


World-wide Perspectives



KEY DATES

March--April	Western Europe	Anti-NATO demonstrations are expected in conjunction with NATO's 20th anniversary. Principal dates: 18 March 1949 NATO formed; 4 April 1949 NATO treaty signed; 10 April 1969 20th anniversary NATO ministerial meeting in Washington.
March		50th Anniversary of founding of Comintern.
March--	Vienna	2nd Preparatory Meeting for Conference on European Security and Cooperation (had been scheduled by WCP for October).
March 17	Moscow	Preparatory Commission Meeting for World Communist Conference in May.
March 18	Conakry	Conference of African and European Trade Unions sponsored by All-African Trade Union Federation and WFTU.
March 22-27	Rabat	Seminar on Education in Africa for African Student Unions, supported by IUS.
April 12-21	Kuala Lumpur	World Fellowship of Buddhists, 9th General Assembly.

WORLDWIDE PRIORITIES

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Our objective of keeping the lessons of the Czechoslovakian crisis fresh and alive is becoming more difficult in view of the absence of dramatic developments on the Czech scene. Under the circumstances we

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must endeavor to relate the implications of the Soviet action to the more basic long-term interests of the target audience. In most cases this boils down to the issue of the demonstrated dangers of too close political, economic, and military relations with the Soviet Union.

In most parts of the world the local Communists are probably the single group most sensitive to current developments in Czechoslovakia and every effort should be bent to deepening the divisions which the invasion caused in their ranks.

VIETNAM

Last year the Vietnamese celebration of the Lunar New Year was marred by the greatest enemy offensive of the war -- an attack coldly calculated to benefit from the truce agreement which permitted many of the South Vietnamese defenders to celebrate the Tet holidays with their families. In 1969 the Tet holiday, which began at midnight on the 15th of February and lasted until midnight of the 21st, was celebrated in relative peace -- apart from dozens of minor violations by the Communists. There was, in contrast to last year, little or no sign of a large scale offensive.

The following week the Communists did attempt a widespread attack against the cities and towns. At the time this is written the attack is still going on. But it is already evident that the Communists' offensive capability is in no way comparable with what it was one year ago. The only result of the attack will be more senseless bloodshed. In a low key and objective tone the following points may be presented to highlight the contrast:

a. During the three months (November, December and January) of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars rallying to the South Vietnamese Government under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program was 8,500. At the outset of the Campaign its goal had been set at 5,000, which critics then claimed was unrealistically high.

b. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign put ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) troops into many of South Vietnam's outlying hamlets, increasing greatly the number of hamlets participating in the civic aid program and also providing more protection than previously for the villagers from Viet Cong raids.

c. In connection with protection for the villagers, approximately 20 per cent of the 1.1 million South Vietnamese recruited into the Self-Defense Corps have been armed since the last Lunar New Year. This arming is not only vital in helping the people to defend themselves, but is

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generating in the villagers a sense of national unity and enables them to participate, not fence-sit, when their villages are under Viet Cong attack. The arming also demonstrates the government's confidence in the villagers' commitment to opposing the Communists.

d. In the past year an increasing number of Viet Cong political cadre have been arrested as a result of South Vietnamese villagers reporting such individuals to team members of Operation Phoenix (designed to identify and apprehend members of the Viet Cong infrastructure).

e. As more areas are pacified, the Viet Cong loses at once its local source of both manpower and food and once more reduces its tax base.

We believe that a comparison of the enemy's activities and capabilities today with those of a year ago is a valid measure of his strength. Much of the credit for the improved conditions is due to South Vietnam's government, army and people.

COMMUNIST CAMP

Confronted with the choice of emphasizing the divisive aspects of the Italian Communist Party's 12th Congress, which was, in fact, an international Communist forum, or alternatively of emphasizing the unity of Communists in their common hostility to the United States and its allies, we believe that our media assets should highlight all signs of disagreement and disarray at the Congress, and the attached unclassified backgrounder reflects that choice. The PCI Congress was important for the Soviets as a potential help or hindrance in their effort to unify the international movement, with an eye more particularly to convoking an harmonious World Communist Conference next May. The more we can publicize the evidences of disarray in the movement, the more difficult it should be for the Soviets to achieve or even plausibly claim unity in the Communist camp.

At the same time, assuming that in general free world parties gain in local prestige and political strength to the extent they can plausibly claim independence from Soviet dictates or even from adherence to the Soviet line, we must constantly point to the ties that do, in fact, bind. In some instances we can point to the "genuine" independence of other parties (far removed from the local scene), and subject to doubt the claims to independence of the local CP with the aim of provoking more extravagant gestures of disagreement with the Soviet line. The very absence of such gestures can be grounds for claiming local CP subservience to the alien influence of the Soviets.

The odd behavior thus far of Soviet media concerning the Comintern anniversary is puzzling. FYI: Soviet radio propaganda broadcast six items on the Comintern anniversary during the last week of January, none the following week, and 16 the second week of February (the latest week for which we have a tabulation). End FYI. Whatever the Soviets decide to do about the anniversary, it is to our advantage to publicize it and the Comintern as much as possible, always tying it in with what we can plausibly insist is a hidden Soviet desire to impose something similar on the world Communist movement of today. Feature articles should be developed recalling its sinister, subversive character and, for the benefit of Communist audiences, recalling how Stalin used it as a major foreign policy arm for Soviet national purposes, and as a means of absolutely controlling foreign Communist parties. A convenient peg for this will be the 17 March meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the World Communist Conference. Stations having the capability are urged to use assets to dig up articles written over past years on the Comintern which will serve to recall its more unsavory aspects.

SHORT SUBJECTS

This is University Reform? Student protesters around the world might profitably pause for a brief moment's reflection on their privileges as contrasted with those of some of their less fortunate contemporaries. Just a year ago, in March 1968, thousands of Polish students in Warsaw marched in protest to dramatize their grievances against the university. They were attacked by steel-helmeted club-wielding policemen; over 1,100 were arrested; the injured were spirited to hospitals in the outlying areas of Warsaw so that no one can say with certainty how many were hurt.

The regime's response was expressed in a nutshell by Minister of Education Henryk Jablonski, as reported in the leading Polish CP daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, on 3 January 1969. He said that higher education must conform to contemporary demands, that is, it must "actively cooperate in the building of socialism." To ensure that these demands are met, the Polish law on higher education was amended by the Sejm (Parliament) on 20 December 1968 in such a way as to almost completely reverse the former law of 1958 liberalizing Polish universities. Under the amendment rectors will be appointed by the Minister of Education, not elected as before by the academic senate. Other university officials and professors (who are no longer required to hold a degree) are to be appointed by the Minister. Such appointments can be terminated at any time by the Minister. The latter can also transfer any professors who oppose these changes. At the same time, the new law prohibits professors from resigning.

The university's senate will now include three non-academic members: the university's Party Secretary, the head of the military studies department, and the Chairman of the Youth Council. The new members must be nominated by the Party.

There is to be a council for youth affairs. However, two-thirds of its members are to come from the academic staff and the rest from youth organizations which are Government-organized and Party-controlled.

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Help This Soviet Propaganda to Backfire. A 4 February 1969 *Pravda* article accused the United Kingdom of participating with West Germany in a nuclear fuel production venture (actually a tripartite arrangement including The Netherlands) just to give the project an air of respectability so that "Bonn can continue its drive for nuclear weapons behind Britain's back." In fact, the project is designed to produce enriched nuclear fuel by a gas centrifuge method and to give its participants entree into the nuclear power market independent of other major fuel producers (including the U.S.A.). All three participants acknowledge the safeguards against weapons production as laid down by EURATOM and the proposed project is subject to these safeguards -- which, most significantly, include inspection.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is pressuring West Germany to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One factor deterring West Germany has been her fear that the NPT provisions might provide a commercial stranglehold on nuclear power. The nuclear powers, especially the Soviet Union, deny that NPT poses any threat to commercial ventures. The tripartite nuclear fuel production venture could, therefore, serve as a test case of the sincerity of Soviet assurances -- if, while she wooed West Germany into the NPT club, her media were to cease conjuring up the sinister image of Bonn's nuclear weapons production carried on under the unsuspecting noses of her NATO allies.

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Cloth rationing in China. Indications are sifting through to Hong Kong from the Mainland that the customary January distribution of the annual cloth ration coupons may be postponed for six months. For the regime to abandon, or at least delay, giving this sop to the already inadequately clothed Chinese people undoubtedly means that the production of cloth has been yet another victim of the Cultural Revolution (for, as far as we know, the supply of raw cotton has been adequate). To cover the delay, the 1968 cloth coupons are being extended to mid-year. It is suggested that any coverage of the subject in connection with China's attempts to import cloth, etc., include speculation that the extension of the 1968 coupons to mid-year probably means the actual distribution of cloth will be delayed; that this postponement is one more indication of how the Chinese people continue to foot the bill for Mao Tse-tung's senile schemes; and that inability of the Mao regime to produce (or share) the basic necessities among its people is another illustration of how far away from the theory of Communism the Chinese Peoples' Republic has been led.

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Rumanian Chuckle. "Soon after my arrival this week, a Rumanian was telling me the current joke about the Sahara: 'Within two years of taking over the Sahara from the Algerians, the Russians will be importing sand.'" Nicholas Carroll, London *Sunday Times*, 16 February 1969.

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The Emperor's (School) Clothes. Castro's admirers and apologists are seemingly able to find something laudable in everything he has done. And even relatively objective observers have consistently pointed to at least two things he is supposed to have accomplished: taken wealth from the rich and redistributed it to the poor, and created a school system that gives every mother's child an equal education. But Fidel Castro himself, in a speech on 5 January, stated that 22% of the Cuban children aged from 6 to 16 do not attend school. Twenty-two per cent!

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