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August 1968

The New Left

Richard Davy, in a sympathizing article in the London Times of 1 June 1968, gave a concise, though idealized, summary of student members of the New Left in revolt:

"If you want to synthesize a student revolt in your laboratory proceed as follows. Take several thousand students of sociology and make them attend lectures in a hall that holds a hundred. Tell them that even if they pass their examinations there will probably be no jobs for them. Surround them with a society that does not practise what it preaches and is run by political parties that do not represent the students' ideas.

"Tell them to think about what is wrong with society and how to put it right. As soon as they become actively interested in the subject send in the police to beat them up. Then stand well clear of the bang and affect an attitude of confused surprise.

"This is, of course, a crude simplification but it does at least hint at the pattern of some of the student trouble in the western world -- a combination of educational grievances, political disillusion, moral concern, frustration, boredom, enthusiasm and a certain amount of imitativeness."

George Keller, former assistant dean of Columbia College, came a step closer to the revolutionary, anarchistic essence of the New Left when he wrote in the book review section of the Washington Post of 19 May 1968:

"During the fourth day of the revolution at Columbia University, where I work and where a small group of 400 students and outside collaborators -- seized by idealism, Maoism, racial concerns, thuggery, spring fever, religious fanaticism, guerrilla warfare and the romance and poetry of movement -- grabbed control of the campus, a colleague turned to me and asked, 'Why is it that so many of the young revolutionaries in our time feel that the universities are the principal lever for smashing the system?' I hadn't slept more than eight hours in those four days, and was quite groggy; but the question rocked me.

"Certainly Marx or Lenin would have snickered at the notion of starting a revolution to transform society by taking over a school -- an ivy-colored retreat without guns, power or money...."

During the June riots of students in France, a statement by Charles August Bardin, a 20-year old student participant in the riots (cited in the New York Times of 13 June 1968) can be taken as representative, and as a confirmation of how far beyond mere educational reform the New Left students are aiming:

"In any revolution there must be an immediate, well-known enemy for everyone to hate, and in our revolution it is the French police. Every bomb we make and throw, every paving stone we tear up, means the revolution goes on another day. Our aim is to destroy the Government, and to change our society, but we fight the police to remind France of who we are, and what we want."

It is undoubtedly true that there are deep-seated and complex sociological causes, as well as genuine and more immediate social and political dissatisfactions, giving rise to student violence and to the role in it played by a movement known as the New Left which has been developing during recent years. More and more observers are beginning to see in this violent and disruptive New Left movement, admittedly aiming far beyond educational goals, an increasingly serious threat to the continuation and organic development of the traditional, free institutions of Western democracy. It also offers an opportunity for various enemies of Western-style democracies to inflict serious damage on the institutional fabric of these societies. The movement has now succeeded in instigating serious mass violence and rioting, disrupting lawfully constituted authority in the West, most seriously in France, but also in Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States, to name the most outstanding recent examples. Because of these successes, an attempt should be made to define or describe some of the basic features of the New Left, despite its complexity in origin, inspiration, and international ramifications. It has its setting in the larger arena of the strivings of students in general to orient themselves to the society in which they are growing up. Most of these strivings are typical of, and natural to, any politically conscious young generation, but have little in common with the broader revolutionary objectives of the New Left.

The University and Social Setting

During recent months, student violence and student power have become a commonplace at universities in many places in the world. In many, if not most cases, there seems to have been sufficient cause for students to attempt some radical method of bringing their problems to wide public attention and for prodding many a lethargic, tradition-bound and hide-bound university administration to make reforms. The explosion in student populations (in itself welcome proof of widening access to higher education) straining university facilities and creating an absurdly high faculty-student ratio, obsolescent and arbitrary regulations on student behavior, rigid and irrelevant curricula of study, the inability of students to contact not only university administration officials but often (and especially in the European universities) their own professors, too, are among the legitimate grievances underlying the demands for redress and deserving sympathetic hearing and concrete efforts at reform.

But there is also the deeper psychological distress of a young generation, bewildered and confused by confrontation with a rapidly changing world, overshadowed by nuclear war, complex international tensions and an

unprecedented population explosion -- but also offering youth unheard-of challenges of scientific breakthroughs in many fields, vastly facilitated opportunities for international travel and communications. The great majority of academic teachers, political systems, governments offer disappointingly inadequate leadership to this youth -- which often seeks outlets in pessimism, cynicism, anarchistic radicalism, drugs and other fads.

To cite the well-known American student leader of demonstrations, Mario Savio, from his essay "An End of History":

"American society is a bleak scene, but it is all a lot of us have to look forward to. Society provides no challenge. American society in the standard conception it has of itself is simply no longer exciting. The most exciting things going on in America today are movements to change America.... The 'futures' and 'careers' for which American students now prepare are for the most part intellectual and moral wastelands. This chrome-plated consumers paradise would have us grow up to be well-behaved children."

It is in most cases idealism which has impelled American students to plunge into the civil rights battle and later into the poverty movement. It perhaps explains the attraction of the Peace Corps. In Europe, the equivalent attraction to youth is found in the developing areas of Africa still emerging from colonial subjection.

In an attempt to view their own movement with detachment and analytical objectivity, two recent American college graduates, members of the local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society, struggle to explain their motivation in an introduction to an anthology of New Left writing:

"... the student is torn between two alternatives: to enter the world of the adult on its own terms, or to remain a part of the student world until he can enter the adult one on his terms. Yet it is difficult to enter on any terms but the given, precisely because it is hard to formulate any other terms, any alternatives to the present, any 'positive myths' about the future and how it should be faced. If the student recoils immediately from this predicament, and proceeds no further in his analysis, he becomes 'knowing,' 'cynical,' determined to 'get his' while he still possesses a modicum of freedom. Another, more difficult alternative is rebellion: but even here the student remains caught in the predicament. In order to be successful in his revolt, he must steer clear of the adult community: Consequently, rebellion often leads to the construction of a very personal, private and highly individualistic world of vehement nonconformity....

"As an example of this tendency, Irving Howe points to the emphasis on 'personal style' among many of the new left partisans, and suggests that style has in many cases taken precedence over the content of revolt, i.e., that the existential act of rebellion, whatever its forms, has come to be enough. It is plausible, perhaps, that one reason for emphasis on style over content is that many students have become convinced that content does not matter any more; the public world is dommed, and the best one can do is dissociate oneself from it as quickly as possible." (Emphasis in the original; from The New Student Left, edited by Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hale, Beacon Press, Boston 1967.)

Some of the factors underlying student behavior have been described above and while the analysis leans heavily on American experience, it applies to a considerable extent to university settings in other parts of the world where student violence has erupted. Within this diffuse student activity small, loosely organized groups in some countries, consciously pursue wide revolutionary aims with a single-minded dedication somehow reminiscent of the prototype of Lenin's professional revolutionary or of the classic portrayal of the complete revolutionary in Dostoevsky's novel The Obsessed. This small group is the motive force of the New Left and it has succeeded on a number of occasions in sweeping into its revolutionary action the large multitude of students who before and after involvement had deep misgivings as to the value of such action.

The New Left, its Tactics and Strategy

The New Left is a radical movement, often influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist doctrines, comprised of a small minority of militant, highly intelligent university students and some older intellectuals, primarily in the more fully developed and powerful industrial countries of the Free World. (Some disturbances which resemble those inspired by the New Left have manifested themselves in places distant from Europe, such as Australia and Brazil.) Its adherents have become disaffected with, alienated from the "Establishment," understood roughly as the dominant political, social and economic institutions of the countries concerned, foremost among which are the United States, Germany, France, England, and Italy. Japan has also spawned a similar movement, mainly represented by Zengakuren (All Japan Federation of Student Autonomous Organizations).¹

¹The main organizations of the European New Left are the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund -- German Socialist Student Federation); UNEF (Union Nationale des Etudiants Francais -- National Union of French Students), and the RSA (Radical Student Alliance) in the United Kingdom. The once notorious Dutch New Left "Provos" (their own abbreviation of provocateurs) disbanded in 1967.

(A New York Times article of 30 June 1968, attached, provides a survey of Japanese and Latin America student unrest for comparison's sake.) In principle, the New Left also condemns the Soviet Union and its Satellites. It expresses contempt for the orthodox Communist parties of the free world, which it considers part of the Establishment, even though more radical splinter Marxist parties (e.g., Maoist and Trotskyite) try to place themselves at the forefront of the movement, notably in France.

Using legitimate student grievances as a point of departure, the New Left resorts deliberately to illegal, violent means, anarchistic in intent, and typically seeks to provoke counterviolence by the police in order to demonstrate dramatically the brutality of the Establishment. Its anarchistic bent extends to its own movement, so that it typically avoids firm organization, formal leadership, or administrative organs. While it has no visible international organization, happenings at one university, thanks to the efficiency of modern mass communications, become quickly known to all universities having a radical student segment and in turn stimulate and encourage imitative action (witness the successive disruptions at universities in New York [the Columbia University affair], Paris, Rome and even Belgrade).² A form of international liaison is maintained by frequent international travel of leading student New Leftists. Some prominent student New Left leaders are known to have visited North Vietnam, Communist China, and Cuba (certainly for inspiration, and very possibly for instruction, moral and material support).

The progress of the more extensive student riots has made it self-evident that the original demands for educational-administrative reforms for which demonstrations are started, very quickly become vehicles for quite different goals. In some cases, it has been unequivocally clear that the true aim of "hard core" New Left leaders is the total discrediting of all authority by total disruption of law and order. If the leaders succeed in this on the campuses, they then seek to spread the chaos to the larger community beyond (as happened in France) with the ultimate aim of total revolution. Spokesmen for the New Left typically aver that they have no positive program (beyond a vague kind of socialism) and typically respond to questions as to what they wish in place of the university organization they are trying to destroy, that they do not have anything specific in mind. Their business, they say, is to tear down the old institutions, not to build new ones. (The attached analyses by British writer Brian Crozier and the American journalist Edmund Taylor are representative of the views of other observers of the New Left who describe the movement as one aimed at society in general and point to totalitarian features in the

²Imitative actions in several other countries have led to the erroneous assertion that the actions were of New Left inspiration. Rather, the success of "student power" asserting itself in one country has moved student organizations in other countries to try similar actions, but with different immediate grounds and more limited goals than the "true" New Left.

movement. Some observers who have written in this vein are the British journalist Neal Ascherson, the American writer and commentator on leftist problems, Lewis Feuer, Kurt Glaser, (writing in the conservative National Review, New York), and George Kennan).

Ideological Base

The New Left has adopted a number of heroes, but the most often mentioned names are "Marx - Mao - Marcuse." From Marx, to whose early humanistic leanings they are apparently attracted, they derive their admiration of socialism, which they, like other modern admirers of Marx, consider has been distorted in the USSR into an oppressive, bureaucratic colossus, a caricature of what Marx intended. In Mao they seem to admire the "puritan" revolutionary who has created the violent Red Guard to destroy those elements of Chinese Communist society which seek to bureaucratize the revolution. (In this sense, the New Left may be said to have some kinship with the Red Guard of China, but the analogy fails in other essential respects, as it does when applied to student and intellectual dissent in Communist-dominated countries of Europe.) As in Mao, the New Leftists see also in Castro, Che Guevara, and Regis Debray "model" revolutionaries, appealing to the romantic sense of the New Left.

Herbert Marcuse is a German-born American philosopher teaching at the University of California, San Diego. He is regarded as the philosopher of the New Left. Briefly, his thesis is that modern society has become a kind of technological-administrative dictatorship of modern industrialism, which like other dictatorships, controls the population, but more pleasantly by providing prosperity and material comfort. These, however, prevent the victims from developing their talents and qualities as individual and unique personalities to the fullest, so that they have become "one-dimensional men" (after the title of one of Marcuse's books). Thus, the proletariat (Marx' historic instrument of revolution) has been bribed away from its revolutionary impulse, which is now inherited by the intellectual (student). The New Left's license for violence is found partly in Marcuse's prescription of "intolerance against movements from the Right and toleration of movements from the Left" and from his idea that the right of resistance to this new dictatorship may be extended to the point of subversion. The following citation from his essay "Repressive Tolerance" is enlightening:

"But I believe that there is a 'natural right' of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extra-legal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate. Law and order are always and everywhere the law and order which protect the established hierarchy; it is nonsensical to invoke the absolute authority of this law and this order against those who suffer from it and struggle against it -- not for personal advantages and revenge, but for their share of humanity. There is no other judge over them than the constituted authorities, the police, and their own con-

science. If they use violence, they do not start a new chain of violence, but try to break an established one. Since they will be punished, they know the risk, and when they are willing to take it, no third person and least of all the educator and intellectual, has the right to preach them abstention."

Moscow and Peking Attitudes

While Chinese Communist propaganda enthusiastically hailed the crisis provoked by the New Left students in France, Soviet propaganda has roundly condemned Marcuse and his student New Left following (see Pravda article attached). Neither propaganda stance is surprising in view of Marcuse's and the New Left's condemnation of the Soviet system and the New Left adulation of Mao. (The Soviet position was taken partly in support of the orthodox French Communist Party, which tried -- with indifferent success -- to resist the New Left tactics in view of the Party's hope to enter a stable leftist coalition government in the event of an electoral victory.)

Nevertheless, the anarchistic goal of the New Left represents what has been one of the major goals of the Communist world from its very beginnings: subversion and debilitation of free world political, social, and economic institutions. While this parallelism of interest between the New Left and world Communism is a far cry from proving that the two movements are conspiring, it would be surprising if either the Soviets or Chinese (or even both together) did not seek to gain, by devious and unpublicized methods, a means of exerting influence on and giving direction to the New Left. This is an aspect of the New Left that will bear watching.

However that may be, those who believe in the preservation of the freedoms (and their institutions), imperfect but expanding and won by the open societies of the West in centuries-old, largely evolutionary struggle, cannot help but condemn this negative, destructive effort by a radical minority of students and intellectuals (rapidly becoming professional revolutionaries) who have learned the art of capitalizing on the just grievances of large groups and parlaying action on these complaints into a full-scale assault on all the values of free societies.

While opposing and denouncing the anarchistic destructiveness of the New Left, each affected nation must eliminate legitimate reasons for student unrest by thorough-going reforms of higher education, including a new place for students in university organization and administration. Such reforms are imperative regardless of student unrest since the rapid progress of the scientific revolution, as well as the other changes in the world of today, make updated education essential for the survival of any nation. For these reforms, the active cooperation of all students of good will ought to be mobilized.

Robert Hessen, an instructor and doctoral candidate at Columbia University, gave his view of the Columbia riots in the magazine Barron's: National Business and Financial Weekly and in the substantial excerpt attached herewith rendered a powerful refutation, one by one, of the arguments used by the New Left to justify its violent, illegal methods. It would seem to apply with equal force wherever the New Left embarks on its violently anarchistic course.

CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
19 June 1968

Marcuse: 'False Prophet of Decommunized Marxism'

WEREWOLVES.—On the False Prophet Marcuse and His Vociferous Disciples. (By Yuri Zhukov. Pravda, May 30, p. 4. Complete text:) Marcuse, Marcuse, Marcuse—the name of this 70-year-old “German-American philosopher,” which has emerged from the darkness of obscurity, has been endlessly repeated in the Western press. In Bonn the name is pronounced Markoozeh; in New York, Markyooz; in Paris, Markyooss. The California resident who has undertaken to disprove Marxism is being publicized as if he were a movie star, and his books as if they were the latest brand of toothpaste or razor blades. A clever publicity formula has even been thought up: “the three M’s”—“Marx, the god; Marcuse, his prophet; and Mao, his sword.”

“Well, well,” some reader will say, “so even Mao Tse-tung is now considered worthy of glorified publicity in the bourgeois press.” Just imagine, I have a big pile of newspapers in front of me that in different ways rehash the “three M” formula, and this is no accident. As far back as February, 1967, a directive circulated by the director of the U.S. Information Service (U.S.I.S.) among all U.S.I.S. centers stated that employees “must take advantage of every opportunity to strengthen the position of Mao’s supporters,” because it is desirable for the United States that “Mao and his group remain in power for the time being,” since their activities are aimed against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Communist Parties. (This secret document was published on May 19 by the weekly Ceylon Tribune.) But let us return to Marcuse.

The Dream of “Decommunizing” Marxism.—Recently this gentleman visited Paris. There he spoke at a UNESCO colloquium devoted to the 150th anniversary of Marx’s birth. His report was entitled “A Revision of Marxist Concepts of Revolution,” but in reality it was not even a revision of Marxism but an attempt to disprove it. A pitiful and flimsy one, but still an attempt. According to the newspapers, Marcuse declared that in our time “the working class, which has cast its lot with the capitalist system (?), is no longer capable of playing the revolutionary role that Karl Marx assigned to it. The power of capital can be overthrown, consequently, only by forces outside this system: the colonial peoples, Negroes or young people who have not yet become part of the system.”

As was to be expected, the Marxist philosophers who participated in the colloquium dealt the proper rebuff to this false prophet. Some were astonished: Why did Marcuse say that the working class “is no longer capable of playing a revolutionary role” at a moment when the wave of sharp class struggle has risen so high in the capitalist world, particularly in France, where he spoke? But more farsighted people realized that Marcuse had been catapulted from distant San Diego to Paris for precisely this reason. It was necessary to set in motion all possible means to try to inject disorder and confusion into the ranks of the fighters against the old world and—most important!—to try to counterpose young people, primarily the students, to the chief forces of the working class.

It was not without reason that The New York Times very recently invented the new term “decommunization (!) of Marxism,” and not without reason that it wrote, with obvious sympathy for Marcuse’s Parisian disciples, that their flag “is the black flag of anarchy, not the red flag of communism.”

These days the Paris newspapers Le Figaro and Le Monde and the weeklies L’Express and Nouvel Observateur have been publishing extensive interviews with Marcuse, his biography*

* A significant biographical detail: During the war Marcuse worked in American intelligence, and then spent many years in the not unknown “Russian Institute” at Harvard. A result of this work was the anti-Soviet book “Soviet Marxism,” which is his “first best seller.”

and detailed summaries of his books, emphasizing that, while living in Germany in the 1920s, he renounced “communism and social democracy” and later, in the U.S.A., created his own “doctrine,” intended for “disoriented” young people.

What is the essence of this “doctrine”?

Four Focal Points.—First, Marcuse replaces the class struggle in present-day society by the “generational conflict.” Flattering the students, he assures them that they are the chief revolutionary force, since, as Nouvel Observateur wrote in summarizing his “doctrine,” “they are young and reject the society of their elders.” Therefore, “young people in general” must struggle against “adults in general.” Everywhere and anywhere!

Second, Marcuse asserts that it is necessary, if you please, to fight not only against capitalism but against “industrial society” in general, and, as L’Express emphasizes, “genuine opposition can consist only in radical and global negation of all the elements constituting this society, including Communist Parties.” In this connection he slanderously asserts that the socialist countries differ in no way from the capitalist countries, since they are becoming industrial, and “floods of concrete” supposedly smother “liberation aspirations.”

Third, Marcuse denies the necessity of any organized quality whatever in the struggle for the overthrow of the old world, urging young people to “spontaneous rebellion.” “It is useless to wait until the masses join the movement,” he said in an interview by the newspaper Le Monde. “Everything has always started with a rebellion by a small handful of intellectuals.” And as the greatest virtue Marcuse cites the fact that among the “rebels” in the U.S.A. “there is absolutely no coordination or organization.” Consequently, down with any organized basis in revolution, and particularly down with Communist Parties, and long live rebellion? This is just a step away from the not-unknown Peking slogan “fire on headquarters.” Not without reason did Marcuse state in the Le Monde interview that “today any Marxist who is not an obedient (?) Communist is a Maoist.”

Fourth, Marcuse, in asserting that in “industrial society” the working class has lost its revolutionary nature, says that “the order of things can be changed” only by “those who stand outside the production process,” that is, “the racial minorities, most of which are excluded from this process, the hard-core unemployed, lawbreakers (!), etc., and at the top, the privileged cultural figures who are able to avoid subjugation.” As the French democratic press rightly wrote, Marcuse and his supporters “seek to cast doubt on the chief role of the working class in the struggle for progress, democracy and socialism,” and their theory, “when put into practice, leads to the weakening of the revolutionary movement by seeking to exclude from it its chief force—the working class.”

Such is the attempt to overthrow Marxism that this “German-American philosopher” is staging.

It is characteristic that his “interpretation of prophetic revelation for the uninitiated” invariably coincides with the practice of Mao Tse-tung’s group. And what is of the greatest significance is that although this group does not stint on abusive language aimed at the imperialists, the governments of the capitalist states have very tolerant attitudes toward dissemination of its “ideas,” and at the same time toward the activities of Marcuse and his vociferous disciples as well. Recently New York Times columnist Sulzberger conversed on this topic with F.R.G. Chancellor Kiesinger himself, who reassured Sulzberger by explaining that the activities of Marcuse’s followers “have nothing in common with Soviet communism” and that “they have special gods.”

Such is the attempt to overthrow Marxism that this “German-American philosopher” is staging. He is “attracted by the Maoist idea that wars in our era will be waged in the poorly

developed 'third world.' This, he said, "appeals to the emotional sentiments" of Marcuse's disciples. Without posing an immediate threat to them. Let war be waged over there, and we here can shout to our heart's content, these "r-r-revolutionaries" reason.

Attacks on the Working Class.—The bourgeois ideologists realized that at a moment of serious exacerbation of the class struggle their old theories of "people's capitalism" and "convergence" (i.e., the gradual rapprochement of the antithetical systems) are powerless to influence the struggling proletariat. But now "ultraleftist," anarchistic statements have been set in motion that often constitute a rehash of Mao Tse-tung's "ideas," with whose aid they seek to sow discord and confusion among ardent but politically inexperienced young people, to split them and make those who can be influenced into blind tools of provocations.

Marcuse is not alone. In the F.R.G., for example, right behind him are some who assert that the West German working class cannot be revolutionary, since it, together with the bourgeoisie, is "participating in the exploitation of the third world." In Italy Socialist Deputy Codignola endorses Marcuse's thesis on the necessity of "rebellion" against "industrial society in general," since, as he said to a correspondent of L'Express, "present-day society—be it capitalist or socialist—increasingly resembles an industrial enterprise."

But just as the Peking leaders these days, by holding demonstrations supposedly in support of the struggle of France's working people for their rights, are pointing their main thrust against the French Communist Party and the U.S.S.R., so Marcuse's vociferous followers in Western Europe are raising their little fists against the working class and Communists.

This same purpose is served by the vague judgments of Marcuse and his disciples on the struggle against "industrial civilization" in general, without ascertaining whether it is the capitalist or the socialist system that is involved. At the Sorbonne Marcuse's followers posted the following "programmatic statement":

"The revolution that has begun calls into question not only capitalist society but also industrial civilization as a whole. The society of consumption must die a violent death. The society of alienation (!) must also die a violent death. We want a new and original world. We reject a world in which the certainty that you will not die of starvation is acquired in exchange for the risk of dying of boredom."

By the way, lordly, snobbish declarations of this kind arouse not only indignation among the few students in bourgeois countries who have made their way to the universities from the workers' milieu (in France, according to data published in L'Humanite, only 8% of [university] students are children of workers): "They, of course, are not in danger of dying of starvation," the workers' children say of these "rebels," who are generously supplied with pocket money by their loving parents. This is why they talk about boredom. But we need something more: an immediate democratic university reform that would open up the way to higher education for working people! And the students who are aware of their civic duty are resolutely struggling for this democratic reform, with the steadfast support of the working class. In this struggle the working class seeks to create a united front with the intelligentsia against the schemes of the reactionaries, who will make use of any means in their interests, including the most refined provocation devices.

And it was obviously not for nothing that on May 28 The New York Times, adopting the terminology of Jenmin Jihpao, suddenly began to say that "rebellion is a just cause" and, lashing out at the French Communists, accused them of "wanting to avoid violence" and seeking to create a people's government with a democratic coalition.

Whom Do These "Insurgents" Serve?—The bourgeois press has been carrying vigorous and colorful accounts of the "monkeyshines" of one Cohn-Bendit, a 23-year-old German from the F.R.G., who until recently was enrolled at the University of Paris, engaging there in schismatic activities among the students. When journalists asked him what he was living on, Cohn-Bendit replied: "I receive a stipend from the German (West German) state as an orphan." At present he is touring

Western Europe, calling for a "bloody (!) revolution." T
On May 9 the weekly Nouvel Observateur published an interview with this "insurgent"—he boasted that his pals had disrupted a speech to students delivered by Communist Deputy Pierre Jucaine, and he urged "beating up the Communist Party guys." "At the present moment," he declared boastfully, "the students alone (!) are waging the revolutionary struggle of the working class. A worker with a family is unwilling (?) to fight."

But when the working class of France organized a 1,000,000-strong demonstration on May 13 in support of the legitimate demands of the students seeking democratic university reform, the same Cohn-Bendit and a handful of his supporters—Trotskyites, anarchists and "Maoists"—tried in vain to sow tumult and dissension in the ranks of the demonstrators by shouting the provocation slogan, "Let's storm the Elysee Palace!"

Speaking on May 27 to the workers of the Renault Automobile Plant, Benoit Franchon, chairman of the General Confederation of Labor, described the ignoble role that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the French underground terrorist organization O.A.S. attempt to play in events involving the French students. "Right now," he added, "a whole cohort of people do nothing but 'feed the fires,' showering all kinds of praise on the young people's enthusiasm, while actually they are preparing a trap and a snare for us."

Not so long ago two of Cohn-Bendit's compatriots came to give him a hand in Paris—they spoke at student meetings. The newspaper Combat obligingly published an interview with them, concealing their names behind the initials "J. S." and "P. B." This interview was quite candid. "P. B." said that "over the entire history of the F.R.G. the working class has identified itself with the bourgeois system," and that "over here" in France the workers "also do nothing"; "J. S." added that "the working class is satisfied (?) to such an extent that it cannot criticize the existing system."

Here the correspondent asked: "Are the students themselves politically conscious?" "P. B." replied: "Yes, because they belong to a privileged (!) group. Revolutionary topics are discussed in privileged groups, in so-called Marcuse groups."

Their Expectations.—By making blasphemous use of the name of Marx, the werewolves attempting to "decommunize Marxism," split the progressive forces and set them against one another are thereby carrying out the very definite social command of the enemies of the workers' movement, who are seriously perturbed by the intensification of the class struggle in their countries. This struggle is headed by the working class, which, as L'Humanite emphasizes, "is powerful, organized and knows where it is going. It is the decisive force, the only completely revolutionary class, because it has nothing to lose but its chains!"

The leading force of the working class has been, is and always will be Communists who draw their strength from the great doctrine of Marx and Lenin. And no matter how much unsolicited "advisers" from The New York Times try to preach "decommunization of Marxism," no matter how much the bourgeois press publicizes Marcuse's judgments and the activities of his disciples, the expectations of the enemies of the working class will be disappointed.

The developments in France provide especially convincing evidence of this. "In France there can be no leftist policy or social progress without the active participation of the Communists," Waldeck Rochet, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, said on March 28. "And it is still more inadmissible to claim to be moving toward socialism without Communists."

Indeed, the working class and particularly the Communists marching in its vanguard are the forces that everywhere uphold the fundamental interests of all the working people, including the intelligentsia and the students. And no one will succeed in weakening the unity, which is intensifying in struggle, among the peoples, who are gradually rallying around the working class and the Communists in its vanguard.

Life, will have its say!

PRAVDA
30 May 1968

О лжепророке Маркузе и его шумливых учениках

Маркузе, Маркузе, Маркузе — имя этого семидесятилетнего «германо-американского философа», вынырнувшее из тьмы безвестности, без конца повторяет западная печать. В Бонне он — Маркузе, в Нью-Йорке — Маркьюз, в Париже — Маркюс. Жителя Калифорнии, принявшегося опровергать марксизм, рекламируют как кинозвезду, а его книги — словно новейшую марку зубной пасты или бритвенных лезвий. Придумана даже ловкая формула публицити: «три М» — «Маркс — бог, Маркузе — его пророк, Мао — его меч»...

— Ну и ну, — смеется иной читатель, — уже и Мао Цзедун сподобился рекламного прославления в буржуазной печати? — Представьте себе, передо мной лежит груда газет, переплетающих на разные лады формулу «трех М», и это не случайно. Еще в феврале прошлого года в директиве, разосланной директором информационной службы США (ЮСИС) всем ее центрам, было сказано, что работники этой службы «должны использовать все возможности для укрепления позиций сторонников Мао», ибо Социальным Штатам желательно, чтобы «Мао и его группа оставались пока у власти», поскольку их деятельность направлена против Коммунистической партии Советского Союза и других компартий. (Этот секретный документ был опубликован 19 мая цейлонским еженедельником «Три-бюн»).

Но вернемся к Маркузе.

Мечта о «декоммунизации» марксизма

Недавно этот господин побывал в Париже. Там он выступил на коллоквиуме ЮНЕСКО, посвященном 150-летию Маркса. Его доклад назывался «Ревизия марксистских концепций революции», но в действительности это была даже не ревизия марксизма, а попытка его опровергнуть. Жалкая и несостоятельная, — во все же попытка. Как писали газеты, Маркузе заявил, что в наше время «рабочий класс, включившийся (?) в капиталистическую систему, не может больше играть революционной роли, которую ему предназначил Карл Маркс.

Свергнуть власть капитала могут, следовательно, лишь силы, находящиеся вне этой системы: народы колоний, негры или молодежь, еще не включившая в систему».

Как и следовало ожидать, философы-марксисты, участвовавшие в коллоквиуме, дали достойный отпор этому лжепророку. Некоторые удивились: почему Маркузе заговорил, будто рабочий класс «не может больше играть революционной роли» в такой момент, когда в капиталистическом мире, — и в частности во Франции, где он выступал, — так высоко вздымается волна острой классов-

вой борьбы? Но более дальновидные люди поняли: Маркузе был катапультирован из далекого Сан-Диего в Париж именно поэтому. Требовалось пустить в ход все средства, чтобы попытаться внести замешательство, путаницу в ряды борцов против старого мира и — главное! — попытаться противоставить молодежи, прежде всего студенчество, основным силам рабочего класса.

Недаром именно теперь газета «Нью-Йорк таймс» изобрела новый термин «ДЕКОММУНИЗАЦИЯ (И) МАРКСИЗМА», недаром она издала с сочувствием и парижским ученикам Маркузе писала, что их флаг — «ЭТО ЧЕРНЫЙ ФЛАГ АНАРХИИ, А НЕ КРАСНЫЙ ФЛАГ КОММУНИЗМА».

Парижские газеты «Фигаро», «Монд», «Экспресс» и «Нувель обсерватор» в эти дни опубликовали пространные интервью с Маркузе, его биографию* и подробный пересказ его книги, подчеркивая при этом, что в 20-х годах, живя в Германии, он оторвался от «коммунизма и социал-демократии», а затем, уже в США, создал свое собственное «учение», рассчитанное на «лишнюю» молодежь.

В чем же суть этого «учения»?

Четыре фокуса

Во-первых, Маркузе подмывает классовую борьбу в современном обществе «конфликтом поколений». Лытя студенчеству, он уверяет, что оно является главной революционной силой, поскольку,

как пишет «Нувель обсерватор», излагая его «учение», «они молоды и они отвергают общество старших». Стало быть, «молодежь вообще» должна бороться против «взрослых вообще». Везде и повсюду!

Во-вторых, Маркузе уверяет, что надо не бороться не только против капитализма, но... против «индустриального общества» вообще, причем, как подчеркивает «Экспресс», «подлинная оппозиция может заключаться лишь в радикальном, глобальном отрицании всех элементов, из которых состоит такое общество, включая коммунистические партии». В этой связи он клеветнически утверждает, будто социалистические страны ничем не отличаются от капиталистических, поскольку они осуществляют индустриализацию, а «поток бетона» якобы дуют «освободительные чаяния».

В-третьих, Маркузе отрицает необходимость какой бы то ни было организованности в борьбе за свержение старого мира, зовя молодежь к «стихийному бунту». «Бесполезно ждать, пока массы присоединятся к движению, — заявил он в интервью газете «Монд». — Все всегда начиналось с бунта горстки интеллигентов». И Маркузе, как величайшую добродетель, превозносит тот факт, что среди «бунтарей» в США «не существует никакой координации, никакой организации». Стало быть, долой всякое организованное начало в революции, и прежде всего долой коммунистические партии, и да здравствует бунт? Тут — два шага до неизвестного песчинского лозунга «огонь по штабам». Недаром в интервью газете «Монд» Маркузе заявил, что «сегодня великий марксист, который не является послушным (?) коммунистом, — это маонист».

* Многозначительная биографическая деталь: во время войны Маркузе работал в американской разведке, а затем долгие годы провел в неизвестном «русском институте» в Гарварде. Итогом этой деятельности явилась антисоветская книга «Советский марксизм» — «первый бестселлер» Маркузе.

В-четвертых, Маркузе, утверждая, будто в «индустриальном обществе» рабочий класс утратил революционность, заявляет, что «изменить порядок вещей» способны лишь «те, кто стоит вне производственного процесса», то есть «расовые меньшинства, в большинстве своем исключенные из этого процесса, постоянные безработные, правонарушители (1) и т. д., а на другом конце этой цепи — привилегированные деятели культуры, у которых есть возможность избегнуть подчинения». Как справедливо писала французская демократическая пресса, Маркузе и его сторонники «стремятся поставить под сомнение основную роль рабочего класса в борьбе за прогресс, демократию и социализм», в их теории «в практическом осуществлении ведет к ослаблению революционного движения, стремясь исключить из него его основную силу — рабочий класс».

Такова попытка опровергнуть марксизм, с которой выступает этот «германо-американский философ».

Характерно, что его «истолкование пророческого озарения для непосвященных» то и

дело совпадает с практикой группы Мао Цзэ-дуна. И вот что в высшей степени знаменательно: хотя эта группа не скупится на ругательства в адрес империалистов, правительства капиталистических государств весьма терпимо относится и распространению ее «идей», а заодно и к деятельности Маркузе и его шумливых учеников. Недавно обозреватель «Нью-Йорк таймс» Сульцбергер беседовал на эту тему с самым канцлером ФРГ Кизингером, и тот, успокаивая его, пояснил, что деятельность последователей Маркузе «не имеет ничего общего с советским коммунизмом» и что «у них особые боги».

Кизингер подчеркнул, что эту публику «привлекает маоистская идея о том, что войны в нашу эпоху будут вестись в слаборазвитом «третьем мире». Это, сказал он, «инспирирует эмоциональным чувством» учеников Маркузе. «НЕ СОЗДАВАЯ ДЛЯ НИХ НЕПОСРЕДСТВЕННОЙ УГРОЗЫ». Пусть до войны идет там, а мы здесь власть покрывим, — рассуждают эти «р-р-революционеры».

Атаки на рабочий класс

Буржуазные идеологи поняли, что в момент серьезного обострения классовой борьбы их старые теории «народного капитализма», «конвергенции» (т. е. постепенного сближения противостоящих систем) бесцельны повлиять на борющийся пролетариат. И вот в ход пущены «ультралевые», анархистские высказывания, зачужденную перепевающие «идеи» Мао Цзэ-дуна, — с их по-

мощью пылится внести смуту, сбить с толку горячую, но не «искушенную в политике молодежь, расколоть ее и превратить тех, на кого удастся повлиять, в слепое орудие провокаций».

Маркузе не одинок. В ФРГ, к примеру, кое-кто вслед за ним твердит, будто западно-германский рабочий класс не может быть революционным, поскольку он вместе с буржуазией «участвует в эксплуатации третьего мира». В Италии депутат-социалист Кодиньола поддерживает тезис Маркузе о необходимости «бунта» против «индустриального общества вообще», поскольку, как заявил он корреспонденту «Экспресс», «современное общество, — будь то капиталистическое или социалистическое, — все больше и больше напоминает промышленное предприятие».

Но подобно тому, как пекинские лидеры в эти дни, проводя демонстрации якобы в поддержку борьбы трудящихся Франции за свои права, направляют главный удар

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Этой же цели служат мутные рассуждения Маркузе и его учеников о борьбе против «индустриальной цивилизации» вообще, без разбора — идет ли речь о капиталистическом или социалистическом строе. В Сорбонне последователи Маркузе вывели такое «программное заявление»:

«Начавшаяся революция ставит под вопрос не только капиталистическое общество, но и индустриальную цивилизацию в целом. Общество потребления должно погибнуть насильственной смертью. Общество отчуждения (1) также должно погибнуть насильственной смертью. Мы хотим нового и оригинального мира. Мы отречаемся от мира, в котором уверенность в том, что ты не умрешь от голода, приобретается в обмен на риск умереть от скуки».

Между прочим, такого рода барские, снобистские декларации вызывают лишь негодование у тех немногих в буржуазных странах студентов, которые проблизи в университет из рабочей среды (во Франции, по данным, опубликованным в «Юманите», лишь 8 процентов студентов — дети рабочих). «Им, конечно, не грозит опасность умереть с голоду, — говорят они по адресу этих «бунтарей», которых любвеобильные родители щедро снабжают карманными деньгами. Вот они и рассуждают о скуке. Нам же требуется иное: немедленная демократическая реформа университета, которая открыла

бы трудящихся путь к высшему образованию! И студенты, сознающие свой гражданский долг, решительно борются за эту демократическую реформу, опираясь на непоколебимую поддержку рабочего класса. В этой борьбе рабочий класс стремится к созданию единого фронта с интеллигенцией вопреки прощам реакции, использующей в своих интересах любые средства, в том числе и самые изощренные провокационные приемы.

И не зря, видимо, «Нью-Йорк таймс» 28 мая, замечая терминологию у «Жюль-Мишель Жюльбао», заговорила вдруг, что «бунт — дело, правое», и обрушилась на французских коммунистов, обвиняя их в том, что они «хотят избежать насилия» и стремятся к созданию народного правительства демократического союза.

Кому служат эти «мятежники»!

Буржуазная пресса сейчас усиленно живописует «художества» некоего двадцатитрехлетнего немца из ФРГ Кон-Бендита, который до недавнего времени числился в Парижском университете, занимаясь там раскольнической деятельностью среди студенчества. Когда журналисты его спросили, на какие средства он живет, Кон-Бендит ответил: «Получаю стипендию от немецкого (западногерманского) государства, как сирота». Сейчас он гастролирует по Западной Европе, призывая к «кровавой (!) революции».

8 мая еженедельник «Нувель обсерватёр» опубликовал интервью с этим «мятежником», — он хвастался, что его приятели помешали выступлению депутата-коммуниста Пьера Жюльбао перед студентами, и призывал «колотить парней из коммунистической партии». «В настоящий момент, — хвастливо заявил он, — студенты одни (!) ведут революционную борьбу рабочего класса. Рабочий, являющийся главой семьи, не хочет (?) бороться».

Когда же рабочий класс Франции 13 мая организовал миллионную демонстрацию в поддержку законных требований студенчества, добивающегося демократической реформы университета, тот же Кон-Бендит с горсткой своих сторонников — троцкистов, анар-

хистов и «маоистов» — тщетно пытался внести сумятицу и раскол в ряды демонстрантов, выбросив провокационный лозунг: «Пойдем штурмовать Елисейский дворец!».

Выступая 27 мая перед рабочими автомобильного завода «Рено», председателем Всеобщей конфедерации труда Бенуа Фрашон рассказал и о той неблагоприятной роли, которую пытаются играть в событиях, затравливающих французское студенчество, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЕ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ США и ФРАНЦУЗСКАЯ ПОДПОЛЬНАЯ ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ОАС. «Сейчас, — добавил он, — целая когорта людей только тем и занята, что «нипит», расхваливал на все лады энтузиазм молодежи, а на деле готовит нам ловушку и обман».

Не так давно по подмогу Кон-Бендиту в Париж приезжали два его соотечественника, — они выступали на студенческих собраниях. Газета «Комба» услужливо опубликовала интервью с ними, скрыв их имена за инициалами «И. С.» и «П. Б.» И это интервью было достаточно откровенно. «П. Б.» заявил, что «во всей истории ФРГ рабочий класс отождествлял себя с буржуазной системой» и что «у вас во Франции рабочие «тоже ничего не делают», а «И. С.» добавил, что «рабочий класс до такой степени удовлетворен (?), что он не может критиковать существующую систему».

Тут корреспондент спросил: «А у самих студентов есть сознание?» «П. Б.» ответил: «Да, потому что они входят в состав привилегированной (!) группы. Революционные темы обсуждаются в привилегированных группах, в так называемых группах Маркузе».

Их расчеты

Концупственно используя имя Маркса, оборотни, пытающиеся предпринять «декоммунизацию марксизма», расколоть и поссорить прогрессивные силы, тем самым

выполняют совершенно определенный социальный заказ врагов рабочего движения, которые всемерно обеспокоены усилением классовой борьбы в своих странах. Эту борьбу возглавляет рабочий класс, который, как подчеркивает «Юмаинте», «смогут», организовав и знает, куда он идет. Он является решающей силой, единственным до конца революционным классом, потому что ему нечего терять, кроме своих целей!»

Ведущей силой рабочего класса были, есть и всегда будут коммунисты, черпающие свои силы в великом учении Маркса и Ленина. И как бы ни пытались сейчас непрошенные «советники» из «Нью-Йорк таймс» проповедовать «декоммунизацию марксизма», как бы ни рекламировала буржуазная пресса рассуждения Маркузе и действия его учеников, расчеты врагов рабочего класса потерпят провал.

Об этом, в частности, убедительно свидетельствует развитие событий во Франции. «Во Франции не может быть левой политики и социального прогресса без активного участия коммунистов, — сказал 28 марта Генеральный секретарь Французской коммунистической партии Вальтер Рюше. — Тем более нельзя серьезно претендовать на то, чтобы идти к социализму без коммунистов».

Именно рабочий класс и прежде всего илущие в его авангарде коммунисты повсюду отстаивают коренные интересы всех трудящихся, в том числе и интеллигенции, и студенчества. И никому не удастся ослабить все усиливающуюся в борьбе единение народов, которые постепенно сплачиваются вокруг рабочего класса и илущих в его авангарде коммунистов.

Жизнь берет свое!
Юрий ЖУКОВ.

9 June 1968

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

CPYRGH

The New Brotherhood of

By Brian Crozier *at Jack*

A British journalist and author of "The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections" and "The Struggle for the Third World," Crozier has made a special study of political unrest, subversion and violence.

WHAT HAVE these names in common: Stokely Carmichael, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, Frantz Fanon, Houari Boumediene, Fidel Castro, Tariq Ali, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Herbert Marcuse, Rudi Dutschke, Karl Dietrich Wolff?

Answer: All advocate revolutionary violence and all have shown, by word or deed or both, that they consider Marx and Lenin obsolete. One might go so far as to add three more names to the list: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Vo Nguyen Giap.

If one is searching for a common denominator, an all-embracing label for the philosophy these people preach and practice, one might do worse than to term it "post-Leninist violence." The collective label that appeals to me most, for members of the group as a whole, is "the new brotherhood of violence."

Lurid though this label is, it is far from fanciful. Nor need one subscribe to the conspiratorial view of history to trace the spiritual and sometimes personal links between the apparently disparate names I have mentioned.

The Guevarists

TAKE, FOR INSTANCE, Tariq Ali. This young Pakistani, living in England and apparently aware that he is safer there than he would be at home, would not, I imagine, object to being called a professional agitator.

In the current fashion of this unusual calling, he has been seen heading demonstrations — to be accurate, students' protest demonstrations — not only at universities up and down the United Kingdom but also in several European countries. Interviewed not long ago on television and asked about his politics, he hesitated, then said: "I suppose you could say I'm a Guevarist."

Similarly, Rudi Dutschke, the German student leader critically wounded in an affray in Berlin in April, named his baby son, Hosea Che. The late Che

Violence

Guevara, deprived so early of his life after the collapse of his guerrilla movement in Bolivia last October, would surely have been sensitive to this sincerest of compliments.

Dutschke's fellow countryman Karl Dietrich Wolff was in London in March, together with Tariq Ali, whipping up what was to have been a peaceful anti-Vietnam war demonstration in Grosvenor Square to a suitable pitch of violence in front of the American Embassy. While declaring himself in favor of freedom of thought, like Rosa Luxemburg—the legendary German Communist of the 1920s—he is careful to specify that "freedom of thought can be misused." Some, in other words, must be freer than others.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, much in the news lately as a major leader of Parisian student riots, goes further. "We claim freedom of expression within the faculty," he said in a recent interview, "but we deny it to supporters of the Americans."

Third Worlders

THIS, OF COURSE, is totalitarian talk, and it is well to be aware of it. But there is another strand in Cohn-Bendit's equipment: identification with the colored peoples' "struggle," especially in the Third World. As he sees it, it is the duty of the militant students to help the struggle of the Third Worlders by destroying the centers of exploitation in France and other Western countries.

Similar views are expressed by such American student leaders as Tom Hayden, Carl Oglesby and Mark Rudd. The countries such young people visit for inspiration are North Vietnam and Cuba.

A generation ago, Moscow would have been their magnet, but the Cohn-Bendits and Rudi Dutschkes of this world now find Russia dull, conservative and repressive. They see little point in pulling down Western society merely to hand over to another power orthodoxy. Their target is the depersonalized industrial state, whether its

label is "liberal" or "Communist."

If one turns from the youthful agitators to their sources of emotional and intellectual stimulus, one finds such names as Marcuse, Guovara, Fanon, Giap and Mao, especially the first three. In student riots in Berlin and Italy, Marcuse cohabited with Marx and Mao on the slogan banners, the important thing to note being that Marx without Marcuse would stir little excitement while Mao is revered less as a philosopher than as the wielder of a revolutionary sword.

It is important to ask why the radical students reject Marx and accept Marcuse and Mao. It is not simply that Marx is out of date, his field of vision limited to Dickensian England. More important is the fact that Marx was basically optimistic and constructive. Destroy, yes, but rebuild afterward.

In comparison, Marcuse is pessimistic and nihilistic. His one-dimensional man, alienated from the industrial, affluent consumers' society, must of course reject it. But what comes after that? Some unspecific utopia?

Racism Is Awkward

MORE UTOPIAN still, and more nihilistic, is the philosophy of the late Frantz Fanon, the French-speaking Negro psychiatrist from Martinique who became the ideologist of the Algerian National Liberation Front during its long war against France. In his major work, "The Wretched of the Earth," he expounds a simplistic philosophy.

Addressing the colonized peoples of the world, he says in effect: "You are the oppressed, the wretched of the earth. Your exploiter is the white man: kill him. Only in violence can you achieve your dignity as a man." And after that, nothing. Fanon's message begins and ends with violence.

It is, of course, a racialist message, and this has proved an awkward thing from the point of view of the radicals of the New Left. Some years ago, it was possible for white and Negro leftists to cohabit and collaborate. But disillusionment set in—on both sides.

The Negroes turned to Black Power and to the inspiration of Frantz Fanon. It was not surprising to find Stokely Carmichael turning up in Algiers last

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7
 summer and had introduced him to Algeria's revolutionary struggle.

Nor was it surprising that his travels had taken him to Cuba and North Vietnam as well as Algeria. In Havana, where Carmichael had attended the Latin American Solidarity Organization's conference, he described the American Negroes as "internal Vietnamese" and called for Negro guerrilla warfare in the streets of American cities.

Fanon, revered in Houari Boumedienne's Algeria and Fidel Castro's Cuba as a major revolutionary prophet, thus serves as a spiritual link between Black Power and the Fidelista guerrillas in Latin America. And when Cohn-Bendit proclaims solidarity with the Third Worlders, he is echoing Fanon's message of anarchic hate.

A Growing Legend

HERE ARE, however, other inspirational links in this new brotherhood of violence. If Fanon is the link between Carmichael, Castro and Boumedienne, Regis Debray is the link between the rebellious students of the West and the Latin American guerrillas.

ments to attract rebellious youth: his own youth, his rejection of an impeccably bourgeois background, his intellectual prowess, his decision to join Che Guevara's guerrillas in the Bolivian mountains, his utopian advocacy of rural warfare and dismissal of the Communist Party's leadership in favor of the charismatic figure of a Fidel Castro. As his languishes in his Bolivian jail, his legend grows, and so do the sales of his explosive little book, "Revolution in the Revolution?"

In no way, however, can Debray's legend compete with Che Guevara's. As Sorel, that French advocate of violence of the generation before last, shrewdly pointed out, the fact that a myth is objectively incredible is of little consequence.

The Che myth, carefully fostered by Castro's intelligence service, is of the great guerrilla leader and theorist, liberator of a half-continent, the Simon Bolivar of the 20th century. Objectively, the truth is that he was a moderately successful tactician whose only major success was a pushover victory against a bankrupt regime in Cuba, and he was uniformly unsuccessful elsewhere.

NO MATTER: the students want their myth and they will have it. Che Guevara is therefore the greatest revolutionary pinup of today, greater than aging Ho Chi Minh and even than that truly masterly strategist of revolutionary war in all its horrors, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. And he is greater, certainly, than Mao Tse-tung, for all the welcome excesses of his Red Guards, or Marshal Lin Biao, for all his utopian calls to the countryside of the world to rise up and encircle the "cities" of capitalism.

It would be beyond the scope of this necessarily limited analysis to deal with the long-term consequences of this inspirational ferment. For different reasons, post-Leninist violence is as worrying to Moscow as to Washington, although the Russians may be better placed than the rest to exploit and canalize the violent movements that are springing up all over the world, including the Communist world. But the organized societies of the West will ignore them at their peril.

THE REPORTER

May 30, 1968

AT HOME & ABROAD

On the Barricades Of Paris

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS
 THOUGH President de Gaulle imperturbably left on his long-scheduled state visit to Romania the morning after the huge, unprecedented student-worker street demonstration of May 13 in the heart of Paris, it was already clear by then that his régime is facing not merely a political but a revolutionary crisis comparable to the one that brought it to power exactly ten years ago.

Paradoxically, it was the endlessly chanted slogans of the demonstrators—"De Gaulle Resign, De Gaulle Assassin, Ten Years, That's Enough,

Happy Birthday, General"—along with the red or black anarchist flags flaunted in front of the City Hall and Prefecture of Police that probably symbolized the Fifth Republic's best chance for survival. Up to the May 13 demonstration, an unopposed and therefore pacific march of several hundred thousand men, women, and children from the Place de la République on the Right Bank to the Place Denfert Rochereau on the Left, it was possible to believe that the disorders of the previous "Red Week" in the Latin Quarter were due essentially to the government's heavy-handed, inept reaction to the student unrest that a few campus extremists were trying to fan into rebellion. Though that view did not adequately explain, for example, how the students happened to be equipped—according to *Le Figaro*—with a pneumatic drill to help them dig up cobblestones for their barricades, and with expensive battery-powered bullhorns for calling the lycée students out to join the fun, it was evident that the government had bungled its original attempt at repression on May 4.

When the rector of the Sorbonne, with government approval, closed down the university and called for police to invade its sacred premises in violation of a six-hundred-year taboo, merely because a few hundred students were holding a routine protest meeting in the courtyard and arguing among themselves about what acts of defiance they might commit, he inadvertently lined up all the students with the leftist extremists who had organized the protest.

WITHIN a short time, indeed, not only all the students in France but most of the intellectuals and eventually a large majority of public opinion manifested disapproval of the government's attempts to preserve order in the streets of the capital. In the absence of Premier Georges Pompidou, who was visiting in Iran and Afghanistan, President de Gaulle's ministers—of course with his approval, to say the least—heroically but unwisely refused to yield to the inevitable. When the Premier returned, however, he consulted with

CPY RGM Gaulle, then made a brief radio talk to the nation that was in effect an unconditional approval for the students' demands, including the release of foreign and nonstudent demonstrators already convicted by the courts for various offenses. The public heaved a sigh of relief and commentators hailed the beginning of de-escalation in the conflict between authority and the forces of revolt. Thus the May 13 demonstration, accompanied by a general strike, came as a shock.

From the first it was evident that the victory of the student revolutionaries was conceived as a beginning, not an end. The public's response to the slogans of the marching students and workers grew steadily cooler as they became increasingly political and revolutionary in character. Accompanying some of the picturesque student delegations were hawkers selling a special issue of the new student paper *Action*, announcing that by decision of the chief national student and teaching unions the universities throughout France would be occupied by the students but would not function "normally" until the Minister of the Interior and the Paris Prefect of Police had been forced to resign. The front page carried the banner line "The Streets Will Conquer," and the back page instructed readers to organize action committees. One banner I saw being carried by an unidentified group said "Organize Self-Defense Groups."

Even more ominous was the systematic use being made of inflammatory rumors and accusations. I saw placards calling for revenge for "our dead," although no fatalities had yet been reported. Others asked, "What happened to the wounded who have disappeared from the hospitals?" As the parade was ending the false rumor was launched that one body of marchers was wheeling to descend on the Elysée Palace. Unquestionably expert and ruthless revolutionary agitators played a big part in organizing the demonstration and in at least some of the earlier Left Bank riots. They had more experience and a more professional staff, not to mention funds, than any student extremists are believed to possess.

Naturally, the disciplined masses of the Communist-controlled Con-

fédération Générale du Travail (CGT) unions, mobilized from the Paris suburbs, dominated the parade by their numbers and organization. While joining in the attacks against de Gaulle and the entire régime, they stressed the slogan "A People's Government." Some friction between the CGT and other traditional labor organizations participating in the demonstration, and the students was evident as it broke up. Violent clashes between leftist demonstrators and police occurred in several provincial cities. After a night and morning of wild confusion within the walls of the Sorbonne, where, according to the Paris papers, the atmosphere was reminiscent of the Chinese cultural revolution, student agitation resumed in the streets of the Latin Quarter.

'Enterprise of Subversion'

The French authorities have made two basic allegations about the origin of the large-scale violence that exploded in the Latin Quarter after the closing of the Sorbonne and its suburban annex at Nanterre west of the city. The first allegation, officially voiced by the Paris Prefect of Police, Maurice Grimaud, is that left-wing extremist agitators, mostly French university students but including a few foreign ones and a number of more mature revolutionaries, initially incited the mass demonstrations on the Left Bank and then turned them into planned experiments in urban guerrilla warfare. The activity of these agitators, the Prefect told reporters, thus constituted an "enterprise of subversion." Observers here believe the charge is seriously founded, and it is accepted by some Paris and Nanterre students I talked with who witnessed the riots close at hand without taking part in them.

The second allegation, more vaguely formulated by otherwise unidentified French "government circles" cited in the local press and on radio networks, is that the disorders were instigated by French Maoists to sabotage the Vietnam peace negotiations here. So far no direct evidence has been published to substantiate this charge, but it is not quite so weird as it sounds. Though it seems doubtful that many of the young Latin Quarter agitators were primar-

ily intent on disrupting the U.S.-Vietnam talks at the Hotel Majestic across the river, the riots were to a considerable degree a direct outgrowth of the almost demented pro-Hanoi and anti-U.S. agitation that had been going on for months in French universities and in the streets of the capital. After so much frenzy and fanaticism had been allowed to build up, some kind of explosion was inevitable.

Most of the student revolutionaries, including the Trotskyites but not the Moscow Communists, are adherents of the French National Committee for Vietnam (Comité National Vietnam), an influential, rabidly anti-American, rather pro-Peking group headed by prominent left-wing intellectuals like Professor Laurent Schwartz, a fifty-two-year-old mathematician and former Trotskyite who was recently refused a U.S. visa to accept an invitation from Berkeley.

At Nanterre, where the student extremists virtually took over control of the courses and administration last March, it was the Vietnam issue, according to *Le Monde*, that crystallized the formation of the revolutionary Twenty-second of March movement there. "Vietnam," the *Monde* article explained, "was the origin and cement of the movement. And the affair of March 22 [the student show of force that forced the de facto capitulation of the university authorities at Nanterre] was born of a protest demonstration against the arrest of certain activists belonging to the National Committee."

OF COURSE Vietnam was not the only factor in the student revolt; like rebellious students elsewhere, those at Nanterre and the Sorbonne have been led to a general challenge to society as they know it by their readings in Marcuse, Mao, Marx, and Trotsky. The importance of the Vietnam question was that it enabled the revolutionary agitators both at Nanterre and in Paris—indeed, throughout France—to mobilize and regiment the nonrevolutionary student mass for political action, and above all, perhaps, to impose their dictatorship on the campuses.

The various extremist factions endlessly squabbled among themselves over fine points of revolution-

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

any dogma and political allegiance—the Maoists at Nanterre threw out a well-known Communist deputy and intellectual who had been invited by other leftist groups to give a talk—but joined in imposing a rigid ban on all “pro-imperialist” campus activities or private utterance. “We demand freedom of expression within the university but we deny it to partisans of the Americans,” Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the twenty-three-year-old German anarchist who has emerged as one of the chief extremist leaders, frankly told the weekly *Nouvel Observateur* in an interview. “Nobody would allow a meeting on the theme that Hitler was right to massacre six million Jews. Why tolerate a pro-American meeting organized by fascists on a very similar theme?”

The “partisans of the Americans” Cohn-Bendit was mainly referring to were those belonging to the right-wing nationalist student movement calling itself *Occident*, which is no less prone to violence and no less allergic to free speech than the young totalitarians of the Left, but on a number of occasions Nanterre students who were partisans of nothing but minding their own business were molested for not adopting the shibboleths of the new anti-conformist conformism. Bloody clashes between leftists and *Occident* commandos in which both sides were armed with wooden clubs, iron bars, slingshots, blackjacks, and switchblade knives became increasingly frequent, both at Nanterre and in the Latin Quarter, during April. It was one of these frays, resulting in a summons for Cohn-Bendit and seven of his comrades from Nanterre to appear before a university disciplinary board at the Sorbonne, that initiated the chain of events leading directly to the Paris uprising.

The Fruits of Permissiveness

Thus, in addition to its basic mistake of cracking down on the students at the wrong time in the wrong way, and then wavering at critical moments during the ensuing disorders between abject appeasement and brutal violence, President de Gaulle's government was the victim of its earlier permissiveness toward almost any agitation in the name of Vietnam, providing it was anti-

American. It seems likely, too, that there is some substance to the frequent Communist charges that the government at least indirectly encouraged the development in France of Maoist, Trotskyite, anarchist, and other extremist splinter movements in order to undermine the orthodox Communist Party in France. If that is so, the President's ministers or advisers who recommended that policy must bitterly regret it today: there can be no doubt that whether or not Peking tried to sabotage the peace conference here, it was furious with de Gaulle for letting the talks take place and that the aggressiveness of the numerically important Marxist-Leninist—that is, Maoist—elements in the student movement was in part a reflection of official Chinese displeasure. (The head of the Agence France-Presse bureau in Peking was expelled recently, while the only representative of the New China News Agency in France and the press attaché of the Chinese embassy here ostentatiously returned home at the beginning of the riots.)

Even the much-celebrated pluralism of the revolutionary Left turned out to be a bane in disguise for the government. The chronic feuding between the two main Trotskyite factions—the Frankists and Lambertists—in the French student movement helped to create the campus climate of violence and fanaticism in which every kind of extremism flourishes, while the multiple rivalries within the leftist camp as a whole incited each group to outdo all the others in militancy. Finally, the leadership of the major student and university teachers' unions, which at the beginning had at least given the appearance of being relatively responsible, was pushed into intransigence and extremism to avoid losing all influence over the mob. After the savage street fighting of May 10, which erupted when the student and faculty demonstrators started tearing up the streets of the Latin Quarter to erect no less than sixty barricades, *Le Monde* interviewed the leaders of the student-professor soviet that had organized the evening's demonstration—ostensibly a nonviolent protest against the government's refusal to accept the students' earlier ultimatum. The tension in the air was such, the demonstration organ-

izers coolly explained to *Le Monde's* reporter, that it was necessary to keep the demonstrators occupied. “If the crowd hadn't been busy throwing up barricades,” the reporter was told, “we wouldn't have been able to prevent them from attacking the police.” (In the end, of course, it was the police who had to attack the barricade to prevent a whole quarter of Paris from becoming an insurrectionary redoubt.) *Le Monde's* article, while generally more critical of the government than of the demonstrators, felt that on the specific issue of the barricade-building the arguments of their leaders were “not wholly convincing.”

All in all, the Left Bank uprisings furnished a classic illustration of how governments and social systems often come to grief at the hands of revolutionary forces whose existence they scarcely suspect. The government made all the textbook mistakes, from neglecting the real and often legitimate grievances of its students and young people generally to miscalculating their reaction to a provocative but unimpressive show of force. While the mob behaved in exactly the way any student of Le Bon, Jung, or Trotsky might have expected, professional politicians—including some Gaullist ones—and most labor leaders tried hard to prove they were more than ever the true heirs of the Bourbons who had learned nothing and forgotten nothing from the downfall of the Fourth Republic ten years before. Their only interest seemed to be in how the riots could most effectively be exploited to weaken and if possible overthrow the Pompidou government.

In the intellectual community a substantial minority of professors, writers, and others more or less frankly sided with the revolutionaries. A symmetrical minority that before the crisis had been bleating for government action to protect them from student insolence began bleating about police brutality as soon as the government acted, while the majority simply manifested their incorrigible irresponsibility, though often with a certain measure of courage and dignity.

At a particularly critical moment in the crisis, René Maheu, Director General of UNESCO (where Professor

Herbert Marcuse and a group of philosophers were holding a timely international symposium on Marx), made a public statement that appeared to confer a kind of global validity on the sick-society argument used by some of the student activists and their adult apologists to justify their revolt. "Those who are concerned with youth," said Maheu, "must henceforth expect to be confronted with a radical questioning of the world in its present state. May governments, teachers, parents, and public opinion realize this while there is still time."

THE most disturbing symptom of

all was the apparent moral and political neutralism—whether viewed as between order and disorder or as between justice and blind repression—displayed by what appeared to a large front of the French middle and upper middle classes. The descendants of the implacable bourgeoisie that in 1848 applauded General Cavaignac's ruthless suppression of proletarian insurrection—virtually on the same spot as many of this month's barricades—and in 1871 approved the massacre of the Communards, played it cooler this time. At the peak of the street battles, such bourgeois Parisians could often be observed leaning out of their balconies—if they were high enough above the tear-gas fog—not exactly cheering the rioters on but tepidly waving encouragement to them, as long as it was the neighbors' cars they were turning over and setting on fire for their barricades. For a number of Frenchmen, apparently, defending the social order by lawful force is passé, like resisting aggression abroad or for that matter at home.

Perhaps the student revolt, for all its irrational and barbarian violence, was healthier than some of the reactions it provoked among adult members of society, in France and in other western countries too.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1968

STUDENT RIVALRY FLARES IN JAPAN

A Power Struggle Between
Factions Adds to Violence

By ROBERT TRUMBULL

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, June 29 — Rivalry among radical campus factions, each trying to seize the leadership of rebellious youth, has led to the violence of the student demonstrations in the streets of Japanese cities this year.

This aspect, and not the violence itself, authorities say, is the latest development in the student movement. And not all of the current Japanese student disorders directly involve politics. Some are purely campus matters, such as protests against fees.

According to the police, what begins as a routine anti-American demonstration these days often deteriorates into a bloody brawl between the pro-Communist wing of Zengakuren, the National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations and an anarchical group that the pro-Communists consider too radical.

It is these ultraleftists, as they are called, and not the pro-Communists, who have been most prominent recently in the movement against the mutual security treaty between the United States and Japan. Their leader is thin, fast-talking Katsuyuki Akiyama, a 25-year-old

former student of the Yokohama National University.

The anarchical organization is a coalition of three student groups that have broken away from Communist Party guidance. It is called Sampa Rengo, or three-faction alliance. Its aims are said to be simply the destruction of the existing order. Adding further to the confusion, the three factions in Sampa Rengo sometimes fight among themselves.

Believing that rebellious students will follow the group that gets the most publicity, the factions compete with each other in staging noisy and violent demonstrations, always with a strong anti-American tint.

Unwelcome Participants

The students, throwing stones and wielding sharp-edged poles in battles with the police, are often unwelcome participants in rallies begun in a more orderly way by older and calmer protesters, such as the leftist labor unions and the Socialist Party.

Injuries to uninvolved onlookers and damage to property caused by the students have made leftist rallies unpopular with the general public since the young radicals have moved in.

Some observers, noting that the students who participated in violent tactics numbered only a few thousand at most, said that the outbreaks created an exaggerated impression of Japanese leftists and of the opposition to the security treaty with the United States.

It is taken for granted by Japanese security authorities that the most violent campus groups are financed by the Chinese Communist Party, which is at odds with the Communist Party of Japan. Student

demonstrators are said to receive payments of \$2.75 for each appearance in an anti-American rally.

This spring, the students have marched in such causes as protests against the arrival of nuclear-powered vessels of the United States at Japanese ports, the location of a United States Army hospital in Tokyo for treating casualties from Vietnam and the movement of fuel for United States military planes on Japanese railroads.

Not Without Effect

The protests have not been without effect. Visits by nuclear-powered vessels have been halted for the time being. Fuel-carrying trains have been held up. And there plans have been discussed to relocate the Tokyo hospital. The busy American air installation at Itazuke, in Kyusu island, in Southern Japan, is to be moved to a new site as a result of fairly widespread opposition to United States bases in the area.

However, besides the politically-oriented outbreaks in the streets, there have been many violent student demonstrations confined to campuses in purely intramural causes.

Thousands of students at Tokyo University, often called the Harvard of Japan, have protested against the administration's disciplinary measures by taking over buildings in the manner of the students at Columbia. The uproar stemmed originally from a new system of hospital internship that was not to the liking of medical students.

Students of Nihon University, a private institution in Tokyo, have been staging sit-ins and imprisoning administration officials in their offices,

in a protest against the manner in which the institution's funds have been used.

An administration decision to build a new library at Toyo University in Tokyo, instead of a student hall, has led to riotous scenes on the institution's campus.

While there is a tendency to relate these developments to student unrest in other countries, the fact is that such outbreaks are neither new or unusual here. Eight years ago this month, students were in the forefront of disorders that brought down the Government of Premier Nobusuke Kishi and forced the cancellation of a visit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1968

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

Student Unrest Plagues Latin America

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, June 29— Latin America, isolated by geography and tradition from most of the great upheavals of the rest of the world, has succumbed to what one exasperated official terms the "international student plague."

In Rio de Janeiro, the city of Sugarloaf mountain and the samba, students and policemen have been fighting a battle that some observers believe could spread to other parts of Brazil.

In Montevideo, the beautiful capital of Uruguay, students using park benches as shields engage in almost daily skirmishes with mounted policemen.

Cities in Argentina, Ecuador and Chile have seen the use of tear gas in recent weeks as students have burned buses, smashed windows and clashed with the police.

Attributions Vary

The unrest in the region is variously ascribed by Government officials to international Communism, Yankee immorality and the over-all degeneration of the world.

In fact, although the student upheavals in Europe and the United States of recent months undoubtedly served as models for events here, there is a peculiarly Latin-American quality in the new disorders.

Eduardo V., a second-year medical student at Buenos Aires University, tentatively heaved a rock at a distant group of pursuing policemen, and then darted into a back street as fast as he could.

He conceded later that he had thrown the rock more as an act of solidarity with fellow students, who were also throwing and running, than as an expression of fervent hatred for the police and the system they represent.

Student Faces Dilemma

Reports from correspondents of The New York Times in Latin America indicate that the Buenos Aires student, in common with hundreds of thousands of students throughout the continent, faces a dilemma.

On one hand, he feels he must maintain his status with fellow students caught up in the struggle. On the other, the rigid norms of a traditionalist society can impose a penalty far more serious than a police

beating or brief jail sentence.

To have been born into a middle-class or upper-class Latin-American family usually confers the financial privilege of a higher education and an eventual position of social standing.

But that privilege can be withdrawn from students who riot or oppose the established order of things too vigorously. While liberal thinking has taken root in Latin America, the continent's conservative churchmen, politicians, businessmen and professionals remain ascendant nearly everywhere.

'Death If You Drop Out'

"I want changes in the Argentine Government and the way it's running our universities," Eduardo said. "But I'm not willing to sacrifice my chance to become a respected doctor in this society."

Another student added: "I have the impression that 'dropping out' is something accepted and respectable in America. Here, it's death. If you drop out, about the only thing left is to look for some guerrilla group out in the hills, or else leave Latin America."

Certainly, many of the goals of restive Latin-American students coincide with those of their contemporaries elsewhere. The alleviation of economic hardship in a period of inflation throughout Latin America is one.

The Brazilian Government announced Thursday that "university reform and the revision of education at all levels is a matter of urgency." The statement was issued, apparently, as the result of the popular support shown earlier in the week for student demonstrations.

Bus Fare an Issue

In Ecuador, the riots began when students demonstrated unsuccessfully for a 50 per cent reduction of bus fares, and students in Uruguay took to the streets when Montevideo bus fares were increased.

A more important motive is similar to the one that moved students to action at Columbia University in New York — a drive for participation in university administration.

Paradoxically, the tradition of student participation in university government is probably older in Latin America than anywhere else in the world.

A wave of student riots in the Argentine university city

of Córdoba in 1918 led to concessions both by the liberal Government of that period and the university that set a pattern throughout Latin America. Students, alumni and university officials were given an equal number of votes in all administrative decisions, and universities became "autonomous". Autonomy meant that a university campus was off-limits to any police or Government incursion, and the university had somewhat the same status as a church or diplomatic mission.

Autonomy Fades

But over the years, this autonomy and the power of the Latin-American student has eroded almost to nonexistence.

The Venezuelan Government placed restrictions on Central University in Caracas in 1966 when it was discovered that the campus was being used as a rest camp for Communist guerrillas and that the students were spending weekends out in the hills with the guerrillas.

Last year, Mexican paratroops put an end to the inviolability of the campus in that country by moving into Morelia University, to end a month's-old student strike.

When the present military Government of Argentina came to power in a coup d'état in 1966, one of its first acts was to abolish university autonomy, outlaw any form of campus politics and impose strict controls over the students and faculty.

Anniversary Year

This month, in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of university autonomy, Argentine students mounted anti-Government demonstrations in at least three cities. Even though local judges in Rosario and La Plata had issued permits for the student demonstrations, the police moved in with clubs and tear gas, beating students, bystanders, and two judges who had come to intervene on the students' behalf.

With uniformed policemen actually stationed in many classrooms, the student campaign came to a sudden halt, and for the moment Argentine students limit themselves to throwing occasional firecrackers.

Chilean students pushed for similar university changes last month, and succeeded. After seizing most of the major university buildings as well as one of Santiago's two television

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stations. they resisted a police siege for days.

In the end, the police battered their way onto the campuses, but students won for themselves roughly a quarter of the votes allotted for administrative decisions.

Anti-Americanism Present

Latin-American students generally admire the late Ernesto Che Guevara and Colombia's guerrilla priest, Camilo Torres, who was killed in a government ambush.

There is also a strong undertone of anti-Americanism, which frequently comes to the fore in completely unrelated demonstrations and riots, as it did in the recent attack on the United States Embassy in Rio. Anti-American feeling among Panama's students resulted in the severe riots in the Canal Zone in 1964.

The sentiments that led students in Peru and elsewhere to shower Vice President Richard M. Nixon with garbage and insults a decade ago are still very much alive. But while the Communist parties of Latin America are always alert for the possibility of turning a student demonstration into anti-American propaganda, Communist leaders are frequently out-

flanked, embarrassed and puzzled by the students themselves.

Disagree With Party

Most of Latin America's Communist parties, including the powerful Chilean Communist party, follow the Moscow line, which rejects violent revolution in Latin America and frowns on the likes of Fidel Castro, Guevara and Mao Tse-tung.

"We stand against Yankee imperialism," a young Chilean ultraleftist said recently. "And we are ready to fight it with strikes, stones or bullets. The Communists are only interested in staying out of trouble and getting along with the Government. Both we and the Communists are Marxist, but there our friendship ends."

Certainly, however, the political thinking of Latin-American fathers is at least to some extent reflected in the actions of their student sons and daughters.

In Rio, office workers have joined students in pelting the police with flying objects. In Argentina, members of political parties, all of which were outlawed when the military Government came to power, have

sons who are students to help register their dissatisfaction.

Two Exceptions

But evidently autocratic governments are not the only source of political discontent among the students. Chile and Uruguay, two democratic exceptions to the Latin-American pattern of authoritarian government, also have had student upheavals.

Some observers feel that there is a certain need in Latin-American students to "keep up with the Joneses" — the students in the United States and Europe.

No charismatic international student leaders of the stature of Daniel Cohn-Bendit have emerged anywhere in Latin America. The students also lack such philosophic ideologues as Herbert Marcuse, whose name in Latin America is virtually unknown.

Student insurrection, while serious and bloody in some countries, may die out in Latin America as quickly as it started. The students as well as the region remain essentially isolated from both the good and evil of movements in the rest of the world.

Excerpts from an article of the 20 May issue of BARRON'S:

But the long-range objective of SDS is even more sinister. As a sympathetic article in The New Republic (May 11, 1968) states: "The point of the game was power. And in the broadest sense, to the most radical members of the SDS Steering Committee, Columbia itself was not the issue. It was revolution, and if it could be shown that a great university could literally be taken over in a matter of days by a well-organized group of students, then no university was secure. Everywhere the purpose was to destroy institutions of the American Establishment, in the hope that out of the chaos a better America would emerge."

* * *

The rebels have no patience for any slow process of change. They are tired of "just talk"—they want "action now." They will tolerate no opposition. They are indifferent to the fact that their tactics will destroy Columbia University by driving out the best minds, just as Nazi terror tactics drove the Jewish intellectuals out of the universities of Germany. But there is a crucial difference now. While men like Einstein could escape to England or America during the Thirties, SDS will try to close all avenues of escape. The use of intimidation and force will spread until there will be no sanctuary for men of reason within the academic world, or, ultimately, within the nation. One need only consider the fate of conservatives and liberals alike in countries which have been overrun by SDS' intellectual mentors: Mao's China and Castro's Cuba.

Since SDS tactics have succeeded in crippling a great university, the next targets can be City Hall, the State Capitol, or even the White House. If this prediction seems alarmist, consider the fact that SDS sympathizers known as "Yips"

pies" already have announced plans to intimidate and disrupt the Democratic National Convention in Chicago this summer, in order to extract concessions on platform and candidates.

Whatever the final outcome of the Columbia strike, one thing is certain: the methods used at Columbia will be embraced by other student leftists on campuses throughout the country. Those who resort to force will justify their tactics by the same arguments advanced by the Columbia rebels and their apologists. If this national menace is to be checked, it is imperative that one know how to answer them.

1) Some rebels claim that none of their tactics involved the use of force. This was true only in the narrow sense that they did not shed blood. But force was inextricably involved in every act that they perpetrated. They held the Associate Dean as hostage against his will—that was force. They barricaded faculty and students from their offices and classrooms—that was force. They seized property which was not rightfully theirs and refused to release it until their demands were met—that was force. Each of these is punished as an act of force under the civil laws of our society. They are the crimes known as false imprisonment, criminal trespass and extortion.

If these acts were perpetrated by a lone individual, their criminal character would be obvious. If a single felon had held the dean hostage, or seized the office of President Kirk, rifled his desk and copied his files, no one would have confused him with an idealistic, "committed" crusader. On an individual basis, if someone demands that you grant him wealth or power that he has not earned and which he can only obtain by threats of violence,

one does not doubt for a moment that he is an extortionist. The act of a lone thug does not become legitimized when he teams up with other hoodlums. As Ayn Rand noted in "Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal," no individual can acquire rights by joining a gang. "Rights are not a matter of numbers—and there can be no such thing, in law or in morality, as actions forbidden to an individual, but permitted to a mob."

2) Other rebels admit that they used force, but claim that force is justified when peaceful tactics fail. The fundamental political principle that all men must respect is that no individual or group may initiate the use of force for any purpose whatsoever. To accept SDS' alternative amounts to carte blanche for violence, and invites the complete breakdown of the rule of law.

To understand the grotesque irrationality of SDS' argument, consider the following. Imagine that there were a student chapter at Columbia of the Ku Klux Klan, which was protesting the proposed use of the new gym by Negroes. They tried, through campus rallies and petitions, to arouse the students, faculty and administration to support their demands, but their peaceful tactics failed. If this group then proceeded to seize university buildings and hold members of the administration as hostages, would anyone have condoned their use of force, or have called for negotiations and compromise? The principle is the same: the initiation of force to achieve one's political objectives is both immoral and illegal, regardless of whether the initials of the aggressors are KKK or SDS.

3) The rebels claim they were justified in using force because the administration had refused to give them a

hearing on their demands for change. A university, like a well-run business, should be interested in knowing whether it is satisfying its customers. If it provides students with incompetent faculty, or poor laboratories or libraries, or supports political policies which they oppose, it is in the university's self-interest to maintain open channels of communication so that grievances can be expressed and remedial actions considered. Students who are dissatisfied with any aspect of a university's policies have a right to peacefully protest and petition, and even, in extreme situations, to boycott classes or organize a student strike. But they have no right to compel anyone to listen to their demands, nor a right to force other people to go on strike with them by prohibiting access to classes or by creating a general climate of terror to intimidate those who would oppose them.

4) The rebels claim that since force is justified when peaceful tactics fail, they should be granted full amnesty. The single best answer to this argument is provided by Professor Leonard Peikoff in his forthcoming book, "Nazism and Contemporary America: the Ominous Parallels," who says: "The demand for amnesty on principle is the demand for the abdication on principle of legal authority; it is a demand for the formal sanction in advance of all future acts of force and violence, for the promise that such acts may be perpetrated hereafter with impunity. It is a demand to institutionalize the appeasement of brute force as a principle of civil policy in this county."

5) The rebels claim that police represent violence, and therefore should not be used on a college campus which is a citadel of reason and persuasion. Here the rebels evade the fact that they were the ones who first resorted to violence. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

lice whose function it is to retaliate with force to restore peace and to protect the rights of the victims.

6) The rebels claim that their quarrel with the administration was purely an internal dispute, hence the introduction of police represents meddlesome interference by outsiders. By the same reasoning, one could just as well conclude that if workers seize a factory, customers seize a store, or tenants seize an apartment building, these, too, are internal matters and do not justify calling in the police. In reason there can be no such concept as an "internal dispute" which allows someone to be victimized and prevented from calling the police. Those who violate property rights are scarcely in a position to claim that their conquered territory is "private property" upon which police may not enter.

7) Rebels should not be criminally prosecuted. After all, they are students, not criminals. One need only remember that it was Nazi students who set fire to university libraries and terrorized professors. Being a student does not grant one an exemption from the laws which prohibit attacks on human life and property. The rebels acted like criminals and should be punished as such.

8) It is impractical to suspend or expel the student rebels because there are so many of them. This amounts to saying that if a sufficiently large mob breaks the law or violates individual right, it will be immune from punishment. If this principle is accepted, then every law-breaker will be safe from prosecution if he can find enough members for his gang. This will provide the leader with an absolutely irresistible recruitment device, and invite the outbreak of a reign of terror.

9) Admittedly the rebels violated property rights, but calling in the police could result in injury or loss of life, which is more important

than loss of property. This argument amounts to saying that the lives of aggressors are more important than the property of victims. In addition, this would mean that the police should not restrain rioting mobs from looting stores, or interfere with the KKK when it uses fire-bombs on Negro churches. On this principle, any victim of theft or expropriation would be advised to surrender his property—his wallet or warehouse—without resistance, lest the thief be hurt in the struggle. Acceptance of this principle would make every individual the defenseless target for any vandal or socialist.

The Columbia crisis vitally affects the life of every American. No one's life or property can be secure in a society which tolerates the use of force by any group to achieve its goals. And no one will be safe as long as college and civil authorities persist in their policy of answering aggression with appeasement.

Now is the time for intelligent counter-action. One means is to withhold financial support from colleges which condone or compromise with student terror tactics. A second is to write to the president and trustees of colleges urging that they endorse the following position: that their institution offers no sanctuary to any group which advocates the initiation of physical force, and that they will act immediately and without hesitation to expel and criminally prosecute any student guilty of such tactics.

Men need to live by the guidance of rational principles and to resolve their disagreements peacefully. It is both immoral and impractical to abandon principles in a time of crisis, and then hope to survive on the basis of pragmatic expediency and cowardly compromise. Each time that a violation of individual rights is tolerated, it serves as an invitation for future violations. A society cannot survive unless men of reason rally to its de-

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August 1968

How Goes MAO Tse-tung's Great
Cultural Revolution

In late June 1968, Hong Kong provided unique testimony on the progress of the Great Cultural Revolution as more than 50 bodies drifted out of China into Hong Kong and Macao territorial waters via the Pearl River. The majority of the bodies were bound and many, despite an advanced state of decomposition, still bore signs of gun shot wounds, burns and cuts. These grim discoveries, added to numerous earlier reports of violent clashes taking place in such cities as Canton, provincial capital of Kwangtung, are considered by many China watchers as evidence of a new stage of turmoil in Communist China. Speculation is that the bodies are vanquished members of one of the various political factions currently at loggerheads in China.

Possible Dissension in Communist China's Army

Political groups are not the only major element in China's power structure riddled by factionalism. In recent weeks there has been growing evidence of dissension in China's standing army ... hitherto the major stabilizing force in the nation. Military units are known to have fired on one another on at least three separate occasions. It is also known that from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, particularly at the higher levels of command, the professional elite of the army has bitterly resented the political role the army has been forced to play in trying to repair the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. Command conditions have worsened during this period to the point where today political commissars outnumber commanders in some units. In two newly formed revolutionary committees (comprised of extremist elements, such as Red Guards, and local elements of the Party and the army) in Kiangsi and Chekiang, senior army officers head each committee and the vice chairman are commanders. This tendency for army involvement in, and frequent domination of, the revolutionary committees has been a cause of resentment and in-fighting among committee members in a number of areas. With Peking's order that many more revolutionary committees be organized in the provinces, the possibilities for additional discord seem excellent. So excellent, in fact, that it is rumored that Chairman Mao is already considering purging the revolutionary committees recently established in 22 provinces.

Problems in Industry, Transportation and Foreign Trade

Factional clashes are also occurring in factories all over China and rival labor groups, along with warring Red Guards (products of China's erratically operating educational system), have continued to hamper Communist China's rail, road and air transportation as well as marine shipping from a number of China's ports. This turbulence, together with apprehension about future turmoil, is believed to be a major factor in the drop in Moscow's trade with Peking since the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Total Sino-Soviet trade last year, according to Moscow, amounted to \$107 million, compared with \$318.4 million in 1966. Moscow's

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7
 23 July 1968

U.S. Study Reveals Damage of Mao's Revolution to Economy

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, July 22—

The Chinese economy appears to face serious problems largely as a result of the disruptions caused by Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's turbulent Cultural Revolution over the past 18 months.

An official study made available today by the U.S. Consulate General here has concluded that Red China's agricultural and industrial production, hit by the cumulative effects of Mao's campaign, are likely to drop this year.

Evidence indicates that some national defense industries have been hurt by strikes, disputes between rival factions and other ferment.

The study also suggested that China's foreign trade, which fell last year for the first time since 1960, will continue its decline.

At the same time, the report said, the purge of several key policymakers as well as divergencies within Peking's present leadership group have evidently led to a suspension of economic planning for the future.

Citing authoritative Chinese sources, the study estimated that production of wheat, rice and other grains probably reached about 200 million tons last year, the highest output since 1958.

So far this year, however, the agricultural outlook is dimmer—partly because of poor weather and partly because peasants subjected to less rigid controls apparently neglected to repair and maintain dikes and irrigation facilities in many areas.

Extensive floods, described as the worst in a century, are estimated to have reduced rice yields in south China's Kwangtung Province by some 10 to 15 per cent. Drought in the

north reportedly cut into the winter wheat crop.

Chemical fertilizer imports from Japan and Western Europe rose appreciably in 1967, presumably to offset a fall in domestic output.

The U.S. study says breakdowns in controls have impeded government procurement of grains, cotton and other products earmarked for the state. Peasants in many localities are reportedly hoarding cereals or black marketing them.

There are no signs of famine, yet reliable accounts from Kwangtung Province, adjacent to Hong Kong, tell of shortages of meat, cooking oil and all but coarse grains.

That Peking has built up food reserves from past years is mirrored in the decline of its wheat imports from a record high of 6.4 million tons in 1964 to 4.3 million tons last year.

The amount of grain Peking intends to buy abroad this year is still unknown. Having sustained a trade deficit of nearly \$400 million in 1967, the Chinese may be inclined to scale down their wheat purchases.

Peking's trade with Japan, Hong Kong, West Germany and Great Britain, its major commercial partners, has already dropped more than 25 per cent this year, suggesting that the Chinese are striving to economize on imports and lack export goods.

The study estimated that China's industrial production fell about 15 per cent in 1967 because of transport tie-ups, coal shortages, labor problems and administrative troubles.

Production of coal, which fuels China's railways and most of its power plants, probably dropped more than 20 per cent as a result of clashes between rival labor

Similar fights at industrial centers like Wuhan, on the Yangtze River, and Anshan in the northeast are believed to have adversely affected outputs of iron, steel, machine tools and heavy equipment.

Scarcities of consumer items such as cigarettes, candles, soap and toothpaste indicate a slowdown in light industry. In many parts of China, the 1968 cloth ration has not yet been issued.

While little is known about China's defense industries, recent official statements warning Red Guards and other activists to refrain from agitating in "top-security units of the state" suggest that these may have been disrupted to some extent.

The study said the Cultural Revolution is bound to have the effect of postponing China's development plans.

The Third Five-Year Plan has evidently been shelved. As for any policy making, the U.S. report said:

"Annual planning is probably also in disarray, and it is doubtful if any of the plans at the local levels, including those for specific enterprises or industries, have been integrated into a national plan."

With an end to violence and improved weather, the study said, the economy might reach 1966 levels this year. But at present, it added, the economy "seems to be moving like a riderless horse, in uncertain starts and halts."

27 June 1968

Grim evidence hints new Red China strife

By John Hughes
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Communist China appears to be starting on a new stage of turmoil.

Leftist, pro-Mao Tse-tung forces apparently are eliminating members of revolutionary committees in some of China's 29 provinces and autonomous regions whose militant support of Chairman Mao is less than satisfactory.

Grim evidence of the strife this is causing has washed up on Hong Kong's shores.

In the past few days a number of bodies, dressed in blue Chinese-type suits and bound with ropes, have been discovered in the colony's territorial waters.

It is inferred that the bodies washed down the Pearl River from China are victims of new violence in Kwangtung Province. This explanation is supported by the discovery of another such body in Macao, the Portuguese enclave on the other side of the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong.

Speculation is that the bodies are either those of refugees, caught and killed while trying to flee China or of members of one of the various political factions currently at Loggerheads in China.

Discovery of the bodies follows persistent reports of fighting in Kwangtung Province, the southern Chinese province with a population of about 40 million, which abuts Hong Kong.

The situation in Kwangtung is complicated by serious flooding following heavy rains which have been drenching southern China and Hong Kong during this sultry monsoon season.

The combination of violence, floods, and possible disruption of food supplies has spurred an exodus from some troubled areas of Kwangtung. Chinese border guards reportedly have been dealing harshly with some would-be refugees, and in Hong Kong gunfire has been heard from the Chinese side of the border.

There are enough corroborating reports to indicate violent clashes are taking place in such cities as Canton, the provincial capital of Kwangtung. There, two rival groups supporting Chairman Mao apparently have been fighting each other, while a third anti-Maoist faction has been sniping away at each of them.

There are reasonably reliable reports that armored cars of the Chinese Army have been in action against students in Canton, killing some 10 of them.

But the problem for the China watcher barred from visiting China is to gauge the real extent of the disorder and to sift fact from rumor and exaggeration as it is carried back across the border by inexpert observers.

The Chinese Communist regime is itself, for instance, referring to "civil war" in various parts of China. But veterans of the China scene are cautious in their interpretation of the phrase. In the strident and colorful language of China it may not have the same meaning as in English translation.

The phrase has been used before to denote factional strife rather than full-scale civil war.

What is clear is that the so-called leftist faction in China, symbolized by Chairman Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, is pressing its campaign against rightist and more conservative elements. Bitter clashes, and bloodshed, are admitted. But whether this has yet become "civil war" in the Western-understood sense is a moot point.

One right-wing Hong Kong newspaper avers that the Mayor of Canton, Tsang Sun, fled his city earlier this month and was smuggled aboard the Soviet ship Baikal in Hong Kong. The ship calls regularly at Hong Kong as the terminal point of its route from Japan and Soviet Far-Eastern ports.

Mr. Tsang has been under criticism from Red Guard units in Canton and is a former political lieutenant of Tao Chu, the former governor of Kwangtung Province denounced for opposition to Chairman Mao.

Toward the end of last year, following a violent summer in which some parts of China bordered on anarchy, the extremists on the left were reined in. The Army and Premier Chou En-lai, in a coalition of moderate forces, appeared to take control and to be bent on restoring order.

Since March of this year, however, the leftists, under the banner of Mr. Mao himself, his wife Chiang Ching, and his designated successor, Marshal Lin Piao, have renewed their offensive.

Probably their aim is to purify and refine into more militant form the "Revolutionary committees" which have been set up.

The revolutionary committees are three-pronged councils consisting of local military officials, revolutionary rebels and party cadres. Their installation in theory means a province has declared itself loyal to Chairman Mao.

Peking Foreign Ministry's struggle for power

By RICHARD HARRIS

Red Guard news sheets recently smuggled from Canton to Hong-kong throw interesting light on the circumstances of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in the past 10 months, including such incidents as the burning of the British mission in Peking on August 22, 1967, and the attacks on Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister.

Within the Foreign Ministry there was, as in every other Ministry in Peking, a left-wing "rebel" faction leading a revolt against those accused of bourgeois thought. However, during the critical period in the early autumn of last year, when an extreme left-wing group of the cultural revolution leadership proposed to attack "capitalist-roaders" in the Army, there was something of a *volte-face* and one by one the extreme leftists disappeared from office and have been open to the scurrilous attack of the news sheets.

Error admitted

The leading leftist was Wang Li, a hero at the time of the Wuhan incident last July. It was allegedly in his service that Mr. and Mrs. Israel Shapiro, Mr. and Mrs. David Crook, Mr. Sidney Rittenberg and other foreigners working for the Chinese cause, have found themselves in trouble and it is believed, are now in detention of some kind.

Another link was one of the extreme left leaders in the Foreign Ministry, Yao Teng-shan. Of him one of the news sheets says: "Yao personally commanded the (leftist)

liaison post publicly to resist the instruction given by the leading comrades of the Central Committee and set fire to the office of the X Chargé d'Affaires in China, thus causing a very abominable effect in the international sphere."

(The habit of using X for countries or parts of names in China is much like the old *Punch* habit; no one has any difficulty in knowing what is referred to.)

This private admission of error has never occasioned any apology to Britain, although it was known at the time that Chou-En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, quickly intervened in the affairs of the Foreign Ministry, and suppressed the influence of the extreme leftists responsible.

However, leftists survived in the ministry and there was a clash earlier this year. It had seemed at the end of last year that Chen Yi, under serious attack all through 1967, had at last been cleared by the personal intervention of Mao—but the Ministry's leftists were not appeased.

At the same time the Communist Party committee within the Ministry—which included many senior members, while the left group tended to be younger, non-party members—turned to the defence of their Minister. Ninety-one of them—including almost all serving ambassadors, who had been recalled to China and have not yet returned to their posts, together with the heads of most departments—drew up a "big character poster" defending Chen Yi and rebutting the charges of the left-wingers.

Loyalty to Mao

The document affirms their complete loyalty to Mao Tse-tung's line on foreign policy and describes the leftists as "capitalist-roaders". The one Chinese Ambassador known to be still in his post, Chen Chia-kang in Cairo, is so labelled and attacked by his colleagues.

They take up the charges made against Chen Yi point by point and show how they have been twisted by his opponents. The language used is entirely that of the rebels, consequently those they attack must be attacked as rightists masquerading as leftists; "they mistakenly believe that the more left they go the more revolutionary they will be, and the higher the key of their tune the stronger will be their spirit of rebellion. They are inclined towards anarchism."

The document charges the leftists with setting the Ministry on an evil road and causing irreparable damage. At one time the leftists intended to parade Chen Yi through the streets and hold a "struggle" meeting against him, but this was stopped by Chou En-lai. Still the leftists were not satisfied. They "turned Chinese embassies in foreign countries into a mess"—no doubt leading to such a fracas as London saw in Portland Place—and paid no heed to Chou.

They "usurped the powers of the centre respecting foreign relations", stole secret files, gained access to confidential personnel records, tried to close down the party committee within the Ministry, and "slandrously accused the Foreign Ministry of carrying out a revisionist foreign policy line."

Guerrilla veteran

Two deputy ministers were attacked by the leftists—Chi Peng-fei and Chiao Kuan-hau—and they are defended by the 91. Among those they charge with being leaders of the left group there is one other ambassador, Liu Hsiao, who has been in Moscow. His qualifications to represent China in Moscow when he was appointed in the late fifties were hard to discover. He seemed to be a veteran of guerrilla fighting and was perhaps chosen at a time when the Sino-Soviet dispute was becoming acute and Mao needed a trustworthy champion in Moscow. In fact Liu's actual presence in Moscow was even rarer than most Chinese ambassadors.

The 91 may have felt that the tide was turning in their favour. They were disastrously mistaken. Their

accusations proved to be most unwelcome to Chou En-lai when they were made public in February. Three weeks later a sharp rap came from him. The 91 were told they were really trying to protect themselves under the guise of defending Chen Yi. They appeared to be left but were right in essence. They would have to remould themselves well in future or they might not have a future. Indeed, by protecting Chen Yi they had actually helped the enemy.

There followed a short sermon on the true purposes of the cultural revolution which the 91 seemed not to have apprehended. A few of them "even cherished hatred and class opposition". As for the party committee in the Ministry, it was simply beyond saving if it did not "begin struggle".

Vitriolic words

This rebuff might well mean nothing more than that Chou found himself somewhat embarrassed by the document. The language used by all sides in the cultural revolution, larded with the most fervent support for Mao, can be vitriolic in criticism without meaning very much.

However, in this case a rebuff to the memorialists from Chou was not enough. It was necessary for Chen Yi to put himself right with Chou and then to return to yet another self-examination to prove his loyalty.

In his letter to the Prime Minister Chen Yi refers to a statement made by Ta-lien-chou—this being the preparatory group for the leftist takeover of the Ministry—which includes "combat teams" in embassies abroad. This seems adequately to describe some member of the mission in Portland Place.

the failings of his bourgeois world outlook, thanks Mao profusely for the unrelenting assistance he has given him in his efforts to struggle against these influences, disowns the effort of the 91 in his defence, and agrees with Chou's criticisms of them—"As their leader, I am responsible for the mistakes they have made." All this comes from the former commander of one of the five field armies, which swept through China in 1948 and 1949 to bring the Communist Party to power.

At much greater length, Chen Yi then has to make his further confession, in which he reveals that he had been through this particular mill seven times during August and September last year. He had always supported the outlook of the 91 and had criticized the young rebels.

Airport incident

In some incident at Peking Airport in February he had openly scolded the rebels and had raved and ranted. At another self-examination in January this year he had said he had been forced into making the confession; to have said this was "the height of folly".

However much the 91 are castigated, it seems they can yet recover their positions and go abroad again. This, of course, was said last March and it was then forecast that heads of mission would be back at their posts by the end of April but so far as is known none of them has gone abroad again. Moreover in the past three months China has swung to the left again, giving new encouragement for extremism.

Nevertheless, Chen Yi seems to have survived. He has lately been playing host to President Nyerere of Tanzania. His self-examination must have passed muster—at least with the exception of one sentence where he says poring over books is no way to solve problems, because they embody the experience of other people and are therefore only good for reference. The kindly Chou En-lai drew attention to the errors of this view and the sentence was withdrawn.

There is, after all, one book that may only embody the experience of one man but nevertheless proposes to solve the problems of all the world.

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
25 June 1968

25 VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE

WITH reports of continuing violence in Canton and other parts of Kwangtung province it was hardly surprising that when nine bodies were found bound and trussed and floating in Hongkong waters yesterday the immediate conclusion was that they were victims of that violence. How they met their deaths has yet to be made known and a post-mortem examination carried out by the Hongkong authorities may shed a little more light on the mystery. There have been reports recently from various sources suggesting that escapees from China are now being shot and from the bound state of the bodies it would seem that they could be either people caught trying to escape or victims of the faction fighting that has been renewed in and around Canton. With the south-westerly winds of the last few weeks it is a reasonable assumption that the bodies could have floated in from the south-west. Another body was later found in Macao waters which tends to confirm the belief that these were not local people.

It would not surprise anyone who has followed the tracts and news sheets put out by red guard factions in Canton that violence had reached the scale where victims were left unburied. Moreover, the recent heavy rains that have affected not only Hongkong but parts of the south-east coast of China have caused floods in many districts in Kwangtung and it is possible that victims of the fighting could have been washed down by flood waters into the Pearl River and out to sea. If these conclusions are substantiated the discovery provides far more vivid evidence of the violence in south China than any traveller's tale or red guard news sheet has yet conveyed. It will be recalled that earlier this year there were reports of an incident in the Pearl River where a boat commanded by one faction rammed the boat of another and fired machine guns at the hapless victims swimming in the sea. Reports of this nature, appearing in propaganda sheets of dubious authorship and with no pretensions to truth, are apt to be treated with reserve. They assume much more ominous proportions when bodies bearing signs of violence are washed up on our shores.

WASHINGTON POST

3 July 1968

*Joseph Alsop*

Power Play by Mao Lieutenants Pushes China Into New Turmoil

For the fourth time in three years, Communist China is in the grip of wide-spread, sanguinary, seemingly uncontrollable civil war. And this time it is harder than ever to believe that what the Chinese call the Mandate of Heaven will not eventually pass from Mao Tse-tung and his disordered, paranoid government.

As on all three previous occasions, Mao himself and the clique of intriguers around him (now really headed by his termagant wife, Chiang Ching) clearly gave the signal for this new collapse into anarchy. It took the customary form of a June 2 edict calling on everyone to heat up the Cultural Revolution again.

The edict's motives, too, were no doubt as before. The fact of the matter is that Chiang Ching, the grim and ruthless Chen Po-ta and the rest of Mao's personal clique cannot hope to survive the old man's death by more than a few weeks, unless they have firmly fastened their claws on power in China before he dies. So they have pushed the old man to try again, as they pushed him to try before.

Judging by all known indicators, however, the prospects of success for the Maoists in this round are very much poorer than in the previous rounds, when they met with almost total failure. Worse still, all the indicators also suggest that it will be immeasurably harder, this time, to achieve the kind of temporary, superficial appeasement in China which terminated the previous rounds of open civil conflict.

This time, in truth, it is not just a matter of hundreds of bodies floating down the Pearl River, from

Canton to the sea; of great factions, such as the East Wind and Red Flag groups in Kwangtung Province, fighting pitched battles with modern weapons secured from army sympathizers; of interruptions in transport and breakdowns of communication.

This time there are darker symptoms, and there are new forces at work. Last summer's good weather prevented food shortages from exaggerating the effects of anarchy. This year, there are fearful floods all over South China.

This year, too, there are new signs—reports of hungry families selling their sons (the going price is around \$45) to the more prosperous, in the old way of China in desperate times; reports, too, of widespread grave-robbing, to secure the pitiful goods the Chinese still lay away with their dead; reports, finally, of severe shortages of many kinds, of machines destroyed in factories by infuriated workers, and of ever-increasing unemployment born of the general economic chaos.

Some things one hears are hard to believe, yet they are well substantiated. The major city of Wuchow, in upper Kwangsi Province, has been half-burned down by the combatants there. In the huge city of Canton, the Public Security Bureaus—the police stations, in short—have closed their doors; and the Public Security men, in terror for their lives, have cast off their uniforms and are masquerading as civilians.

In all this, the army is once again playing a strangely equivocal role. In Kwangtung, the provincial military headquarters still

appears to be aiding the true Maoists of the Red Flag faction, as happened before. But again as happened before, the headquarters of the military region, far more important than the provincial headquarters, is quite openly sustaining the East Wind faction.

In addition, the wicked conservatives and pragmatists, who head the East Wind faction, have been mobilizing the peasantry of Kwangtung. They have in fact been forming the farmers into militia, and leading them to the attack on the towns.

Kwangtung, to be sure, is far the easiest to observe of all the provinces of China. There are indications, though there is no real guarantee, that the Kwangtung situation typifies the general Chinese situation. During the Great Leap Forward and each of the previous plunges into civil conflict, Kwangtung proved to be pretty typical in the end.

God knows, no one on earth, least of all perhaps Mao Tse-tung himself, can judge with real assurance what the outcome will now be. The paper facade of unity behind Mao has not yet been publicly ripped. Many provincial radio stations have ceased to broadcast local news—a sure sign of dire trouble—but they have instead rebroadcast the propaganda gobbledygook of the Peking radio.

The point remains, however, that it is almost against nature for a regime to endure which destroys its own instruments of authority and continuously inflicts on its people what the Chinese people have had to endure in these last lunatic years. So one must wait and see.

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HINDUSTAN TIMES
17 June 1968

China

The War Within the Army

By Frank Robertson

Hong Kong:

THERE is growing evidence, irrefutable in some areas, of dissension in China's standing Army, the one stabilizing force in a nation of 750 million people.

It is known that in three instances recently military units have fired on each other. But the main cause of dissension, at least among the professional elite, is the political role the troops have been forced to play in trying to clear up the mess caused by the cultural revolution.

Only two weeks ago dependants of the 102 divisions comprising the regular force were ordered to withdraw from all mass organizations, the groups from which the cultural revolution gained and for some 18 months maintained its momentum. China's standing ground forces today number around 2,300,000 men and women.

Border Build-up

The withdrawal of their dependants from the mass groups must have come as a nasty shock to Peking, particularly to the Army leader Lin Piao and those around him who are still trying to push through the great proletarian cultural revolution.

Recent fighting in Yunnan Province on the North Vietnam border between units of the 14th Army and other such incidents elsewhere reflects the sharp distinction between those divisions still loyal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Gen. Lin Piao and the majority who want to get on with the business of being fully trained professional soldiers.

Considering the latter category, it is interesting that China's main concentration of land forces is grouped in Northern Manchuria, reflecting the professional belief that the main military threat to China lies in Russia across the Amur River. Neither America nor Formosa, despite the warnings of the cultural revolutionaries, is taken seriously.

The professionals, by now sick and tired of hearing Lin Piao's oft-repeated dictum that the Chinese infantryman is unbeatable at 200 metres, are well aware of the massing Russian strength beyond the Amur and may wonder how they could ever get within 200 metres.

Unity Breaks

The breakdown of Army unity, spurred by dissatisfaction with the disrupting cultural revolution, is also influenced by other factors—old personal loyalties, regional alliances, and the association of those dismissed from power in recent years.

Mao Tse-tung and, more lately, Lin Piao have tried to break up these anti-centralist groupings by diffusion—by transferring key figures from the former elite Fourth Field Army, for example, to the First and vice versa. In much the same way he tried to break down local regionalism by moving civilians about and trying to destroy the deep-seated Chinese Wall psychology by tearing down these physical barriers. In both efforts they have failed.

Never Monolithic

Contrary to general belief the armed structure of China has never been monolithic. There have been too many sackings of key figures in the past to support this convenient theory.

The removal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai, the Defence Minister who was sacked in 1959, although he was by no means the first important figure to go, began the present trend. He wanted a purely professional army; in some units today political commissars outnumber commanders.

Of more recent significance was the summary removal in March of Fu Chung-pi, Peking garrison commander, Yang Cheng Yu, assistant chief of the general staff, and Yen Li-chi, the air force commissar. Apparently they were removed for conspiring to achieve military power.

If this could happen in the capital, it is not difficult to imagine what is happening in such far-away provinces as Kwangsi, Yunnan and, most of all, Szechwan, China's most populous and most dissident province.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that regionalism, warlordism or factionalism is on its way back to China.

YOMIURI, Tokyo
14 May 1968

Rice Exports Ire Chinese Farmers

Hong Kong, May 13 (AP)—Starving farmers in China's Kwangsi Province have formed suicide squads to stop shipment of food from China to North Vietnam, an arrival from the mainland said in Hong Kong today.

The arrival, who said he had been only 300 yards away from one suicide attack, reported seeing five food trucks exploded by suicide bombers as they traveled to North Vietnam.

"More than 20 soldiers who were guarding the trucks were blown to pieces in the explosion following an ambush by the farmers," the arrival said.

"When the trucks reached the road that leads to the China-North Vietnam border, farmers' hiding on the roadside attacked with heavy gunfire," he said.

Seeing that their bullets could not damage the heavily armed trucks, five men sudden-

ly dived under the trucks with high explosives tucked under their arms. They detonated the bombs, killing themselves," the arrival said.

In Canton a strike by bus drivers has paralyzed transportation systems in the city, train arrivals from Red China said today.

They said the strike followed a collision between a bus and a train on May 6 during which the bus driver was killed and more than 10 passengers were injured.

The bus drivers, according to the arrivals, blamed railway authorities for "not putting up sufficient notices."

Some arrivals said after the collision many bus drivers and conductors clashed with railway workers in Canton. More than 30 persons were wounded during the fight, they said.

WASHINGTON POST
10 July 1968

Chou Admits Supplies To Hanoi Are Held Up

From News Dispatches

HONG KONG, July 9—Chinese Premier Chou En-lai admitted that supplies to North Vietnam were being held up because of clashes between groups of railroad workers in various parts of China, it was reported here today.

Red Flag Bulletin, a Red Guard publication which arrived here from Canton, quoted a May speech in which Chou said the "longest" struggle was in Liuchow, an area in southwestern China which borders North Vietnam.

Radio Moscow complained last week that rail service through China to Vietnam had been disrupted. It accused China of deliberately fomenting the unrest which caused this.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES

30 June 1968

Stoppage of War Aid to Hanoi Attributed to Chinese Unrest

By TILLMAN DURDIN

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 29—Observers of the Chinese scene doubt that the recent disruption of rail shipments of war materiel to North Vietnam is the result of a deliberate move by Peking to express disapproval of the peace talks in Paris.

They believe the difficulty has been caused by the sporadic, temporary interruption of rail and highway routes through the turbulent province of Kwangsi.

There has been intermittent factional strife in Kwangsi for a good part of the last year. Clashes between rival groups became especially severe in Nanning, Wuchow and other centers earlier this month, and it was reported these had resulted in the stoppage of road and rail transportation at a number of points.

Disapprove of Talks

Despite their doubts about deliberate interruption of shipments to North Vietnam, the analysts are certain that the Chinese leadership disapproved of Hanoi's entering into peace talks with the United States in Paris. This has been amply shown by a complete absence in the Chinese press of reports on the talks and by intermittent reaffirmations of the view that people's wars should be fought uncompromisingly until complete victory.

President Ho Chi Minh and other North Vietnamese leaders

have been quoted in these terms from time to time in the Chinese press as if Peking is trying to show that the North Vietnamese are contradicting their own principles in opening the Paris talks.

Peking Hails Hanoi Struggle

The North Vietnamese press agency reported that Lu Weichao, the Chinese chargé d'affaires in Hanoi, had congratulated North Vietnam on its victories, and particularly on the reported shooting down of the 3,000th United States war plane by North Vietnamese reckoning. The United States puts its losses at about a third of that number.

The agency said Mr. Lu had stressed that the Chinese people "pledge themselves to serve as a steady backing for the Vietnamese people and resolutely support the Vietnamese people's struggle against United States aggression, for national salvation till final victory."

The agency said Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh of North Vietnam "warmly thanked the Chinese chargé and members of the Chinese embassy and said "the great support of the party, Government and brotherly people of China has greatly stimulated and is greatly stimulating the Vietnamese armed forces and people and increase the latter's combat strength in their advance towards more brilliant victories with a view to defeating the United States aggressors."

JAPAN TIMES
30 June 1968

Mao Clamps Down

'Attempt Seen Likely at Purges of Revolutionary Committees

By ERIC CHOU

LONDON (FWF)—The Cultural Revolution in China has to clear many a new hurdle. Mass rallies and demonstrations are, for the time being, out; but many behind-the-scenes struggles are being carried out in the revolutionary committees—the administrative bodies designed and set up by Mao Tse-tung to manage military, political and cultural affairs—at all levels.

According to announcements made by Peking over the past months, revolutionary committees have so far been established in 22 provinces. But obviously these organs, which embody the principles of the Three-Way Alliance (of revolutionary masses, party cadres and the Army, have failed to work as smoothly as Mao and his close associates would have liked. The rivalries which have developed among the three factions in the committees have reached such proportions that, instead of stabilizing the situation, they have even inspired some outbursts of violence and armed clashes.

New Measures

There are indications that Chairman Mao is now contemplating new measures to purge the committees. In a recent issue of the People's Daily, an editorial entitled "The Revolutionary Committees are Good" has more or less revealed Mao's frame of mind. The editorial emphasized that the "members of all revolutionary committees must be selected with greater care" in order to make them work more effectively. It went on to quote Mao as saying that it was absolutely necessary "to revolutionize the revolutionary committees" with great expedition.

By using the word "revolutionize," the aged Chinese leader could mean to bring about some organizational changes within the existing committees. If this is the case, some form of purge will be carried out.

In what way will Mao purge or "revolutionize" the revolutionary committees?

The situation is still far from clear. But, according to recent Chinese broadcasts from Peking, Mao received quite a few Army leaders in the latter part of May and these interviews could well have had something to do with the reorganization of the committees.

In view of the Army's preponderant position in the committees, it is not impossible that Mao tried to extract some concessions from these Army leaders through "gentle persuasion." If he succeeded, it is likely that the Army agreed to give away some seats in the committees, to be shared out among the two other factions.

Centralism Preferred

It is also possible that in "revolutionizing the revolutionary committees" Mao would like to send some of his "loyalists" to take over the control of the committees for the sake of centralism. Over the past months the revolutionary committees in various provinces seemed to have become something like "independent kingdoms," enjoying so much autonomy that they were not obliged to carry out Peking's orders to the letter. Perhaps this is why the spring farming program failed to achieve its targets and industrial production dropped considerably.

Whether Mao can succeed in installing these "loyalists" depends on the attitude of the Army. It is unlikely that the Army will be content to play second fiddle after having been entrusted with full power for such a long period. On the other hand, some workable formula could have been reached during the recent sessions between Mao and the Army leaders.

Meanwhile, Mao seems unwilling to leave anything to chance. It is reported that at a recent top-level conference he issued an order to recruit 600,000 men to strengthen the "people's armed forces." This can be seen as an effort to reshape the Army to his own advantage. It could also be a step to

"blend" the Army with an infusion of Red Guards—the people who would most readily respond to Mao's call for recruits. But the most important objective of such a move could well be to absorb the manifestly discontented young peasants—who have clashed with troops and the Red Guards practically everywhere—into the Army so that they could be duly disciplined. In Mao's eyes, this would be the surest method of consolidating internal security, which has increasingly worsened.

It is apparently due to concern about internal security that public trials and immediate executions of "counter-revolutionaries" have been conducted on the Chinese mainland almost incessantly since last autumn. It must be pointed out that the Chinese Communists did in fact decide to shelve the system of trials by public rally after many innocent people became victims of it in 1951, 1952 and 1955 when successive campaigns were staged to suppress "undesirables" and "counter-revolutionaries."

Executions Possible

The Communist leadership at one time denounced such executions as "useless and senseless," arguing that the human mind could be re-molded, by other less drastic means, to accept Mao's thoughts and teachings. That the regime has felt compelled to bring back public trials and executions on an even bigger scale indicates that the menace posed by the lack of internal security and unity exceeds what the outward symptoms have revealed. It is also a sign that the Chinese people have not really accepted communism even after nearly two decades of Communist rule.

Needless to say, Chairman Mao has landed himself in a most unenviable situation. The need to resort again to the ruthless methods which he himself once discarded constitutes a greater threat than the conflicts within the party and the troubles in the revolutionary committees.

WASHINGTON POST
10 July 1968

China's Drop in Trade With Russia Reflects Turmoil, Poor Relations

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, July 9—A dramatic decline in trade between Peking and Moscow appears to reflect both the ravages caused by Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution and a further deterioration in the bitter Sino-Soviet dispute.

This is the initial assessment by analysts here of the Soviet disclosure last week-end that Russian trade with Red China in 1967 dropped some 60 per cent below the previous year's level.

In part, these analysts submit, the movement of Soviet merchandise into China was significantly hampered by railway dislocations as well as by turbulence in the principal Chinese port cities.

At the same time, the trade setback is believed to mirror the sharp ideological and national differences that have increasingly separated the major Communist powers within the past decade.

Drop May Continue

That Chinese and Russian experts have failed to meet so far this year to negotiate an annual commercial agreement suggests that trade may continue to fall in 1968. Meetings between the Peking and Moscow trade experts are usually held in July.

Total Sino-Soviet trade last year, according to Moscow, amounted to \$107 million compared with \$318.4 million in 1966.

Chinese exports to Moscow—largely clothing, textiles, foodstuffs and minerals—were slightly higher than their imports of such Soviet goods as machinery and petroleum products.

The drop in Peking's dealings with Moscow paralleled an overall decline in Chinese foreign trade for the first time since 1961. China's trade deficit last year, roughly \$400 million, is probably being financed out of Chinese gold and foreign exchange reserves. Analysts here estimate that the deficit is to be at least \$500 million.

In 1967, moreover, the Chinese showed a marked shift away from trade with Communist countries, increasing their business with West European nations, especially West Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy.

These nations, along with Japan, now provide China with machinery, chemicals, iron and steel and other products formerly obtained mainly from Russia and Eastern Europe.

This year, however, Chinese trade with Japan and Western Europe has also fallen, most likely as the result of the cultural revolution's effect on China's agricultural and industrial production.

In the first three months of 1968, Peking's total trade with Japan was 26 per cent below the same period last year. For comparable periods, trade with Great Britain fell 38 per cent and with West Germany 19 per cent.

Railways Disrupted

The disruption of China's railways by rival Red Guard and labor factions is considered by analysts here to have been an important factor in blocking the movement of Soviet goods last year.

Soviet trade with China has also been disrupted by incidents aboard Russian vessels in Chinese ports. Some of these incidents have been blown up by both Peking and Moscow into huge political proportions.

In August, 1967, for example, some 2500 Red Guards besieged the Soviet freighter Svirsk for three days in the northern Chinese port of Dairen. The ship was freed only after Soviet Premier Kosygin threatened to halt trade with China.

Last April, in the South China port of Whampoa, Chinese stormed aboard the Soviet tanker Komsomolets Ukrainy, reportedly carrying fuel to North Vietnam.

According to Moscow, 11

Although they consider the latest Sino-Soviet trade drop startling, analysts here point out that commerce between Peking and Moscow has slid steadily since 1959. In that peak year, their total turnover was more than \$2 billion.

The decline stemmed from two main factors—the Sino-Soviet political schism, and China's need to focus on agriculture rather than industry in the hungry years after the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958.

Thus the Chinese curtailed their capital-goods imports, acquired almost entirely from Russia and Eastern Europe, while making large wheat purchases from Canada and Australia, and buying chemical fertilizer from Japan.

The aid Peking had received from Russia, valued at more than \$3 billion, was instrumental in China's remarkable industrial growth in the 1950s. During that period, however, Sino-Soviet trade views grew strained.

From their viewpoint, the Soviet leaders apparently felt that they were making a sacrifice in providing China with capital goods and technical assistance required at home. Among other things, they were irritated by Chinese unpredictability as well as by Peking's refusal to integrate economically into the world Communist bloc.

For their part, the Chinese resented the Soviet demand that they pay for Korean war military equipment. They also resented Moscow's system of overpricing its exports to China while underpricing Chinese exports to Russia.

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August 1968

Walter Ulbricht: Stalinist Outpost
in Central Europe

For Walter Ulbricht, boss of Communist East Germany, the past 19 months have been particularly trying. He sees Bonn as sapping his position in the Communist Bloc and further isolating him from the rest of Europe. Disturbances in Czechoslovakia and Poland, especially Czechoslovakia's liberalization program, and the danger that unrest from Western Europe could seep through The Wall are viewed by Ulbricht as threats to his regime. His efforts to woo recognition from uncommitted or developing countries have had small success. His latest provocation in Berlin, further restricting access from the West, while blessed by Moscow is criticized by his other allies and is unpopular, both East and West.

To cap it all, Ulbricht was 75 on June 30th and must face the consequences of his own longevity. (He has already been in power longer than Hitler.) He is obsessed by the vision of a permanent Communist German state and he does not have much time left to assure its creation. He must wonder if his heirs apparent, though "cast in his own intransigent mold," will be as skillful as he in identifying East Germany's with Moscow's interests. To somehow insure the durability of the "Ulbricht Regime" concept by the time that regime celebrates its twentieth anniversary in October 1969 must be a sore challenge.

Ulbricht Reacts to Bonn's Bridge Building

In December 1966 Bonn served notice of its intentions to improve relations with Eastern Europe and to increase its unofficial contacts with East Germany. Throughout early 1967, Ulbricht responded to the former by campaigning among the Warsaw Pact countries for guarantees that relations with Bonn would not be made at the expense of his interests. In response to the latter, he ceased paying lip service to "German nationalism" and began propagandizing the image of "East German" nationalism.

When, at the end of January 1967, Bonn agreed to exchange ambassadors with Rumania (and at the same time warmed up relations with France) the Ulbricht regime set its entire press and radio force to criticizing Rumania. As a consequence, however, both Prague and Budapest editorial commentary began overlooking their previous requirement that Bonn should recognize the sovereignty of East Germany. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria also seemed eager to mend the breach with Bonn. Nervously, Ulbricht began a frenzy of activity throughout the Warsaw Pact and emerged a few weeks later clutching a series of formal bilateral treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" signed with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. As one commentator noted, Ulbricht had temporarily "secured his own rear and blocked the Federal Republic offensive into the East."

Also in January 1967, Pankow (district of East Berlin where Ulbricht's top functionaries dwell) began its campaign to arouse in the East German

populace a sense of "East German" nationalism. Old slogans such as "all of Germany must be the German people's property" and "Collaborate, Co-reign!" were replaced by new terminology which described "GDR culture," "GDR science," and even "GDR medicine." Getting ready for the Seventh Party (SED -- Socialist Unity Party) Congress of mid-April 1967, the Party began propagating the slogan "Our Love, Our Art for the GDR, and Our Socialist Fatherland." With the insistence that such "love" is only compatible with "implacable hatred of the enemy," a bitter campaign against Western cultural influence also was launched.

On 20 February 1967, a law was promulgated which forced a "citizenship of the German Democratic Republic" (GDR) on all past and present residents of East Germany. The law was passed despite a provision in the Constitution then in effect that "there is only one German nationality."

Liberalization in Czechoslovakia Alarms Ulbricht

Pankow's reaction to recent developments in Czechoslovakia was aptly described by Newsweek (22 April 1968):

"Nowhere else in Eastern Europe ... had the heady Czechoslovakian spring caused quite so much alarm as in East Germany where, in an attempt to win additional legitimacy for his regime, party boss Walter Ulbricht actually went to the trouble of staging a national referendum on a new constitution.

"From the start, the whole affair was a propaganda extravaganza. On voting day, brass bands paraded through the streets at 6 a.m. -- an hour before the polls opened. Those who voted early were rewarded with portions of Moscow ice cream, a particularly delicious brand seldom available. When the votes were finally counted, Ulbricht's constitution, which formalizes East Germany's separation from West Germany and tightens the Communist Party's already firm grip on the country, was adopted in a landslide.

"The new constitution, which was rushed through ahead of schedule, was merely the latest of Ulbricht's efforts to counter the new heresy in Prague. When Dubcek first took over, Ulbricht launched a sizzling attack on Czechoslovakian democratization, strongly implying that it was nothing but a West German plot....

"Since then, Ulbricht's fears seem to have grown. 'You would never guess how nervous our Communist Party has become,' said one East German student. 'They wouldn't even let us demonstrate about Vietnam the other day.'" (Emphasis added.)

Wooing the West and the Free World

A constant thorn in Ulbricht's side is East Germany's lack of international recognition. The only multi-national organizations to which the regime belongs are CEMA (the Soviet Bloc economic organization, sometimes called COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact. In a continual propaganda barrage, almost monthly letters of appeal for recognition of East Germany by various international organizations are presented by Hungarian and Polish representatives. The appeals are presented under the guise that East Germany has pertinent, valuable information to present but is prohibited from doing so by lack of membership. To date, the appeals have fallen on deaf ears.

East German embassies, at this writing, are limited in Europe to Albania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia; in Latin America, to Cuba; and in Asia, to Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam. Only in Egypt and Yemen have East German trade missions been granted a "consulate" status. During 1967, East Germany offered Algeria economic credits in exchange for a consulate; the stratagem did not work. The only non-Bloc consulates general in East Berlin are those of Finland, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

In the spring of 1967, taking advantage of what he hoped was Arab disenchantment with the Bonn Government as a result of Bonn's denial of an Arab request for additional assistance, Ulbricht sent his Foreign Minister Otto Winzer on a tour to try and get diplomatic recognition from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq. Winzer came home empty handed.

In wooing the "third world" (especially Africa) Ulbricht tries to take advantage of the developing sense of nationalism and the "same desire which third world countries share for international recognition." He took propaganda advantage of Bonn's diplomatic relations established with Rumania and Yugoslavia by falsely claiming throughout the third world that they signified that a "diplomatic breakthrough toward recognition of Pankow was in the offing." By propagandizing economic achievements within East Germany and by propagating an image of growing respect for the GDR throughout official and public opinion in Western Europe, he would hope to lull the third world into buying his justification for recognition.

New Anti-West German Moves

The latest effort to achieve at least de facto recognition and safer isolation was made on 11 June 1968 when Ulbricht announced the imposition of new controls over passenger and freight traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. This came on the heels of earlier bans to access imposed in March and April. In addition, Ulbricht solemnly decreed that "no senior officials of the West German government may set foot on East German territory." (As described by Time (28 June 1968), "Ulbricht's law was flouted by his closest ally (on 17 June) when ... a Russian driver called for West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt in West Berlin, whisked him past East German checkpoints without even bothering to stop" ... and drove him to the much publicized meeting with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov.)

On 13 June, Moscow endorsed the Pankow announcement with a Pravda editorial pointing to East Germany's links with the Soviet Union and other Communist states and concluding that its actions have "the complete support of all peace-loving countries."

Threat of further East German measures appeared in Neues Deutschland on 14 June. Decrying the West German reaction to the transit restrictions, the article said "Bonn will face unpleasant surprises" as long as it insists on its claim to sole representation and pursues "its adventurist, revanchist ... course ... and hostile policy toward the GDR."

By 16 June, objection to Ulbricht's action was heard from within the Bloc. Prague's Svobodne Slovo carried a commentary by Jaroslav Cerny on the introduction of entry visas for West Germans. While Cerny noted that the East German step had been interpreted in Western circles as a violation of allied agreements on Berlin, he stated significantly:

"One may counter, however, that the efforts to incorporate West Berlin into the integral territory of the German Democratic Republic are also directed against the spirit of the allied agreements. Under any circumstances it remains a fact that Berlin has now again become a sensitive spot around which direct or indirect, more or less sharp polemic statements are being made. If there was not a certain confidence that the big powers are not interested in an excessive aggravation of the situation in the middle of Europe at a time when the Vietnamese negotiations in Paris have not yet advanced one step and when the USSR and the United States want to push through the common project of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons -- if this confidence did not exist -- the situation around Berlin these days would be rather dangerous."

Ulbricht's Unhappy Birthday

On June 30th Ulbricht's 75th birthday was celebrated. Could it have been with tongue-in-cheek that Tsola Dragoycheva, member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian CPCC congratulated Ulbricht by referring to him as ... "one of the oldest cadres..."? (East Berlin, ADN, 30 June 1968.)

In congratulations from the SED Central Committee it was noted that Comrade Ulbricht had ... "for six decades ... been standing in the ranks of the revolutionary vanguard of the German working class ... for more than 40 years ... been ... a member of the Central Committee and its Politburo; for nearly 20 years ... headed the SED Central Committee." (Neues Deutschland, 30 June 1968.)

It must have given Ulbricht pause as he reflected on the level of East European representation sent to honor this auspicious occasion. With the exception of the Soviet Union and Poland -- his two closest allies, who sent their Presidents -- the others can best be described as backbench Party types:

"In the banquet hall, Walter Ulbricht and his wife took their seats in the presidium together with the representatives of the socialist sister countries: Nikolay Podgorny, Marian Spychalski, Pal Losonczi, Tsola Dragoycheva, Gheorghe Apostol, and Jozef Valo....

"On behalf of the foreign guests, Podgorny congratulated Ulbricht. In the conclusion of his speech, Podgorny stressed: 'The common aims and principles, interests, and tasks facing the Communist sister parties in the socialist community are reflected and confirmed in the present visit of the representatives of these parties and countries to the GDR.'" (East Berlin, ADN, 30 June 1968.)

On 27 June 1968, the Committee for the Preparation of the 20th Anniversary of the GDR was established and Ulbricht was announced as its head. In addressing the committee, Ulbricht attached particular "importance to the strengthening of the alliance with the Soviet Union...." He said "we are on the path to prosperity and happiness and to the further strengthening of the socialist community of man. All are called upon to make their contribution to this aim." (East Berlin, ADN, 24 June 1968.) Ulbricht would see as his personal contribution the continuation and perpetuation of the regime he has been nurturing. At 75, Herr Ulbricht is trying to ensure that the succession of East Germany will pass to men cut in his mold: Erich Honecker and Willy Stoph.

A well-phrased forecast of the outlook for the post-Ulbricht era appeared in The Economist (22 April 1967):

"We do not know what timetable Herr Ulbricht has in mind for carrying out his ambition to socialize the whole of Germany ... (But) at the seventh congress (of the SED) ... he promised that, from the marxist point of view, things would look pretty shipshape in his domain by 1980.

"... Erich Honecker, ... member of the politburo charged with responsibility for state security, is obviously being prepared to succeed ... Ulbricht.

[Honecker spoke to the seventh congress.] "The subject of his address, the second longest delivered at the congress, was 'The party's role in the period of perfecting socialism.' The timetable is loose, but the direction is the same as ever." [Emphasis added.]

The Ulbricht regime claims to have brought relative affluence to Eastern Germany. Statistics are published in the press then quoted by the western press. Pankow claims, in 1968, that East Germany is the eighth ranking industrial state in the world. As stated in The Economist, 22 April 1967, in describing Ulbricht's claims to an affluent society:

"The East Germans are grateful for recent improvements in their daily lot. But they have not grown insensitive to the cost of it all. Does the end really justify the brutal and shabby means...?"

BERLIN

The Wall Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

The scream of sirens and the clank of steel on cobblestones echoed down the mean, dark streets. Frightened East Berliners peeked from behind their curtains to see military convoys stretching for blocks. First came the motorcycle outriders, then jeeps, trucks and buses crammed with grim, steel-helmeted East German troops. Rattling in their wake were the tanks—squat Russian-built T-34s and T-54s. At each major intersection, a platoon peeled off and ground to a halt, guns at the ready. The rest headed on for the sector border, the 25-mile frontier that cuts through the heart of Berlin like a jagged piece of glass. As the troops arrived at scores of border points, cargo trucks were already unloading rolls of barbed wire, concrete posts, wooden horses, stone blocks, picks and shovels. When dawn came four hours later, a wall divided East Berlin from West for the first time in eight years.

The wall was illegal, immoral and strangely revealing—illegal because it violated the Communists' solemn contracts to permit free movement throughout the city; immoral because it virtually jailed millions of innocent people; revealing because it advertised to all the world the failure of East Germany's Communist system, and the abject misery of a people who could only be kept within its borders by bullets, bayonets and barricades.

Just in Time. For Walter Ulbricht, East Germany's goat-bearded, Communist boss, the wall was utterly necessary to preserve the very life of his dismal satrapy. For seldom had history witnessed so great an exodus as had been flowing Westward in great clotted spurts. "You are sharing in the Great Socialist Experiment," Ulbricht cried to his people in 1949, as he cut their food ration and trimmed away their liberties. Far from sharing Ulbricht's enthusiasm, almost 3,500,000 East Germans—no less than 20% of the post-World War II population—fled to the West in the eleven years that followed. In the first eleven days of August 1961 alone, 16,500 sought haven in West Berlin; the refugees included an East German Supreme Court judge, East German policemen, soldiers, physicians, lawyers, engineers, farmers, workers, merchants—the lifeblood of any country.

Even as the 80,000 East German *Volks-polizei* (People's Police) and *Volksarmee* (People's Army) troops were erecting their barricades across most of the 80 border-transit points last week, desperate clusters of East Berliners were still trying to break out to freedom. Only a few were successful. One elderly man and wife crawled on hands and knees across a cemetery near the boundary as "Vopos" strung barbed wire only 20 yds. away. A young married couple swam the Teltow Canal with their four-year-old child perched on his father's shoulders. A couple of East Germans returning from a late movie to the American sector just in time.

Rooms with a View. But most were Communist planning. Even as the open street crossings were being barricaded, other squads raced to lock the gates of the *S-bahn* (elevated) and of the ten major *U-bahn* (subway) stations that serviced trains traveling into West Berlin. Guards were posted in the pitch-dark *U-bahn* tunnels to halt the more imaginative sneakers. After a helmeted Vopo guard at the new barrier leaped across the barbed wire and escaped to the West, East German officers began keeping their enlisted men several yards from the wire to prevent more defections. Toughest task of all was sealing the frontier where the line slices down the center of residential streets and even cuts through the middle of houses. Solution: Tommy gunners sauntering along the middle of the streets, locked doors and bricked-in windows for any home that had a room with the wrong view.

Berlin—both East and West—responded to the new Communist crisis with electric excitement and ill-subdued resentment. The barricades meant that thousands of families, split between the halves of the city, could not see their relatives. Fifty thousand East Berliners who regularly commuted to West Berlin were now cut off from their jobs by official decree. At the city's two biggest squares where East once met West, bustling Potsdamer Platz and the soaring sandstone Brandenburg Gate, thousands of East and West Berliners gathered to gape and to jeer at the scowling Communist troops gripping submachine guns and standing shoulder to shoulder beside a solid phalanx of armored cars. When the crowd moved too close, there was the jab of a Communist bayonet or a sudden blast from the powerful *Wasserkanonnen* (water cannons), the wheeled squirters of the East Berlin riot squad that can topple a man at 50 yds.

The Bobbing Beard. The danger was that the tense crowds on both sides of the barriers might merge and touch off the East German revolt that everyone feared. Already Moscow's famed Marshal Ivan Konev had moved two divisions of Russian troops into Berlin's outskirts, ready for the kind of action that the Soviets had employed to put down the abortive 1953 East German revolt. But the West Berliners were not intimidated. "*Berlin bleibt frei, Berlin bleibt frei*" (Berlin will remain free), chanted a crowd of 30,000 gathered a stone's throw from the Vopos on the Western side of the Brandenburg Gate. Near by, an East German cop who got too close to a West Berlin throng was grabbed, hauled over the line and savagely beaten. Realizing that things were nearing flash point, West Berlin police slowly forced their own people a half-mile away from the sector border. As they backed off, the West Berliners, in one final retort before they were out of earshot, cried "Hang Ulbricht! Hang Ulbricht!"

The man the mob wanted to lynch was Walter Ulbricht stayed out of sight in his office, blocks away in the ugly little square headquarters of his Socialist Unity Party. He was constantly on the telephone, receiving reports, issuing crisp commands. As he talked, the little white-streaked beard bobbed incessantly below flaring nostrils. But there was no animation in the cold clear eyes behind the rimless bifocals. Just back from Moscow, where he had sought and finally won Nikita Khrushchev's personal permission to close the Berlin escape route, Ulbricht himself had planned much of the border crack-down. But not until two days later did he get out to visit the troops. Then, protected by a swarm of security police, he appeared at Potsdamer Platz in a light grey suit and cream-colored straw hat to pat a Vopo on the back, gaze briefly at the sullen West Berliners through the barbed wire. Seconds later he was off again in his big black Zil limousine. No rubbernecking West Berliner recognized him. "Thank God," sighed a West Berlin cop. "I doubt that we could have stopped them. There were too many."

"Pfu! Pfu!" Hate followed Ulbricht through his own East Berlin streets; as the Zil headed next toward the Brandenburg Gate, 50 East Berliners on the corner of Unter den Linden and Friedrichstrasse let loose with Berlin's Bronx cheer: "*Pfu! Pfu!*" The police entourage stopped long enough to chase the crowd and arrest one man. Walter Ulbricht rolled on, unmindful of the curses of his own people.

The crowd could jeer, but Ulbricht had the guns. For 16 years he had handled his detractors with little difficulty, and now, with 30 Soviet divisions to back him up, he could handle them again. He was proudly boasting that he could even handle the Western imperialists. "Terrific the way everything clocked," gloated Ulbricht's party paper *Neues Deutschland*. "Here is proof that in Germany a strong state has arisen . . . see how our worker and peasant power asserts its authority!"

The Communists noted with glee the West's initial wait-and-see reaction. Moscow's massive bluff seemed to have worked wonders. For weeks Khrushchev had been waving his bombs around, threatening the Greeks and Italians with nuclear destruction, frightening the British with talk of rockets. And even as the Berlin border seal-off was in progress, the Red army invited Western military attaches in Moscow to a show of Soviet infantry alleged to be armed with nuclear-tipped tactical rockets—a strong hint that this was precisely the way Marshal Konev's divisions around Berlin were equipped for a scrap.

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

TIME, AUGUST 25, 1961

CPYRGM

shooting Grouse. For three days there was neither retaliation nor official word from Washington, London or Moscow. Vopos worked feverishly to finish their wall. Critics of Western policy were quick to point out that several avenues of action were actually open. In Remagen, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, campaigning hard for next month's West German elections, stole a march on his opponent, West Berlin's Socialist Mayor Willy Brandt, with the suggestion that West Germany's lucrative trade pact with East Germany might be terminated to penalize Ulbricht. Another possibility: a ban against East Germans traveling anywhere in the free world. But the Big Three seemed determined to take no hasty action that might aggravate an already dangerously tense situation. Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan calmly went grouse shooting; De Gaulle looked the other way.* Finally, a note from Berlin's allied commanders rapped Khrushchev's knuckles, threatened no reprisals at all. Furious West Berliners massed in front of Willy Brandt's town hall to hear the mayor demand "not merely words but political action" from President John F. Kennedy. As the crowd roared its assent and waved placards ("Kennedy to Berlin," "You can't stop tanks with paper"), Brandt went on to suggest that Berlin was becoming a "new Munich."

Saving Ammunition. Mayor Brandt might be forgiven his electioneering zeal, his on-the-spot emotions, but for a German of any political persuasion to remind the British of Munich was a bitter gibe. What mattered to the U.S. and Britain and France were the vital access routes that cross the 110-mile reach of East Germany and enter West Berlin; what mattered was the welfare of West Berlin itself. Even Willy Brandt took heart when President Kennedy showed his colors by sending Vice President Lyndon Johnson as a personal emissary to

Berlin, and a battle group of 1,500 U.S. soldiers raced down the *Autobahn*, reasserting the allied right of access to the beleaguered city.

The world waited to see how far Nikita Khrushchev might press the rest of his threats—to sign a peace treaty with Ulbricht's barbed-wire corral, to declare West Berlin a free city. The Russian also had other complaints: the West's use of the city as a propaganda and espionage center. But the biggest bone in Nikita's throat had been the refugee flow that threatened to destroy his East German satellite, machine shop for the whole Red bloc and the vital buffer between the West and Red Poland. Now the exodus was stopped.

* In Rome, the Vatican took the occasion to test the Communists' intentions further by appointing an East German as new Roman Catholic Bishop of Berlin. He is Monsignor Alfred Bengsch, 39, who probably will find it difficult indeed to travel from his East Berlin home to visit the western half of his diocese.

The Carpenter. Walter Ulbricht, 68, the man who stopped the refugees, had been in Berlin together ever since 1945. No other satellite leader can make so lengthy a claim to power. Cold, tough Ulbricht has been able to survive not only Moscow's postwar purges, but Communism's intraparty conflicts and democracy's popular revolts.

A tailor's son, Ernst Paul Walter Ulbricht learned early the art of political survival. He was already a member of a workers' youth organization when he began his career in Leipzig as a cabinet-maker's apprentice at the age of 17 ("I am a carpenter by trade," he says proudly today). Only a hundred miles away was Berlin, where Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht were working to merge their *Spartakusbund* with the splinter Socialists to form the German Communist Party. In 1920, two years after Rosa and Karl were killed by the authorities for provoking street fights, the merger was accomplished—and Walter Ulbricht was at the meeting. His presence ensured him an exalted role in Communist councils for years to come, and an early job with the K.P.D.—the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*.


From the start, Ulbricht was a brassy enemy of the intellectuals who had captured control of the party in the early 1920s. Ulbricht's pal was a Russian courier who had direct contact with Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in Moscow. Soon *Pravda* was sniping at the "nonproletarian enemies of the working class in the German party," and soon Ulbricht's enemies were purged. It was time for a major party overhaul; tough, conscientious Walter Ulbricht got the job. Comrade Ulbricht took on the name *Genosse Zelle* (Comrade Cell), began atomizing the easygoing Communist cliques into tight little cells of neighborhood half-dozens who were strangers to one another.

By 1928, Ulbricht was a Red big shot, wearing a necktie and having Berlin's best tailors make his suits; he sat in the Reichstag itself as a Communist Deputy. He was grandly aware of his station. Once, when Ernst Thälmann, the new party leader boarded a train at a Berlin railway station and took his seat in a third-class railway coach, Ulbricht stiffly declined to join his colleague, choosing instead a seat in the plush first-class section. He was entitled to such preference as a member of the Reichstag.

For all his airs, when things really got tough in Nazi Germany, Ulbricht was one of the first to run out. As a Communist agent, he took refuge in Prague, then Paris. In between, there were the months in civil war-torn Spain when, from his base at Albacete, he took on the OGPU-assigned task of purging the West European "Trotskyites," i.e., anti-Stalinists. What made Walter Ulbricht famous in Spain was his ingenious torture chamber, a cell of granite blocks too small for a man to stand or sit.

The Weathervane. Few in Germany will forget Ulbricht's traitorous attacks on his own fellow Communists, many of them colleagues of long standing. Even today, contemporaries are sure that he tipped off the Nazis who arrested Thälmann and later executed him. In 1938 Ulbricht moved to Moscow to serve Stalin more closely. Of the many other German Communists who sought refuge in Russia, some 3,000 were killed or sent to labor camps by Moscow's harsh dictum. Ulbricht had not so much as raised a finger to protect them.

Among his relentless, cold-blooded fellow plotters, Walter Ulbricht stood out as the iciest of them all, for he had no trace of sentiment or warmth. He was generally despised even by his colleagues; "Tovarish Woodenhead," they sneered behind his back because of his mimicry



Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

WEST BERLIN DEMONSTRATORS
Tovarish Woodenhead nearly came too close.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

of Moscow. The great female stalwart of German Communism, Klara Zetkin, once remarked: "May a benevolent fate prevent this man from ever rising to the top of the Communist Party. I cannot stand him. Look into his eyes and you will see how sly and false he is."

But as long as he had Stalin's blessing, Ulbricht neither needed nor wanted close friends. In Moscow's Hotel Lux he enjoyed not only the companionship of his Berlin-born girl friend, Lotte Kuhn,* but also the comfortable knowledge that each purged comrade meant more room for himself as he scrambled toward the top job in Communism's German party. No one cherished leadership more avidly, nor carried favor with the Kremlin more expectantly. When the Hitler-Stalin treaty was signed, Ulbricht dutifully put his pen to work in the pact's support. "Whoever intrigues against the friendship of the German and Soviet people is an enemy of the German people," he wrote in 1940. "Under no circumstances can a breach of the pact be tolerated."

On to Wall Street. Such sterling services produced their due reward. When the Germans finally attacked their "ally," Stalin named Ulbricht a top member of the National Committee for Free Germany, which organized anti-Hitler propaganda campaigns in German prisoner-of-war camps, broadcast Moscow's message by loudspeaker to the Nazi divisions around Stalingrad. The National Committee was no great success in winning over the enemy. But it did serve as a readymade nucleus for Communist administration when the time came to move into postwar Germany. When Hitler's armies collapsed, one man was the logical choice to carry the Red flag into shattered Berlin: on May 2, 1945, Walter Ulbricht, flown from Moscow for the honor, drove into the Nazis' burning capital in a convoy of limousines with ten tough, trustworthy German Communist aides.

Headquarters of Communism's first postwar political commissariat in Berlin was on the second floor of a dismal concrete building on a thoroughfare named, of all things, Wallstrasse—Wall Street. From these few dingy rooms, the faithful Ulbricht, now sporting a wispy mustache and a pointed little Lenin beard, sent his agents fanning out to grab control—first of the Berlin city administration, then of every town and city in the Soviet zone.

Cops and Robbers. Ulbricht's formidable stamina kept his colleagues on an 18-hour workday, and his astonishing memory enabled him to pull the names and addresses of hundreds of loyal Communists out of an ever ready mental file. "When we set up the East Zone's first Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs," recalls Wolfgang Leonhard, a member of Ulbricht's original Berlin group who has * Herself an up and coming agitprop leader who later was highly commended in the Communist press for defining a new sin: "practicism," the "neglect of Communist ideology through everyday life." Ulbricht finally married Lotte in 1951.

since defected to the West. "Ulbricht assigned every department head and staff—some 40 appointments, down to the motor-pool boss—in about an hour."

Ulbricht's close ally was the Red army and its local commander, powerful, squat Marshal Georgy Zhukov, whose troops helped get the newspapers, power plants and factories going again, and supplied the necessary pressure to force local leaders to line up behind the Moscow-trained German Communists. In return Moscow got Ulbricht's unstinting support for the wholesale looting of East Germany, a maneuver that began with the arrival of the very first Soviet regiments. The looting was called reparations, and before it was over, between \$11 billion and \$18 billion in German equipment—railroads, factories, barges, even plumbing from a jail—had been hauled away for the benefit of Russia's backward and war-devastated economy.

Party "United." Ulbricht approved wholeheartedly. "The Soviet Union is justified in claiming reparations. It is our obligation to fulfill these claims punctually," he told his aides. He was too busy consolidating his new political gains to worry overmuch about the rape of his country.* By early 1946 he had swallowed up the only major opposition to a complete Communist takeover, the huge, old Social Democratic Party. At a mass meeting packed with Ulbricht's followers, the Social Democratic Party was killed and the Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.)—Communist to the core—was constructed.

Getting a Title. Ulbricht's land did not become a "nation" until three years later, after the long Soviet struggle to force the U.S. and its Western allies out of Berlin had failed. Moscow did not give up easily; week after week, in the four-power Kommandatura that administered the city, Soviet Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky vetoed, bellowed, threatened, cajoled, then finally walked out. With that, the Soviet blockade began. When it, too, proved fruitless after the West's mammoth airlift, Moscow gave its puppet Ulbricht "sovereignty" and a new national name for his trapped millions: the German Democratic Republic.

That was in October 1949. Already Communism's East German boss had laid the foundations for a decade of terror, repression, poverty and hunger for the 17.4 million people whose fate he had inherited. Ulbricht began "building socialism" with tried and true techniques: a Five-Year Plan, nationalization of industry, merciless stamping out of opposition political groups, throttling of the press and radio, farm delivery quotas and the buildup of a para-military police force—the *Volkspolizei*—that spent much time

* Or about the rape of his country's women. At one of the first party meetings in Berlin, some Communists urged that abortion be legalized for German girls made pregnant by rampaging Russian soldiers. "There can be no question of it," Ulbricht replied. "It is quite impossible. People who get to worked up about such things today should have got worked up when Hitler began the war."

working with submachine guns, no time at all giving traffic tickets.

Then, in June 1953, after Stalin had died, Moscow ordered Ulbricht's S.E.D. to admit publicly that it had been too harsh. Food ration cards, taken away as punishment, were returned to thousands; and Protestant church groups, recently expelled from schools, were reinstated.

To the politically sensitive East Germans, it all seemed a confession of weakness; many thought that the Russians had decided to abandon their Ulbricht puppet. Suddenly, on June 16, East Germany's workers were in the streets; thousands went on strike, marched in Communism's East Berlin showcase boulevard, Stalin-allee. Spontaneously, the nation was seething with revolt.

For two days, the mobs ran wild. Then, like a horde of waddling ducks, hundreds of Soviet tanks clattered out of their garrisons and into all the major towns; Moscow, it seemed, had not abandoned Comrade Ulbricht after all. Workers hurled bricks at the tanks and curses at their own jack-booted People's Police, but they had no arms or organization. Bitterly, docilely, East Germany's grey millions returned to work and settled down to years of hopelessness.

An End to Baptism. Since then Walter Ulbricht has ruled his people with deft application of both the carrot and the stick, always careful to keep in step with the word from Moscow. In 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, Stalin's old friend Ulbricht was quick to echo the new line ("One cannot reckon Stalin among the classic Marxists"). For all the thaw, Ulbricht soon cracked down on students and teachers who had friendly ideas of their own, arresting dozens, expelling scores from their universities. To stamp out religion and give new meaning to socialism, Ulbricht introduced "socialist name-giving" ceremonies to replace baptism, "socialist marriage" rituals to replace church weddings. Orders went out to force thousands of private storekeepers and handicraft shops into state-run co-operatives. More orders were issued to build a fire under the peasants who still largely declined to join the collective farms.

Early last year, collectivization was finally completed in a frenzied, three-month drive that sent thousands of farmers fleeing to the West and damaged even further East Germany's limping food production. Today no East German goes hungry, but his grocery supplies are at best erratic. Although formal rationing was finally abandoned in 1958, milk is in such short supply that it no longer is readily available; butter is distributed at the rate of a half-pound per person every ten days; beef is a rare luxury. To push a substitute, Ulbricht's regime in 1959 introduced "pony bars," restaurants that sell nothing but horse meat and urge customers to eat "pony steak," "foal filet," "goulash from the harness."

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Girls on the Job. But these material facts of life were not the main force that sent 160,000 East Germans fleeing from their country this year. Under Walter Ulbricht's Communism, life is a dreary procession of rules and slogans that drag on mind as well as body. At the Karl Marx Oberschule (elementary school) in Leipzig, kids are urged to keep an ear peeled at home for anti-Communist remarks by their parents; placards on the schoolroom walls proclaim "The Party Is Right" and "Struggle Today to Halt Atom War Tomorrow!" In the desperate labor shortage, tens of thousands of schoolchildren are taken from their studies to work several hours a week in factories and fields; already 88% of all girls between the ages of 18 and 20 are at work, and pressure is on as well to force women over 30 to take jobs.

Virtually all the comfortable old neighborhood *Bierstuben* have been forced out of business. Today the German worker must take his evening glass of beer at the big, bleak, state-run HO halls, where portraits of Lenin and old *Spitzbart* (pointed beard, i.e., Ulbricht) look down mockingly from the walls.

For doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers and professors, professional success is a state crime; last month the regime rejected 12,000 of 28,000 high school graduates applying for admission to universities.

The reason: "bourgeois" family backgrounds. Virtually no one gets to college without having first worked in a factory or on a collective farm.

There is also the ever present aura of fear. As one refugee put it: "The police no longer drag people out of their houses in the middle of the night. But the agents are still everywhere. You sit in a movie house watching a film, and suddenly the lights go on and you wait while the Vopos walk down the aisle looking everyone over. You wonder who they are after. When they motion to someone to get up and go with them, you relax. But the next time it could be you . . . I couldn't take that any more."

No More Planes. For all its troubles, East Germany today is the sixth largest industrial manufacturer in the world (after the U.S., Russia, West Germany, Great Britain, France). Yet the stern program announced three years ago to match West German per capita consumption by 1967 failed miserably, is no longer even mentioned. Largely at fault is the huge drain on the economy resulting from shipments of heavy industrial equipment to the rest of the Soviet bloc; East Germany is the machine shop for Russia (it produces one-half of the Soviet Union's total machine imports) and half a dozen other satellite nations. So great is the strain on the economy that Ulbricht's planners last March abruptly put East Germany's airplane industry out of business so that raw materials and labor could be used elsewhere.

Despite his age and occasional bouts of ill health (liver and gall bladder), Ulbricht runs his country with undiminished authority, working as many as 18 hours a day, barking rapid-fire orders in his high-pitched voice. There is only a bare pretense of democracy. Technically, Ulbricht's S.E.D. rules not alone, but with four other parties (including a sham offshoot of West Germany's Christian Democratic Party) in a National Front whose united list of candidates is presented to voters at each election with no other choices. After the election rituals, the S.E.D. always gains control of the *Volkstammer* (Peoples' Chamber), a rubber-stamp legislature that follows Ulbricht's every nod.*

Still Hope. Walter Ulbricht will never be happy until his troubled land is elevated from occupied status to become a full-fledged, sovereign nation. This Nikita Khrushchev has promised time and time again since 1958, as he has threatened to * Ulbricht holds the *Volkstammer* in such contempt that he did not even show up at the session when the chamber was invited to approve the decision to seal off the Berlin sector frontier.

sign a peace treaty and let the German Democratic Republic take over its own affairs (including control of the West's presence in, and access to, Berlin). The current mood in Moscow is to give Ulbricht his treaty this fall. So far, virtually no important non-Communist nation has recognized the G.D.R. diplomatically, but Ulbricht is working feverishly for what he considers East Germany's due reward. "We are strong," he cries. "The world one day must deal with us."

In a sense, the West has speeded him on his way by tacit acceptance of Berlin's border closure. For, in effect, East Berlin is now no longer under four-power military control (basic to all Western rights in Berlin), but is a part of East Germany itself. Now Walter Ulbricht can press with even greater effect his argument that the West's presence in West Berlin no longer can be guaranteed by the rights of "ancient" armed conquest. Sign a new agreement with the German Democratic Republic, he will soon suggest, and you can have your access to West Berlin. If this request is successful, *de facto* recognition will automatically have occurred and Ulbricht will have scored a singular triumph.

As the week's events began to unfold, a nightmarish vision flashed momentarily across the minds of thousands of West Berliners—a vision that they too might one day be forced to live under Walter Ulbricht's ugly system. After the long years of tension during which the city—and the West—stood up to Russian threats, freedom seemed at last to be slipping away. But at week's end, when U.S. troops began moving up the *Autobahn*, crossing Communist territory to reinforce the West Berlin garrison, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson flew in to add the weight of his prestige, most West Berliners knew that it was far too early for them to give up hope.

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

Swiss Review of World Affairs

A monthly publication of the

Neue Zürcher Zeitung

July, 1968

Zurich, Switzerland

Vol. XVIII, No. 4

The Berlin Pledge

By Fred Iuchsinger

What are the GDR's new measures against travel with Berlin all about? Do they, many people have begun to ask themselves with some concern, portend a new power conflict in Europe—after a period of relative quiet in the shadow of the Wall and as a result of a shift of the political weight to Asia? At first glance there is not much to indicate such a development, if one tries to evaluate the game from what can be seen of its pattern at this moment of writing.

It means to minimize things, to be sure, to speak of "Ulbricht's" measures, and to thus suggest that the new requirement of documents for travel through the GDR and the imposition of a transit tax is an action on the part of East Berlin and thus merely a fresh piece of chicanery of Germans against Germans. There can be no doubt that the action has its origin in Moscow, that it is an action agreed in and with Moscow. Soviet policy cannot be separated from it, whatever the appearance of independence it grants its East Germans trustees, however much Bonn tries to isolate Ulbricht as the one chiefly responsible, and however much Washington has tried to brush off the whole thing as a *querelle d'allemands*.

The original tendency of the US State Department to minimize the situation however relied on a point which the Kremlin took care to make when it designed the action in such a way that for the time being it does not violate directly or very strongly American interests, or what is described as such. Thus the picture of the coexistence of the two big powers is not being disturbed—or, in more accurate terms: a person who is as interested in this picture as President Johnson will not actually be forced to consider it disturbed.

This tendency to separate responsibilities and competences reveals, first, the extent to which the West has drifted away from those times and conditions in which every threat to Berlin still released spontaneous reflexes of solidarity. The very harmless minimum of a common defensive gesture—the imposition of a tax on temporary travel documents issued to GDR functionaries—seems to have been a rather strenuous, because no longer usual, effort for the NATO partners.

Second, this separation in the last analysis has a rather hypothetical character. For the American position and the American interests in Berlin are involved not only when the American right to military presence is directly questioned. This presence would be devalued also if the city itself were to be drastically reduced and crippled. What is the use of a garrison that protects not men and their freedom, but mere houses?

In the great political controversies among the powers following Khrushchev's ultimatum against Berlin in 1958-59, and even earlier in the negotiations about the termination of the blockade in 1949, the maintenance of the viability of Berlin had played an outstanding role in the programs of the Western allies. This viability however is, if not already touched by the new measures decreed by the GDR, at least threatened. The possibilities of an arbitrary, drastic reduction of the movement of persons and goods by rail and road, and thus the possibilities of a continuous blackmail by simple bureaucratic measures, have been considerably increased and refined. If these measures are accepted without any effective defense, it will no longer be possible later to prevent their prohibitive application in practice. The slices that have been cut off the salami cannot be added again to a sausage that is getting shorter and shorter.

The reproaches which in West Germany are now being addressed to the allies because they give so little evidence to their engagement in Berlin, limiting themselves more or less to protests on paper only, inevitably provoke the question whether Bonn itself is really doing all it can to counter the situation. Thus there is inaugurated a new round of the mutual suspicion which ever since Adenauer's time has been undermining confidence between West Germany and the United States and has so greatly changed the once "Western" climate of the Federal Republic.

Foreign Minister Brandt, together with others, has never recovered from the trauma he suffered when the Wall went up in 1961—out of the realization that the American engagement, even, or precisely, as determined by Kennedy, was meant much more narrowly than had been assumed from the standpoint of the Berliners and the "all-German" interests, that this engagement in any event was and is quite clearly subordinated to the American interest in peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

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Out of this disappointment some German politicians at the time took refuge with de Gaulle, that is, they fled from the rain to the downpour. The number of those who still persevere there, hoping for French support for the German cause, presumably is very small today. Others, especially Brandt and his friends, have thrown themselves into the adventure of a particularly "active German policy toward the East," by which they hoped to advance German politics in the course of the general relaxation, after it had proved impossible to assert it against this current. It was clear from the beginning however that the two did not harmonize very well: a relaxation policy aiming at a peaceful arrangement with the Soviet Union on the basis of existing conditions, and a Germany policy which yet seeks to change these conditions in a decisive point; a policy which wants to come to terms with those who consider the partition of Germany accomplished (and right) and who are not interested in its being undone, and a policy which wants to isolate, in the last analysis liquidate, the other German state.

The inner contradiction as a matter of fact soon became evident in the practice of this policy toward the Communist East. The more Bonn advanced on the way of relaxation and normalization with the European East, the more it found resonance and achieved effects, the more violent and aggressive became the reactions of its opponent, that is the GDR threatened by isolation within its own "bloc." And the more this West German penetration in Eastern Europe promoted the latter's stirrings of independence from Moscow and a reduction of the East-European compulsory solidarity, the more Moscow considered itself challenged, the closer became the community of interest between the Kremlin and Ulbricht, the more intransigent became Soviet-East German policy of partition, the more intransigently also Moscow operated with the "pledge" of Berlin, a pledge of Western and West German "good conduct."

This effect of its policy toward Eastern Europe is far from welcome to Bonn: but it cannot be undone by rhetorical assertions that this policy is not directed against the Soviet Union. The effect lies in the nature of the matter as long as

Bonn does not want and is not able to understand relaxation policy the way the Soviet Union understands it, that is, as a recognition of the partition of Germany and of the existence of a German state subservient to the Soviet Union.

The most recent debate in Bonn has not shown any way out of this dilemma of German policy. It has issued in an emphatic affirmation of the policy of relaxation to which the coalition, all adverse effects in Germany itself notwithstanding, wants to adhere, and in criticism of "Ulbricht's anti-relaxation" conduct. That probably means that Bonn itself will not take any counter-measures that have too obvious an "anti-relaxation" character. It thus adopts the same priorities as its Western allies, and therefore cannot logically criticize them for their sins of omission—just as in 1961, when the Wall was built, German criticism of American passivity was essentially void because neither the then Federal Chancellor nor the then Berlin Mayor advised any "hard" reactions, nor would they have been prepared to bear the consequences of such reactions. Brandt seems to place great hopes in a trump of relaxation policy which he has long held up his sleeve—the offer of "declarations of renunciation of violence." Whether these can lastingly transform the configuration and lead the dilemma of German politics to a harmonious dénouement remains to be seen. The renunciation of violence toward Poland, for example, a sort of substitute for the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line which the Federal Republic continues to find unacceptable, has not produced any such relaxing effect.

Altogether the policy of relaxation so far has not solved any of the cardinal problems with which Germany and with it the powers have been confronted for the past twenty years. Those who had thought that the principle of coexistence was a magic formula by which not only the "climate" but also the political stage-setting and problems in Europe could be changed quickly and thoroughly, those who dreamed of the "cold war" and the post-war configuration as already overcome, now will have to register with some disillusionment and apprehension the resurrection of nearly forgotten conflicts of just that "cold war."

CURRENT HISTORY

March 1965

East Germany: Stable or Immobile?

By HANS ROGGER

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AMONG the speculations current at the time of Nikita Khrushchev's fall as Soviet premier and first party secretary, there were suggestions that his readiness to come to terms with the West over East Germany had been one of the reasons for his dismissal. There is no reliable evidence that any surrender of the Soviet position in the Communist half of Germany, any diminution of full backing for its government, had, in fact, been part of Khrushchev's intentions. The very mention of such a possibility does, however, point up Soviet sensitivity to any threatened change in the status of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) as well as the important role that country plays in Russian foreign policy and internal party politics.

Once before, shortly after Stalin's death in 1953, another prominent Soviet leader, Lavrenti Beria, was dismissed from his functions and indeed executed because (along with other misdeeds) he was said to have envisioned the abandonment of Soviet control over East Germany as part of an accommodation with the Western powers. Again, it is difficult to tell whether the head of the secret police, a man much feared by his colleagues for the power he had amassed in Stalin's day, was really at variance with them to the degree suggested; but it is clear that the new and less stringent course which he proposed for East Germany backfired and that he was made the scapegoat for policies not favored by himself alone.

As often happens when a repressive regime holds out promises of relaxation, the new course initiated by the government of the late Premier Otto Grotewohl of the G.D.R. in early June, 1953—a course designed to ease the political and economic pressures to which the population had been subjected—not only failed to appease deep-seated grievances but stimulated and brought into the open long-repressed demands for political liberalization and economic improvements. What began

on June 16 as spontaneous workers' demonstrations for a reduction in work norms, turned the next day, in East Berlin and many other cities, into a full-fledged revolt which could be put down only with the aid of Russian troops. The regime of Grotewohl and Ulbricht, of the so-called Socialist Unity party (S.E.D.), had strikingly displayed its unpopularity, its weakness and its incompetence. It had also forced the Soviet Union, perhaps against its will, to demonstrate what was again to be made clear in Hungary three years later—that the U.S.S.R. would not view with equanimity the disintegration of its system of client states, least of all in response to a popular rising.

The events of June, 1953, and the Soviet response have largely defined the nature of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. This implies a mutual, nearly symbiotic dependence which neither side can in the foreseeable future be expected to abandon, and makes unreal any projects for the genuine reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to both East and West. West German demilitarization and her exit from NATO, in exchange for free elections in all of Germany, has long since ceased to be (if it ever was) a credible basis for German unity. It is for this reason that the East Germans have suggested the surrogate formula of confederation, with the unequal partners to such an agreement enjoying equal rights and weight. "There are two German states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic," the Soviet Foreign Minister said as recently as December 7, 1964, adding that one had to proceed "from this obvious [read: unalterable] fact. . . ."¹

The lesson learned in 1953 in East Berlin (as well as in Hungary and Poland in 1956) has also indicated to the East German Communists the limits of political liberalization and toleration of intellectual dissent they feel they can afford. It is this which makes

¹ Andrei Gromyko at the United Nations. *The New York Times*, December 9, 1964.

the German "Workers' and Peasants' State," despite certain economic advances, one of the least attractive of the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe—least affected by the thaw, least open to the winds of doctrinal and artistic change that have been blowing across the whole area, though with variable force and effect,

TWO SYMBOLS

There are two symbols for the air of sluggish stability which has prevailed in most areas of East German life since June, 1953, and even more since August, 1961: Walter Ulbricht and the Berlin Wall, and they make the contrast with what is going on in other parts of Eastern Europe depressingly obvious. . . .

The Wall is unquestionably one of the twentieth century's ugliest structures, aesthetically as well as politically and morally. It expresses in brick and barbed wire the regime's continuing distrust of its own people. Whatever those who are responsible for its erection may say—whether they claim that the wall was made necessary by West Berliners with their solid currency emptying Eastern shelves of scarce consumer goods or insist that this was the only way of keeping out "spies and saboteurs" (Ulbricht)—the fact is that the "protective wall," "the wall of peace," is designed to keep East Germans in. Before it went up, there was not only a constant drain of manpower, skills and youth,⁴ but the realization that so long as there was a way of escaping from the exactions and controls of the system, it would never win the obedience, or at least the passive acceptance, of the 17 million Germans over whom it rules. Escape was the only, and most painful (to the country's rulers) way of voting against the regime, and it was not made more tolerable by the fact that the regime received the customary 96 to 99.95 per cent of the ballots cast in elections.

The Wall does more, however, than mark the ultimate in deprivation of freedom of movement, as understood in less regimented societies, and the flagrant violation of the G.D.R.'s own constitution (Article 10, para-

⁴ After 1953, 19,000 engineers and technicians and 18,000 teachers fled to West Germany. Defections among the People's Police reached 18,000 in the years from 1954 to 1961. Fifty-four per cent of those who fled were officers. See also the report above and Bernard Newman, *Behind the Berlin Wall* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1964), p. 53.

graph 3), which grants to every citizen the right of emigration. It also measures the distance by which East Germany lags behind other Communist states in the process of relaxing controls and employing concessions, rather than coercion, to try to win the nation's loyalty. The considerable numbers of Hungarians and Czechs, and the lesser numbers of Poles and even Russians, who are now allowed to travel, not merely in the countries of the Bloc but also in Western Europe, provide a strong contrast to East Germany, whose citizens cannot, as of May, 1963, so much as contact a foreign embassy (including those of the Soviet Union or Poland) without official permission.

With travel to the East . . . now as tightly controlled as travel elsewhere, a sanctioned leave of absence from the G.D.R. stands out more clearly than ever before for what it was always intended to be: an integral and carefully manipulated component of the regime's elaborate system of rewards to socially productive and ideologically reliable elements of the population.⁵

"What has long been possible in other socialist countries should also prevail in the G.D.R.," Professor Robert Havemann, director of the Physico-Chemical Institute at Humboldt University, suggested earlier this year,⁶ but such a demand for greater freedom of inquiry and information can still lead to dismissal from one's post, even if it involves no basic questioning of accepted doctrine. There are still many political prisoners—12,600 according to one estimate⁷—and although there was a declaration of amnesty in 1964 (as there had been in 1960 and 1962), how many of the 10,000 to be released have been political offenders is not known. In 1960, the number was 2,800 out of 16,000.⁸

It is significant that it was a scientist, Professor Havemann, who was led to ask for greater intellectual freedom; that he initiated his criticism in 1962 with a complaint that the economy was drifting towards "chaos and destruction"; and

⁵ Melvin Croan, "Of Walls and Utopias," *Survey* (April, 1964), p. 53 and "The Tourist Trade," *East Europe* (November, 1964), pp. 22-26.

⁶ "Professor Havemann's Views," *East Europe* (April, 1964), pp. 21-22.

⁷ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 26, 1964.

⁸ *East Europe* reported in May, 1964 (p. 39) that in exchange for West German deliveries of butter, coffee, sugar and citrus fruits, 800 political prisoners were allowed to leave the country. Similar agreements may follow.

that despite his expulsion from the Party he continues to do important work and was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences.

Similarly, while Kafka, Proust and Joyce continue to be proscribed, participants in a discussion on the state of higher learning in the G.D.R. were quoted in the East Berlin paper *Sonntag* as saying that ideological dissidence could never be remedied by suspicion and decree, that it could be defeated only in open debate by better arguments. And the editor's preface to the discussion noted that such debate required some familiarity with the opponent's arguments and freer access to the heretofore forbidden "poison shelves" (*Giftschrank*) in the libraries. There is as yet no real sign of basic change in the regime's anxious and petty tutelage over its intellectuals, certainly not in the arts—

The Russians may, in an impersonal, historical way, be at fault for creating the situation in which the citizens of the G.D.R. now find themselves; but it is the leaders of the S.E.D. who are immediate targets of discontent. Neither Ulbricht, nor any of his lieutenants (like his probable successor Erich Honecker, central committee secretary for

organization and security or Willi Stoph, the prime minister) ever were or could be German Gomulka's, Kadars or even Gheorgiu-Dejs. Those who might have been—like Herrstadt and Zaisser in 1953 or Schirdewan and Wollweber in 1958—were removed long before they could fulfill or disappoint the expectations held of them. Ulbricht's control of the apparatus of party and state has, if anything, become even more firm in recent years and the new Soviet leaders are even less likely than was Khrushchev to welcome changes in his domain,

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Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7
 May 1968

Germany and East Europe: Problems of Détente

BY WILLERD R. FANN

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SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the ultimate goal of its foreign policy has been German reunification "in peace and freedom," to use the official formula. In practice, the achievement of other goals, such as European integration, and security from Soviet aggression, has been given higher priority.¹ It may also be true that some West German politicians, including the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, have seen potential domestic political disadvantages in reunification. Nevertheless, the artificial division of Germany remains the paramount problem faced by West German statesmen. It colors all major facets of the Federal Republic's foreign relations and inhibits ordinary diplomatic flexibility. Any discussion of the recent West German détente policy must begin with the problem of reunification.

Shortly after the formation of the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union converted its occupation zone into a so-called German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.). The Potsdam agreement of 1945, which provided for the division of postwar Germany into four occupation zones, had not envisioned separate German governments or a permanent partition of Germany. But the emergence of the Federal Republic and the D.D.R. raised the possibility of a long-term division. This possibility became a probability when the D.D.R. was eventually recognized as a sovereign state by the Soviet Union and the satellite regimes of Eastern Europe, and later entered the Warsaw Pact. From the Soviet standpoint, an effectively neutralized or communized Germany was a more desirable goal, but that was not an immediate likelihood. In theory, the D.D.R. was supposed to provide the basis for a reunified Germany but, in practice, the Soviet Union opted for a "two-Germanies" policy.

¹ For an interpretation of West German foreign policy from this point of view, see Werner Feld, *Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

There were, of course, many differences between the two "Germanies." The Federal Republic was the product of freely-conducted elections. It contained the overwhelming majority of the German people, most of the territory of postwar Germany, and the most important German industrial regions. The major political parties shared a common commitment to constitutional democracy. The D.D.R., by contrast, was a rump state without popular support, whose continued existence depended on the presence of Soviet bayonets.

From the outset, it was a fundamental principle of West German foreign policy to deny the legality of the D.D.R. and to prevent its recognition as a second German voice in international relations. Until such time as free elections were held, the government of the Federal Republic, as the only freely-elected German government, insisted on the right to speak for all Germans in international relations. Every West German cabinet has carefully reiterated that claim.² With the exception of Communist countries, the rest of the world has tacitly accepted the West German position.

THE HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE

West German stature in international relations was increased by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955. The Soviet Union recognized the Federal Republic without insisting on its reciprocal recognition of the D.D.R. This success, however, was counterbalanced by the danger that other nations might utilize Soviet recognition of the Federal Republic as an excuse to extend recognition to the D.D.R. In December, 1955, an attempt was made to ward off such a possibility; Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano announced that the Federal Republic would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with any government

² Cf. Chancellor Kiesinger's "Regierungserklärung," in *Deutsche Politik 1966* (Bonn: 1967), pp. XVIII-XIX.

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which formally recognized the D.D.R. This principle is usually referred to as the Hallstein doctrine.³ The Soviet Union was regarded as an exception, since it occupied a special position in German affairs (as one of the four powers held responsible for German reunification). Reunification, in any event, depended on Soviet acquiescence.

From 1955 until 1966, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successor, Ludwig Erhard, steadily adhered to the Hallstein doctrine. It was actively invoked only once. In 1957, despite repeated warnings from Bonn, Yugoslavia recognized the D.D.R. The Federal Republic immediately severed diplomatic relations with Tito's government (but retained economic relations and consular representation). Adherence to the Hallstein doctrine also meant that diplomatic relations could not be established with any of the Warsaw Pact states, since all of them recognized the D.D.R.⁴ In effect, then, the de facto partition of Germany had come to restrict West German diplomatic possibilities in East Europe.

THE GRAND COALITION

It was not until the chancellorship of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and the formation of the so-called Grand Coalition in December, 1966, that the Federal Republic began to explore new approaches in East Europe.

In his initial "policy statement" (*Regierungserklärung*) of December 13, 1966, the new Chancellor announced that the Federal Republic was willing to establish diplomatic relations with the East European states and to make positive efforts to increase contacts between the two parts of Germany. The general policy of the Federal Republic would be aimed at a relaxation of tension. On the other hand, the usual reservations were made about the legality of the D.D.R. and Germany's postwar frontiers; continuing loyalty was pledged to NATO, the Common Market and France.⁵

³ Named after Walter Hallstein, then state secretary in the foreign ministry, and Chancellor Adenauer's closest associate in foreign affairs between 1952 and 1955.

⁴ The Hallstein doctrine, naturally, restricted relations with Communist regimes outside of Europe also; but whether or not the Federal Republic has a mission in Ulan-Bator is scarcely a matter of significance compared to whether or not it is represented in Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, Budapest or Sofia.

⁵ Text in *Deutsche Politik 1966*, pp. XV-XIX.

BEGINNING OF DÉTENTE

This was a cautious statement that elicited complaints, in some quarters, that the Chancellor had not gone far enough. But the importance of the new line was clear.

There are, of course, practical obstacles. Despite the emergence of polycentricism in the Communist world, the freedom of action of the East European states is still circumscribed by existing political, military and economic ties to the Soviet Union. The D.D.R. has grown even more important to the Soviet Union in recent years and it is not likely to be abandoned or allowed to be weakened. Some East European countries have reason to fear German territorial ambitions, and as a result of the Nazi occupation there is considerable hostility toward Germany among East Europeans.

Enmity between the Germans and the peoples of Eastern Europe should not, however, be exaggerated. There have been serious national antipathies among all the peoples of Eastern Europe. These were suppressed after 1945 as a matter of Soviet policy; anti-Germanism was encouraged as a substitute. With the emergence of polycentricism, however, the old hatreds have tended to surface. Anti-German feeling, while not negligible, is no insuperable obstacle to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the various regimes of East Europe.

A more serious obstacle to détente is the fear of renewed German territorial and military ambitions, usually summed up in the Soviet propaganda formula: "West German militarism, revisionism, and revanchism." Such fear is strong primarily in Czechoslovakia and Poland, both of which now hold territory that was inhabited by Germans and was part of the prewar German *Reich*. After World War II, Czechoslovakia recovered the so-called Sudetenland, which had been lost to Nazi Germany as a result of the Munich agreement of 1938. Poland acquired the German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers (with the exception of that part of East Prussia taken by the Soviet Union). The surviving population of these territories was expelled and resettled in the remainder of Germany.

The government of the Federal Republic has always made a distinction between the Sudetenland and the so-called "Eastern territories" taken by Poland. Although the rights

of the Sudeten German refugees have never been flatly repudiated, no frontier problem is considered to exist between Germany and Czechoslovakia. All West German governments have declared the Munich agreement to be "no longer valid"⁹ (the Czechs insist that it never was valid).

POLISH BORDER

The question of Germany's frontier with Poland represents a far more serious problem.¹⁰ The Potsdam Agreement defined Germany's frontiers as those of 1937, until such time as a peace treaty should be negotiated. The Eastern territories were, however, placed under "Polish administration." No German government has been willing to accept the Oder-Neisse frontier as final.

The Soviet and Polish propaganda line has consistently demanded voluntary West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a prelude to better relations.¹¹

RELATIONS WITH RUMANIA

Thus far the most noteworthy achievement of the Grand Coalition's détente policy was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania in January, 1967. Bucharest was the logical place to start. Rumania was interested in increased trade, and General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu showed considerable willingness to follow an independent diplomatic line. The Rumanians demanded no special conditions, and in public statements no mention was made of the Oder-Neisse line or the D.D.R.

The East German party boss, Walter Ulbricht, accused the Rumanians of "deplorable" conduct in these dealings with the Federal Republic. The Rumanians responded with a charge that Ulbricht was interfering in their domestic affairs. In an effort to strengthen its position, the D.D.R. concluded bilateral treaties of friendship with the other Warsaw Pact states (except Rumania). Since the Rumanian episode, Ulbricht has demanded that his allies extract

⁹ Cf. *Deutsche Politik 1966*, p. XVI.

¹⁰ A considerable literature already exists on this subject, most of it partisan. Different points of view are represented in the following works: Goettingen Research Committee, *German Eastern Territories* (Würzburg: Holzner, 1957); Andrzej Lesniewski, *Western Frontier of Poland* (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1965); Friedrich Wilpert, *The Oder-Neisse Problem* (Bonn, Brussels, New York: Edition Atlantic-Forum, 1964); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors* (London: 1956).

12) The D.D.R. recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier in 1950.

"political association" (in some sort of recognition of the D.D.R.) in exchange for diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic.



* Unshaded portion, former German territory

GERMANY'S BORDERS

Despite Ulbricht's objections, in the first months of 1967 it was confidently predicted that Hungary, Bulgaria, and even Czechoslovakia would soon follow the Rumanian lead and establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. These expectations have not materialized, although the Czechs and West Germans did exchange trade missions in 1967.¹⁴

The Soviet Union appears to have held back the Bulgarians and Hungarians.¹⁵ Despite the so-called Bucharest Declaration of July, 1966, which appeared to invite the type of contact advocated by the Grand Coalition, recent West German moves in Eastern Europe have been received with considerable coolness by the Soviet Union.¹⁶ At the Seventh Congress of the S.E.D. (Socialist Unity Party) in East Berlin, in May, 1967, Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev denounced West German policy as an effort to split the Warsaw Pact and isolate the D.D.R. While this might be interpreted, in part, as a pep talk for Ulbricht, which did not close

¹⁴ Such contacts had already been established with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland in 1963.

¹⁵ See Stephen Anderson, "Soviet Russia and the Two Europes," *Current History*, October, 1967, p. 206.

¹⁶ For the text of the Bucharest Declaration, see *Current History*, October, 1967, pp. 236-237.

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

the door to détente, there has been no subsequent departure from this line.

Although the Soviet Union can restrain the Warsaw Pact states, Yugoslavia is much more difficult to influence. At the beginning of 1968, negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations were opened between the Federal Republic and Yugoslavia.

In contrast to the limited advances in East Europe, nothing positive was achieved in relations with East Germany during 1967. In line with some segments of West German opinion, the publicly stated policy of the Grand Coalition has been to draw the D.D.R. into the general framework of détente and even to negotiate "practical questions of co-existence."¹⁹ This willingness to cooperate with the D.D.R., however, is subject to the limitation that the Federal Republic will not agree to any formula which would imply recognition of the D.D.R. as a second German state. The East German regime has responded with unacceptable demands for "normal relations" between Bonn and East Berlin. The Grand Coalition obviously has never envisioned more than the encouragement of private and semi-official contacts with the D.D.R.

The D.D.R., on its part, has not displayed any interest in increased contacts with West Germany. Toward the end of 1967, in fact, the tone of East German pronouncements became more strident, and further restrictions were placed on existing religious, scientific, cultural and sports contacts. There were no Christmas passes for West Berliners in 1967.

— — — the fundamental obstacles to détente remain. Reunification does not appear to be any closer; the Soviet Union continues to hold East Germany as a diplomatic hostage. West German policy remains cramped by the Oder-Neisse problem, which in turn provides the Soviet Union with a whip to hold over the heads of the Poles.

¹⁹ See "Neue Profile der Deutschlandpolitik," *SBZ-Archiv*, October, 1967, pp. 291-292; and Conrad Ahlers (Bonn's Presschief), "Das Zweite Jahr der Grosse Koalition," *Deutsche Korrespondenz*, January 6, 1968, p. 4.

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Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

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Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7

August 1968

Soviet Protesters Increasingly Articulate

Deep-seated criticism of Soviet society by its citizens has been particularly evident since early 1966. In February of that year 25 leading intellectuals protested against reported plans to rehabilitate Stalin. In March 1966 some 80 respected intellectuals petitioned for paroling into their custody authors Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who had been sentenced to maximum terms of imprisonment in February. Growing out of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case were other protests, including those registered by young Soviet writers Aleksander Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Yuri Bukovsky, and Vadim Delone. Their arrests in early 1967 and the trials of Bukovsky in the fall of 1967 and of Ginzburg and Galanskov and others in January 1968 have evoked signed protests from hundreds of Soviet citizens from all walks of life.

In 1968 protest has continued in the USSR, as illustrated by three remarkable documents. One, completed in June and circulated inside the USSR by Professor Andrei D. Sakharov, who remains in the USSR, is a detached, well-reasoned 10,000-word essay the broad scope of which is indicated by its title: "Thoughts About Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom." Another document, written outside the USSR in June 1968, is a letter by Soviet author Arkady V. Belinkov who, on grounds of personal experience, emotionally condemns Soviet society and resigns from the USSR Writers Union. A third protest document is the novel by Oles Honchar* entitled Sobor (The Cathedral). Published in Ukrainian in January, the novel discusses fictional situations which, because of the harsh criticisms of the novel by the Party press, are confirmed as revelations of actual conditions.

Professor Sakharov is in a peculiarly favorable position from which to launch a protest against Soviet society. He is widely known to have made a substantial contribution to the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. Shortly after the detonation of the first in 1953 Sakharov was made a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; then 32, he was the youngest Soviet scientist to receive that honor. Sakharov has joined other scientists, artists, and intellectuals in protest before, including the above-noted February 1966 petition. He circulated the draft of his recent essay amongst the USSR's leading intellectuals, soliciting their comments and incorporating these in his manuscript.

In his essay Sakharov aimed much of his criticism at Stalinism, calling for a thorough investigation into the damaging effects of Stalin's dictatorial rule and demanding that "neo-Stalinists" be ousted from positions of influence. For example, in pleading for intellectual freedom he denounced Soviet censorship policies as a harmful restraint on free inquiry

*Honchar is the author's name in the Ukrainian language; in Russian it is Aleksander Gonchar.

and asked for a law to reduce the absolute powers of Glavlit, the Soviet censorship agency founded during Stalin's reign. He proposed that debate be encouraged, allowing the expression not only of correct but also of dubious ideas as a way to nurture fresh and profound thoughts; praising the ancient Greeks for their understanding of this, Sakharov said that "after 50 years of full control over the minds of the entire country, our leadership seems to be afraid of even a hint at such a debate." He spoke up for supporting the Czechoslovaks' "bold initiative, which is very important for the fate of Socialism and the whole of mankind." Sakharov condemned as shameful the imprisonment of Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel, the Soviet writers whose arrest in September 1965 and trial in February 1966 epitomized for many re-Stalinization by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Moreover, he urged the release of all political prisoners.

Discussing current foreign affairs, Professor Sakharov charged that the USSR was responsible for the Israeli-Arab conflict of June 1967 because of "irresponsible encouragement" of the Arabs. Moreover, he denounced the USSR's action in breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, protesting that this had damaged efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict and had made more difficult "a necessary diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Arab countries."

One of Sakharov's basic theses is that the estrangement of mankind has put civilization under the perilous shadow of nuclear destruction, famine and ideological myths that leave nations at the mercy of "cruel and treacherous demagogues." In the light of Brezhnev's series of speeches in July laying down the strict orthodox line,* it is quite likely that Sakharov is referring not only to Stalin's deliberate estrangement of the non-Communist world, but also to the policies of the current Soviet leadership as well.

Sakharov's essay is circulating around Moscow in manuscript. The attached article from the New York Times summarizes the essay; on 22 July the full text was published in the New York Times

* * *

Arkady V. Belinkov, 48, attempted to adjust to the Soviet system despite having spent 13 years in concentration camps and being confronted with numerous obstacles to the publication of most of his works. His frustrations eventually led him and his wife to flee to the West and in June 1968 he set forth in bitter, piercing prose his long-accumulated, emotional

*Brezhnev sternly warned against having anything to do with the "rotting, degenerating capitalist society" in the world of ideas, and spoke out for determination in holding the line against "ideological subversion" from the West.

protest in a lengthy letter of resignation from the USSR Writers Union.**

As did Professor Sakharov, Belinkov directed a large part of his protest against the past and present influences of Stalinism. Excerpts from his letter follow:

"... with the ascendancy of this latest government -- the dullest most worthless, least intellectual government in the history of the Soviet state -- it became clear that a certain and inevitable restoration of Stalinism had taken place; the Stalinists, who had felt a slight pinch in the past, were now squaring their shoulders, rolling up their sleeves, and rubbing their hands with glee -- their hour had come. A return to the ideas of Stalin, Beria, and Zhdanov had begun; the once-stagnant revanchists are forming into columns and reviewing the lists of their enemies....

"Of the tyrants Lenin was not all-powerful because he did not have time to destroy the opposition; Stalin, however, was all-powerful because he succeeded in destroying it....

"Stalin was the purest, highest, and most significant incarnation of Soviet power. He was its symbol, portrait, and flag. And therefore everything that happens or will happen in Russia is more or less related to the Stalinism which has infused Soviet society. The Soviet regime was unable to discover anything better than Stalin in its bowels because it found in Stalin the ultimate synthesis of the qualities of a dictator and a scoundrel. Thus everything that happened after him was connected with the weakening or strengthening of his magnetic field which at first receded, then stretched out again to precipitate trials and reprisals, stone-age censorship, unbridled prevarication, and petty complacency....

"For four years a battle has raged over the publication of the novels The Cancer Ward and In the First Circle, by the great Russian writer Aleksander Isayevich Solzhenitsyn. This battle has not been won and I am not sure the author will emerge victorious on the Soviet publishing battlefield....

"In rehabilitating Stalin with increasing savagery, the post-Khrushchev government has inevitably found it necessary to intensify repression with increasing savagery, and the return of Stalin to the ranks of the great has this purpose. By birth and profession, I belong to the circle of people who have been subjected to constant attacks by the Soviet authorities, that is, to the intelligentsia -- those people who cannot tolerate violations of their freedom. Like

**The full text of Belinkov's letter appeared in Russian in Novoye Russkoye Slovo (New Russian World), New York, 20 July 1968.

many other intellectuals, I hear the same question in differing versions: why does this most powerful state persecute people who do not agree with its ideology, since the state is well aware that these persecutions -- more than anything else -- arouse world public opinion? I could never understand their bewilderment....

"Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev.... This common Soviet man and metallurgist, having imprisoned and murdered as many as he could in the good old Stalin days...."

* * *

In contrast to Belinkov, Oles Honchar has been able over the years to accommodate the Soviet system. Since 1959 he has headed the Ukrainian Writers Union and was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1964. He was able to stay within the bounds of acceptable behavior when he argued fervently against censorship and suppression of writers in November, 1966, at the Ukrainian Writers' Congress and in May, 1967, at the USSR Writers' Congress. Confirming his "acceptability," his recent novel Sobor was published in January, 1968, in the Ukrainian literary journal Vitchyzna (Fatherland).

The initial published reaction to Sobor was highly favorable. For example" Robitnicha Hazeta (Workers Gazette) of 22 February praised it as the "apex of Ukrainian prose." Starting 26 April, however, Communist Party organs such as Radyanska Ukraina (Soviet Ukraine) started to attack the novel. In that and other criticisms the following points have been brought out:

-- The novels' setting is really Dnepropetrovsk, where Brezhnev launched his political career in the 1930's;

-- Industrialization, with its heavy air pollution, is portrayed as a mixed blessing to the Cossacks of the Ukraine and has made the "young" city of Dnepropetrovsk grimy;

-- Honchar evaluates modern reality as a time of "gloomy standardization and a spiritual impoverishment of the people";

-- The novel's nationalistic and religious overtones are objectionable;

-- Freedom of the spirit and the spirit of independence and unconquerability, and the association of art and freedom, according to one critic, are "often" discussed by the novel's heroes;

-- Everyday life is depicted as monotonous;

-- The main conflict of the era is the struggle of creators against wreckers, and workers against bureaucrats (elsewhere a critic complains that Honchar's novel regards State and Party workers as bureaucrats and even wreckers).

The sum and substance of the Party press criticism is that the book depicts life in the Ukraine negatively. As muted as this criticism was -- and it obviously skirted the limits of what is publishable -- it nevertheless gives an effective insight to the issues which move Soviets to demand changes in their system.