

# N. Korea Pressures South With Guerrilla Tactics

CPYRGHT

By Sho Ishikawa

Mainichi Correspondent

SEOUL—Bloody battles are being fought in some quarters in the Korean Peninsula. Early last November, some 90 guerrillas entered the Te Peg Mountains from the eastern coast of the peninsula. Fighting between these guerrillas and South Korean military and police corps has not come to a full stop yet.

Recently I visited the mountains near the 38th parallel to track down footprints of guerrillas. The following is what I found.

One evening five guerrillas stormed into the home of I Suk Woo, a 35-year-old farmer at Pyong Chang, Kang Won Prefecture, and ordered his wife Te Wa, 33, to prepare supper for them. The intruders began to spout propaganda about communism. The elder members of the family, terrified by the guerrillas' attitude, obediently listened to them. Three little boys of the family, aged 10, 7 and 4, could not understand the situation and one of them said that he did not like communism, without understanding what he was saying. The innocent boy's utterance caused the murder of four of the family.

"The guerrillas began to give propaganda about communism. When my younger brother shouted at them 'I don't like communism,' they ripped his jaw off," 15-year-old Jong Won, a survivor of the family, tearfully said in telling me how four members of his family were massacred.

I visited there the next morning after I heard the report of the murder. I left a jeep and walked for some 12 kilometers to the spot. I tried to get information about the tragedy from several neighboring farmers in vain. In their expressionless faces I sensed their fathomless fear.

At a shabby restaurant in the hamlet I overheard a veteran telling local residents how Mrs. I Te Wa was killed by guerrillas, her head crushed by stones. I felt that these people held ill feeling toward guerrillas.

As in the case of the Vietnam War, whether guerrillas' activities could take root depends on whether such activities could win the support of local residents.

## For Position

The primary purpose of guerrillas intruding into rural communities is to secure their positions, and therefore they have

Every guerrilla who was shot to death had a notebook with him in which local people who were murdered by guerrillas were all labeled "bad special servicemen" or "agents." How could the woman and little children be "bad special servicemen"?

The guerrilla theory and actual activities were different things in the case of Korean guerrillas. Their activities caused the people's estrangement and fear. The South Korean Government claimed that such guerrilla activities disclosed the true aspect of communism and their criticism has aroused sympathy from the public.

For what reason have guerrillas tended to resort to violence?

Those who came to the Ul Chin area on the eastern coast last November must have believed that they would be given a welcome and warm reception (according to testimonies by arrested guerrillas.)

"We came to release you people from pressure," they began to claim at the first hamlet they entered. Contrary to their expectation, local residents tipped off the Army and police officers. Each time they intruded into a hamlet for propaganda activities, the number of victims among them soared.

Their failure to gain the people's support, despite their belief that they were fighting for them, and shortage of food seemed to cause them to doubt their judgment.

I had a chance to talk with Kim Wol Yong, a priest at a temple in the Oh Tae Mountains, where one person was killed by guerrillas some 10 days before the murder of the four members of the I family.

"Guerrillas shouting loudly broke into the temple with their shoes on and confined us, eight priests of the temple, in a room and threatened to kill us unless we obeyed them. They ransacked the temple, and then we began to talk with them. Their attitude softened. They even shook hands with us, apologizing for disturbing us when they were about to leave. One of the priests, however, had been murder-

ed a little distance away by that time," he said.

## Only Propaganda

North Korean guerrillas must have been embarrassed facing unexpected difficulties — anti-communist sentiment among South Korean people. They apparently were not taught how to deal with South Korean people who hold anti-communist sentiment.

I visited several hamlets scattered in the mountain region in Kang Won Prefecture. Pyongyang Radio had broadcast that a revolutionary committee was established and guerrillas temporarily held the area. North Korean propaganda exaggerated their activities. In the broadcast, guerrilla activities were reported as an armed uprising in South Korea. Guerrillas dealt a hard blow every day to South Korean military and police forces, they also reported.

A leader of a hamlet said: "I sometimes hear broadcasts by the North Korean Radio but they are all false. They reported that a revolutionary committee was established in this area. Nothing of the kind. We were forced to proclaim the setup of the committee at gunpoint and the committee naturally ceased to exist after the guerrillas left here."

Another leader of a hamlet where guerrillas had "passed" told me that local people were forced to become Communist Party members.

The "facts" were prepared perfunctorily and reported to North Korea by wireless. Then, Pyongyang Radio broadcast their "victories." This was their propaganda formula.

"Guerrillas were making only favorable reports to their home offices because they wanted to win appreciation from their bosses. A signed application of a villager to join the Communist Party was found in the pocket of a guerrilla who was shot to death. It might have proved of good account if he could have returned home alive," said Chon Chong Keun, chief of Kang Nung police bureau.

South Korean report, they had many sym-

guerrillas in South Korea. As far as I know, the report was suspect.

"If guerrillas were South Korean sympathizers as reported by North Korea, someone must have known them, but... although their bodies were shown in pictures, nobody knew them," a villager told me. These farmers doubted the genuineness of the North Korean reports.

**By Violence**

The prime purpose of North Korea sending guerrillas into the south can be interpreted as their abandonment of peaceful ways for attaining unification of North and South Korea. It is also understood that they might have considered it effective to turn South Korea into a "second Vietnam."

Fishermen on the eastern coast were often whisked away on the 38th parallel by the North Korean Navy and released after brain-washed. In 1966, one fisherman was captured. The number of captured fishermen rose to 222 in 1967

and 1,000 between January and October 1968.

North Korea had expected that not a small number of these fishermen would become collaborators but their guerrillas failed to obtain cooperation from South Korean people.

Guerrillas from the north hide themselves beneath fallen leaves in the Te Peg Mountains during the daytime and become active at night. The South Korean forces encircle their hiding places and try to find them from helicopters.

Police and veterans at each hamlet take up garrison duties. On the eastern coast, foxholes are dug at intervals of some 100 meters against guerrilla invasions and young soldiers are alerted on sea patrol.

What will be North Korea's next strategy?

Despite a change in the world situation, North Korea has steadily escalated its guerrilla warfare. Judging from this, they will send them again into the Te Peg Mountains because of the geographical advantage of the region.

**Danger Of War**

According to a police chief of Kang Nung Police, guerrillas told local people that the North and South would be united in 1970 and that they would reward collaborators by appointing them village heads. He added that North Korean attacks would be given momentum this year.

If North Korea comes to realize that it would be difficult to set up their guerrilla positions, they would resort to destruction of plants and military facilities in South Korea or send guerrillas to Seoul and other big cities in extensive offensives. Unrest and crisis in the Korean Peninsula, as proved in the past, would evolve into a war by accident.

South Korea, on the other hand, has built up a steady defense setup and will further make such efforts. After making inspection trips in the area, I have become worried about the outcome of mutual escalation of military forces between

THE ECONOMIST, London  
30 November 1968

**Korea**

**Nobody here but us chickens**

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN KOREA

The demarcation line between North and South Korea stretches 150 miles across the neck of land joining the two halves of the country, and is bordered on each side by a demilitarised zone more than a mile deep. In theory there is a complete ban on bringing aircraft, armoured vehicles or weapons into the area. But in Korea theory and practice are very far apart. There is an almost daily exchange of fire, and the Americans have now accused North Korea of bringing tanks and assault guns as well as troops into the area.

Overlooking the zone on the southern side there are regularly spaced watch-towers with radar and guns, which tend to go off regularly because wild animals are common in some parts of the zone. Behind all this there is another line of defence. A high chicken-wire fence stretches from one side of the country to the other and is topped by festoons of barbed wire; the area in front of it is heavily mined. There is then a second chain of watch-towers, and at night American and South Korean troops occupy foxholes at 15-yard intervals.

Despite all these hazards, the past two years have seen a sharp increase in tension along the demilitarised zone and more than 900 incidents have been reported. North Korean saboteurs armed with grenade-launchers and Russian sub-machine guns try to get through to the south and even more frequently try to reach home after completing their missions there. Most saboteurs are delivered to the South Korean coast but have to make their own way back. They travel in three-man teams with a guide to help them through all the military and electronic barriers in the way. It takes them 60 hours to get through the demilitarised zone and then to swim or toboggan across the icy Imjin river before they reach safety in the north.

The infiltrators are rarely captured alive, for they usually blow themselves up with a grenade when they are cornered. And at the regular armistice meetings at Panmunjom the North Korean delegates always deny infiltration and claim that the bodies produced as evidence are southerners who have been disguised after suicide.

The north's prime minister, Kim Il-sung, stepped up his war of nerves in January with his attempt to assassinate the South Korean president, Park Chung-hee, and with the seizure of the American spy ship *Pueblo*. He has not relaxed the pressure since: 350 infiltrators have been killed in incidents since then. He may hope to keep the promise he once made to conquer South Korea by 1970. Or he may just want to rock confidence and deter

investment there.

North Korea has about 400,000 men in its armed forces, including 15,000 with special training in guerrilla fighting. The air force has about a thousand planes, including, it is said, a number of the latest Mig 23s supplied by Moscow; recently the Russians have replaced the Chinese as North Korea's favourite ally. The south, too, spends heavily on defence. Nearly 30 per cent of the budget goes on it and South Korean forces number

600,000 men, 47,000 of them fighting in Vietnam. There are also two American divisions in the country, as well as some pilots, and in all 50,000 American servicemen are stationed here. If there was trouble from the north, the American 5th Air Force in Japan and the Pacific fleet are pledged to intervene. With the possibility of an end to the Vietnam war in sight, the Americans may find that they face a second front in Korea. It is quite a problem for President Nixon to face in January.

EAST AFRICA REPORTER, Nairobi  
10 January 1969

## NORTH KOREANS IN AFRICA

### Preliminary moves to enlist Africa's sympathy in the event of another war

CPYRGHT

*By Jacque Lefert of the Swiss Press Review*

In the last few months, it has been noticeable that the North Koreans have been interesting themselves increasingly in African affairs. In particular, North Korean diplomats stationed in Africa have been travelling a great deal in countries which do not yet recognise North Korea.

These journeys hither and thither have enabled the North Korean Communists to be represented at an impressive number of Independence Days in African countries with which they are not in a state of normal diplomatic relations. Some of these African countries have also been persuaded to send delegations to Pyongyang, and there have also been visits by leaders of Left-wing movements directed against established Govern-

ments in Africa—one of these being led by Gaston Soumialot of the Congo-Kinshasa.

Travelling normally by way of Budapest, Moscow and Irkutsk, these African delegations—whose journeys are entirely financed by the North Korean Government—were mostly invited to take part in the celebrations for the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Korean State. The North Koreans have been hoping that these special missions from Africa will soon be turned into regular diplomatic missions.

**Sympathy sought.** It is said that in general these African visitors are impressed by the economic development accomplished in North Korea—but not less so by the extraordinary personality cult of the

Korean Communist leader, Kim Il Sung. They have also been surprised to see that North Korea appears to be mobilised for war.

Indeed, this war footing probably gives a clue as to why the North Koreans should be indulging in efforts of this kind. An attempt is being made to enlist the sympathies of African countries in the event of a new Korean war in the near future. In such an event, discussions in the United Nations will play an important role; and the North Koreans know that their only hope of finding a majority—in the General Assembly at least—lies with the Africans. The North Koreans have never hidden their ambitions eventually to re-unite their country by force, and there have been increasing signs that the day of their next attempt may be near.

Confessions of a

RED AGENT

SP5 John J. Stetans  
Headquarters, I Corps (Group, Korea)  
Photos by SP5 Greg P. Iger

CPYRGHT

On the night of 17 January 1968, 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated south across the Demilitarized Zone in the boldest act of aggression by the Communist Pyongyang government since the Korean War. Their mission—to assassinate the Republic of Korea's President Park Chung Hee at his residence in Seoul and cause political havoc throughout the South Korean government.

Four nights later, the agents were intercepted by Korean National Police on the outskirts of Seoul and a fire fight ensued. Two of the agents were killed in the initial battle. Their plan aborted, the others fled.

One of them, 26-year-old Kim Sin Jo, soon found himself running alone up Seoul's Inwang Mountain. Moments later, he was spotted by Republic of Korea Army soldiers, who surrounded him and shouted to him to surrender. Kim hesitated a minute, then, as he describes it, a "will to live" seized him. He threw down his weapon and put his hands over his head.

Kim was the only agent to give himself up. During the next week, 23 of the remaining 28 agents fought to their deaths in individual clashes with police and soldiers—both Korean and American—within the U.S. Army's I Corps (Group) sector. (Two more were killed in Seoul, one east of Seoul. And two, although never found, are believed to have died of exposure somewhere in the frigid mountains north of Seoul.)

As the one survivor of the assassination attempt, Kim Sin Jo became a focus of attention for newsmen throughout the world. Articles about him appeared in newspapers of every language, and he became a familiar face on Korean television. But still, something was missing.

At interview sessions, Kim told how he came, but not exactly why. He explained his reasons in terms of his Communist government's goals, but he never said what made him, Kim, the individual, want to risk his life to assassinate the leader of a nation of people who, prior to 1945, were united to his own.

He also told about 2,400 young North Korean Army officers, like himself, who are presently undergoing rigorous training to commit additional acts of aggression in South Korea.

His comments were interesting—and frightening—but there were still some questions that needed to be answered. Such as, how do you get 2,400 young men so worked up that they will sacrifice personal safety and life itself to do something which all rational thinking points to as wrong?

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governments. On 15 February, a guard opened a solid green door at the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion's stockade in Yongdungpo, Seoul, and there stood Kim Sin Jo, a man from the other side of the chasm—a man with the answers.

For the next two hours, Kim talked through an interpreter, Corporal Yoon Nam Ho, a member of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army, attached to the I Corps (Group) Information Office as a reporter. Smoking cigarettes, and speaking freely and frankly, Kim showed himself to be a "good soldier"—a strange appellation indeed for a would-be assassin.

As the interview was to show, the deceit of his government had diluted Kim's mind into a ghostly hue. His powers of critical reasoning had been deprived of nourishment until they had grown pale and numb. Like an arm in a cast, his analytical muscles had grown weak from disuse.

ARMY DIGEST  
May 1968

**A Faulty Grenade—  
He's Captured Alive**

Kim Sin Jo was born 26 years ago of what he describes as "poor proletarian parents" in the North Korean village of Ch'ongin. By the time he was ready for school, World War II was over and North Korea had become a Communist state. Kim began his education at the No. 6 Peoples' School in his home town.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Kim and his family fled north to Pukto, where they remained until the armistice was signed in 1953 at which time they returned to Ch'ongin.

When Kim finished middle school in July 1958, he was instructed to work at a machine shop in Ch'ongin. He worked there three years and then joined the North Korean Peoples' Army as a private.

In July 1967, Kim, who had been a member of the Labor Party since his machine-shop days in Ch'ongin, was commissioned a second lieutenant. A few months later he was transferred to the 124th Army Unit, a select group of 2,400 hard-core soldiers—all officers. Their mission—to train rigorously for agent activities in South Korea.

On 16 January 1968, Kim and 30 other officers from the 124th departed from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang with a mission to assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee and destroy his presidential mansion in Seoul. Five days later the team was intercepted by Korean National Police near Seoul. A fire fight broke out, and Kim fled.

At the top of Iwang Mountain, Kim discarded all his equipment, except one hand grenade, which he kept to kill himself should he be caught.

Moments later he was spotted by 20 ROK soldiers. He slipped into a shadow beside a road, but the ROK soldiers surrounded him. "Come out with your hands up," they shouted. Kim threw down his grenade and surrendered.

He says that just before he gave himself up, a "desire to live" had seized him. But others have a different theory. The grenade Kim had been carrying was later tested and found to be defective. It wouldn't go off.

*Following are excerpts from the interview:*

**Q. What are newspapers like in North Korea?**

**KIM:** In North Korea nothing can be printed that criticizes the government. They can print and announce only that which can be utilized for good propaganda purposes. Publications and speech is well-controlled.

North Korea makes many false reports through its mass communications. As you know, after we came down here, our agents were killed. But I heard a North Korean report that it was South Korean youths who had rebelled against their government with arms. Things like this are reported in this manner by North Korea.

**Q. How did you learn that North Korea was reporting this about your team?**

**KIM:** I listened to a North Korean broadcast here in the South.

**Q. How many kinds of newspapers are there in North Korea?**

**KIM:** All of the newspapers are controlled by the government. All of the papers are the organization newspapers of the various agencies existing in North Korea. There are no privately published papers available.

**Q. Have you ever read in a North Korean newspaper a criticism of Red China or the Soviet Union?**

**KIM:** Occasionally I have seen criticisms of China's Great Cultural Revolution and also criticisms of Khrushchev and his ideas on revised Communism.

**Q. On your way down to Seoul, you and the other agents were captured for about five hours. Be-**

**sides intelligence questions, what else did you discuss with them?**

**KIM:** We told them that the American imperialists treat the South Koreans terribly and we also spoke out against President Park Chung Hee. We told them life was better in North Korea than in South Korea and we told them that within a short time unification would be accomplished. Then we threatened to kill the four men if they reported seeing us to the police or local military authorities.

**Q. Why didn't you kill them?**

**KIM:** Our plans were to stay in South Korea for only three days. The four men were young and we felt they should not be killed and also that if we killed them, their families would know something was wrong when they didn't return home. Their families, we feared, would contact the police or the army.

We thought by threatening them with death they would take much longer to report us than if we killed them and prompted their families to report us.

**Q. So when you released them you felt they would cooperate with you at least to some extent, right?**

**KIM:** Yes. We never thought that all South Koreans were anti-Communist and we expected some of them would give us help. We didn't expect everyone to cooperate, but we felt some would agree with our mission and aid us.

**Q. Did you think that the successful completion of your mission would trigger another war in Korea?**

**KIM:** No, I never thought that it would create another war. I figured it would create political problems within the South Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to fight with arms against their government and the American imperialists. We knew that if they did this, North Korea would aid them

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Q. Did you have any other instructions other than killing President Park and destroying his residence?

KIM: We had no other instructions. However, we felt that the South Korean people would join in for further uprisings against their government. We felt that when the South Korean people knew we were in Seoul, it would give them confidence that North Korea would aid them militarily if they staged an uprising against their government.

Q. How would you compare the industries in North Korea with those in the South?

KIM: I believe North Korea is ahead of South Korea in heavy industry.

Q. What is the relationship between war industries and the normal consumer goods in North Korea?

KIM: Since there is a priority on the production of war materiel, the daily-needs items are not sufficiently produced. Although North Korea can produce much war materiel, the production of textiles and other daily necessities is at a very low level. This is due to the stress on heavy industry.

Q. Did North Korea support the war in Vietnam?

KIM: It is supporting North Vietnam with rifles, hand grenades and army uniforms. North Korea has also sent a number of its officers to North Vietnam to give tactical advice. There is also a rumor that the North Korea Air Force is aiding Vietnam, but I'm not sure about this.

Q. You mentioned that in North Korea you were taught that South Korea is not capable of producing much of anything. Has what you have seen thus far in Seoul changed your mind?

KIM: Yes. Unexpectedly I saw that South Korea is producing high-quality items. Nobody in North Korea would believe that South Korea has reached this level. In fact, nobody in North Korea would even dream that South Korea could do this much.

Q. What things did you find better in North Korea?

KIM: Besides kimchi\* and girls? Nothing.

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\* *Kimchi is a traditionally favorite food of the Koreans and, along with rice, is the staple of their year-round daily diet. It is made from cabbage fermented in herbs and spices.*

14 November 1968

CPYRGHT

## S. Koreans Disclose a 2d Red Landing

SEOUL, Nov. 13 (AP)—The South Korean government revealed today that a second band of North Korean guerrillas landed on South Korea's east coast two weeks ago, bringing the total number of invaders in the area this month to 60, twice the number reported earlier.

The government says 28 members of the Communist force have been killed.

Defense Minister Yim Choong Shik told a news conference one of the guerrilla bands landed near Ulsin, 130 miles southeast of Seoul, and

the other group went ashore 35 miles north of Ulsin near the village of Smachok.

Yim said the Communists were attempting to set up bases for a guerrilla war in South Korea. They have killed five South Korean soldiers and four civilians, and wounded seven soldiers and two civilians.

The Defense Minister said most of the South Korean casualties occurred during the invaders' brief occupation of Ulsin before a force of police,

paratroopers and marines was deployed Nov. 3 to seek out the guerrillas.

Yim said the double landing was the largest infiltration of Communists agents since the 1953 Korean armistice. It was the first since a guerrilla band infiltrated Seoul last January in an attempt to kill President Park Chung Hee. Yim said 26 submachine guns and nearly 15,000 rounds of ammunition were among a truckload of supplies captured from the two guerrilla bands.

AN NAHDAH, Beirut  
31 December 1968

THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

CPYRGHT

When in 1953, the armistice agreement was signed, it was considered as a recognition from the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, that he had miscalculated and that the attempt to annex South Korea to the communist bloc through violence had been frustrated by the United Nations forces which had been formed of the Americans and their allies.

But the armistice did not mean that the communists decided to admit their defeat. Until today, they have not recognized the government of South Korea. On every occasion, they still reiterate their intentions to unify North and South Korea, under a communist system, as soon as a chance to do so offers itself.

It may be an exaggeration to affirm that such a chance is now available. But there are convincing evidences that the North Koreans have suddenly realized that time is now running against their interest. The rate of economic growth in South Korea is one of the highest in the world and prosperity is prevailing all over the country and covering all the population of all walks of life. Soon, there will no longer be any harmful economic traces that can be exploited by the communists for their own interests. Even if an invasion occurs, today, the invaders will find only very trifle support from the people of South Korea.

However, what has thunder shocked the North Korean is the news about the possibility of putting an end to the war in Vietnam. As long as the war in Vietnam drags itself, one month after another, without any solution, the North Koreans will continue to feel that time is running to their interests in Southeast Asia. The Pueblo incident in which the communists captured an American reconnaissance ship standing far from the shores of North Korea was some form of a probe of the American reaction. When the North Korean leaders

protest, they began to wonder and ask themselves : will the Americans react in the same way if they made another attempt on a peninsula they are already occupying? Korea ?

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The North Vietnamese committed a great and persistent miscalculation when they thought that the frequent anti-war demonstrations in the United States were an indication of the deterioration of the American determination to continue the war. The election of Richard Nixon to the presidency was a categorical evidence of their miscalculation. But the North Koreans comment on the situation saying that putting an end to war is something and waging a new war, in a time of frustration, is a different thing.

It is difficult to predict the psychological mood of the people that may prevail over the United States if the new administration gets involved in a new exhausting war in Asia. But, undoubtedly, the United States will fulfill its pledge to defend South Korea because any other course will mean a recognition by the United States that the sacrifices given by the generation that is now ruling America were useless.

The North Koreans do not see the problem as seen by the United States. One of the ironic features of the present situation in Asia lies in the fact that the communists cannot understand how a big power can be ready and willing to defend freedom in an area far away from its borders. In fact, they see in the Vietnam war a chance that should not be wasted. If peace is established in Southeast Asia without America's withdrawal from the region - and in the current atmosphere a complete American withdrawal does not seem possible - there will no longer be any opportunity for the communists to occupy South Korea, during the active part of Kim Il Sung's life, at least.

Consequently, the communists have in recent months escalated their guerilla warfare. During the past year, the number of incidents on the borders were almost as many as the number of all the incidents that happened during the previous ten years. More than six hundred men were killed during last year's incidents. If these incidents have not reached the level of a conclusive war, yet they indicate what may happen if a small change in the direction of the communist policies in North Korea occurs. Such a change may occur if North Korea feels the smallest indication of weakness to the south of the line dividing the North from the South.

As it happened just before the Korean war, the North miscalculated. They could not believe that the Americans and their allies in the United Nations would really fight for the sake of the freedom of the South. That miscalculation caused the war that took the lives of thousands of people.

The best guarantee against recurrence of such a miscalculation lies in a firm renewal of the American determination to defend freedom in Korea, as they did before and are still ready to do if necessary.

The reiteration of such an American commitment should be given the greatest degree of publicity by the international press. In this way, it may reach the leaders of North Korea.

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# انتهاء الحرب الفيتنامية يحول دون طرد الكوريين الشماليين الى كوريا الجنوبية

## أميركا مصممة على الدفاع عن الأنظمة الحرة في المنطقة في كل الظروف

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AN NAHDAH, Beirut  
31 December 1968

Translation of: The Korean  
Problem and the War In Vietnam

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عندما وقعت هدنة عام ١٩٥٣ كان هذا العمل بمثابة اقرار من قبل الزعيم الشيوعي لكوريا الشمالية ، ( « كيم ايل سونغ » ) ، بان تقديرا خاطئا قد ارتكب ، وأن محاولة ضم كوريا الجنوبية الى الكتلة الشيوعية عن طريق العنف قد حيل دونها من قبل قوات الامم المتحدة التي تشكلت من الامريكيين وحلفائهم .

والواقع ان من الصعب ان نتكهن عن الحالة النفسية الشعبية التي مستمود الولايات المتحدة

لم ان الهدنة لم تكن تعني ان الشيوعيين قرروا الاعتراض

للك اخلت نشاطات هزرب العصابات الشيوعية تزداد في الأشهر القليلة الماضية ، وبلغت حوادث هذا العام وحده ما يقارب عدد ما قد وقع منها طوال السنوات المشر الماضية ، وقتل فيها اكثر من ستمائة رجل من الجانبين . ولئن كان هذا لا يرتفع الى مصاف الحرب الشاملة بالطبع ، فهو يشير الى ما يمكن ان يقع لو حدث تغيير بسيط في اتجاه السياسات الشيوعية في كوريا الشمالية ،

وهذا التغيير نفسه عرضة للاستتارة عند ظهور اقل علامات الضعف جنوبي خط الحدود الفاصل .

وكما رأينا أثناء اندلاع الحرب الاخيرة في كوريا ، اخطأ الكوريون الشماليون التقدير ، فلم يصدقوا ان الامريكيين وحلفائهم في الامم المتحدة سيحاربون فعلا من اجل حرية الجنوب . وهذا الخطأ في التقدير في معناه العميق سبب الحرب وما ادت اليه من الآف القتلى .

وخير طريقة لضمان عدم تكرار مثل هذا الخطأ في التقدير هو ان يجدد الامريكيون الاعلان بعبارة جازمة عن عزمهم على الدفاع عن الحرية في كوريا ، كما فعلوا سابقا وما لا يزالون على استعداد لفعله في كل فرصة ملائمة .

ان تكرار مثل هذا الالتزام من جانب امريكا في حاجة ماسة الى ان ينشر على اوسع المجالات الممكنة في الصحافة العالمية لانه بهذه الوسيلة قد يصل في نهاية المطاف الى اذان زعماء كوريا الشمالية الصماء ، ولو بعض

فيما لو تورطت الادارة الجديدة في حرب منهكة ثانية على ارض الاسيوية ، ولكن مما لا ريب فيه ان امريكا ستكون عند عهدها بالدفاع عن كوريا الجنوبية لان اي تصرف يخالف ذلك سيكون معناه الاعتراف بعدم جدوى التضحيات الجسيمة التي كان قد بذلها هناك الجيل الذي يحكم امريكا اليوم .

والكوريون الشماليون لا ينظرون الى الامر على هذا النحو ،

اذ ان احد الجوانب الخيرة للتهكم في الموقف الحالي في اسيا هو ان الشيوعيين لا يستطيعون ان يفهموا كيف ان دولة عظمى يمكن ان تكون مستعدة لتحمل الخسائر الجسيمة من اجل الدفاع عن الحرية بعيدا عن حدودها . بل هم ينظرون الى الحرب الفيتنامية على انها فرصة يجب الا تفوتهم . فلو خيم على جنوب شرق اسيا سلام لا يتبعه انسحاب امريكا من المنطقة — ولا يلوح في الجو الراهق ان الفعل الامريكي . وعندما انضج لزعما كوريا الشمالية ان رد الفعل هذا لم يتعد الاحتجاج الشعبي اخلوا يتساطون فيما بينهم : ترى هل يتكرر الشيء ذاته لو انهم قاموا بمحاولة اخرى على قياس شامل لغزو كوريا الجنوبية ؟

لقد كان الفيتناميون الشماليون مخطفين خطا جسيما وعندا في ما خيل لهم من ان المظاهرات الكثيرة ضد الحرب في الولايات المتحدة دليل على خور العزم الانسحاب التام سيكون ممكنا — فلن تكون هناك اي فرصة امام الشيوعيين لاحتلال كوريا الجنوبية،

بهزيمتهم . فهم الى يومنا هذا لم يعترفوا بحكومة كوريا الجنوبية ، بل كانوا يريدون نواياهم في توحيد جنوب كوريا وشمالها تحت نظام شيوعي بمجرد ان تسنح الفرصة . وربما كان من المفالة ان نقول بصورة جازمة ان هذه الفرصة قد حانت الان . الا ان هناك دلائل مقنعة على ان الكوريين الشماليين قد اصبحوا فجأة يدركون ان الزمن يجري في غير صالحهم . فمعدل النمو في كوريا الجنوبية واحد من والازدهار يعم السكان بكل فئاتهم . وقريبا لن تكون هناك اثار اقتصادية سبلة يستطيع الشيوعيون استغلالها لصالحهم . ولو انه وقع اليوم لغزو شيوعي فان الغزاة لزيستطيعوا ان يجدوا الا النزر اليسير جدا من النابذ بين افراد الشعب .

ولكن الشيء الذي صعبق اعلى المستويات في العالم ، للكوريين الشماليين حقا كان بشائر انتهاء الحرب الفيتنامية . فطالما كانت هذه الحرب مستمرة شهرا بعد شهر دون التوصل الى حل ، ظل شعور الكوريين الشماليين يتزايد بان الزمن في جنوب شرق اسيا موات لهم . وكان حادث السفينة « بويلو » ، الذي صادر فيه الشيوعيون سفينة استطلاع امريكية بعيدا عن ساطع كوريا الشمالية ، شكلا من اشكال جس النبض كان الفرض منه معرفة رد الامريكي لمواصلة الحرب . وقد جاء انتخاب وينشارد نيكسون ليللا على هذا بما لا يقبل الشك . ولكن الكوريين الشماليين يريدون على هذا قائلين ان انتهاء حرب قائمة امر ، ومباشرة حرب اخرى في وقت نظير نفسه هبة الاصل امر اهر

# Communist Disarray

A half year after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the tensions in world Communism sparked by that act of political banditry remain unresolved.

Last weekend Italian Communist party leader Luigi Longo drew stormy applause at his party's national congress by strongly reaffirming the Italian Communists' condemnation of the invasion. And Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu has now publicly and explicitly denounced the Brezhnev Doctrine Moscow enunciated last September to justify its aggression against Prague. This is the thesis that socialist states have less than full sovereignty and that they may be invaded by other socialist states any time the latter think it necessary to "protect" socialism. The fact that President Ceausescu spoke so openly shortly after his recent talks with Yugoslav President Tito gave added significance to his defiant demand that Communist-ruled states enjoy full sovereignty and independence.

The Soviet leaders no doubt console themselves with the fact that they won agreement late last year for a world Communist congress in Moscow next May. That meeting had originally been scheduled for

last November, but it had to be postponed because of the explosion of anger the Czechoslovak invasion precipitated in many Communist parties. It is legitimate to speculate now that the May meeting will not be entirely a rubber stamp for Moscow. Mr. Longo, for example, defined that gathering's usefulness as dependent upon its success in "relaunching of internationalism of which we all have need." Since he also denounced the idea of any Communist "guide party" or "guide state," he seemed to be hinting that the Italians do not intend to let Moscow run the congress to suit itself.

Meanwhile Peking has escalated its anti-Soviet propaganda to record or near-record heights, while simultaneously increasing tensions on China's borders with Mongolia, a loyal Soviet satellite. The recent Chinese behavior suggests Mao believes that he has gained much politically in the Communist world as a result of Kremlin blunders in Czechoslovakia. Certainly in strongly condemning last August's Soviet imperialist adventure, the Chinese have staked out an important claim for leadership of the independent-minded elements in world Communism, elements whose numbers now are greater than ever.

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 February 1969  
**ITALIAN RED CHIEF  
RENEWS CRITICISM  
OF CZECH INVASION**

But Longo Indicates an End of Opposition to Meeting of Party Leaders in Moscow

By ROBERT C. DOTY  
Special to The New York Times

Bologna, Italy, Feb. 8

Luigi Longo, the leader of the Italian Communist party, reaffirmed today his party's strong opposition to the Soviet bloc's intervention in Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, however, he withdrew objections to the long-delayed Soviet project of a summit meeting of all Communist parties in Moscow.

Most observers here identified these two positions as part of an arrangement worked out in Moscow last month by Enrico Berlinguer, a member of the Italian Politburo who is expected to be named Mr. Longo's deputy and eventual successor.

Mr. Longo is to preside at the Italian party's 12th Congress.

He dealt with the problems that made the last year a trying one for the biggest European Communist party outside the Soviet bloc, with 4,520,000 members and 25 per cent of Italian voters.

Students a Problem

The problems include intrusion on the left by students, pro-Peking Communists, anarchists and other "total contesters"; the development of thinly veiled factionalism within the party itself and, above all, the stresses resulting from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August by the Warsaw Pact states.

The invasion was directed against the kind of reformist, liberal Communism that the Italian party has projected for Italy.

Outspoken criticism of the invasion by Italian Communists has produced strong Soviet covert pressures, including clandestine dissemination to rank-and-file Communists of printed attacks on the leadership.

On the public level, the Soviet leaders have limited themselves to mild reproofs, leaving it to Polish and East German leaders to deliver virulent public attacks amounting almost to threats of excommunication.

Insist on "Italian Road"

Mr. Longo and his party are too thoroughly committed to the "Italian road to social-

ism," implying independence from outside dictation, to make a public obeisance to Moscow on the Czechoslovak issue. At the same time, the party leadership does not dare push things to an open break with Moscow for fear that some of its own, hard-line Stalinists, brought up in a tradition of absolute loyalty to the "fatherland of socialism," would quit or split the party.

Mr. Longo spoke for four hours, divided into morning and afternoon segments.

Six thousand delegates and foreign guests were in the red-draped sports Palace of this "Communist capital" of Italy. Bologna has had a Communist mayor and Communist-dominated city government since the end of World War II.

The 68-year-old party secretary, who was the victim of an unspecified circulatory disorder last fall, delivered his 25,000-word speech from a special chair that put his head at standing height behind the rostrum. He appeared at times to tire and his voice cracked occasionally.

The relative sharpness and unambiguous nature of his comments on Czechoslovakia surprised some observers, who expected him to play down the disagreement.

"Our position of dissent and disapproval was immediate to the Italian Politburo's statement in Rome only hours after the troops crossed the Czech-

slovakia frontier. And we reconfirm the judgment we expressed on the events in the very course of their occurrence and of their political and theoretical motivation."

He went on to say that the Italian party rejected the idea of a "guide state" or "guide party" and insisted on the full respect of the "autonomy and sovereignty of every Communist party and socialist state."

He praised the "sense of responsibility" of the Prague leaders in taking account of "all elements of the situation" — including, presumably, the presence of Soviet-bloc tanks — in trying to construct "a socialist society always more human and efficient."

His remarks on Czechoslovakia were interrupted four times by waves of applause, especially when he spoke of the Czechoslovak student, who immolated himself in protest against the occupation and the policies it produced. The principal Czech delegate to the Congress, Evzesh Erban, sat, impassive, through the first three outbursts but joined in the fourth round of applause.

Gives Assurance of Loyalty

Mr. Longo mentioned several times the Italian party's basic loyalty to the "October Revolution" and to the Soviet Union, and, more concretely, he offered a new Italian line on the summit conference of Communist parties long sought by Moscow, long resisted by Italy.

"We think," he said, "that the forthcoming international conference of Communists and workers parties will be useful

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precisely as it succeeds in marking an important moment in that process of relaunching of internationalism of which we all have need. This, friends of revolutionary and progressive movements, is also the terrain on which we want to, and can, reinforce our relations because this is a task not only of Communists but also of all revolutionary and progressive forces."

On the domestic front, Mr. Longo counseled the party to seek contact with the new upsurges of "contestation" by stu-

dents and others, to guide and channel them in useful, disciplined ways, but to fight against "anarchic fractions."

Quotes Papal Encyclical

He continued and enlarged the party's tactical effort to woo Roman Catholics—and even Christian Democrats—through dialogue. His language, for example, in condemnation of maldistribution of the world's wealth, of huge expenditures for arms and of the dominance of the profit motive included a long quotation from the encyclical "Progress of Peoples," by Pope Paul VI.

Left and right wing dissents from Mr. Longo's centrist course are expected to be heard, beginning tomorrow, in the guarded, cryptic terms Communists use to try to cloak internal disagreement from those uninitiated in the jargon.

Awaited also are the greetings to the Italian Congress, probably Tuesday and Wednesday, from the 40 delegations from other Communist parties, with only the Chinese and Albanians absent. The statement of Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Mr. Longo went on to re-implicit support to another Papal position—opposition to contraception and refusal to see peril in a population explosion.

By the year 2000, he said, about half of the seven billion inhabitants of the globe would be doomed to death by hunger under present conditions. He said, if all of the hygienic, productive resources of the planet were properly employed "technicians affirm that [the world] is capable of assuring food to a population of 13.5 billion men."

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 February 1969

CPYRGHT

ITALY'S REDS HAIL  
CZECHS' LEADER

Dubcek's Name Gets Long

Applause at Party Talks

By ROBERT C. DOTY

Special to The New York Times

BOLOGNA, Italy, Feb. 11 —

The name of Alexander Dubcek, who charted the liberalized Communist course in Czechoslovakia last year, touched off the longest, most enthusiastic demonstration of the Italian Communist party congress here today.

It came at the end of a speech

by Evzen Erban, president of the Czechoslovak National Front and a delegate to the congress. Mr. Erban was easily the winner in the first confrontation between Czechoslovak and Soviet delegates at a Communist gathering in the West since the Aug. 21 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces.

The Congress gave to the Soviet representative, Boris N. Ponomarev, only a minimum of polite applause.

Mr. Erban pleaded for understanding of the "complex and often dramatic period" his country was undergoing. In his closing passage, when he passed on greetings from "Comrade

Dubcek," the big circular Sports Palace echoed with applause and cheers for more than a minute.

This contrasted sharply with the icy silence with which the congress received, a few minutes earlier, a defense of the invasion of Czechoslovakia delivered by Mr. Ponomarev, secretary of the Soviet Central Committee.

The contrast made clear that the main current of the Italian Communist party, with 1,502,000 members, the biggest outside the Soviet bloc, fully endorsed the "dissent and repudiation" expressed by Luigi Longo, the party secretary, at the time of the invasion and in his keynote speech to the congress last Saturday.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 February 1969

2 IN BLOC SCORE  
MOVE ON CZECHS

Parley of Italian Reds Hears  
Yugoslav and Rumanian

Special to The New York Times

BOLOGNA, Italy, Feb. 12 —

Yugoslav and Rumanian delegates to the Italian Communist party congress drew inthustastic applause today for a blunt, unqualified condemnation of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia last August.

Neither Edward Kardelj, a member of the Presidium of the Yugoslav party, nor Paul Niculescu-nizil, secretary of the Rumanian Central Committee, observed the diplomatic niceties of Communist "unity" that have been the staple of speeches at this five-day-old congress.

The reaction of the more than 800 delegates and several thousand guests to their speeches and to those yesterday by the Czechoslovak and Soviet delegates — convinced most observers that the party base is even more militantly opposed to the Soviet intervention than is the already fairly outspoken leadership.

Mr. Kardelj said that Socialist unity could be based only on "respect for the sovereignty of peoples and the autonomy of every movement."

Soviet Doctrine Opposed

"This is the first and fundamental reason why the League of Yugoslav Communists opposed resolutely both the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty."

This was a reference to the dictum of Leonid I. Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet party, that the sovereignty of individual Socialist states must be subordinate to the needs of the socialist world community.

The Soviet delegation stayed 2

away from the hall during Mr. Kardelj's speech, either by accident or design. But there was prolonged applause in the big sports palace for this and other assertions by Mr. Kardelj of the absolute right of each country to find its own way to Socialism.

At one point he condemned forces of imperialism and hegemony, seeking to impose on the world "their economic and political interests, their political and social systems, their division of the world"—a statement considered as applicable to the Soviet Union as to the usual target of such attacks, the United States.

Early Dispute Recalled

The reference to the imposition of foreign economic interests seemed to recall, for example, the original cause of the Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union two decades ago. This was Moscow's attempt to curtail Yugoslavia's industrialization in favor of a plan that called for a primarily agricultural contribution by Yugoslavia to the Communist world.

The Rumanian speaker asserted that only the legitimate and constitutionally elected representatives of each

country could determine its course. Therefore, he continued, Communists could not accept in any form, theoretical or practical, the idea that "membership in the Socialist system can imply the contraction or limitation of the sovereignty of the people."

The Rumanian party, he said, held that the military action in Czechoslovakia had deepened differences and misunderstandings within the Communist world and had been "lacking in any real justification whatsoever."

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CPYRGHT

# ITALY'S REDS BACK LEADERS AND LINE

## Reformist Role Is Stressed as Party Ends Congress

Special to The New York Times

BOLOGNA, Italy, Feb. 15—

The Italian Communist party endorsed its leadership and a "reformist" road to revolution today and called for friendly "autonomy" in dealings with the Soviet Union.

Delegates representing the 1.5 million Italian Communists, the largest Communist party in the West and the only one that seems to have a chance for a role on constitutional government, overwhelmingly endorsed the aim of the party leadership to insert itself in the present political structure rather than to try to overthrow it.

At the same time, the party's secretary, Luigi Longo, 68 years old, and Enrico Berlinguer, the young Sardinian

who is expected to be designated as the eventual heir to Mr. Longo, made it clear that their ultimate aim is the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.

They continue to affirm that there will be a distinctively "Italian road to socialism", avoiding the excesses and repressions their Soviet predecessors found necessary in a Russian context. But their goal still will be a purely Marxist society, managed by a Communist apparatus.

### U.S. Still a Target

And their principal targets of enmity remain, at home, the bourgeois and "monopolist" industrial society, and abroad, the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Long-Berlinguer centrists repulsed, in the week-long Congress, a thrust by a "new left" in the party. This minority group advocates a more militantly revolutionary course to attract to Communist ranks radical students and other advocates of "total confrontation, who currently tend to regard the Italian Communist party as a lukewarm reformist group.

The leadership also managed to neutralize a right wing that

would make a governing alliance with the present ruling parties, the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Republicans. The Longo strategy, adopted by the Congress with only four dissenting votes, is to work for the breakup of the present ruling parties. His tools would be exploitation of their internal dissensions and, though strikes, carefully controlled public disorders and parliamentary obstructionism, demonstration of their inability to produce the reforms that are generally believed to be necessary for Italy.

### Seek Coalition of Left

The Communists would then, in Mr. Longo's blueprint, harvest the dissentiant left-wing elements of the present ruling parties to form a new, Communist-dominated, majority of the left.

Mr. Longo and Mr. Berlinguer, in their enthusiastically applauded closing speeches to the Congress, noted the existence of large groups in both the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties that were exploring the possibility of collaboration with communism.

### Continues Decision of 1948

The party line represented the continuation of the basic 1948 decision by the late Palmiro Togliatti, the postwar party

secretary, that the western alliance would not permit violent revolution to succeed in Italy, even with the arms and Communist partisan formations available then. Mr. Togliatti decided, instead, to work through the constitution to give the Communist party a respectable, democratic image.

This strategy has paid off generously. Slightly more than one in four Italian voters mark his ballot for the Communist party and huge areas of north-central Italy, including this city, are under local Communist administrations.

Maintenance of this image of a smiling, reasonable, "democratic" Communism demanded a sharp reaction by the Italian party to the heavy-handed Soviet-bloc repression of a similar liberal Communism in Czechoslovakia. At the same time Mr. Longo, Mr. Berlinguer and the directing group here wanted, desperately, to avoid real heresy and excommunication.

Total break with Moscow would entail loss of Soviet subsidies and, probably, the defection of an Italian Communist old guard conditioned to absolute fidelity to the "fatherland of socialism" and capable of creating a schismatic party to maintain it.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
19 February 1969

# There to stay?

## Communism Italian style pursues permanency on platform of dissent

By Charles Foley

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Rome

Communism Italian style appears here to stay.

It asserts the right to dissent with Moscow. It allows open disagreement in its ranks.

And in five years it aims at achieving peacefully a sharing of power with the other leading parties of the republic.

To project this novel—and what it hopes will be appealing—image it has skipped a generation and chosen a dynamic young leader, Enrico Berlinguer, who fought the Nazis as a schoolboy partisan.

Mr. Berlinguer was elected vice-secretary by acclamation at the closing session of a week-long Communist Party congress at Bologna. He is expected before long to take over from the veteran and ailing secretary-general, Luigi Longo.

### Factions compromise

Even before the congress opened, most of the 900 delegates elected Mr. Berlinguer as Mr. Longo's successor in a compromise between the party's right- and left-wing rivals. But it was Mr. Berlinguer's

personal triumph in a long closing speech that made his election a successful vindication of the middle way he represents.

Breaking away from party clichés, Mr. Berlinguer gave what was by Communist standards a fresh, imaginative address. It was heard with keen interest by thousands of observers and delegates from more than 40 countries. Many of these will attend next May's long-awaited conference of Communist Parties in Moscow when equal frankness is to be expected.

Mr. Berlinguer, as spokesman for the biggest Communist Party in the West, made no bones about his anti-Soviet stand on Czechoslovakia, which drew loud applause. Nor did he give the Kremlin any hope that its Italian comrades would support attempts to excommunicate Communist China.

Instead he suggested that a new search for unity should be based on a wave of worldwide sympathy for Vietnam (meaning the Viet Cong and Hanoi).

In Italy itself, said Mr. Berlinguer, the Communist Party carried more weight than in any other country. Its power not only through Parliament but in the many provinces and communes like Bologna which it had already captured.

Next year autonomous regions are to be set up all over Italy and these would give the Communists fresh opportunities, he said.

By 1974, when the next general election is due, it might no longer be possible to keep the Communists from direct or indirect participation in the government. Meanwhile they could influence events.

Italy, said Mr. Berlinguer, is by no means an unimportant nation.

"Acting in harmony with liberation movements everywhere we can start a policy of European detente which can change the world," he said.

\* \* \* \* \*

NEW YORK TIMES

9 February 1969

## RUMANIA AFFIRMS INDEPENDENT LINE

Ceausescu Rejects Doctrine  
of 'Limited Sovereignty'

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Feb. 8 — President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania has denounced the new Soviet doctrine of "limited sovereignty" of Communist countries and warned against "outside interference" when differences arise within any Communist party.

Mr. Ceausescu, who also heads the Rumanian Communist party, made these points in a major policy speech delivered last night before the national educators' conference in Bucharest. Although he never mentioned the Soviet Union by name, but his remarks were clearly addressed to Moscow and alluded to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia last Aug. 20-21.

The full text of Mr. Ceausescu's speech was published this morning in the Rumanian press. His views on international problems and Communist relationships closely resembled those of President Tito of Yugoslavia, who became in 1948 the first Communist leader to break away from Soviet influence. Mr. Ceausescu conferred with President Tito for two days last weekend.

The Rumanian leader said

last night:

"We hold that under the present conditions when differences of views and divergencies are manifest among the socialist countries with regard to a series of problems of contemporary development, it is our duty to work tirelessly for the normalization of relations and the unity of the socialist countries."

### Independence Stressed

Emphasizing that Rumania believes in the independence and sovereignty of Communist countries and "noninterference in their internal affairs," Mr. Ceausescu insisted that "the mistakes and the unjust practices which cropped up over the years should be resolutely removed" in Communist relationships.

"The attempts to justify mistakes as well as the emergence of some new theses, like the thesis of limited sovereignty, are damaging to Communist unity," he said.

This comment appeared to refer, among other things, to Soviet efforts to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the grounds of saving Socialism there and to the so-called Brezhnev doctrine that set forth last September the concept of "limited sovereignty" within what Moscow calls the "socialist commonwealth." The doctrine, associated with Leonid I. Brezhnev, head of the Soviet Communist party, asserted that Communist countries had the right to intervene in one another's affairs, including taking military action, if they felt that the survival of socialism was at stake.

The Soviet leader subsequently enlarged on this doc-

trine to include the notion that in economic affairs too all Communist countries must limit their sovereignty for the common good.

Specifically, this relates to proposals for economic integration without Comecon, the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation. Rumania is on record as opposing integration within Comecon, because of her opposition to "suprenational" arrangements.

In an obvious allusion to the Soviet invasion, Mr. Ceausescu said: "If there are differences of views on some problems within a party, they evidently must be solved—within the respective party. In such situations, any outside interference cannot but cause harm to the respective party and to the cause of revolutionary struggle and of socialism."

Elsewhere in the speech, he told of Rumanian efforts for the "expansion of socialist democracy," an expression often used in Czechoslovakia before the invasion.

At another point, Mr. Ceausescu criticized the recently completed United States Army maneuvers in West Germany, near the Czechoslovak border, as being conducive to a new arms race.

In a more general comment in his next sentence, which may have alluded to Soviet pressures to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Rumania, Mr. Ceausescu said that any "measures of military character, such as the organization of maneuvers with the participation of several states at the frontiers of their countries, can only be assessed as demonstrations of force aimed at intimidation."

CPYRGHT

SUNDAY TIMES, London  
16 February 1969

# Rumanians think the Israelis are lucky—the only people surrounding them are their enemies....



By Nicholas Carroll  
Jasi, near the Rumanian-Soviet border, Saturday

TEN MILES east of this ancient Moldavian university city, a single track Rumanian railway line changes to the much broader Russian gauge. It then crosses the River Pruth over a steel girder bridge into the Moldavian Republic of the Soviet Union.

The tiny Rumanian village of Ungheni lies on the west bank, snowed under in the hardest winter Rumania has had for 15 years. But there is no road bridge across to Russia, a matter of 50 yards away. There used to be one, but it was dismantled immediately after the last war, when the Russians once again annexed what had been Rumanian Bessarabia. Cars must cross the frontier at an official customs post 35 miles farther south.

Today I drove out to Ungheni and found that the only visible indication of any special situation there is a tall, spindly watch tower on the Rumanian bank of the river. On the Russian side, there is no sign of life at all.

No observer would guess that this peaceful point was as close as any Rumanian could approach physically to the source of his main anxieties.

In Jasi itself, however, people make a point of claiming to be quite unworried either at the possibility of Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in this area or about a Soviet occupation.

But this apparent indifference strikes me as something of a studied pose, and it is by no means typical of the attitude in the country as a whole. In the minds of almost every Rumanian today, there are two nagging questions: "Will the Russian troops enter Rumania for Warsaw Pact manoeuvres this year? If so, will they go away fairly quickly or will they find some pretext for prolonging their stay?"

It is 12 years since the last Russian tank went back across the Soviet frontier, and 10 years since the last of the Soviet "advisers" in the various ministries in Bucharest returned to



Moscow. The thought that Russian tanks may return, even if only on manoeuvres, naturally sickens Rumanians, whose experience of Stalinist control was perhaps as traumatic as any Eastern European people's.

At the end of last week Rumania's President Ceausescu gave comforting answers to both questions. In a speech to a teachers' conference he attacked the principle of "limited sovereignty" advanced by Mr Brezhnev to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia (though Mr Ceausescu did not name Mr Brezhnev) and also condemned military manoeuvres that increase tension in Europe.

Although this latter criticism was formally aimed at NATO, by implication it also condemned plans to hold Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in Rumania.

Officials in Bucharest, in fact, interpreted this remark to mean that there will not be any Pact manoeuvres in Rumania after all and the general mood at first was one of relief. But doubts persist. Some Rumanians I talked to this week remain optimistic. Others do not see how the manoeuvres can be avoided.

After all, some say, it is Rumania's turn to be the scene of Pact manoeuvres. Also, it is argued, most Rumanian equipment comes from Russia and is obsolete or obsolescent. The Russians would doubtless like to commit Rumania to buying more.

Thirdly, it is a long time since the Warsaw Pact's combined general staff (mainly Soviet) assessed the battle-worthiness of Rumania's 150,000-strong army

(including two armoured divisions) and her 15,000-strong air force. (This consists of 240 combat aircraft organised into 18 interceptor squadrons flying various MIGs.) And finally, the pessimists argue, the Russians would find it useful to familiarise themselves with terrain over which an occupying force might be moved one day.

In Bucharest, where few political facts leak out but speculation abounds, the latest word is that the Russians have eased their pressure slightly for a decision on manoeuvres in Rumania this year; hence President Ceausescu's current bold postures.

Since my last visit, shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Rumanians have become noticeably more outspoken about their deep dislike of everyone and everything Russian. Soon after my arrival this week a Rumanian was telling me the joke about the Sahara: "Within two years of taking over the Sahara from the Algerians, the Russians will be importing sand."

The Rumanian party leadership obviously has a testing year ahead. Apart from the manoeuvres, it faces the prospect of a difficult Warsaw Pact summit meeting, a Comecon summit and a world meeting of Communist parties. On each occasion the Rumanians are bound to find themselves at odds with the Russians. President Ceausescu's tactics are plain; he is playing for time as he builds up the country's industrial base with impressive speed by buying Western technology. He is doing his best to win friends abroad by sending out streams of goodwill and trade missions.

He evidently wants to make the world Rumania-conscious and sympathetic, while at the same time continuing to proclaim Rumania's total commitment to the socialist camp and her Warsaw Pact allies. They seem sensible tactics but I imagine he must often have in mind another joke going the rounds here: "The Israelis are lucky—they're surrounded by their enemies."

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# East European Defiance of Soviet Reviving Despite Czech Invasion

By TAD SZULC

SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

VIENNA, Feb. 19—Six months after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the authority of the Soviet Union is once more being challenged in Eastern Europe.

Indications are mounting that the democratizing and nationalistic Communist spirit that arose in Prague early in 1968 has not been checked by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on Aug. 20-21.

An examination of the Eastern European situation, as seen from Vienna, a neutral crossroads capital, brings out these key points:

¶Rumania, an increasingly defiant member of the Soviet-directed Warsaw Pact alliance, has joined openly with Yugoslavia to reject Moscow's "limited sovereignty" doctrine, which sought to justify the Czechoslovak invasion on the ground of overriding interests of the "socialist commonwealth."

¶Czechoslovakia's continuing defiance of Soviet pressure for political conformity, despite the military occupation, is encouraging the new challenges elsewhere in the region and gradually bringing the progressive Communist leadership back into alignment with the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs.

¶Among the Warsaw Pact countries, whose armies participated in the invasion, a backlash effect is developing. This has removed Hungary from the "hard core" of the invaders' camp and made the regime politically acceptable to such independent-minded leaderships as that of Yugoslavia and to progressive groups in Czechoslovakia. While Poland, East Germany and Bulgaria officially defend the invasion decision, inner stirrings, new domestic problems and widespread second thoughts are reported from all three countries.

¶Despite steady efforts since last fall, the Soviet Union has been unable to "consolidate" the Eastern European area politically, militarily or economically. Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic organization, is torn

by dissension and Moscow has been forced to continue postponing planned Comecon and Warsaw Pact summit conferences.

The most important development is the campaign against Soviet views by Rumania's President, Nicolae Ceausescu and President Tito of Yugoslavia.

While both leaders have been on record since last August as condemning the Czechoslovak invasion, their stand has been transformed in recent months from a passive, or defensive, opposition to an offensive in diplomacy, politics and the press and broadcasting.

The drive, which includes denunciations of the Czechoslovak occupation, goes beyond that specific case and sharply criticizes the "limited sovereignty" doctrine as a threat to socialism. In addition, such expressions as "hegemony," clearly aimed at Moscow, have entered the official Rumanian and Yugoslav lexicons to warn of possible perils ahead.

The two countries equate "limited sovereignty" with the enforced "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops on the territories of what they call independent socialist states. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia or Rumania.

## Campaign Coordinated

The coordination of the Rumanian-Yugoslav campaign can be traced to the conference President Ceausescu and President Tito held early this month in the Rumanian border town of Timisoara.

A week later, Mr. Ceausescu delivered in Bucharest a strongly worded speech against the "limited sovereignty" theory and intervention by foreign Communist parties in the internal affairs of others. The Rumanian press, ranging from the Communist party daily Scinteia to the intellectuals' weekly Contemporanul, has picked up the theme, and it is being sounded almost daily.

Rumania and Yugoslavia chose last week's congress of the Italian Communist party in Bologna as a world forum to express their thoughts on Czechoslovakia, "limited sovereignty" and, by implication, the Soviet Union.

Rumania was represented by

Paul Niculescu-Mizil, a member of the ruling eight-man Presidium of the party, and Yugoslavia by Edward Kardelj, a member of the Presidium and a close associate of President Tito.

Their subsequent private meetings with Italian Communist leaders, who are the chief Western Communist spokesmen of the anti-intervention line, and with the Czechoslovak delegation led by Evzen Erban, a progressive, suggested that a broader ideological alliance was being organized three months before a planned Moscow conference of world Communist parties.

This endeavor is expected to be taken a step further when the party congress of the Yugoslav Communists meets in Belgrade March 11.

Two days ago, the Rumanians provided not only another public assertion of their basic stand but also contributed a new definition of what international Communism should be. In a message to the Danish Communist party, they urged the "right of each and every party independently to establish its political line by applying the general truths of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions in the respective country."

The call for the application of "general truths of Marxism-Leninism" appeared to experts here as the most explicit call ever issued for Communist independence in a Warsaw Pact country. It was stated more bluntly than in any preinvasion Czechoslovak party declaration.

## Basis of Decision Unclear

The question has arisen why Rumania and Yugoslavia have chosen this time for such open defiance of Moscow.

Opinions among specialists include a view that the Czechoslovaks' continued resistance has created a climate propitious for new challenges in Eastern Europe. A related theory is that offense is the best defense in the face of the Soviet return to tough-line Communist orthodoxy.

Some experts believe that both President Ceausescu and Marshal Tito feel that the tide of history is turning and that their actions may even affect the internal leadership development in the Soviet Union, demonstrating that the orthodoxy illustrated by the August

invasion is no longer effective. In any event, the Soviet Union has begun to show signs of growing concern over this situation.

The Soviet Ambassador to Rumania, Aleksandr V. Basov, called on Mr. Ceausescu Monday, and the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Ivan A. Benedictov, called yesterday on Miljalko Todorovic, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav party.

Today, Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovskiy, the Warsaw Pact commander, and First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Y. Kuznetsov, who coordinated the post-invasion political Soviet activities in Czechoslovakia, arrived in Bucharest for talks.

They are expected to seek to bring pressure on Rumania, which has been opposing Soviet political guidance, resisting Warsaw Pact maneuvers and declining to renew a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that expired last year.

Rumanian acts of defiance have included a refusal to break diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Mideast war. This week, Rumania sent a cultural delegation to Tel Aviv, and an exhibition of Israeli modern painting was opened in Bucharest yesterday.

A reflection of Yugoslavia's policies was seen in the official visit to Hungary this month by Premier Mika Spiljak in a move resuming cordial relations between the two countries for the first time since the Czechoslovak invasion.

The Soviet problems six months after the invasion are compounded by Rumanian, Hungarian and East German opposition to integration with Comecon.

The Rumanians openly link integration to "supranational" endeavors under the general approach enforcing "limited sovereignty." The Hungarians who announced this week they were studying the convertibility of the florin, would like creation of a convertible currency in Comecon, to replace the Soviet-directed "trade ruble." The East Germans fear integration would complicate their growing trade with West Germany.

At the six-day mark after the Czechoslovak invasion, a growing consensus in Eastern Europe, as expressed by a Communist official visiting Russia, problems are only beginning.