verbal note on 15 March in which it rejected the contention contained in the Soviet note of

11 February that the Soviet delegates at the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana spoke as private citizens. The Uruguayan note calls upon government of the USSR to condemn all actions which negate or violate the foreign policy principles stated by the USSR, in other words that it disavow its approbation of the policies laid down at Havana. An unclassified attachment reprints an English translation of the verbal note as it appeared in the Uruguayan press. We suggest maximum replay of the note, with appropriate comments based on previous guidances covering the Tri-Continent Conference, especially the Briefly Noted item, "Support of Liberation Struggle," in BPG #186.

* * *

SPECIAL *****
 * on GHANA *****

 by GHANAIANS

A special PRESS COMMENT (18 March 66) has been sent to all regular recipients, containing

*editorials and articles--
 from Ghana publications
 (25 Feb to 8 Mar)*

*first-hand attribution--
 people involved in and
 reacting to the problems
 of Nkrumah's Ghana*

*live accounts--
 portraying attitudes and
 atmosphere in a country
 which rid itself of a
 tyrant.*

* * *

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



Commentary

2-15 March 1966

#74

Principal Developments:

1. The 23rd CPSU Congress remains scheduled for 29 March: numerous clandestine or off-the-record reports describe or forecast plans or intentions of the Soviet leaders and of other CPs for treating the problems of the ICM at that gathering -- but the reports are so divergent that it is difficult to summarize them. Most sources apparently assume that the CPSU has promised not to engage in anti-Chinese polemics or to attempt to use the gathering to isolate or excommunicate the Chinese. On the other hand, a number of sources predict that the Chinese will attend and will attempt to use the forum for a down-the-line denunciation of Soviet policies and objectives, thus precipitating the "organizational demarcation" which the Chinese have been proclaiming in recent months.
2. Overtly, Peking continues to excoriate Moscow on the old charges of selling out the revolutionaries of the world and, specifically, trying to "bring the Vietnam question into the orbit of US-USSR collaboration." Moscow does not reply.
3. Castro replies to Peking's late-February rebuttal of Castro's earlier charges, delivering a long, free-wheeling speech which brands the Chinese leaders as "degenerate" and in their "dotage" (by implication, holding on to their posts after they have become "biologically unable" to run their country), including by name the "god Mao Tse-tung," and predicts that "the Chinese people will settle accounts" with them for their present errors. Castro expresses his opinion that "they have been trying to create a problem, to provoke a break." (The 72-year-old Mao Tse-tung has now been out of public view for 5 months, exceeding his longest recorded previous absence in 1956-57 when he is believed to have suffered a stroke. This absence, plus a recent outpouring of idolatrous propaganda, leads observers to speculate that he may be nearing the end of the road.)
4. A Yugoslav correspondent reports from Moscow that "observers" there emphasize that China's aim is to pressure the USSR to open in Europe a second front of struggle against imperialism and also to push North Korea into a similar move against South Korea.
5. Western correspondents in Moscow report continued rumors there -- traceable to the Chinese Embassy -- of the move of large Soviet troop units into Mongolia in accordance with the 1966 Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance treaty.
6. The Miyamoto-led Japanese CP delegation flies from Peking to Pyongyang. In Europe, Italian CP SecyGen Longo confers with Polish First Secy Gomulka.

in Warsaw, and a Kadar-Kallai Hungarian party-state delegation visits Rumania. Emphasis is on the need for unity, but nothing is heard from either Warsaw or Bucharest about an international CP meeting.

7. The Yugoslav Party CC approves a 17-point resolution embodying such far-reaching economic and social changes that press observers call it a new "greap leap forward -- in revisionism."

8. In neighboring Albania, there is fresh evidence, including an open letter from the Party CC to the population (broadcast 6 March but text not yet received here), of serious factional differences in the leadership, with opposition to Hoxha, reportedly led by Defense Minister Balluku, disturbed by lack of economic progress and Albania's international isolation.

9. Pro-Chinese Communist splinters from most of the countries of South America reportedly held a clandestine conference in Santiago, Chile, at the beginning of March. Reported as violently anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet in tone, though final resolution omits Cuba and makes Soviet revisionism the main enemy (above U.S. imperialism), to be fought to the end and without quarter. NOTE: This is highly sensitive Noform information, FYI only until further notice.

10. A further clandestine report on plans for the 1966 conference of the CPs of the European capitalist countries places it in Vienna 9-11 May. (This is still unconfirmed information, differing slightly from earlier reports -- #71.)

Significance:

Although the 23rd CPSU Congress will be under way or past when this reaches its readers, we (and most of the rest of the world, Communist as well as non-Communist) are still unable to forecast with any assurance prospective developments relating to problems of the ICM.

Meanwhile, the public charges and counter-charges of this period are again concerned almost exclusively with state and national rather than ideological issues.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#74

2-15 March 1966

March 2-5: Italian CP SecyGen Longo meets with Gomulka and other top Polish Party officials in Warsaw, discussing (according to Warsaw PAP) the main problems of the international situation and the ICM and stressing the "decisive importance of unity of action" -- with no mention of any kind of a Communist meeting.

March 6 and 7: Peking People's Daily excoriates Moscow on two successive days. On the 6th, a Commentator article headed "What Are They Up To? -- Comments on the Moscow Talks Between the Leaders of the British and Soviet Governments," includes passages such as the following:

"It is true that the roles played by the British Labor Government and the Soviet Leadership are not entirely the same. The Wilson Government is playing the open, undisguised part. Whenever U.S. imperialism escalates the war, it cheers and applauds; whenever U.S. imperialism peddles its 'peace talks' hoax, it hawks all around the world.

"The Soviet leaders, however, follow a different course. They pretend to support the Vietnamese people by mouthing a few words in condemnation of U.S. imperialism.... But their real aim is to try to lead, by hook or crook, the Vietnamese people to the conference table of 'unconditional discussions' of the Johnson administration to bring about another 'Munich.'"

A highly defensive article entitled "About Twists and Turns" on the 7th acknowledges that even "Comrade Mao has said: 'Like every other activity in the world, revolution always follows a tortuous road and never a straight one,'" and that, although "twists and turns in themselves are not always bad, of course one prefers not to have them." Answering its own question: "What sort of attitude one should take toward the twists and turns in the path of revolutionary advance?" PD declares:

"The attitude of M-Ls and other thoroughgoing revolutionaries is diametrically opposed to that of the opportunists and revisionists: the former do not slacken their vigilance but anticipate possible twists and turns...; and when twists and turns do come, they are never panic-stricken, nor do they sink into passivity and despair....

"Today, whenever a temporary zig-zag appears in the revolutionary road in a certain country, the modern revisionists, like the opportunists of former times, will jubilantly try to peddle their foul proposition for the abolition of revolution.... This is the typical countenance of a renegade...."

March 8: Yugoslav Radio correspondent in Moscow, Milika Sundic, comments on Chinese efforts to stir anti-U.S. hostilities on other fronts:

"...China's aim is not war against the U.S., Moscow observers emphasize. Its aim is pressure on the Soviet Union to open in Europe a second front of struggle against imperialism. The possibility must not be discounted that this is precisely what is being demanded in N. Korea now, with bigger prospects of success than in the case of the Soviet Union, which, contrary to N. Korea, can resist this pressure and recognizes where the opening of a second front in Europe or in the Far East would lead."

March 10-12: Hungarian Party First Secy Kadar and Premier Kallai pay "a friendly visit" to Bucharest, holding talks with top Rumanian party-state officials. Bucharest AGERPRES says "the two parties and governments hold that it is imperatively necessary to make efforts for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion" of the socialist countries and the ICM, -- but makes no mention of any discussion of an international meeting.

March 11: The Miyamoto-led Japanese CP delegation which has been touring in China and N. Vietnam (see also #72 and 73) flies "by special plane" to Pyongyang, with a send-off by Chou En-lai and "more than 4,000 ... well-wishers, beating drums and gongs and waving flowers and banners." Also, New Zealand CP GenSecy Wilcox departs for home from Canton after "a friendly visit" which began with a 2,000-man welcome in Peking on the 3rd.

The Yugoslav Party CC approves a 17-point resolution calling for major economic and social changes, including a welcome to foreign capital investment with the right to take a share of profits out of the country, a formal proclamation of the "right" of every enterprise "to decide freely and independently on the mutual development of all forms of economic cooperation, at home and abroad," and a denunciation of "the usurpation of workers' rights" by Communist bureaucrats. Foreshadowing a purge, it declares:

"Communists cannot treat political and social functions as acquired rights. Recognizing the justified criticism of working people, the leadership must call to responsibility those Communists who have made serious political mistakes and propose their removal from their functions...."

March 12: Djakarta Radio announces that "President - Great Leader of the Revolution" Sukarno on the 11th delegated General Suharto to act on his behalf "to take whatever steps necessary to insure security, and stability of the Government" ... etc. Suharto on the 12th proclaims "Decision of the President - Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Republic Armed Forces - Mandate Bearer of MPRS Great Leader of the

Revolution No. 1/3/1965 (sic)" dissolving the Indonesian CP, "including all of its sister organizations, both in the center and in the regions, and including all organizations which are under its protection," and banning it as an organization "in all territory of the Indonesian Republic." The Western press cites "Western intelligence sources" to the effect that the Indonesian military leaders took over Sukarno's political power because they had come into possession of a secret document signed by Foreign Minister Subandrio and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi outlining a plot to wipe out the Indonesian military leadership, a document which rioting students reportedly found when they ransacked the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

March 13: Speaking more than 4 hours at Havana University on the 9th anniversary of the assault on Batista's Presidential Palace, Cuban Premier Castro waxes increasingly vituperative and personal in his denunciation of the Chinese leaders (among other subjects!):

"... It is painful, and it is shameful at the same time, that in the midst of the battle that our people are obliged to wage against imperialism, we also have to divert our energies to replying to those who until a short time ago we believed to be sincere and honorable allies of the people who fight against that imperialism, to those who until a short time ago we believed to be honorable revolutionaries. It is shameful and painful to see how NCNA can now hardly be distinguished from UPI and AP.

"It is shameful that even the Government of that country has not yet made a reply, but in a belligerent tone threatens like a veritable Jupiter and has limited itself to writing a brief string of insults and saying that it reserves the right to reply. What fear! What terror! What a fearsome threat! What an intimidating threat! [See Chrono #73, Feb. 22, for Chinese "threat" to which Castro refers.]....

"... They are shoddy revolutionaries, theoreticians of a revolutionary war they will never carry out, people who have never fired or will ever fire a shot.... Those are the chorus leaders used by the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic to denigrate the Cuban revolution.... Paper revolutionaries, revolutionaries in theory -- I am not going to say that the Chinese people are not revolutionary.... Those who do not deserve any respect are the others, the salaried ones, the ones who lie for wages, who are the ones who have been used as instruments to accuse Cuba, to launch against Cuba a campaign in the imperialist style, in the Goebbels style, in the fascist style.

"If we are going to argue basically, we must tell some basic truths and we must unmask everything that is of fascist type hidden under Marxist emblems. Of course this story of revolutionaries, who in spite of having done good things in their lives, have committed great barbarities later at the end of their lives,

is not new. During the past we have seen with sorrow the things that men are capable of doing when they degenerate.

... We ... have ... one of the first laws of the revolution, establishing a prohibition against putting the name of any living leader on any street, on any city, on any town, on any factory, on any farm; prohibiting even the statues of living leaders; prohibiting something more -- official photographs in administrative offices.

"This honor goes to this revolution, and I invite the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic to approve a similar law in their country....

"And going back ... to the hope I expressed that all of us men of this revolution, when in obedience to biological law we become unable to run this country, will know enough to leave our posts to other men able to do it better. It is preferable to organize a council of elders, where they are listened to, but in no way allowed to carry out their whims when dotage has seized upon them.

"... Preserve us from the ridiculous belief that we know it all... that we are infallible....

... While the (Tri-Continent) conference was taking place, China published hardly a word about the conference. Then when the conference ends, they began to write and to transmit over NCNA numerous articles talking of the great Chinese victory at the Tri-Continent Conference, taking for themselves all the merit, and presenting in a lying and false manner as a victory for them the results of the Conference....

... Some day the Chinese people will settle accounts in connection with the errors which their leaders are committing with regard to us. They have tried to present to the Chinese people our charge as an act directed against the Chinese people, an anti-Chinese act. There is nothing more infamous, nothing more slanderous....

"We have simply defended ourselves against a cowardly and unmentionable aggression.... It is not important that so many million Chinese can be deceived.... No lie can last for long, and we know that one day the truth will be known. We know that one day, regardless of the fact that today that country makes a god of Mao Tse-tung, one day there will be men capable of seeing objectively, and they will know how to distinguish errors from right actions....

"... We have noticed that the Chinese Embassy has requested a number of permits to take out trunks, luggage, packages, auto-

mobiles, and we assume that their plan is to provoke a break with our country!... In my opinion, they have been trying to create a problem, to provoke a break...."


March 15-16: Western correspondents in Moscow (we have seen dispatches from NYTimes' Grose on 15th and Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet of 16th) report persistent rumors of the movement of large units of Soviet troops into Mongolia under the 1966 Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance treaty: the reports are said to be traceable to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. (See also #73, Feb. 25, for earlier AP report of same.)

999.

WANTED:

THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

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SITUATION: In going to the assistance of South Vietnam the U.S. has shouldered a burden of benefit to the whole free world. This effort has received considerable free world support, but more is required. The tragic cost to the U.S. in the lives of her fighting men is growing inexorably and the consumption of military hardware and cost of civilian economic aid for South Vietnam will rise this year to a tremendous \$10,500,000,000.* The casualties already suffered and the money already spent have not finished the job in Vietnam -- even though they have begun to turn the tide. Defense Secretary McNamara has just authorized (2 March) an increase in U.S. forces to 235,000 men and is already preparing Congress and the public for another boost by assuring the nation that the U.S. forces in Vietnam can be increased to 350,000 without calling up the reserves.

World-wide public support and governmental aid for Vietnam is essential -- and should be an obligation accepted by all. South Vietnam needs help against its enemies -- the communist aggressors from the North -- who are also the enemies of the entire free world. In answering South Vietnam's cry for help, the U.S. has been fulfilling duties to the world. It is now time for the free world to recognize that the reality in Vietnam -- Communist aggression -- is a vital concern of all free nations.

U.S. official efforts have drawn material and military support from allies; but Vice President Humphrey's mission to muster country support for South Vietnam did not elicit as much as could be hoped. Formal efforts will continue, of course, but a non-attributable, world-wide effort is now needed to persuade third countries that the battle in Vietnam is theirs also and that separation by distance and ocean mean very little in the way of protection in the nuclear age. Since self-interest is the driving force behind any nation's offer of assistance in a situation like that in Vietnam, this

*as of early March 1966, 2,314 Americans had been killed and 11,472 had been wounded.

Department of Defense estimates that the monetary cost of the war will run \$10 billion for purely military needs and \$500 million for help to the South Vietnamese civilians in 1966.

can be used to U.S. advantage today -- not in reminding our allies what they owe us for our investment of billions in foreign aid after World War II, but in pointing out that it is to their own interest to see communist aggression blocked in the Far East. Only after the war is finished in Vietnam can Southeast Asia and the Far East be at peace.

[See unclassified attachments:

Chart from U.S. News and World Report, 14 March 1966, showing free world aid to South Vietnam.

Quotations from prominent citizens or high level officials in third countries expressing support for forces fighting communist aggression in Vietnam.

Expressions of support on part of private citizens of third countries]

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CASTRO FACES NEW DIFFICULTIES

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SITUATION: The trial on 8-9 March 1966 in Havana of seven persons accused of a plot to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro was widely interpreted in Cuba as a phony show-trial, designed to provide an excuse for eliminating several of Castro's opponents. The trial itself gave every evidence of being staged, with the principal defendant abjectly declaring his guilt, blaming his failing on a "disorderly life of parties, cabarets, vices, and all the things involved, including drugs." "If I must die, I will die shouting 'Long Live the Revolution and Long Live Fidel! Fatherland or Death!'", proclaimed Major Cubelas, a comrade-in-arms of Castro in the Escambray mountains in the struggle against Batista.


As the trial neared its end Castro unexpectedly sent a letter to the prosecutor requesting that the original demand for the death of the chief defendants be dropped. It is believed that the motivation for this surprise move was in good part the widespread protest movement which arose among the students at Havana University. Their signs painted on university walls went so far as to threaten Castro's life if he executed the accused. There is also evidence that this protest struck a sympathetic chord among the armed forces, where Major Cubelas and another defendant, Major Guin, enjoyed a certain prestige as a result of their role in the revolution.

The protests of the students are in turn symptomatic of growing popular discontent on the island, where Castro's Communist dictatorship is, by its own admission, in very difficult times. Sugar production is not meeting expectations, per capita food production is off by one third compared to pre-Castro times, and the rice ration has been reduced to three pounds per month from the former level of 11 pounds. Other indicators of discontent are the defections of Cubans abroad and the continued exodus of refugees to the United States. The airlift from Varadero to Miami is carrying out from 3,500 to 4,000 refugees per month, and the waiting list still grows. Some 200,000 Cubans have applied for exit permits and Cuban refugees in the United States have submitted the names of almost one million persons they believe would leave if they had the chance.

Castro is also having his troubles on the international scene. The blatant call to armed revolution which issued from the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana served more to stiffen the opposition to Castro than to frighten shaky governments. Most of all, Castro must be haunted by the spectres of fellow dictators Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah -- all overthrown by their own military forces.

That these troubles weigh on Castro was clearly in evidence in his speech at the University of Havana on 13 March. Displaying a defensive, whining, petulant state of mind which contrasted starkly with the ebullient, aggressive, optimistic Castro of years past, he lashed out at a "degenerate," "feeble-minded" Mao Tse-tung, called Chilean President Frei "a liar," and the CIA: "this plague of rascals who in all the ports of the world, in all the cities of the capitalist world, await the Cuban merchant ships and besiege the diplomatic and commercial officials of our country. Anybody who reads that captain so-and-so abandoned such-and-such a ship, or this commercial attaché or the other ambassador deserted, and who judges our people by that, would be making a tremendous mistake, because he would be judging our people by that weak, vacillating, cowardly, corrupt, conscienceless, unprincipled, characterless tribe that lets itself be bought for a few paltry pesos."


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1001.

SOVIET MARITIME POWER GROWS --
for Legitimate and Illicit Uses.

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SITUATION: Because of their potential use for aggressive and defensive purposes, the Soviet merchant fleet (SMF) and Soviet fisheries are considered jointly. Together they give the Soviets an increasing presence on high seas and shore bases throughout the world. (See attached map.) They provide the Soviets with a force in-being to concentrate on objectives in particular areas. Besides contributing to the development of Soviet sea power the SMF and fisheries are economically advantageous.

Soviet Merchant fleet. In 1965 the Soviets' share of total world seaborne foreign trade amounted to only 7 to 8 percent; it is expected to rise to about a tenth by 1970. However, the growth in tonnage and the performance of the fleet, now sixth in the world, has been rapid and is expected to continue.* Whereas the Soviets depended on foreign-owned vessels for the shipment of well over half of their seaborne cargoes in 1958-64, they were able to ship half of their cargo in their own ships in 1965 (and they have never been known to suffer delays in shipping military goods [Secret]). By 1970, they are estimated to be able to ship about two thirds of their cargoes in their own vessels. To a limited extent, they will also be able to service shipping needs of other countries during lulls in their own demand.

*1958 to 1965 the fleet increased to a total of 8.4 million deadweight tons -- about 150 percent. In ten years ending 1965, seaborne cargo increased by about 400 percent to 56 million tons, and the ton-miles increased by almost 1,000 percent to 176 billion. The five-year plan programs a tonnage increase of 50 percent, 1966-70, and ton-miles performance by 82 percent. (Western analysis based on unclassified sources)

The major economic results of these improvements will be a saving of scarce convertible currencies and the benefits from exercising closer control over their shipments.

Fisheries. The growth of the Soviet fishing fleet, now one of the world's largest, has been even more remarkable than that of the SMF. But the growth of the fish catch, while substantial, has not been commensurate with the increase of fishing facilities.* This disparity provides support for the widely held belief that some of the Soviets' purported fishing activity is a cover for other activities. And, according to a recent Moscow broadcast, in 1966-1970 "larger and more up-to-date ships are to be built which will be able to operate efficiently in any ocean of the world." Presumably, the broadcast refers to ships of a size up to and including the 43,000 displacement ton factory ship now under construction in Leningrad. Besides its canning and freezing facilities this ship will carry 20 small trawlers on its deck.

The fishing industry contributes almost 15 percent of the animal protein consumed in the USSR. Its low time and investment costs have spurred Soviet planners to program in 1966-70 an increase in the catch by 50 percent or more.

The geographical areas of Soviet fishing activity -- actual and potential -- are shown on the attached map. Also shown are the land bases for fishing activities in Africa, South America, Asia, and Caribbean which the Soviets have either established or have shown an interest in establishing. Another revelation of the geographic scope of Soviet fishing activities is indicated by the industry's significant auxiliary, the world's largest and most active fleet of oceanographic vessels. This fleet consists of at least 18 well-equipped vessels from which Soviet scientists have conducted research in: the Northeast, Northwest, Central, and South Atlantic; the Caribbean; the Mediterranean; the Red Sea; the Indian Ocean; the Arctic; the Antarctic; and the Pacific. (Details of last sentence S E C R E T.)

Intelligence collection and support for navy: This coverage by the fishing ships, plus the sealanes which are or could be covered by Soviet merchant ships, provide the Soviets with a virtually unlimited scope of operations on the high seas. The Soviets have taken advantage of several opportunities to use fishing and merchant ships for the collection of

*1948-1955: fishing fleet horsepower increased by 242 percent (to 834,200) and the number of ships by 244 percent (to 10,872) while the fish catch (including whales and other sea animals) increased only by 74 percent (to 2,737,000 tons).

1965: fish catch exceeded original plan by 26 percent and was 112 percent more than 1955, compared to an increase in the fleet's horsepower by 193 percent. (Western analysis based on unclassified sources.)

intelligence and support of their navy. Such uses have been extensive electronic monitoring and photography of US and Allied naval vessels on maneuver and US missile and space shots, and refueling of naval vessels on the high seas. (Secret)

Most of the Soviet intelligence collection has been performed by trawlers stripped of their fishing gear which has been replaced by electronic equipment. It is noteworthy that no Soviet fishing trawler so equipped has ever been registered at a non-bloc port. (Secret)

Potential uses: Of greater concern, however, are the potential uses to which such vessels could be put. Among the numerous fears which have been raised, the more plausible are the following: landing of small guerrilla or sabotage units; logistic support of Soviet submarines and other warships on the high seas; expanded intelligence collection by electronic means; guidance of submarine-launched missiles through precise mapping of ocean topography and by stationing well-equipped vessel between shore and distant submarines; detection and reporting of other nations' submarines by trawlers (between 200 and 800 of them fish in the NE Atlantic on a year-round basis). (Secret)

Soviet penetration objectives and methods: A separate but related problem arises in the sphere of Soviet aid in the establishment of fisheries in underdeveloped countries. As shown on the attached map, the Soviets have completed or are building fisheries in 6 countries and have entered into discussions with 5 other countries about establishing fisheries with Soviet aid. Not only does this form of aid provide the Soviets land bases far from their own shores for possible uses in intelligence collection and naval support, but it also has been an early step in the penetration of underdeveloped countries.

Soviet fisheries activities in 3 African countries -- Ghana, Somalia, and Senegal -- yield some insight into the Soviet methods and objectives. In Ghana, a fishery was among the first batch of projects discussed, and was included in the August 1960 agreement which provided the first USSR credit given Ghana. This economic agreement preceded the first Soviet military aid to Ghana by an estimated 1 to 2 years. In Somalia, a fish cannery was on the original list of projects under the June 1961 economic aid agreement with the USSR. The first Soviet military aid to Somalia dates from November 1963, almost 2 1/2 years later. In Senegal, the first and only economic aid agreement, signed in November 1964, covered the construction of a tuna-fishing complex.

From the foregoing it can be speculated that the Soviets use fisheries as a lure in the early stages of their economic-political-military penetration of underdeveloped countries. The recently publicized espionage and insurgency activities in Ghana and the Soviet focus on Somalia for their military assistance and instruction in East Africa serve as a warning against possible Soviet motives in offering assistance in establishing fisheries.

Activities by other bloc countries: In addition to the Soviet efforts along these lines, account should be taken of some of the activities of other bloc countries. Poland was active in the preliminary steps to set up a fishery in Guinea; recently however, the Soviets are reportedly taking over this activity. East Germany has supplied 10 fishing vessels on credit to Tunisia under an April 1964 agreement. And the Bulgarians and Ethiopians have discussed a joint venture to develop the fishing industry of Ethiopia.

TREATMENT: General treatment of the



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
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1002.

MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS

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SITUATION: May 1 (May Day), first proposed by the Second Socialist International in 1889 as a day for world-wide labor demonstrations, will be observed as Labor Day in many free and in all the Communist-controlled countries. Celebrations will range from entertainment, to serious rallies, marches, parades, demonstrations, and possibly to riots. In the Communist countries, May Day is a government-organized propaganda spectacle; and in certain Free World countries Communists are the most active May Day celebrants. Originally, May Day celebrations sought to muster international labor solidarity, primarily in European countries but also in the U.S., Cuba and Chile, for an eight-hour work day. This year, May Day will most likely also give occasion to protests -- be it in the form of resolutions or of demonstrations at U.S. embassies on the war in Vietnam.

It is somewhat ironical that the big achievements made by labor, especially in the advanced countries, have made the masses of non-Communist workers increasingly apathetic to May Day celebrations, even in the many countries where May Day is a paid holiday today. With the improved living standards and the faster-living societies, the accent is more on private or family relaxation in a great variety of forms rather than on organized political, socio-economic or similar activities. Where free labor demands largely have been satisfied domestically, the accent of May Day celebrations is on labor's role in international affairs, and in such instances labor leaders and socialists tend to feel that further justified demands can well be met without parades. On the other hand, the modified character of May Day has drawn some non-socialists into the ranks of the celebrants.

Free World labor organizations (ICFTU and its affiliates, as well as the Socialist International and its member parties [see also BPG 186 Item #997] now emphasize on May Day the need for social and economic progress for the working masses in the developing countries -- i.e., the battle against hunger and disease, the closing of the gap between "have" and "have-not" nations, etc. -- which, if not attained, will lead to frustration and unrest and ultimately to dictatorship. In these situations, they consider the rights and role of free labor a vital one. In countries where labor unions are state-controlled (Communist, fascist or military dictatorships), free labor deplores the exploitation of workers under these systems, i.e., less than decent pay, inadequate housing, sub-standard working conditions, inhuman labor discipline, production "norms," denial of basic workers' rights, etc.

Communist governments and Communists in the Free World exploit May Day for political objectives. During the month of April Communist countries issue May Day greetings to fellow Communist regimes and to selected governments outside the Communist sphere as well as a series of May Day slogans. These proclamations have consistently reflected the propaganda image which the issuer wishes to project in matters of domestic or foreign policy and on problems within the International Communist Movement (disarmament, peace, agriculture, space, "peaceful coexistence," colonialism, "national liberation," Vietnam, Dominican Republic, etc.) In Communist countries, the day is marked by mass rallies or parades, speeches of officials, marching workers, military reviews and display of military hardware and by disinterest on the part of the general public. Communist May Day celebrations in the Free World generally reflect the interests, orientation and objectives of the local party: In affluent countries, emphasis is on international issues; in the developing countries, or where organized May Day celebrations are repressed, the focus is more on local issues which are of interest to the workers. In any event, however, it is primarily in the underdeveloped countries where Communist exploitation of May Day presents a threat.

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
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THE PRAGMATIC POLICIES AND
PERSONAL DIPLOMACY OF AYUB KHAN

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SITUATION: Pakistan's Fear of India Continues to Dominate Its Foreign Policy. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan, which drew to an inconclusive close with the cease-fire agreement of 22 September 1965, marked the alteration of the framework of great power relationships with the subcontinent, but left the basic issues between the two countries still unsettled. Pakistan sees itself in a struggle for survival against India, a struggle symbolized by Kashmir.

The immediate aftermath of the conflict was a conviction that Pakistan's worst fears had been realized, and caused Pakistan to test international friendships by the measure of support given it against India. According to Pakistan, Communist China alone among the big powers stood by Pakistan. The result was a bitter Pakistan, unmindful of past support, deeply skeptical of the Western alliance and sensing abandonment by the United States in favor of India.

During the seven months since the cease-fire, Ayub Khan has held private talks with President Johnson in Washington in December 1965; with Prime Minister Shastri and Premier Kosygin at Tashkent in January 1966; with Vice-President Humphrey in Pakistan in February 1966. These exertions in personal diplomacy have resulted in a new and more pragmatic approach to Pakistan's foreign alignments. Ayub has recently displayed a keener appreciation of Pakistan's continuing requirements for US (and Western) aid for economic stability, while at the same time counting on friendship with Communist China for political tranquility and insurance against future Indian aggression.

On 1 March 1966, Ayub expressed his current reappraisal of the political necessities of national survival: "The guiding principle of our foreign policy is that differences among other countries should not interfere with our relations with them. Consequently, alongside our ties of sincere friendship with China, we are developing friendly relations with the United States on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other."

Pattern of Personal Diplomacy Established By Ayub.

The frank talks held in private between President Johnson and Ayub helped to improve the atmosphere between Pakistan and the United States, and gave each leader a better understanding of the policies of the other. These private talks also set a pattern of personal diplomacy which Ayub continued at Tashkent. The most important were those held between Ayub and Shastri alone: Pakistani spokesmen emphasized the value of these direct contacts between the responsible leaders of the two countries. While Pakistan certainly did not achieve a victory over India in Tashkent, a basis was established from which fruitful negotiations could proceed. (At least equally important, from the Pakistan point of view, was the role of the Soviet Union as that of an impartial friend of India and Pakistan rather than that of a partisan of India.) But Shastri's sudden death created new uncertainties just when the relations between India and Pakistan showed signs of improvement. The friendly personal relations which Ayub appears to have established with Shastri have lost their effect on future Indo-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, Ayub had regarded the pending visit to Washington by Shastri as the third important part in the round of discussions begun by Ayub's talks in Washington. Washington's attitude towards India, in Ayub's view, would have had to confirm the US attitude towards Pakistan as clarified to him in Washington in December. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has pledged her government's support to the Tashkent Declaration signed by Shastri, the momentum of the personal diplomacy established by Ayub with Shastri is lost, and the extent of mutual understanding possible between Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub is still an unknown factor.

Resolution of Kashmir Basic to Indo-Pakistan Dispute.

Both Pakistan and India realize -- helped by the insistence of the US and the Soviet Union -- that some accommodation and eventual reconciliation between them is essential, but both are seemingly intransigent about Kashmir. Neither government can afford to move too fast or too far from positions in which each is so firmly entrenched. Public opinion in both countries reflect the emotionally charged climate resulting from the conflict over Kashmir. Demonstrations against the Tashkent Declaration have occurred in both India and Pakistan, each side citing the Declaration as a betrayal of the Kashmir people, and even more, an acknowledgment of defeat in the bitter three-week war.

President Ayub has termed the Tashkent Declaration a beginning and not an end. Both countries have completed the withdrawal of their forces to positions held prior to the armed conflict in September 1965 and met the 25 February 1966 deadline, as outlined in the Declaration.


The first Ministerial talks called for in the Tashkent agreement were held in Rawalpindi the end of February, with another scheduled for late March. No significant progress was made in solving the sources of dissension, although Pakistan insists that the talks produced one minor accomplishment. By undertaking extensive discussion on Kashmir, India in

effect, tacitly acknowledged that its claim to the area is a proper subject for negotiation. This is looked upon as a step forward by Pakistan, since at the time of the cease fire, victory could be claimed by neither side.... Pakistan did achieve its tactical purpose of bringing the long-simmering Kashmir question to international attention, although falling far short of its ultimate goal of removing Kashmir from Indian control.

Neither Ayub nor his Foreign Minister Bhutto has given any evidence of compromise regarding Kashmir in their consideration of foreign policy. Winding up the debates in the Pakistan National Assembly on 15 March, Bhutto categorically stated that Pakistan will never accept a non-war pact with India as long as the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, and that the Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was merely a "declaration of intent" and not a contractual obligation.

(The unclassified attachment provides a review of the developments of the Kashmir situation, the changing relationships between Pakistan and the US; Pakistan and Communist China; Pakistan and the USSR.)

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Fact Sheets

March 1966

Official statements supporting forces fighting communist aggression in South Vietnam

Philippines: Former President of the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal, who was making an extended tour of Latin America, was asked while in Argentina in January 1966, his opinion of the U.S. role in Vietnam. Macapagal's reply was carried in all Buenos Aires morning papers on 24 January:

"I think (U.S. intervention in Vietnam) has been very opportune, because it has prevented that part of Asia from falling under communist domination. The situation has greatly improved with the increase in American troops and our hopes have grown that democracy will continue in the Far East."

Philippines: The newly-elected (November 1965) President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, in discussing Philippine contributions to the Vietnam conflict stated that he feels it is essential for the Philippines to send more than engineers to Vietnam to augment the small group of civilian Filipino doctors and technicians already there. The Philippines will spend \$350 million to send the engineers. In discussing this expenditure and related matters on 22 February 1966, Marcos told the Filipino people:

"If South Vietnam falls we may have to spend \$350 million for the defense of the Philippines . . . (it is our intention to make our commitment in Vietnam) more meaningful . . . the necessity for stopping this aggression is obvious. If we sat by complacently awaiting the uncertain arrival of peace, we might wake up to find that we had nothing left to negotiate about."

Marcos went on to say that if the communists win in Vietnam, "that victory will signal the reactivation of Communist insurgency all over Southeast Asia, including the Philippines . . . assisting Vietnam today constitutes one form of guarantee that communist activity does not arise in our country again."

West Germany: During 1965 German publishers in West Berlin initiated a fund raising campaign for the material and moral support of the South Vietnamese people. At the end of the December 1965, 133,473 DM (about \$33,368US) had been collected. On 1 March 1966 a number of Berlin newspapers thanked contributors to the fund in identical articles which reported the use of much of the fund for the purchase of medical supplies:

"In the light of the meaningful, humanitarian purpose of this project on behalf of the suffering people of South Vietnam, pharmaceutical houses . . . responded to the appeal with such open-heartedness and charity that the actual market value of the drugs supplied was three times the sum collected....

"Special gratitude is due the German Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross for aid in the packaging and transporting of medical supplies to Vietnam.

"In late January 1966 a delegation of the publishers association delivered the initial shipment of medical supplies to South Vietnam's Social Minister in Saigon. This gesture was received by the Vietnamese public with considerable gratitude.

"Berlin daily newspapers have learned that (their) initiative has led to the development of worldwide attention to the social problems of these people who have lived under war-time conditions for 25 years. (We) once again thank all the participants for this successful demonstration of humanitarian unity."

West Germany: During January and February 1966 West German Minister of the Interior Luecke has been carrying on discussions with various German firms regarding contributions German industry could make to the South Vietnamese war effort. In January 1966 Luecke stated that:

"Federal Republic of Germany is in agreement that there should be a substantial and well-coordinated German aid effort for Vietnam . . . to make the German people more fully aware that their own interests are at stake there."

Luecke is also organizing a publicity campaign to explain the Vietnamese situation to the German public and to enlist popular support through public contributions for a CARE-type of program.

West Germany: In press conference given 2 March 1966 when Walter Scheel, West German Minister of Economic Cooperation was asked about West German aid for South Vietnam, he replied:

"The Federal Republic of Germany has comprehension for the difficult problem the U.S. faces in Southeast Asia and considers that the U.S. is defending the freedom of the people of that country and of other people in the world....

"We should be grateful to the U.S. for thus engaging itself in the defense of freedom."

Belgium: In a speech delivered in Brussels on 7 March 1966, Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister and former Secretary General of NATO posed a series of questions to his audience stressing the far reaching implications of what was going on in Vietnam:

"In 1960, the North Vietnamese CP declared (publicly) that the objective of North Vietnam was the conquest of South Vietnam - that is the way the affair began . . . little by little North Vietnam sent troops into South Vietnam . . . it was then and only then that the U.S. intervened.

"If the U.S. does not observe one among the commitments it has made in various parts of the world, how can the rest of the world believe that it will respect other engagements? Here, we are directly concerned. (Should) . . . the U.S., which has a treaty with South Vietnam . . . fail to honor it . . .? Is there anyone who would dare to suggest that the free peoples of Asia are not menaced by Chinese imperialism?

"Much more is at stake in the Vietnam conflict than simply the independence or the servitude of South Vietnam. If the Americans were voluntarily to abandon Vietnam, why should they remain in any Asian country? I am astounded and stupefied when I receive petitions asking . . . peace in Vietnam. Of the belligerents, which ones unceasingly offer peace under reasonable conditions? The Americans and the South Vietnamese. Who obstinately refuse? North Vietnam supported by Communist China."

Spain: The Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga made the front pages in Bern on 5 March 1966 in discussing the obligations of European nations to assist in what is also Europe's battle in Asia:

"The U.S. is fulfilling duties to the world. The most one could charge is that they should patiently wait until the necessity of their battle is gratefully recognized by some hundred nations and a billion people who seek protection behind American soldiers . . . it would be better if . . . European nations - a United States of Europe - stood together with the United States of America against Chinese imperialism . . . for their fight is our fight."

Italy: At the end of a week long visit to Argentina in January 1966 the Italian Defense Minister Giulio Andreotti, made a statement warning against abandonment of Vietnam. The Buenos Aires Herald of 22 January 1966 quoted from Andreotti's speech:

"It is not a question of United States prestige but to avoid leaving all Asia and the Philippines at the mercy of Red China. Italy appreciates and shares the desire for

peace but feels that peace cannot be gained at the cost of abandoning Vietnam to the hands of the communists." Andreotti added, "United States withdrawal would also give China an open road to Australia."

Canada: In late 1965, a Toronto group of (primarily) students formed an organization called "Canadian Volunteers for Vietnam" to recruit 900-1200 Canadians for induction in the U.S. armed forces as a unit. The convictions and aims of the group have been embodied in a charter from which a few quotes follow:

"The governments of Communist China and her satellites are determined to extend their system . . . over the entire world, and are willing to employ military force to this end . . . only a conviction of the capacity and willingness of the U.S. and her allies will persuade China and her satellites of the unfeasibility of extending their system by warlike means.

"... all free men have an interest in a U.S. victory in Vietnam. Only through such a military victory can come the fruits of American financial and technical aid to the development of this troubled, sorely distressed country."

US News and World Report, 14 March 1966

What the rest of the free world gives to South Vietnam—

AUSTRALIA—1,400 combat infantrymen with logistic support. Also: 1 million textbooks, 3,300 tons of roofing, 6 windmills, 15,750 sets of hand tools, 400 radios, 16,000 blankets, 14,000 cases of milk.

AUSTRIA—Blankets and medicines. No troops.

BELGIUM—Medicines. No troops.

BRAZIL—Coffee and medical supplies. No troops.

CANADA—1 professor, 130 scholarships, a new science building at Hue University, \$850,000 worth of flour and butter. No troops.

CHINA (NATIONALIST)—500,000 textbooks, 80-man agricultural team, 2 surgical teams, 26 warehouses, tools, seeds and fertilizer. Government has offered troops, has been turned down.

DENMARK—Medical supplies. No troops.

ECUADOR—Medical assistance. No troops.

FRANCE—600 educators, medical and technical personnel. No troops.

GERMANY (WEST)—23 professors, physicians and technical advisers, 30 ambulances, 20 million dollars in credits, radio batteries. Promised: 3,000-ton hospital ship, additional people and credits. No troops.

GREECE—Medical supplies. No troops.

GUATEMALA—15,000 doses of typhoid vaccine. No troops.

INDIA—Clothing for flood relief. No troops.

IRAN—22-man medical team, 1,000 tons of petroleum. No troops.

IRELAND—\$2,800 in cash. No troops.

ISRAEL—Pharmaceutical supplies. No troops.

ITALY—9-man surgical team, science scholarships. No troops.

JAPAN—55 million dollars in World War II reparations, 6-man medical team, 20,000 radios, 25 ambulances. No troops.

KOREA (SOUTH)—20,321 troops now in South Vietnam, 20,000 more promised. Also: mobile surgical hospital, 3 ships.

LAOS—\$4,167 in cash for flood relief. No troops.

LUXEMBOURG—Plasma and blood-transfusion equipment. No troops.

MALAYSIA—Counterinsurgency training for 2,000 South Vietnamese air-men. No troops.

NETHERLANDS—2 surgical teams, 1 dredge, \$2,000 worth of antibiotics. No troops.

NEW ZEALAND—150 troops in howitzer battery. Also: surgical team, \$200,000 science building.

PAKISTAN—Clothing and \$10,000 cash for flood relief. No troops.

PHILIPPINES—2,000 troops to come if Philippine Congress approves. Already furnished: 70 persons in medical and psychological-warfare teams.

SPAIN—Medical team, medicines, blankets. No troops.

SWITZERLAND—30 microscopes. No troops.

THAILAND—Cement, certain classified aid. No troops.

TURKEY—Medical supplies. Cement promised. No troops.

UNITED KINGDOM—11 police instructors, a professor of English, some technical and construction equipment. No troops.

VENEZUELA—500 tons of rice. No troops.

28 March 1966

CASTRO'S MOUNTING TROUBLES

The growth of Castro's troubles seems to be accelerating; at least that is the deduction to be made from the 8-9 March trial in Havana of seven persons accused of plotting the assassination of the Cuban premier. Actually, it developed during the course of the trial that only three of the defendants were really accused of the assassination plot; three others had unwittingly become involved in a plan to buy an escape boat, and another, it turned out, was in the dock on the much used charge of being a spy for the CIA.

The leader of the group of plotters was Army Major Rolando Cubelas Secades, a former member of the Revolutionary Directorate, once a powerful anti-Batista organization. In March 1957 he had taken part in an abortive attack against Batista's presidential palace and had subsequently become military leader of the Directorate's guerrilla forces in the Escambray Mountains during the prolonged struggle against the Batista dictatorship. He was named Deputy Minister of Interior in the first revolutionary government. Subsequently, he returned to medical school, where he was appointed president of the powerful Federation of University Students as a result of which he gained considerable popularity among the students. He graduated from medical school in 1962 and was then named director of the Manuel Fajardo Hospital in Havana, one of Cuba's largest.

Also implicated in the alleged assassination plot were Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta, who had been secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and had apparently been in close contact with anti-Castro exiles, and Alberto Blanco Romariz, who had been sent abroad by Castro's secret service as a spy, but who had immediately put himself at the service of the anti-Castro exiles. Three persons were accused of attempting to arrange for the purchase of a get-away boat; one of them was convicted, though the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he was aware that there was an ulterior purpose behind his friend's request for help in buying a boat for weekend fishing; the other two were acquitted.

Thrown into the trial as an accessory, on the accusation that he was aware of the plot but hadn't reported it to the authorities, was Major Ramon Guin Diaz. Guin, only 31 years old, had served under Cubelas as a guerrilla fighter in the Escambray Mountains. Since the revolution he has served as a high official of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform.

The trial. The conduct of the trial was obviously carefully staged by Castro's minions to be a convincing demonstration of the guilt of the accused. This was an extremely important point for Castro because the two major defendants were important, well-known figures. They bore the highest rank in the Cuban army, that of major, they had

(Cont.)

fought with him in the hills against Batista, they had been important officials in establishing the regime after the revolution, in short, their revolutionary credentials were as authentic as his -- and yet they set out to assassinate him for his perversion of the revolutionary cause. Castro was obviously concerned over the support and sympathy they might have among the military, which constitute the single most important source of support for the regime, and among the students, the breeding ground of political discontent in Cuba.

Because it was too carefully staged, perhaps, the trial succeeded in horrifying many observers. Major Cubelas, a guerrilla fighter, leader of an attack against the presidential palace, a leading light of the revolution, abjectly declared his guilt, blaming his failing on "a disorderly life, a life of parties, cabarets, vices, and all the things involved, including drugs." He shouted: "If I must die, I will die shouting 'Long Live the Revolution and Long Live Fidel. Fatherland or Death!'" At times the testimony was pure rote:

Question: Cubelas Secades, what, in your view, is the punishment merited by [your] conduct?

Cubelas: The worst!

Question: What do you mean by "the worst?"

Cubelas: The wall.

Question: What do you mean by "the wall?"

Cubelas: Deserved execution by a firing squad.

Question: And what is execution by firing squad?

Cubelas: Execution by firing squad is the punishment for those who commit errors such as this.

Question: And what is the consequence of the execution?

Cubelas: The consequence of the execution by firing squad? Well, the decision the court may have taken on . . .

Question (interrupting -- evidently because Cubelas had missed his cue): But what is the consequence of execution by firing squad?

Cubelas: The consequence of execution by firing squad is loss of life.

Question: Loss of life? Do you want to lose your life, or not?

Cubelas: I deserve to be executed, that's what I deserve.

Perhaps some day some scholar will prepare a dissertation on the staged trial as a necessary phase in the evolution of the Communist state, drawing on the abundant material available in the archives of Moscow, Prague, Peking, and elsewhere.

In sum, Guin, Gallarretta and Blanco also dutifully admitted their guilt. The other three acknowledged their tangential involvement in the purchase of a boat, but firmly denied any knowledge of the assassination plot. The prosecutor demanded the death penalty for the four leaders and 30 year prisons sentences for the other three.

The imposition of the sentences demanded by the prosecutor seemed a foregone conclusion until, in a last-minute letter to the prosecutor, Fidel Castro requested that "you not ask the court for the death sentence for any of the accused." As a result, Majors Cubelas and Guin were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and Gallarretta and Blanco each received 20 year terms. Two of those involved in the getaway boat were absolved and one, Juan Alsina Navarro, was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Castro's "intervention." The motivation of Castro's intervention puzzled observers until the explanation leaked out through refugees recently arrived in Miami: the trial had stirred widespread unrest among both the military and the students. One refugee reported seeing an old, emaciated horse which had been left grazing in a neighborhood where many of the government leaders have their residences. The horse carried a sign which read: "No me empujen. Yo me caigo solo" (do not push, I will fall by myself). This was an obvious reference to Fidel Castro who is referred to by the public as "El Caballo" (The Horse). Other refugees reported seeing signs on walls in the University of Havana area which read: "Fidel, Cabeza Paga Cabeza" (Fidel, one head pays for another head), which can only be taken as a direct threat of reprisal against the premier's life should the prisoners be executed. Other refugees reported additional signs and also a student demonstration march which had to be broken up by the police and by firemen using water hoses. According to other reports, there were widespread arrests in the western end of the island: some seventy persons arrested, including some military. The most common interpretation of these extraordinary protests was that both the students and the military viewed the charges as trumped up reasons for eliminating Castro opponents.

Student opposition. Actually student unrest existed well before the trial, which served principally to exacerbate the situation. The older complaints were against the political indoctrination which has largely replaced education, frequent purges of teachers and students,

often under the guise of eliminating homosexuality, and, most of all, protest against the closing of the universities for one or two months in the cane cutting season to force students and teachers into the cane fields to help in the harvest. In the lower schools there has been discontent over the hiring of totally unqualified teachers. Because of the large numbers of teachers applying to leave Cuba for refuge in the United States, the Ministry of Education appealed on 5 February for youths to undertake a five-month teachers' training course. The only academic qualification stipulated was the completion of primary education!

Military opposition. There has also been considerable opposition to the regime by the military, the very forces which constitute the backbone of Castro's authoritarian regime. In April 1961, Major Humberto Sori Marin and Rafael Diaz, an engineer, were executed after being accused of an assassination attempt. And in October 1961 the Cuban police foiled an attempt to fire several bazooka shells at the balcony of the Presidential Palace, where Castro was scheduled to speak. Again, in the summer of 1965 a Cuban Air Force pilot was executed after failing in an attempt to shoot down a plane carrying Fidel Castro. On 7 February 1966, Raul Castro, Minister of the Armed Forces, spoke about the difficulties they were having in recruiting regular army officers and technicians. He suggested that party members in the armed forces should work to improve the image of the army among non-party civilian families. This would seem to be a rather urgent necessity in view of the trial of Major and Cubelas and the others.

Indeed the image was even further sullied by the announcement on 17 March that the Vice Minister of the Armed Forces (i.e. second only to Raul Castro) Major Efigenio Almeijeiras was dismissed, stripped of his rank, and would be court-martialed for "activities contrary to revolutionary morals." Almeijeiras was one of the original cohorts of Fidel Castro, having participated in the attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in July 1953, having been with Castro in exile in Mexico, and having been one of the 12 survivors of the small band that landed on the coast of Oriente Province. Reportedly several dozen other government officials were arrested at the same time as Almeijeiras and they will also be tried for "antisocial activities."

Other symptoms of unrest have appeared with increasing frequency in recent months. There seems to have been a veritable flood of merchant marine officers deserting the Cuban ship of state. One Cuban merchantman sailed from Japan without insurance coverage because Castro apparently couldn't provide a qualified captain to replace the one who defected in Tokyo. There has been a steady stream of defections from the Cuban diplomatic service, including ambassadors and ministers. And, of course, the airlift of refugees from Cuba to the United States continues. Although 3,500 to 4,000 persons are flown out each month,

the waiting list gets longer and longer. Some 200,000 Cubans have already applied for exit permits, and Cubans in the United States have submitted the names of almost one million relatives they believe would leave Cuba, given a chance. (Cuba's population is only 7 million.)

Failures. These symptoms of discontent reflect the all-too-obvious failure of Communism in Cuba, where the economy is falling to pieces. Despite Castro's early boasts of freeing the nation from dependence on sugar, Cuba is now more a one-crop economy than ever. In 1965 sugar production of 6,050,000 tons barely equalled the 1952-59 average of pre-Castro Cuba; production of rice, root crops, and corn fell to half of the pre-Castro levels; the cut in rice imports from China has forced a reduction in the monthly rice ration to 3 pounds per person (compared to an average 10 pounds per month consumption pre-Castro). Overall, total agricultural output last year was almost 15 percent lower than the 1957-59 level, and per capita food output, exclusive of sugar, was about a third lower.

On the international front, too, Castro is in serious trouble. His blatant call to armed revolution in Latin America issued at the Tri-Continent Conference did more to arouse a determined opposition than to frighten other Latin American governments. Most of all, Castro must be haunted by the spectres of Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah -- all fellow dictators overthrown by their own military forces.

That these troubles weigh heavily on Castro was clearly in evidence on the 13th of March when he gave a speech at the University of Havana commemorating the ninth anniversary of the assault on Batista's presidential palace. Displaying a defensive, whining, petulant state of mind which contrasted starkly with the ebullient, aggressive, optimistic Castro of years past, he lashed out at a "degenerate," "feeble-minded" Mao Tse Tung, called Chilean President Frei "a liar," and decried the constant defections of his ambassadors, merchant marine personnel, and commercial officials abroad. He cited the array of forces assailing Cuba in such detail that the Cuban listener must surely have sensed a siege of acute paranoia.

SOVIET FISHING AREAS AND FOREIGN BASED FISHING INSTALLATIONS

○ - Installations operating or under construction

○ - Installations proposed or under negotiation


▨ - Areas currently being fished by the Soviets

▨ - Areas exploited to a limited degree by Soviet Fisheries Research Vessels

Installations Operating or Under Construction:

1. Havana, Cuba - port facilities operating, processing plant under construction.
2. Conakry, Guinea - port facilities operating.
3. Tema, Ghana - port facilities operating, processing plant planned.
4. Ras Banas, UAR (Egypt) - port facilities operating, processing plant under construction.
5. Las Khoreh, Somali Republic - port facilities and processing plant under construction.
6. Al Hudaydah, Yemen - port facilities and processing plant under construction.

CPYRGHT



March 1966

C. Mtwara, Tanzania - proposed port facilities rejected by Tanzania.

D. (Undetermined port), Sudan - negotiations dropped by Sudan.

A. Montevideo, Uruguay - planned port facilities and processing plant.

B. Dakar, Senegal - planned port facilities and processing plant.

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Terms of the Tashkent Declaration,

10 January 1966

1. A "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations," including a commitment to repatriate prisoners of war; restore normal diplomatic relations; consider measures aimed at restoring economic, trade, communications, and cultural relations; and "to discourage" propaganda directed against the other country.

2. A re-affirmation of the "obligation" of India and Pakistan under the UN Charter "not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means and a statement that, with this background, "Jammu and Kashmir was discussed," a discussion in which each side "set forth its respective position."

3. Agreement to complete withdrawal of "all armed personnel of the two countries ... to positions they held prior to August 5, 1965," by the deadline of February 25, 1966.

4. Agreement to continue discussion of "questions relating to problems of refugees and evictions;" and to continue "meeting both at the highest and other levels, on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides, moreover, recognized the need to set up joint Indo-Pakistan organizations to decide "what further steps will be taken."

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