


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May 1968

WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

- 1 HANOI'S OTHER FRONTS IN ASIA
- ② COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF THE
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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs

(22 March to 18 April 1968)

1. Czechoslovakia

a. Exit Novotny. The liberalizing trend in Czechoslovakia became noticeable late in 1967 and led to the ouster of Antonin Novotny as Party First Secretary on 5 January 1968. Now more of the Stalinist "Old Guard" have been removed from their positions of power. Novotny was obliged by public pressure to resign his remaining -- and largely ceremonial -- post of President on 21 March and was replaced on 30 March by 72-year old General Ludvik Svoboda, who had already received some pointedly favorable publicity in the Soviet press.

b. The Action Program. The Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party held a Plenum which lasted a week (29 March-5 April). The Plenum approved the much discussed "Action Program." Though replete with typical Communist propaganda scoring imperialism, praising the Soviet Union, pledging support for North Vietnam, etc., it contains many promises of reforms which, by totalitarian standards at least, are liberal. These include pledges of greater freedom of speech and press, and promises for the rehabilitation of both Communist and non-Communist victims of past political purges. It also outlines economic and managerial reforms designed to modernize the Czech economy which has fallen sadly behind Western European levels during the 20 years of Communist rule. Significantly, the Action Program proclaims a two-Germanies policy, saying that "realistic forces" in West Germany (presumably meaning the Social Democrats) deserve Czech support.

c. Public comment in Czechoslovakia on the Action Program was not universally favorable. Some hard-liners criticized it, and so did some liberals who were disappointed that it did not go much further. The most distinguished among the liberal critics was Professor Ivan Svitak, a leading intellectual and former professor at the Institute of Philosophy, who said in a lecture, excerpts of which were published on 10 April in the newspaper STUDENT: "The peculiarity of the current change is that no changes have occurred; the mechanism of total dictatorship remains intact." Professor Svitak commented that the Action Program contains no provision for true opposition parties. (It does make the statement that parties allied with the Communists in the National Front should be strengthened.) Svitak also noted that although the Action Program calls for abolishing press censorship, it qualifies this by saying that the state should still be able to determine when publication of certain information can be forbidden. Similarly, the Action Program calls for freedom of speech, but with the reservation that this must be "within the framework of Socialist laws."

d. General Bohumir Lomsky, Defense Minister and Deputy Commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, resigned on 3 April. One of the last of the Novotny men, Lomsky's resignation or dismissal had been expected since the defection to the U.S.A. in February of one of his close colleagues, Major General Jan Sejna. Lomsky's deputy, Colonel General Vaclav Janko, committed suicide in March.

e. New Government Formed. An almost completely different government was formed shortly after the Plenum ended. Oldrich Gernik, one of the few holdovers from the previous government, was named Premier. Although only 46 years of age, he has been a member of the Central Committee for 10 years, and a member of the Presidium for 2 years. Professor Ota Sik, Director of the Economic Institute and author of many economic reforms instituted in recent years, is one of five Deputy Premiers in the new cabinet. He was a prisoner of the Nazis in the notorious Mauthausen concentration camp, 1940-45. Dr. Jiri Hajek, 54, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, has been a member of the Central Committee since 1948. He was the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Great Britain, 1955-58, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1958-62. The Party Presidium has also been reorganized. Of the 10 full members of 5 January 1968, the date Novotny was dismissed as Party First Secretary, only 3 remained (Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Gernik and Drahomir Kolder). In fact not one of the old conservative (Stalinist-Novotnyite) members remains.

f. Bloc Pressure. Within forty-eight hours after the forced resignation of Novotny, Alexander Dubcek was summoned to Dresden on 23 March to explain to leaders of the other Warsaw Pact¹ countries exactly how far he and his colleagues proposed to carry the "liberalization" program. Dubcek apparently at least partially assuaged his colleagues' alarm and assured them that Czechoslovakia remained loyal to the Soviet Union and to the Warsaw Pact. The Czechs achieved a noteworthy victory at Dresden in dissuading other Warsaw Pact members from holding planned military maneuvers this summer on Czech territory, since the presence of Soviet and East German troops in Czechoslovakia at such a critical time would have put the new regime under great pressure. The harmony was soon broken by Kurt Hager, leading ideologist of the East German Communist Party and a member of its Politburo. Speaking before a congress of Marxist philosophers, including some from Czechoslovakia at Karl Marx University in East Berlin on 26 March, Hager attacked "renewers" and revisionists, and singled out Josef Smrkovsky, one of the most dynamic Czech liberals, as a chief target. He was also extremely critical of Austrian Communist Ernst Fischer, who is frequently lauded by the new Czech leaders for his innovative ideas and for the fact that he led the 1963 fight for the ideological "rehabilitation" of Franz Kafka, celebrated Czech writer. The Czech Government took a sufficiently grave view of the Hager speech to make a formal diplomatic protest to the East Germans over this interference in Czech domestic affairs. In addition, many Czech Party and front groups rebutted the East German's criticisms and expressed complete support for Smrkovsky. Indicative of the current state of Czech-East German relations, there has been no public East German acknowledgment of the Czech protest in more than two weeks.

¹Except Rumania, which did not participate in the meeting in Dresden.

2. Poland

a. Gomulka in trouble. Student unrest and widespread anti-Semitic campaigns continued to dominate news from Poland. However, these appear to be but symptoms of a growing political crisis within the Polish Party and Government. The present Party leadership under the direction of Wladyslaw Gomulka has now held power for nearly 12 years, and a number of influential Party men feel that that is long enough. Gomulka came to power in 1956 as a symbol of resistance to Stalinist rule, but as the years have passed, he backslid increasingly to a very similar system of repressive government. During the past six months, there have been more and more frequent reports of pressures on Gomulka from within the Party to make way for new and younger leadership. Meanwhile, Gomulka presents the somewhat pathetic figure of an aging, tired man, incapable of adjusting to, let alone controlling, the rapid course of events. General Mieczyslaw Moczar, the Minister of Interior, seems to be gathering some of the influence and power Gomulka is losing. Another man who also is working hard to improve his position in the power structure is Edward Gierek, Presidium member and boss of the Party in Upper Silesia. Both Moczar and Gierek have made strongly anti-Semitic statements in recent weeks. Short biographies of Moczar and Gierek are attached.

b. Governmental changes. Several changes which appear to be of only secondary significance have been made in the Polish Government. Edward Ochab, the ailing President (Chairman of the Council of State), resigned for reasons of health and was replaced on 11 April by General Marian Spychalski, previously Minister of Defense. Lieutenant General Wojciech Jaruzelski, formerly Deputy Minister of Defense, was named Minister, replacing Spychalski. Spychalski's appointment was viewed as a compromise between the factions of Gomulka and Moczar and his departure from the Defense Ministry was considered more of a loss to the Gomulka faction because his replacement is thought to be a less staunch Gomulka supporter than Spychalski, whose new job reduces him to a mere figurehead.

3. Soviet Union

a. Brezhnev 29 March Speech. The CPSU line has been harder in recent months, particularly since the Budapest Conference, and on 29 March, at a congress of Moscow Communists, Brezhnev delivered a tough speech in which he declared that "Western imperialism is trying to weaken the ideological unity of the socialist countries by relying mainly on revisionist and nationalist elements." He explicitly attacked dissident Soviet intellectuals and seemed to be aiming his remarks also at liberals and intellectuals in Eastern Europe. He made it clear that the Party would not tolerate Czech-type liberalization in the USSR. He called for "iron discipline" in the 13-million member CPSU and warned dissident Soviet intellectuals that they "cannot expect impunity if they fall into the net of Western ideologists."

b. Central Committee Plenum. The Central Committee of the CPSU held a two-day Plenum in Moscow, April 9-10. Party chief Leonid Brezhnev gave the principal report of topical problems of the international situation and the struggle of the CPSU to rally the International Communist Movement, as well as the closing speech. A number of party leaders and other public figures also spoke, including the Minister of Culture, the Editor-in-chief of Pravda, the Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the First Secretary of the Komsomol, and the Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers.

c. The Plenum was deeply concerned over the potential impact on Soviet society of the Czechoslovak program, and over the political situation in Poland. The extent of Soviet concern over Czechoslovakia may be gauged from the fact that the Plenum was originally due to meet 20 March and, as promised by Brezhnev just last February, had been expected to discuss agriculture. The twenty-day postponement was evidently occasioned by the Soviet CC's desire to have the benefit of the results of the Dresden Meeting of 23 March, as well as more information on the "Action Program" which was formally adopted by the Czech CC Plenum whose final session was held on 5 April. When the CPSU finally did give some prominence to Czech Party activity on 12 April in Pravda, it did so by stressing the views of the Czechoslovak old-guard Communists, who are worried by the current liberalization drive.

d. The CPSU leaders are obviously determined to isolate the Soviet people as much as possible, not only from the freeworld, but also from the ferment in Eastern Europe. The resolution adopted by the 360-member Central Committee "called for expansion of the entire ideological activities of the Party" as one of the "most sacred duties of all party organizations." The resolution endorsed Brezhnev's intensive ideological campaign "to combat subversive efforts by the West" by tightening ideological control over Soviet literature and art as part of a program to strengthen the patriotism of the Soviet people. The resolution claimed that "the entire huge apparatus of anti-Communist propaganda is now directed at the unity of socialist countries, the international Communist movement, at splitting the front-ranking forces of our times, at undermining the socialist society from inside."

e. The CC Plenum expressed "full approval" for the decision taken at the Budapest Consultative Conference to hold a World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow toward the end of this year and instructed the Politburo "to exert every effort" for the success of the world conference. The Plenum also approved Soviet actions at the Sofia summit conference of the Warsaw Pact in early March; it expressed support for North Vietnam and for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty now before the U.N.; and it approved Soviet actions in the Middle East.

4. East Germany

New Constitution Approved in Referendum. In a national referendum held with great fanfare on 6 April, the East German electorate ratified by a comfortable margin (94.9% of the electorate favored it) a new Constitution drawn up by Walter Ulbricht and his colleagues on the Central Committee. The constitution attempts to legitimize the situation which has existed for 19 years, i.e., a separate East German state in which the Socialist Unity Party (Communist) holds all political power. The new Constitution, which replaces a 1949 Charter, guarantees all citizens the right to an education and to a job, but omits mention of some previously approved rights, notably the right to strike. The new Constitution contains what amounts to voluntary restrictions on East German sovereignty, especially in Article VII, which speaks of "close brotherhood in arms with the armies of the Soviet Union and other socialist states."

5. Communist China

a. Army Chief Purged. Purges of key people continue. The latest victim is Yang Cheng-wu, Acting Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Yang's fall is of special interest as he was said to have been Lin Piao's personal choice for the position when the previous Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching, was purged in May 1966. Yang has been replaced by Huang Yung-sheng who had been Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Kwangtung Province, a post he had held only since 21 February 1968. (The revolutionary committees have been established in many provinces throughout the country to replace administrative bodies which either ceased to exist or were powerless to act as a result of the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.) Huang Yung-sheng, 62 years old, has been an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party since 1956.

b. Red Flag leading theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, has apparently suspended publication, no issue having been seen since the first of the year. Chen Po-ta, member of the Central Committee and editor of Red Flag since its inception in 1958, was MAO's personal secretary for many years and Red Flag was considered to be MAO's mouthpiece. It appears that Chen's star has fallen considerably, for he has not appeared at public functions for some time, although his name has not been mentioned among those disgraced or purged. Red Flag has loudly and frequently criticized the Army during the past 2 years, and the Army is thought to be responsible for having forced the journal to suspend publication.

6. Dissensions within the International Communist Movement

a. Sino-Soviet.

(1) Radio Peace and Progress, the Soviet Union's "unofficial" foreign propaganda broadcasting station, claimed in a broadcast beamed

to China on 3 April that China had halted all economic and military aid to North Vietnam and said that foreign observers attributed the cessation of aid to chaotic conditions prevailing in China.

(2) Much in the manner of the North Korean detention of the Pueblo, the Chinese authorities in Whampoa held a Soviet tanker for two weeks, accusing the Soviets of using its visit to Chinese ports to spy on Chinese ships and fortifications.

b. Greece. Yet another recent example of dissension in the World Communist movement is the split in the exiled Greek Communist Party (illegal in Greece since 1941). One faction under Nikos Zachariades, who was the Communist leader during the guerrilla war in Greece, 1946-49, is based in Moscow, while the other has its headquarters in Bucharest. (The group in Bucharest is reported to be further divided, with some members favoring the Chinese.) An important aspect of the split is the bitter disappointment of most Greek Communists over the surprisingly mild attitude of the Soviet Bloc towards the present military junta in Greece. In fact the Soviet Union has given profitable contracts to Greece and East Germany has even offered the Greek government credits to the extent of \$90,000,000.

c. Iraq. The Soviets have cut off their support of the Voice of the Iraqi People (VOIP), a semi-clandestine broadcasting station believed to be based in Bulgaria, which has been broadcasting Communist propaganda to Iraq in Arabic and Kurdish for the past five years. On 24 February, only two days prior to the opening of the Consultative Communist Conference in Budapest, which representatives of the pro-Soviet Iraqi Communist Party attended, VOIP announced that, "due to changed conditions in Iraq," it would cease broadcasting as of 27 February. The "changed conditions" in fact applied to Soviet foreign policy, not to conditions in Iraq. Soviet policy currently is to curry favor in the Moslem world, including the favor of such "reactionary" (by Communist standards) regimes as those of Jordan and Iran (both monarchies), and Iraq (a military dictatorship). Three days before VOIP announced its "suspension," it excoriated the Iraqi Government in these words:

"The regime's evil, reactionary whims have caused the imprisonment, death, or dismissal from army ranks of thousands of efficient national officers and soldiers. During the battle against Israel in June 1967, the regime sent only token units and resorted to a hypocritical propaganda campaign instead of mobilizing the struggling forces against the enemy They frustrated the will of the people by their provocative, intimidatory policy and crushed the people's demonstrations by force Such behavior reveals their strong feelings of support for the reactionary agent regimes in the Arab countries and their inclination to bargain with imperialism Those who ally themselves with imperialism and its supporters are actually placing themselves outside the national liberation camp's struggle against imperialism and Israel"

Such sentiments being directly contradictory to current Soviet official policy, it is understandable that the Soviet Government cut off its support to VOIP. It is merely another instance in which the Soviets have sacrificed a local Communist Party to Soviet national and foreign policy interests.

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May 1968

Mieczyslaw Moczar: Poland's Minister of Interior

Mieczyslaw Moczar (pronounced Mo-char) has frequently been mentioned as a possible successor to Wladyslaw Gomulka. He has also been called a "king-maker" because, although he prefers to operate behind the scenes and does not appeal to the majority of Poles, as Minister of Interior he controls the powerful state security apparatus and as head of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (a veterans group referred to as ZBOWID) he controls one of Poland's largest mass organizations. (Moczar has expanded ZBOWID in recent years by opening up its membership to anybody affected in any way by World War II -- concentration camp inmates, civilian victims, fighters adhering to the anti-Nazi and anti-Communist Polish government in London. To perpetuate the organization, he now includes the sons and daughters of qualified members.) With these instruments, Moczar can apply considerable pressure for or against contenders for the leadership of Poland's Communist Party. In any case, Moczar is deeply involved in Poland's current power struggle and will be a key figure in any decisions of that country's future.

Moczar's background, like that of many Communist leaders, is obscure. He was born in Lodz on 25 December 1913. His Ukrainian parents had him christened Mikolaj Demko; he was known by his Ukrainian and Russian nickname of "Wanka." He received little education, and when very young became a member of a gang of petty robbers and horse thieves. (He was once caught and badly beaten by some peasants while attempting to steal some horses.) He got a job in a textile factory, and became active in the Communist movement in Lodz in the 1930's.

At the outbreak of World War II, Moczar fled to the USSR, where he received training from the NKVD, the predecessor of the present KGB (Committee for State Security). He was sent back into German-occupied Polish territory by the NKVD, and joined the Polish resistance. He "miraculously" escaped the fate of the rest of his unit when the Germans overran the area and killed or captured them. There have been rumors that he had at times collaborated with the Gestapo.

After the Germans were driven from Poland, Moczar participated in the liquidation of thousands of non-Communists, and is credited with having arranged the assassination of Boleslaw Scibiurek, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, in December 1945. In fact, this particular crime led to the murder of a UB (Secret Police) lieutenant whom Moczar feared and ordered "removed" because of his knowledge of the affair.

Moczar was so ruthless in his actions against any enemies of the Communist regime, real or imagined, that he was promoted to Colonel and placed in charge of the UB in Lodz. There he continued his repressive

activities and thousands of Poles were beaten and tortured, and many were killed -- usually in the same buildings previously used by the Nazi Gestapo. Moczar was responsible for the bloody suppression of workers' strikes at Pabjanice and Moszczenice in 1945, in Lodz in 1947.

Moczar's career has been marked by ruthless opportunism. His willingness to employ force stamped him as a "Stalinist" and was his primary qualification for the post of Minister of Interior, to which he was appointed in December 1964.

He has become particularly prominent in the news from Poland in early 1968. According to some reports, Moczar helped to provoke student uprisings in early March by ordering that the play "Dziady" ("Forefather") be closed in late January. (The play contained lines which, though written in the 19th century and directed against the Russia of tsarist times, were deemed insulting to the Soviet Union.) According to numerous reports, the Polish students denounced Moczar during their protests and regard him as the most serious obstacle to political and economic liberalization. In any event, Moczar reacted harshly to the demonstrations, and his UB plainclothesmen played a large role in the numerous arrests which ensued.

Moczar is also regarded as a driving force behind the current campaign against "Zionism." It is felt that this campaign is at least partly an expression of his hostility toward Poland's intellectuals, from whom he receives no significant support and with whom he has little in common even though he has been trying to cultivate them by such standard techniques as conferring honors on them, going to writers' meetings and having his picture taken shaking hands with them.

The picture of Moczar which emerges from his background, career, attitudes, and policies is that of a "Stalinist." Unfortunately for Poland, Moczar is not an exception amongst leading Communist politicians; rather, he represents a sizable element of the Party. Whether Moczar can exploit his present strong position for himself or for a contender of his choice remains to be seen.

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May 1968

Edward Gierrek: A Profile

In nationally publicized speeches of 14 and 30 March 1968, Edward Gierrek projected himself as a serious contender for the leadership of Poland in the event Wladyslaw Gomulka is forced to relinquish his 12 year hold on the country. In those speeches Gierrek gave the impression of a cautious advocate of reforms which would appeal to the Communist Party's younger members. Although he criticized students for their behavior in the riots of early March he did not endorse the regime's harsh reactions in putting the riots down, and as a general practice he rejected coercion as a means of solving problems. In the earlier speech he attacked "Zionists", but on 30 March he omitted them from his list of Poland's political opponents. Gierrek also emphasized his strong support of the Polish-Soviet alliance. The combination of these positions and his reputation as a hard-driving, successful political leader and industrial administrator in Katowice Province establishes Gierrek as a person who can appeal to moderate Party members and at the same time assure Party conservatives that they need not fear substantial political and economic changes if he assumes power.

Edward Gierrek is not an ordinary Communist leader. He spent 24 of his 55 years (he was born on 6 January 1913) in France and Belgium, where he worked as a miner. His activities in Poland since he returned in 1948 have been well publicized in the press and by radio reports. He turned down opportunities to live and work in comfortable circumstances in Warsaw, preferring a more difficult assignment in the remote province of Katowice, where he has been the first secretary of the Party organization since 1957. Gierrek is also distinguished from most of his fellow leaders by his success in fostering industrial development in Katowice and by the support he received from the workers in his province.

Highlights of Gierrek's career are:

1948-56: Studied engineering and economics, performed Party work in Katowice Province, and became the Party's leading expert on the political administration of heavy industry.

1956: Headed the commission of inquiry into the Poznan riots in July, and supported Gomulka in the confrontation with Khrushchev in October.

Since 1957: Has headed the Party in Katowice Province.

Since 1957: Has been a member of the Party Politburo.

Gierek's industrial achievements are evidenced by statistics on Katowice: occupying only 3% of Poland's territory and containing 11% of the population, the province accounts for 20% of the country's industrial production.

Gierek has shown political shrewdness in carrying out his assignments. For instance, he is credited with halting a trainload of food bound for Germany in the winter of 1963-64, a time of food shortages, and distributing the contents throughout his province. He has seen to it that workers in his province are paid better than in most other areas of Poland. In 1966 he undercut the national policy of restricting celebrations of the Millenium of the Catholic Church in Poland by hinting that he did not agree with Warsaw, and thus gained some sympathy from Church leaders in his area. He also bolstered his image by appearing to oppose Gomulka's decision in the fall of 1967 to raise meat prices. One measure of the response to such political gestures was the March 1965 parliamentary election, in which Gierek's showing was as impressive as Gomulka's and better than anyone else's.

Gierek also seems to have attained significant status in foreign relations. He has regularly accompanied Gomulka on major trips to Moscow and the Soviet press mentions him frequently. De Gaulle, during his trip to Poland in September 1967, spent considerable time with Gierek in Katowice and made flattering remarks about the "Polishness" of one of that province's formerly German towns.

In national affairs Gierek has steadily broadened his appeal to Poland's various political groupings: the Communist Party apparatus, the "Partisans" (hard-line faction led by Minister of Interior Moczar), the moderate Catholics, the students, and the liberals. In addition, Gierek has developed extensive ties with the military by virtue of being chairman of the parliamentary Commission on National Defense.

In short, Gierek has worked hard to pave the way for his rise to the pinnacle of power in Poland. The question now seems to be when will he make his bid, rather than would he be able to do nationally what he has done for his province ... and for himself?

Tokyo JIJI
9 March 1968

JCP BLASTS PEKING OVER 'METHOD OF ATTACK'

Tokyo--The Japan Communist Party in a formal statement Saturday blasted Communist China for "resorting to the dirtiest method of attack" in a frantic move to discredit the Japanese party. It is now evident, the party averred, that Peking already has no alternative but to have even Premier Chou En-lai pitch in to start a new campaign of slander in person against the Japanese party.

The party's statement was meant as a rebuttal to the reported allegation by Premier Chou that the Japan Communist Party as well as Soviet revisionists, American imperialism, and Japanese reactionaries are engaged in undercover activities to disrupt the situation in mainland China. The remark was made when he received a delegation of Japanese traders in Peking on Wednesday.

The statement maintained that "Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts" in the Chinese Communist Party had been engineering various activities of intervention and subversion against the Japan Communist Party, which is committed to the lines of independence and international communist solidarity. Now that all these machinations have come to naught, the party asserted, they have started resorting to the dirtiest method of slander under the leadership of Premier Chou himself.

The Japanese Communist Party, once Peking's protege, has washed its hands of the Chinese Communists' tough line in recent years and has pursued an independent line in the international communist movement.

Peking NCNA
19 March 1968

Text of Minutes

Following is the text of the minutes of talks between the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and six organizations belonging to the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade:

At the invitation of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, representatives of the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade, the association's Kansai head office, its Ishikawa Prefecture branch, Kyoto branch, Kobe branch, and Tokai headquarters paid a friendly visit to the People's Republic of China in the spring of 1968. They visited factories, people's communes, schools, and units of the People's Liberation Army, and had extensive contacts with workers, peasants, armymen and Red Guards.

During their stay in Peking, the representatives of the friendly Japanese trade organizations were received by Premier Chou En-lai in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.

Representatives of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the friendly Japanese trade organizations held friendly talks in a warm atmosphere. They reached unanimity of opinion on questions of continuing to develop the friendly and trade relations between the Chinese and Japanese people in the future.

The two sides unanimously point out that the present world situation is excellent. With great pleasure, the Japanese side has been for itself that China's unprecedented great proletarian cultural revolution, initiated and led by the Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao, scored a decisive victory in 1967. Guided by the whole series of Chairman Mao's latest instructions, the Chinese people are striving for all-round victory in the great proletarian cultural revolution. Mao Tse-tung's thought has been popularized even more extensively in China's cities and countryside and has gone deep into the hearts of the people. It has become the source of strength for the hundreds of millions of revolutionary masses in their valiant march forward. The masses of workers and peasants have grasped the great call of the great leader Chairman Mao "to grasp revolution and promote production," and industrial and agricultural

production is developing vigorously. All China is full of vitality and confidence and prosperity is seen everywhere. In the visit, what impressed the Japanese side most was the extremely great achievements of the Chinese people in their living study and application of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The Japanese side points out that the great victories in China's great proletarian cultural revolution have greatly inspired the oppressed people and nations all over the world in their struggles for liberation, and have dealt heavy blows at U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism and all reaction.

The Chinese side warmly acclaims the Japanese people's patriotic just struggle against U.S. imperialism. During the past year, the Japanese people have repeatedly launched extensive mass struggles against U.S. imperialist aggression, for national independence, in support of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, in defense of Sino-Japanese friendship and in opposition to Sato's criminal activities in visiting the U.S., Taiwan, and South Vietnam. A new anti-U.S. storm recently swept the islands of Japan. The masses of the Japanese people have waged heroic struggles in powerful waves against the entering into Sasebo port of the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, against the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries building of a military air field in Sanrizuka, and their building of a new U.S. Army field hospital in Tokyo, for recovering Okinawa, for abrogation of the Japan-U.S. "security treaty," and against U.S. imperialism's turning Japan into the biggest base for its aggression in Asia. In the course of these struggles, a broad patriotic united front against U.S. imperialism is being formed and broadened.

The Chinese side declares that the great struggles waged by the Japanese people are a tremendous support and inspiration to the people of China and the rest of the world.

Chairman Mao says: Japan is a great nation. It will certainly not allow U.S. imperialism to ride roughshod over it for long. "Among the Japanese, except for the pro-U.S. monopoly capitalists and the militarists, the broad masses of the people are our true friends." The Chinese side declares that the Chinese people follow the teachings of the great leader Chairman Mao, resolutely support the Japanese people in their struggle for independence, democracy and peace, and are convinced that final victory assuredly belongs to the great people of Japan.

Both sides unanimously point out that the people's war waged by the heroic Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is the greatest war for national liberation in the world today. The brilliant victories of the South Vietnamese people since their recent spring offensive once again demonstrate to the world that the Vietnamese people have completely taken the initiative in the war, and that the U.S. aggressor troops have been badly beaten into an impasse and are sinking fast. The great victories of the Vietnamese people have greatly enhanced the morale of the revolutionary people throughout the world and have put U.S. imperialism and its lackeys into chaos and confusion. The flames of the Asian, African, and Latin American people's struggles for national liberation are raging. The anti-U.S. struggle of the people throughout the world is growing. Imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reaction are in a dead alley. The capitalist world is sinking into an inescapable crisis. The devaluation of the British pound and the U.S. dollar crisis have greatly sharpened interimperialist contradictions. U.S. imperialism is facing a serious crisis politically, economically, and militarily. The entire situation, as Chairman Mao points out, is this: "The enemy rots with every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily."

The two sides unanimously hold that U.S. imperialism is the number one enemy of the people of China and Japan and the whole world; the Soviet modern revisionist clique is the number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism; the reactionary Sato government, which has accelerated its reactionary pro-U.S., unite with the Soviet Union and anti-China policy, and has been doing its utmost to speed up the all-round revival of militarism, has acted as a faithful stooge of U.S. imperialism in its aggression in Asia; the Miyamoto revisionist clique has degenerated into an antipeople and anti-China special detachment of the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries. To continue strengthening the struggle against these four enemies conforms to the interests not only of the Japanese and Chinese people, but of the

During the talks, the Japanese side gave an account of how the friendly Japanese trade personages, along with the Japanese people, develop national integrity and fight shoulder to shoulder against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. The Chinese side expressed firm support for the friendly Japanese trade personages in their struggles against U.S.-Japanese reaction and paid tribute to the friends in the friendly Japanese trade circles for their active efforts to develop the friendly and trade relations between the people of China and Japan.

The two sides affirm that the "protocol on the promotion of friendship and trade between the Chinese and Japanese peoples" signed in Peking on 27 February 1967, was correct. It has played a great role in developing the friendship and trade between China and Japan and has been welcomed and supported by the people of China and Japan.

During the talks, the two sides considered the prospects of expanding Sino-Japanese friendly trade. They unanimously pledged that they will develop the militant spirit of the "protocol," continue to insist on the three political principles and the three principles for trade, and the principle of the indivisibility of politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations and make concerted efforts to continue developing the friendly and trade relations between the peoples of China and Japan. These obstacles come from U.S. imperialism, the Sato reactionary government, and their accomplices. Therefore, the friendly contacts and trade relations between the peoples of China and Japan can grow smoothly only if tit for tat struggles are carried out against the four enemies headed by U.S. imperialism, their various plots and subversive activities exposed, and the artificial obstacles they have placed removed.

During the talks, the two sides discussed matters concerning the strengthening of mutual friendly contacts, technological exchange and friendly trade, reaching a harmony of views, and they are determined to make further efforts for this end.

The two sides discussed the question of holding a Japanese industrial exhibition in China and reached satisfactory agreement.

TASS, Moscow
3 April 1968

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SOVIET UNION PROTESTS CPR DETENTION OF SHIP

On 31 March and 3 April, the Soviet Government strongly protested to the CPR Government against the unlawful detention from 27 March in port Wampu (near the town of Kwanchow) of the Soviet tanker Komsomolets Ukrainy carrying a cargo for embattled Vietnam, it is officially announced here.

The Soviet Government demanded the adoption of measures to insure the safety of the tanker's crew and the lifting of the ban on the ship's departure from port with all its crew. The USSR Government stressed that the entire responsibility for the serious aftermath of the acts of arbitrariness and rude violence regarding the tanker and Soviet seamen rests with the CPR Government.

It is said in the announcement that the Chinese authorities are inventing various pretexts to prevent the ship from leaving port and are committing acts of arbitrariness against its crew. There is information that armed CPR servicemen have broken down doors and burst into the tanker's inner premises and are using force against the captain and other members of the crew.

These actions of the Chinese authorities are of a premeditated, provocative nature and are a rude violation of international law.

They can be assessed only as an intention to damage the cause of aid by the socialist countries to the Vietnamese people in their heroic struggle against the U.S. aggressors.

Peking NCNA
5 April 1968

SOVIET SHIP OFFICER ACCUSED OF PHOTO ESPIONAGE

Foreign Ministry Protest

--The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, in a note to the Soviet Embassy in Peking today, lodged a strong protest with the Soviet Government against the crime committed by Ponomarchuk, second mate of the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy, in carrying out espionage activities encroaching on China's sovereignty, and against the serious violation of law by Kosyakov, captain of the ship.

The note said that at 1404 on 23 March 1968, when the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy was sailing from Lasewei Island of Whampoa [Huangpu] port of Kwangchow [Canton], China, to Humen, Ponomarchuk, second mate of the ship, stealthily took photographs of Chinese naval vessels and the topography of the Humen fortress. But when Chinese inspectors made an inspection, Ponomarchuk flatly denied his crime and tried to expose the negatives for the purpose of destroying the evidence. Kosyakov, captain of the ship, took an intolerable attitude of shielding the crime of Ponomarchuk. He openly opposed the lawful detention of Second Mate Ponomarchuk by the Chinese department exercising proletarian dictatorship for trial. In addition, he instigated other crewmembers to make unwarranted provocations against Chinese personnel, completely ignoring the dignity of Chinese law.

While the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy was at the Whampoa port, its captain illegally used the ship's radio to transmit messages on many occasions, defying repeated warnings from the Chinese side and seriously violating China's port regulations.

The note pointed out that Soviet vessels and their crews had for a long time engaged in espionage activities in China's territorial waters. In July 1967 alone, the Soviet reconnaissance vessels Gidrolog and Gidrograf made six intrusions into east China coastal waters to engage in espionage activities, flagrantly violating the sovereignty of the PRC.
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In response to the Chinese protests, the Soviet side continued such criminal activities. At a time when U.S.

imperialism is taking new steps to expand its war in Vietnam, you act just like U.S. imperialism and energetically carry out espionage activities in the People's Republic of China, the rear area for the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. This clearly exposes the criminal aim of the Soviet revisionist leading clique to collude with U.S. imperialism and oppose China," the note said.

The Chinese Government, it declared, hereby lodges strong protests with the Soviet Government against the crimes of the Soviet vessels and their crews in carrying out **espionage activities and encroaching on China's sovereignty**. The Chinese Government sternly warns the Soviet Government that it must immediately stop such criminal activities by the Soviet vessels and their crews in China; otherwise, the Chinese Government will take severe measures.

In conclusion, the note said that the Chinese department concerned had made these decisions: Ponomarchuk, second mate, Kosyakov, captain, of the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy, ~~are to be~~ deported from China immediately and they are forbidden to enter any Chinese port again; and the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy should leave the port under armed escort.

Peking NCNA

Deportation of 2d Mate, Captain

Kwangchow, 4 April--The Whampoa frontier defense inspection station in Kwangchow today announced a decision with regard to Ponomarchuk, second mate, and Kosyakov, captain, of the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy.

The decision said that Ponomarchuk had engaged in criminal espionage activities, encroaching on China's sovereignty and Kosyakov had flagrantly violated Chinese law. To safeguard the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China and defend the dignity of Chinese law and port regulations, the decision announced the following measures to be taken:

- 1--Immediately deport from China Ponomarchuk, second mate, and Kosyakov, captain, of the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy. They are forbidden to enter any Chinese port again.
- 2--Order the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy to leave the port under armed escort.
- 3--Confiscate the camera and the negatives which Ponomarchuk used in his criminal activities.

The above decision has already been carried out.

BALTIMORE SUN
13 March 1968

Peking Renews Campaign To End Student Turmoil

By EDWARD K. WU
(Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun)

Hong Kong, March 12—Communist China has launched a renewed nation-wide campaign to send all students back to school in an attempt to end its current political turmoil.

The youths, idle for four semesters, have been jockeying for power and fighting "civil wars" among themselves for more than a year.

Many of them who acted as Red Guards and champions of Mao Tse-tung's thought during the early stages of the cultural revolution have largely ignored Mao's personal directive of March 7, 1967, ordering resumption of schools.

Last week, one year after the directive was circulated as a restricted document, it was published for the first time and with unusual fanfare that a "re-open school movement" was begun in all of China's 29 provinces, autonomous regions and independent cities.

The campaign appeared to reach a climax this week, with military-civilian rallies being held in all major cities to pledge full implementation of Mao's instructions on education.

Students Resist

That local military commanders and top officials of newly established provincial revolutionary committees addressed these rallies underlined the gravity of the situation caused by the students who, as Premier Chou En-lai recently put it, would rather turn to "love-making, playing poker and leading a dissipated life" than return to school.

The fact that the authorities had failed to reopen schools, closed since June, 1966, even with active military intervention, also indicated strong resistance on the part of the students.

Mao's directive empowered the Army to take over the schools and conduct military and political training for the students to pave the way for settling up new school leadership on a three-way alliance basis, comprising elements of the students, teachers and Army.

Student opposition to the in-

clusion of their former teachers, whom they had denounced as monsters and demons, in the new leadership core was one obstacle to the reopening of school classes.

At a rally of students and teachers held in Shanghai yesterday, Chang Chun-chiao, leader of the city's new administration, stressed that the question of who should be in the leadership overshadowed all other aspects of education reform.

Shanghai's 24 colleges and universities have set up revolutionary committees, but Chang warned that "interference from the right and extreme left" and anarchism and factionalism might still disrupt these committees.

Students Get Pled

In Kwangtung province where anarchism and factionalism are still rampant, Kung Shih-chuan, the local military leader, urged the students at a rally in Canton yesterday to welcome the "revolutionary" teachers and cadres to join them in executing Mao's directive.

In Hunan, Mao's home province, many primary and high schools and universities are still closed.

A Hunan newspaper, in a weekend editorial, appealed to the rival student groups to end their "civil war," treat without hostility those who have erred and lead the "deceived" masses back to the fold of the revolution.

The best place for them to make revolution was in the classrooms, the paper said.

"Reign Of Terror"

China's schools were first closed in June, 1966, to allow the students to take part in the cultural revolution and to map out an education reform.

Student Red Guards roamed the country and imposed a "reign of Terror" in the summer of that year followed by long journeys to the provinces to "exchange revolutionary experience."

Efforts to reopen schools to the schools since January, 1967, have met with little success.

Be Plagued

By Discontent Among Workers

By TILMAN DURDIN—
Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, March 9—Worker discontent and the spread of furtive capitalist practices are proving to be serious problems for the Maoist Government of Communist China.

The Chinese Communist press and persons arriving from the mainland disclose that the Peking regime is having constant trouble with labor demands for better pay and working conditions.

These sources also report widespread evidence of petty private trading and of surreptitious, small-scale enterprises. Both activities involve illegal evasions of state-run systems of distribution and production.

Troubles with both workers and incipient free enterprise are a result of the disruption of the normal social and economic fabric of China by the 18-month-old Cultural Revolution, which was instigated by Mao Tse-tung with the aim of purging his political opponents.

"Economism" Denounced

For more than a year the official press has been regularly disclosing difficulties in labor relations and in production and distribution by denouncing worker demands, free markets and other so-called capitalistic phenomena. These have all been lumped together under the label of "economism."

But a significant new indication of disarray has appeared in the form of a stern notice issued jointly in Peking by the Central Committee of the Communist party, the State Council, the Military Affairs Commission and the central group in charge of the Cultural Revolution. The text of the notice, dated Jan. 18, reached here in a Canton paper published by the "revolutionary" rebel general headquarters of the Canton railway subbureau of Mao Tse-tung's Thought.

The order calls for a halt in free marketing by unlicensed traders and vendors, buying and selling on the free market by rural communes, buying from private sources by state organizations, and production and trade on a private basis by craftsmen and small private factories.

Opposition Indicated

The notices discloses opposition among workers to the Maoist austerity policy, which has attempted to eliminate the former "revisionist" practice of unrest in the work force, a lack of interest in output, the black-marketing of many commodities and considerable effective to some degree in growth in the free sale of

notice order that have not enforced and any policies not to do so for the time being. The situation of incentives is believed to have been partly responsible for the strikes and factionalism in the last few months. The notice indicates that there is continued sharp friction over the system, inaugurated years ago, of having much of the work in factories and modern enterprises done by contract workers. Those workers do not enjoy the pensions, medical services and other welfare benefits of permanent workers.

The order said that "reforms" were being studied but cautioned that no workers should now be changed to permanent status.

Organized Effort Banned

The notice prohibited any organized effort to get better conditions by contract workers by stating that "none of the temporary workers, workers working by rotation and workers supplied by outside contractors are allowed to form independent organizations."

It reprimanded local officials who had given in to "economic demands" by some persons and organizations. "Any terms and conditions that do not conform to the provisions of the Central Committee and the State Council should be withdrawn immediately and declared null and void," it added.

The notice called for a propaganda campaign to teach the people to "see through the sinister scheme of the class enemy to sabotage the revolution and production by means of counter-revolutionary economism." It reminded all that a similar notice, issued last January, and subsequent Peking notices on economic policy remained valid and could not be distorted or attacked.

The Canton railway paper underscored the notice with an editorial that denounced the clamor for "extra wages, subsidies, living allowances, transfer to the permanent establishment, changes of post, etc."

Travelers and refugees who have come to Hong Kong recently from Canton, Shanghai and other areas report much unrest in the work force, a lack of interest in output, the black-marketing of many commodities and considerable effective to some degree in growth in the free sale of

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May 1968

Hanoi's Other Fronts In Asia

For the past few years world attention has been riveted so closely on the war in South Vietnam that the steadily increasing pressures Hanoi and Peking are applying against North Vietnam's other neighbors have largely bypassed international notice. They have not, however, escaped the attention of the other Asian nations -- particularly those being subjected to such pressures or those who fear they might be next in line. The "Domino Theory" -- that the other states of Southeast Asia would be toppled, one by one, if South Vietnam should be conquered by the Communists -- never accepted in many areas of world opinion, has not been ignored nor rejected in Asia. The statements of Asian leaders increasingly reflect their alarm over possible developments should the U.S. and its allies pull out of Vietnam. Their concern is justified, for, as the pattern has developed over the past three years, it is clear that Hanoi and Peking have more extensive ambitions in Asia -- ambitions not confined to Vietnam, nor for that matter to the former French colonial area of Indochina, but extending to Thailand and Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia.

What is Happening in Laos

The nation most affected by a spill-over of the war in Vietnam is Laos, which has a little war of her own blazing despite her supposed neutrality. Helping to keep that little war going are approximately 15,000 North Vietnamese troops who have been infiltrated into Laos to help the local Communist and pro-Communist rebels (the Pathet Lao) fight the Royal Laotian Army. An estimated 25,000 additional North Vietnamese troops are in Laos manning the extensive supply and infiltration routes that run from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam. The most important of these routes is the famed Ho Chi Minh trail along which as many as 9,000 North Vietnamese Army troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam in a single month. Ho Chi Minh's troops are in Laos in direct defiance of the Geneva Agreements of July 1962 by which 13 nations (North Vietnam, Communist China, the U.S.A., Great Britain, the USSR, France, Canada, Burma, Cambodia, South Vietnam, India, Poland and Thailand) guaranteed the neutrality of Laos; however, the military terms of the Agreements, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops except a small French training force, have never been observed by the North Vietnamese who have just recently increased their troop strength in Laos. Nor has North Vietnam cooperated with the International Control Commission in conducting investigations of charges of violations of their agreements.

A combination of factors is probably involved in Hanoi's recent intensification of activity in Laos:

First, the possibility that Hanoi has decided to open a second front in Laos as indicated by increased troop deployments there, the direct attacks by North Vietnamese troops against Laotian government positions and the introduction of heavier, more sophisticated field weapons into southern Laos;

Second, the possibility that the North Vietnamese are enlarging or diversifying the Laotian routes they use to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam, at the same time continuing to use areas close to the Laotian-South Vietnam border for sanctuary, rest and food foraging;

Third, the possibility that Hanoi plans to use Laos as a political pawn in the event of peace talks -- presumably by taking as much territory as possible in Laos to strengthen her bargaining power at the peace table.

(See attachments 1 to 4 for Souvanna Phouma's protest speech and other details.)

Thailand is Also Vulnerable

The recent increase of Communist insurgency in Northern Thailand is undoubtedly connected with Hanoi's strategy in Vietnam: Hanoi's leaders must calculate that the growing military action in Laos, combined with increased insurgency in Thailand, may concern that country's leadership enough to affect Thailand's military and other support for the Allied effort in South Vietnam. Hanoi and Peking have long been implicated in Thailand's troubles with subversion. In late 1964 and again in early 1965 Peking's Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a visiting European that "we may have a guerrilla war going in Thailand before this year is out." Chen told his fascinated visitor that Peking would furnish Chinese arms and supplies to Thai citizens to help them overthrow their government. In 1965 the Chinese Communists also sponsored the organization of the Thai Patriotic Front in Peking with the specific aim of directing Communist subversive activities in the northeastern and southern provinces of Thailand.

Prisoners and defectors have frequently testified to guerrilla and other training given to Thai citizens by Hanoi and Peking. Hanoi has been conducting such training at least since 1962, concentrating on Thais from the North and Northeast areas of Thailand -- the traditional strongholds of the Communist-led insurgents. The major Communist training camp for Thais is reportedly near Hanoi. As many as 500 or 600 young men recruited in Thailand have been trained in this school and have then returned to Thailand to carry out their terrorist operations. Documentary evidence on this training camp fell into the hands of Thai officials in April 1966 when a Thai guerrilla who had surrendered told about his class of 130 Thai citizens who had been exfiltrated from Thailand, trained by North Vietnamese Army personnel in guerrilla warfare and then infiltrated back into Thailand to operate against their government.

Other defectors have told of being trained in Peking where they were taken on tours of industrial and cultural sites, met with leaders of the Thai Patriotic Front, and were trained by Chinese experts in guerrilla tactics and in the use of American weapons.

Some of the "Thais" recruited by the Communists in Northeast Thailand have reportedly come from a group of refugees from Vietnam who became Thai citizens and settled in Northeast Thailand to a great degree retaining their pro-Vietnamese leanings. These individuals, estimated to number 30-40,000, furnished a convenient starting point for Peking's and Hanoi's ultimate objective of setting up full-fledged training camps inside Thailand proper. Defectors have already reported a basic sabotage school in Northeast Thailand whose top graduates were sent to Haiphong (North Vietnam) for advanced training. The number of Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam, China and more recently Laos is estimated to total about 2,000. (See attachments 5 and 6 for details.)

Thailand's government quietly fought the insurgents for several years and finally protested to the United Nations, but with small success. In January 1967, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat bluntly said:

"We can see clearly that danger of aggression comes from Red China and North Vietnam ... they have already started aggression ... by a campaign of subversion and incitement inside our country as they have already done in other countries, such as Vietnam, Laos and Korea."

In October 1967 Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman told the United Nations' General Assembly:

"Let us, the smaller and weaker nations, candidly face facts and realize that imminent dangers which may descend upon our nations are less likely to come from nuclear development than from combinations of military and political ventures which their proponents euphemistically call 'wars of national liberation'..."

Cambodia Also Reacts to Recent Events


Cambodia's mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk has also been moved to outbursts in the past few months protesting Communist encroachments against his land and people. For the moment, at least, he has forgotten his chronic displeasure with the U.S. in his indignation over the stepped-up activity of Cambodia's home-grown Communists, the Khmer Reds. Sihanouk claims these Khmer are being assisted by Thai Communist forces with Peking's backing in concerted attacks against widely spread areas, from Battambang on the Thai border to Kampot near South Vietnam. Vicious attacks have been mounted against outlying Cambodian police posts and the Khmer have used terror tactics to compel the cooperation of local officials. In at least one instance they summarily executed a loyal village chief. On 7 March 1968 Sihanouk wrote a letter to Le Monde in which he stated categorically that the Battambang attacks had been launched from "outside," that evidence of this "abounds" and that "Asian Communism strives to overthrow our regime from within."

Sihanouk's letter to Le Monde appeared to represent a last straw. In January, it was reported that Viet Cong representatives were attempting to recruit Vietnamese residents in the vicinity of Phnom Penh and in rural areas

in eastern and southeastern Cambodia. In February, stories circulated that the Cambodian Navy had captured a vessel carrying munitions to Communist guerrillas in southwestern Cambodia; at about the same time, foreign newsmen gave worldwide publicity to a North Vietnamese troop encampment within Cambodian borders. The Cambodian Government at that time denied that Cambodian territory was being violated by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong; but Sihanouk did say openly that "civil war is being imposed on Cambodia from outside" and ordered the execution of any hard core Communists captured by the Cambodian police. Finally, in early March, Sihanouk said in a radio broadcast that if a pro-U.S. government should take power in Cambodia "the supplies of the Viet Cong ... will be finished ... the sanctuary will be finished...." This was the first time that Sihanouk has frankly admitted that Cambodia is being used as a sanctuary by the Viet Cong and as a supply route by the North Vietnamese. (See attachments 7 to 9 for Sihanouk's letter to Le Monde and other details.)

Conclusion

There is little doubt that Vietnam's Asian neighbors would have cause for alarm should the Allied forces pull out of South Vietnam without first concluding a peace guaranteeing the right of the people of South Vietnam to have a government of their own choosing. Those who have discarded the "Domino Theory" so lightly might do well to gather about their maps for additionally study. If they sketch on the maps those areas of Vietnam's neighbors already occupied or endangered by Hanoi, they will recognize what most Asian nations already know: that Hanoi and Peking have not limited their plans for Southeast Asia to South Vietnam.



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SOUVANNA PHOUMA REVIEWS MILITARY SITUATION

Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0130 GMT 23 Mar 68 D

[Speech of Prince Souvanna Phouma delivered on the occasion of the Laotian National Armed Forces Day in Vientiane on 23 March 1968--presumably recorded]

[Text] His Majesty the King, your excellencies, and dear compatriots, the national armed forces have just completed their 18th anniversary today. While we are celebrating the 18th founding anniversary of the national armed forces today, we must know that the situation in our country is (?deteriorating) critically. Since the early part of 1968, external aggression and invasion and internal revolt have been increasingly serious by degrees because the traitors [the NLHX] with the support of some of our neighbors, have constantly (?violated and trampled underfoot) the 1962 Geneva accords [on Laos].

This year the war in Laos is getting more serious, and everybody knows very well that this war is undoubtedly connected with the Vietnam problem. Therefore, we can say that the NLHX is merely the tool manipulated by its alien bosses to serve their interests. They have cooperated with one another to wage a propaganda campaign by saying that the current war in Indochina is "a national liberation war." Under the above-mentioned pretext, the enemy recently launched fierce attacks against the Nam Bak area, which resulted in the involuntary withdrawal of the national armed forces from our positions there.

Currently, the fighting in upper and lower Laos is noticeably (?improving) in Tha Thom, Lao Ngam, Attopeu, Saravane, Pha Lane, including the recent incident at Pha Thi. Although heavily mauled and suffering heavy losses, the enemy is still obdurate and continues to attack our strongholds in accordance with his plan. The more serious the Vietnam situation becomes, the more tense the Laotian situation will become.

This is the first time that we have seen the enemy use modern weapons, for example, some 120-millimeter rockets which the Lao-Viet forces never used before. In every battlefield, the enemy forces have (?deployed) a large number of modern weapons which some foreign countries have supplied them. This action, which is a violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords, means that they do not respect (?this) legal Government of Laos.

All these I mentioned are the important incidents concerning our Laotian problem which the government would like some (?international concerns), for example the United Nations and the signatories of the 1962 agreement, to know and to seek ways to solve and (?help protect the Laotian people).

In addition, the Ho Chi Minh trail also passes through Laos for the benefit of North Vietnam. (?To the people who doubt what it is, I will tell you that) the trail is a very important route facilitating the flow of supplies, weapons, and men from North Vietnam to South Vietnam passing through Laos. We see that the war in Laos is getting more serious by degrees and we see no end to it.

(?Even though outnumbered by the Lao-Viet forces), our national armed forces have bravely fought against the enemy and attained a number of successive victories, for example at Dong Hene, Lao Ngam, and Attopeu, and even though (?suffering some losses), our national armed forces have bravely weathered many battles sacrificing the blood and lives of a number of heroic fighters.

Dear generals, officers, noncommissioned officers, and rank-and-file soldiers, the Government of His Majesty the King would like to laud your highly praised duty [words indistinct] and our nation will never forget your (?conduct) when our nation was in a critical situation. The government is concerned about and closely follows (?the progress) of your activities every step. And the government is also trying to

(?provide you) adequate (non-vehicle) transportation. I believe that the victories or defeats in battlefields are lessons for the national armed forces to study for military benefit. Once soldiers, officers, including commanders of every level throughout the armed forces are united as a single unit, our (?suppression operations) will be satisfactorily accomplished.

The important duty of the national armed forces is to defend the independence, sovereignty, and complete territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos without any manipulation or serving the interest of any political parties. The national armed forces will always be strong if everybody, whether he is a soldier, an officer, or a general in the front or rear, enthusiastically carries out his assignment, whether hard or easy.

Moreover, the orders of the command, especially the orders for (?troops in the front), must be clear and just without any personal interest of the higher commanders. In accordance with the armed forces discipline and orders, all of you have the responsibility to fight the enemy to the last in order to protect the honor and (?identity) of the national armed forces. Particularly, every officer must carry out his duty and discipline strictly so that he will become the good example to his subordinates and soldiers.

Dear officers and soldiers, your current duty is now greater than before because the military movement in Laos as well as in surrounding countries is now (?more intense). It is a fight between the two ideologies competing to expose the influence of one another. [words indistinct] I appeal to all soldier compatriots to be united to fight the enemy of our nation in order to protect the territorial integrity, independence, and freedom of our Kingdom of Laos forever.

CPYRGHT

JAPAN TIMES
29 February 1968

(2)

Communist Threat in Laos

It is now becoming evident that the Vietnam war is spreading to neighboring Laos. This, indeed, had been our expectation for some time past, not only because it is clear that Communist ambitions relate to Indochina as a whole, and not solely to South Vietnam, but because it seems that in the Communist view a widening of the area affected by their guerrilla operations could best serve their immediate over-all military purposes.

Laos is an eminently suitable terrain for these Communist purposes. Not only does Laotian territory provide routes for the infiltration of troops and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam but the weakness of the Laotian Government in the face of the powerful local Communist movement in Laos by the well organized and well armed Pathet Lao forces makes them able to use the country much as they wish without serious resistance.

The Royal Laotian Government forces are "increasingly crumbling" due to what the Pathet Lao said were "staggering blows" inflicted by it and pro-Communist forces in Laos, the official New China News Agency in Peking said Tuesday, quoting the Khaosan Pathet Lao agency. It stated that 3,594 "enemy" troops surrendered, deserted or were captured in the first three months of the dry season beginning last November. The Pathet Lao declared the morale of the "battered" Royal Government soldiers had been sinking lower and lower. "They often run away or surrender, even before the fight begins," it was claimed. In the fighting in Nam Bac alone last month, it was alleged 1,867 Royal troops were captured.

The situation has naturally caused considerable alarm in Washington. "We are continuing to receive reports about North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacks, and are seriously concerned over what may be a drive toward the lowly-lying parts of Laos," the U.S. State Department said in a

brief statement on Tuesday. "This and other recent military moves by the North Vietnamese in Laos and the Pathet Lao represent further violations of the Geneva accords of 1962."

The "lowly-lying parts" referred to in this statement are presumably no other than the valley region along the Mekong River where most of the population dwells and the best rice crops of Laos are produced. According to Mr. Robert McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, three distinct areas are involved in the present fighting in one of which the Communist forces are actually advancing in the direction of Paksane on the Mekong.

It is stated that North Vietnam has about 40,000 troops in Laos. At least half of the force is said to be assigned to security duty along the Ho Chi Minh Trail; the rest are integrated with the Pathet Lao combat battalions and are taking part in fighting the Royal Government's forces when occasion arises.

Meanwhile, the question of whether the Communists are preparing an all-out major offensive that could result in the overthrow of the Royal Government is being debated both in Laotian Government circles and in Washington.

It is, of course, possible that they may decide to refrain from trying to do so at the present juncture by the thought that the prevailing situation temporarily suits them best. But it is clear that the people of Laos are being subjected to unhappy experiences. Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister, said recently he might appeal to the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreement if the situation deteriorated. It appears he has not yet done so, nor can we expect that it would prove of any avail if he did. Nor has he asked for American assistance in connection with the current Communist offensive in Laos. According to Mr. McCloskey, however, the United States has provided military assistance to Laos for some time past although he said nothing about the extent of this help.

It seems clear, however, that American aircraft have been bombing targets in Laos, including Communist troop

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encampments, storage areas, supply lines and other facilities. Latest reports indicate that for the first time the U.S. aircraft have now supported the Royal Laotian troops in battles with the Communists.

Such then is the present situation with regard to Laos. It seems clear that if the Communists are determined to push their offensive the Americans will feel obliged to take sufficient military action to hold them up and we shall then be presented with a situation in Laos similar to that in South Vietnam.

This prospect could hardly be pleasing to Washington, already so extensively involved in South Vietnam. But we may expect at any time now to hear the cry raised by the Reds of "American aggression in Laos," it being the

accuse others of the crimes they are themselves committing or intending to commit.

In this latter connection, it is of interest to note that North Korea charged on Tuesday that the United States is trying to find a pretext for starting a war in Korea by using the Pueblo incident.

While President Johnson appears determined to pursue the struggle in South Vietnam until victory is achieved we hardly think the United States Government is looking for fresh wars. But no doubt the supposition to the contrary appeals to the perfervid imagination of the Communists as a fine piece of propaganda!

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 April 1968

(5)

Insurgents open third Thai front

By John Hughes
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Chieng Kham, Thailand

Though the talk may be of peace in Vietnam, here in Thailand the Communists have launched a new wave of dirty, deadly insurgency.

Trouble started in December. In a series of incidents terrorists pounced on Thai border police patrols operating in the area, killing

12 officers in a month.

Initially, most of the trouble was in Nan Province. But now the major action appears to be in the eastern part of Chiang Rai Province along the mountainous border with Laos.

The Thai Third Army has been deployed in the area under the command of Lt. Gen. Aung Potinganit, who served with distinction as a battalion commander of Thai troops in the Korean conflict.

Now, although many Thai officers admit they are thin on the ground, Thai troops are nudging up into the mountains in a quest for Communist guerrillas.

They have been caught in a series of ambushes, and in a quick initial reaction they have used airpower, including napalm strikes, on mountain villages considered hostile.

Western observers say no strikes were called on villages whose people had not been warned to leave, and who had not had time to get out. Certainly there has been a stream of Meo, Yao, and other tribesmen out of the mountains as Thai officials ordered them to vacate. Some 3,000 of them now are located in schools and other makeshift camps in the lowlands of Chiang Rai Province.

The idea is that they should be held there while the Thai Army flushes out Communist terrorists left behind in the mountains. However, Thai officials frankly admit they are not yet sure whether the eviction of tribesmen from their mountain homes is to be temporary or permanent.

According to Thai intelligence, the terrorists themselves are a mixture of mountain tribesmen, Thai Communists trained at the guerrilla training center of Hoa Binh, 50 miles south of Hanoi, and North Vietnamese.

Regulations violated

The Thais say they have killed some North Vietnamese but have not captured any.

The tribesmen are exploitable by the Communists. As a minority group they have no particular loyalty to Bangkok, the Thai capital. They are addicted to the profitable



By a staff cartographer

New area of Red subversion

In the mountainous areas of northern Thailand, in and around Chiang Rai and Chiang Kham, Communists are opening a third sector of insurgency. This is in addition to areas in the northeast and south.

business of opium growing, which runs counter to government policy. They also pursue a slash-and-burn type agriculture which means they run afoul of various government afforestation and conservation regulations. There are indications the Communists have been playing upon all these "grievances."

The Thai military establishment is convinced the terrorists are getting substantial help from North Vietnam via neighboring Laos. Here at Chiang Kham, intelligence sources say they have located two Communist camps just across the border in Lao territory. One, at Huey Phra, is believed to contain between 200 and 300 men. The other, at Huey Ngueng, is supposed to have between 300 and 500.

Forces estimated

Military men on the scene estimate there are 500 Communist terrorists in Chiang Rai Province. This is somewhat higher than the estimate back in Bangkok, where the military have other sources to tap for cross-checking.

Lt. Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, chief of the Counter Subversion Operations Command, for example, believes there are 150 hardcore terrorists operating in the north, with perhaps several hundred more slipping back and forth across the border with Laos.

All sources agree that the number of terrorists operating in the northeastern provinces is considerably higher. Various in-

telligence and military services, both Thai and American, now set the figure in the northeast at about 1,500.

Though the number of terrorists in the north, however, may be less than that in the northeast, the Thais are taking the northern insurgency seriously.

Some observers argue that the Communists can never hope to be effective in Thailand until they have successfully penetrated the Thai populace. Penetration of minority hill tribes cannot, they argue, carry much weight, with the purely Thai people of the lowlands, and indeed might even antagonize them. Though this is certainly a valid argument, it overlooks, in the view of other observers, the damage which might be wrought by the hill tribes should they fall substantially under Communist sway.

Meanwhile, there is not much doubt about ultimate Communist ambitions for Thailand.

The manifesto of the Patriotic Front of Thailand, the front organization of the Thai Communist Party headquartered in Peking, calls for the overthrow of the present "fascist dictatorial administration which is subservient to United States imperialism."

The manifesto demands abolition of military and economic agreements between Thailand and the United States, the withdrawal of Thailand from SEATO, and a ban on Thailand's participation in any military bloc. It also calls for the restriction of foreign capital and the "assistance and protection" of "national industry and commerce."

Excerpts from
Bangkok newspapers (6)
15 November 1966

North Vietnam Runs Guerrilla School for Thais

The North Vietnamese regime has been operating a secret guerrilla warfare school for Thais for the past four or five years. One training school near Hanoi gives an eight-month course; other establishments for indoctrination of Thai farmers have been located in China and in Pathet Lao-held territory in Laos.

A young Thai farmer revealed details of the school near Hanoi at a press conference in Bangkok in mid-October. Like many other Thais he had gone to North Vietnam, not knowing that he was to be given guerrilla instruction. He had joined the "Farmers' Liberation Party" at the behest of a man from another Thai province, not realizing that this "Party" was a Communist front organization. Through this organization, he was offered a chance to go abroad to study, and he accepted this offer, hoping to receive medical training. The man who had induced him to join the "Farmers' Liberation Party" conducted him and four others from Thailand into Laos. There they were met and guided by Pathet Lao or Vietnamese soldiers. After 18 days of travel the group reached Hanoi, and proceeded to the training school.

Our Thai farmer was given eight months of training in Communist doctrine and guerrilla warfare. A political course instructed the trainees in methods of persuasion to use to get villagers to "join the revolution" and the regular

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courses were approved for release. The group, known as the "Voice of the People of Thailand," as well as to Hanoi radio. 130 Thais attended the school while the farmer was there; most of them were laborers and peasants from the south, middle and northeasterly sections of Thailand. The group included 18 women. Trainees were paid in Vietnamese currency at a monthly rate equivalent to 120 Thai baht. On leaving, they received a pair of pants and a final payment of 400 baht. The farmer said that he was in the fourth group of trainees, and since the school had been set up four or five years ago, his information indicates that there are by now a sizable number of potential guerrillas in Thailand, trained by Hanoi. They return to Thailand in the way they come, via Laos; the instructors tell them that they will be given instructions by the liberation movement after they reach home.

In the case of this farmer, the indoctrination failed. On arriving home in March 1966, he told his parents what had happened, and on their advice he gave himself up to the Thai police. Even before he got back to Thailand, he related, he had known that the Communists were trying to use him as a tool. Also, he had no desire to endanger his life for the sake of Communism.

CPYRGHT

MAINICHI
9 March 1968

(7)

Commentary On Communism

By Colin Johnstone

Cambodia's Internal Disturbances

Cambodia's Head of State, Prince Sihanouk, has issued another sharp warning against the growing threats to his country's security. Addressing a Phnom Penh Press conference, he said that a rebel Cambodian "Viet Minh" movement was trying to gain control of strategic areas in an attempt to cut Cambodia in two. Recently, he added, the subversives forced the inhabitants of several villages in Battambang province to leave their homes and take to the jungle. Subversion had also occurred in central Cambodia and the "Viet Minh" were trying to re-activate old cells in four southern provinces.

It is now exactly a year since the normally peaceful political climate of Cambodia was disturbed by agitation fomented by the Khmer (Cambodian) Communist Party, or Prachenchon, which has come to be known as the "Khmer Maoists" and "Khmer Viet Minh." The Communists have sought to exploit economic discontent in some parts of the Battambang province and in other areas for their own purposes.

Phnom Penh Radio quoted Prince Sihanouk as saying that the Khmer Maoists had declar-

ed war on Cambodia and begun hostilities. He revealed that these forces were receiving supplies from the self-styled Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF), based in Peking. Civil war was being imposed on Cambodia because he had consistently rejected the "satellization" of the country and wanted to preserve its independence and neutrality. The Communists, on the other hand, had decided to wage war until he and the Sangkum (the ruling People's Socialist Community) had been overthrown. They did not say this in so many words, but their intention was clear. The proof lay in their activities in Battambang where they had attacked isolated provincial guard posts, killed some of the personnel and rounded up nearly 500 families, driving them into the jungle.

Battambang, in western Cambodia, has for some time been worrying the central government. In February 1967, demonstrations arising from economic grievances developed into Communist-led unrest and violence. As a result, a parachute battalion was sent to the town of Pailin and military units were put on the alert. A demonstration in Phnom Penh, believed to have been Com-

munist-inspired, demanded the withdrawal of the troops from Pailin. In a broadcast to the nation on April 3, 1967, Prince Sihanouk said that the Khmer Reds were resorting to armed attacks because of the failure of their previous efforts to secure the resignation of the Lon Nol government then in power. The Battambang rebels and others had acted under orders from "their great chiefs in Phnom Penh," he said.

Official accounts of the unrest show that the Communists have also been operating in the provinces of Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kompong Speu, and Svay Rieng. After the Special National Congress on March 12, 1967, the rebels in Battambang were reported to have murdered villagers and burned down the homes of people who had denounced their activities at the meeting. In several provinces, the Communists distributed pamphlets strongly attacking government policies, stole rifles and ammunition from the security forces, destroyed bridges and ransacked an agricultural camp. According to the official Agence Khmer Presse (AKP), Cambodian troops engaged in mopping-up operations encountered one group of some 500 armed rebels.

Though successfully contained by the army, the Battambang troubles continued until June and have erupted sporadically since then. Their consequences and the challenge to Cambodia's stability were summed up by the Prince on

January 2, 1968
said that in some Press reports the Battambang rebellion had been described as a popular movement, whereas it was a purely Communist affair.

The Khmer Communists appear to have launched their campaign not from a position of strength but from the realization that, unless they succeeded in carrying the masses with them, or better still in setting up a "liberated area" under their control in the provinces, they were likely to become progressively weaker.

For years the party has tried to build up a following by posing as the champion of social reform and neutrality. The TPF is, however, a Communist front organization, whose only known members live in Peking, and which has never made any secret of its subservience to China. The TPF leader, Phayom Chulanont, recently described himself as "a new pupil of Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

The Cambodian Prime Minister, Penn Nouth, in an appeal to the nation over Phnom Penh

Radio said: "Once again, I call on you to stop their destructive action against our nation and surrender to our national society. At present, 99 per cent of the population are well organized. The government will grant an amnesty to small groups who come over to the government side. If this appeal is not effective, my government will take measures to suppress those who destroy our nation and will cooperate with those who follow the policy of the Sangkum."

WASHINGTON STAR
8 March 1968 (8)

Sihanouk Orders Execution Of Captured Hard-Core Reds

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Star Staff Writer

Cambodia's chief of state, Norodom Sihanouk is stepping up his anti-Communist campaign and has ordered the summary execution of hard-core Communists captured by his police.

For the past three years, Sihanouk has striven for close relations with China, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, in the belief that being befriended, they would leave his government alone.

Now, he is reporting increased efforts by these foreign Communists to get local Cambodian Communists — the so-called Khmer Reds — to stir up trouble in western provinces of Cambodia.

Sense of Urgency Enters

Sihanouk has been making such complaints for about a year, but officials here notice that a sense of urgency has entered Sihanouk's language, and he has sharply reduced the scale of his anti-American attacks, which formerly were a mainstay of his public position.

In a radio broadcast heard today in Bangkok, he was so angry at the Communists that he said he may "side truly with the Americans" and turn his own job over to his pro-American military commander, Gen. Lon Nol.

Sihanouk said when and if a pro-U.S. government takes power, "the supplies of the Viet Cong and Viet Minh will be finished ... the sanctuary will be finished. . ."

Diplomatic sources said it was the first time Sihanouk had admitted his territory is used as a sanctuary and supply route by Vietnamese Communists.

"Out of indignation with Reds, who do nothing but call others U.S. lackeys, I am inclined to say that I want to side truly with the Americans," Sihanouk said.

"Out of indignation I want to submit really to the Americans because these people (Communists) never stop speaking of my submission to the Americans."

In a letter to Le Monde, the Paris newspaper, yesterday Sihanouk said "it is perfectly clear that Asian communism does not permit us any longer to stay neutral."

He also accused Communist guerrillas in neighboring Thailand of supplying arms to Communists in Cambodia.

Reports Ship Capture

In a speech Monday, Sihanouk reported that Khmer Reds had arrested and shot many village chiefs.

"Therefore, I am also forced now to order the execution with-

out trial of the Khmer Reds," he said.

And today he reported the Cambodian navy has captured a vessel carrying munitions to Communist guerrillas in southwestern Cambodia.

The prince just returned from a tour of the Communist rebel-infested Battambang area near the Thailand border where he said he found "proof of their collusion with the foreign power which supplies them."

Another broadcast by government radio in Phnom Penh said that various rallies have been held in Cambodia to show support of Sihanouk's policy against the Communists.

In Sum officials here think Sihanouk probably is more sympathetic now to the problems caused by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of his territory, but there is little he can do to control it.

Administration officials are also saving Sihanouk's speeches to refute critics who say that Asian Communists are just nationalists with no aggressive intentions.

WASHINGTON STAR (10)
9 April 1968

The Burma Threat

In a recent public statement, his first in over a year, General Ne Win — Burma's Defense Minister, Prime Minister and Chief of State—rang an alarm bell. The Chinese Communists, he warned, were now apparently providing a sanctuary for traitorous Burmese guerrillas operating in the northern frontier area. "There is much difficulty," he said, "in fighting these insurgents, as the locality is very close to the border. We have to be very careful lest our bullets go into the other country."

But "the other country" — Red China — is not likely to be moved by Ne Win's effort to continue to be "the most neutral of the neutrals" in Asia. No land has tried harder than Burma to maintain good relations with Peking. Although historically distrustful of its giant neighbor, and although its own Communists are outlawed, it was the first non-Communist country to recognize the Mao Tse-tung regime, and it has sought to adhere faithfully to the Sino-Burmese treaty of friendship and non-aggression. All in vain, however. Mao and his co-conspirators, for reasons best known to themselves, are following a

course that mocks Burma's neutrality.

The first clear sign of this occurred last summer when Peking incited Communist-led Chinese citizens of Burma to stage violent anti-Burmese demonstrations. Next came open and repeated Maoist assertions wholeheartedly supporting Burma's illegal Communist party and strongly advocating a "revolutionary people's war" to overthrow Ne Win's government and bring about the country's communization. So it is not surprising that the guerrillas are able to flee to Red China's territory to escape pursuit, to be given food there, and to receive other forms of aid — including presumably weapons — from their patrons. These insurgent forces are not large at the moment, but they can grow, and they can become dangerous indeed in a country that shares a 1,200-mile border with so hostile and aggressive a neighbor.

This is a matter of concern, of course, or at least it should be, to other countries besides Burma. Every land on or near China's periphery, including neutralist India, has a special stake in the situation. That is one of the lessons Vietnam teaches.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 February 1968

(4)

Status quo shakes in Laos

Laotians are searching for the meaning of new attacks by Pathet Lao Communist forces in Laos. Prince Souvanna Phouma says it is a Communist diversion to help the North Vietnamese seek a new infiltration route to South Vietnam in a more populated and more difficult to bomb area.

By John Hughes

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vientiane, Laos

While the war thunders on in Vietnam, the government in neighboring Laos is pondering the meaning of new Communist militancy in this landlocked kingdom.

In recent weeks units of the Communist Pathet Lao, stiffened by North Vietnamese troops, have moved aggressively on a number of posts and towns held by the government.

Initial fragmentary reports Friday indicate mortar and small arms fire at the southern town of Saravane, Communist mortar fire on Attapeu and fighting at the strategic little town of Lao Ngam. The latter outpost was overrun Friday by Pathet Lao forces.

Both Lao and American military men interpreted Communist moves at first as part of the routine seasonal Pathet Lao offensive. This is a fairly standard operation of limited scope to gather rice and erase territorial gains made earlier by government forces. It is a seesaw movement in peripheral areas which, in the view of some military men here, does not disturb the status quo under which Laos is virtually partitioned between government and Communist forces.

This year, however, there has been a much sharper edge to the Communist thrusts. The government is worried. In January, the Communists overran the key position of Nam Bac north of the royal capital of Luangprabang, inflicting a serious defeat on the Lao Army. Now a force apparently including four North Vietnamese battalions is threatening Saravane. A defector from one of those battalions has given

the government information on the deployment of Communist forces and the apparent plan of attack.

But if the Communists should seize Saravane, this would disrupt the whole delicate arrangement by which war in Laos has been kept in low key.

Though the Poles have boycotted an investigation, the Indian and Canadian members of the International Control Commission in Laos have just made a survey of the situation in Saravane. But they are not talking publicly, and their report is yet to be submitted.

The question, of course, is, what are the Communist objectives? Some military men in Laos see a parallel with the Viet Minh prelude to the battle of Dien Bien Phu 14 years ago. They point out that when North Vietnam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap massed his troops for that battle he swirled through Laos, dispersing and disrupting the French reserve forces.

Others, however, argue that the situation in Laos today is not parallel. There are no American reserves in Laos, and it is in South Vietnam that General Giap is appar-

ently trying to disperse the Americans with Communist attacks on the towns and cities.

Another theory is that the Communists are consolidating and extending their position in Laos in preparation for any peace talks which might develop.

But for North Vietnam the main significance of Laos is that it provides the infiltration route to the south via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This year the traffic over the trail has been heavier than usual. One Lao general says allied intelligence had detected the movement southward of Communist tanks and armored vehicles before these were thrown against Lang Vei.

The Pathet Lao thrusts thus may be a diversionary ploy to protect the infiltration trail. The aggressive movement at Saravane is too far south to screen the Communist reinforcement of the North Vietnamese divisions presently poised opposite Khe Sanh.

However, activity at Saravane might fit into a pattern of Communist movement into the South Vietnam central highlands.

Although attention has been focused on Khe Sanh, some military men have been keeping an anxious eye on Dak To, scene of bitter fighting earlier.

Mr. Pheng Norin at a Press Conference on
General Situation in Laos

On February 29, 1968, Mr. Pheng Norin, secretary of the cabinet meeting, gave an interview to reporters on the present military situation resulting from the invasion of the PL and the North Vietnamese soldiers. He also repeated the opinion of the Prince Premier that the war in Laos would be brought to an end the same time as the Vietnam war.

Mr. Pheng Norin told reporters in French that Nambac, an important strategic area and a front door to the city of Luang Prabang was occupied in January 1968, by the PL forces with the cooperation of the North Vietnamese 316th Division, a onetime famous division during the Dienbienphu battle. Our forces had to retreat from the area because of the overwhelming forces of the enemies. The withdrawal of the government forces from the area ease the contact between the PL and Hanoi and at the same time intensify the situation of the battlefield in the North.

Moreover, the enemies increased threats by launching attacks in the Central and Southern parts especially the areas in Khoueng Sedone, Saravane and Attapeu. In order to get more evidence, the RLG requested the ICC to send a delegation to investigate the situation in Pakse and Saravane. The Canadian and Indian delegates had agreed to conduct investigation but the Polish delegation refused to do so.

PL Attacks:

On February 23, 1968, 4 North Vietnamese battalions and 2 PL battalions attacked Lao Ngam and at 0300 hours the same day 3 PL battalions attacked Attapeu airfield by artillery.

Casualties on the enemy side:

The Headquarters in Lao Ngam which was occupied by the enemies at 0600 hours of February 23, was reoccupied by the government forces on February 24, 1968. The enemies withdrew from the area leaving 186 dead soldiers, 2 antiaircrafts, 2 DK-82 cannons, 8 B-40 rocket launchers and more than a hundred of rifles and pistols. The enemies retreated to the areas of Nami and Phou Tid. 95 dead soldiers of the enemies were seen on the battlefield in the area of Khoueng Attapeu. The present situation in the area of Khoueng Saravane is in difficulty.

General Situations:

Tha Thom in the area of Khoueng Xieng Khouang was occupied by the enemies on February 21, 1968. The enemies also attacked the areas between

Xieng Khouang and Borikhane. Three enemy battalions attacked and seized the stronghold in Sala Dendin. At 1900 hours of February 21, the above mentioned battalions attacked Muong Ngan.

Enemy Aims:

The enemy aims of the attacks are as follows:

1. to promote the influence and increase the PL occupation in order to strike a tough bargain during the future meeting on the problems in Indo-China,
2. to occupy the area of Phou Vieng which is a flourishing area in order to set up their Headquarters for sending troops into South Vietnam,
3. to take control of strategic routes of the National Army,
4. to help North Vietnam protect and broaden the Ho Chi Minh Trail to various villages and residential areas to increase moral irritation against the pilots in their air raids.

61 Prisoners captured:

During the attacks from the enemies the National Army captured 61 North Vietnamese prisoners. These prisoners serve as evidences to confirm the North Vietnamese cooperation with the PL to infiltrate and invade Laos. The ICC also acknowledged the incidents.

The War in Laos Depends upon the Vietnam War:

At present it is obvious that the situation in Vietnam and the situation in Laos cannot be separated. The Prince Premier had recently said that the war in Laos would be brought to an end the same as the Vietnam war.

Q. Why doesn't the government hold an interview of prisoners in the presence of the concerned diplomats when some countries in the Socialist Bloc such as the Soviet Union, Poland and Red China deny the presence of North Vietnamese troops?

Q. Mr. Pheng Norin said, "We do not care. The fact still is the fact."

Questions and answers during an interview of three Vietnamese prisoners are as follows:

Q. Why does North Vietnam invade Laos? Because of hatred?

A. (One of the prisoners answered) I don't know. We are soldiers. We fight according to the order of the government.

Q. What will you do when the North Vietnamese Embassy does not recognize you as North Vietnamese soldiers being sent to fight in Laos?

A. We are North Vietnamese from North Vietnam. We don't care what people say and we have requested the Lao government to save our lives.

Q. How did you feel when you were captured?

A. At first we were afraid of being killed. To the contrary, we all have been well treated by ordinary authorities. We don't know how the higher-ups will treat us.

Q. Were you forced to fight in Laos? Did you volunteer to fight in Laos?

A. On our mission.

Q. Radios of Hanoi and Peking deceive the world that North Vietnamese soldiers have been sent to fight against American Imperialists. Did you see Americans in the battlefield?

A. No.

Q. If you are released, what will you do? Will you go back to North Vietnam? Or will you live in Laos?

A. We would rather go back to see our parents. If the Lao government does not allow us then we have to live here.

Q. How do your government and your families feel knowing that you are captured?

A. We don't know what to say because we have never been captured. This is the first time. We know well that our families will feel ashamed for us.

A Letter from Prince Sihanouk

We received from Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian Chief of State, the following letter concerning an article that our contributor, Jacques Decornoy, wrote on the situation in his country [Cambodia], in the Monde, on 2 February 1968:

"Mr. Decornoy implied that the revolt in the southern part of Battambang was not the result of foreign instigation, but originated essentially from discontent among the people, which was caused by a lack of employment for young intellectuals, the 'burdensome' presence of the army, and other reasons, among which, of course, was corruption.

This point of view seems very far from the truth, and I should like to explain to your readers what the real situation is.

First of all, the people in this part of Battambang are not at all unhappy. As in the case of all inhabitants of remote areas, these people had received fertile land (2 to 5 hectares per family), fully equipped houses, animals for tilling soil and for breeding purposes, agricultural machinery, and seed. I believe that Cambodia is one of the very few countries to do as much for their small farmers.

Further, roads have been opened, and schools, hospitals, and co-operatives have been set up in this area.

There could not be any 'uprising' under such conditions; but this province has been occupied for many years by the Vietminh, which has seen to it that it has indoctrinated certain people, and has continued to be in contact with them. They are the ones who took up arms. They are headed by some former professors -- and perhaps also by some deputies 'who have disappeared.' They are the ones who have obliged the people, under threat of death, to leave their villages and to go to the forests.

Has our army behaved badly toward the people? I should like to emphasize that no troops have ever been quartered in the area of Samlaut, which is the seat of the rebellion. The only soldiers that could have been seen there were there only occasionally, to open roads, to build bridges, and to bring supplies to the villages.

And unemployment among the young people? There is not a single unemployed person in this area of small proprietors. The people live more comfortably and have more means than those in other provinces. I am not unaware of the problem of employment, which is of national interest. It is precisely in order to give work to young people that our government has increased the number of factories and of government plantations and settlements, which have furnished some dozens of thousands of new jobs. Our training is now essentially technical and professional.

We are a nation of many students (1,053,000 young people go to school, to the lycee, to the university, out of 6,300,000 inhabitants), and we must make an even greater effort to ensure work for everyone. One might ask if the other countries of the 'Third World' are resolving their unemployment problem better than we are. Permit me to doubt this, in view of what is obviously happening elsewhere. Whatever the case may be, there is not a single 'former unemployed person' among the Battambang rebels.

Corruption? I do not deny that it still exists. It is an 'institution' which not only afflicts our Asia, but which strikes very developed countries as well. But we are fighting against this. Our press, both governmental and private, denounces it with exceptional vigor. Sanctions are applied against the guilty each time their offenses are proven. The sanctions include censure, loss of job, and even imprisonment. It is precisely because we do not hide anything (in contrast to our neighbors) that we are accused of laissez-faire.

The uprising in Battambang is essentially political and was started by outsiders. There is abundant proof: the discovery of propaganda leaflets printed in Siamese in Peking and bearing the image of Mao (this is material that was offered by the patriotic Thai Front who are loyal to the Chinese, which operates in the neighboring Thai provinces and supply our rebels with weapons and equipment).

I should also like to emphasize the foreign origin of thousands of leaflets insulting Marshal Tito, which were distributed during the days preceding his arrival, of the weapons, and of the means of communication that were discovered among the Chinese terrorists who were preparing an attempt on the life of the Yugoslav Chief of State. And it was also at the request of a foreigner that an illiterate mountain dweller from Rattanakiri -- a province near Vietnam -- recently questioned me concerning the visit of Mrs. Kennedy and of Ambassador Chester Bowles.

It is perfectly clear that Asiatic Communism no longer permits us to remain neutral and outside the conflict in which the Sino-Vietnamese and Americans are involved. Since they were not able to succeed in making us parties to unconditional surrender (we do not want to die for Hanoi or Peking -- nor for Washington, either), Asiatic Communism has attempted to overthrow our government, from within. As long as the great majority of my compatriots will put their trust in me, I will pursue the struggle for the independence and freedom of my country.

Norodom Sihanouk"

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May 1968

Communist Military and Economic Support
Of the North Vietnamese War Effort

On 23 September 1967, North Vietnam's Deputy Premier Le Than Nghi signed in Moscow a new agreement under which the USSR was to continue in 1968 to deliver military and economic goods, some free of charge and some on credit, to North Vietnam. During the previous month and a half, Le Than Nghi's delegation had signed military and economic aid agreements in Peking, Pyongyang, Sofia, Bucharest and Havana.

Moscow was faced with a dilemma in announcing its agreement. For Soviet citizens, it was desirable to continue to tone down the military nature and the magnitude of the USSR's support of North Vietnam. As part of Moscow's continuing polemics with Peking, it was desirable to create the opposite impression: that the USSR was living up to its obligations to her embattled Vietnamese ally by supplying large quantities of advanced weapons and armament. The result was that, in announcing the new aid agreement, the Soviet press for the first time emphasized the military aspect by stating that, at the request of the North Vietnamese Government, the USSR would deliver aircraft, antiaircraft rockets, artillery and infantry weapons, and ammunition. However no figures were given, although it was indicated that the 1968 shipments would exceed the volume of previous years.

Non-Communist journalists have attempted to ascertain, first, the extent of the support the North Vietnamese were actually receiving from Communist countries, and, second, the significance of such support.

Soviet and other Communist publications have revealed little, because it would be undesirable for their citizens to be able to relate support of a far-away war to the shortages of goods at home. One clue has come from the Soviet press. In February 1967 Marshal Zakharov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, explained the military budget's 1.1 billion ruble increase (from 13.4 billion rubles in 1966 to 14.5 billion in 1967) by referring to military aid to North Vietnam. Later, on 15 April 1967, Radio Moscow mentioned "the current increase in Soviet weapons shipments by sea and especially by land, to the Vietnamese Democratic Republic."

Various estimates of the magnitude of Communist war aid have appeared in Western media. The Neue Zuercher Zeitung of 29 September 1967 cited former U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara as having estimated Soviet shipments to North Vietnam in 1967 at \$1 billion and commented that this figure would appear to be too low. On 5 November 1967, in the New York Times, Soviet aid in 1965, 1966 and 1967 was estimated at \$1.5 billion. Other journalists point out that this figure may well be low, since the Soviets price their war goods for export at as little as a fourth of their cost. The USSR has provided the preponderance of the aid to North Vietnam, perhaps three quarters of the total.

The amount of materials shipped would be hard to estimate since rail movements from and across China can't be observed, as can ocean shipping. According to the New York Times of 27 December 1967, a record high of 47 deep-draft ships reached North Vietnam in January 1966; it also reported that 22-25 ships arrived each month in July, August and September 1967; a number of ships were also observed steaming into Cambodian waters.

The scope of military aid received by North Vietnam is indicated by the fact that Communist countries have provided virtually all of the military supplies for the estimated 800,000 men in its armed forces. These forces include 7 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam or on its borders. In addition, North Vietnam supplies most of the needs of the 9 Viet Cong divisions, as well as numerous irregular forces in the South. Soviet shipments have included:

- jet bombers (IL-28)
- jet fighter planes (MIG-17, MIG-21)
- surface-to-air rockets
- antiaircraft artillery
- rifles (AK 47 and AK 50, the most modern in Soviet arsenals)
- 122 mm. rockets (5,000 according to one estimate)
- 140 mm. rockets
- 12.7 mm. heavy machine guns
- 120 mm. mortars
- two types of rocket-propelled grenades
- armored personnel carriers
- tanks.

The Chinese Communists have supplied:

- 75 mm. pack howitzers
- 82 mm. mortars
- 102 mm. rockets
- AK 47 rifles.

Large numbers of trucks have been provided to the North Vietnamese by the USSR, Communist China and several Eastern European countries. Also, the Chinese Communists have provided gunboats and the USSR has provided submarine chasers and motor torpedo boats to the North Vietnamese Navy.

Military aid has also been provided in the form of training. Hundreds of North Vietnamese military personnel are said to be in the USSR and Eastern Europe learning to operate modern weapons such as MIG jet fighter aircraft and surface-to-air rockets. Other military training was being given to many more of the 3,000 North Vietnamese in the USSR in 1967. According to an agreement signed in July 1967, 6,000 North Vietnamese (including military, industrial and other personnel) are to be trained in the USSR between 1967 and 1969. Similar agreements were reached with other Eastern European countries for the training of an additional 4,000 North Vietnamese.

Unknown numbers of military "advisors" and instructors from several Communist countries are reportedly in North Vietnam on training missions. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists are reported to have sent 50,000 to 100,000 engineer troops to help repair damages to airfields, bridges, rail lines and roads on which military supplies are delivered and to construct new military support facilities.

Non-military aid in 1967 consisted mainly of food, but also included civilian transport equipment and small industrial plants. Food supplied in 1967 amounted to about a half million tons. The Soviets shipped flour and wheat (a substitute for rice and distasteful to the Vietnamese). The Chinese Communists shipped rice and the Eastern Europeans sent beans and grain.

In summary, the Communist countries have contributed massive military and economic aid to the North Vietnamese war effort. Such aid has accelerated during the past year and, according to agreements now in force, it is expected to increase further.

The significance of such outside support can be measured against the capability of the North Vietnamese economy to supply the wherewithal with which to fight the war in the South. To do this, it is helpful to take a look at a few pertinent features of the North Vietnamese economy:

First, its gross national product at its high point in 1964 was only 1.6 billion dollars, or less than \$90 per capita.*

Second, North Vietnam has practically no capacity to produce military equipment, not even small arms. North Vietnam's industrial production consists largely of minerals, cement and coal and thus is severely limited in its capacity to support war.

*Most estimates of the North Vietnamese economy are based upon Soviet statistical compilations and are believed to tend to exaggerate rather than to underestimate its magnitude.

Third, North Vietnam's industry has been almost totally dependent upon foreign aid for its development, which lagged far behind planned goals, even in the period 1954-64 when it was not hindered by the bombing.

Fourth, and of great significance, the country's agricultural production has been sufficient to feed its people in only one year since 1956. North Vietnam's rice production, for example, reached a peak in 1959; by 1963 it had declined by 17%. (South Vietnam outstripped North Vietnam in increasing rice production by a ratio of more than 4 to 3 in the late 1950's and early 1960's.)

North Vietnam's economic history from 1954 to 1964 was characterized by failures and disappointments which were relieved only by grants and credits from Communist countries amounting to approximately \$1 billion. The organization and management of industry suffered from difficulties very similar to those prevailing in the Eastern European satellites during their early attempts to adopt Soviet-style economies. As stated in September 1960 by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Minister of State for Economic Planning,

"... in planning, we have been more or less subjective; some indices were too high, thereby bringing about a tense situation in the course of their implementation. A number of departments did not fulfill their plans, thus causing a measure of discouragement in these departments. A number of concrete policies were not formulated or amended in time; control was not very strict; cases of corruption and waste are still rather numerous."

One specific failure was witnessed in the construction of the Thai-Nguyen Steel Plant: The Vietnamese reduced the size of the French-planned project by one half, and still hadn't completed it 7 years after construction had begun.

In agriculture the regime was confronted not only with serious organizational problems, but also with a peasant revolt in 1956 over the regime's poorly planned and clumsily executed land reform. This revolt resulted in the execution of close to 50,000 people and the arrest and detention at forced labor of more than 100,000, according to Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams.

The current shakiness of the North Vietnamese economy is underscored by the fact that the regime has refused since 1963 to issue reports on the status of its economy. Recently Far East observers have noted North Vietnamese reports of labor waste in industry and agriculture caused by absenteeism, bad organization, inefficiency, "freedomism" (a term used pejoratively), corruption, and an unwillingness of minor officials to work in the rural areas.

Even from such a brief survey of the economy it is possible to conclude that North Vietnam falls far short of the capacity to wage or support a sustained war beyond its borders. North Vietnam could hardly get started on such a war without large-scale aid; and it would certainly be obliged to abandon its efforts in the South if the military and economic aid of the Communist countries were stopped.

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India: Early Russian Interest
and Soviet Penetration

In the late fifteenth century a Russian merchant named Atanasiy Nikitin arrived in India to explore possibilities of Indo-Russian trade. After spending four years on the sub-continent, he returned home completely disenchanted with his enterprise. "Brethren, Russian Christians ... the infidel dogs have lied to me, for there is nothing to be found in India for us; pepper and colors, these are cheap but bringing them by sea costs taxes and there are many pirates on the sea," he reported to his compatriots.

Some years later -- in 1579 -- a Jesuit priest, Thomas Stevens, arrived in Goa on a Portuguese ship. The first Englishman to set foot on Indian soil, he devoted the next forty years to missionary work among the natives. He is remembered less for his evangelistic accomplishments, however, than for the impetus for Eastern trade which his letters are said to have provided to London merchants. That interest culminated in the foundation in 1599 of the East India Company, which later became instrumental in the British conquest of India.

It was not until 1675 that Russia made an earnest attempt to open relations with India. Tsar Aleksis sent a large delegation to Emperor Aurangzeb, but the Moghul ruler refused to establish inter-state contacts, reasoning that there had never been an embassy from Russia to Delhi before, that there was not and never had been a dispute between the two countries, that the Tsar's religion was different from the Moghul's, and that the Tsar, with no other possible excuse for establishing an embassy in far-off India, was therefore interested in Indian wealth.

Russian interest in India took a new turn under Peter the Great (1682-1725) with his policy of expeditious westernization and territorial expansion. While the English and French East India Companies were engaged in a contest for commercial and political supremacy in India,* the Russian Tsar dreamed of extending his influence toward the Oxus and the Indus, but his death prevented his actual quest for India's riches. Neither Peter's aspirations nor those of his successors caused any chasm in Anglo-Russian relations until the end of the eighteenth century. Friction developed when Catherine the Great (1762-1796) launched a policy of southward expansion

*In 1664, the French formed La Compagnie des Indes under the patronage of Louis XIV to begin trading operations in India. The first French settlement was founded in Pondicherry around 1674, and for the next hundred years and more, Britain and France fought continuously to get the upper hand in India. Portuguese influence in India was at a low ebb at the time the British arrived; Dutch interest lay in the East Indies (now Indonesia).

with the ultimate objective of seizing Constantinople from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Britain, a traditional ally of Russia, viewed this as a threat to the balance of power in Europe and to her dominant position in the Levant and the Mediterranean. Tension flared up in 1791 when Britain unsuccessfully tried to make Russia give up to Turkey the Ochakov fortress on the Black Sea which the Russians had captured after costly combat, and marked the beginning of Anglo-Russian rivalry not only in the Near East but also in India: the first Russian plan for the invasion of India was hammered out in the heat of the Ochakov affair.

Incensed at Britain's opposition to her territorial ambitions, Russia decided to threaten the British position in India. This strategy was frequently although never successfully employed by Russia through the ensuing years in the ebb and flow of Anglo-Russian rivalry. The Russian strategy of keeping Britain passive in the Dardanelles by threatening the Indian Empire failed, while the British policy of defending India beyond India's borders on the periphery of the Russian Empire from the Pamirs to the Straits bore fruit. After some sixty years of such maneuvering, the end of the Anglo-Sikh wars (1849) marked the extension of the British frontier to the mouth of the Khyber, and the British conquest of India became complete.

As the size and scope of Britain's commitment in India grew, the administrative apparatus of the East India Company changed. Its headquarters became the seat of governmental power, headed by a governor general responsible only to the Company's board of directors in London. After the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, which for a time threatened to bring down British rule in India, the colony was transferred from the Company to the Crown on 1 November 1858.

To a large extent, the foundations of present-day politics in India, the pattern of government and parliamentary practices, the liberalism of the ruling elite and its preference for representative institutions modeled on Western lines were laid during the next ninety years ... from 1858 until British rule ended with the transfer of power in August 1947. For the British, the first half of this period proved a time of consolidation and reform; for the Indians, the second half was a time in which to give shape and substance to their growing sense of nationalism.

In August 1907, Britain and Russia, confronted by the German threat in Europe, decided to bury mutual rivalries in Asia by concluding the Anglo-Russian Entente. As a result, Persia (Iran) was divided into three spheres of influence, China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognized and its territorial integrity acknowledged, and Russia recognized that Afghanistan was within the British sphere of influence. The entente cordiale, effected without consultation with or the consent of the countries concerned, remained in force until November 1917 when the Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the Romanov regime and annulled its treaties and commitments.

In order to allay Indian unrest, the British dramatically announced on 20 August 1917 their pledge to "the progressive realization of responsible self-government to India as an integral part of the British Empire." Shortly, therefore, with the Bolsheviks' rise to power in November 1917, Anglo-Russian relations with regard to India underwent a radical change. Tsarist Russia, whose expansionist ambitions often came into conflict with those of Britain, had been a military threat to the security of the British Empire; Soviet Russia, whose Communist principles and practice clashed with Britain's imperialist interests, became additionally an ideological threat which was even more destructive to the status quo than Tsarist arms had been. Tsarist Russia craved for the control of Constantinople and the Straits, while Soviet Russia aspired for the establishment of a Communist commonwealth embracing the entire globe.

The opening gun in the propaganda war over India between the Soviet Union and the West was fired on 7 December 1917, when the Council of People's Commissars appealed to the Moslems of Russia and the East, alleging:

"Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the 'enlightened' European robbers for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organizing its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the peoples of the East to the struggle and to freedom. The empire of capitalist plunder and violence is falling in ruins. The ground is slipping from under the feet of the imperialist robbers."

Whether or not this early insurrectionary appeal ever reached the intended audience is debatable, but it did not pass unnoticed by the British Government, whose envoy in Russia issued a rejoinder to the press in which he commented that "Mr. Lenin spoke of us as rapacious extortioners and plunderers, while he incited our Indian subjects to rebellion."

It took forty months of tumultuous Anglo-Soviet politicking over India before England first established relations with the Soviet Union, marked, of course, by the circumstances of World War I. While Allied statesmen were discussing the Russian question, Churchill's War Office, in a statement on 15 January 1920, described the extent of Soviet threat in the East, highlighting the danger to the British Empire in India. "... The Tashkent Soviet ... at a recent meeting, determined to concentrate efforts first on India, and it is intended to open propaganda centers there as soon as possible."

On 16 March 1921 an Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed which, in effect, constituted de facto recognition by Great Britain of the Soviet Government. The rapprochement between two diametrically opposed systems of government which had been arch adversaries was an agreement in name only; in reality, it was a move which placed mutual animosity on a different footing. The Trade Agreement was subject to the condition:

"That each party refrains from hostile actions or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests of the British Empire, especially in India and the Independent State of Afghanistan...."

Meanwhile the Soviets were not letting down their efforts to keep the "General Staff of World Revolution" in a state of readiness. On 19 July 1920, the Second World Congress of the Communist International convened in Moscow. Prominent among the Asian delegates was Manabendra Nath Roy, a revolutionary Brahmin from Bengal, who became the first Soviet link with India. Soon after, Roy organized the handful of Indian exiles in Europe into an 'emigre' Communist Party of India and started his crusade against the British raj, ably assisted by his American wife.

The political situation on the Indian sub-continent became more tense than ever. Gandhi was preparing India for a momentous struggle against the Government; under his leadership, the Indian National Congress had decided to support the Khalifat movement (to preserve the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey). However, the Treaty of Sevres (June 1920), which decimated the Turkish Empire, inflamed extremist Moslems who decided on hijrat (religious migration from one country to another). From the standpoint of Anglo-Soviet relations, the important sequel to this pilgrimage was the arrival in Soviet Central Asia of some 300 Moslems. A small number eventually became Bolshevik converts under the tutelage of M.N. Roy. It was these who returned to India to work toward the foundation of the Communist Party of India in the late 1920s. Founded under the auspices of the Communist International, it was originally set up under the general supervision of the Communist Party of Great Britain and made its first appearance on the political scene as an autonomous organization around 1938.

However, Indian passions did not turn to Communism, but were fixed on gaining national independence. On 25 November 1922, the political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party issued a secret circular, signed by Stalin among others, which stated in part:

"A mistake was made by the Communist International in its first efforts to promote a revolution in India ... the real aspirations of these peoples to emancipate themselves from the foreign yoke were consequently used merely as an argument to induce them to accept Communism. It has now been realized that Communism is completely unacceptable to the Hindus in their present state of development ... and independence is a condition which must precede it. Our propaganda agents did not realize this...."

Relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union did not improve. Nevertheless, after changes of government in Britain, and in spite of increased fears of Soviet policies and mutual accusations of having broken the propaganda agreement of 1921, the British Labor Government did extend de jure recognition to the Soviet Government on 1 February 1924.

Two interesting, and now familiar, diplomatic and propaganda exercises were instigated soon after. On 24 May 1927, after a deliberate raid by London police on a Russian trade corporation and the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation (in an abortive attempt to obtain incriminating documents), Prime Minister Baldwin charged the Soviet Government with espionage, subversive propaganda and intrigue. Disregarding Soviet denials, the British Government on 26 May renounced the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and severed diplomatic relations.

Great Britain and the USSR resumed formal diplomatic relations on 20 December 1929, allegedly with the approval of India, in spite of recurring problems over continued hostile propaganda by the Soviet Union and by the Comintern. When Foreign Secretary Henderson assured Parliament in November 1929 that cessation of propaganda was guaranteed by the Soviet Union, his interpretation of Soviet promises with respect to propaganda brought criticism from the official organ of the USSR, Izvestia:

"It is futile ... to pretend that this undertaking in any way concerns the Comintern; as the Soviet Government can neither speak for the Comintern nor undertake any responsibility for the Comintern's activity."

(That 1929 disavowal of Soviet Government control over "unofficial" propaganda organs holds true in the current Government of India complaints about Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, and over the recently concluded propaganda exchange agreement between Novosti and India's governmental Press Information Bureau.)

The pattern of Anglo-Soviet relations vis-a-vis India remained more or less unaltered until 1934. The Soviets and the Comintern kept on with the kind of anti-British propaganda and activity they had been conducting since the October Revolution, while the conservative press and parliamentarians, who seldom ceased their own tirades against the Soviets, maintained their protests against Moscow's violations of the commitments not to engage in propaganda attacks.

In April 1930 London and Moscow signed a temporary commercial agreement which could be extended by mutual consent to any part of the British Empire including India. In the meantime, India was once more astir with the Civil Disobedience Movement, and the revolutionary ferment in India caused the Soviet press to publish glowing accounts of the whole affair. At the same time the Soviets were apprehensive that the British might wrongly impute Indian disturbances to Soviet machinations. The Soviet press (naturally) published a warning that the Indian revolutionaries might be found bearing Russian arms ... and warned that any such discovery would be a plot against the Soviet Government by its imperialist foes!

A change in Soviet attitude occurred following Hitler's rise to power in 1933: the danger of Fascism took the place of the much-advertised threat of an imperialist offensive against the Soviet Union. In February 1934 Great Britain and the USSR signed a new trade agreement; seven months later, the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations. In the summer of 1935, the Comintern inaugurated the policy of the United Front Against Fascism; instructions went to the CPI, which had been declared illegal in July 1934 (and remained illegal until 1942), to give up its "left-sectarian" policy and to adopt the new line. This policy remained in full force until the conclusion of a Treaty of Non-Agression between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939. It was then that Winston Churchill said (October 1939) that the key to the Soviet policy, which he described as a "riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma," was "Russian national interests."

In spite of all the twists and turns in domestic and foreign policies of Soviet Russia, there was but one determining factor behind them all ... to safeguard and increase the power of the Soviet State. Moreover, the increase in tempo of the Indian nationalist movement under Mahatma Gandhi, from 1919 on, provided circumstances hand-tailored for the penetration of skillful propaganda from the Soviet Union. When most other countries were negative or neutral in their support of the Indian nationalist aims, the Soviet leaders were firm supporters -- at least until the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union in 1941 when the Soviets again became British allies. Soviet leadership then decreed that all communists within the British Empire should support the British war effort, a demand that was very unpopular in India; today the Soviet Union is doing all it can to consign these events to oblivion.

At the end of World War II, the Indian Communists tried to lessen the gap between them and the Congress Party. They supported Nehru, hoping this would make him adopt policies friendly to the Soviets. But Moscow did not approve this policy -- and it had to be abandoned. The Soviet press criticized the cooperation of the Congress Party with the British authorities during the independence preliminaries. Moscow then suggested the formation of an anti-imperialist front to mobilize public opinion against Great Britain and the U.S.

This was consistent with Soviet interest at the time: in 1947 the Soviets started the Cold War, broke their wartime alliances with the West and started to consolidate the Communist satellite empire in Eastern Europe, and the new governments of India and Pakistan were promised Communist support.

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ASIA:

The Russians Are Coming

Their "goodwill" call at the ports of Madras and Bombay at an end, three Russian warships—including the Dmitri Pozharskiy, flagship of the Soviet Far Eastern fleet—pulled up anchor and headed home to Vladivostok last week. Scarcely had they cleared Indian waters before the New Delhi government publicly denied rumors that it might grant the Russian Navy refueling rights in Indian ports. But the disclaimer in no way lessened the long-term significance of the visit. Not only did it mark the first time Soviet warships had appeared in Indian harbors; it was also the first occasion on which the Red Navy had shown the flag in the Indian Ocean.

All this was part of a little-noticed aspect of the growing Soviet effort to rival the U.S. as a conventional global power. Over the past few years, without fuss or fanfare, the Russians have been determinedly seeking to expand their influence throughout Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. And now, with all British military forces save the Hong Kong garrison scheduled to leave Asia by 1971, the Soviet drive east of Suez is stepping up.

The primary purpose of the Soviet effort in Asia is presumably to counter the influence of Communist China. In any case, much of that effort has been military. The Soviet Pacific fleet, with more than 100 submarines, 50 destroyers and destroyer escorts and some 250 shore-based navy planes, now regularly maneuvers in the western Pacific, once regarded as a "U.S. lake." The Russians have also mended their fences in Communist North Korea and North Vietnam, sending them massive amounts of military aid, including some of the most sophisticated weapons in the Soviet arsenal.

At the same time, the Russians are also making an energetic attempt to win friends among the "neutral" nations of Asia. Gone are the days when Moscow supported local Communist movements in their attempts to overthrow Asian governments by force. Now, while Peking-backed Communists are in the field against the governments of Cambodia and Burma, the Russians are sending significant amounts of aid to both countries. And in Laos, they have scrupulously refrained from interfering with the efforts of the U.S.-backed government of Souvanna Phouma to fend off the Communist-led Pathet Lao.

It is, however, in the avowedly "pro-Western" countries of the area that the Soviet Union is making its biggest pitch—and that is primarily an economic one.

More and more, Russian consumer goods from marmalade to matches are appearing in the markets from Tokyo to Bombay, and, in return, Soviet imports from the area are soaring. The Soviet Union, for example, is now the largest single importer of Malaysian raw rubber, and recently Moscow contracted for an enormous purchase of Indian manufactured goods. Trade with Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan has also risen significantly, and recently the Russians have shown an interest in working out joint-venture deals with private and public Asian capital. For the past eight months, in fact, Japan Air Lines and Russia's Aeroflot have been cooperating amicably in the operation of a trans-Siberian route.

Along with all this economic activity, the Soviets have also been busily strengthening their diplomatic network in the area. In the past year, they have set up new embassies in Malaysia and Singapore, both of which have strongly anti-Communist governments. And so correct has Soviet diplomatic behavior been that even the Philippines, one of the most outspoken anti-Communist nations in the world, is said to be considering the establishment of relations with Moscow.

Rivalry: What this expansion of Soviet influence will ultimately mean for the U.S. is still uncertain. Quite conceivably, if the U.S. were to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, Moscow might bid for an even larger role in Southeast Asia. But this is a prospect which appears to leave many U.S. diplomats supremely unconcerned. In the foreseeable future, they contend, Russia simply will not have the power, prestige or money to replace the U.S. as the major outside power there.

No doubt, these diplomats add, there will be a heightening of the economic and diplomatic rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Asia over the years ahead. Still, as one perhaps overoptimistic U.S. official noted last week: "The major hostile force in Asia is China. And the Russians can be a counterweight to the Chinese along with us. They can help us promote stability in the area. They may make life more complex for us, but I hardly think they are going to make it more dangerous."

WHAT CHANGE EAST OF SUEZ?

E. TABROV

THE British government's retrenchment measures were not really a surprise. The cutbacks in expenditures had been debated long in advance, and proposals and counter-proposals had been aired in the press and over the radio and TV. Yet when Prime Minister Wilson told a packed House on January 16 that under the economy programme the British bases in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf would be given up and British troops withdrawn from these areas by the end of 1971, he created a sensation. For the announcement was hard to reconcile with all that had been said earlier from the same parliamentary rostrum about the British presence East of Suez.

For two days Parliament was in turmoil. The government was criticized from the Right and from the Left. But it carried the day. The plans became law. Now a detailed exposition of them is available in the Defence White Book published on February 22.

The history of the British presence in the area from Suez to Singapore dates back to the days of which Kipling sang, "Ship me somewhere East of Suez," and when Britannia ruled not only the waves but vast possessions stretching from Cairo to Hongkong. In those years it was not merely a facet of policy but intrinsic in Britain's over-all policy of empire.

With the disintegration of the British Empire and the liberation of Britain's Asian and African colonies, the formula "East-of-Suez policy" came to denote specifically the complex of military and political measures in Asia constituting a new "imperial defence" system designed to protect the interests of British imperialism in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asian countries rich in oil, tin, rubber and other resources.

One might have thought that the breakdown of the colonial system would introduce far-reaching changes in London's military and political strategy. Actually, however, only the tactical methods were refurbished and Kipling's poetry was supplanted by the prose of agreements with Washington.

In recent years Britain's East-of-Suez policy came to hinge on her "overseas commitments" arising from participation in the Seato and Cento blocs and her bilateral military treaties with Malaysia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei, the South Arabian sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia.

There were also the "commitments" to

Australia and New Zealand, with which Britain has secret military agreements. An important factor too was her "special relations" with the U.S.A. As *Sunday Times* noted in the summer of 1967, this policy could be traced directly to the understanding reached long ago between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy that the "strategic gap" between the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific would be filled by Britain.

In practical terms this meant a chain of British military bases stretching from Aden and the Persian Gulf to Hongkong. At present, after the withdrawal from Aden, there still are at least twelve such bases, the biggest of them in Hongkong, Singapore, Malaysia (Butterworth, Malacca, Johore and Kota Tinggi), the Persian Gulf area (Bahrain and the sheikhdom of Sharja), and the Mascarene and Maldive islands. The troops at these bases run to more than 90,000. Some 70 ships of the Royal Navy and 300 combat aircraft are stationed in the Indian Ocean area.

Official London has resorted to a wide variety of arguments to cover up the imperialist essence of its East-of-Suez policy, above all to the plea that Britain could not give up her image as a great power.

"We cannot afford to relinquish our world role, sometimes described in shorthand as 'our role East of Suez,'" Wilson said in Parliament in late 1964, shortly after Labour came to power.

Another common argument was that Britain maintained her foreign bases exclusively in the interests of the local population, shouldering the burden because of her moral obligations to the peoples of her former colonies. And to counter criticism emanating from some West-European capitals, it was said that the East-of-Suez policy was designed to protect the interests of the European powers.

"Our military presence in this area," Michael Stewart, then Foreign Secretary in the Labour government, said in 1966 in an interview given to the West-German *Spiegel*, "serves not only British interests, but all who need oil."

This statement contained an element of truth. Safeguarding the positions of the oil monopolies was always the object of Britain's Middle East policy, though the prime concern was of course

Britain's own oil interests, as well as those of the United States, which has virtually monopolized oil extraction in this area.

Characteristic too was the argument that Britain retained its foothold in Asia allegedly to prevent this part of the world from falling completely under U.S. military control and in order to be able to influence Washington. How far this is from the truth is evident from the fact that it is Washington which is now most displeased with the plans for British withdrawal. For in reality throughout the entire area east of Suez debilitated British imperialism is less a rival of American imperialism than its ally in suppressing the national-liberation movements.

Underlying all this cant was the striving of British imperialism to cling to its positions in the developing countries. The East-of-Suez policy was nourished by the illusion that armed force could halt the march of history. The *Economist* said two years ago that the British forces in this area were intended "for counter-insurgency operations, preferably at the bud-nipping stage, which Britain happens to be pretty good at." At the Unison '67 Study at Camberley, attended by senior British and Commonwealth officers, the British reported that in the previous seventeen years—from 1949 to 1966—British troops had taken part in 85 campaigns, mostly against so-called "insurgents." And on January 25 this year no less an authority than Foreign Secretary George Brown frankly admitted in Parliament that Britain had shouldered over the years a "world policing role" she could no longer afford.

The East-of-Suez policy has always laid a heavy burden on the treasury. *Sunday Times* estimates that its annual cost exceeds £120 million. Wilson and members of his Cabinet have been publicly complaining ever since they took over office that Britain is carrying a financial load in Asia which she can hardly afford. But for a long time they did little more than deplore the fact. The policy remained the same while its cost kept soaring. Besides the direct expenditures, Britain also incurred indirect losses. For instance, support of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, also dictated by the East-of-Suez policy, cost London more than £160 million in 1967 owing to the closure of the Suez Canal and the boycott of British goods in Arab countries.

Christopher Mayhew, former Navy Minister, makes the relevant point in his book "Britain's Role Tomorrow," published last year, that the British military presence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia "hinders rather than helps commercial interest."

"The cost of military presence there," he said in the House of Commons in January 1967, "is far greater than any economic benefits received from our military presence east of Suez."

What has prompted the Labour government to decide to withdraw British troops from Asia and to dismantle its military bases and installations there? Can the step be regarded as genuine abandonment of the East-of-Suez policy, as do some of the government's more vociferous Opposition critics? Neither Wilson's January 16 announcement nor statements made by members of his government, not to speak of other attendant circumstances, give grounds for such a conclusion. True, Wilson did say in Parliament that review of military expenditure means "reassessing" Britain's role in the world and "realistically limiting our commitments and outgoings to our true capacities." But at the same time Foreign Secretary Brown said "there could be British influence without British armies on the spot," and Commonwealth Secretary Thomson assured the governments of Malaysia and Singapore of "Britain's continued interest in the maintenance of security in Southeast Asia with the forces which will be available here." And Defence Minister Healey, stressing that the British government was displaying due realism in its foreign and military policy, made it clear that if the circumstances required it, Britain would draw on her potential in Europe to send armed forces to Asia.

Moreover, no immediate or early withdrawal is contemplated. The time limit set is December 1971, and much can happen in four years. For one thing, the statements made by Tory leaders Heath, Macleod and Maudling that if returned to power the Conservatives would maintain the British presence in the East should not be lost sight of.

Noteworthy are the alternatives envisaged by the Labour leaders to the direct military presence they are giving up not for political reasons, but owing to Britain's economic straits. Firstly, not all British military bases are to be abolished. Bases and military stations will remain in Hongkong, on Mauritius and

the Maldiv Islands, and some minor strongpoints in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. Further, Britain intends to maintain special mobile units based on the smaller islands and aircraft carriers in readiness for dispatch to "trouble spots." Besides, the British are already busy arming puppet troops of the type of the Trucial Oman Scouts and the sultans' armed forces in Muscat and Oman. Hopes are also being pinned on Saudi Arabia, to which, according to the *Spectator*, Britain intends to bequeath her role in that part of the world. Contracts concluded to date for British military supplies to Saudi Arabia exceed £100 million, and King Faisal has already pledged his "support" to Bahrain. The proposals advanced in Teheran, Kuwait and Riyadh in January by the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Roberts should be regarded in the same light. The idea was to establish under British tutelage a Persian Gulf regional "defence system" envisaging the conclusion of military agreements between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the federation of Arab sheikhdoms in the area.

The peace forces have condemned these plans.

"The Soviet Union," a TASS statement of March 4 declares, "true to its policy of defence of the national interests of sovereign states and nations against imperialist encroachment, and aware that these neo-colonialist plans are aimed also against the security of the southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., takes a firm stand against the latest attempts by aggressive U.S. and British circles to intervene in the affairs of the Persian Gulf countries and to impose their diktat on them."

Measures have also been outlined for compensating for the withdrawal from Southeast Asian bases. The governments of Singapore and Malaysia are particularly disquieted by the prospect of the British pulling out, not only because of economic considerations (the British bases here provide employment for large numbers of local people, and it would not be easy to find other work for them, especially with unemployment at its present high level), but also because of apprehensions as regards the recklessness the Peking leaders are apt to display in their policy towards their Southeast Asian neighbours. A special regional conference of Commonwealth countries to be attended by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain is

planned to be held within the next few months. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman has already declared for the establishment of a defence organization of these countries to "fill the vacuum" created by the withdrawal of British forces. Moreover, Britain has undertaken to build up a joint air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore and to train the personnel for it.

The Wilson government, then, is by no means completely discarding the old East-of-Suez policy, but merely modifying it to adapt it to the new conditions. This, generally speaking, is typical of postwar Britain, which has had to relinquish the old military-colonial forms of domination throughout its former empire and go over to neo-colonialist lines.

Time will show what the announced changes will really amount to. One thing is unquestionable: Britain's East-of-Suez policy has no future, irrespective of whether she can afford it or not. The national-liberation movement cannot be stopped. By taking ambiguous and half-hearted decisions and cultivating new forms of colonialism while remaining in the "special relations" merry-go-round with the United States, the British rulers are only steering their country into deepening political and economic difficulties.

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Our Southern Neighbours

THE Soviet visits of President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and King Hussein of Jordan have again turned the spotlight on the Soviet Union's relations with the nations of the area to the south of it. Equal interest was aroused by the earlier Moscow visits of Prime Ministers Demirel of Turkey and Hoveida of Iran and by Soviet President Podgorny's trips to Afghanistan and a number of Arab countries.

While each of these meetings was primarily designed to discuss relations between the two countries concerned, together they reflected the general new atmosphere that has developed in these past years around the Soviet Union's southern borders.

It isn't so very long ago that only India and Afghanistan of the countries in this area resisted Washington's schemes of fettering Asia with its war-bloc chains. Not really so long ago that the notorious U-2 took off from a Peshawar airfield, heading for Sverdlovsk. Not so long ago that the Turks were being incited to enmity towards their Bulgarian, Arab, Soviet neighbours....

Now these cold-war abominations are a thing of the past. Our southern neighbours are increasingly shaking off the American-inspired anti-Soviet nightmares. True, Pakistan remains a member of Cento and Seato, Turkey of Nato and Cento, Iran of Cento; but friendliness and trust towards the Soviet Union are growing in all these countries. Without such trust, would Pakistan ever have asked Premier Kosygin to act as mediator in producing the Tashkent Declaration?

And the Tashkent Declaration is by no means the Soviet leaders' only contribution to the cause of peace in the East. The useful results of the visits by L. I. Brezhnev to Iran and N. V. Podgorny and A. N. Kosygin to Turkey are generally known. To quote the verdict of the Iranian and Turkish press, these visits sealed the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and opened up prospects of further mutual understanding.

No one today can help seeing how greatly the international atmosphere between the Bosphorus and the Indus has changed. The Soviet-Pakistani communiqué of October 4 says, for example, that the "friendly and neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan" allow them to draw up a plan of economic co-operation and trade for the period up to 1975. A plan of economic co-operation for eight years ahead—what more telling proof could there

be of good intentions? And on his return to Rawalpindi President Ayub Khan said that his talks with the Soviet leaders had been held not merely in an atmosphere of formal good will, "but in a spirit of sincerity and friendship."

That spirit of sincerity and friendship is spreading to relations between other Asian countries too. Here is an illustration. The two-thousand-kilometre network of modern motorways built with Soviet assistance in Afghanistan has not only given a fillip to domestic trade and economic life but provided the facilities for large-scale Afghano-Pakistani trade, and also for the transit of goods between Pakistan and Iran, and Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The opening of the new transport network roughly coincided with a noticeable improvement in the previously extremely strained Afghano-Pakistani relations. And in August road engineers from Pakistan, India, Iran, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia all came to Kabul to draw up joint plans for a great Trans-Asian highway. This project, which it is hoped to accomplish by 1973, will be the realization of a dream dating back to the days of Marco Polo and Afanasy Nikitin, and a valuable contribution to peaceful co-operation in the area.

A similar beneficial influence is being exerted by the project for the construction in Iran, with Soviet help, of a large port on the Caspian and a railway leading to it from the south. This will revive the old-time trade route from Persia to Russia, and will also make it easier for neighbouring Iraq to transport its goods to the Soviet Union. There have already been negotiations on the subject between Iran and Iraq, whose relations long left much to be desired, and the *Tehran Journal* (October 5) writes that after years of quarrelling, Iran now has a chance to achieve both political agreement and mutually advantageous trade relations with her Arab neighbour.

The Turkish press notes with satisfaction that the oil refinery to be erected shortly near Izmir in co-operation with the Soviet Union will end the Western monopoly of the sale of petro-

leum products in Turkey. The refinery will get its oil at acceptable prices from Iran. Ankara and Teheran are already discussing the matter, and both sides see this co-operation as another step towards economic independence.

The atmosphere of peace and stability in the north of the Moslem East contrasts sharply with the tense situation in the south in the wake of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states. Israel continues to threaten the Arabs, and they can see who are their true friends. During King Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union—the first ever paid by a king of Jordan—the Amman *Al Fajr el Jadid* wrote editorially that recent events in the Middle East had "radically altered previous political conceptions, clarified Arab relations with different countries, and shown the Arabs who is their friend and who their enemy." Amman, the paper said, had "come to appreciate the importance of a policy of non-alignment and the fact that the Soviet Union and the socialist states are friends of the Arab and his liberation struggle against imperialism."

The joint Soviet-Jordanian communiqué issued at the end of the visit states that "the Jordanian side is deeply grateful to the people and government of the Soviet Union for the genuine and valuable support and assistance which the U.S.S.R. has rendered and actively continues to render to the Arab victims of aggression."

The communiqué describes the Israeli aggression as being *imperialist* in character. And as the earnest of the Arab countries' success, it proclaims their unity on an "*anti-imperialist and anti-colonial basis*." It also says that "the Soviet Union, like other socialist states, will continue to render the Arab states the necessary support in their just struggle for their lawful rights, in the rehabilitation and development of their economy, and in strengthening their defences."

The young developing nations have had many opportunities to see the invariable friendliness of the Soviet people and government towards them. And the Soviet leaders' recent meetings with statesmen of our southern neighbour countries furnished added and cogent proof of it.

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Castro's Continued Attempts to Export His RevolutionBackground of Failure

Since 1959 Castro has tried to export his revolution throughout much of Latin America, or, as he himself has said, to convert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America. Since 1959 Castro's doctrine of revolutionary war, or guerrilla warfare, has been tried in sixteen or seventeen countries, and it has failed in all of them. Only a small, extremist minority has heeded Castro's and the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara's call for "two, three or many Vietnams."

Inherent in the guerrilla failures have been deficient leadership, inadequate training, poor support mechanisms and frequent internal struggles over leadership or tactics which, among other reasons, have led to disillusionment, low morale and desertions from the ranks. External factors in these failures have been the increasingly effective counter-action of the threatened government security forces, and the complete lack of support, or even interest, on the part of the local peasant population.

On a broader level, the Castroite movement in Latin America has been generally weakened by the increasing strains and, in some cases, outright breaks in cooperation between the pro-Cuban elements and the orthodox Communist groups, especially since the 1967 LASO Conference -- when Castro attacked the pro-Soviet parties as being in the "rearguard of the struggle against imperialism" -- which caused strains even within the orthodox parties themselves. Since then, Castro's continued insistence that Latin America is ripe for revolutionary war, and his continued attacks on the old-line Communist parties have further strained relations and weakened his cause.

Castro's Calls for Revolution

In spite of the basic handicaps of the guerrilla groups and their repeated failures, and notwithstanding the apparent lull in guerrilla activities following the spectacular failure and death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, the Castro forces are clearly determined to continue their efforts to create periodic, if not sustained, unrest throughout a number of countries in the area.

Castro himself, in fact, announced his intention to continue exporting his revolution even as he delivered his eulogy of Guevara in October 1967. Although he acknowledged the "tremendous blow to the revolutionary movement" of "Che's" death, at the same time he said, "they are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat of his theses...." Likewise, Castro's use of the January 1968 Havana Cultural Congress to propagandize the Cuban revolutionary theme, and his vow to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries throughout the world was yet another demonstration of his intent to export the revolution.

Bolivia: Guerrilla Activity Continues

After the death of "Che" Guevara in October 1967, the remnants of his guerrilla band went into hiding. The three surviving Cubans crossed the Andes into northern Chile during February and were arrested by Chilean authorities at the village of Camina. Although extreme leftists in Chile demanded the group be granted political asylum, they were deported to Cuba. Because of the absence from the group of Guido "Inti" Peredo, the leading Bolivian member, it wasn't clear whether he had escaped arrest in Chile or had remained in Bolivia, but the Chilean left-wing newspaper, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, published an interview with one of the Cuban members, Daniel Alarcon Ramirez, in which he said Peredo had left the others during a clash near La Siberia, in Bolivia. The newspaper also quoted another report that Peredo had stayed in Bolivia with his lieutenant, David Adiazola, to try and revive Guevara's Army of National Liberation (ELN) and to reorganize urban support groups. At a press conference on 27 April, President Barrientos said the Bolivian army was on the lookout in the northern department of Beni, where Peredo may be organizing another guerrilla movement.

The Case of Julio Dagnino Pacheco

The most startling recent example of Cuban subversives still at large in Latin America came on 19 April 1968, when the Bolivian Government announced the arrest in late March of Julio Dagnino Pacheco, a Peruvian Communist journalist who acted as chief support agent for the Guevara guerrilla group in Bolivia. He had used the alias Gernando Herrera Fernandez in Bolivia, but was also known as the "Peruvian Sanchez," and was referred to by this name in Guevara's diary.

Interrogation of Dagnino revealed extensive Communist/Cuban links: He joined the Communist Party of Peru in 1959 and in 1961 went to Cuba where he was trained in guerrilla warfare for over a year. He arrived in Bolivia in 1963 where he joined the Peruvian guerrilla groups attempting to foment revolution in Peru. The next year he returned to Cuba with Nestor Guevara, alias "Negron," to seek support for guerrilla operations in Peru. In September 1964 he returned to Lima to organize support for Guevara's ELN. In March 1966 Dagnino was ordered by the Cubans to travel to La Paz to serve as a communications link and paymaster in the advance group of Cuban guerrillas preparing for "Che's" arrival, and he subsequently visited Guevara in the Nanchauazu guerrilla camp on 31 December 1966 with the Bolivian Communist Party leader, Mario Monje Molina. After guerrilla warfare broke out in Bolivia in March 1967, Dagnino's contacts were restricted. He claimed to have had neither contact with guerrilla groups nor instructions since Guevara's death in October 1967.

Dagnino's testimony has provided the Bolivian government with considerable information on the Cuban apparatus and membership in Latin America. In addition to valuable information on guerrilla activities, the Bolivian

Colombia: Sporadic Incidents and Divided Guerrilla Forces

There has been no major guerrilla action in Colombia for several months, although minor incidents occur from time to time. The significant let-up is doubtless due not only to the successful military and civic action programs of the Colombian security forces in 1967, which considerably reduced guerrilla effectiveness, but also to the formal opening of diplomatic relations in January between Colombia and the Soviet Union. This obviously places restraints on the pro-Soviet, Communist Party-controlled Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla force, with an estimated several hundred members.

The smaller, Castro-supported Army of National Liberation (ELN) has been involved in minor activity since the beginning of the year and a new guerrilla movement, called the Popular Army of the Liberation (EPL), has recently been formed and reported as operating sporadically in the northwestern region of the country.

There have been numerous reports on the Colombian peasants' dislike of Communism and their lack of cooperation with the guerrilla groups, which has been attributed to the government's reform programs. But the guerrillas (many of whom are little more than bandits) are able to engage in periodic harassment actions.

Guatemala: Guerrilla Forces Regrouping

The situation has been relatively quiet since the end of March, in contrast to the early months of 1968 when violence and bloodshed increased. This upsurge in violence followed a lengthy period in which the Guatemalan guerrillas had turned increasingly to urban terrorism and sabotage, after suffering severe setbacks in their rural campaigns.

In February the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) split with the pro-Soviet Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), blaming the "rightist leadership clique" of the PGT for guerrilla failures over the past four years. The earlier merger of the FAR with the smaller, weaker but extremist guerrilla Revolutionary Movement of 13 November (MR 13), led by Yon Sosa, may well have contributed to its ultimate split with the PGT, although it is certain the Cubans played a major role in promoting the split, including publication of the FAR leaders' attacks on the PGT leadership in the official newspaper Granma. The situation in Guatemala now is probably the most striking example of the growing polarization between the pro-Castro and pro-Soviet Communists in Latin America, and will undoubtedly mean continued Cuban support for the movement, now rumored to be reorganizing its apparatus and its tactics in preparation for launching new guerrilla offensives at a later date.

In addition to its strong urban leaning, the Guatemalan guerrilla movement has acquired a religious aspect in the involvement of the Melville group, the former Maryknoll missionaries who were expelled from the country

authorities confiscated \$20,000 from Dagnino which had been destined for subversion in Bolivia and Peru.

Venezuela: Guerrillas Suffer Setbacks

On 22 April, a Venezuelan Defense Ministry official announced that at least ten Castroite guerrillas had been killed and many more wounded in a period of only three days, when significant clashes broke out for the first time in several months between the army and the guerrillas in western Venezuela. Army units, supported by military aircraft, had pursued the guerrillas in the States of Yaracuy, Falcon and Lara, where Douglas Bravo's Armed Forces of National Liberation (FLN-FALN) operate. An army guide reportedly identified one of the dead guerrillas as a Cuban naval officer. On 21 April, a group of Venezuelan Castroite terrorists blew up an oil pipeline belonging to the Creole Petroleum Corporation near Maracaibo and then reportedly scattered leaflets describing the action as "Operation Che Guevara."

In early May, government officials confirmed that specially-trained army ranger units captured several more members of the Bravo group and by mid-May, following further skirmishes, an estimated fifteen guerrillas had been killed, with at least several captured. This should leave only about forty remaining members in the Bravo band, which is also said to be weakened by a split between Bravo and his chief lieutenant, Leuben Petkoff, on the issue of rural warfare versus urban terrorism.

In spite of these solid successes of the Venezuelan forces, the guerrilla threat remains in the East, where the forces of the Castro-supported extreme Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) number over 100. According to a published interview with one of its leaders, Moises Moleiro, the MIR group will continue to concentrate on classical rural warfare rather than engage in urban terrorism, as the FLN-FALN tried unsuccessfully to do several months ago. Recently, at least a part of the MIR force has been active in the area of the Bachiller Mountains in Miranda State. A third group of guerrillas, under the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), has been inactive the past year, in line with party policy, although a newspaper story of mid-May says they may now step up their "armed preparations."

The recent increase in Venezuelan guerrilla activity has been connected with rumors that Francisco Camaano Deno has been appointed to replace Guevara as head of the Latin American guerrilla movement. (Camaano was the Constitutionalist leader in the Dominican crisis of April 1965 and later was Dominican military attache in London. His sudden disappearance, while on a visit to Madrid, has led to repeated rumors he defected to Cuba.) There have been unsubstantiated but published reports that Camaano had actually made a recent, secret visit to Venezuela and Columbia, as well as to Bolivia, to direct the organization of new guerrilla actions, but the Venezuelan government has denied any knowledge of this.

for collaborating with rebel groups. They are now attempting to organize their own "Christian Front" group from a base in Mexico near the Guatemalan border, intending to re-enter the country to help overthrow the present government.

Uruguay

While Uruguay has been free of the usual Castro-type rural guerrilla warfare, Montevideo was the site in February of a meeting of pro-Cuban extremists who are endeavoring to recruit Catholics with a strong social conscience for guerrilla warfare. Calling itself the "Camilo Torres Movement," after a defrocked Colombian priest turned guerrilla, the group attacked the orthodox Communist parties and the social reform programs of the Church, and asserted that Castro's revolutionary strategy is the only valid strategy. It praised Camilo Torres, who died in a guerrilla attack on a Colombian army patrol, as the symbol of "Christian-revolutionary struggle."

The marked increase in leftist activity in Uruguay in recent months is the result not only of the steadily deteriorating economic situation, but also of the splits which have occurred in the orthodox Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU), following internal disputes over resolutions passed at the 1967 LASO Conference. There has been a noticeable increase in the activity of the more extreme groups, the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO), led by Ariel Colazo, and the National Liberation Movement (MLN). The MRO has apparently concentrated on putting out extreme revolutionary propaganda, although there have also been rumors it is preparing to turn to more traditional guerrilla activity in the countryside. The MLN, or "Tupamaros," is a leftist urban terrorist group which has become notorious for bank robberies, gunfights and other violence. There has been speculation that both groups may now be vying for support from Cuba.

* * * *

In early April Castro made a speech which is noteworthy because in it he appeared to modify his theory that rural-based revolution is the only valid revolutionary struggle. By acknowledging that "different points of view, different theses" exist within revolutionary movements, and also by claiming that a "mass movement" had been developing in Cuba before 1958, he was apparently trying to concede to the urban populace, in Cuba, to the urban guerrilla elements in Latin America and to orthodox Communist critics abroad that urban masses, too, have a significant role to play in carrying out revolutions.

Junio 1968

CONSTANTES TENTATIVAS DE CASTRO DE EXPORTAR SU REVOLUCION

Antecedentes de Fracaso

Desde 1959 Castro ha tratado de exportar su revolución por toda América Latina o, como él mismo ha expresado, hacer de los Andes la Sierra Maestra de América del Sur. Desde 1959 la doctrina de Castro de la guerra revolucionaria, o guerra de guerrillas, ha sido ensayada en 16 ó 17 países, y en todos ellos ha fracasado. Sólo una pequeña minoría extremista ha obedecido la consigna de Castro y del difunto Che Guevara con respecto a "dos, tres o muchos Vietnams."

Motivos inherentes del fracaso de los intentos guerrilleros han sido la dirección deficiente, adiestramiento inadecuado, mecanismos de apoyo ineficaces y frecuentes luchas internas sobre la dirección o la táctica, los cuales, entre otros motivos, han llevado al desaliento, la moral poco elevada y las deserciones de las filas. Entre los factores externos de dichos fracasos se cuentan la reacción más y más eficaz de las fuerzas de seguridad de los Gobiernos amenazados y la ausencia absoluta de respaldo y hasta de interés por parte de las poblaciones campesinas locales.

A un nivel más amplio el movimiento castrista en América Latina ha sido debilitado en general por las tensiones en aumento y, en algunos casos, las rupturas abiertas en la cooperación entre los elementos procubanos y las agrupaciones comunistas tradicionales, especialmente a partir de la Conferencia de la OLAS de 1967--durante la cual Castro arremetió contra los partidos prosoviéticos acusándolos de estar en la "retaguardia de la lucha contra el imperialismo"--que provocó tensiones hasta en el seno de los propios partidos comunistas tradicionales. Desde entonces la constante insistencia de Castro de que América Latina está lista para la guerra revolucionaria y sus persistentes ataques contra los partidos comunistas de viejo cuño han hecho más tensas las relaciones y debilitado su causa.

La Llamadas de Castro a la Revolución

No obstante las desventajas básicas de las guerrillas y sus repetidos fracasos, y no obstante la aparente pausa en las actividades guerrilleras a partir del espectacular fracaso y la muerte del Che Guevara en Bolivia, las fuerzas castristas están claramente resueltas a proseguir sus esfuerzos por crear desórdenes de manera periódica si no constante en varios países del Continente.

En efecto, Castro mismo anunció su intención de seguir exportando la revolución precisamente cuando hacía la despedida al finado Guevara en octubre de 1967. Al propio tiempo que reconocía el "tremendo golpe al movimiento revolucionario" ocasionado por la muerte del Che, declaraba: "Se equivocan quienes crean que su muerte es la derrota de sus ideas, la derrota de su táctica, la derrota de sus concepciones guerrilleras, la derrota de sus tesis..." Del mismo modo, al aprovechar el Congreso Cultural de La Habana de enero de 1968 para hacer propaganda al tema revolucionario cubano y hacer la promesa de

"cumplir el deber de solidaridad" para con los revolucionarios de todo el mundo, Castro demostró de nuevo su intención de exportar la revolución.

Bolivia: Prosigue la Actividad Guerrillera

Después de la muerte de Guevara en octubre de 1967 los restos de su guerrilla se escondieron. Los tres supervivientes cubanos pasaron por los Andes al norte chileno en febrero y fueron detenidos por las autoridades chilenas en el pueblo de Camina. La gente de extrema izquierda de Chile pretendió que se concediera asilo político al grupo, pero éstos fueron deportados a Cuba. Por faltar del grupo Guido (Inti) Peredo, el principal boliviano, no se supo de cierto si había evadido la detención en Chile o había permanecido en Bolivia, pero "Las Noticias de Última Hora," diario de izquierda chileno, publicó una entrevista con uno de los guerrilleros cubanos, Daniel Alarcón Ramírez, en la cual éste declaraba que Peredo se había separado de los otros en un encuentro cerca de La Siberia en Bolivia. El diario se refirió también a otro informe que decía que Peredo había permanecido en Bolivia con su lugarteniente, David Adriazola, para tratar de reconstituir el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) de Guevara y reorganizar grupos urbanos de apoyo. En rueda de prensa el 27 de abril, el presidente Barrientos declaró que el Ejército boliviano estaba alerta en el departamento de Beni en el norte de Bolivia, donde Peredo puede estar organizando otro movimiento guerrillero.

El Caso de Julio Dagnino Pacheco

El caso reciente más sorprendente de agente de subversión cubano en libertad en América Latina se produjo el 19 de abril de 1968, cuando el Gobierno de Bolivia anunció la detención a fines de marzo de Julio Dagnino Pacheco, periodista comunista peruano que fungía de principal agente de apoyo de la guerrilla de Guevara en Bolivia. Había empleado el alias de Fernando Herrera Fernández en Bolivia pero también se le conocía como "el peruano Sánchez," nombre con el cual se le designa en el diario de Guevara.

El interrogatorio de Dagnino dio a conocer sus extensas relaciones con comunistas y cubanos. Se afilió al Partido Comunista del Perú en 1959, fue a Cuba en 1961 y allí recibió más de un año de adiestramiento guerrillero. Arribó en Bolivia en 1963 y se unió a las guerrillas peruanas que trataban de fomentar la revolución en el Perú. Regresó a Cuba en 1964 con Néstor Guevara, alias Negrón, en busca de respaldo para las operaciones guerrilleras en el Perú. En septiembre de 1964 volvió a Lima a organizar el apoyo para el ELN de Guevara. En marzo de 1966 los cubanos dieron orden a Dagnino de trasladarse a La Paz a servir de enlace y pagador del grupo avanzado de guerrilleros que se preparaba para el arribo del Che, y luego visitó a Guevara en el campamento guerrillero del Macahuasú el 31 de diciembre de 1966 en compañía de Mario Monje Molina, dirigente del Partido Comunista boliviano. Con el comienzo de la campaña guerrillera en Bolivia en marzo de 1967, se redujeron los contactos de Dagnino. Manifestó no haber tenido contacto con las guerrillas ni instrucciones desde la muerte de Guevara en octubre de 1967.

El interrogatorio de Dagnino ha provisto al Gobierno boliviano bastantes datos sobre el aparato cubano y los que lo constituyen en América Latina. Además de obtener valiosa información sobre las actividades guerrilleras las autoridades bolivianas le confiscaron a Dagnino 20 mil dólares que habían sido destinados a la

El 22 de abril un funcionario del ministerio de Defensa de Venezuela dio a conocer que por lo menos diez guerrilleros castristas habían sido muertos y muchos otros heridos en tres días solamente en que se produjeron choques de importancia por primera vez en varios meses entre el Ejército y los guerrilleros en el occidente de Venezuela. Unidades del Ejército apoyadas por aviación militar habían perseguido a los guerrilleros en los Estados Yaracuy, Falcón y Lara, donde están en acción las Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FLN-FALN) de Douglas Bravo. Un gufa del Ejército se supone haber identificado a uno de los guerrilleros muertos como oficial de la Marina de Cuba. El 21 de abril un grupo de terroristas venezolanos castristas hizo estallar un oleoducto de la Creole Petroleum Corporation cerca de Maracaibo y luego, según se informa, derramó volantes describiendo la acción como "Operación Che Guevara."

A principios de mayo funcionarios oficiales confirmaron que unidades de "rangers" del Ejército adiestradas especialmente habían capturado a varios miembros del grupo de Douglas Bravo, y a mediados de mayo, en nuevas escaramuzas, un total calculado de 15 guerrilleros habían sido muertos y por lo menos unos cuantos capturados. Esto debe haber reducido a unos 40 la banda de Bravo, la cual se dice estar debilitada aun más por una escisión entre Bravo y su principal lugarteniente Lubén Petkoff sobre la cuestión de la guerra rural y el terrorismo urbano.

No obstante los éxitos ya relatados conseguidos por las fuerzas venezolanas, la amenaza guerrillera prevalece aún en el sector oriental, donde las fuerzas del extremista Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) cuentan más de un centenar. De acuerdo con una entrevista de prensa con uno de sus líderes, Moisés Moleiro, el grupo del MIR continuará con el tipo clásico de guerra rural sin adentrarse en el terrorismo urbano, como trató de hacer el FLN-FALN sin éxito hace varios meses. Recientemente por lo menos parte de la fuerza del MIR ha estado en actividad en la zona de las montañas Bachiller del Estado Miranda. Un tercer grupo de guerrilleros dirigidos por el Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) ha estado inactivo el pasado año, de acuerdo con la línea del partido, aunque a mediados de mayo se informaba que podía ser que incrementara sus "preparativos armados."

En el reciente incremento de la actividad guerrillera en Venezuela se ha visto relación con los rumores de que Francisco Caamaño Deñó ha sido designado en reemplazo del Che Guevara como jefe del movimiento guerrillero latinoamericano. (Caamaño fue el líder constitucionalista en la contienda en la República Dominicana en abril de 1965, y luego fue agregado militar dominicano en Londres. Su repentina desaparición durante una visita a Madrid ha suscitado reiterados rumores de que hizo defección a Cuba.) Se han publicado sin confirmación noticias de que Caamaño realizó hace poco una visita secreta a Venezuela y Colombia así como a Bolivia para dirigir la organización de nuevas acciones guerrilleras, pero el Gobierno venezolano niega tener conocimiento de ello.

Colombia: Incidentes Esporádicos y Fuerzas Guerrilleras Divididas

Por varios meses Colombia no ha tenido incidentes guerrilleros en grande escala, aunque sí se producen algunos menores de vez en cuando. La significativa disminución se debe sin duda no sólo al éxito de los programas de acción

cívica y militar de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en 1967, que redujeron bastante la eficacia de las guerrillas, sino también al inicio formal de relaciones diplomáticas entre Colombia y la Unión Soviética en enero. Esto sin duda pone freno a las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), agrupación prosoviética controlada por el Partido Comunista y que constituye la fuerza guerrillera más numerosa del país con un total calculado en varios centenares de miembros.

El Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), respaldado por Castro y de menor tamaño, ha estado en actividad en menor escala desde principios de año. Un nuevo movimiento guerrillero conocido como el Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) ha sido creado hace poco y se informa que está operando esporádicamente en el sector noroeste del país.

Ha habido numerosos informes sobre el desagrado del campesino colombiano por el comunismo y su no cooperación con los grupos guerrilleros, que ha sido atribuida a los programas de reforma del Gobierno. Pero los guerrilleros (de los cuales muchos son poco más que bandidos) consiguen llevar a cabo periódicamente acciones de hostigamiento.

Guatemala: Se Reagrupan las Guerrillas

La situación ha estado relativamente en calma desde fines de marzo, en contraste con los primeros meses de 1958 en los cuales aumentaron la violencia y el derramamiento de sangre. Dicha erupción de violencia ocurrió después de un prolongado período durante el cual los guerrilleros guatemaltecos se habían dedicado más y más al terrorismo y el sabotaje en el sector urbano luego de haber padecido fuertes derrotas en sus campañas rurales.

En febrero las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) se separaron del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), prosoviético, culpando a la "camarilla derechista dirigente" del PGT por los fracasos de las guerrillas los últimos cuatro años. La fusión de las FAR anteriormente con el Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR 13), más reducido y débil pero extremista, encabezado por Yon Sosa, puede haber contribuido a su ruptura definitiva con el PGT. Pero también es cierto que los cubanos jugaron papel principal en la promoción de la ruptura, incluyendo la publicación en su diario oficial "Granma" de los ataques de los líderes de las FAR contra la dirigencia del PGT. La actual situación en Guatemala es probablemente el ejemplo más vívido de la creciente polarización entre los comunistas castristas y los prosoviéticos en América Latina, y sin duda significa que Cuba seguirá respaldando el movimiento, del cual se rumora que está reorganizando su aparato y su táctica como preparativo para lanzar nuevas ofensivas guerrilleras en fecha futura.

Además de su fuerte tendencia urbana, el movimiento guerrillero guatemalteco ha adquirido un aspecto religioso con la intervención de los Melville, exmisioneros Maryknoll que fueron expulsados del país por colaborar con grupos rebeldes. Actualmente están tratando de organizar su propio "Frente Cristiano" desde una base en México cerca de la frontera guatemalteca, proponiéndose reingresar al país para ayudar a derrocar al actual régimen.

Uruguay

Uruguay ha estado exento de la acostumbrada guerra de guerrillas rural tipo Castro, pero Montevideo fue la sede en febrero de una asamblea de extremistas procubanos que están tratando de reclutar católicos de fuerte conciencia social para crear guerrillas. Haciéndose llamar "Movimiento Camilo Torres," por el nombre de un sacerdote colombiano expulso que se convirtió en guerrillero, el grupo atacó a los Partidos Comunistas y a los programas de reforma social de la Iglesia, declarando que la estrategia revolucionaria de Castro es la única estrategia válida. Ensalzó a Camilo Torres, que murió en un ataque guerrillero contra una patrulla del Ejército colombiano, como el símbolo de la "lucha cristianorrevolucionaria."

El notable aumento en la actividad de izquierda en Uruguay en meses recientes se debe a la situación económica en constante deterioro pero también a las escisiones que se han producido en el tradicional Partido Comunista del Uruguay (PCU) a raíz de rencillas internas con respecto a resoluciones aprobadas en la conferencia de la OLAS en 1967. Se ha comprobado una mayor actividad entre los grupos más extremos, el Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental (MRO) procubano encabezado por Ariel Collazo y el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN). El MRO parece haberse dedicado a difundir propaganda revolucionaria extremista, aunque también se ha dicho que se está preparando a dedicarse a la actividad guerrillera tradicional en el campo. El MLN, o "Tupamaros," es un grupo terrorista urbano de izquierda que se ha hecho notorio por los asaltos a los bancos, tiroteos callejeros y otras formas de violencia. Se han hecho conjeturas de que ambos grupos están rivalizando por el apoyo de Cuba.

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A principios de abril Castro pronunció un discurso que es digno de notar porque en él parece haber modificado su teoría de que la revolución basada en el campo es la única lucha revolucionaria válida. Reconociendo que existen "diferentes puntos de vista, diferentes tesis" dentro de los movimientos revolucionarios, y asegurando que un "movimiento de masas" se había estado desarrollando en Cuba antes del 1958, parecía estar tratando de admitir ante el pueblo urbano de Cuba, los elementos guerrilleros urbanos de América Latina y los críticos comunistas tradicionales del exterior que las masas urbanas también tienen un papel significativo que jugar en la realización de las revoluciones.

Ex-Dominican Red Describes Castro Role and Fund-Raising

By Carlos Martinez
Chicago Daily News Service

MIAMI—After three years of training in guerrilla tactics, urban agitation, and military intelligence, Luis Genao Espallat was ready to go home to the Dominican Republic.

This was the final briefing, and it was long after midnight when the bearded man in olive green walked with Genao to the door.

"Remember, Luis," said Fidel Castro, "the Dominican Republic is a primary objective to us."

It was late in 1962 when the Dominican Communist leader met in Havana with Castro for the last time. In September, 1965, Genao broke with the Castroist 14th of June Movement in the Dominican Republic.

Tells of Plotting

Genao has now described how he plotted with Castro for a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. He also told of meeting with Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Nikita Khrushchev to seek financial and technical aid for Communist revolutionaries in Santo Domingo.


Genao, soft-spoken 33-year-old bachelor, was interviewed during a brief stay in Miami.

He was among the Communist leaders who fought in the civil war in the Dominican Republic in April, 1965. His name was high on a list of 77 Dominican Communists compiled by U.S. intelligence sources and issued during the revolt as part of the justification for U.S. intervention.

The visit to Miami marked the first time U.S. officials have permitted Genao to enter the country. Since leaving the hospital seven months ago after being wounded in an assassination attempt, Genao has lived in virtual seclusion in a small apartment in Santo Domingo.

"I know they will try it again because I know too much," Genao said.

Before defecting,



a leading organizer of the central committee of the 14th of June Movement.

From 1959 to 1962, he was the group's permanent delegate to Cuba, and met with Castro to map strategy "from 30 to 40 times—as often as the circumstances required."

Genao said Castro has been supporting the 14th of June group financially for the last eight years. He also has provided instruction in Cuba for "several hundred" movement members who traveled to Havana on phony passports, Genao said.

"Castro is still subsidizing the 14th of June on a monthly basis. He's generous with his money—contributions are in dollars, in bills of small denominations—but he demands itemized descriptions of how the money will be used," Genao noted.

Money Comes From Paris

A delegate from the movement travels to Havana once a month to meet with Maj. Manuel (Barba Roja) Pineiro Lozada, 35, head of the General direction of intelligence, in charge of planning and financing subversion in Latin America.

Genao said sometimes Pineiro hands out the money himself. Other times the cash is made available in Paris by the intelligence officer at the Cuban embassy there.

"The actual delivery of the money never takes place inside the embassy," said Genao. "It's always done at some small cafe or at the intelligence officer's private apartment."

Even the 14th of June's powerful radio transmitter-receiver, which Genao helped

smuggle into the Dominican Republic, has been provided by Castro. The Cuba government periodically provides the codes used in the broadcasts.

Deported to Lisbon

Genao was among the leaders of an abortive guerrilla uprising in the Dominican Republic in 1963 that he and Castro had planned in Havana. He and several dozen guerrillas were captured and in 1964, Genao was deported to Lisbon.

It was there, Genao said, that he was given his "most delicate" assignment by the 14th of June—orders to visit Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Albania and the Soviet Union to enlist aid for the Dominican revolutionaries.

Most generous of the leaders he spoke to, Genao said, was Mao Tse-tung. Mao quickly agreed to provide the 14th of June with a monthly allowance, which still exists, varying between \$10,000 and \$20,000, Genao said.

Mao also agreed to provide guerrilla training, but refused a request for training of doctors and engineers belonging to the movement, Genao said Mao told him:

"Comrade, the fundamental task is to seize power. After that, we will have time to worry about engineers and doctors."

Ho Chi Minh, Genao said, was "harder to deal with" than Mao.

"He said it would be of great importance to Latin American revolutionaries to receive theo-

retical and practical guerrilla training in Vietnam, but pledged no financial help.

"He maintained that the seizure of power could only be achieved through armed action, and said that anyone planning to do it otherwise was not a good Communist."

Genao said Ho kept his promise to train Dominican revolutionaries.

Genao said Khrushchev expressed interest in the Dominican movement but turned down a request for assistance.

"Nikita was very sympathetic, but said he was already providing financial assistance to the Dominican Communist Party, a more orthodox Communist organization."

Returned with Disguise

After completing his mission, Genao flew to Paris in mid-1965. From there he returned to the Dominican Republic clandestinely with the help of Red Chinese agents.

Experts from the Chinese embassy in Paris changed Genao's features by mounting dentures over his natural teeth and coloring his hair. He said they taught him to talk and act like a wealthy Spaniard on a business trip. He made it easily through Dominican customs.

Foul play discounted

Caamaño disappearance perplexes Dominicans

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

Francisco Caamaño Deñó has replaced Ernesto "Ché" Guevara as No. 1 man of Latin America's missing person's list.

The Lieutenant Colonel who headed the constitutionalist forces in the Dominican Republic's 1965 civil war has been missing since last October. His whereabouts are an increasing mystery.

Here in the Dominican Republic, the question has become a leading topic of discussion. The humor magazine *Cachafú* in its current issue calls it "the 64,000 peso question."

In the cafés along El Conde Street, much of the conversation of Dominican businessmen, politicians, and others revolves around the unanswered question. And if any of the former associates of Colonel Caamaño have any idea of his whereabouts they aren't saying.

Speculation burgeons

All this has led to lively speculation centered on the possibility that the civil-war leader is in Cuba preparing for some sort of return here, perhaps as leader of a guerrilla band.

But this speculation is only that — and nothing more.

Dominican President Balaguer and other Dominican leaders, and foreign observers say they have no concrete information on Colonel Caamaño since he disappeared when he went for a walk last October in The Hague. He was in the Dutch capital visiting a friend.

President Balaguer, however, subscribes to the theory that the Colonel is in Cuba. It is "my impression," he says, "that Colonel Caamaño is in Cuba." But he hastens to add that he has no information to confirm the impression.

"Logic dictates his presence in Cuba," President Balaguer adds, "preparing something against the country."

Wherever he is, there is almost no concern that he was the victim of foul play. To the contrary, there is a general belief that he is alive and that he is merely using his absence as a vehicle for some political purpose. And that is what makes the absence all the more intriguing.

Colonel Caamaño disappeared just 15 days after the death of Mr. Guevara in Bolivia. This has led some Dominicans to suggest that the Colonel may have taken over "El Ché's" role as leader of Cuban-sponsored guerrilla movements in Latin America.

But to many other Dominicans, such a possibility seems unlikely. These sources indicate that Colonel Caamaño might have had contact with Cubans in Europe where he went in early 1966 as Dominican military attaché to Britain, but they doubt that he is in Cuba or that he has been tapped for the guerrilla role.

Still the question of Colonel Caamaño's whereabouts nags these sources. They simply have no answers.

In some circles, composed largely of former supporters of the constitutionalist cause in the civil war of 1965, there is mounting concern that the colonel's mysterious absence may hurt their cause among many Dominicans who were on the fence in the civil war.

This seems to be the view taken by *Ahora*, a weekly magazine which subscribes in considerable measure to the constitutionalist cause for which Colonel Caamaño fought in 1965.

In its issue this week, *Ahora* carries a brief item on the Caamaño question. After exploring the various possibilities of his whereabouts, generally rejecting the theory that he is in Cuba and suggesting instead that he might be in Europe or Australia or the Soviet Union or the United States, the magazine calls on Colonel Caamaño to come forward and show himself.

Reappearance expected

"The former constitutionalist chieftan ought to clear up the situation," it says, "because not to do it would be equivalent to failing to comply with his sacred duty."

There is one school of thought here which holds that Colonel Caamaño's absence is essentially an effort to keep his many enemies off base—and that he will eventually surface to lead the constitutionalist cause again. Those holding to this idea suggest that he is actually in Europe, perhaps in Spain, where former Dominican President Bosch, in whose name the constitutionalists fought the 1965 civil war, is in exile now.

But like other Dominicans with other speculations, they have no proof to back up this theory.

As *Cachafú* says, it is "the 64,000 peso question."

Despite Death of Guevara Revolution Crackles

By WILLIAM MONTALBANO
Herald Latin America Correspondent

The flow of Cuban money, arms, agents and moral support for violent revolution in Latin America has continued unchecked since Ernesto (Che) Guevara died in Bolivia nearly seven months ago.

This is the conclusion drawn from increasing reports of revived guerrilla activity in the region. The general situation is no worse than it was at the time of Guevara's death last October. But neither is it substantially improved, although no Latin government is in danger of a guerrilla takeover.

Even in Bolivia the guerrilla movement survived Guevara. Survivors of his band eluded pursuing troops for more than four months before passing into Chile, where they were granted asylum and deported.

One member of the band, a Bolivian named "Inti" Peredo, was thought to have remained in the country. And this week Bolivian authorities were investigating reports Peredo had formed a new group of guerrillas and was operating in the northeastern province of Beni on the border with Brazil.

Substantial caches of arms, supplies and possibly money are thought to have been left in southeastern Bolivia where Guevara operated. Peredo, a veteran of Guevara's campaign, presumably would know the location of most of the caches.

In the period since Guevara's death, the most serious threat to stability from Communist guerrillas has continued to exist in Guatemala.

Reports from Guatemala indicate control of the guerrilla movement has passed from Cesar Montes, basically a theoretician, to Marco Antonio Yon Sanguinetti, primarily an activist.



'Inti' Peredo
... guerrilla leader?

A rural guerrilla movement has moved largely into the cities and has triggered right-wing counter-terrorism. Two U.S. military attaches were murdered in January, and the archbishop of Guatemala was kidnapped by terrorists who demanded the resignation of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro.

A guerrilla band surfaced in the mountains of Yaracuy state in Venezuela last month after a long period of inactivity. The guerrillas seized two small settlements briefly, and then fled in the face of specially trained army units.

By last week, the army had claimed 15 guerrillas slain. It said the survivors were fleeing to join another band operating in the mountains of neighboring Falcon State.

The guerrillas who seized the settlements were reported under the command of Luben Petkoff, and those in Falcon State under the command of Douglas Bravo. Both men are said to have close ties with Cuba, and observers consider the renewed activity is a prelude to an election year terrorist campaign in Venezuela.

New guerrilla activity has

mountains of neighboring Colombia. A Cuban-trained Colombian named Antonio Dahut has reportedly assumed command of guerrillas operating in the Alto Sinu region of Cordoba Department.

Dahut was believed to have at one time led Fidel Castro's guerrilla forces at Minas Del Rio in Cuba's Oriente Province.

Apart from the operating guerrillas, Castro is also reported to be taking an active interest in fomenting unrest in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and possibly Peru, where rural guerrillas were wiped out within months about five years ago.

In Cuba itself, training of Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare is continuing. Persistent but unconfirmed reports indicate that one of those being trained is Col. Francisco Caamano Dengo, the leader of the "constitutionalist" forces during the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic.

One Cuban agent was uncovered while posing as a delegate to a United Nations conference in Panama early this year, and others have been reported travelling elsewhere in Latin America, including southern Brazil.

Several new landings of guerrilla parties have been reported in the Colombia-Venezuela border area, but none have been confirmed. Latin security forces have been keeping close watch on the Cuban fishing fleet, which is believed to be playing a greater role in subversion efforts.

Although the level of Cuban activity has not diminished, it has not provided any spectacular successes, or the "new Vietnams" Guevara

dreamed of. It is apparent, however, that for Castro, the determination to export revolution did not die with Guevara.

BALTIMORE SUN
15 May 1968

Venezuela Reds To Seek Arms

Caracas, Venezuela, May 14 (AP)—Venezuela's Communists have moved to increase their armed preparedness almost a year from the date on which they announced an abandonment of terrorism as a means of achieving power.

A "political report" issued after an underground meeting of the Venezuelan Communist party's Central Committee says it was decided to "take maximum advantage of legal possibilities and accelerate armed preparations."