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EFFECT OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON COMMUNIST FRONTS

The degree of consternation, opposition and disarray caused among Communist front organizations presumably surprised the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact invaders of Czechoslovakia. Some officials in some front headquarters and certain national affiliates of the fronts, condemned or deplored the invasion as being contrary to national sovereignty and independence; in some cases front officials, speaking as individuals in order not to invoke the credentials of the front itself, voiced sharp criticism. Given the fact that support of Soviet foreign policy and of Communist Party objectives is the overriding purpose of the fronts' existence, open disagreement with the Moscow leadership of the fronts is a most significant development, indeed one which has never occurred before.* The problem is further accentuated by the fact that the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with headquarters in Prague -- the most important international front with by far the largest membership -- issued the strongest statement of condemnation and its activities and organization were particularly affected.

The fronts' reactions to the invasion by "fraternal" forces unquestionably impaired their usefulness to the Soviets at a moment when their support was sorely needed. Most likely, the invasion also contributed to furthering the general erosion of the fronts' influence on selected target audiences -- a trend evident in the past few years due to such factors as the Sino-Soviet dispute, the strained relations between the Soviets and Cuba, the increasing demands for national independence and individual freedom within the Soviet camp, etc. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the fronts had maintained silence on the struggle for freedom in that land in spite of the fact that four of them are headquartered in Prague, including the WFTU, International Union of Students (IUS), and the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). The Soviets have worked hard to restore "normalcy" in the fronts, and they have been rather successful so far. While major differences remain over the invasion, the Soviets have managed to impose a tacit understanding to avoid the invasion/intervention issue to the degree possible and to concentrate on Vietnam, "European Security," the Middle East, Greece and other propaganda missions. In any event, whereas in the period immediately following the invasion, front meetings which had been scheduled earlier had to be canceled or postponed because of the tension and disarray in the fronts, the WCP

*The invasion of Czechoslovakia is the first instance of the fronts' failure to support Moscow wholeheartedly on a major issue. In 1956 none of the fronts questioned, and some supported outright, the Soviet invasion which brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution. It should be noted, however, that there had then been strong differences of views within the World Council of Peace (WCP) leadership, and by failing to commit itself did signify something less than approbation. In this context it might also be recalled that in 1948 Moscow's control of the fronts was so complete as to lead to the immediate expulsion of the Yugoslav affiliates from all fronts when Stalin expelled Tito from the Cominform.

and WFTU did manage to hold major meetings by November and December, respectively. These conferences particularly the WFTU's, were less than harmonious, but organizational splits or other deep, irreparable divisions did not occur.

Highlights of Front Reactions

-- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

On 28 August the WFTU Secretariat issued a statement endorsing the earlier public reactions of WFTU Secretary General, Louis Saillant and WFTU President, Renato Bitossi and "condemning and deeply regretting" the military intervention by the five Warsaw Pact countries. The statement stressed that relaxation of international tension can be achieved only if everyone adheres to the rules of noninterference in the internal affairs of others and of negotiations to settle problems. Saillant emphasized that this declaration reflects the fundamental principles which justify the WFTU's existence.

While the Secretariat's statement was supported by most of its affiliates in non-Communist countries, particularly by the Italian CGIL and the French CGT, it was bitterly condemned by Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe, in particularly uncompromising terms by the Polish trade unions (yielding to imperialist propaganda; an act of arbitrariness not reflecting the attitude of the WFTU; etc.). During September it appeared that a split might develop within the WFTU and there were indications that the Soviets might oust the organization's leadership. A number of Soviet-arranged, fence-mending meetings were held concurrent with Soviet attempts to intimidate and bring Bitossi and Saillant to heel. However, these actions and the efforts of WFTU's Soviet vice-president, Aleksandr Shelepin, could not even force a retraction of the WFTU Secretariat statement critical of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

In the October issue of World Trade Union Movement, the acting secretary of the WFTU, Pierre Gansous, wrote an editorial in which he said "... serious divergencies have arisen within the WFTU and more widely within the international trade union movement ..." but "the WFTU must go on. The difficulties will be serious but the will to surmount them in order to ensure the continuity of the WFTU is great." He stressed that member organizations must coexist and co-operate, especially against U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

During October and November, bilateral and multilateral meetings of WFTU national affiliates were continued, and the 18th WFTU General Council meeting, originally planned for Rostock, East Germany (2-5 October) was held in East Berlin (16-19 December). Great efforts were expended to mask the dissensions that have continued to plague the WFTU since its condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow and its allies insisted defensively, in reportage and comment during and after the meeting, that a spirit of harmony prevailed, and failed to mention Czechoslovakia in accounts of the speeches made at the session or in the final resolution. But the Rumanian speech attested, obliquely, to strains at the conference and the Italian Communist organ L'Unita aired the

dissenting minority position upheld by the CGIL on the issue of what the guiding ideological and organizational principles of the WFTU should be. In brief, it maintained that it should be a democratic international organization independent of parties and governments with each national trade union center free to determine its own path and orientation.

It would now appear that the Soviets' ability to force the resignation of Bitossi or Saillant was limited, so long as the PCI and the PCF continued to assert their independence of the CPSU. Their positions may be less tenable, however, as the Italian and French parties move further back into Moscow's fold.

-- World Council of Peace (WCP)

The WCP statement on Czechoslovakia was issued three weeks after the invasion -- the hesitation reflecting its own dilemma and that facing most of the fronts. Published on 10 September in Brussels and signed by WCP's Belgian Coordinating Chairman Isabelle Blume, and Indian Secretary General Romesh Chandra, the statement expressed "concern and anxiety" but, unlike the WFTU, welcomed the "agreement" reached in Moscow. With this mild rebuke, the WCP was out of step with several of its affiliated peace movements, especially in Europe, which denounced the invasion.

The disruption caused in the WCP was apparently not particularly serious: It opened its new headquarters in Helsinki on September 20 and that same day published its first appeal which asked for action during the Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People (15-21 October). Chandra led a WCP delegation to the Afro-Asian "Conference for Support for the Vietnamese People" held in Cairo in September and a joint WCP/Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference in support of the Portuguese Colonies and of the Peoples of Southern Africa was decided upon during September for January (18-20) in Khartoum. The WCP's stress on collaboration with and support of "third generation fronts" (such as AAPSO) and other groups in the Third World precedes, of course, the Czech crisis. It reflects the WCP's awareness of its limited action potential in those areas where it must operate entirely in its own name, which is too tainted with Communism to permit a wide freedom of action.

In October the WCP felt strong enough to call a Presidential Committee meeting, as many members had demanded immediately after Czechoslovakia was invaded. It took place in Lahti, Finland, from 11 to 13 November and dealt with many familiar action issues: Vietnam, the Middle East, support of the Arab Peoples, Greece, Latin America, etc. The official conference press release stated that differences of viewpoint on Czechoslovakia were expressed, and the common wish was for an improvement in the situation. Prior to the meeting, the Yugoslav League for Peace had written to the WCP demanding "concrete action in favor of the victims."

At a preparatory meeting in Vienna, from 10 December, for the Conference for European Security and Co-operation, it was decided to postpone the conference by some five months and to hold it in Vienna in October 1969. The

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on December that the 65 delegates from Western and Eastern European countries had expressed serious differences of views on questions of national sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of other nations.

-- International Organization of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

As reported by Le Monde on 13 September, the President and Secretary General of the IADL issued a statement addressed to the IADL affiliates of the Warsaw Pact countries, excluding Rumania, condemning the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia which was "contrary to the norms of international law." Internal stresses in this lawyers' organization over the Czech invasion are not surprising, particularly since it is heavily involving in various kinds of anti-Vietnam War propaganda and "investigative" actions.

-- World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

The only significant action taken by this organization concerning the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a statement by its Italian Communist President, Rodolfo Mechini. He issued a personal statement on August 27, condemning the military action. WFDY's Secretary General, Le Gal, was replaced by another French Communist youth leader, Michel Jouet, but no reason was given for the change. Only the Chilean affiliate of the WFDY expressed support for the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

-- International Union of Students (IUS)

The IUS issued no statement on Czechoslovakia. The Secretariat met on 26 August in Prague, but decided to postpone discussions. At the next meeting on 7 October, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, IUS President and Chairman of the Czechoslovak Youth Organization, requested the removal of the Czechoslovak matter from the agenda. In a letter on 24 August to the youth organizations of all Warsaw Pact powers involved in the invasion, he had accused them of violating the bonds of friendship by "clear and absolutely unfounded aggression" and demanded withdrawal of the foreign troops "who are mainly made up of members of your organizations." Several Western European and African members of the IUS were displeased with the IUS's official silence. The fact is that Vokrouhlicky's views remain as stated in his letter of 24 August.

-- International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

On 22 August, the IOJ protested against the occupation of its headquarters in Prague by the invading troops. The statement said: "we protest most earnestly against this illegal measure" and it appealed to all IOJ members and all colleagues throughout the world "to oppose by every means this brutal intervention." On 3 September, the IOJ Secretariat demanded that the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists be allowed to resume normal operations and it is now planning for an international exhibition, "Interpres '69," to be held in Prague, 11-18 June, 1969.

-- Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

There is no evidence of any significant reaction to the Czechoslovak issue in this organization, which is somewhat surprising given WIDF's alleged concern with injustice and related matters. The reason for the silence may well be that the WIDF is headquartered in Ulbricht-controlled East Berlin. The French affiliate sent the WIDF a statement condemning the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

-- World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

This organization has been deeply affected by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Scientific World (No. 6) admitted that the invasion had complicated the work of the WFSW. The Swiss government blocked the convening of the Ninth General Assembly, due to be held in Switzerland from September 25-29, and the work in Prague of the Central and Eastern European Center was interrupted. The WFSW did not issue a statement on the invasion because, it said, the 29 affiliated organizations could not agree on a common view. The editorial in Scientific World explained that besides disagreeing on the question of the invasion, affiliates also disagreed on whether the subject came within the terms of the WFSW charter and constitution. They finally agreed that the WFSW was a federation of scientific organizations, each with an equal right to a view on how the constitution should be applied.

-- International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR)

The FIR has been deeply affected by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Its Italian President, Banfi, in a letter to Presidium members, condemned the military intervention in one European country by another, and the French and Italian affiliates issued statements reflecting views similar to Banfi's. The FIR and all its West European affiliates sent messages of support to Dubcek. The Sixth Congress, which was due to be held in November, has been postponed until 1969.

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CASTRO'S PERSONAL REIGN

The official celebration of the tenth anniversary of Fidel Castro's seizure of power was marred by two events: the announcement of sugar rationing by the world's leading sugar producer and the dramatic escape of 88 Cubans into the Guantanamo Naval Base. The two cases illustrate the sorry state of Cuban economic and political life since Castro came to power and became the self-proclaimed "liberator" of all the Andes. Castro's pre-occupation with extending his "liberation" movement to all Latin America can be partially explained as a method of bolstering his own revolution, but is also largely due to his own personal inclinations and weaknesses. The one major success of his life has been toppling the (already wobbly) Batista regime. He is trying to relive and recreate this single act on a hemispheric basis and by this obsession has brought chaos to Cuba, has ostracized his country from the Western Hemisphere and alienated many of the "fraternal" Communist Parties and certain old-time Cuban Communists, too. His fervent enthusiasm for exporting the revolution has dissipated the goodwill and faith originally bestowed upon his government by other Latin American countries.

Cuba as a Revolutionary Model

Castro has devoted an inordinate amount of time and attention to his doctrine of revolutionary war, or guerrilla warfare. Since he came to power many of his speeches have called for the overthrow of the established governments of almost all of his neighbors and have stressed the part to be played by the peasants in guerrilla warfare. A very small number of extremists have been attracted by Castro's revolutionary zeal and Castro has supported them in varying degrees, often to the dismay and at the expense of the orthodox Communist parties. At one time or another guerrilla warfare has been tried in sixteen or seventeen Latin American countries and has failed in all of them. Several countries -- Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala and Colombia -- are believed to be currently designated by Castro as priority targets for guerrilla warfare.

Failures and Setbacks

Venezuela first became a prime target for Castro in 1960 and this led to severance of diplomatic relations by Venezuela in 1961. By 1963 Venezuelan terrorists were being trained in Cuba and arms were supplied to terrorist groups inside Venezuela who were trying to wreck the elections. An unprecedented wave of terrorism preceding the elections failed to prevent 87% of the voters from going to the polls. The Communist Party of Venezuela broke with the Castroites and subsequently changed its tactics. Castro continued his efforts against Venezuela and in 1966 Dr. Julio Iribarren Borzes, brother of the then Foreign Minister, was kidnapped and murdered; the crime was boastfully admitted by the Havana representative of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). In 1967 Castro sent a number of Cuban military personnel to Venezuela to support the pro-Castro movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Most of these men were captured or killed as they attempted to land. They were to join a group of Cubans who had been infiltrated into the country in 1966 and were subsequently apprehended. About 100 guerrillas of the MIR still

operate in Eastern Venezuela and engage in terrorist acts; the latest case involved the arrest of forty persons, and documents seized at the time contained orders from Cuba to stage an uprising before the inauguration of the new President. Even though Castro has persisted in trying to unseat the government of Venezuela over a period of eight years, he has been totally unsuccessful and in the process has incurred the wrath of the PCV which accused him of setting himself up as an "untouchable revolutionary oracle."

The most spectacular failure was, of course, Bolivia where Castro sent his chief revolutionary evangelist Che Guevara to establish a guerrilla movement. Since Guevara's death, guerrilla activities have slowed down but there is no evidence to conclude that Castro has given up his hopes of exporting the revolution to Bolivia. In his eulogy to Guevara in October 1967, he admitted Che's death was a tremendous blow to the revolutionary movement but said, "they are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat of his theses...." At the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968, Castro again reiterated his vow to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries throughout the world.

Castro's calls for revolution were not so frequent in 1968. This may be due to several factors: the dismal state of the Cuban economy, to unrest within the country, and pressure from the Soviets. Castro's crackdown on all aspects of Cuban life is becoming increasingly unpopular and his patron, the USSR, more impatient with his ineptness at home and the havoc he has wrought among the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America.

The State of Cuban-Soviet Relations

Despite the numerous irritations, which are real on both sides, the "ties that bind" these two disparate countries are unlikely to be severed. The Soviet Union's political and economic investment in Cuba is far too great to abandon and Castro is well aware of this. The Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy is believed to be more than one million dollars per day with total indebtedness approaching two billion dollars, excluding military aid.

The new technical aid agreement signed 7 January 1969 provided for aid in reconstruction of the technical base of Cuban television, assistance in the fields of irrigation and drainage, and an amendment to the 1967 agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy, whereby the USSR would provide Cuba with an experimental atomic reactor. Although the 1969 trade protocol has not been signed, it is generally thought that the terms will be as generous or more so than the 1968 agreement in which Cuba was granted \$328 million in credits and which called for \$970 million in trade. The Soviets have shown that they are willing to pay their loyal supporters for endorsement of their invasion of Czechoslovakia and the meaning was not lost on Castro. No doubt his endorsement was completely cynical -- in part to gain more favorable terms for the new economic agreement. It is not known if Cuba will attend the World Communist Conference in May 1969 (there have been no Cuban representatives at preparatory meetings), but it could be part of the price Castro must pay for his continued doles from the USSR.

Practically speaking, Russia appears to be more unhappy over the chaotic conditions of the economy and over her small chances of collecting the 2.5 percent interest on the Cuban debt, not to mention the principal, than over the political provocations of Castro. Even the purging of old line Anibal Escalante and other pro-Soviet elements brought the most restrained comment. These provocations have been more of a nuisance than a serious affront and in some cases actually served Soviet purposes throughout the continent. The image of a peaceful trade and diplomatic partner, which the Soviets are assiduously pursuing throughout Latin America, is served well by the contrast of Castro's violent invectives and actions. Moscow is not opposed to violence and has given honorable mention to the guerrilla movements of Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela, for instance. The main quarrel the Soviets probably have with Castro's political philosophy, revolutionary warfare, is that it does not work. The Soviets would undoubtedly prefer a less egocentric, egotistical man who would be more easily controlled, but the fact remains that Castro stays in power only through the military and economic support of the Soviet Union. The Soviets must surely find Castro a strange ideological bedfellow with his espousal of his own brand of Marxism, a doctrine which proclaims that the Communist Party is not necessarily the vanguard of the revolution and that those who want to make the revolution have the right and duty to constitute themselves the vanguard, independently of the Marxist-Leninist parties. By Castro's personal decree, Marxist-Leninist theory, the essence of all Communist dogma, is no longer taught in Cuban universities.

Castro's intransigent militancy and desire for personal power are of concern to the Soviets, but they must nevertheless defend Castro to prove no Communist country ever reverts to capitalism and because he is able to exploit anti-Yanqui nationalism and the social and economic iniquities which exist in Latin America. Castro knows he cannot exist without Soviet support and realizes the Soviets are as intent about their subversion of the continent as he is in exporting the revolution.

Diplomatic Relations with Latin America

Castro's egocentric desire to impose his beliefs on the entire continent has almost totally isolated his country, even from the Latin American Communist parties, which are rejecting him. Almost every nation has been the target of his subversion and each has reacted by applying diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. With the exception of Mexico, which did not vote for the OAS sanctions, the embargo has not been broken. Diplomatic isolation has been a barrier to Castro's efforts to support guerrilla activities, since one of the reasons for their failures has been the lack of support mechanisms. Without this isolation, Castro would be able to fund and advise guerrilla groups through his diplomatic installations and an upsurge of guerrilla activity could be expected.

Castro is currently soft-pedaling his theme of the export of the revolution in certain Latin countries; this is probably temporary and at the behest of the Soviets and should be interpreted as merely an attempt to

break this isolation. Chile is believed to be interested in re-establishing relations with Cuba and it is possible other countries would follow once they feel it would be unlikely that Castro will be replaced and that he poses no threat to them. This would, in fact, certainly not be the case and would be a great disservice to the other Latin American countries under attack.

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HOW FIDEL CASTRO RUINED CUBA

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has very opportunely recalled to the westerners that there exists a Soviet imperialism and colonialism, it does not seem useless for us to illustrate this imperialism by still other examples than by the European side of the USSR. A recent 270 page study, devoted to Cuba, furnishes us an overwhelming documentation on that island of nearly 8 million inhabitants. [Footnote: Jose R. Alvarez-Diaz, A Comparative Study of the Cuban Economy Before and After Castro. Miami, Florida, 1968.] This work permits the reader to follow step by step the process of degradation that Fidel Castro and his group have inflicted on a country in full development.

Moreover, it should be said in behalf of the men of the Kremlin that for once -- one time does not make a habit! -- they neither invaded nor conquered Cuba; it is Castro who presented it to them as a gift, a gift that they adjudged to be a rather onerous one at first and the essentially strategic value of which they did not discover until 1962. It is true that the missile affair of November 1962 taught Khrushchev that this was a rather poisoned gift.

Cuba Before Castro

Cuba is a part of what is called the "third world." However, despite the slightness of its territory and population, it must be classed among the most under-developed countries of Latin America. As for its national per capita income, Cuba fell behind Venezuela and Uruguay in 1958, but before Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Like most of the so-called under-developed countries, Cuba sadly sensed its dependence on the industrialized nations. The fact that most of the countries of the third world are single-crop (monoculture) lands involves a double servitude. On the one hand, they are in an inferior position in dealing with their clients, who profit from their position of monopoly buyers since the selling country hardly has any alternative to selling the product which almost alone creates its wealth. On the other hand, they are closely tied to the fluctuations in the world market prices, the dropping of which can lead them to catastrophe. Finally -- but this is unrelated to the question of single-crops -- lacking capital, they are obliged to remunerate the foreign capital invested in their economy and thus feel themselves "exploited." This combination of facts obviously gives a singular resonance to the anti-imperialist slogans.

Castro profited from this. An unhappy combination of circumstances permitted him to take power in the beginning of 1959 and to carry out his program which, in the beginning, consisted only of a few sentences: it was necessary to withdraw Cuba from the hold of "imperialism" (which, in the event, was obviously American), it was necessary to diversify the Cuban production to break the servitude of a single-crop (sugar), it was necessary to end the hold of foreign capital, basically American, on the national economy. After which the road would be open to bring to the working class' well-being and abundance.

However the Cuban economy had not awaited the accession to power of Castro to start down the path which permitted it to gradually emancipate itself from its servitudes.

Its agricultural production had begun to diversify while the sugar production had remained almost steady between 1949-51 and 1957-58, that of bananas had increased 30% and that of rice had more than doubled. Industrial activity showed an appreciable growth: just from 1953 to 1959 the manufacturing industry progressed by 19%, construction by 21%, and the production of gas and electricity by 58%.

In the same period, the principal Cuban industry, that of sugar, little by little escaped foreign control, essentially American. Here is how the refineries were classed by nationality:

Sugar Refineries

	Number (units)			Production (percent)		
	1939	1952	1958	1939	1952	1958
Cubans	56	113	121	22 %	55 %	62 %
Americans	66	41	36	55 %	43 %	37 %
Others (a)	52	7	4	23 %	2 %	1 %
	174	161	161	100 %	100 %	100 %

(a) principally Spanish

Foreign control over Cuban banks also diminished. The Cuban banks amassed more and more deposits, the importance of banks owned by foreign capital fell fairly sharply:

Deposits In Commercial Banks (millions pesos)

	Total	Cuban Deposits	Foreign Deposits (a)
1939	138,9	23,3 (17 %)	115,6 (85 %)
1950	647,6	294,5 (46 %)	353,1 (54 %)
1958	1,076,8	658,2 (61 %)	418,6 (39 %)

(a) principally American

The Cuban economy was thus in the process of growing more and more out of its primitive stage of under-development, of monoculture, and of dependence. It was at this point, 1 January 1959, that Castro took power.

The Upset

In taking power the Castro group had no economic program to speak of, but only a few broad-brush documents sketching a democratic planning on a base of private industry with the aim of diversifying agricultural production and industrializing the country.

But once their dictatorship was established, the new masters adopted a new line of conduct under the pressure of the communist extremists. They rushed the reforms, the whole of which resulted in less than two years in a complete upset (it would be giving them too much honor to call it a revolution) of the Cuban economy.

The agrarian reform -- the first decisions were taken as early as May 1959 -- began by the distribution of lands exceeding an area of 30 "caballerias" (402 hectares) to the farmers and agricultural workers. The expropriation was to have been accomplished with an indemnity in the form of bonds reimbursable in 20 years carrying an interest of 4.5% per annum. These bonds have never been delivered and the former landowners are still waiting to be indemnified. Since October 1960, most of the lands expropriated have been under the direct control of the state which prescribes thereafter to the farmers the nature and quantity of what they are to produce.

During the same period, the government took in hand the non-agricultural sector by expropriations, again without indemnity. In October 1960, these nationalizations were the subject of two decrees. In the beginning of 1961 the state appropriated to itself 18,500 large and middle-sized enterprises which represented 80% of the industrial production and 55% of the agricultural production.

In undertaking these confiscations without indemnity, Castro inevitably entered into conflict with the United States. The Cuban proprietors obviously had no means of defense. But the American government could not overlook the plundering of its own citizens. During the year 1960, relations between the two countries became more and more strained. Being unable to import American crude oil for lack of dollars, Castro signed an accord with the USSR, which did not require much persuading. But the Cuban refineries owned by Americans refused to process the Russian oil and were expropriated by Castro. The United States retaliated by reducing their purchases of Cuban sugar and that led to the confiscation of all American holdings in Cuba. On 3 January 1961 the United States broke diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro.

The sequence of these events might leave the impression that this fatal linkage might have been avoided if the Castro group had shown itself more conciliatory in the question of indemnities. It is, however, permitted to suppose that Castro had deliberately wished and provoked this break. Certainly he did not declare himself "Marxist-Leninist" (it would be nice to know what his poor brain understands by this term) until later, in his speech of 2 December 1961. But it is certain that the Soviet example, seen from afar, must have impressed him for a long time and that his

Communist advisors pushed him in that direction. And it is not by chance that he had envisaged since 1960 the launching of a five-year plan slated to get underway in 1961. It was not by chance, either, that he appealed, as early as August 1960, to the enlightened advice of Charles Bettelheim, well known specialist and expert in under-development.

Mr. Bettelheim felt that it would be premature to launch a five-year plan before having proceeded with the nationalization of the banks and the creation of a central banking system, with the nationalization of an important part of the wholesale commerce and with the creation of a national Institute of Foreign Commerce. Castro deferred to the advice of Mr. Bettelheim and the plan was not launched until the beginning of 1962 as a four-year plan.

Dependent on Moscow

Having cut himself off from the traditional and normal circuits of the world economy, Castro turned toward the USSR and toward the Soviet bloc in general, including China. It was necessary to industrialize the country at any cost and at full speed, in conformance with the old thesis of Moscow according to which extreme industrialization is the sole salvation for an under-developed country eager to escape from its misery and to free itself from its dependence on "imperialism."

Cuba was to receive equipment worth \$357 million, divided as follows (in millions of dollars):

USSR	200
China	60
Czechoslovakia	40
Rumania	15
Hungary	15
Poland	12
East Germany	10
Bulgaria	5

Moscow had foreseen everything, even the "experts" charged with installing this equipment, with advising the Cuban technicians, and with spotting (this was not known until a little later) the best places for the famous rockets which provoked the grave conflict of November 1962.

Two years later, toward the middle of 1963, Castro had to face the facts: the promises had not been kept. In all, Cuba had received only eight factories from the Soviet bloc: 3 from Czechoslovakia, 3 from East Germany, 1 from the USSR and 1 from Poland. He had been promised five times as many.

The equipment delivered by the Soviet bloc was for the most part unusable, for the same reasons as in the USSR: shortage of spare parts, of tires, of generators. In any case the industrialization plan failed.

But cut off from the markets of the free world, Cuba had become a satellite of the USSR and could no longer export except to the Soviet bloc. Having essentially only sugar to export and the members of the Soviet bloc not paying in hard currencies -- the exchanges were carried out on a barter basis -- Cuba lost all freedom of movement.

The dictatorial planning according to the Soviet model did the rest. In February 1964, Ernesto Guevara, then the economic director of Cuba, gave a speech of "self-criticism" in which this admission may be found:

"Our task consists at present of regaining in certain sectors of production the technical level that we formerly possessed and that we have lost."

Summary Balance Sheet

We can only take into account certain essential facts in the limited framework of this expose. Let us begin with the principal production of Cuba, sugar. Cuba produced 5.964 million tons of it in 1959. After 1961, a favorable year (6.767 million tons), the consequences of collectivization began to be felt: 4.815 million tons of sugar in 1962, 3.800 million in 1963 and in 1964. Since the failure of industrialization, the government has made a major effort to reverse the trend, since it has to export something. Sugar production is estimated by the government (thus a figure subject to caution) at 6 million tons in 1967.

Six million head of livestock were counted in 1958. This number fell to 4.4 million in 1964 and grew to 5.2 million in 1967.

The production of beef fell from 200,000 tons in 1959 to 100,000 tons in 1962; that of pork from 38,600 tons in 1959 to 20,000 tons in 1962. Since that date the statistics are lacking; this is understandable.

Since 24 March 1962, innumerable products are rationed and the inevitable corollary of rationing, the black market, has appeared.

The following table contrasts the average consumption in 1958 with the quantities allotted on the ration cards in 1962:

	1958	1962
oil	0,75 livre (a)	9,5 livre
rice	2 1.8 onces	1 1.8 onces
vegetables	224 grammes	172 grammes
beef	2 1.3 onces	0,75 livre
poultry	1,5 livre	0,5 livre
fish	1 livre	0,25 livre
dairy products	0,75 litre	0,20 litre

(a) 1 livre = 16 onces = 46 grammes

This is a balance sheet of bankruptcy.

Castro had wanted to deliver Cuban from the American "imperialism."
He delivered it, bound hand and foot, to Soviet imperialism.

Castro wanted to diversify the Cuban economy and to industrialize it to deliver it from the servitudes that monoculture brings. He stopped and reversed the process of liberation in which it was engaged. And he ruined it more than ever. Which does not at all hinder many students around the world from proclaiming themselves "Castroites."

Comment Fidel Castro a ruiné Cuba

PUISQUE l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie a rappelé fort opportunément aux Occidentaux qu'il existe un impérialisme et un colonialisme soviétiques, il ne nous paraît pas inutile d'illustrer cet impérialisme par d'autres exemples encore que par le « glacis » européen de l'U.R.S.S. Une récente étude de 270 pages, consacrée à Cuba, nous fournit une surabondante documentation sur cette île de près de 8 millions d'habitants (1). Cet ouvrage permet au lecteur de suivre pas à pas le processus de dégradation que Fidel Castro et son équipe ont infligé à un pays en plein développement.

Encore faut-il dire à la décharge des hommes du Kremlin que pour une fois — une fois n'est pas coutume! — ils n'ont ni envahi ni conquis Cuba; c'est Castro qui leur en a fait cadeau, un cadeau qu'ils jugèrent plutôt onéreux au début et dont ils ne découvrirent la valeur essentiellement stratégique qu'en 1962. Il est vrai que l'affaire des missiles de novembre 1962 fit comprendre à Khrouchtchev que ce cadeau était plutôt empoisonné.

CUBA AVANT CASTRO

Cuba fait partie de ce que l'on appelle le « tiers monde ». Cependant, en dépit de l'exiguïté de son territoire et de sa population, il faut le classer parmi les pays les moins sous-développés de l'Amérique latine. Quant au revenu national par tête d'habitant, Cuba se classait en 1958 après le Vénézuéla et l'Uruguay, mais avant l'Argentine, le Chili et le Mexique.

Tout comme la plupart des pays dits sous-développés, Cuba ressentait douloureusement sa dépendance à l'égard des nations industrialisées. Le fait que la plupart des pays du tiers monde sont des pays de monoculture comporte une double servitude. D'une part, ils sont en position d'infériorité en face de leurs clients, lesquels profitent de leur monopole d'acheteurs puisque le pays vendeur n'a guère autre chose à exporter que le produit qui fait sa richesse quasi unique. D'autre part, ils dépendent étroitement des fluctuations des cours

mondiaux, dont la baisse peut les acculer à une catastrophe. Enfin — mais ceci n'a rien à voir avec la monoculture — manquant de capitaux, ils sont obligés de rémunérer les capitaux étrangers investis dans leur économie et se sentent ainsi « exploités ». Cet ensemble de faits donne évidemment une singulière force de percussion aux slogans anti-impérialistes.

Castro en profita. Un malheureux concours de circonstances lui permit de s'emparer du pouvoir au début de 1959 et de réaliser son programme qui, au début, ne tenait que dans quelques phrases : il fallait soustraire Cuba à l'emprise de « l'impérialisme » (lequel, en l'occurrence, était évidemment américain), il fallait diversifier les productions cubaines pour rompre les servitudes de la monoculture (sucre), il fallait industrialiser le pays à toute vitesse, il fallait en finir avec la mainmise du capital étranger, essentiellement américain, sur l'économie nationale. Après quoi, la voie serait libre pour apporter à la population laborieuse le bien-être et l'abondance.

Cependant, l'économie cubaine n'avait pas attendu l'accession au pouvoir de Castro pour s'engager dans une voie lui permettant de s'émanciper graduellement de ses servitudes.

Sa production agricole commençait à se diversifier. Alors que la production sucrière était restée à peu près égale entre 1949-1951 et 1957-1958, celle des bananes avait augmenté de 30 % et celle du riz avait plus que doublé. L'activité industrielle marqua un essor appréciable : rien qu'entre 1953 et 1959, l'industrie manufacturière progressa de 19 %, le bâtiment de 21 %, la production du gaz et de l'électricité de 58 %.

En même temps, la principale industrie cubaine, celle du sucre, s'était peu à peu soustraite à la mainmise étrangère, essentiellement américaine. Voici comment se répartissaient les raffineries quant à leur nationalité :

Raffineries de sucre

	Nombre (unités)			Production (pour cent)		
	1939	1952	1958	1939	1952	1958
Cubaines	56	113	121	22 %	55 %	62 %
Américaines	66	41	36	55 %	43 %	37 %
Autres (a)	52	7	4	23 %	2 %	1 %
	174	161	161	100 %	100 %	100 %

(a) Surtout espagnoles.

(1) José R. Alvarez-Diaz, *A Comparative Study of the Cuban Economy before and after Castro* (Miami, Florida, 1958).

L'emprise étrangère sur les banques cubaines allait également en s'accroissant. Les banques cubaines concentraient de plus en plus de dépôts. L'importance des banques possédées par le pays devenait de plus en plus assez net :

Dépôts dans les banques commerciales (Millions de pesos)

	Total	Banques cubaines	Banques étrangères (a)
1939	138,9	23,3 (17 %)	115,6 (83 %)
1950	647,6	294,5 (46 %)	353,1 (54 %)
1958	1.076,8	658,2 (61 %)	418,6 (39 %)

(a) Surtout américaines.

L'économie cubaine était donc en train de sortir de plus en plus de son stade primitif de sous-développement, de monoculture et de dépendance. C'est à ce moment-là, le 1^{er} janvier 1959, que Castro prit le pouvoir.

LE CHAMBARDEMENT

En accédant au pouvoir, l'équipe de Castro n'avait pas de programme économique à proprement parler, mais seulement quelques documents-canevas préconisant une planification démocratique sur la base de l'entreprise privée en vue de diversifier la production agricole et d'industrialiser le pays.

Mais une fois leur dictature établie, les nouveaux maîtres adoptèrent une nouvelle ligne de conduite sous la pression des extrémistes communistes. Ils précipitèrent les réformes, dont l'ensemble se solda, au bout de moins de deux ans, par un chambardement complet (ce serait leur faire trop d'honneur que d'appeler cela une révolution) de l'économie cubaine.

La réforme agraire — les premières décisions furent prises dès mai 1959 — débuta par la distribution des terres excédant une surface de 30 « caballerias » (402 hectares) aux fermiers et aux ouvriers agricoles. L'expropriation devait s'effectuer avec indemnité, contre des bons remboursables en vingt ans et portant un intérêt de 4,5 % par an. Ces bons n'ont jamais été délivrés et les anciens propriétaires attendent toujours d'être indemnisés. Dès octobre 1960, la plupart des exploitations expropriées furent soumises au contrôle direct de l'Etat, qui prescrivit désormais aux exploitants la nature et la quantité de ce qu'ils ont à produire.

Pendant la même période, le gouvernement lut main basse sur le secteur non-agricole, en expropriant, là encore, sans indemnité. En octobre 1960, ces nationalisations firent l'objet de deux décrets. Au début de 1961, l'Etat s'était approprié 18.500 grandes et moyennes entreprises, lesquelles représentaient 80 % de la production industrielle et 55 % de la production agricole.

En procédant à des confiscations sans indemnité, Castro entra inévitablement en conflit avec les Etats-Unis. Les propriétaires cubains n'avaient évidemment aucun moyen de défense. Mais le gouvernement américain ne pouvait se désintéresser des spoliations dont furent victimes ses propres ressortissants. Au cours de l'année 1960, les relations entre les deux pays se tendent de plus en plus. Ne pou-

vant plus importer de pétrole brut américain faute de dollars, Castro signe un accord avec l'U.R.S.S., laquelle ne se fait pas prier. Mais les raffineries cubaines possédées par des Américains refusent de traiter le pétrole russe et sont expropriées par Castro. Les Etats-Unis ripostent en refusant leurs achats de sucre cubain, et c'est la confiscation de tous les avoirs américains à Cuba. Le 3 janvier 1961, les Etats-Unis rompent leurs relations diplomatiques avec Fidel Castro.

La succession de ces faits pourrait laisser croire que cet enchaînement fatal aurait pu être évité si l'équipe de Castro s'était montrée plus conciliante dans la question de l'indemnisation. Il est cependant permis de supposer que Castro avait délibérément voulu et provoqué cette rupture. Certes, il ne s'est déclaré « marxiste-léniniste » (on aimerait bien savoir ce que sa pauvre cervelle entend par ce terme) que sur le tard, dans son discours du 2 décembre 1961. Mais il est certain que l'exemple soviétique vu de loin devait l'impressionner depuis longtemps et que ses conseillers communistes l'ont poussé dans cette direction. Et ce n'est pas un hasard qu'il ait envisagé dès 1960 le lancement d'un plan quinquennal appelé à démarrer en 1961. Ce n'est pas un hasard non plus qu'il ait fait appel dès août 1960 aux conseils éclairés de M. Charles Bettelheim, célèbre spécialiste et expert du sous-développement.

M. Bettelheim estima qu'il était prématuré de lancer le plan quinquennal avant d'avoir procédé à la nationalisation des banques et à la création d'un système bancaire centralisé, à la nationalisation d'un secteur important du commerce de gros et à la création d'un Institut national du Commerce extérieur. Castro déféra aux conseils de M. Bettelheim, et le plan ne fut lancé qu'au début de 1962 comme plan quadriennal.

SOUS LA DEPENDANCE DE MOSCOU

S'étant coupé des circuits traditionnels et normaux de l'économie mondiale, Castro se tourna vers l'U.R.S.S. et vers le bloc soviétique en général, y compris la Chine. Il fallait industrialiser le pays à tout prix, et en brûlant les étapes, conformément à la vieille thèse de Moscou selon laquelle l'industrialisation à outrance est la seule planche de salut pour les pays sous-développés désireux de sortir de leur misère et de s'affranchir de leur dépendance à l'égard de « l'impérialisme ».

Cuba devait recevoir de l'outillage d'une valeur de 357 millions de dollars se répartissant

sant comme suit (en millions de dollars) :

U.R.S.S.	200
Chine	60
Tchécoslovaquie	40
Roumanie	15
Hongrie	15
Pologne	12
Allemagne de l'Est	10
Bulgarie	5

Moscou avait tout prévu, même les « experts » chargés d'installer cet outillage, de conseiller les techniciens cubains et de repérer (cela ne se sut qu'un peu plus tard) les endroits les plus propices aux célèbres fûsées qui provoquèrent le grave conflit de novembre 1962.

Deux ans plus tard, vers le milieu de 1963, Castro dut se rendre à l'évidence : les promesses n'avaient pas été tenues. Au total, Cuba n'avait reçu que huit usines du bloc soviétique : 3 de Tchécoslovaquie, 3 d'Allemagne orientale, 1 de l'U.R.S.S., et 1 de Pologne. On lui en avait promis cinq fois plus.

L'outillage livré par le bloc soviétique était le plus souvent inutilisable pour les mêmes raisons qu'en U.R.S.S. : manque de pièces de rechange, de pneus, de dynamos. De toute

façon, le plan d'industrialisation était tombé à l'eau. Mais coupée de tous les marchés du monde libre, Cuba était devenue un satellite de l'U.R.S.S. et ne pouvait plus exporter que vers le bloc soviétique. N'ayant essentiellement que du sucre à exporter et les membres du bloc soviétique ne payant pas en devises fortes, les échanges s'effectuant sur la base du troc, Cuba perdit toute liberté de mouvement.

La planification dictatoriale selon le modèle soviétique fit le reste. En février 1964, Ernesto Guevara, alors le directeur économique de Cuba, prononça un discours d'« auto-critique » où l'on trouve cet aveu :

« Notre tâche consiste à présent à retrouver dans certains secteurs de production le niveau technique que nous possédions et que nous avons perdu ».

BILAN SOMMAIRE

Nous ne pouvons faire état que des faits essentiels dans le cadre limité de cet exposé. Commençons par la principale production de Cuba, le sucre. Cuba en avait produit 5.964 millions de tonnes en 1959. Après 1961, année faste (6.767 millions), les conséquences de la collectivisation se firent sentir : 4.815 m

de tonnes de sucre en 1962, 3.800 millions en 1963 et en 1964. Depuis l'échec de l'industrialisation, le gouvernement fait de gros efforts pour remonter la pente puisqu'il faut bien exporter quelque chose. La production sucrière est estimée par le gouvernement (donc chiffre sujet à caution) à 6 millions de tonnes en 1967.

On comptait 6 millions de têtes de bétail en 1958. Ce nombre est tombé à 4,4 millions en 1964, pour remonter à 5,2 millions en 1967.

La production de la viande de bœuf est tombée de 200.000 tonnes en 1959 à 100.000

tonnes en 1962 ; celle de la viande de porc de 38.600 tonnes en 1959 à 20.000 tonnes en 1962. Depuis cette date, les statistiques font défaut ; on comprend pourquoi.

Depuis le 24 mars 1962, d'innombrables produits sont rationnés, et l'inévitable corollaire du rationnement, le marché noir est entré dans les mœurs.

Le tableau ci-dessous confronte la consommation moyenne de 1958 avec les quantités allouées sur cartes en 1962 :

	1958	1962
Mat. grasses ..	0,75 livre (a)	0,5 livre
Riz	2 l. 8 onces	1 l. 8 onces
Légumineuses et légumes ..	224 grammes	172 gram.
Viande de bœuf	2 l. 3 onces	0,75 livre
Volaille	1,5 livre	0,5 livre
Poisson	1 livre	0,25 livre
Lait	0,75 litre	0,20 litre

(a) 1 livre = 16 onces = 460 grammes.

C'est un bilan de faillite.

Castro avait promis le bien-être au peuple cubain et l'industrialiser pour la soustraire Castro avait voulu soustraire Cuba à « l'impérialisme » américain. Il l'a livrée pieds et poings liés à l'impérialisme soviétique.

Castro avait voulu diversifier l'économie cubaine et l'industrialiser pour la soustraire aux servitudes que comporte la monoculture. Il a arrêté et renversé le processus d'affranchissement où elle était engagée. Et il l'a ruinée par-dessus le marché. Ce qui n'empêche point maints étudiants à travers le monde de se proclamer « castristes ».

Lucien LAURAT.

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CASTRO POSTPONES INDUSTRIAL DRIVE

Also Announces Rationing of Sugar in Speech Marking His 10th. Year in Power

By JORGE VOLSKY

Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Jan. 2 — Premier Fidel Castro today committed Cuba to a long-range agricultural development plan and by implication indefinitely postponed the country's industrialization, once a major economic goal.

Mr. Castro spoke at a mass rally on Havana's José Martí Plaza commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution. After 25 months of guerrilla struggle, he came to power on Jan. 1, 1959, when the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, fled the country.

In a two-hour-and-10-minute speech, monitored here, Mr. Castro condemned what he called an excessive domestic consumption of sugar and announced rationing would begin tomorrow. Sugar accounts for 85 per cent of Cuba's exports.

Foresees Hard Times

Mr. Castro said he was confident that the 1969 and 1970 and 1980 Cuba's agricultural production would grow at a rate of 15 per cent a year.

But he also indicated that hard times still lay ahead.

"We have to work very hard and will face many difficulties," he said.

He said that 1969, which he called "the year of decisive effort," would be "a year of 18 months of hard work" during which Cubans might have to forgo Christmas and New Year holidays.

At the same time Mr. Castro disclosed creation of a new central agency to coordinate the agricultural development program.

The new Agricultural and Livestock Development Agency appears to be an amalgam of several existing organizations. Its creation emphasized a recent trend toward centralization in Cuba's economy sphere.

Industrialization was an early goal of the Castro regime. But the effort, directed by the late Ernesto Che Guevara as Minister of Industry, made little headway. After about five years, the basic economic effort began to shift back to agriculture.

Mr. Castro has suggested that after 1970 a modest industrial development would be possible, based on improved agriculture.

High Sugar Goals Set

According to the production schedule for sugar, Cuba was to have produced eight million

tons in 1968 and nine million tons this year.

Last year's sugar production was 6.5 million tons, and in his speech Mr. Castro indicated that only about five million tons would be produced this year.

In explaining the rationing, Mr. Castro said the 1970 goal would be met.

He said that increased domestic consumption resulted not only from the rationing of other foodstuffs but also from the fact that in the absence of corn, sugar cane has been widely used to feed animals.

For the first time in many years, Mr. Castro thanked the Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet bloc for what he termed their "decisive aid" in the last "10 most difficult years."

He said that many of the past economic difficulties were caused by the fact that production has considerably diminished as a result of a drop in labor productivity and "total inexperience" and ignorance of Government officials.

He indicated that overcoming these problems has been difficult and that to a large extent these two adverse factors continue to affect the Cuban economy.

Mr. Castro mentioned foreign affairs briefly. Speaking about the recent seizure of a Cuban fishing boat by Venezuela, he indicated that if such an incident was repeated, Cuba might retaliate by intercepting commercial airliners flying over Cuba and forcing them to land, or by prohibiting flights over Cuba.

The fishing boat, the Alcecrin, was released by Venezuela and returned to Cuba Sunday.

CPYRGHT

Cubans Who Fleed Tell of Desperation

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

MIAMI, Jan. 9—"People are going mad in Cuba. They will do anything to get out."

The 13-year-old Cuban student who made this statement was one of the 88 men, women and children who succeeded in fighting past Cuban Army guards Monday in a desperate escape to the United States Guantánamo Naval Base.

A frail woman from Havana, who found the strength in her 95-pound body to get herself

and two small sons over the six-foot wire fence around the base, watched her children play with plastic toy trucks at the Cuban refugee center here.

"I didn't want them to grow up under Communism," she said.

A wiry young man, who spent three years in the Cuban Army and was one of the leaders of the escape, said he was ready to go back and fight to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro if the United States gave support to insurgent Cubans.

Hopes Pinned on Nixon

"People in Cuba have their hopes pinned on Nixon," he said. "If there is a new invasion, this time it will be different. The whole island is ready to rebel."

President Kennedy gave United States training arms and limited support to a Cuban exile invasion in 1961 that was thwarted in 48 hours at the Bay of Pigs by Premier Castro's air force and militias. There was no internal uprising.

Hunger and forced labor were the two complaints most generally voiced by the refugees, who came from various parts of the island. They included both lower-middle-class students and laborers, in addition to entire working-class families. Their feat constituted the largest mass escape since the Castro regime began 10 years ago.

"Not only is there not enough to eat, but they make you spend extra hours in the fields after a 54-hour work week," said a Negro brick layer from Guantánamo, a city near the base.

The refugees, who arrived

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here from the Coast Guard... yesterday in two United States Navy planes, were being processed for residence in the United States today along with the regular daily quota of 160 refugees who arrived here by airlift from Varadero Beach, Cuba, under the United States-Cuban agreement that permits some people to leave for the United States.

Processed With Others

This is the safe, but slow way out of Cuba for those who have a United States sponsor. Some arrivals today had already waited more than three years for an exit permit. The fugitives chose the dangerous, illegal way out. It cost some of them their lives and others, including 40 believed to have been captured, face the likelihood of years of imprisonment in Cuban labor camps.

An account of the escape was pieced together from the recollections of different participants, some of whom asked not to be identified because of relatives still in Cuba.

Truck Driver Began It

The plot began with a Havana truck driver named Delgado, whose job for the state transportation enterprise took him on frequent trips to the eastern Province of Oriente. In Guantánamo, a major sugar-producing region in Oriente, Mr. Delgado met a group of young men who were living in semi-clandestine fashion to escape military service or forced agricultural labor.

...met and discussed a plan to use the big trailer truck to get through the barbed wire enclosures and checkpoints manned by Cuba's Frontier Battalion around the 17.4-mile perimeter of the Guantánamo base.

A plan of the base was obtained and a weak point in the Cuban defenses chosen. The plotters tried unsuccessfully to acquire arms and ammunition. The decision to make the attempt came during Christmas week, when some of the members of the Guantánamo group had been given leaves to visit their families.

Mr. Delgado and a nephew, Daniel, put about 20 members of their family and some friends from Havana into the truck and set off for Guantánamo 600 miles to the east. Along the route they picked up some others who were doing farm work.

The trailer, a big United States-built truck in which a Soviet diesel engine had been installed, arrived in Guantánamo about 1 A.M. Monday. Mr. Delgado parked near the headquarters of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. These watchdog committees often gather city people to be trucked to work in the countryside.

It attracted little attention, therefore, as the plotters entered.

Many of the fugitives were

...at the last minute and just jumped aboard.

When the trailer was jammed, Mr. Delgado closed the door. There were estimated to be 150 aboard.

Stopped by Road Patrol

From Guantánamo, they set out for Caimanera, the Cuban town closest to the United States base. It was 4 A.M. A road patrol stopped the truck, but Mr. Delgado said he was on his way to pick up a load of sugar and was allowed to pass.

Near the town cemetery, the six-foot Cuban barbed wire fences come within 300 yards of the road. The Guantánamo base fences are 300 yards beyond.

Mr. Delgado drove off the road and set across the field a cement pillbox on iron legs. The truck smashed over the pillbox.

From another pillbox, two Cuban sentries armed with automatic rifles rushed out. Daniel Delgado, firing a .45-caliber pistol, the only weapon possessed by the group, killed the two sentries. The younger Delgado was said to be a marksman.

As the truck careened toward the Cuban wire fence, one wheel went into a ditch and the trailer jackknifed. The people inside spilled out and headed for the fence. It was broad daylight.

An alarm had been sounded. Cuban soldiers opened fire as

...sought their way through the barbed wire.

"I don't know how many were killed," one refugee said, "but I saw some people fall wounded, including women and children. If we had only had arms we would have wiped them out."

Among those surrounded was the wife of Daniel Delgado. He ran to get her and was shot.

"I saw him fall, but he kept on firing and got a couple of the soldiers," said a refugee. The exchange of gunfire allowed many to get across the fence and into the base.

Did Not Fire Back

The United States marines inside the base are not allowed to fire back at the Cubans without specific orders. These were not issued.

There is a fairly regular flow of Cubans into the Guantánamo base. Some arrive by land, and some swim past Cuban cutters. The monthly rate is believed to be about 100.

Oscar Torres Sanchez, a 19-year-old jockey in training at Hialeah Race Course here, made it to Guantánamo late in 1967 by swimming five hours.

Many arriving today were friends of Mr. Torres Sanchez. He was on hand to greet them and provide advice on housing, jobs and the finding of relatives.

Among the refugees was a little girl about one and a half years old, who was pulled over the fence in the scramble. Her parents have not appeared.

NEW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
9 January 1969

81 of 150 Shoot Way Past Cuban Lines, Reach Guantánamo and Fly to Florida

Rest of Band Is Killed or Seized—Survivors Are Accepted by U.S.


MIAMI, Jan. 8 — A group of 81 Cubans shot their way past Cuban Army guards yesterday and entered the United States base at Guantánamo. They arrived in Miami today as refugees.

It was the largest number of Cubans ever to flee at one time since Fidel Castro came to power 10 years ago.

United States officials refused



The New York Times



Jan. 9, 1969

The U.S. base at Guantánamo, shown in black on both maps

to discuss details of the break, but the Cubans arrived this morning at the Coast Guard's Opa-Locka Air Station aboard two Navy C-135 aircraft from Guantánamo.

According to informed sources, the refugees were part of a group of at least 150 men, women and children who gathered secretly near the Guantánamo Naval Base on the southern coast of Oriente, Cuba's easternmost province.

They were armed and when they approached the base somewhere on its 17.4-mile perimeter they were attacked by Cuban soldiers from the crack Frontier Battalion, which surrounds the Guantánamo base.

The sources said that at least 30 of the Cubans had been captured and 12 to 15 killed in the attempt to reach the wire enclosure around the base.

Those who made it to the base were taken in by the

United States marines who guard the base. The Cuban forces normally maintain a no man's land of 200 yards around the fence.

The group was kept under close military security here while processing went on at the Miami Cuban Refugee Center, known as Freedom House, near the Miami airport. Members of the group were being released as relatives or friends pledged to provide lodging for them in the United States.

Other recently arrived Cubans said that tight internal security conditions on the island, particularly in the vicinity of the base, made it extraordinary that such a large group could have formed and obtained enough arms to battle the guards.

The refugees were reported to include some who had come from as far away as Havana. The group was reported to consist of 46 men, 13 women and 22 children.

This was one of the most spectacular escapes from Cuba in a history of dramatic flights.

Small boats and even inner tubes have been used to cross the 90 miles to the United States.

There is an airlift that brings refugees to the United States five times a week from Varadero Beach, Cuba, under an agreement between the United States and Cuba.

Under the agreement, the names of those whom the two Governments regard as eligible for the airlifts form the so-called Joint Consolidated Lists, from which Havana selects passengers for the Varadero-Miami flights.

Cuban males between 15 and 26 years of age, and sometimes technicians and specialists, are not permitted to leave.

When a Cuban applies, an inventory of all his possessions, including household articles and savings accounts, is taken by the authorities.

He cannot sell or give away any of the inventoried items, most of which he is obliged to turn over to the state. He is permitted to take with him only a few personal belongings, but no valuables.

More important, every able-bodied future refugee is sent to work in agriculture for a year.

Those whose names are now approved may expect to wait to leave.

This airlift, in operation more than three years, has brought over 131,000 Cubans to the United States. It is estimated that over 400,000 Cuban refugees live in the United States, half on the greater Miami area.

Steady Trickle to Base

In the 10 years of the Castro regime, there has been a steady trickle of refugees seeking refuge at Guantanamo although United States officials have never officially recognized these escapes.

The Guantanamo Base was granted to the United States through a 1903 treaty that provides that fugitives from Cuban justice must immediately be turned over to the Cuban authorities. It also requires that persons entering the base, except for Cuban employes who have work permits, must pass through Cuban immigration control.

The reluctance of United States officials to discuss the most recent break stemmed from the possibility that this incident would provoke even more friction with Cuba over

the future of the base. Premier Castro's position has not challenged the treaty, but that in time Cuba would present her claims internationally for the recovery of Guantanamo.

Base Serves U.S. Fleet

Guantanamo is a 45-square-mile base that exists to serve the United States fleet. It contains ship-repair facilities and a naval supply depot. An average of 130 vessels a year, manned by 45,000 to 60,000 men, visit the base for up to

10-week periods of shakedown or refresher training.

Three years ago it was estimated that Premier Castro had spent \$6-million to \$15-million to make a no man's land and military zone out of a wide strip of terrain adjoining the base.

An elaborate but militarily erratic system of obstacles and fortifications was said to have been constructed around the fence separating the United States enclave from the rest of Cuba.

To the men stationed there, the base is known as Gitmo from its official abbreviation "GTMO," used in correspondence and communications.

NEWSWEEK

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CPYRGHT

The Year of Decisive Effort

Beneath an overcast sky, a throng of 300,000 straw-hatted Cubans in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución sent up a roar as their Maximum Leader, Fidel Castro Ruz, strode out onto the balcony of Independence Palace. It was nearly ten years to the day since Castro and his motley band of guerrillas had vanquished the army of dictator Fulgencio Batista. But last week, to mark the anniversary of his first decade in power, Fidel dispensed with his usual histrionics. In what for him was a brief two-hour and ten-minute speech, Castro proclaimed 1969 as Cuba's Year of Decisive Effort—a year in which Cubans would be called upon to make further personal sacrifices to rescue their nation's sagging economy. To cover the event, Newsweek's Paris bureau chief, Edward Behr, who last visited Cuba in 1963, flew into Havana. Below, Behr presents his balance sheet on Castro's achievements and failures:

On the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution, the bearded visages of Fidel Castro and two of his dead guerrilla comrades—Ernesto (Che) Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos—stare down from billboards in towns and villages all over Cuba. These are Communist Cuba's only saints: Marx, Engels, Lenin—none is per-

mitted to share pride of place. For despite Cuba's critical dependence on the Soviet Union for a daily transfusion of aid amounting to well over \$1 million, it is clear that this small, verdant Caribbean island does not regard itself as an obedient Soviet satellite. In the last resort, Cuba stands alone—and that is the way Fidel wants it.

Breach: True, Castro dutifully deflected the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and last week, in a rare move, actually gave Moscow public thanks for its aid. But there is no love lost between the Russian and Cuban people. With a frankness that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, Soviet diplomats in Havana poke condescending fun at the volatile Cuban temperament and endemic Cuban inefficiency. More important, there is a complete breach between Cubans and the Russians over the issue of fomenting revolution in the rest of Latin America. Among the slogans featured in last week's revolutionary celebrations was "One, two, three and many more Vietnams." Inevitably, this grated on the ears of Russian advisers in Cuba who make no secret of their belief that, before exporting revolution, the Cubans should first make a success of their own.

Yet even the Russians—ranked as they are by what they consider Cuban ingratitude—feel obliged to give Castro his due. In a single decade, he has transformed the character of a nation of 7.9 million people and turned Havana—once a Latin oasis for pleasure-seeking Americans—into a Spartan monument to Communism.

Today, the reminders of Havana's U.S.-oriented past are few: battered, rust-bitten black smoke as they crawl like wounded beetles along empty streets; shuttered bars and cabarets (temporarily reopened for the anniversary celebrations) with names like "Mandy's" and "Las Vegas," and disheveled hotel lobbies where stuffed fish are still incongruously displayed along with placards reading black smoke as they crawl like wounded beetles along empty streets; and the name of the American angler who caught them.

Model: But if Havana is one of the most depressing cities on earth, it is essential to remember that Castro—a rolic did not make his revolution for the benefit of city folk. Consequently, while the quality of life in Cuba's towns has plummeted in the past ten years, the lot of the *campesino* in the Cuban countryside has unquestionably improved. If nothing else, the country's small farmers and cane cutters are healthier today than ever before. Cuban babies are now inoculated at birth against a wide variety of diseases. And government nurses car-

ry out see that rural homes are kept hygienically clean. "As far as public and preventive health goes," says one Western observer, "Cuba is a model for the rest of Latin America."

Even more astonishing progress has been made in the area of social reform. A decade ago, one out of every four Cubans could not read; today illiteracy has been virtually eliminated. And any talented Cuban child—no matter how remote his home or how poor his family—can be confident that his ability, whether it be for music or baseball, will be spotted by officials and nurtured in special schools. Nor does the color of a Cuban's skin any longer limit his opportunity for obtaining a good job or for receiving promotions. With mixed marriages on the increase, Cuba has become a genuine multiracial society.

But such impressive accomplishments must be weighed against a series of economic blunders that has actually reduced per capita income from \$422 a year in 1958 to \$415 in 1968. Partly, of course, the Cuban economy has been the victim of the nine-year-long U.S. trade embargo. A major share of the blame, however, must be placed on Castro himself who, for all his avowed Marxism, is as undisciplined in his approach to economics as he is in his personal life. It is Fidel's own article of revolutionary faith, for example, that by 1970 Cuba must produce 10 million tons of sugar. (This year's crop amounted to 5.2 million tons.) So, at incredible cost, Cubans are now working day and night planting cane all over the country. Dolefully, economists point out that the sugar-planting campaign is wreaking havoc with other vital sectors of the economy and that it is highly improbable that Cuba could ever sell 10 million tons of sugar a year on the world market. But Castro is disdainful of their advice ("Economics," he says scornfully, "is a bourgeois science"). And taking their cue from Fidel, lesser Cuban officials boast: "If he can't sell the sugar, he'll feed it to our cattle."

The same obsession with the grandiose has spawned other irrational agricultural projects. Thus, Cuban officials proudly proclaim that 90 million coffee trees have been planted in a "green belt" around Havana during the past nine months; they fail to note, however, that the sultry, sea-level climate of Havana is not suitable for coffee and that the program is almost surely doomed to failure. Likewise, on the Isle of Youth (formerly three Vietnams) in Latin America, with known as the Isle of Pines), where a huge crash citrus program has been started with a labor force of more than 50,000 young "volunteers," experts expect that 60 to 70 per cent of the seedlings will die.

Situation Critical: As a result of Castro's barren experiments—as well as his

agricultural output to pay for foreign machinery—Cubans are living today in unprecedented discomfort. The food situation throughout the island has become so critical that almost everything is strictly rationed; last week, indeed, in the ultimate absurdity, Castro announced that, henceforth, sugar, too, would be rationed.

All this has created a situation in which Cubans are obliged to spend long hours waiting in bread lines, green-banana lines, soap lines, cooking-oil lines and restaurant lines. Things have gotten so bad that people have begun to hire men called *vendedores de turno*—permanent standers-in-line. And, recently, Cuban officials became so exercised over the potentially productive time wasted in queuing-up that they solemnly issued a Kafkaesque order limiting the number of hours a week during which a person could legally stand in line.

Disaster? What is happening under Castro's erratic leadership, it seems, is that Cuba is undergoing a "great leap forward" in agriculture—and this leap may well turn out to be as disastrous as China's was. To this criticism, Castro would probably reply that what matters is not the tonnage of oranges, coffee and sugar harvested—or even the prosperity that might thereby accrue to Cuba's population. What matters in his eyes are the romantic involvement and the national discipline that total mobilization brings. And, in a sense, he is right. For Castro must himself be keenly aware of what is apparent to any visitor—that the fear of a U.S. invasion has gone for good and that, in the absence of any external threat, economic mobilization may be the regime's only way of preserving national unity.

In part, this is true because Castro is so remarkably vague about the kind of society toward which he is leading his countrymen. There are, of course, recurring—and contradictory—themes in his interminable harangues. There is his dream of abolishing money as a means of exchange. There is his dream of creating the *hombre nuevo*—the "new man," who, while content to labor at menial jobs and to live as austerely as a Trappist monk, will enjoy the privilege of having qualified as an engineer, a lawyer or a scientist. There is, on occasion, the promise of material abundance too—although this is somewhat belied by Fidel's fierce rejection of a "consumer-oriented society." And lastly there is the Maximum Leader's slightly tarnished dream of "one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-three, thirty-four, thirty-five, thirty-six, thirty-seven, thirty-eight, thirty-nine, forty, forty-one, forty-two, forty-three, forty-four, forty-five, forty-six, forty-seven, forty-eight, forty-nine, fifty, fifty-one, fifty-two, fifty-three, fifty-four, fifty-five, fifty-six, fifty-seven, fifty-eight, fifty-nine, sixty, sixty-one, sixty-two, sixty-three, sixty-four, sixty-five, sixty-six, sixty-seven, sixty-eight, sixty-nine, seventy, seventy-one, seventy-two, seventy-three, seventy-four, seventy-five, seventy-six, seventy-seven, seventy-eight, seventy-nine, eighty, eighty-one, eighty-two, eighty-three, eighty-four, eighty-five, eighty-six, eighty-seven, eighty-eight, eighty-nine, ninety, ninety-one, ninety-two, ninety-three, ninety-four, ninety-five, ninety-six, ninety-seven, ninety-eight, ninety-nine, one hundred."

But all of these are still only dreams and so long as the Cuban economy continues to stagnate, they seem doomed to live only in Fidel's rhetoric. Meanwhile, the streets of Havana are lined with dour, silent and tired people waiting for

bread, and the "mercy flights" of would-be immigrants to the U.S. are fully booked for the next three years.

Myths and Monuments

From that stunning moment on New Year's Day 1959, when he rode in triumphal procession into Havana, Fidel Castro ceased to be merely a Cuban curiosity. Like no other Latin American figure in this century, Castro fired the imagination and stoked the fears of the entire Western Hemisphere. Today, ten years later, both Castro and Castroism seem somehow diminished by age. But the ferment created by the Cuban revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere—and, indeed, throughout the world—has yet to run its course.

Curiously, for all their common concern, the 21 other nations that inhabit the Americas have been unable to fashion a coherent policy to counter the challenge from Communist Cuba. Perhaps the most ambitious effort in this direction was made by John F. Kennedy soon after he entered the White House. Keenly aware of the need for social reform in South America, Kennedy seized upon the sense of urgency spawned by the Castroite threat and launched the Alliance for Progress. During the Alliance's first eight years, the U.S. poured a total of \$7.8 billion in aid into Latin American countries. Yet, despite this enormous investment, few of the recipients can boast of truly impressive economic growth—and fewer still have made much progress toward political reform. Inevitably, the U.S. Congress has grown increasingly disenchanted with the program and last year it drastically slashed the Administration's request for funds.

Results: But if the Alliance has fallen short of its political and economic goals, its members—spurred on by the fear of more Cuban-style revolutions—have achieved surprising results in the sphere of military cooperation. The most notable example of this came in 1965 when Washington claimed that Communists were about to overthrow the government of the Dominican Republic—and five Latin American nations buried their traditional suspicion of the "Colossus of the North" to join the U.S. in armed intervention in Santo Domingo. And since then, thanks to extensive U.S. military assistance (\$60 million worth in 1968 alone), most Latin American armies have acquired the ability and wherewithal to crush their own homegrown guerrillas. Thus, almost everywhere that Fidel Castro has attempted to foment revolution—in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Colombia—he has been checkmated. Only in Guatemala does the issue still hang in the balance.

Expense: This heavy emphasis on a military response to Castroism has had some disappointing results. Some experts

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...ue that, by strengthening Latin America's military establishments and, hence, the forces of the political status quo, the U.S. has sought hemispheric security at the expense of social reform. And, at first glance, the facts seem to bear out this view. During Castro's ten years in power, the governments of no fewer than thirteen Latin American countries have been taken over by military regimes. Today more than half of the people south of the Rio Grande live under army-backed dictatorships.

Other students of Latin American affairs, however, reject this indictment of U.S. policy as overly simplistic. They contend that the polarization of forces in Latin America—pitting, as it does, left-wing students and intellectuals against right-wing businessmen and army officers—is less a reflection of Castro's efforts to export revolution than it is of a worldwide movement for change. But true though this may be, it is also probably accurate to say that the specter of Cuba has encouraged Latin American conservatives to react with particular vehemence to any challenge to their interests.

There is less debate over the impact of the Cuban revolution on the U.S. itself. Initially, the Soviet penetration of Cuba (in direct defiance of the Monroe Doctrine) and the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion filled Americans with a sense of impotence and incomprehension. But then in 1962, during the perilous nuclear showdown with Moscow, John Kennedy forced the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba—and suddenly U.S. credibility and stature as a great power seemed redeemed.

But perhaps it was too heady a triumph. For the Cuban missile crisis convinced many Americans—as it did that master strategist Charles de Gaulle—that the U.S. had achieved a critical psychological edge over the Soviet Union. And this, in turn, may unconsciously have encouraged the U.S. to rely on a policy of military interventionism that eventually produced the impasse in Vietnam.

Yet another unexpected result of the Cuban missile crisis was the change that it prompted in Castro's own policies. Abandoned in the clutch by his Soviet ally, Castro felt free to ignore Moscow's advice—which he did by proclaiming his intention to foment violent revolutions throughout the rest of Latin America. For this task, Castro chose as his personal agent Che Guevara, the dedicated Argentine Marxist who had fought by his side in the Sierra Maestra. And though Che bungled his mission and marched to a meaningless death in Bolivia, he is today an object of veneration among young people all over the world—the archetype of the brave, selfless and ultimately irrepressible revolutionary. Ironically, it now seems altogether possible that Che Guevara the myth—rather than anything wrought by Fidel Castro the man—may prove the most lasting monument of the Cuban revolution.

The Dispossessed

Though the commodities that it would most like to peddle abroad are sugar and revolution, Fidel Castro's outstanding export in practice has been his own discontented countrymen. In an exodus that has continued without letup almost from the moment Castro took power, an estimated 500,000 men, women and children—roughly 6 per cent of Cuba's total population—have fled their island homeland to avoid political persecution or simply to escape the harsh drabness of life under the Castro regime. And even now, some 700,000 additional would-be refugees from Castroism await their government's authorization to emigrate to the U.S. aboard the regularly scheduled airlift to Miami.

Ferries: Emigrating legally—or illegally—from Castro's Cuba has never been easy, and it became particularly risky after commercial flights between Havana and Miami were halted by the 1962 missile crisis. With all legal means of escape cut off, hundreds of courageous and desperate anti-Castro Cubans braved the rough Straits of Florida aboard flimsy vessels in which they hoped to elude the patrol boats of the Cuban Navy and strafing Cuban Air Force planes. Many got through on these "Freedom Ferries," but many more did not; so many would-be emigrants, in fact, lost their lives trying to navigate the 90 miles to Florida that the Straits became known to Cubans as "el corredor de la muerte"—the corridor of death.

Then, apparently concerned over the bad publicity he was getting abroad—and perhaps equally anxious to provide an escape valve for the growing domestic opposition to his regime—Castro dropped a bombshell. Haranguing a crowd in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución one September day in 1965, Fidel announced that Cubans with relatives already in the U.S. could henceforth emigrate if their relatives vouched for them. And a few days later, he grandly expanded the offer to "all those who want to leave."

There was, as it turned out, no dearth of Cubans eager to take up the offer. The airlift that was established by the Johnson Administration in response to Castro's 1965 speech has already brought more than 131,000 Cubans into the U.S. And still the flow continues. Currently, some 200 Cubans a week arrive in Miami aboard the chartered airliners that, twice daily, fly in from Veradero Beach.

The airlift and the waves of self-exiles that preceded it have already come close to denuding Cuba of its urban middle class—including the best of its doctors, lawyers, teachers, intellectuals and businessmen. And now, mechanics, artisans and semiskilled laborers are queuing up to leave the island—even though the hardships imposed upon anyone applying are so great as to discourage all but the most determined.

Camps: As soon as a would-be emigrant files an application to leave Cuba, his bank account is frozen, and a complete inventory of his goods is made—to insure that he turns them all over to the state upon his departure. (Even broken cups must be saved or replaced.) In addition, all applicants automatically lose their jobs and men under 50 must report to labor camps where they may wait as long as three years before receiving authorization to depart for Miami. Conditions in the camps for the "Miami Brigade" are so deplorable (food is poor and fourteen-hour working days are common) that many exiles-in-waiting give up and withdraw their applications. And rather than face the camps at all, as many as a thousand Cubans each month still choose the high-risk procedure of defecting clandestinely in small boats or stolen airplanes.

Miami, where most of the emigrants arrive, is also where most of them settle—partly because its humid climate reminds them of home and partly because its geographical proximity to Cuba somewhat eases the pain of exile. Today, Cubans make up nearly a quarter of Miami's 1.1 million residents and the city is well on the way to becoming bilingual. In "Little Havana"—the 40-block area of Miami where most Cubans congregate—it is not uncommon to see signs in shop windows reading: "English spoken here."

Preference: Notwithstanding the recent rash of bombings and airplane hijackings, the overwhelming majority of the Cubans who have come to the U.S. have proved to be hardworking and law-abiding. And, perhaps because most of them have privately lost any hope of seeing Castro overthrown, they have begun to show an increasing interest in U.S. politics. This year, for the first time since Castro came to power, a substantial number of Cuban refugees in the Miami area voted in a Presidential election—and displayed a pronounced preference for Richard Nixon. The Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961, it appears, is equated in the minds of Cuban refugees with the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.

Despite the fact that the Cuban exiles have, on the whole, coped extremely well with the problems of adapting themselves to an alien culture, Armando García Sifredo, editor of one of Miami's Cuban newspapers, estimates that more than 70 per cent of the refugees would return to Cuba "just as soon as circumstances permitted it"—and that another 20 per cent would follow suit "as soon as they could liquidate their businesses" in the U.S. Quite clearly, the yearning to return to a Cuba free of Castro still burns in all but the youngest of the Cuban exiles—those who came to the U.S. as children and have grown up as Americans. Says José Miguel Morales Gómez, a prominent pre-Castro attorney who fled Havana in 1961 with \$10 in his pocket and who now is senior vice president of Miami's Boulevard National Bank: "Even if I were a millionaire, I would leave it once Castro is overthrown."

CASTRO STARTS HIS SECOND DECADE

Communist Success Story?

After 10 years of Communism under Fidel Castro, Cuba is in miserable shape and its bearded leader is a chronic irritant to his Russian backers.

But the Soviet goal—a strategic penetration of the Western Hemisphere—is so important that Moscow will pay what it costs to keep Castro going until a less troublesome successor emerges.

Just 10 years ago—on New Year's Day of 1959—Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba and the Soviet Union got its first foothold in the Americas.

In the decade since, Castro—with Russian help—has built a full-fledged Communist state 90 miles from U. S. shores.

Castro has been a nagging nuisance not only to his proclaimed enemy, the U. S., but to his Soviet "ally" as well. But the Russians are in Cuba to stay and will continue to pay the high price of underwriting the erratic Castro regime. The reason is simple:

Through Castro, troublesome as the bearded dictator is, the Soviets have been able to flout the Monroe Doctrine, the 145-year-old U. S. warning that no European power could attempt to extend its political system to any part of the Western Hemisphere.

A Soviet doctrine, too. Moscow—by its armed crackdown on Czechoslovakia—has just demonstrated the force of its own "Brezhnev Doctrine." The gist of that doctrine is that Russia will step in when there is any threat to its influence in a Communist country within its strategic sphere. That is something for Castro to think about.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin is accepting the costs of keeping Castro going, tolerating the dictator's insults—and looking ahead.

"The Soviets," one U. S. expert says,



"will be in a position to influence Castro's successor—whatever he is and whenever he emerges."

The Russians have had to pump at least 3 billion dollars into Cuba in economic aid alone, plus millions more in military assistance.

Economically, the Kremlin has had little return on its Cuban investment. After 10 years, it has become clear that the Soviet dream of turning Cuba into a Communist showplace has no chance of fulfillment. Under Castro, Cuba has been led through a whole series of economic misadventures. One grandiose plan after another has flopped.

"Instant industrialization"—decreed by the Castro regime after its grab of more than a billion dollars' worth of U. S.-owned properties—didn't work. The attempt at diversification to end Cuba's dependence on sugar, its one crop, was a failure. An effort to build up the island's scanty cattle herds by artificial insemination has not succeeded.

Rationing, forced labor. Years ago, deficiency in the sugar crop and shortages of food resulted in collectivization of farming. Stringent labor controls were imposed. As things got worse, many foodstuffs, clothing, shoes and gasoline were rationed.

This year, restrictions similar to the rationing system went into effect on

Labor productivity has declined to the point where Castro is demanding that "revolutionary zeal" be substituted for decent wages as an incentive to work. As a result, forced labor is now the rule in Cuba. "Volunteers" from cities are herded into the fields to cut suga. cane, which the workers, because of lack of training, often ruin.

Just before the tenth anniversary of his rise to power, Castro's regime announced that an additional 100,000 women were being "recruited" for manual labor on farms and in cities.

In a country that has a total population of 8 million, it was declared that by 1975 there would be a million women in the ranks of manual laborers.

Revolt, sabotage. Castro has some new worries. For the first time in five years, armed bands are roaming Cuba's mountains, launching hit-and-run attacks against military posts. On December 16, the Government announced that five "armed infiltrators on a mission to stir rebellion" had been captured in Pinar del Rio Province.

Sabotage is increasing. Castro went on television earlier this year with a charge that "counterrevolutionaries" had destroyed hatcheries, clothing and sugar warehouses, and other facilities.

Castro's latest economic experiment—a "green belt" around Havana—has been hit by sabotage and had planning. Almost 90 million coffee trees were planted in the "green belt." But conditions are not right for production of good coffee beans, and the trees have produced only tiny beans of poor quality. Also, many trees are dying because volunteers—deliberately or through ignorance—did not remove plastic covers from the roots before planting the trees.

U. S. officials who keep track of the problems that plague Castro caution against any idea that he is in danger of being overthrown. As far as they can determine, there is no effectively organized resistance to his peculiar brand of Communist rule.

The Cuban Army's officer corps, these U. S. officials say, appears to be loyal to Castro. So are most of the peasants and most of the young people who have grown up on a steady diet of Castro propaganda. Many of his foes within the Communist Party, who plotted against him, have been caught—thanks to the regime's elaborate system of espionage—and imprisoned.

Why Russia helps. It is because of Castro's ability to cling to popular support despite all his difficulties that the Russians continue to bolster him. Also, in the Russian view, there are certain advantages, including the fact that Castro is a chronic headache for the U. S. seemingly powerless to do anything about it—is

embarrassed by the shuttle-like frequency with which the members of the cabinet and forced to fly to Cuba.

Another point that pleases the Soviets: The U. S. bickers with its friends that trade with Cuba—Britain, Canada, Japan, France, Spain and others.

Further, young American radicals—including some Negro extremists—go to Cuba for instruction in Marxism and for more-practical training in how to wage guerrilla warfare and how to foment riots. This is a plus for Russia.

Castro's hope that he can start armed revolts in Latin America is at odds with the current Moscow line, which calls for softer penetration—through trade and diplomatic links and by means of "popular front" movements. But the Soviets are making no attempt to curb Castro's "missionaries of revolution," busy not only in Latin America but in Africa.

Ships from Cuba still land guerrillas and arms in Venezuela. A lieutenant of the slain "Ché" Guevara, chief aide to Castro in the take-over of power, remains in Latin America, promising to resume revolution in Bolivia, where Guevara was killed. It is reported that Col.

Francisco Caamaño, a Red leader of the ba preparing, under Castro's direction, to instigate another Dominican revolt.

Students of Cuban affairs say that, in Africa, Cubans are training black rebels from Rhodesia, South-West Africa, South Africa, Mozambique and the Congo.

"World out of kilter." Best judgment of U. S. officials is that Cuba, after 10 years of Castro Communism, poses no immediate threat to the U. S., because—so far as can be determined—the Soviets no longer have strategic missiles based on the island. Presence of such missiles caused a crisis during the Kennedy Administration.

However, one expert gives this view: "With Communism in control in Cuba—no matter what kind of Communism—the world is thrown out of kilter. The U. S. sphere of influence is breached. A key point is that Cuba should be in the hemispheric community of nations, and is not."

Despite the many irritating factors Russia finds in the Castro regime, the Soviets, say U. S. analysts, will continue to support the dictator as a symbol of the entrenchment of Communism in a

vital spot of the Western Hemisphere. Castro in 1966 denounced Russia's Communist archival, Red China, for "blackmail and extortion" in slashing rice exports to Cuba. This had some propaganda value for Russia in the Moscow-Peking ideological struggle.

Over all, as U. S. officials see it, Russia's stake in Cuba is so high that Castro, maverick though he is, must be helped as long as he retains popular appeal—and there is no sign that he has lost it even after long mismanagement.

The heir apparent. Castro's brother, Raúl, is an important element in the Soviets' long-range view. Raúl—the officially designated heir to leadership should anything happen to Fidel—has ties to Moscow that are closer than his brother's. Moscow, U. S. Cuba-watchers say, would welcome a change in Castros.

But whether or not this comes about, one thing is certain, U. S. experts agree:

In the 10 years since Fidel Castro led a ragtag army into Havana, Cuba has been transformed into a Communist country as strategically important to the Russians as is Czechoslovakia.

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The 10-Year Score

By FENTON WHEELER
Associated Press Writer

A rundown on aims and achievements of 10 years of Castro government in Cuba:

EDUCATION

THE ILLITERACY rate is down and government figures show school enrollment is 2½ times what it was in pre-Castro days. An estimated 150,000 young Cubans are government scholars, with food, clothing and lodging furnished. The figure is projected to double in the early 70s. Per capita expenditures for education have risen about 400 per cent in 10 years.

Visiting experts working with college graduates say the government's insistence that university students be militant revolutionaries first and scholars second has killed the initiative of some. The mass production of young teachers has resulted in some superficial instruction. To critics the curricu-

lum is unbalanced by political orientation and increased military training.

HEALTH

THE GOVERNMENT has increased hospitals from 44 in 1959 to 177 in 1967. It has established 264 health centers not available before.

By concentrating on doctors, Castro has plugged the drain of physicians to the United States. Cuba's doctors now number 7,000 compared to 6,300 before Castro chased Fulgencio Batista out of the country.

The drawbacks are government red tape, inefficiency, overcrowded facilities and a severe shortage of medicine.

HOUSING

FAMILIES often crowd one house, and an apartment in Havana or elsewhere is almost impossible to find without official help. Many young couples are forced to live apart or at home.

Reduction of rents to 10 per cent of income helped

hundreds of thousands but the luster has faded as repairs have become difficult and money less valuable. Most slums have been eliminated but thousands still live in huts in rural areas.

ECONOMY

THE GOVERNMENT still has not reached the pre-Castro one-year record of 7.2 million tons of sugar nor has it surpassed per acre production of the old days despite mass labor mobilization and a longer harvesting season.

It is shooting for 10 million tons in 1970. Most experts agree the organization and planning for this harvest is the best yet but they say everything will have to mesh properly to reach the goal.

This year the country has had its worst food shortage since Castro took over. Economists suggest the cause is high cost per production unit plus a draining of food overseas to make up for a poor sugar crop.

In the industrial sector, the

government claims it is approaching or surpassing pre-Castro levels.

FOREIGN TRADE

HAVANA has continued to do most of its business with Communist allies while punching holes in the U.S. economic blockade. Most Western trade sources here view the Washington boycott as a nuisance for Castro but a propaganda tool for him. They say the real problem for Cuba is money.

Cuba continues to trade at a deficit with the Soviet Union, opening itself to Kremlin economic and political pressure. Anti-Castroites are fond of saying that Castro has transferred Cuban dependence on the United States to the Soviet Union. This overlooks a basic difference in the relations the United States had with Cuba and the arrangement Havana enjoys with Moscow.

Trade figures, however, are surprisingly similar: Cuban trade with the United States in 1959 was \$910 million; with Russia in 1968 it was about \$912.5 million.

POLITICS

THE COMMUNIST party of Cuba for all practical purposes is the government. It is

firmly entrenched in all ministries.

Party membership probably exceeds 50,000 with some estimates of 65,000. Membership means honor, extra work and responsibility. At lower levels, privileges are almost nonexistent. High party leaders, the intellectual community and top officials clearly live better than the average Cuban. Castro, however, has never permitted high living and today's tough times the living standards of leaders is far from luxurious.

PEOPLE
SINCE JAN. 2, 1959, an estimated 5 1/2 per cent of the Cuban population has left the country. Cubans continue to leave at a rate of 4,000 monthly. The total number of exiles is now estimated at near 500,000.

Castro's policies have divided virtually every family in Cuba. The tragedy of separation is a continuing part of the Cuban revolution: sons of military age left behind, wives divorcing husbands, children remaining with aged parents until it is too late to

leave.
The problem is ideological and physical. Many Cubans don't like Castro's brand of communism. Many more say they are tired of nearly seven years of rationing and shortages and tired of unkept promises. Some still harbor a dream that pre-Castro days will return.

Hard times have opened up pockets of discontent this year. The opposition, however, does not approach the anti-Castro attacks of the early '60s when armed bands staged raids.

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Exportation of Castro's Revolution Failing

By WILLIAM MONTALBANO
Herald Latin American Correspondent

Execute the "Year of the Heroic Guerrilla" at a dead march.

Fidel Castro named the year, inspired by the example of his friend Che Guevara. The Cubans even wrote a song about it, with stirring drum rolls and the sound of marching feet. The song's refrain, "Adelante Guerrillero Heroico" (Forward Heroic Guerrilla) became a trademark of Havana radio and television.

It was a good tune. But from Castro's view it was hardly a good year: there was a dearth of guerrillas and what few there were exhibited scant heroism.

Castro begins his second decade in power this week; his cry for violent revolution undiminished, his quest unrewarded.

Castro's vow is to transform the Andes into a new Sierra Maestra, to create in Latin America, in Guevara's words, "two, three, many Vietnams."

THE EXPORT of revolution is the keystone of Castro's foreign policy. It re-

fects a recognition of the potential for violence in Latin America and the need for a new social order that is also evident in the charter of the Alliance for Progress.

The Alliance preaches peaceful change. Castro seeks violent revolution in his own image.

It is a dedication to which Castro has been unswervingly faithful at great expense to precious resources.

It is, in large measure, responsible for Cuba's role as the hemisphere's outcast.

It has enraged Castro's enemies and exasperated his erstwhile allies, notably the Soviet Union.

It has ruled out any lessening of tensions between Cuba and the U.S.

And it has failed.

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DESPITE a decade of persistent promotion with men, material and moral support, Castro has been unable to create any new Cubas in Latin America.

There have been some sparks, but no important fires, and at the dawn of a second decade Castro has little to show for 10 years

Venezuela, his principal target for subversion, is more robust than ever. A guerrilla movement that once posed a threat to the government is now little more than a nuisance.

In Guatemala, Castroite terrorists have taken to the cities after being driven from the hills. They are still capable of isolated spectaculars — like the killing of two U.S. military attaches and the assassination of the U.S. ambassador — but are much weaker than they were a year ago.

Colombian authorities say they have just about eliminated small guerrilla bands that have operated in isolated mountain regions for years.

A survivor of Guevara's band named Inti Peredo is the nominal leader of Castroite guerrillas in Bolivia. He writes a nice manifesto, but if he has resumed Guevara's struggle in the mountains he has done so alone.

In the past year there has been minor, mostly urban, terrorist activity in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. In some cases the

violence has been obedient to foreign ideologies, in others it was a purely domestic affair.

There remains as much, or more, unrest in Latin America today as there was in 1959, but Castro's attempts to capitalize on it have been unsuccessful.

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THE REPEATED failures have affected the way Latin America looks at Castro.

Once he was greatly feared as an ominous specter of revolution. Part of the fear lay in the unknown. Could Castro transplant his revolution? How much response would he evoke among those inclined to revolution, those only awaiting a figure to lead them? Were guerrillas as militarily invincible as they appeared in Cuba? Would the apathetic poor join them and protect them as happened in Cuba?

By now, it is evident that Castro's revolution is a uniquely Cuban experience with only limited continental application.

Latin American governments have learned guerrillas can be combated successfully, a lesson brought home forcefully 14 months ago by the death of the paramount guerrilla at the hands of a notoriously inept army in

Support for Castro among those most prone to accept revolution, has waned. The peasants in Bolivia were Che Guevara's enemies, not his allies.

Latin American governments don't like Castro any better today, but neither do they fear him as much. He simply has not turned out to be the threat to the hemisphere he once loomed.

But Castro is not a man easily discouraged. On the eve of his second decade in power, he remains in unabated pursuit of heroic guerrillas.

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CPYRGHT

Cuba talks friendlier to Soviets

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

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Washington

Now Dr. Castro, who charged a few months ago that Moscow was being niggardly toward him, says that Soviet aid has "been decisive for this country in these difficult years."

In his Jan. 2 speech, marking the 10th anniversary of his coming to power, the Premier said "at times we have had differences of opinion with the Soviet Union and have said so promptly and honestly."

Aid expanded

There appears to be a softening in relations between Havana and Moscow.

At least that is the view of a number of Cuba watchers both here in Washington and in New York. They cite a variety of evidence:

- Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's Jan. 2 speech marking the 10th anniversary of his revolution included a number of warm references to the Soviet Union. He praised Cuba's ties with the "socialist camp and especially its solidarity with the Soviet Union."

- Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a new technical-aid agreement Jan. 7 which calls for an expansion of aid and specifically for the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. It also provides for technical aid in television and irrigation.

- A lessening of Cuba's ideological attacks on the Soviet Union since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last August, based on a scanning of Havana newspaper and radio comment during the period.

Strategy debated

There was a time less than a year ago when Cuban-Soviet relations were far from good. They dropped to their lowest point, in the eyes of observers, when more than 40 Soviet-line Cuban Communists were purged last February. At that time, the Castro government accused the Soviet Embassy of working against it.

Disagreement between the two nations has centered largely on Dr. Castro's repeated support for the exporting of revolution throughout Latin America while the Soviet Union has championed the idea of increased economic and trade ties, together with diplomatic relations.

"But," he said, "they have continued their aid during past bad years with gifts of armament and food, and continued remittances even when we had poor sugar harvests and were unable to deliver as promised."

Quickly on the heels of this statement, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed their agreement for expanded technical aid. Soviet Deputy Minister Vladimir Novikov, head of a delegation attending the anniversary celebrations in Havana, signed the agreement for the Russians, while Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, president of the Cuban National Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, signed for Cuba.

Observers here do not see the agreement as a major one, but they do regard its signing as one more indication of a warming trend in Cuban and Soviet relations.

This improvement apparently dates to last August, when Dr. Castro, after waiting several days, came out with a strong speech supporting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

At the time, there was speculation that one reason for the public support of the Soviet Union was concern that the United States might try to apply the principle of "sphere of influence" to Cuba, as the Russians had apparently done in Czechoslovakia. Under this reasoning, it is presumed

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the Cubans were held to believe their position would be strengthened if they supported the Soviets.

Now that Richard M. Nixon is President-Elect and that therefore there is a possibility of a harder line on Cuba, considering his past viewpoints, it is argued that Dr. Castro may feel that a relaxation in tensions with the United States is unlikely.

Although Havana was decked out with banners proclaiming revolution and solidarity with Latin America on the occasion of Dr. Castro's Jan. 2 speech, the Cuban leader hardly mentioned guerrilla warfare and revolution in Latin America.

For some months, he has seemed to downplay encouragement of such warfare and the evidence available now suggests that he has made a decision to concentrate on the island's economic situation and to try to overcome some of the difficulties in the economy which he freely mentions.

Soviets back trend

The Soviet Union long has encouraged him to devote his energies to the economic task.

Cuban observers think it unlikely that Dr. Castro will ever fully abandon his proguerrilla policy for the peaceful-revolution line advocated by the Soviet Union. They note the number of banners saluting Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Dr. Castro's onetime close associate, which were prominent on the platform from which the Cuban leader spoke Jan. 2. The banners carried slogans attributed to Mr. Guevara urging the creation of more Vietnams.

But there is a feeling that for the time, at least, the proguerrilla policy may be downplayed while Cuba concentrates on solving some of its internal problems. In this regard, Dr. Castro spent most of his 2¼-hour speech Jan. 2 talking about the economy.