


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February 1968
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WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs

(13 December 1967 to 16 January 1968)

1. Preparations for the Budapest consultative meeting continue to hold the center of attention of most of the Communist world. A CPSU statement carried by TASS on 9 January disclosed that the opening date will be 26 February and confirmed reports that the Hungarian invitation was sent only to the 81 parties which participated in the 1960 Moscow conference, contradicting the 25 November announcement that "all" fraternal parties would be included. This excluded the Yugoslav party -- which stated its intent to boycott the meeting under any circumstances. The Budapest daily NEPSZABADSAG claimed on 24 December that "some 30" parties had declared their intent to join the 18 signatories; TASS has since then reported acceptances by a number of parties, but it is not clear whether these are in addition to those counted by NEPSZABADSAG. There has been (at this writing) no indication that any of the Far East parties has yet committed itself.

2. Meanwhile, various developments underscore Soviet difficulties in managing Communist affairs even among generally Moscow-oriented CP's:

a. The Italians and Yugoslavs are organizing a 22 January Rome meeting of representatives of some 20-25 Communist and other left-wing political parties from countries bordering on the Mediterranean to plan "a major conference dealing with threats to peace in the area" on the very eve of the Budapest conference. Yugoslav Communists, who leaked the story to the western press in Belgrade, reportedly view the conference as "something of a slap at the Soviet Union," according to the NEW YORK TIMES of 14 January 1968.

b. Rumania became further estranged from the USSR and the Soviet bloc. The 14-15 December visit of Ceausescu with CPSU leaders produced a communique described as the coldest ever resulting from a visit of a Communist leader; at least one foreign correspondent in Moscow described the situation as "the brink of a major crisis." (Anatole Shub in the WASHINGTON POST). On 3-4 January Ceausescu paid a "friendship visit" to Tito which was seen as a consultation on opposition to the Budapest meeting. (However subsequent news reports indicate the Rumanians will attend that conference.) Meanwhile, a Rumanian delegation signed new protocols, in Tel Aviv on 19 December greatly increasing trade and providing for joint industrial ventures. And in Bonn it was reported on 12 January that Rumania imported more industrial machinery and equipment from West Germany in 1967 than from the USSR for the first time since World War II. West Germany has become Rumania's principal creditor.

c. The Czechoslovakian Communists finally ousted old-liner Novotny from his 14-year Party leadership on 5 January in a stormy

Central Committee plenum which began 19 December (recessed on the 21st for the holidays), despite Brezhnev's hasty visit to Prague on 8-9 December in an apparent attempt to avert the action. The compromise victor, 46-year-old Alexander Dubcek, moved in from the top spot in the Slovakian party organization, thus becoming the first Slovak to head the national party. There seemed to be nothing in Dubcek's background foreshadowing resistance to Soviet policies; indeed, he grew up in the USSR while his dedicated Communist father worked there. Less than a week after he took command the Party's official daily, RUDE PRAVO, published an article which set forth in broad outline a series of radical policy proposals which appear to be more liberal domestically than those of the Yugoslav "revisionists", and more independent internationally than those of Rumania. (These, however are similar to articles in the same paper last summer and may well represent only the hopes of the liberals, not the policy of the new leadership.)

d. Further Soviet problems with Cuba were seen when, only four days after PRAVDA on 29 December glorified the Soviet "oil bridge ... guaranteeing the supply of oil to the Cuban economy," Castro announced stringent gasoline rationing and other curbs on oil because Soviet deliveries had been so inadequate that Cuba had to use its military reserves.

e. In mid-January the Communist press revealed ex post facto that the Soviet "troika" -- Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny -- had made secret visits to Warsaw, on 13-14 January, and to East Berlin, on 15-16 January. This was the highest-level Soviet delegation to travel abroad since Khrushchev's trips with Bulganin. Speculation on the reasons for such a move included discussion of further preparations for the Budapest conference, measures to curb West Germany's growing ties with Eastern Europe, and discussion of the new Czech leadership ... but there have been no "inside" reports as yet.

3. The most notable Soviet Bloc achievement during this period was a 19-21 December Warsaw meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers which drew Rumanian and Yugoslav participation. It produced a weak communique which did not repeat their earlier charge of Israeli "aggression", balanced a renewed call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory with the reaffirmation of Israeli's right to exist, and failed to mention any pledge of military and economic aid to the Arabs.

4. Moscow suffered public exposure of internal unrest during this period, brought into the open by the daring opposition of a number of brave Moscovites to the regime's efforts to crack down on dissident intellectuals. Even the daily organ of the British Communist Party, MORNING STAR, was moved to condemn the secrecy of the trial of Galanskov and his colleagues in a front-page editorial on 13 January. And in New Delhi,

where Svetlana Alliluyeva chose freedom last year, there was a repeat performance on a lower level as 28-year-old Aziz S. Ulug-zade, member of a Soviet youth delegation and son of a prominent Tadzhik writer, slipped away from his colleagues and requested asylum in the U.S. Embassy on 20 December. After complicated negotiations, he was permitted by the Indian Government to leave on 31 December for refuge in Great Britain.

5. Reports from Communist China indicate the continued spread of disorder and violence in many areas. Most schools are apparently still closed, despite the orders to reopen last fall. Meanwhile, a speech by Peking Revolutionary Committee Chairman Hsieh Fu-chih, reported in Canton Red Guard newspaper WEN NO TUNG HSUN of 11 December, indicates that the Chinese CP is planning to hold a national congress -- the last was its 8th in 1956 -- between May and October of this year. It will be totally rigged, with delegates appointed from the top down. Further Chinese isolation from the world resulted from the expulsion of the only Czech correspondent from Peking 15 January, and the closing of the NCNA office in Brussels on 22 December.

6. Miscellany: A pro-Chinese "Parti Communiste Marxiste-Leniniste de France" was formally constituted by dissidents formerly associated in the "Mouvement M-L" at a 30-31 December congress in Aix-en-Provence. The weekly L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE will continue as the organ of the party.The strengthened Berlin wall permitted only 120 refugees to escape across the boundary in 1967, according to the West Berlin "August 13" organization.

'56 Soviet TV Film Omits Khrushchev

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 6—Nikita S. Khrushchev, in his momentous "secret speech" before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party in 1956, exposed Stalin as a tyrant whose abuses of power had caused suffering to millions and inflicted great harm on Soviet society.

The speech marked a turning point in Soviet history, but in a one-hour television documentary about that turbulent year, the producers have succeeded in recalling the events without once mentioning Mr. Khrushchev's name or even alluding to his existence. He was ousted from power three years ago.

The documentary shown tonight, briefly records that the 20th party congress demolished the myth of Stalin and condemned his rule of terrorism. But full credit is given to the party and its Central Committee.

Hungarian Revolt Recalled

The film also deals with the anti-Communist uprising in

Hungary in October of that year. But the rebellion, which was suppressed by the Soviet Army, is described as a result of plotting and active intervention by Western imperialists, primarily the United States.

Hungarian rebels are shown firing on streets at troops and security police. The narrator says that weapons and anti-Communist Hungarian emigrés had been infiltrated into the country from Austria.

The television documentary films, each devoted to a year of Soviet rule, began to be shown last fall to mark the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, celebrated Nov. 7.

The programs were interrupted shortly before the holiday and were resumed Dec. 25 with 1953, the year of Stalin's death.

In contrast to the blackout on Mr. Khrushchev, the films about the nineteen-thirties and forties occasionally showed Stalin, usually without comment.

Stalin Is Denounced

The producers were frank about the tragedies of those years, however, and particularly denounced the dictator for the purges in which thousands were shot and millions sent to labor camps.

The films about the years after Stalin's death have carefully avoided mention of Mr. Khrushchev, who became party chief, and Georgi M. Malenkov, who took over the premiership.

Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, who was named Premier in 1955 forced to step down, appeared fleetingly in a scene of young Communist volunteers arriving in Kazakhstan to plant the vast virgin lands to wheat. The marshal's portrait was being raised by someone at the edge of a crowd of welcomers.

Narration of the years since Stalin death poses a sensitive political problem for the films' producers since most of the members of the post-Stalin collective leadership have since been disgraced.

WASHINGTON POST
7 January 1968

Soviets Put Nikita Out Of Picture

Reuters

MOSCOW, Jan. 6 — Soviet historians, who decreed Josef Stalin a nonperson, may have decided the same fate for Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader who began the historic process of destalinization.

The official Soviet motion picture record of the year 1956, released tonight, includes the momentous 20th Congress of the Communist Party, at which Khrushchev, then Party Secretary, denounced the late dictator for

ality" and liquidating his enemies in a reign of terror.

But the motion picture does not name either Stalin or Khrushchev, who was ousted in 1964 and now lives in retirement in Moscow.

The commentator of the movies—part of a series devoted to 50 years of Communist power—begins to speak in solemn tones and background music fades out as the movie comes to the 20th Congress.

He tells listeners that delegates to the Congress discussed "temporary failures and mistakes."

The film at no time shows the presidium of the Congress—where Khrushchev sat—but only shots of rank-and-file delegates.

A brief reference to the arrival of Yugoslav President Tito for his first visit to Moscow after the split with Sta-

ing a train and striding across the platform with his hand outstretched.

But as he approaches his host, Khrushchev, the scene fades out.

Spanish party challenges the power of Moscow

THE Spanish Communist Party, which is managed from a secret headquarters in Eastern Europe on funds provided by the Kremlin, has bitten hard the hand that feeds it.

The party has rejected Moscow's prompting that it should work with other political forces in Spain to establish a constitutional monarchy. It added insult to injury by announcing this over "Radio Independent Spain," a supposedly clandestine radio station which is operated from Czechoslovakia with the aid of Soviet funds.

The Soviet Union's preference for Spanish royalty was conveyed by an article in "Izvestia," the official Government paper. Had the article appeared in a "less responsible paper," said the Spanish Communist Party's reply, "we would have taken no notice of it." But the publication of it in "Izvestia" might cause some people to think, said the broadcast, that the article reflected the views of the Spanish party, or, worse still, that it was an attempt to "correct" the party's attitude.

But the article was neither of these things, the broadcast declared. "We formulate our own policy." If the party were to "follow the line" set out in "Izvestia," the broadcast said, the Spanish Communists would fall into error.

The broadcast thus says, in effect, that the "Izvestia" article was not an attempt to dictate to the Spanish party—but that, if it was, the Spanish party will not have it. This is only an attempt to sweeten the pill, for the writer of the "Izvestia" article cannot have been unaware of the party's uncompromising stand against the monarchy.

First step

In other words, "Izvestia" was reflecting the views of the Kremlin, as it always does in matters of policy. There is some disagreement among Spanish Communists as to whether they should work for the restoration of the monarchy as a first step.

Because the Spanish party leadership is officially against this, the Kremlin could not formally declare that it favoured the "Communist Party's" since this would be regarded as interference in the party's internal affairs. But since the Kremlin wishes the "Communist

royalists" to prevail, it had to give them some indication of

The Communist World by Victor Zorza

Soviet support. This is why the "Izvestia" article was published.

The quarrel between the Spanish party-in-exile and the Kremlin reflects the wider dispute in the world Communist movement between the moderates and the radicals. In Latin America the Cubans and their associates, much farther to the Left than the Spanish party, represent the radicals who are impatient at Russia's flirtation with the "reactionary" regimes.

They suspect that the Kremlin is pursuing Russian national interests in Latin America rather than those of the world revolution, and that in doing so it is hindering their own revolution. This is a complaint often heard in the Communist parties since the early days of the Comintern, particularly after Stalin transformed the Communist International into a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

Gold question

There were certainly many Spanish Communists during the Spanish Civil War who thought that their party was being bled to death for the greater glory of Stalin. Their suspicions were silenced by the ruthless operations of Stalin's secret police whose tentacles extended even over the battlefields of Spain.

In recent years, there have been several unofficial attempts by Moscow to re-establish diplomatic relations with Spain. One of the difficulties which stands in the way of a reconciliation is the question of Spanish gold, 500 tons of which was shipped to Moscow during the civil war. So far the Russians have refused to return it.

The Spanish Communists, whose political following in the country is small but not insignificant, would naturally suspect that in Spain, too, Russia is seeking to satisfy its own national interests rather than those of the Spanish Communist Party.

In Latin America, the Kremlin is cooperating with "reactionary" regimes because it doubts whether the Communists can come to power in the foreseeable

future, or so much to influence the policies of their countries now. It believes that its own diplomatic and economic activities could do more to turn the existing regimes away from dependence on the United States.

The Kremlin's Spanish policy seems to be similarly motivated, and it would evidently prefer to see a liberal "constitutional monarchy" as a step towards a regime of the Left. The Spanish Communists, on the other hand, fear that a constitutional monarchy might prove to be so strong as to keep their party out in the cold for a long time to come.

In a statement broadcast by "Radio Independent Spain" at the beginning of this month, the general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, maintained that the Communists had repeatedly said that they would never take part in any action to restore the monarchy. If the monarchy was restored, they would regard it as a "continuation of the dictatorship," even though it might try to present itself as a "liberal" regime.

But the "Izvestia" article, published a few days later, said that "monarchy" and "reaction" need not be synonymous. Denmark and Norway were monarchies, but their peoples enjoyed democratic freedoms.

In a remark that might have been addressed directly to the Spanish Communist Party, "Izvestia" said that "one must not fail to take into account the possibility of the restoration of the monarchy, if only for a time." Don Juan, the Pretender, "Izvestia" said, was in favour of a dynamic and liberal monarchy, and had declared that he wanted to occupy the throne only with the support and agreement of the people.

Differences

Where, asked "Radio Independent Spain," had "Izvestia" obtained Don Juan's views? "We do not know these opinions," it declared. The "Izvestia" article had presented "a variety of debatable propositions" which "were bound to cause confusion"—presumably in the minds of party members, who might come to look with favour on a constitutional monarchy, in opposition to the party leadership.

But there was a "profound difference" between the stand of "our party," said the broadcast, and the view expressed by "Izvestia." That was why the party had decided to publish this "clarification." But it is more than a clarification—it is a challenge, and a declaration of independence, which is symptomatic of the new situation in the Communist movement.

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February 1968

PROBLEMS OF REFORM IN CHILE

Eduardo FREI Montalva's election as President of Chile in September 1964 was hailed by democratic forces as a major step forward in the history of a country long considered one of the most stable and democratic in Latin America. It was hoped that his dynamic, reform-minded Christian Democratic administration would prove to be an effective alternative to Communism by offering a real route to social and economic progress. Frei's decisive victory in the presidential election was followed six months later by an impressive Christian Democratic Party (PDC) showing in the March 1965 congressional elections. The PDC won a majority in the Chamber of Deputies as well all the Senate seats it contested. However, the Senate majority remained in opposition hands, presenting a serious obstacle to the passage of Frei's reform measures. Since December 1966 the Senate has been controlled by an informal coalition of the Communist-Socialist front, FRAP (Popular Action Front), and the opportunistic Radical Party (PR), supported at times by the conservative National Party (PN). In January 1967 the PN voted with this combination in the Senate to embarrass the government by withholding permission for Frei to make an official trip to the United States.

Christian Democratic Party

What is Christian Democracy? Its definition varies from country to country in Latin America. The movement is a force on the left which espouses change and reform, often radical in nature. It has parties in 16 of Latin America's 20 countries, but only in four of them -- Chile, Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador -- is the movement of current political significance. In only one of these -- Chile -- is the PDC the governing party. Christian Democracy is based essentially on the Roman Catholic Church's growing liberalization in social issues. While the majority of Christian Democrats are Roman Catholics, the ideology of the party throughout Latin America is one of general Christian practice and not especially one that is grounded in the precepts and tenets of Roman Catholicism. Many Latin American Christian Democrats have renounced the teachings of the Catholic Church. The changes advocated by the PDC are broad in range and include agrarian and tax reform, and extensive economic planning and control by the state. Classical capitalism is repudiated. The Christian Democratic movement is definitely on the left, but the distance from the center varies from country to country. No matter where the parties stand, however, Chile's President Frei may be regarded as the symbolic hemispheric leader of the movement.

Recent PDC Trends toward the Far Left

After Frei's victory the PDC was faced with the problem of changing from an opposition party to a governing party. Frei had drained off many of the most able, moderate party members for positions in his government, leaving a leadership vacuum which he himself refused to fill -- he feels

that the position of the presidency transcends party leadership responsibilities. The left-wing "rebel" faction of the PDC -- taking advantage of its newly acquired freedom of action -- gained control of the party on 16 July 1967 by taking over the national council and the presidency of the party.

Five days before the party elections last July, the PDC rebel faction asserted its independence of the Frei administration by engineering a party resolution approving the formation of a Chilean committee of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). The declaration damaged Chile's image in both North and South America and disheartened Christian Democrats elsewhere in Latin America who had regarded the Chilean party as a prime example of successful radical reforms through peaceful means. Frei reacted by denouncing LASO and labeling Chilean delegates to the LASO Conference as "traitors," pointing out that while he had no legal means of preventing LASO from forming a local committee, his government "will repress without hesitation any subversive intent and will not permit Chile to be the base for any action whatsoever which interferes in the free self-determination of other peoples," adding that "Chile has all the means necessary" to control extremists.

One of the first acts of the new PDC governing group was to appoint a commission to "stimulate a non-capitalistic way of development." The commission's "Chonchol Report" advocated large-scale government intervention in the economy and nationalization of industry and conflicted directly with Frei's more moderate reform program. Shortly thereafter, the rebels demanded that Frei shake up his cabinet, firing the ministers of health and labor, whom they considered too far to the conservative right; Frei refused, saying that the selection of cabinet officers is the prerogative of the president -- but he did compromise by agreeing to consult the new party leadership on important questions of internal and foreign affairs.

A drop in popular support for both Frei and the PDC was indicated in the 2 April 1967 municipal elections, when Frei, placing his administration and program on the line in the hope of turning the municipal voting into a plebescite for the PDC, received only 35.6 per cent of the vote -- a distinct decrease from the 42.3 percentage received in the 1965 congressional elections.

However, Frei regained at least interim control of the PDC on 7 January of this year at a special party convention where -- after a hard-fought 15-hour battle during which the President made two personal appearances to defend his program -- he received a vote of confidence of 278 against 202. Senator Rafael Gumucio, the rebel leader, and his directorate stepped down to make room for the new chairman, Jaime Castillo Velasco, former Land and Colonization Minister and staunch supporter of President Frei. The PDC convention pledged support for Frei's reform program, including his wage adjustment legislation, but voted against his one-year ban on strikes. (See Attachment A)

Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)

During the course of the recent disputes in Latin America between adherents of the Cuban brand of militant revolutionary Communism and the advocates of the more moderate Moscow line of peaceful revolution, the PCCh has consistently favored the "via pacifica." Secretary General Luis Corvalan is one of the foremost Latin American proponents of the theory that the correct strategy for achieving Communist goals in a particular country can best be determined by the local Communist Party, and that armed revolution is not the way to success in Chile. To prove this thesis the PCCh will have to make an all out effort to gain power through legal means; therefore it can be expected to attempt to broaden its popular base as much as possible in preparation for the 1970 election. Corvalan, in an article in the "World Marxist Review" for July 1967 (see Attachment B), claims that this is being accomplished: "The Communist effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Democrats, delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petit-bourgeois support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit." Since July 1967 PCCh has made several steps toward inspiring a loose left-to-far-left coalition with the Radical and Socialist parties, even though a new split within the Socialists themselves (see below) and other factors may keep these three parties from any meaningful coalition behind a common presidential candidate in 1970. The PCCh took an active part in the campaign of Alberto Baltra, the Radical Party's candidate for the senatorial by-election on 17 December 1967, and the Communists and the Radicals are likely to continue their cooperation. Baltra won the senate seat by a narrow margin over the PDC candidate Jorge Lavandero, who received little help from his party.

Socialist Party of Chile (PS)

Dissensions within the PS during the last year tended to strain the unity of the FRAP, the Communist-Socialist coalition of several years' standing, in its struggle against the Frei administration. In a PS Party plenum in June Senator Raul Ampuero, motivated by presidential ambitions and disagreeing with Socialist Party leader Salvador Allende, withdrew from the meeting, taking with him another Senator, six deputies, and 15 (of about 30) regional secretaries. Ampuero, who has since been expelled from the party, threatens to drain off the remainder of his so-called "popular socialist" following from the PS and establish a party of his own -- thereby creating a special dilemma for the Communists, who would then be forced to maintain working relations with two groups opposed to each other.

At the PS Party congress in November, Senate President Allende, long a supporter of Castro's extremist views, suddenly found himself on the other side of the fence. The extremist faction of the PS, which had come out strongly against supporting Radical Party candidate Baltra for the special senatorial election on 17 December, vilifying the PR as an "opportunistic bourgeois grouping," and condemning the electoral process as a means to power, decided not to participate in the election. Allende,

booed when he counseled moderation toward the Radicals, threatened to resign the Senate presidency and did, in fact, later turn over his official duties to an acting president. Meanwhile, the extremist faction, strengthened by the Ampuero withdrawal from party leadership, threatened to form a new party -- possibly in combination with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and other ultra extremists -- unless the congress adopted a harder line toward elections. The congress finally decided on a compromise course -- to abstain from the December senatorial by-election and participate in future elections on a selective basis only. The decision will further increase the strains within FRAP, since the PCCh is committed to the legal road to power.

Student Trends toward the Far Left

In the student field there has also been a significant turn to the extreme left. In the Concepcion University Student Federation (FEC) elections the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Socialist University Brigade (BUS) formed a coalition to defeat the Christian Democratic slate. The FEC Council will be composed of five members of the winning coalition, three Christian Democratic Youth members and one Radical Youth member. The new president, Luciano Cruz of the MIR, was expelled from the Communist Party youth organization in 1964 for adopting a position more radical and extreme than that held by the Communist Party. The election of Cruz would seem to indicate that University of Concepcion students openly support violent revolutionary change.

Frei's Reform Program

In spite of opposition from both the extreme left and the far right, the PDC reform program has made some headway. Just past the mid point of his "revolution in liberty," Frei has managed to obtain some of the necessary legislation for his program, although in his own party the left wing seems to have more in common with the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front than with the government. Frei's land reform program has been hailed as the best of its kind in Latin America. The Land Reform law, which was signed 16 July 1967 by Frei, proposes to parcel out 100,000 small holdings to landless farm workers, squatters who have worked land they do not own for at least five years, sharecroppers, renters, and caretakers or owners of land insufficient to support one family. The land, which will be sold to peasants without down payment and on long-term credit, will be expropriated from other land holders, who will be paid in cash and bonds over the next 25 years. Land can be expropriated if it is larger than 160 acres of irrigated land, if it has been abandoned and lies fallow, or if it is poorly administered or unproductive. This does not mean all large farms will be taken over by the government for sale. In outlining his program Frei has said: "There are 260,000 farms in Chile; we propose to expropriate only 4,000 of these." All this is to be accomplished in the next five years, according to Frei's program. In this program as well as in most of his other reforms, Frei is caught in a cross-fire by his political opponents -- the Communist and Socialist parties

are claiming that the law does not go far enough in that it will not prevent the rich land-holders from hanging on to their properties by hook or crook, and the rightwing interests contend that turning over good land to Chile's ignorant campesinos is a criminal waste.

Inflation has long been recognized as a major problem in Chile by the Frei administration. His latest measure to combat increasing inflation is a composed wage adjustment plan which would limit wage increases in both public and private sectors, establish a wage increase partly payable in slow-maturing government savings bonds, prohibit strikes for additional wage increases and impose extensive price controls. A 24-hour general strike in protest against this wage bill was called on 23 November by the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh), which is controlled by the Communist and Socialist Parties. The strike was also supported by non-Communist unions not affiliated with CUTCh. The government initiated proceedings against the leaders of the strike charging them with "organizing, guiding and promoting" massive riots, which left at least five persons dead and 66 injured. The 35-day strike at the Anaconda Copper Company's mine was settled on 4 December, with wage increases far above the government's suggested guidelines. Other copper workers struck last month, both in sympathy with the Anaconda miners and in cooperation with the strike of 23 November. When their contracts expire next year they will undoubtedly demand wage increases at least equal to those attained by the Anaconda workers, thus ending Government hopes for wage and price restraint in 1968.

Frei has initiated other reforms -- some quite unpopular with the voters. In order to lessen Chile's dependence on imported foodstuffs and conserve foreign exchange, he placed a ban on the sale of beef three weeks out of every four; and in an effort to regularize the working day, he shortened the daily three-hour siesta and placed strict regulations on the hours of movies and bars. In the fields of education and housing the Frei administration had made significant progress. Other portions of Frei's reform program, however, have not fared so well -- his revision of corporation law have been held up by the opposition majority in the senate.

Any attempt to assess the Frei government's popularity, however, must take into account his successes and failures on issues such as agrarian reform and inflation. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of his agrarian program -- just getting underway -- but he managed to reduce inflation from 48 per cent a year when the PDC took over in 1965 to 19 per cent in 1966.

Febrero de 1968

PROBLEMAS DE LA REFORMA EN CHILE

La elección de Eduardo Frei Montalva como Presidente de Chile, en septiembre de 1964, fué considerada por las fuerzas democráticas como un paso hacia adelante en la historia de un país considerado por largo tiempo como uno de los más estables y democráticos de Latinoamérica. Se esperaba que su administración Cristiano-Demócrata, dinámica y reformista, probaría ser una alternativa efectiva al comunismo, ofreciendo una ruta verdadera hacia el progreso económico y social. La decisiva victoria de Frei en las elecciones presidenciales fué seguida, seis meses más tarde, en las elecciones para congresistas de 1965, por la presencia del impresionante Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). El PDC obtuvo la mayoría en la Cámara de Diputados y en todas las curules del Senado; sin embargo, el Senado permaneció en manos de la oposición, presentando un serio obstáculo en la aprobación de las medidas de reformas presentadas por Frei. Desde diciembre de 1966 el Senado ha estado controlado por una coalición informal del frente Socialista-Comunista, FRAP (Frente de Acción Popular), y del oportunista Partido Radical (PR), apoyado en ocasiones por el conservador Partido Nacional (PN). En enero de 1967 el PN votó con esta combinación en el Senado con el fin de sabotear al gobierno denegando el permiso a Frei de un viaje oficial a los Estados Unidos.

Partido Demócrata Cristiano

Qué es Democracia Cristiana? Su definición en América Latina, varía según el país. El movimiento es una fuerza de izquierda que promulga cambio y reforma, a menudo en forma radical. Tiene partidos en 16 de los 20 países de la América Latina, pero solamente en cuatro de ellos - Chile, Perú, Venezuela y El Salvador - el movimiento tiene una verdadera importancia política. Únicamente en uno de estos países - Chile - el PDC es el partido que gobierna. La Democracia Cristiana está basada esencialmente en la creciente liberación social de la Iglesia Católica Romana. Aunque la mayoría de los cristiano-demócratas son católicos romanos, la ideología del partido, a través de América Latina, es la practicada por la generalidad de los cristianos y no está especialmente basada en los preceptos y normas del Catolicismo Romano. Muchos cristiano-demócratas latinoamericanos han renunciado a las enseñanzas de la Iglesia Católica. Los cambios abogados por el PDC son muy amplios e incluyen las reformas agraria y de impuestos, un extenso plan económico y el control por el estado. El capitalismo clásico es repudiado. El movimiento Cristiano-Demócrata es definitivamente de izquierda, pero la distancia que lo separa del centro varía según el país. Aún sin tener en cuenta las tendencias de los partidos, puede considerarse al Presidente Frei de Chile como líder simbólico del movimiento en el hemisferio.

Después de la victoria de Frei, el PDC se enfrentó con el problema de tener que cambiar de partido de oposición a partido de gobierno. Frei ha extraído de su partido a muchos de los miembros moderados más capacitados para ocupar posiciones en su gobierno, dejando un vacío en la jefatura que él mismo rehúsa llenar -- él siente que la posición presidencial está por encima de las responsabilidades de la jefatura del partido. La fracción "rebelde" del ala izquierda del PDC -- aprovechándose de su libertad de acción recientemente adquirida, obtuvo el control del partido el 16 de julio de 1967, tomando las riendas del consejo nacional y ocupando la presidencia del partido.

Cinco días antes de las elecciones del partido en julio pasado, la fracción rebelde del PDC asentó su independencia de la administración de Frei con la elaboración de una resolución del partido aprobando la formación de un comité chileno de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OLAS) - organización apoyada por Cuba. La declaración afectó la imagen de Chile en Norte y Sur América y descorazonó a los cristiano-demócratas en toda América Latina que habían visto en el partido chileno el primer ejemplo del éxito de las reformas radicales por medios pacíficos. Frei reaccionó denunciando a OLAS y tildando de "traidores" a los delegados chilenos a la Conferencia de OLAS, señalando que aunque él no tenía medios legales para impedir a OLAS la formación de un comité local, su gobierno "reprimirá sin vacilar todo intento subversivo y no permitirá que Chile sea la base para cualquier acción que interfiera con la libre determinación de otros pueblos", añadiendo, "Chile tiene todos los medios necesarios" para controlar a los extremistas.

Uno de los primeros actos del nuevo grupo gobernante del PDC fué el de nombrar una comisión para "estimular una forma no capitalista de desarrollo". La comisión "Informe Chonchol", abogó por una intervención del gobierno en gran escala en la economía y en la nacionalización de la industria e interfirió directamente con el programa de reforma más moderado de Frei. Poco después los rebeldes pidieron que Frei rehiciera su gabinete ministerial, suspendiendo a los ministros de Salud y de Trabajo, a quienes ellos consideraban de tendencias demasiado derechistas. Frei se negó diciendo que la selección de los miembros del gabinete era una prerrogativa del presidente - pero se comprometió accediendo a consultar con la nueva jefatura del partido importantes aspectos sobre asuntos internos e internacionales.

Las elecciones municipales del 2 de abril de 1967 indicaron una baja en el apoyo a Frei y al PDC, cuando Frei, al poner su administración y su programa en juego con la esperanza de convertir las elecciones municipales en un plebiscito para el PDC, obtuvo solamente el 35,6 por ciento de la votación - una baja apreciable del 42,3 por ciento que obtuvo en las elecciones para congresistas en 1965.

Sin embargo, Frei volvió a ganar por lo menos el control interino del PDC el 7 de enero de este año en una convención especial del partido, donde - después de una ardorosa lucha de 15 horas, durante las cuales el presidente se hizo presente dos veces para defender su

programa, recibió un voto de confianza de 278 contra 202. El líder rebelde, Senador Rafael Gumucio y su directiva se retiraron para dejar el lugar al nuevo director, Jaime Castillo Velasco, Ex-ministro de Tierras y Colonización y partidario incondicional de Frei. La convención del PDC invocó la ayuda para el programa de reforma de Frei incluyendo su legislación sobre ajuste de salarios pero votó en contra de su proclama de ilegalizar las huelgas durante un año (véase anexo A).

Partido Comunista Chileno (PCCh)

Durante el curso de las recientes disputas en América Latina entre los partidarios del comunismo revolucionario militante de sello cubano y los partidarios de la línea de Moscú, de revolución pacífica, el PCCh ha favorecido continuamente la "vía pacífica". El Secretario General Luis Corvalán es uno de los principales proponentes latinoamericanos de la teoría de que la estrategia correcta para lograr las metas comunistas en un determinado país, debe ser establecida por el partido comunista en un determinado país, y que una revolución armada no es la forma de obtener éxito en Chile. Para probar ésta tesis, el PCCh tendrá que hacer un verdadero esfuerzo a fin de llegar al poder por medios legales; sin embargo, es de esperar que intente aumentar su base popular tanto como sea posible a fin de prepararse para las elecciones de 1970. Corvalán, en un artículo en la "World Marxist Review" (Revista Mundial Marxista) de julio de 1967 (ver anexo B), pretende que se está logrando: "el esfuerzo comunista de ganarse gradualmente a las masas de los cristianos demócratas, liberándolas de la influencia burguesa y obteniendo el soporte del pequeño burgués para el Frente de Acción Popular, está dando su fruto". Desde julio de 1967 el PCCh ha dado varios pasos hacia la inspiración de una coalición suelta de izquierda a extrema izquierda con los partidos Radical y Socialista, aún cuando una nueva ruptura dentro de los mismos socialistas (véase adelante) y otros factores, pueden mantener a estos partidos apartados de una coalición significativa respaldando a un candidato presidencial común en las elecciones de 1970. El PCCh tomó parte activa en la campaña de Alberto Baltra, el candidato del Partido Radical para las elecciones de senadores el 17 de diciembre de 1967 y parece que los comunistas y los radicales continuarán dando su colaboración. Baltra ganó la curul del senado por un estrecho margen sobre el candidato del PDC, quién recibió poca ayuda de su partido.

Partido Socialista Chileno (PS)

Las disensiones dentro del PS durante el año pasado tendieron a atirantar la unidad del FRAP, la coalición comunista-socialista por varios años en su lucha contra la administración de Frei. En un pleno del PS celebrado en junio, el senador Raúl Ampuero, llevado por ambiciones presidenciales y en desacuerdo con el líder del Partido Socialista, Salvador Allende, se retiró de la asamblea, arrastrando consigo a un senador, seis diputados y quince (de aproximadamente 30) secretarios regionales. Ampuero, quien desde entonces ha estado expulsado del partido, amenaza con buscar la escisión del remanente de los que él llama "socialistas populares" que aún siguen en el PS, y establecer un partido propio -- creando por consiguiente un especial dilema a los comunistas, quienes entonces tendrán que mantener relaciones de trabajo con dos grupos opuestos entre sí.

En el congreso del PS celebrado en noviembre, el Presidente del Senado, Allende, por mucho tiempo partidario de los puntos de vista extremistas de Castro se encontró al otro lado de la valla. La fracción extremista del PS que se había pronunciado fuertemente en contra del apoyo al candidato del Partido Radical, Baltra, para las elecciones especiales de senadores del 17 de diciembre, calificando al PR de "agrupación burguesa oportunista" y condenando el proceso electoral como medio del poder, decidió no participar en las elecciones. Allende fue abucheado cuando aconsejó moderación hacia los radicales, amenazó con retirarse de la presidencia del senado y efectivamente lo hizo mas tarde relegando su posición a un presidente encargado. Mientras tanto, la fracción extremista reforzada con la renuncia de Ampuero de la jefatura del partido, amenazaba con formar un nuevo partido -- posiblemente con el Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) y otros ultra-extremistas -- a menos que el congreso adoptara una línea más severa en las elecciones. Finalmente el congreso se decidió por un curso de compromiso -- abstenerse en las elecciones para senadores en diciembre y participar en las elecciones futuras únicamente en una base selectiva. La decisión aumentará posteriormente las escisiones dentro del FRAP, ya que el PCCh está comprometido a la vía legal para el poder.

Tendencia de los Estudiantes hacia la Extrema Izquierda

En el campo estudiantil también ha habido un giro fundamental hacia la extrema izquierda. En las elecciones de la Federación Estudiantil de la Universidad de Concepción (FEC), el Movimiento de izquierda revolucionaria (MIR) y la Brigada Universitaria Socialista (BUS) formaron una coalición para derrotar a la fracción Demócrata Cristiana. El consejo de la FEC estará compuesto por cinco miembros de la coalición ganadora, tres miembros de la Juventud Demócrata-Cristiana y un miembro de la Juventud Radical. El nuevo presidente, Luciano Cruz, del MIR, fue expulsado de la organización de la juventud del Partido Comunista en 1964 por adoptar una posición más radical y extrema que la que seguía el Partido Comunista. La elección de Cruz parece indicar que los estudiantes de la Universidad de Concepción apoyan abiertamente el cambio revolucionario violento.

Programa de Reforma de Frei

A pesar de la oposición tanto de la extrema derecha como de la extrema izquierda, el programa de reforma del PDC ha hecho algún progreso. Justamente, habiendo pasado del punto medio de su "revolución en libertad", Frei ha conseguido obtener algo de la legislación necesaria para su programa, aún cuando en su propio partido el ala izquierda parece estar más en común con el Frente de Acción Popular Comunista-Socialista que con el gobierno. El programa de reforma agraria de Frei ha sido ensalsado como el mejor de su clase en América Latina. La Ley de Reforma Agraria que fue firmada por Frei el 16 de julio de 1967, propone parcelar 100.000 pequeños lotes para los campesinos sin tierra, arrendatarios que hayan trabajado por lo menos cinco años terrenos ajenos, cosecheros, mayordomos o propietarios de tierra insuficiente para mantener una familia. La tierra que será vendida a los campesinos sin cuota inicial y a un largo plazo, será expropiada a otros propietarios a quienes se les pagará en dinero y en bonos durante los 25 años siguientes. La tierra podrá ser expropiada si tiene una extensión mayor

de 160 acres de tierra irrigada, si ha sido abandonada y permanece desmontada o si está pobremente administrada o se encuentra improductiva. Esto no quiere decir que todas las fincas grandes vayan a ser apropiadas por el gobierno para su venta. Al delinear este programa, Frei ha dicho: "En Chile hay 260.000 fincas; nos proponemos expropiar solamente 4.000". Todo esto será llevado a cabo en los próximos cinco años de acuerdo con el programa de Frei. En este programa al igual que en la mayor parte de sus otras reformas, Frei está entre dos fuegos, sus oponentes políticos - los partidos socialista y comunista reclaman que la ley no va lo suficientemente lejos al no impedir que los terratenientes retengan sus propiedades por medios tortuosos o aviesos, y los intereses de las derechas claman que entregar buenas tierras a los ignorantes campesinos chilenos es un desperdicio criminal.

La inflación ha sido reconocida durante largo tiempo por la administración de Frei como el mayor problema en Chile. Su última medida para combatir la creciente inflación es un plan compuesto de reajuste de salarios que limite al aumento de los mismos, tanto en los sectores públicos como privados, establecer un aumento en los salarios pagadero parte en bonos de ahorro del gobierno a largo plazo, prohibir las huelgas por demanda de aumento en los salarios e imponer un extenso control sobre los precios. El 23 de noviembre, la Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh) que está controlada por los partidos socialista y comunista, llamó a una huelga general de 24 horas en protesta contra esta ley de salarios. La huelga fué apoyada también por uniones no comunistas ni afiliadas a la CUTCh. El gobierno inició procesos contra los líderes de la huelga acusándoles de "organizar, guiar y promover" motines masivos que dejaron un saldo por lo menos de cinco muertos y 66 heridos. La huelga de 35 días en la mina de la Compañía de Cobre Anaconda fué solucionada el 4 de diciembre con un aumento de salarios muy por encima de las líneas promulgadas por el gobierno. Otros mineros de cobre hicieron huelga el mes pasado para simpatizar, tanto con los mineros de Anaconda como para cooperar con la huelga del 23 de noviembre. Cuando sus contratos expiren el año entrante, sin duda, demandarán aumentos de salarios por lo menos iguales a los obtenidos por los trabajadores de Anaconda, acabando así con las esperanzas del gobierno de una restricción en los precios y salarios en 1968.

Frei ha iniciado otras reformas - algunas bastante impopulares para los votantes, a fin de reducir la dependencia de Chile en alimentos importados y conservar el cambio exterior, implantó una disposición prohibiendo la venta de carne tres semanas de cada cuatro; y en un esfuerzo para regularizar la jornada de trabajo, acortó la siesta diaria de tres horas y estableció regulaciones estrictas en los horarios de los cines y de los bares. En los campos de educación y vivienda, la administración Frei tuvo progresos de importancia. Otros aparte del programa de reforma de Frei no han tenido tanta suerte - su revisión de la ley sobre corporaciones ha sido rechazada en el senado por la oposición mayoritaria.

Sin embargo, el cualquier intento para tasar la popularidad del gobierno de Frei, deben tomarse en consideración sus éxitos y fracasos en aspectos tales como el de la reforma agraria y la inflación. Es muy

pronto aún para juzgar la efectividad de su programa agrario -- recién puesto en marcha -- pero logró reducir la inflación en un 48 por ciento, cuando el PCD asumió el poder y en un 19 por ciento en 1966.

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Frei wins go-ahead on Chilean reforms

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Mexico City

Eduardo Frei Montalva's success in regaining control of leadership of his party is a personal triumph for the Chilean Christian Democratic President.

At the same time, victory provides Chile's reformist President with new impetus to carry out his moderate program of national reforms.

As seen by hemisphere observers here, Mr. Frei's success at ousting extremists from control of party apparatus signals a smoother path in his struggle to win nationwide support for his reforms.

The Frei victory came in a marathon 15-hour party congress which ended in the clear party mandate for the President's reform program. The majority of delegates voted 278 to 202 to support the President.

It was a hard-fought battle, requiring two Frei appearances. But in the final tally, the six-month extremist hold on party leadership was ended and extremist leaders resigned.

Jaime Castillo, onetime Frei cabinet member and perhaps leading Christian Democratic theoretician, was promptly elected new president of the party in wake of the resignations.

Moderation criticized

Regarded as a noncontroversial party figure but one loyal to President Frei, Mr. Castillo is expected to concentrate his attention on ending party differences.

These differences are significant. Opposition forces to Mr. Frei, headed by Rafael Agustín Gumucio, say the President has not moved fast enough with his reforms.

Moreover, they say reforms announced to date are too moderate. They also have called for elimination of the capitalist system in Chile and its replacement with a vague doctrine termed "comuntarianism."

In a special report titled "A Noncapitalist Route to Development," extremist elements expounded a philosophy which to many observers differs little from a program advanced by Marxists and others of Chile's far Left.

Control of the Christian Democratic Party apparatus by forces of the extreme Left

made Mr. Frei's role quite difficult — in light of the sharp opposition he faces from both Left and Right in Chile's political spectrum.

On the Left, the Communist Socialist amalgam known as Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) has called the Frei reforms "too little and too late," in the words of the Socialist leader, Sen. Salvador Allende Gossens, who lost out in the 1964 presidential election to Mr. Frei.

Rightist opposition

On the Right, oldtime conservative and liberal parties are banded together in a new national party, and represent conservative business and landholding groups. Also to the right of the Christian Democrats but generally regarded as somewhat moderate is the Radical Party.

In numerous electoral contests, as well as in the arena of political debate, these forces have presented stiff opposition to Mr. Frei.

Thus when control of the Christian Democratic Party apparatus fell into the hands of extremists last June, Mr. Frei was presented with a serious new obstacle to his reform program. For a time it appeared to observers that he was losing control of his own party, Chile's largest.

There have been numerous hints, however, that in the crucial vote Mr. Frei would still be able to rally the party behind him.

And he did just that in a speech which observers on the scene say was a rousing call for support.

"I have been criticized for attempting to proceed with prudence. . . and this has occurred within my own party," President Frei said in the course of his speech. "The opposition exploits these sputterings to inflame the impatient ones."

The President said an international conspiracy of the "economic right" combined with "international Marxism" was a serious threat to his reform program and he called on all Christian Democrats to rally around the party banner to work for moderate reforms.

Controversial plan

In the voting during the party convention, held in Peñafiel, a small Chilean village 25 miles from the capital city of Santiago, the Christian Democrats voted to back almost all parts of the reform program. This included the controversial and unpopular

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forced-savings plan for all Chileans—a plan designed to curb the nation's rising inflationary pattern.

The party did, however, vote against one Frei proposal—one that would ban all labor strikes for one year. But this was a small defeat in the multihour session which saw a procession of votes which supported the Chilean Christian Democratic leader.

Mr. Frei and his supporters argue that reform is essential for Chile, but it must come about through legislative vote and must not undermine the Chilean Constitution. Mr. Frei calls his program a "revolution in liberty."

Key elements of the Frei program include agrarian reform including land distribution, Chileanization of the copper industry (in which the government owns a substantial share of foreign-controlled copper companies), education reforms including expansion of the system to include all Chileans, tax reform, and significant housing construction.

'Temporary setbacks'

The Frei reform program has been widely viewed as a major test of whether a Latin-

American nation can carry out reform within the context of existing social and economic order. The latest Frei victory gives new hope to those who believe such reform is possible.

Many observers of the Chilean scene have not been overly concerned by setbacks to the Frei program which have occurred from time to time, saying, as one here this week said, "In the end Mr. Frei always manages to win the battle despite temporary setbacks."

Only time will tell, however, whether Mr. Frei has won a lasting victory over dissident elements within the Christian Democratic Party.

Mr. Castillo, new head of the party, said after assuming the post that he is interested in being the leader of all Christian Democrats but refrained from making any other statements on the party vote.

In line with this, Radomiro Tomić, Chile's Ambassador to Washington and a member of party often regarded as its leading presidential hopeful for 1970, urged the party in a cable that "there will be neither winners nor losers" in the show-down.

Alliance of the Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America

LUIS CORVALAN

1. The fight against imperialist domination and against the oppression of local oligarchies, tense and arduous, diverse in form but single in content and ultimate aim, is gaining momentum in Latin America.

Latin Americans are on the road to national and social liberation, democracy and socialism. Their fight for freedom is conditioned by the need for social progress; their ship is sailing before the wind of history.

True, they have to contend with imperialism's aim of maintaining its grip on the continent and with the aim of the oligarchies to perpetuate their privileges. So the inevitable conflict between the two forces is in full swing. The time of grand battles has come: battles which will be won despite all the vicissitudes.

North American imperialism is resorting to undisguised intervention. Its system of military pacts and missions, anti-guerrilla training centres and units of "green berets", "black berets" and Rangers is a form of armed aggression. President Johnson has stated he will stop at nothing to prevent any other country from following Cuba's example. The imperialists are prepared to sow death and destruction in town and village, flouting international law as they did at Playa Girón and Santa Domingo, and as they are doing every day in Vietnam.

The independence of every Latin American country is in jeopardy. The road to salvation, to a happy future, is that of battle.

The Latin American peoples must unite in defence of their sovereignty and right to self-determination. As pointed out by the Thirteenth Congress of our Party, "the supreme task, the task of tasks, is to frustrate the aggressive designs of the imperialists. The fight for revolutionary reconstruction and people's rule blends with the fight against US intervention for sovereignty, self-determination and peace".

The historical mission of the proletariat is to abolish capitalism and build socialism, while the specific tasks may change in accordance with changes in the international situation. In the 'thirties, when Hitler Germany was the centre of world reaction, the task was to rally all forces against fascism in defence of freedom. Now that US imperialism is the main reactionary force, the task is to enlist all forces against the imperialist policy of war and aggression, for the liberation of colonial, neo-colonial and dependent countries, for peace and peaceful coexistence, fusing these efforts with the fight for the social reconstruction imperative in every country.

One or another specific aspect of the world-wide struggle against imperialism comes to the fore, depending on what the adversary is doing in the particular area at the particular moment. Yet every area of battle is part of the single historical movement.

The October Revolution in Russia, the 50th anniversary of which we celebrate this year, marked the beginning of the end of capitalist domination. It ushered in the socialist era, the time of the liberation of the working class and of peoples oppressed by imperialism.

Today, socialism is being built in Cuba on American soil. Social conflicts have engulfed our continent, which is an important theatre in the world-wide battle against imperialism, for democracy, peace and socialism. Imperialist plunder, coupled with the tyranny of the feudal oligarchies, is imposing poverty and suffering on millions of Latin American workers, peasants and Indians, and prejudicing the interests of students, white-collar workers, intellectuals, tradesmen and industrialists, who are also being oppressed. And they will gain in political awareness and extend their

anti-imperialist action as they fight together for common aims against the aggressive interventionist policy of the Yankee imperialists. The fight against US imperialism and the local oligarchies, their common enemy, is bringing the Latin-American peoples closer together. So are the imperatives of solidarity with the other peoples of the world, particularly of Vietnam and Cuba, and with the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movements on our own continent, especially those forced to resort to armed struggle (in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia) or to function underground.

The Latin American wars of independence in the past century were continental wars. When Bolívar, Sucre, San Martín and O'Higgins fought for the independence of their countries, they were striving also for the freedom of the other American peoples. No national states and no geographical frontiers existed on our continent in those days. The borders of the various colonial possessions were rather indistinct, and the independence armies fighting for the liberation of their people counted in their ranks officers and soldiers from other colonies.

It was not until independence was won and capitalism began to develop that the national states came into existence. But, as before, the peoples of Latin America had a common destiny, common problems and common enemies. Still, they could not and did not escape the effects of the law of the uneven development of capitalism and capitalist society. Against the present general setting of backwardness, there are appreciable disparities between the countries in levels of economic, political and social development. This gives the revolutions a national complexion and conditions their variety in form and discrepancy in time.

For this reason, the present situation differs from that of the past century. However, Washington is pursuing its policy of aggression and intervention throughout the continent, which, as the Cuban Communist Party stressed in its statement of May 18, "internationalises aggressive wars, in which soldiers of different nationalities are engaged, as in the Korean War and now in South Vietnam where North American, South Korean, Thai, Filipino, New Zealand and Australian troops have been committed, and as in Santo Domingo, where soldiers were shipped from Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay; furthermore, imperialism is trying through the OAS to build up an international armed force for use against Cuba and the liberation movements on the continent".

This necessitates joint action by the Latin-American peoples and imparts an all-continental complexion of outstanding international importance to their struggle.

Working hand in hand with the local oligarchies, imperialism spurns the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty and frontiers of the Latin American countries. It espouses the so-called doctrine of ideological frontiers, which revolutionaries have to counter with the utmost solidarity. Among other things, this presupposes direct participation in the liberation struggles of fraternal peoples wherever this is warranted by necessity, provided it is done under their leadership.

In some cases, as in the anti-fascist war in Spain, revolutionaries of different nationalities may participate in large numbers, with marked political and historical effect. However, the most important contribution revolutionaries can make to liberation and working-class victory on a world scale is struggle in their own country and their moral and material support to revolutionary battles in other countries.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels, the founders of Marxism and of proletarian internationalism, stressed that "though

not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie."

In this national struggle it is the revolutionaries in each country who determine the various aspects and concrete tasks of the revolution. They know the home situation better than anybody else and are in a far better position to define the aims and the methods of attaining them. They may err, but are less likely to do so than others. In any case, revolutionaries in their respective countries are best equipped to assume full responsibility for working out the right course of action after a preliminary review of their own experience, their successes and setbacks. Needless to say, this does not rule out exchanges of opinion and, in some cases, fraternal counsel.

The Cuban revolution is proof of the fact that reality plays havoc with preconceived assumptions, serving as a reminder of the folly of generalising the singular features of this or that experience. This is not to say, however, that the specific features of one revolution, say that of the Cuban, will not recur elsewhere (at least in a somewhat different form). We believe, therefore, that in some Latin-American countries revolution may be sparked off by a guerilla movement, as was the case in Cuba.

For this to happen the courage and determination of a group of revolutionaries, though an important, sometimes even decisive factor, is not enough. Much more essential are favourable general conditions. To be sure, we hold that they need be neither absolutely favourable nor completely mature, but they must be in the process of maturing with a clear prospect of becoming fully ripe.

Certainly, it is not easy to define the place and the exact time for guerilla or some other form of armed action. Lenin warned against reckless ventures which, as a rule, cause a senseless waste of lives and end in retreat. On the other hand, Leninism has always been creatively bold, infused with the desire to advance the revolutionary cause. It would be wrong therefore both to reject out of hand or blindly accept any specific form of struggle. The main thing is to embark squarely on the path of struggle, size up the situation to the best of one's ability and decide on the most propitious course of action. The revolutionary must be ready to take the offensive at any moment, to retreat when necessary, and to perceive situations favourable for revolution.

2. Many trends—men, women and youth of varying political views and social backgrounds—have joined the liberation struggle. The important thing is to extend the anti-imperialist front and engage against the common enemy all sections of the public, including those who may not be admirers of the Cuban revolution and revolution in general, but who have taken a stand in behalf of Cuba's right to build socialism and the right of all Latin American peoples to opt for the system of their choice.

Any attempt to impose the Communist view on the other anti-imperialist forces, and similarly any attempt by the latter to impose their views on others, can but hamper unity of action and narrow the struggle against the common enemy.

This is why the accent should be on the specific tasks that all agree need to be carried out—that is, on what unites, rather than divides, the revolutionary movement. We believe that the Organisation for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) and the respective national committees should concentrate on extending and co-ordinating international solidarity and joint action. What is needed most is for all revolutionaries, all anti-imperialists and all popular movements on our continent to thrash out a common revolutionary standpoint. This, however, is inconceivable before a certain process of development runs its course. We may accelerate the course, but cannot as yet consider it completed. If, therefore, we were to try and impose a standard approach, entirely unnecessary difficulties would arise. The best way to facilitate unity in defence of the Cuban revolution and the fight against imperialism and its agents is to promote joint action and to accentuate what unites us, while rectifying whatever disunites us.

It is no secret that Latin American revolutionaries have differing agency made its appearance after considerable numbers of new fighters from the less politically developed sections of the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie joined the Latin American revolutionary movement, and after differences of an international order obstructing the struggle broke out among the revolutionaries.

The allusion here is to problems bred by the development of modern society, the emergence of new extremely complex social phenomena, the disparities between objective conditions from country to country and to the growth of the revolutionary forces.

Lenin pointed out that any growth of the working-class movement and appearance of new fighters and new sections of working people "is inevitably accompanied by vacillation in theory and tactics". And he called attention to the fact that "the yardstick of an imaginary ideal" will get us nowhere and that vacillation should be regarded as "a practical movement of ordinary people".

In other words, what we are dealing with are growing pains that cannot conceivably be removed overnight. But it is also a cogent fact that imperialism benefits from differences arising between the revolutionary forces, and especially from differences in the Communist parties. It is our duty, therefore, to prevent differences from obstructing united action against the common enemy. Differences arising between Communist parties should not impede mutual understanding any more than differences between Communists and other revolutionaries should impede their common fight against imperialism.

Experience has shown that open polemics results in senseless name-calling and in arbitrary judgments. It serves no useful purpose and only aggravates the difficulties. Sometimes, it is true, a party has no choice but to express its opinion publicly. We have nothing against this. But we are sure that direct contacts, bilateral and multilateral meetings, a tactful fraternal dialogue and, most important of all, steadfast unity of action, are the best way to further mutual understanding.

3. The driving force of the revolution in Latin America comprises the working class, peasants (the majority of whom in many countries are Indians), students, middle strata and some sections of the national bourgeoisie. There are contradictions between them, but common interests in the fight against US imperialism and the oligarchies predominate. This offers a serviceable basis for unity and calls for closer bonds. Our policy of united action by all anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic forces builds on the belief that an alliance of workers and peasants, of the proletariat and the non-proletarian elements, is the best possible basis for an enduring and militant united front. To make headway, mutual understanding between proletarian and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries is absolutely essential.

The proletariat, the most powerful social class on our continent, is still growing. As many as 40 million people (of whom one out of every three is a factory or farm labourer), or more than half the gainfully employed population between the Rio Grande and Cape Horn, earn a livelihood by selling their labour power. In five countries, that is, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, with nearly two-thirds of the total population of Latin America, the proletariat is relatively strong, and not in numbers only.

Communist parties exist in all Latin American countries. Like the fraternal parties elsewhere in the world, irrespective of their degree of development, they expound ideas that strike terror into imperialism, of which they are the most relentless enemies.

They are the bearers of the finest revolutionary traditions of their peoples and have acquitted themselves splendidly in the important work of disseminating Marxism and socialist ideas, in moulding the scientific socialist outlook of the foremost workers and intellectuals. Cultivation of proletarian internationalism among the working class is one of their accomplishments. In brief, it is they who are forging the class consciousness of the Latin American proletariat and the anti-imperialist awareness of the peoples.

In all the countries of Latin America the Communist parties 2005/0421
 subjected to persecution at one time or another. But they have never
 flinched in face of the terror campaigns. Thousands have seen the
 inside of prisons and concentration camps, thousands have been
 manhandled and tortured, and many leaders have paid with their
 lives for their convictions. Staunch and experienced fighters emerge
 from this ordeal.

Some Communist parties, entrenched among the masses, constitute an influential and at times even the decisive, political force. Others are still small and lack some of the requisites of a vanguard. However, international experience has shown that small parties can become large revolutionary contingents, at times virtually overnight. Just before the Second World War, for example, the Italian Communist Party numbered 15,000 members in a country with a population approaching 50 million. Yet after Mussolini's downfall towards the end of the Second World War the Party grew into a powerful force of millions of members. Early in 1958, at the time the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship was overthrown in Venezuela, the Communist Party had a mere 300 members; soon, however, its membership numbered tens of thousands, making it in a matter of months the biggest political body in Caracas.

Communists organise the workers in trade unions, fight for the economic and social demands of the people and safeguard working-class unity by inspiring a new, anti-imperialist patriotism.

The most advanced section of the working class and the best of the Latin American intelligentsia have joined the Communist parties. These parties have their sources in the proletariat of their respective countries, in the October Revolution, in the victory of Leninism, of revolutionism over reformism.

This consolidation of the Latin American Communist parties is a great gain of the revolutionary working class. Their path has not been strewn with roses. They have had to withstand the assault of their class adversaries and also to combat anarchism, Trotskyism and other petty-bourgeois trends in their own ranks.

The founding of Communist parties brought about the fusion of Marxism with the working-class movement. This was an historical imperative so that the working class, to use Marx's words, should not be only a class in itself but a class for itself, and that its fight for emancipation should be a conscious fight.

Pernicious tendencies and sectarian views, isolationism, passivity, adventurism, conformism and time-serving occur now and then in the Communist parties regardless of whether they are functioning legally or underground. None of these can be combated effectively, unless a continuous fight is waged for the Party line through criticism and self-criticism and hard daily work among the masses.

These pernicious tendencies, which we Chilean Communists know all too well from our own experience, are a hindrance to party development. But small parties grow into big ones by virtue of their vanguard position in the social struggle, for as the proletarian masses gather experience they range themselves alongside the Communists. This we want to make absolutely clear. However, we should not lose sight of another objective factor, namely, that not only the politically conscious workers but also a considerable section of the petty-bourgeoisie are adopting a revolutionary attitude and fighting for the liberation of our continent with the aim of building socialism. This became doubly evident after the socialist revolution in Cuba.

Some of the petty-bourgeoisie join the Communist parties or become friends and followers, exerting an influence of their own for a certain length of time. However, a more considerable part forms its own parties or joins the Left wing of other movements.

This trend often engenders sectarianism. In Chile, for example, Communists campaigned for a time for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for Soviet power. This approach did not help our Party to grow. (Upon abandoning this sectarian line, we defined the Chilean revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution, but realised in 1945 that even this non-sectarian definition had been rendered unsound by reason of the world-wide changes—advance of the working class, the content of the new economic and social conditions and the revolutionary ardour of the bourgeoisie.)

In any case, the rise of revolutionary tendencies among the petty-bourgeoisie can be traced to the struggle waged by the proletariat, to the years of work put in by the Communist Parties, to the entire modern development of history, influenced chiefly by the steady growth of the socialist system.

Objectively speaking, the revolutionary mood of the petty-bourgeoisie is a welcome fact. It is a manifestation of progress and should not be regarded as merely a posture or an act of desperation, an act which the petty bourgeoisie admittedly often commit. Under no circumstances should we underrate the revolutionary potential of the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie. While the Latin American bourgeoisie is no longer capable of heading revolutionary processes (though some sections of it may participate in them), the petty bourgeoisie is still a revolutionary force and one that may even play a leading role in countries where the working class is weak numerically and lacks the needed political weight.

The Cuban revolution has demonstrated that the petty bourgeoisie has a potential of revolutionary courage in battling for national liberation and socialism.

There is, then, a distinct bond between the revolutionary trends of the proletariat, on the one hand, and those of the petty bourgeoisie, on the other. There is much that unites them, but also much that divides them. Petty-bourgeois revolutionaries tend at times to underrate the workers and the Communist parties, to gravitate towards nationalism, recklessness, terror and, at times, even anti-communism and anti-sovietism. Also, they are more susceptible to despair and subjectivism. But they are revolutionary all the same, and the proletariat must put the accent on unity with them rather than on fighting their mistakes. The two trends are competing for leadership of the movement; to a certain extent, their rivalry is ideological. But if anything is done to accentuate this rivalry and precipitate a "fight for the destruction" of either trend, the sole beneficiary will be imperialism. That imperialism and its agents are concentrating precisely on intensifying the rivalry should be enough to bear this out. The national bourgeoisie, too, which seeks to maintain its class positions, is also eager to see the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie part ways. So today, mutual understanding, co-operation and united action by the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie is a matter of the first magnitude.

The Latin American Communist parties are aware of the need for understanding with the other Left forces, above all those espousing socialism. However, this does not apply to anti-Party groups and splinter parties, who represent no one and who live off factional activity and dissent.

The militant co-operation of the working class and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie need not stop short of founding united revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties wherever they have parties of their own today. In Chile this co-operation has crystallised into socialist-communist unity within the People's Action Front. The Socialist Party, like the Communist, has deep roots in the working class, though those of the Communist Party are deeper. Both wield considerable influence also among the petty bourgeoisie, with the Socialists holding an edge. The petty-bourgeoisie do not comprise a special group in the Communist Party, whose leadership derives chiefly from the working class.

The mutual understanding of Chile's Communists and Socialists comes up against snags from time to time, but the alliance is sufficiently strong to make a split highly improbable. It draws its strength from the will of the people. As Comrade Galo González pointed out at the Tenth Party Congress in 1956, whenever Socialists and Communists worked together "the working class has gained and whenever we parted ways or quarrelled the enemy benefited". We are strong when we stand together, and weaker when we do not. The people of Chile will not win political power unless Socialists and Communists are allies. Neither Communists nor Socialists can claim sole leadership. We need each other.

Some sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the working class while gravitating towards revolution have not yet taken a definite stand. Most of them support the Radical or Christian Democratic parties.

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However, since the municipal elections last April the more advanced groups in the Christian Democratic Party, too, have been working for an understanding with the Socialists and Communists. Their leader, Alberto Baltra, maintains that "the objective interests of the proletariat and the middle sections are similar", that "the world is moving inevitably towards socialism" and that "a socialised alternative is perfectly conceivable, paving the way to effective planning, replacement of the capitalist system, abolition of monopolies, decline of imperialist influence and to accumulation and mobilisation of the considerable resources required to expand national capital and, hence, the rate of Chile's development". Baltra described people's unity as "a process of joint action by Radicals and other Left forces".

Some deputies and many members of the Christian Democratic Party, too, are calling for "concentrated fire on the oligarchy" and for joint action with the People's Action Front. Most have expressed themselves in favour of socialism.

To be sure, their idea of socialism differs substantially from that of the Socialists and Communists. But the important thing is their desire to reach an understanding with the People's Action Front.

The most important factor in Chile today is the desire for change. Thanks to Communist and Socialist efforts, the people are beginning to realise that the old economic structure must be radically altered. The national bourgeoisie represented by the Christian Democratic Party is acutely conscious of the advances made by the revolutionary working class and of the possibility of a major shift in public sentiment, which could bring the working class to power. Consequently, large sections of the national bourgeoisie have declared themselves in favour of change, offering reformist solutions within the Alliance-for-Progress framework. To stem the tide, the oligarchy, too, aligned itself with the Christian Democrats in the 1964 presidential election, thus enabling the latter to win.

The thirty months of the Christian Democratic government have been enough to disenchant the people who had believed in bourgeois reformism. Most of them turned to the Popular Action Front and now seek revolutionary change.

Needless to say, this reaction was not spontaneous. It was brought about by the work of the Communists who have consistently urged joint action by all partisans of change, regardless of whether or not they are against the government.

The shift in favour of the Communists and Socialists was reflected in the results of the April municipal elections. The Communist Party polled 354,000 and the Socialist Party 322,000 votes. Some 120,000 electors who previously voted Christian Democrat sided with the Communists and Socialists, who polled 30 per cent of the vote. Meanwhile, the Christian Democratic Party, which formerly collected 42 per cent, slipped to 36 per cent. The Socialists and Communists are on the upgrade, while the Christian Democrats have entered a phase of decline.

The future of the Radical Party, which represents some 16 per cent of the electorate and consists chiefly of middle class people, will depend on its eventual understanding with the People's Action Front.

In the circumstances, the People's Action Front is becoming a centre of contact for all the democratic forces in the country.

The election was a serious setback for the Christian Democratic Party and for President Frei's administration. It was a setback for the reformist alternative and the Christian Democratic variety of the pilot experiment offered by the US imperialists to some of the Latin American countries. The election also showed that the Communist effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Democrats, delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petty-bourgeois support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit. This Communist policy holds out good prospects for the people's movement in its advance and in combating the enemy on other fronts in the event of Chile being affected by the present epidemic of "gorillism".

Doubtless the situation in the country is a singular one. But elsewhere in Latin America, too, mutual understanding between prole-

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tarian and revolutionary petty-bourgeois groups is being forged in into the fight for change with the ultimate aim of sparking off anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutions.

It is up to the revolutionaries to find the way to mutual understanding between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. And clearly, in each country the choice rests with the local revolutionary forces, which makes it doubly necessary to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideas and implant proletarian ideology.

The argument most frequently used by the enemy is that the Communists' united action policy is simply a tactical manoeuvre to strengthen their hand, to absorb real and possible allies, use them to the fullest and then abandon them and to go on to achieve a Communist one-party empire.

It would be a sheer waste of breath to go into this at length, for it is malicious slander pure and simple. That the Communists will gain in strength is certain, despite all the difficulties. The other progressive forces will also grow in proportion to their contribution to the common struggle, because the march of time favours the exponents of progress, not the reactionaries. In Chile, the co-operation of Socialists and Communists has benefited both parties. They improved their positions in the recent elections, with the Socialists making a somewhat bigger advance this time.

We Communists have always maintained that the working class has two types of allies—permanent and temporary. This is an objective fact. History never stands still. Upon attaining one goal, society begins planning the next. New tasks and contradictions appear, conditioning changes in the political approach, with new alignments, some drifting into the reactionary camp and the majority straining forward. It is not the Communists, therefore, who by malice afthought part ways with groups that had been their allies.

Imperialist policies of menacing world peace, flouting the rights of nations, assailing democratic freedoms and human rights, and prejudicing the interests of all socio-economic groups save those of the monopoly bourgeoisie, evoke the indignation of all social strata, including a large part of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the spectacular achievements of the socialist world and its accomplishments, which are in harmony with man's aspirations for freedom, learning, culture and welfare, coupled with its aid to non-socialist countries aspiring to independent development, is making socialism attractive not only to the proletariat, but also to other classes and social strata.

The development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist one and the socialist orientation of some revolutionary processes in Africa and the Middle East could never have occurred other than in the new historical conditions brought about by the October Revolution and then the Soviet victory over Hitler Germany, after which socialism became a world system strong enough to safeguard the new revolutionary states, frustrate imperialist blockades and assist the newly-free countries in their independent development.

In this situation, the problem of our temporary alliances with non-proletarian and non-Communist forces calls for a new approach. Our allies now have much greater opportunities for marching ahead, not of course without vacillation and difficulties. Whatever happens, it is farthest from our minds to use them at some specific stage, only to discard them at another. On the contrary, we could wish for nothing better than to co-operate with them indefinitely.

What we Communists want is a progressive alignment of all champions of democracy and socialism, recognising the right of every ally to participate in all stages of the revolutionary process and in all governments that the people's struggle may bring into being.

It should be added here that many Communist parties do not consider the one-party system obligatory for socialist society. The

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matter hinges on specific national conditions and on the existence in many countries of democratic and popular political forces and of objective social realities that condition a multiplicity of progressive trends and parties. The Communist Party of France, for example, does not believe that "the one-party system is essential for the transition to socialism", and the Italian Communists share its opinion.

The Communists in Chile, too, favour a multi-party system. We hold that the Communist and Socialist parties should not only jointly lead the people in the fight against imperialism and the oligarchy but also jointly build the socialist society of the country and we expect many other groups to participate as well.

The Communist Party of Chile, a working-class party, exercises leadership in co-operation with the Socialist Party, which, as we have noted before, holds strong positions in the country. Many problems faced by our movement are settled by agreement between the Socialists and Communists on the initiative of one of them. We call this joint leadership, which in Chile represents the concrete form in which the Communist Party plays its vanguard role.

It may be that ultimately the Communists and Socialists will form a united party. But so far the question has not arisen, and is not likely to arise in the foreseeable future, and perhaps may never arise.

As for the other Latin American countries, it appears that the need for united action by Communist parties and other revolutionary forces fits in with the need for co-operation at the level of joint leadership by those revolutionary forces which, in a definite sense, share the function of vanguard.

A vanguard cannot conceivably be built by arbitrary or synthetic means around a leader or a few men who, individually, at least in their own opinion, adopt radical standpoints and prepare for revolutionary action. The exceptions to this rule only bear this out.

A vanguard is the result of the fusion of Marxism with the working-class movement, the moulding of revolutionary thought (above all among proletarians) and the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of a country, that is, the result of purposeful activity and of a natural, rather than spontaneous, process.

On the other hand, as Lenin said, it is not enough to call oneself the vanguard or the forward contingent; all other contingents must be convinced that we really are in the van.

The Latin American Communist parties were founded at different times. They function in different conditions and in different social and political situations. Some are going forward from dissemination of scientific socialist ideas to consolidating their bonds with the masses, to organising mass struggle, to the phase of intensive social and political work which paves the way to the conquest of power, to the rapid development of the Latin American parties into the guiding force of the revolutionary movement.

However, the Communists do not consider this the only possible perspective. In the name of the proletariat and on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, they are prepared to raise to the highest possible level co-operation and unity with the other revolutionary forces.

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BACKGROUND USE ONLY

February 1968

Soviet Penetration of Nigeria

The birth of Nigeria on 1 October 1960 was acclaimed by many as the entry onto the world scene of a black African state "destined to emerge as a major power in Africa." The British wanted Nigeria to become their "showpiece" in West Africa, but a showpiece of good government by Western standards -- a major mistake in the case of Nigeria. The country is a collection of diverse nations, tribes and cultures. Its people speak three major languages -- Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo -- and about 150 minor languages. English is the official language, but many Nigerians cannot speak it. Religions make the gap even wider. Most of northern Nigeria is Moslem, and its culture comes from centuries of contact with Arab caravans. The south is Christian and pagan, with a Bantu culture, somewhat modified by European incursions into the coastal areas. British rule has been the only unifying factor in Nigeria's past history, and even then the British administered it as three units -- the colony of Lagos and the northern and southern protectorates. Since 1960 this loosely knit structure of incompatible cultures and racial groups has been held together by a constitution written as if intended for a people united by Anglo-Saxon traditions and committed to a multiple-party system of government. Its present internal problems were inevitable. In January 1966 an Ibo officers' clique staged a coup, murdering officials and seizing power. Six months later a non-Ibo officers' clique ousted them with additional bloodshed. Each tribal faction called on tribal loyalties for support and this inflamed latent passions. Northerners began to slaughter Ibos in their territories -- upwards of 30,000 men, women and children who had been living and working in northern cities as civil servants, technicians and traders were murdered in a barbarous fashion. About two million survivors fled south where an Ibo Colonel named Odumegwu Ojukwu led the secessionist movement that in May 1967 created the independent state of Biafra. (For further background data, see Attachment A.)

SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in Africa by supplying arms and planes to developing countries inimical to the West began in Egypt in 1955 and extended rapidly to Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana. Quick to take advantage of a chaotic situation, the Soviets have turned toward Nigeria. Until last year Moscow never showed itself sympathetic toward the Western-oriented leaders of the Nigerian Federation of 1960. However, after the fighting broke out in July 1967 between the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra, the Soviet Union was quick to respond to the FMG's appeal for assistance. During the latter part of 1967 the Soviets managed to sell over \$5 million worth of military equipment

to the FMG, including 10-12 MIG jet fighters and three patrol boats. There are currently about 50 Soviets in Nigeria training Nigerians to operate and maintain the equipment. By the end of August a Nigerian jet fighter was already attacking secessionist forces in the Midwestern State.

Other Communist countries have also proffered military and technical assistance. In 1965 Czechoslovakia extended a \$14-million line of credit to Nigeria and, after the secession, furnished to the FMG six jet trainers -- which can also be used as fighters and bombers. In September 1967 there were 14 Hungarian civil engineers engaged in roadbuilding and river control in northern Nigeria. Polish pilots now predominate in harbor operations. But through it all the Soviet Union insists that the conflict in Nigeria is an internal one and that all that the Soviets want is peace and stability for Nigeria! In October 1967 Soviet Premier Kosygin, in a personal message to Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian Chief of State, stated that he is opposed to any outside interference in Africa's internal affairs.

OTHER SOVIET TACTICS

While the Soviet Union is giving military support to General Gowon's Federal Military Government, it is also pursuing its standard tactics of penetrating Nigeria from within. A number of Soviet-Nigerian friendship societies have recently been formed in the Western State, the home of the Yoruba tribe. With the withdrawal of the educated Ibos to Biafra, the Soviets have found it expedient to cultivate the Yorubas, who are now supplanting the Ibos in public office. Friendship societies are also being formed in the largely Muslim north, where the Soviets undoubtedly foresee future ties with the rest of Muslim Africa.

Moscow is also trying to enlarge its toehold in the Nigerian labor movement. Following the dissolution of all political parties in 1966, the pro-Communist "Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party" formally disbanded, but its weekly organ ADVANCE has been taken over by the pro-Moscow Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and continues along party lines. On 5 November 1967 ADVANCE published a glowing message of greetings to the Soviet Union for its 50th Anniversary and a tribute by the head of the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship Society to the great friendship shown by the Soviet Union in Nigeria's time of need.

While openly professing its support for Gowon's government, the Soviet Union is giving its covert support to the extreme Left. In an October 1967 article on Nigeria in the international Communist journal WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, the Soviets praised the banned Socialist Worker's and Farmers' Party and claimed that this party and the NTUC are in the forefront of the struggle against "feudal and captialist" elements in Nigeria (See Attachment B.)

The Soviets have also stepped up their efforts aimed at the information media. The Soviet news agency, Novosti, has recently appointed a representative in Ibadan and a splinter journalists' organization is receiving Communist support. With the relaxation of FMG import restrictions, there has been an increased influx of Communist literature, which can be bought at newstands and bookstores, and which is also distributed by the NTUC and affiliated unions. The Soviets have requested permission to increase their Embassy staff in Lagos and have just opened a new chancery which is obviously designed for a greatly augmented diplomatic force.

SOVIET INTERESTS IN NIGERIA

The Soviet Union had long taken special interest in countries that supply oil to Western Europe: Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and others. Now it has taken a stake in Nigeria which, before the war broke out, was supplying ten per cent of Britain's oil and has rich oil resources as yet only partially exploited. Soviet interest in Nigerian oil became apparent in early 1967, following speculation in the American press that an independent Eastern Nigeria might give the oil companies better terms than they enjoy under existing contracts with the FMG. Over twenty million tons of oil were produced in Nigeria in 1966, and 63 per cent of that in the Eastern Region. If Biafra remained an independent state, the Soviet Union's chances of cutting into that vast oil reserve would be negligible. Once Moscow had made the decision to support the FMG, it did not hesitate to play upon Nigerian suspicions of the United States by linking that country's oil interests with Biafra and claiming that the United States is supporting the rebel forces with white mercenaries.

In addition to its oil reserves, the Eastern Region has a palm products crop that has been bringing in nearly \$100 million a year. Now, of course, revenue from both oil and palm products is denied to the FMG. The oil reserves of the Midwestern Region are at least as large as those of the East, although not yet as well developed. The Western Region relies largely on its \$100 million yearly cocoa crop, and the landlocked North on its \$150 million crop of peanuts, which, however, must be moved through the East or West to the sea. While oil and cocoa are Nigeria's major exports, its natural resources also include coal, iron, limestone and natural gas. It produces 45 per cent of the world's columbium ore -- used in the manufacture of steel alloys. With a foreign trade amounting to \$1.5 billion in 1966, it is the biggest and richest state in Black Africa, and -- with the decline of Western influences -- a natural target for Soviet subversion.

WESTERN INTERESTS IN NIGERIA

Although the Soviets have made a substantial breakthrough in Nigeria, and their position can be expected to improve at all levels in the future,

there are still important influences at work against Communist aims. General Gowon does not wish to break Nigeria's traditional ties with the West, particularly with Great Britain which has resumed military support to his government. In addition both Gowon and his foreign affairs minister, Dr. O. Arikpo, seem fully aware of the dangers inherent in too serious a commitment to the Communist camp. As long as the present government is in power, Western interests will continue to be represented in Nigeria and expansion of the Communist subversive base may yet be contained.

THE NEW LEADER
1 January 1968

Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0

Nigeria: A Study in Hypocrisy

By George T. Orick

NIGERIA, the world's tenth most populous country, has torn itself apart, aborted its economic and social development, and begun the extermination and suppression of its most advanced tribal component. The developed countries which had regarded Nigeria as the very model of black African promise and stability now watch the disaster, paralyzed by their own habitual stances, relationships and antagonisms. The situation is a study in functional hypocrisy, both on the part of the developed countries and of the Nigerians themselves.

Until two years ago, the industrial nations rejoiced in the capacity of corrupt Nigerian governments, regional and Federal, to buy millions of pounds' worth of largely unnecessary capital goods, and in the capacity of Nigerian farmers to expand their plantings of peanuts, cocoa and oil palm to keep even with declining world market prices. The big sharecropper country was doing fine: producing more every year, buying more and more goodies at the company store—and going satisfactorily into long-term debt.

Then the Nigerians embarrassed the world by exposing to public view what most of the participants had known from the start: that Nigeria was not a developing country; it was not, in fact, a country at all. In January 1966, when a group of young Army officers representing many tribes seized control from the thoroughly corrupt hierarchy of political leaders, there was jubila-

GEORGE T. ORICK, a new contributor, is a free-lance writer who lived and worked in Nigeria for six years.

tion among much of the citizenry. The one serious exception was the reaction in the predominately Moslem Northern Region.

The young officers made two serious mistakes. First, in doing away with those responsible for Nigeria's drift into heedlessness, they killed the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a gentle man who had grown in world stature as his government rotted from within, and his manipulator, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto, who in addition to being premier of the Northern Region was spiritual leader of Nigeria's Moslems. Deep in Ramadan fasting, the Moslems did not react immediately; but when they did, six months later, their fury was spiritually as well as politically motivated.

Secondly, the officers assigned to kill the Ibo premier of the Eastern Region, Michael Okpara, failed to fulfill their mission, and in two days tribalism eclipsed idealism: The officers handed over the central government to their Army superior, Ibo Brigadier General Aguiyi-Ironsi. By the time Ironsi himself was murdered in July 1966, tribal polarization in Nigeria had gotten well under way.

Since the military men were fairly naive about the techniques of corruption, while foreign businessmen trained them in the proper use of Swiss bank accounts the growth rate of the Nigerian economy began to fall. For several weeks after Ironsi came to power, there was a sharp shrinkage in the country's cash flow:

The giving and taking of bribes—a way of life at all levels in Nigeria—

came to a halt as 60 million citizens evaluated the military government's intentions.

This quickly removed millions of pounds from daily circulation, and for a short time it was possible for a father to enroll his child in a parochial school without paying a bribe to the registrar, or for a dying hospital patient to get a bedpan without bribing the nurse. Soon, however, Ironsi became a Big Man—Rolls Royce with motorcycle outriders, embassy parties, the works—and a wary populace relaxed. Membership cards in the revived Bribe Scorners' League were quietly put away, and business returned to normal—almost.

It was already too late: Foreign investment was declining, food prices were rising, and tribal hatreds and regional suspicion were becoming exaggerated into overt hostility. Oil drilling and pumping had increased, helping to preserve for a time the illusion that the economy remained viable. The multi-regional charter of the oil operations, moreover, was a practical argument for continued national unity. But the big tribal cats, tied together by their tails in the artificial colonial creation called Nigeria, were fighting free of one another—each blaming the others for the growing troubles, and each convinced it was the rightful dictator of terms for continued national association.

In the six months between that first Army coup and the second in July 1966, it was Ironsi's Ibo tribe of Eastern Nigeria whose influence was felt. Ironsi permitted his tribesmen to encroach disproportionately into the civil service and into the managerial levels of the big quasi-public corporations that operated the railroads, telephones, electric power networks and ports.

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That the Ibos were probably more qualified than the other big Nigerian tribes to operate the government bureaucracies was particularly galling to their rivals. Through almost unique tribal openmindedness, the Ibos had moved in half a century, from primitive paganism to Chistianity, to progressive, educated modernism. This angered the increasingly decadent Yorubas of the Western Region, and the feudal, static, fatalistic Moslem Hausas of the Northern Region.

BY JUNE 1966, the country's fragile framework could no longer survive the imbalance of one-tribe supremacy. The Ibos were moving too fast, too gleefully in their search for the secrets of durable national power, and the keys to the safe. Tribal fragmentation was the order of the day, and one-tribe supremacy was, after all, only a warped version of tribal fragmentation. A scapegoat had to be found for Nigeria's troubles.

Clearly, the Ibos were the enemy, for they represented much that was hateful to both the Yorubas and the Hausas: They worked together in a spirit of mutual self-help, instead of clinging together out of mutual suspicion; their upstart peasant vigor challenged the clever, subtle sophistication of the Yorubas and the dignified trance of the Hausas; their tribal democracy was almost un-African. Particularly tiresome was the Ibo insistence that political leaders are stewards of public trust, owing their constituents at least a shilling's worth of benefit for every pound of bribe sent to Switzerland. Most disturbing of all was the Ibo conviction that there is a future beyond the beginning of the next rainy season, and that a man could somehow learn to control that future to his betterment.

The Ibo reflex was operative in Ironsi, and the affable, permissive general began to think politically. In his search for the roots of stable

power, he set about restoring the dignity and local-level power of traditional chiefs and minor kings in the Western (Yoruba) Region. This limited gesture was about as far as he could go in applying democratic thinking to the Yorubas, but its tentative success was too much for the Northerners.

Thus, on July 29, 1966—two days after a conclave of traditional chiefs whose support he was wooing, at which he had decreed that the national anthem would be sung at the opening and closing of all school sessions and at all public entertainments—Ironsi was murdered by Northern soldiers. Killed with him was Colonel Fajuyi, his governor of the Western Region, and his ally in courting the chiefs.

Each of the major Nigerian tribes is a nation in spirit, and bigger than most African countries in size: There are about 17 million Hausas, 15 million Yorubas and 9 million Ibos. During the week following Ironsi's death, it was evident that no replacement could be selected from these tribes, giving rise to the short day of the minority tribe. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian member of one of Nigeria's 200-odd smaller tribes, emerged as the nominal leader of the military government. Gradually Gowon has become little more than a mouthpiece for the Hausa leaders, who still speak of national unity yet say, and not always so privately, that unity (meaning Northern domination) is not possible unless the Ibos are either killed or contained in their homeland.

For two months after he became Supreme Commander of the Military Government of Nigeria, Gowon tried to bring some semblance of order to the country. Then in September 1966, the Moslem Hausas got down to the serious business of exterminating Ibos: In less than 10 days they slaughtered upwards of 50,000 Ibo men, women and children who had been living and working in

Northern cities as traders, technicians and civil servants. The Army units in the North, already purged of Ibos in July and August, instead of stopping the slaughter participated in it.

Whether the killing stopped suddenly through Gowon's good offices, or because it was planned to begin and end on a signal from the Northern leaders, is a subject of debate to this day in Nigeria. In any event, the next six months saw nearly 2 million Ibos who had over the years gone to live in all parts of Nigeria flee back to their homeland in the Eastern Region.

Disintegration, accelerated by the mass killings, was irreversible by early 1967. Foreign investment shrank to almost nothing, ending the proliferation of factories that had passed for development. Trade dropped to about half its normal level; Nigeria was no longer viewed as a prime market for toothpaste, plastic shoes, used clothing and all the other manifestations of Western prescriptions for African progress. Whites began to leave, and the withdrawal of their purchasing power pushed the Nigerian economy down still further.

The leader of the Ibos, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, disappointed his old friend Gowon by listening to his assurances of goodwill and fair treatment with the special ear of a man whose people have been martyred for the wrong reasons: Ojukwu reflected the growing paranoia of his tribesmen, and in threatening secession he found support among the minor tribes of the Eastern Region who had begun to identify their interests with the Ibos'.

WHILE THE REST of Nigeria stagnated, the Eastern Region came alive with secession fever, and in May constituted itself as the Republic of Biafra. Whites fled—except for missionaries, arms salesmen and diplomats. A month later Gowon began a gentleman's war in

are basically capitalists and hopelessly bourgeois; but the Russian presence clouds the situation and minimizes U.S. effectiveness in any effort to knock heads together and bring peace. Nigeria would be a sad and pointless place for a new East-West confrontation.

The British have never been able to leave Moslems alone. The desert is the opposite of an island and seems always to fascinate them. Of all the Nigerian tribes whose leaders learned to speak with a good British accent, the Hausas, on the southern fringe of the Sahara, have remained the most amenable. The Ibo leaders have good British accents, too, but they think Ibo. Nearly all colonial rebellions against British rule originated in Iboland, including the final drive for independence. So the British have quietly cast their lot with the Northern-controlled Federal government. And a considerable lot it is: British-owned oil companies, trading companies, raw-materials extractive and purchasing companies, and British investment still dominate the Nigerian economy. All of this means more pious talk of unity for unity's sake.

Biafra has made some strange friends in its struggle for embryonic progressivism. Portugal has become the principal channel through which arms and supplies reach Biafra, and a telecommunications link through Lisbon keeps Biafra in tenuous touch with the world. The crisis of Africa's biggest nation tends to divert attention from Portugal's unpopular colonial holdings elsewhere in Africa; and for the moment, Portuguese help is as acceptable as any to the desperate Biafrans. Rhodesian planes have also been reported in occasional traffic into and out of Biafra, and Rhodesia's motive may be similar to Portugal's.

French prospectors have reportedly found a particularly rich oil field in northwestern Biafra, which may account for the sale to Biafra of French helicopters and arms. The

extent of the French presence in Biafra is not fully known, since the world press reports the war almost exclusively from Lagos. It is known, though, that the Biafran government has been promising mineral and raw material concessions to its new friends in order to get still more tools and money for its war. Like a low-rated boxer selling more percentages of himself than exist, Biafra is fair game for fiscal adventurers, who stand to gain a great deal for low stakes if independence can be brought off.

THE ORGANIZATION for African Unity—whose members fear fragmentation in a world where economic success belongs more and more to nations acting in concert—has been easily dissuaded by the Federal government from making any serious efforts to effect peace in Nigeria. That Nigeria's principal human resource for development—the Ibo tribe—may be decimated while the OAU acts out its charade in perfect righteousness is one of the unfortunate contradictions of Africa today.

No African nation has recognized Biafra, and no other nation can until the black countries make the first move. Such are the rules of the world game of diplomatic patronization.

Biafra possesses all the elements of a viable political and economic entity. Its population is certainly large enough, it has plenty of raw materials to trade in the world markets, and an aggressive human core. The opposite argument, for unity, is equally convincing. A big Nigeria could in time, become a nucleus of a huge federation encompassing its landlocked neighbors to the north and perhaps its smaller neighbors to the west—the first real possibility of a United States of Africa. Yet what is needed is not an immediate determination of the merits of secession vs. unity but rather a cessation of fighting, and most particularly of

genocidal aggression against the Ibos.

In terms of world politics, the positions of the various powers toward the Nigerian tragedy are orthodox and perfectly correct—in other words, based on their own self-interest. The hypocrisies involved in the public descriptions of those positions are irritating to a number of observers, though, and must be galling to the Biafrans, principally the Ibos, who know they are being penalized in the name of unity for being progressive in a country unable to move out of stasis.

The heedless inrush of machinery salesmen, investors, and merchant adventurers after Nigerian independence in 1960—backed by European and American government credit, cash and guarantees—was not, somehow, seen as foreign intervention. Now that the pickings are slimmer, persuasive, even strong measures to stop the current slaughter in Nigeria are labelled intervention and forestalled by the label. It has, however, the ring of abandonment, of an abdication of responsibility. The Nigerians, no matter what their tribe, are the same people today in their inchoate thrashing as they were yesterday when they so happily posed for their unity portrait and bought what the developed world said they should have.

the expectation that minimal force would bring the rebels to heel. Ojukwu not only held off Federal attacks but shocked the Lagos government by immediately seizing the Midwest Region and grabbing nearly \$10 million in cash from the banks and business houses there. An earnest war was obviously called for, and effective control of the Federal military forces was lifted from Gowon by the Northern Officers.

Now, after nearly half a year of fighting, Federal troops have found it impossible to establish military supremacy over the stubborn Biafrans, even though they have retaken the Midwest and established some measure of control over approximately 25 per cent of Biafra's land area. Ojukwu, meanwhile, has been given a mandate by his Consultative Assembly, representing 14 million people from all tribes in Biafra, to continue the fighting. With the Ibos feeling compression, and with the other tribes in Biafra having committed themselves to secession beyond the point of no return, the Federal troops are facing an elusive and difficult opponent. Formal military action has increasingly degenerated into unconnected guerrilla skirmishes.

Enugu, the Biafran capital, has fallen to Federal forces—largely because of a sellout by a handful of Biafran officers who decided the situation was ripe for a Communist coup. (They have since been executed by Ojukwu.) But capitals are portable, especially the Biafran capital, and offices of the civil service have been scattered in three other Biafran cities. The present center of government is Ojukwu's car, the most portable capital of all.

Biafran civilians are aware that upwards of 10 thousand non-combatants have recently been slaughtered by Federal troops in the combat areas. They experience little confusion, therefore, when they compare Federal broadcasts from Lagos promising safety to the somewhat

more realistic broadcasts from Radio Kaduna, in the Northern capital, discussing the final solution to the Ibo problem and dolefully listing names of Ibo leaders marked for execution. If the truculent Biafrans show no signs of giving up, it is because they at least know they are literally fighting for their lives.

Therein lies the major hypocrisy of the Nigerian disaster: The public posture of nearly everyone else reflects a pious concern for Nigerian unity, as if this were still possible. Diplomats, businessmen and other foreigners familiar with the situation know very well that the Ibos, and perhaps other tribes in Biafra, face extermination in large numbers; that in the event of a Federal victory in the civil war the Eastern survivors will be pariahs. Gowon and his government maintain that Nigerian unity is the sole issue in the civil war; they claim such matters as the clash between Moslem and Christian ethics and suppression of the uppity Ibos do not exist.

That the civil war has turned punitive is undeniable; that there is unanimity on the purpose and extent of the punishment to be meted out to the Ibos is debatable. Gowon's personal attitude seems more petulance than hatred; his field commanders seem committed to mass slaughter. But no matter who prevails, there is little chance that the Ibos will be welcomed back as real participants in a unified Nigeria, should there ever again be a unified Nigeria. Employment is a critical issue in the country, and the Ibos, having been displaced in their jobs by Yorubas and members of other tribes, are not likely to find postwar Nigeria receptive to their aggressive penetration.

MONEY, tribal supremacy and religion are what the Nigerian turmoil is all about, and unity as an abstract concept cannot be seriously discussed. Oil is money, and Nigeria is the world's 10th largest pro-

ducer of crude oil. Sixty per cent of the Nigerian oil reserves so far discovered are in the Eastern Region, and 60 per cent of that is in Iboland. So talk of unity means, among other things, talk of who is to control the oil.

Religious conversions from animism in West Africa are being won by the Moslems, seven to three. To deny that there is religious involvement in the Nigerian impasse is fatuous nonsense, especially when it is realized that two directly opposite ways of looking at life are in clash between the North and the East: Moslem fatalism and Christian self-determination. A sort of *jihad* is in progress, no mistake.

Tribal supremacy is not in doubt for the moment. The Ibos could gain supremacy only through complete military victory, and that is all but impossible, considering the array of Nigerian and world forces against them. The Yorubas, through a half-century of internal bickering and disorganization, have forfeited their claim to forceful influence, especially now that Nigerian military power is virtually a Northern monopoly. The Hausas and their intermingled Fulani remnants are supreme again.

No world power seems willing to intervene to stop the war, to minimize the gathering genocide. America has abdicated its growing influence in Nigeria to the British on the thin, vestigial pretext that it is in the British sphere of influence, and that a special relationship between Washington and London precludes American interference. The American cop-out has hurt and angered many Nigerians deeply.

Now the USSR—invoked by the Gowon government because America and Britain would not, at a crucial point last spring, permit arms purchases by Nigeria—has moved into the vacuum with MIG and Czech Delfin jets, and hundreds of "technicians." The Russians probably cannot make lasting headway in Nigeria, for most West Africans

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WORLD MARXIST REVIEW

Vol. 10, No. 10

October 1967

Nigerian Patriots Want National Unity

NIGERIA, largest country in Africa, is in the throes of war. The conflict was sparked off on May 30, when Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Governor of the Eastern Region, announced the region's secession from the Federation to become the independent republic of Biafra. Early in July, Federal troops were ordered into Biafra. One more war, with all its attendant destruction of life and property, was added to the list of wars already raging.

The conflict had been maturing for some time. In fact, its roots can be traced to the divide-and-rule policy customarily followed by British imperialism in colonial territories. Its repercussions were painfully felt after Nigeria became independent in 1960. The ruling feudal and capitalist elements fomented communal strife, pursued a reactionary policy that left foreign-monopoly control intact and aggravated the poverty of the people. These factors, in the aggregate, are responsible for the present tragedy.

In February, the *New York Times* had this to say to potential American investors: "The Federal Republic of Nigeria possesses abundant human and natural resources. Moreover, Nigeria maintains an open-door policy towards foreign capital . . . and has the largest and fastest growing market in Africa."

With the biggest population of any African country, Nigeria probably also has Africa's greatest natural wealth potential. It is the world's biggest exporter of palm products, a major grower of cocoa beans and ground-nuts; its northern areas supply 90 per cent of the world's columbite and 9 per cent of its tin, and Nigeria also exports quantities of timber, cotton, hides, rubber and soya beans.

Its economic and strategic importance was enhanced in recent years with the discovery of rich oil deposits in the South-east. With an output of more than 20 million tons last year, Nigeria is Africa's third, and the world's 17th, biggest oil producer, supplying about 10 per cent of Britain's requirements. American economists estimate that within five to ten years Nigeria will rank with the world's top ten oil-producing countries.

The growth of the freedom movement compelled Britain to grant independence, but Nigeria, as the *Daily Telegraph* rightly stated on August 15, 1967, was to be turned into a "show-window" of successful devolution from colonial paternalism to the responsible exercise of self-government". Independence was hedged off with reservations that safeguarded the interests of the imperialist monopolies, which continue to operate just as they did in the colonial days.

So much so, that practically the entire economy is controlled by the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of the great Unilever monopoly. Its operations extend from production of primary products to the clothing industry and retail trade, and together with other British firms it has cornered the supply of imported foods and consumer goods. The country's finances are controlled by two British banks, Barclays and the Bank of West Africa.

In oil, 85 per cent of extraction, refining and export are in the hands of Shell-BP, a combine of British Petroleum and the Anglo-Dutch Shell firm. Its new refinery at Port Harcourt is owned jointly by the company (40 per cent), the Federal Government (40 per cent), and private Nigerian investors (20 per cent). A pipeline has been built across the Eastern part of Nigeria to carry the oil to Benin. Experts estimate that oil could become the basis of intensive industrialisation, but industrialisation is the last thing the foreign monopolies want.

Latterly, US business has come into the picture and there have been vigorous efforts to appease the British and prevent West-German

and French penetration. The Americans operate through "aid": Nigeria is one of the nine "selected" countries which this year account for 86 per cent of all American economic aid. The *New York Times* recently published an incomplete list of 36 American companies active in Nigeria. Some of them are drawing up development plans, others are prospecting for oil, and still others are actually producing and exporting oil.

The whole profit structure rests on rich natural resources and cheap labour, and to maintain that structure the imperialists have trained a cadre of bureaucrats and politicians.

The foreign-monopoly stranglehold, the policy of the feudal chiefs, the compradore and venal bureaucracy have sharply aggravated social conflicts. The gap between the privileged minority and the poverty-stricken majority is steadily widening. And in recent years the feudal and capitalist elements, supported by foreign Big Business, have maintained an offensive against living standards through wage freezes and confiscation of communal land tilled by the peasant farmers. The result has been more poverty and more unemployment.

The working people have never accepted this and through their trade unions have been fighting to change the situation. The Marxist-Leninist Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party, founded in 1963, is in the forefront of the struggle. Nigeria now has a workers' paper, *Advance*. In the summer of 1964, the country experienced the biggest general strike in African history, involving 800,000 workers in practically every branch of the economy.

Discontent grew, and in January 1966 triggered off a *coup* by a group of progressive officers led by Chukuwma Nzeogwu. The new government, however, did not last long, and power passed to army chief General Ironsi, who was able to hold out for only six months. In fact, Ironsi only succeeded in complicating the situation; he banned all political parties, including the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party. General Ironsi was overthrown in July and a new government formed under Major-General Yakubu Gowon.

It leaned for support on the feudal sultans and emirs in Northern Nigeria, but General Gowon realised that, in this complex situation, his administration could survive only if it had the backing of the public, and if it curbed the omnipotence of the foreign monopolies. The ban on the political parties was not lifted, though many political detainees were released, among them Obafemi Awolowo, the West-Nigerian radical leader.

The new government announced it would encourage economic and cultural co-operation with the socialist countries. For one thing it envisaged a substantial increase in trade with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and co-operation with these countries on oil refining, iron and steel and other projects.

The Nigerians attach importance to the recent Soviet visit of their Commissioner for Information and Labour, Mr. Anthony Enahoro, and to the signing of a cultural agreement. *Advance* (September 2) commented that the visit "not only strengthened the relationship between the USSR and Nigeria but also opened a new era of friendliness and mutual understanding between our two countries".

On January 1, the government modified its financial arrangements with the oil companies. It would still receive half of the profits, plus concession payments and taxes, but there would be more stringent financial control. The oil companies, predictably, objected. Shell-BP reluctantly accepted the new arrangement, but American and French firms took a tough attitude and suspended production.

The imperialists retaliated by stepping up subversion in an attempt to sever off the oil-rich regions. They adroitly exploited tribal tension, always part of Nigerian life.

Nigeria is inhabited by numerous tribes, the biggest of which are the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. The Hausa, followers of Islam, are concentrated in the North, whereas the Yoruba and Ibo are concentrated in the predominantly Christian South. Originally the North formed a separate region, while the South was divided into three—the Western (including the Federal District of Lagos), the mid-West and Eastern regions.

Distribution of the population, according to the latest census figures published in the Nigerian *Sunday Times* in August 1964, is as follows:

Northern Nigeria	29,758,875
Eastern Nigeria	12,394,462
Western Nigeria	10,265,846
Mid-West Nigeria	2,535,839
Lagos District	665,246
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All Nigeria	55,620,268

The Northern Region, as will be seen from the table, predominated. Nor is that accidental, for prior to colonialisation the North was an agglomeration of feudal states with which the British compacted to exploit the people and the natural resources through a system of indirect administration, that is, through the feudal emirs and sultans. This tended to keep alive the old, backward structure. In the South, direct rule encouraged the development of capitalist relations, the rise of industry and towns, a national bourgeoisie and a working class and, in the final analysis, a powerful national-liberation movement.

The first labour organisations and the first political parties working for national independence originated in the southern, western and eastern regions. Nigerians still remember the 1949 miners' strike in Enugu, capital of the Eastern Region, when many workers were shot down on orders of the colonial authorities.

The post-independence divide-and-rule policy was designed primarily to divide the Southern Region, where the revolutionary movement was maturing, and place it under the control of the northern feudals. This, in fact, was consolidated in the Nigerian Constitution: each region would have its own legislature and government, but the North would always have a majority (167 seats out of 312) in the Federal Parliament.

Long before independence capitalist industry and trade were growing in the Southern regions, with their predominant Ibo and Yoruba populations. In the Eastern Region, where good land was scarce and there was practically no industry, unemployed Ibos migrated to the North. Here, thanks to their spirit of enterprise and tribal mutual support, they were able to start businesses of their own. After independence many Ibos were brought into the government services.

Meanwhile, in the North, there had been little retreat from feudal customs and religious fanaticism, both formidable obstacles to progress. The peasants were weighed down by the monopoly system of feudal relationships, religion and foreign monopoly exploitation. In these circumstances—and not without aid and encouragement by the leading element in the Eastern Region—there developed what might be described as a superiority complex, with all its ugly chauvinism in relation to the "backward" North. The Northerners, on the other hand, exploited this, and also relative Ibo prosperity, to incite the Hausa tribe against the Ibos, who were held responsible for the poverty and misery of the peasants. In other words, this was the old British divide-and-rule policy, and it should be said that Nigeria is not the only country where it has been, and is being, employed to sidetrack attention from social, economic and political problems.

The military *coup* of January 1966 overthrew the feudal-based Balewa government, and the new government under General Ironsi,

abolished the feudal system. The sultans and emirs, alarmed at the prospect of Ibo rule and loss of their privileges, engineered a series of massacres in which thousands of Easterners were killed and their homes sacked. Then, in July, came another military *coup*: Ironsi was overthrown and killed, and Major-General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, established a military government. The Eastern Region governor, Colonel Ojukwu, refused to recognise the new regime, though there was no indication of what policy it would follow. This precipitated a new series of anti-Ibo attacks, in the course of which, according to press reports, not less than 30,000 people were killed. Needless to say, this inflamed tribal passions. About two million Easterners fled from the North.

But was war inevitable? Nigerian progressives say it could have been avoided. In one of its August issues, *Advance* printed a letter by Chukwuma Nzeogwu, organiser of the progressive January 1966 revolution, to Tunji Otegbeye, General Secretary of the banned Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party: "I do realise that each component portion of our hapless Federation is in itself a little federation. This is all the more reason why the solution of the problem of nationalities should have been tackled in the same manner as the USSR dealt with its own nationalities. We must continue to preach this idea in preparation for the day when the people can fully liberate themselves through a popular revolution."

The letter was written in Enugu, the Eastern capital, at the height of the chauvinist hysteria following the proclamation of the independence of Biafra.

Supported by the progressive forces, the Federal government made several attempts to preserve the Federation. In January, General Gowon had a meeting (in Ghana) with the governors of all the regions. Their communiqué emphasised the need to "preserve the political unity of the country". Things looked more hopeful but, in a situation charged with distrust and imperialist intrigue, chauvinist passions, and acrimony, continued to mount. Ojukwu refused to turn in tax revenue to the Federal government, and the latter retaliated by cutting off communications with the Eastern Region.

On May 27, the Federal government made a last attempt to keep the country united by revising the administrative map. The old regions were abolished and 12 states formed instead. This broke Northern domination, for the Northern Region was divided into six units and the Eastern into three. This, it was hoped, would weaken the stranglehold of the Northern sultans and emirs. But it also worked against Colonel Ojukwu and his separatists and destroyed the imperialist hopes of creating a puppet oil republic.

The Nigerian press often likens the Biafra breakaway, backed and largely incited by the imperialists, with the split in the Congo in 1960. And while the comparison applies only to a point, there is this common feature: in both cases the aim is to slice off areas rich in natural resources. Just as they wanted to turn Katanga into a copper republic, they now want to turn the Eastern Region into an oil republic. And in both cases the method has been much the same—exploitation of tribal discord, assiduously cultivated for years by the colonialist administration.

Nor do the monopolies make any secret of the fact that they are interested in Nigeria's oil and other wealth, and not in the well-being and future of its people. Writes the *London Times*: "With the Suez Canal closure and the threat to Western oil supplies from the Middle East, Nigerian oil, mainly concentrated in Biafra, could achieve a vital new importance".

The imperialist powers are officially neutral in the conflict; indeed, some have announced support of the Federal government (a lesson learned from the Congo, one suspects). But in practice—and that much is obvious from the Nigerian press—some of them have been giving support to the separatists. There was, for instance, the incident with the US plane carrying arms to Port Harcourt in Biafra which crash-landed in Cameroon. *Advance* charged US intelligence with recruiting mercenaries through Israel and supplying them with weapons.

On the whole, Nigerian opinion regards the position of the

imperialist powers as hostile. There have been protests from different circles. The pro-government *Morning Post* noted recently that Britain and the US were gravely impairing their prestige and would henceforth find it hard indeed to win back Nigerian friendship through "aid".

Nigeria's patriots, notably its working class, are campaigning for territorial integrity and demanding effective measures to block support for the separatists. Wahab Goodluck, President of the Nigerian Trades Union Congress, has declared that the task of the labour movement is to preserve Nigerian unity.

And a trade union programme to that end calls for nationalisation of oil companies that refuse to pay taxes to the Federal government, for measures to stop the espionage activities of US and British organisations and consulates, organisation of volunteer security detachments and permission for the Trades Union Congress to rally the workers against imperialist conspiracies.

In Eastern Nigeria itself, many favour national unity, and have been drawn into the separatist movement under pressure. The revolutionary traditions of the working class, which is least of all

subject to chauvinist influence, are very much alive in Enugu, Port Harcourt and other parts of Biafra. The Trades Union Congress and the banned Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party enjoy wide influence too. This is how the situation is described by Tunji Otegbeye: "It is true that the forces of tribal chauvinism have risen to control the affairs of the Eastern Region of our country; that secession has been popularised through the radio and the press. But all the information reaching us here indicates that the common people do not believe that the answer to our teething problems is Balkanisation of our country."

Progressive opinion and Communists the world over are deeply disturbed by developments. They hope and believe that Nigeria's patriots, its working class and the people generally will put an end to the fratricidal war and preserve Nigeria's unity. Peace and unity is the first step towards a democratic structure and a just solution of the social and national problems that continue to beset Africa's biggest country.

Mamadou Diene

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Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0

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February 1968

Problems Besetting Hanoi and the Viet Cong

For the Communist leaders of North Vietnam, 1967 was a year characterized by more failures than successes and beset with problems of increasing severity. In the area of population control, which most observers recognize as vital to ultimate victory and lasting peace, the Communist forces continued to suffer a steady loss. Captured enemy documents originally revealed that the Communists lost control over one million people between mid-1965 and mid-1966. It has since been estimated, on the basis of population control statistics, that another million persons deserted the Communist cause in 1967. Some of the "desertions" were the result of the extension of friendly areas of control, but most were caused by the flight of people from enemy-controlled areas. Many fled the dangers caused by military operations against the guerrilla forces. Disenchantment with their treatment by the Viet Cong -- who increasingly expected food, shelter, intelligence and tax money -- was a major reason for the population's swing away from the Viet Cong as were the prospects of a more secure life under the protection of the South Vietnamese Government, and the appeal of the Government's economic and social development programs.

One of these, the Revolutionary Development (RD) program trains 59-man teams to go into hamlets all over South Vietnam to teach the people about farming, the need for education, medical and sanitation techniques, etc. The RD cadres have been increasingly successful in helping the people and often in providing resources for the way to a better life. At the end of 1965 there were 3,000 such team workers, by December 1966 there were 24,000 and by mid-1967 35,000. By the end of 1968 it is anticipated that more than 60,000 RD workers will have graduated from the National Training Center at Vung Tau and will be at work in the field trying to build a new and better Vietnam. A measure of their success was illustrated this spring when 4,500 of South Vietnam's 12,500 hamlets were sufficiently secure to hold the first round of free elections.

The Chieu Hoi ("open arms") defector program encountered unprecedented success in the first half of 1967, winning over more Viet Cong defectors in six months than it had in the whole of 1966. By November 1967 over 25,000 Viet Cong had defected.* Captured enemy documents have revealed great concern on the part of the enemy leadership over the inroads of the Chieu Hoi program on their manpower as well as the effect of the RD program on their population base. The RD cadres are high on the list of targets for assassination by the Viet Cong and the intelligence given to the South Vietnamese Government by Hoi Chanh (ralliers to the Government) is a cause for continuing concern to enemy leaders. A link between

*Although this figure represents a drop in the number of Viet Cong defectors, experts attribute this to the fact that the Chieu Hoi program has been sufficiently successful to appeal to all save the hard core Viet Cong. They have now been reached and the number of defectors may decline further.

these two government programs has been the willingness of an increasing number of Hoi Chanh to work in the RD program.

One problem inevitably breeds another, and the Communists' shrinking area of population control markedly reduced their ability to extract food, shelter, protection and tax money from the population. The amount of intelligence they were able to gather via the civilian population also dwindled with a steady reduction in their effectiveness. An increase in the brutality exercised to keep the population under control only served to alienate the people more and eventually this loss of influence was felt in fewer recruitments for the Viet Cong fighting forces. As far as can be learned from Viet Cong defectors, the enemy, in the early days, had little difficulty in recruiting sufficient manpower in South Vietnam to fill the ranks of existing Viet Cong units and to activate new units as well. By mid-1966 the Viet Cong was recruiting an estimated 7,000 guerrillas per month. However, their waning population control and the increased Allied military pressure have greatly reduced the Viet Cong's ability to recruit, and between January and May 1967 their recruiting average was only about 3,500 per month. To bolster their dropping numbers, the enemy was forced to find recruits somewhere and considerable evidence points to the increasing enlistment of women and young boys.

The supply of fighting men from North Vietnam, which averaged about 8,000 during the first six months of 1966, dropped to an estimated 5,000 for the same period in 1967. Allied bombing has made infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam more difficult and certainly more hazardous, but that is only one portion of the problem. North Vietnam has great numbers of able-bodied men available, but over half a million must be used constantly to repair damage caused to North Vietnam's vital transport arteries by Allied bombing in order to keep up the flow of imported materials on which their entire war machine depends. That fact eliminates at least 300,000 able-bodied men from military duty. Other major drains on manpower are the constantly increasing need for troops to man coastal defenses, heavy artillery batteries, and more than 7,000 anti-aircraft gun sites, and the growing need for army and security forces to maintain internal security. It is suspected that the North Vietnamese Army leaders will inevitably be driven to drafting younger men and then boys as well as women to keep their fighting units close to minimum strength.

Closely related to Communist difficulties in maintaining troop strengths are Communist difficulties in supplying the troops they do have with rice, clothing, medicines and a variety of other essentials. Hanoi's agricultural and industrial output has shrunk to such a minute fraction of its former volume, that it is now dependent upon the Communist bloc for most of these civil requirements as well as virtually all its military supplies. Supplies traveling overland can come only through Communist China, whose internal discord and running argument with the USSR have caused innumerable stoppages of badly needed supplies for Hanoi. Allied bombing

of the area close to the China border compounds transportation difficulties as does the mountainous terrain of the frontier area. Allied bombing of the areas close to Haiphong (the major seaport) has caused Haiphong's virtual isolation from the rest of the country and goods leaving it since October of 1967 have had to be ferried laboriously across each of the many waterways. Godowns quickly filled to overflowing and the congestion has become so serious that valuable goods have been left in the open streets.

As for supply of foodstuffs, numerous captured documents, prisoners, and defectors have reported that food is increasingly scarce, that many of the rice growing areas formerly used by the Viet Cong have been overrun by Government troops and that the population is increasingly loath to pay higher taxes or to produce food upon demand. And the increased demands have served to alienate more of the population with the result that the Viet Cong has a decreased base from which to derive support.

The Communist difficulties are interlocking and feed upon one another in other ways as well. The population swing against the Viet Cong resulted in a considerable reduction in the intelligence furnished the Viet Cong which resulted in a poorer military showing. A concomitant increase in intelligence flowing to the Allied troops has, in turn, been of considerable military help.

In 1967 the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam suffered heavier casualties than in any previous year (92,000 KIA by actual body count in 1967 as compared to 58,000 in 1966), they saw their supposedly impregnable base areas overrun in large-scale operations (such as Cedar Falls and Junction City), they lost immense quantities of arms and foodstuffs, abandoned quantities of top secret military and political documents and saw the destruction of literally miles of laboriously constructed underground tunnels.

1967 also saw a steady decline in the desertion rate from the South Vietnamese army and a steady increase in that of the Communist forces. The Communist forces are also losing greater numbers in combat -- more than four times as many men as all the allied forces combined; Communist losses reached an alltime high in January 1968 with 5000 enemy troops killed in two weeks. In 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was losing three weapons for each Communist weapon they captured. By late 1967 they were capturing four Communist weapons for each one they lost.

There is no question that one of the telling factors in the declining combat effectiveness of the Communist forces has been the growing military maturity of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The ARVN now has paramilitary forces. The ARVN has made more contact with the enemy and inflicted more losses than ever before and U.S. observers are quick to point out that the South Vietnamese soldier is shouldering more of the heavy combat burden with every passing month. (See Hanson Baldwin article, attached, for details.)

Tied in with the Communists' declining fortunes is a propaganda problem, a weakness, that is being interpreted in some quarters as the major influence on their future military course. Whereas Communist forces achieved 13 significant military victories in 1965 and four in 1966, there were none in 1967. The end of 1967 was characterized by heavy concentrations of Communist troops (principally at Dak To in October and Loc Ninh in November) who sought, with what appeared to be suicidal desperation, a military victory. "Human wave" attacks followed one upon the other, with appalling losses against an enemy in an obviously vastly superior position on land and in the air. The lunacy of these attacks can be interpreted, in light of the mounting difficulties facing the Communist forces in 1968, as a dramatic illustration of North Vietnam's anxiety to secure an improved position from which to negotiate an end to the war. The Communist military offensive undertaken in early January may be a prelude to a diplomatic offensive by Hanoi to start as soon as it is possible to do so without its appearing to be the result of a military defeat. If this speculation is correct, the enemy's belated willingness to sue for peace, or at least to commence negotiations, constitutes the strongest evidence of increasing Communist military weakness.

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February 1968

KOREAN CHRONOLOGY

- 1943-1945 A series of wartime agreements between U.S., Britain, China and the U.S.S.R. led to the reestablishment of Korea as a free and independent state. The Soviets occupied a portion of Korea from the 38th Parallel north, while the U.S. occupied the South.
- 1946-1949 A Joint Soviet/American Commission failed to reach agreement on the formation of a Korean government. The U.S. referred the matter to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947. Elections sponsored by the UN were held in May 1948. The North Koreans refused to participate and established their own government. The UN subsequently declared the Republic of Korea to be the legitimate Government of Korea. The Americans and Soviets withdrew their troops.
- 1949-1950 The UN established a new commission on Korea to work for reunification of the country, in the light of developments "which might otherwise involve military conflict in Korea."
- December 1949-January 50 Mao Tse-tung conferred with Stalin in Moscow. A Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed. Allegedly the decision to attack the South was made at this time.
- 25 June 1950 A force of 60,000 North Koreans crossed 38th Parallel. The U.S. requested UN action and UN forces were committed to Korea.
- October 1950 Chinese Communists began infiltrating thousands of troops into North Korea.
- November 1950 200,000 Chinese troops smashed across the 38th parallel in a massive drive which split and trapped UN forces and brought Chinese forces in South Korea to a fighting strength of 400,000.
- 14 December 1950 The UN General Assembly approved a resolution for the creation of a Cease Fire Committee to negotiate a compromise solution. Communist China was invited to the UN to discuss peace terms. No compromise was reached.
- 1 February 1951 The UN General Assembly condemned Communist China as the aggressor in Korea.

Spring 1951 Chinese Communists begin their spring offensive with a force which totaled 600,000. UN forces began counter-attacks which defeated the Chinese offensive and opened the way for armistice negotiations.

April 1951 General MacArthur was relieved of command. President Truman assured the allies that he did not wish to extend the war.

June 1951 UN forces drove the Communist forces back to the 38th parallel.

23 June 1951 Russia's Jacob Malik, during a UN radio program said, "Discussion should be started for a cease-fire."

10 July 1951 UN (including ROK), North Korean and Chinese Communist representatives met in the first truce session at Panmunjom.

26 July 1951 The negotiators agreed on an agenda after weeks of exchanges of messages between General Ridgway and Marshal Kim Il Sung.

1952 The truce talks dragged on; all major issues were agreed upon except the voluntary repatriation of prisoners. During these negotiations the UN forces were continually denounced for alleged violations of the truce. The war continued and the Chinese, despite their agreement not to do so, increased their troop strength to a total of 700,000 plus 1,000 airplanes in comparison with a total of 450,000 UN forces, which remained static during this period. U.S. casualties alone were 30,000 per year, while negotiations continued.

October 1952 Truce talks were suspended indefinitely over the issue of repatriation of prisoners.

April 1953 An agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was reached after an adjournment of six and a half months.

27 July 1953 An armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom after more than three years of war and two weeks of negotiations.

Saigon Controls Two-Thirds Of the Country, Computer Says

SAIGON, Dec. 1 (AP) — Two-thirds of South Vietnam's 17 million people now live in secure areas controlled by the Saigon government, the U.S. mission said today.

The U.S. Embassy unveiled its new computerized Hamlet Evaluation System and said the "secure" population has increased more than a million since last January.

Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who heads the American side of the pacification program, told a news conference that the computer system provides a detailed monthly check on the campaign for the allegiance of the South Vietnamese living in the country's 12,600 cities and hamlets.

A checklist on 18 major criteria is filled out on computer cards for each hamlet by the U.S. district adviser and put through computers in Saigon and Bangkok, he said.

In addition to hamlet security, the cards include information on such matters as

schools available, development projects, health facilities and even whether the hamlet chief sleeps in the hamlet at night.

Pointing out that human evaluators previously weren't even sure how many hamlets were in South Vietnam, Komer said the new system is "not even near perfect, but it's more objective, more systematic and it focuses on the key aspects of pacification."

"I think it's getting a pretty accurate picture," he added. The system has been in use since January.

Only 8650—or 63 per cent of South Vietnam's 12,600 hamlets can be evaluated. The rest are controlled by the Vietcong. But Komer said population figures are more important than the number of hamlets considered secure because the hamlets vary in population from 50 to 20,000 persons. Saigon and other large cities are classed as a group of hamlets.

He said government-con-

trolled hamlets tend to be larger and more prosperous since the government gives higher priority to more heavily populated areas.

Secure hamlets now embrace 66.6 per cent of the population. Contested hamlets account for 16.2 per cent of the population, while another 17.2 per cent lives under Vietcong control, according to the computer report.

When the system was put into operation last January, Komer said, 62.1 per cent of the population lived in secure hamlets, 18.5 per cent were in contested areas and 19.4 per cent were under Vietcong control. The population then was estimated at 16.4 million.

Vietcong control is highest in the Mekong Delta, where it runs 27.6 per cent, according to the report.

In the embattled Military Corps I area just south of the Demilitarized Zone, 28.5 per cent of the people are said to be under Vietcong control.

WASHINGTON POST (2)
7 December 1967

A Long Night of Burning

By Peter Arnett

DAKSON, South Vietnam, Dec. 6 (AP)—The Montagnard tribesmen of Dakson learned only recently how to use matches. Flame throwers were beyond their imagination.

But for one hour Tuesday just after midnight these weapons, wielded by the Vietcong, wreaked death among them.

"They threw fire at us," said the survivors in this "New Life" hamlet 80 miles northeast of Saigon. They were describing one of the most vicious attacks of the war against Vietnam's civilian population.

Sixty thatched-roof houses, built in four neat rows late last year, were razed by fire. The ashes blew across the carcasses of

water buffalo slaughtered near the hamlet's bamboo fence.

A day later, the bodies of men, women and children were laid out in rows under the one shade tree on the hill. On the lid of a basket were the bodies of a tiny brother and sister, still clinging to each other. Like the other bodies at Dakson, they were blistered by flame throwers.

By late Wednesday, 63 bodies had been dragged from the bunkers where the population hid when the Vietcong first launched its attack. More were expected to be dug up. American and Vietnamese officials at the scene estimated that as many as 114 civilians may have died.

At least 47 were wounded, 33 of them with serious

burns. Of the village's population of 2008, 400 were missing, presumably driven into the jungle by the enemy.

Within hours, the injured began dragging themselves into the hospital at the nearby provincial capital of Songbe. Some were carried.

"I picked up a little girl to move her from a litter to a bed," said Dr. Herbert Rosenbleeth of Flemington, N.J. "Her flesh came away in my hands. She was dead."

Nurse Linda Mudge of Mansfield, Pa., said she had "never seen people so filthy. They had been crawling around in the mud all night. Their wounds were packed in mud."

Lt. Col. Nguyen Duong described the cause of this carnage as "a calculated

Communist attempt to frighten the Montagnard population away from the government—the stakes are high."

The people of Dakson are members of the Steng tribe, nomads who move freely back and forth across the border of neighboring Cambodia. The women go bare-breasted and the men wear simple loincloths. Many of them have been used by the Communists as porters.

Late in 1966, the Saigon government won several thousand Stengs over to its side. These were settled in "New Life" hamlets around Songbe. The hamlets are fortified enclaves guarded by Revolutionary Development teams.

The Vietcong have made it clear this year that they want the tribesmen back under their control. emissaries visited the new villages, warning the inhabitants that their houses

would be burned unless the Montagnards returned to the jungles.

Dakson apparently was singled out as an example. It repulsed three earlier attacks. The assault this week was probably carried out by more than a battalion. The 120-man defense force was beaten to the southern edge of the hamlet.

According to survivors, the Vietcong shouted through bullhorns: "Evacuate your houses, you must return with us. Evacuate your houses."

Some of the people fled into the darkness. Others cowered in their flimsy bamboo homes or crawled into the deep bunkers dug beneath them.

One survivor, a man named Duot, said he heard the enemy shouting to him to leave. He said he was too frightened to move.

He saw a shadow in his doorway. Then a jet of flame shot out, searing his back and shoulders. As his house began to burn, he crawled out.

All around him, he said, men were running and

the air. Americans at Songbe across the valley said the hamlet seemed to be ablaze in minutes.

The Vietcong melted back into the jungle.

Saigon authorities erroneously identified Dakson during the confused first accounts from the area Tuesday as Daksong, a bigger settlement near the Cambodian border 50 miles farther north. The U.S. Mission at first reported 300 dead in the incident, but this was later scaled down.

SAIGON POST
8 December 1967 (3)

37 Guerillas and Nurse; Biggest Haul

Tired VC Platoon Surrenders

SAIGON, Dec. 7 (UPI)—Tired, hungry and starved, a platoon of 37 guerillas and their 15-year-old girl nurse stumbled out of the jungle and surrendered in the largest single communist defection of the war, U. S. spokesmen said today.

"They were afraid to die. They stated they lacked food and were disenchanted with the Viet Cong cause," the spokesmen announced.

The platoon carried four automatic weapons in surrendering Tuesday at the village of Loc An, about 365 miles north of Saigon.

will. It is conceded here that the Soviets and the Chinese have the weapons and the "volunteers" to restore the balance, if they wish to take the risk.

Men and Missiles

For example, they have missiles which could knock out the American air fields at Danang, Saigon or Thailand, and even harass the U.S. aircraft carriers in the South China Sea, but this would really be "escalation" that would probably lead to the mining of Haiphong harbor or worse.

The Administration does not believe Moscow and Peking are prepared for an escalation of this sort, which could easily get out of control. But who knows? The debate goes on here, not because anybody questions the sincerity or even the evidence of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, but simply because men differ in their estimates of what the Russians and the Chinese will do.

Accordingly, both sides in the debate here are guessing. They are operating on different assumptions about what the Soviet Union and Communist China will do if the Administration's optimism is correct, and the answer to that is not available here but only in Moscow and Peking. replacement, but leaving this personal question aside, their latest figures are hopeful.

The Official Estimates

1. In June of 1966, they observe, Hanoi sent 14,000 men from the North into South Vietnam. This was the peak. The infiltration is now down to between 5,000 and 6,000 a month.

2. Hanoi has large reserves of trained and organized units in the North, but they are not committing them to the battle fast enough to win a single

NEW YORK TIMES (4)
22 November 1967

Washington: Why Westmoreland and Bunker Are Optimistic

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, Nov. 21—General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker have made a good case for their optimism since returning here from Vietnam, provided you accept the assumption on which their case rests.

They have been effective witnesses because they are serious, attractive and well-informed men—as good as anything we have in the military and diplomatic services of the United States. They have been careful in their estimates, modest in their manner, and as factual as anybody can be in reporting on such a complicated war with so many different fronts.

Their conclusion is that the United States and its allies are steadily wearing down the enemy at the present level of force and supply on both sides, and their assumption is that the Soviet Union, China and the rest of the Communist world will not provide the additional weapons and men necessary to restore the military balance that is now going against Hanoi and the Vietcong.

The evidence they offer on the first point is persuasive. They are privately critical of past U.S. intelligence estimates made by an American officer who has been transferred to another post, and confident about the intelligence estimates they are now getting from his

puted areas to provide military intelligence.

5. Finally, the Vietcong now control only 2,500,000 people out of a total of 17.2 million in South Vietnam—down from 4,000,000 in mid-1965. And according to the latest estimates here, Vietcong recruitment in the South has dropped from 7,500 to about 3,600 a month in the last twelve months.

This is what Westmoreland and Bunker mean by "steady progress." The war, they estimate, is now further along toward a conclusion than the World War was after Normandy and the Korean War was after MacArthur's Inchon landing, and the official conclusion is that it is now merely a matter of time until this trend forces the enemy not to fade away into the jungle.

Captured VC Papers Raise U.S. Hopes

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Nov. 23—Captured enemy documents, which have become one of the major indices in measuring the progress of the Vietnam war, show that areas of South Vietnam controlled by the Vietcong are declining.

Both Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. William C. Westmoreland quoted from the enemy documents in speeches in Washington last week, in describing the hardships and failures of the Communists.

The men here who work with the documents, most of whom are attached to the intelligence staff of the U.S. Military Headquarters, say that the material they see is becoming increasingly exciting.

Documents have given evidence of the enemy's inability to find recruits, food and supplies, and to win cooperation of the people in several areas of the country.

The U.S. Mission in Saigon yesterday released four lengthy documents in which the Vietcong mention their loss of control over the population.

A cadre's notebook captured last January during Operation Cedar Falls describes Vietcong control in 1965 and 1966.

"A comparison with the early part of 1965 shows a decrease of 1 million people in rural areas due to the presence of U.S. troops." The cadre wrote, "We have greatly worn down the enemy potential. All the same, we have failed to win many people over to our side."

"If we fail to solve this problem urgently, we will be bound to encounter more difficulties," the notebook says at another point. "Four-fifths of the funds derive from the population . . . guerrillas dropped to 180,000 and the requirement of this

year is 300,000. The decrease of quantity also involved a decrease in quality."

Other documents criticize wavering determination among some Vietcong soldiers. This "passive rightism" manifests itself in "fear of hardships and a fierce, protracted war, escapism and demoralization," according to a Vietcong political directive issued last January and captured in September.

"Overestimating the enemy, and becoming subject to his psychological warfare, dreams of an illusionary peace and the slackening of alertness for enemy propaganda, signs of weariness and the inclination to enjoy some rest," are other weaknesses the directive orders controlled, criticized and corrected.

Setbacks Described

In diaries, letters to their families and other personnel documents taken from dead North Vietnamese and Vietcong, there have been repeated statements of the difficulties of fighting in the countryside and the fear of American air strikes and artillery.

Communiques from combat groups to their headquarters asking for more men, rice and medicine have been captured in large numbers recently.

The 171st Vietcong Regiment moved from its traditional base in War Zone D about 40 miles north of Saigon in September because it couldn't get rice to feed its men, according to a document cited by U.S. military officials.

As it moved west from its former stronghold, elements of the U.S. 1st Division picked up its trail and inflicted heavy casualties in a series of battles during September and October.

"Food supply does not meet the combat requirement," a May 13 political directive issued in Phuyen Province says and there are similar examples in other

dinh and other provinces.

More than 3 million pages of documents have been captured by American and South Vietnamese troops this year—1.5 million were captured in all of 1966.

Passed to Saigon

A piece of paper uncovered on a military operation is passed through intelligence channels from company to battalion to brigade to division and then to the Combined Document Exploitation Center in Saigon.

The lower levels have limited means to translate and evaluate the documents as they pass them up to Saigon. The CDEC works quickly to separate the documents into categories.

Its first responsibility and first interest is in uncovering information that may be of value to soldiers in the field.

Recently, the CDEC got a description of an enemy minefield in a certain area. In less than 24 hours they sent word back to the troops who had found the document. The troops had planned to walk into the minefield area the next day. After receiving the report from CDEC they sent men with minesweepers ahead of the combat soldiers.

The minefield example is only one of many times that CDEC has helped field troops avoid a trap or frustrate an enemy attack.

Not a Stalemate

Data which provides this sort of immediate help to combat units is the first priority with the documents center. Most documents fall into a second category which includes the type of enemy reports, Bunker and Westmoreland quoted recently.

From enemy internal orders, after action reports, memorandum and personal documents, intelligence men gather a picture of a foe who is not fighting a stalemated war, but is hurting badly.

The Center has other categories of documents are of marginal

or no intelligence value.

The largest single group of translators in South Vietnam sifts this material and puts what is important into English. In addition to being screened for their English ability, these Vietnamese translators have to learn the vocabulary of the Vietcong. Often the enemy uses words, and phrases which are not intelligible to other Vietnamese—it is a language developed from years of guerrilla fighting among people who are not meant to know all of the army's plans.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 December 1967 (6)

'Arvin' Is a Mixed Bag

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

SAIGON, South Vietnam — Units of the South Vietnamese Army moved into a few of the new bunkers and strong points of the "McNamara Line" south of the demilitarized zone last week. At the same time, three Vietnamese ranger battalions took over from the U. S. 199th Brigade the principal burden of providing a pacification screen around Saigon.

These and many other indices pointed to what some—but by no means all—U. S. officers feel is an increasing Vietnamese military maturity. Everyone agrees that greatly improved Vietnamese combat effectiveness—better leadership, better discipline, less corruption, a lower desertion rate and better morale—are essential if a military victory is to be won and confirmed by the political victory of pacification.

The expanded responsibilities of the Vietnamese armed forces are, in a sense, a test of the degree of improvement in these forces since their low point in 1965. That they have improved is unquestionable; that they have a long way to go is also unquestionable. The armed forces now number about 750,000 men and women and include many different types of military and paramilitary units.

Conscious of Clamor

American officers in Vietnam are conscious of the public clamor in the United States about "Arvin"—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. But they feel that many unfair criticisms and sweeping generalizations have been made, and that since U. S. combat units have been in Vietnam, the American press has not reflected adequately the heavy combat burden shouldered by the Vietnamese.

"The truth is," one observer put it, "that everything you say about the Vietnamese forces is true."

The armed forces are a mixed bag. They are spotty and uneven; their leadership varies from excellent to execrable; some of the Popular Force platoons are ragged, undertrained and

militia; some of the best units have fought the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to a standstill. In some units the war stops at siesta time and the dark of the night is a time to sleep, not to patrol. But not in all.

Some units repeat the same mistakes they have made time after time in the past. But not all.

Some units loot the villages they are supposed to defend. But not all.

Some units are commanded by officer politicians. But not all. There are highly encouraging and very discouraging signs.

Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that there have been few Vietnamese Army debacles in 1967. Two years ago, V.C. Main Force units used to give "Arvin" units a bloody nose and Government forces left scores or hundred of bodies on the fields. It is true, of course, that more U. S. troops and increased air and artillery support for "Arvin" have been major factors in the improved performance.

Nevertheless, even in the Mekong Delta where three "Arvin" divisions have shouldered the principal burden, the Vietcong units have lost more than they have gained. Two local V.C. battalions have been deactivated, and even the once-feared and famous Taydo battalion, which operated near Cantho, has been worn down to a fraction of its former strength.

Leadership Is Vital

The effectiveness of South Vietnamese units is almost a direct reflection of their leadership. And in Vietnam—an undeveloped country with only 13 years of independent life and more than 20 years of war—leadership is thin indeed in both the North and the South.

Thus, the results vary from the sublime to the ridiculous from unit to unit. In the Camau Peninsula, a battalion of the 21st Division—regarded as one of the better "Arvin" divisions engaged in providing a pacification screen

patrols regularly to five "clicks" (kilometers) beyond its base camp. But in the Vungtau coastal region, the vessels of the Vietnamese Navy's in-shore patrol usually lie snugly in harbor at night, the very time when V.C. blockade running sampans may land their arms.

There are many things being done to change this very mixed picture. A list of ineffective "Arvin" officers at many levels has been prepared; some have even been relieved and a few court martialed. An inspector general of the South Vietnamese Army is now checking effectiveness of units and commanders. Retraining programs and mobile training teams are operating throughout South Vietnam with regular and regional and popular forces. Enlisted men have been promoted from their ranks; new sources of officers and noncoms are being tapped, and slowly, very slowly, the French Mandarin system which tended to restrict commissions to the upper classes is being broken.

Many Reforms

New laws have broadened the draft; a rice ration, pay raises, a better accounting system and stiffer penalties have reduced the desertion rate by about 37 per cent this year as compared to last year. Even so, desertions still account for about 71 per cent of the total manpower losses in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and the slow struggle to make all the units combat effective is only in its first chapter.

Nevertheless, the process has started. "Arvin" has rebounded from the dismal days of 1965, and next year the process of re-equipping the "Arvin" forces—which has already started with the assignment of M-16 rifles to the First Division—will be broadened and expedited.

Record Enemy Toll

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Jan. 11—The U.S. Military Command today confirmed a South Vietnamese report that more Vietcong and North Vietnamese were killed last week than in any other week of the war.

An American spokesman said 2868 enemy troops were killed during the week, which included the 36-hour New Year truce.

In the same period, guerrillas killed 184 American troops, he added.

The highest previous total of Communist deaths in any week was in March when 2783 guerrillas died in seven days of fighting, the U.S. spokesman said.

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING OR CAPTURED	
	1/6	12/30	1/6	12/30	1/6	12/30
U.S.	184	185	1132	437	37	(not given)
S. Vietnamese ..	263	227	657	556	83	63
Other Allied	19	37	36	47	0	0
*Communist	2868	1438	(not given)		(not given)	

*As reported by the U.S. Command.

pening is comprehensible, in fact, if you do not grasp the amply documented fact that the efforts the enemy troops are now being asked to make are regularly presented as climactic, with the assurance that they will be followed by peace-by-coalition.

Hanoi's own terms. As to the motives for such an offer, they are obvious enough.

One motive is the simple fact that the strain and burden of the war are becoming near-unbearable for both Hanoi and the Vietcong puppets. That is why the extraordinary step is being taken of promising the enemy troops an end of the war at a stated time. As for the other motive, Hanoi is obviously planning to use the lever of the election year in America to get a better deal than would be possible later on.

THE GENERAL dissemination of this happy assurance in Vietnam is the reason, in turn, for the conviction of the informed group in Washington that Hanoi is getting ready to offer negotiations, although only on

No positive negotiating move will be made, most probably, until the attacks now prepared have at length been mounted. The offer will then take the initial form, beyond doubt, of a public or private intimation by Hanoi: "You stop bombing the north unconditionally, and we'll start talking about coalition government in the South." This has already been telegraphed by the Hanoi Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh.

There are only two drawbacks to this. An unconditional, unreciprocated bombing halt in the North is a nice, simple way to give the enemy just the respite he needs, so that the U.S. and allied soldiers at the front will have a brand new war on their hands in six months' time. And the kind of coalition Hanoi wants to talk about is also intended to permit the "occupation of the countryside," followed by "surrounding the towns," leading to "complete victory."

But there are all too many people in this country who have forgotten all our past experience, in Korea and elsewhere. President Johnson will need a lot of guts to stand up to the clamor of people like these. What almost certainly lies ahead is profoundly encouraging for the long run, in fact, but it may be rough going in the

WASHINGTON POST
8 January 1968 (8)

Hanoi Seen Aiming for Talks, On Red Terms, After Attack

AFTER LONG years of waiting, almost everyone in the narrow circle of informed persons is at last convinced that Hanoi is on the verge of a major drive for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Yet there is little rejoicing, for two quite different reasons.

The first and simplest reason is the kind of enemy effort that must be expected in the very near future, which will be aimed to create a favorable climate for the kind of talks that Hanoi obviously wants. This can, perhaps, cost all too many American and allied lives.

For example, Khesanh, the most westerly of the Marines' fortified outposts on the DMZ, is now held by less than two battalions of troops. It enjoys overwhelming artillery support, but at this season it is very hard to resupply. And no less than six regiments of the North Vietnamese home army—the equivalent of two divisions—have been moving into place around this outpost held by less than two battalions.

The temporary...

of Khesanh is imaginable. Gen. Westmoreland may perhaps order evacuation in order to throw the very slow-moving enemy off balance for a while, anchoring the western end of the Marine line on the DMZ on the more easily defensible rock-pile position. But there is no sign of any such plan.

Other less important positions like the airfield at Banmethout and even Pleiku, where the attack on the U.S. barracks touched off the Northern bombing, are also beginning to be menaced, albeit by less substantial enemy forces than those around Khesanh. There have been a whole series of sapper and even ground force attacks on districts and provincial capitals in South Vietnam in recent weeks. These will no doubt continue throughout this month at a minimum.

ALL THIS PAST or future enemy activity can only be put in perspective by the captured documents summarized in the last report in this space. Some documents announce that the "winter-spring campaign" will be decided, leading to the

formation of a coalition government in which (the National Liberation) Front will fully participate."

All indicate that climatic, especially intensive enemy efforts will produce peace-and-coalition during 1968. A few documents even say that fighting will end "after the Tet holidays — which means in early February. A fairly far-out, but broadly representative specimen, is a propaganda directive from Binh Dinh Province, where the other side has long been in very bad trouble.

"The period 20 December to 5 January will be regarded," said this directive, "as the climax of the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign."

Being interpreted in the light of hindsight, this meant that in Binh Dinh, the dreadfully tattered and eroded 18th North Vietnamese regiment was being asked to make one last bold effort, in the form of an attack on one of the most fully pacified districts. Tuy-phuoc district was duly attacked by the 18th Regiment, so the schedule was kept.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS (9)
12 January 1968

The Viet Cong Offensive

THE Viet Cong have been attacking at a hard, fast pace ever since the New Year's truce ended. A Communist battalion flattened Tan Uyen, a district town 23 miles north of Saigon; another occupied for three hours Khiem Cuong, a province capital 21 miles northwest of Saigon. Commandos hit supposedly secure Kontum airfield in the highlands. North Vietnamese troops are showing new toughness in the central coastal plains and valleys, notably Que Son. And now a big buildup is reported near exposed Khe Sanh, near the Laos border.

We find this situation ominous and mystifying.

Allied commanders take some satisfaction in the high price the communists are paying: 2868 reportedly killed the first week of the year. But the fact the Reds can mount an offensive in every section of the South — despite the 1.2 million men the "improving" allies have under arms — gives us no comfort.

As the Saigon-area attacks show, the Viet Cong evidently are using "War Zone C" northwest of the capital, despite the massive American "clean-out" in "Operation Junction City" over a year ago.

And there is some disturbing arithmetic in the latest official estimates of communist strength in the South. Despite 87,534 communists reportedly killed and 27,178 defected last year, their ranks increased from 281,000 to somewhere between 298,000 and 333,000 comparing Jan. 1, 1967 and Jan. 1, 1968.

To cover losses and achieve that buildup, the communists had to recruit or infiltrate between 132,000 and 167,000 new troops! Either the official statistics are out of whack, or the communists are not being so badly hurt by Gen. Westmoreland's "war of attrition" as we are led to believe.

Even so, why the big communist offensive now? Probably to add to the fears of the South Vietnamese populace and further shake the morale of Saigon's armed forces and make headlines in the USA. There may also be an internal motive: in recent weeks Viet Cong indoctrinators have urged their troops to make a special effort before the Tet holidays (at month's end) to win the "decisive victory" they promise will bring about a coalition government on favorable terms.

Maybe, then, the current offensive is designed as a prelude to a new diplomatic move by Hanoi. We'll know shortly. If the communist do use the Tet period to make an offer, it will have to be more detailed and forthcoming than the bare "willingness" to talk provided we permanently halt our Northern bombings.

In the past some leading doves have shrieked with fury that just when (it seemed) the chances for peace talks brightened, the U.S. would "destroy" the prospect by upping its bombing raids or sending in reinforcements. Now that peace talk is in the air again — and is accompanied by the current communist offensive in the South — we haven't heard even a chirp of complaint.

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February 1968

Expulsions of Communist Officials
from Free World Countries in 1967

<u>Country</u> <u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Country from</u> <u>which Expelled</u>	<u>Month When</u> <u>Expelled</u>
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ALBANIA: none (none in 1966)

BULGARIA: none (2 in 1966)

COMMUNIST CHINA: 9 (7 in 1966)

a. CHEN Lu-chih	First Secretary	India	June
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The Indian Government labelled Chen a spy and ordered him out of the country. Unofficially, the real reason is regarded to be retaliation for the severe beating of India diplomats in Peking.

b. HSIEH Ch'eng-hao	Third Secretary	India	June
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The Indian Government labelled Hsieh a spy and ordered him out of the country. See above note on Chen for the unofficial reason for Hsieh's ouster.

c. HSU Jen	Consul General	Indonesia	April
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HSU was expelled as a result of a series of rude exchanges between Chinese Communist diplomats and Indonesian officials.

d. LI Chien	Third Secretary	Kenya	July
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LI was expelled for interference in Kenya's internal political affairs, specifically as a direct result of the Chinese Communist Embassy's letter to a Nairobi newspaper attacking Kenya's Minister of Economic Planning and Development.

e. LU Tzu-po	First Secretary	Indonesia	September
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LU was declared PNG by the Indonesian Republican Government because he and another official were held responsible for shooting at Indonesian youths who were holding a demonstration at the Chinese People's Republic Embassy compound in Djakarta on 5 August 1967.

f. SHIH Hsin-jen	Assistant Naval Attaché	Indonesia	January
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Shih was told in a diplomatic note to leave Indonesia by 28 January at the latest. He was accused of demonstrating an unfriendly attitude toward the Indonesian Government and people.

b. Aleksey N. KAZANTSEV Novosti representative Ghana June

Kazantsev was declared persona non grata for "committing slanderous propaganda activity against the Government and people of Ghana and for engaging in wanton acts of espionage in an attempt to bring the outlawed CCP and its notorious ex-leader and criminal Kwame Nkrumah back into power."

c. Valentin I. KOROVIKOV Pravda correspondent Ghana June

Korovikov was expelled for the same reasons as Kazantsev. (See above.)

d. Anatoli T. OGORODNIKOV TASS correspondent Belgium April

Ogorodnikov was accused of endangering state security. He was reported in the press as having been involved in directing and paying a "Madame X" to gain employment in SHAPE, and to photograph secret documents there.

e. Ignor Pavlovich OSHURKOV Commercial representative Greece March

Oshurkov was linked to the famous Rinaldi case in Italy, and expelled for that reason.

f. Yuri Kuzmich PAVLENKO Attaché Italy March

Pavlenko was reportedly an Embassy contact man for Giorgio Rinaldi, the nominal head of a spy ring which operated against NATO installations in several Mediterranean countries.

g. Boris M. PETRIN Attaché Cyprus March

Petrin was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.)

h. Ivan Yaklovlevich PETROV Official of international organization Switzerland February

Petrov was expelled for asking a senior Swiss civil servant to spy for the USSR. Petrov had been a high-ranking member of the UN-associated International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva, a post to which he had been elected by all member nations of the ITU.

i. Nikolay I. Ranov Aeroflot Representative Cyprus March

Ranov was expelled for the same reason as Shurkov. (See above.)

j. Albert M. ZAKHAROV Second Secretary Greece March

Zakharov was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.)

YUGOSLAVIA: none (1 in 1966)

January 1967

Expulsions - 1966CountryNamePositionExpelled fromALBANIA

None

BULGARIA

1. KRISTANKOV, Zahari Military Attache Greece

Bulgarian Military Attache Zahari KRISTANKOV was arrested by Greek security officials on 3 November 1966 while he was holding a clandestine meeting with a Greek non-commissioned Army officer whom the Greek authorities had been surveilling for more than a month. Perceiving the approach of the security officials, KRISTANKOV attempted to flee in his automobile and was only stopped by police officers firing at the rear tires, thus immobilizing the automobile. He was released when he disclosed his identity and claimed diplomatic immunity, but was declared PNG by the Greek government that same day.

2. POPOV, Stefan Commercial Representative Colombia

It was announced in the Bogota press in October 1966 that Stefan POPOV, commercial representative in the Bulgarian trade mission in Colombia had been declared persona non grata and given four days to leave the country. He was accused of intervening in the internal affairs of Colombia and of giving unspecified aid to the subversive elements in that country. However POPOV appealed the order and was still in Colombia at year's end.

COMMUNIST CHINA

1. CHANG Chung-hsu, Embassy employee Kenya
(also spelled CHANG Tsung-hsu)

In March 1966, ten diplomats, correspondents, and commercial representatives from Communist nations were expelled by Kenya for attempting to subvert the government of that country. They included persons from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Communist China. While specific charges were not levied against individuals, the Minister of Home Affairs, Daniederap Moi stated that more than £400,000 had been used by "certain individuals" to subvert the government. CHANG Chung-hsu was declared PNG on 9 March and his colleague, YAO Ch'un, Third Secretary of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was PNG'd on 16 March.

30 September, at which time the Cuban Embassy was closed. Although it was not officially stated in the formal accusation against them, information leaked out that they had been involved in, among other things, conspiring to return Kwame Nkrumah to power in Ghana. The other persons involved were: Georgina PEREZ Puig, Gaspar VARONA Hanlen, and Antonio Lino VARONA Salgado.

2. PEREZ Puig, Georgina *Chargé d'Affaires* Ghana

Georgina PEREZ Puig was ordered to leave Ghana on 24 September 1966, and actually left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.)

3. VARONA Hanlen, Gaspar *Third Secretary* Ghana

Gaspar VARONA Hanlen was PNG'd on 24 September 1966 from Accra, Ghana, and left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.)

4. VARONA Salgado, Antonio Lino *Third Secretary* Ghana

Antonio Lino VARONA Salgado was expelled from Accra, Ghana, on 24 September 1966 and departed on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. CARDA, Jan *Third Secretary* Kenya

On 15 March 1966 Jan CARDA was given 24 hours to leave Kenya because he had engaged in espionage activities inimical to the government of that country. His expulsion had been preceded, on 10 March, by that of Zdenek KUBES of the Czechoslovak news agency, CETEKA, and Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy.

2. KOZUBIK, Stanislas *Second Secretary* Kenya

Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was expelled from that country on 10 March 1966. He was accused of having engaged in activities inimical to the host government. Also ousted on the same date was Zdenek KUBES of the Czech news agency CTK. On 15 March Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also expelled.

3. KUBES, Zdenek *CETEKA (Czech news agency) correspondent* Kenya

Zdenek KUBES was accused by Kenya of having engaged in activities inimical to that country, specifically of having planted in the local press an article unfriendly to the government of President Kenyatta. He was declared PNG on 10 March 1966. Also ousted on the same date was Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy. On 15 March Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also expelled.

3. KRUGER, Jurgen (Major) (alias) Ghana
ROGALLA, Jurgen (true) Representative of Ministry
for State Security

Major Jurgen KRUGER arrived in Ghana in November 1964. He established a secret training school for Ghanaian spies which was exposed upon the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966. KRUGER was arrested but not tried since the East German government held 350 Ghanaian students then studying in that country as hostages in order to arrange KRUGER's release. On 25 May 1966 the Ghana Government released KRUGER in exchange for the students. KRUGER had been formally charged with "illegal entry into Ghana, impersonating a diplomat and using his privileged position to conduct espionage against countries with which Ghana had friendly relations." Prior to his release KRUGER confessed to the charges against him and further admitted that his true name was Jurgen ROGALLA.

HUNGARY

1. BUDAI, Ferenc Second Secretary of trade mission Italy
in Milan

Ferenc BUDAI was arrested by Italian police in Milan, Italy, on 3 November 1966 while in the act of receiving secret information from an Italian citizen employed by the United States 40th Tactical Air Force in Italy. Since BUDAI did not have diplomatic status, he was not declared persona non grata, but is being held for trial.

2. NOVAK, Janos Third Secretary Kenya

Following the eclipse of the notoriously pro-Communist Oginga Odinga, who lost his influential post as Vice-President of the KANU Party, some 11 diplomats and journalists from Communist countries were expelled from Kenya. They included Soviets, Czechs, Chinese, an East German and the Hungarian, NOVAK. They were accused of maintaining contacts with certain leftist Kenyan politicians for the ultimate purpose of subverting the Kenyatta government.

NORTH KOREA

1. CHU Chan-pyon Trade Mission Uruguay

CHU Chan-pyon was expelled from Uruguay in the Spring of 1966 when his visa expired. (See CHU Chang-won, below, for further details.)

2. CHU Chang-won Trade Mission Uruguay

In February 1966 the Uruguyan Government announced that it would refuse to renew the visas of the North Korean Trade Mission members when they expired. The announced reason was that the North Koreans were attempting to act as diplomats rather than as trade representatives.

As a consequence three North Koreans left with their families on 11 February: CHU Chang-won, MUN Chong-sok, and YI Hyong-su. A fourth member of the trade mission stayed until his visa ran out and then left: CHU Chan-pyon.

3. KIM Kong Interpreter Ghana

In March 1966, in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, three members of the North Korean embassy in Accra, Ghana were given 30 days to leave the country by the National Liberation Council. They were NO Su-ok, Ambassador, SIN Sang-ku, Third Secretary, and KIM Kong, Interpreter.

4. MUN Chong-sok Trade Mission Uruguay

MUN Chong-sok was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966, when his entry visa expired and the Uruguyan Government refused to renew it. (See CHU Chang-won, above, for further details.)

5. NO Su-ok Ambassador Ghana

NO Su-ok was expelled, on 30 days notice, from Ghana. (See KIM Kong, above, for further details.)

6. SIN Snag-ku Third Secretary Ghana

SIN Sang-ku was expelled, on 30 days notice from Ghana. (See KIM Kong, above, for further details.)

7. YI Hyong-su Trade Mission Uruguay

YI Hyong-su was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966. (See CHU Chang-won, above, for further details.)

POLAND

1. DZIEDZIC, Ryszard (Major) Military Attaché U.S.A.

As a result of harrassment of two U.S. military attachés in Poland in April 1966, for which the Polish Government refused to make amends, Col. Stefan STARZEWSKI, assistant air attaché of the Polish embassy in Washington, was expelled on 4 May 1966. In retaliation the Polish Government then expelled three U.S. military attachés from Warsaw. This in turn resulted in two other Poles, Lieut. Col. Tadeusz WISNIEWSKI and Major Ryszard DZIEDZIC, being declared PNG on 20 May 1966 by the United States.

2. STARZEWSKI, Stefan (Colonel) Assistant Air Attaché U.S.A.

STARZEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in May 1966. (See DZIEDZIC, above, for further details).

3. WISNIEWSKI, Tadeusz (Lt. Col.) Military Attaché U.S.A.

WISNIEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in May 1966. (See DZIEDZIC, above, for further details.)

SOVIET UNION

1. ABRAMOV, Valdimir Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Ghana

In the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah (February 1966), a large number of Communist officials was expelled from Ghana. This included over a thousand Soviets, of whom only 20 were officially declared PNG. According to the Ghana radio, and a "White Book" on "Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa," the Soviets were actively involved in every possible form of subversion. Not only did they train and supervise the internal Ghanaian secret police, including the detachments charged with protecting Nkrumah, but they also trained and supervised the Ghanaian espionage and sabotage services which operated against the other countries of Africa. These Soviets were declared PNG on 16 March 1966 and left almost immediately.

2. AKHMEROV, Robert Isaakovich First Secretary Ghana

AKHMEROV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

3. GLADKIY, Nikolay Ivanovich Second Secretary Ghana

GLADKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

4. GLUKHOVSKIY, Vasilii Vasilyevich Trade Mission Ghana

GLUKHOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

5. IVANOV, Nikolay Iosifovich Acting Consul Uruguay

Four Soviets were expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966 for "intervening in labor affairs and inciting strikes." An official Uruguayan Government memorandum stated that the four men were members of the Soviet State Security Service and Military Intelligence and summarized their objectives as: precipitating labor paralysis through strikes and stoppages; aggravating Uruguay's economic difficulties by disorganization of work, industrial sabotage and economic subversion; and strengthening the position of Communist agents in the labor unions. The four Soviets were: YANGAYKIN, Aleksey A., ZUDIN, Nikilay A., IVANOV, and Valeriy F. SHVETZ.

6. KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy Borisovich Second Secretary Ghana

KAMAYEV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

15. LAPUSHENKO, Nikolay Ivanovich Instructor, Ideological Ghana
Institute, Winneba

LAPUSHENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

16. LEMZENKO, Kir Gavrilovich Member of trade mission Italy

Kir Gavrilovich LEMZENKO attempted to recruit an Italian non-commissioned naval officer to obtain secret information on the Italian Navy and on the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces in Southern Europe, based in Naples. The Italian officer reported the recruitment attempt to Italian security authorities who encouraged him to pretend to cooperate with the Soviet. As a result the security forces were able to catch LEMZENKO red-handed paying the non-commissioned officer for photographs which he believed to contain secret information. LEMZENKO was declared PNG on 3 November 1966 and given 48 hours to leave the country.

17. MALININ, Aleksey Romanovich Assistant Commercial Counselor U.S.A.

MALININ was declared persona non grata on 31 October 1966 by the U.S. Government on the heels of the arrest of a U.S. Air Force sergeant for "conspiring to commit espionage" by delivering to the Soviet diplomat "information relating to the national defense of the United States." The sergeant worked as a communications equipment repairman.

18. MAMURIN, Leonid Aleksandrovich Soveksportkhleb employee Thailand

MAMURIN was arrested by Thai police on 26 September for espionage. Security officials stated they had abundant evidence that he was collecting information about Thailand and he was charged with performing actions detrimental to the state. He was later released to Soviet custody and left the country very shortly thereafter.

19. MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy Nikolayevich TASS correspondent Ghana

MATYUSHIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

20. BOLENTSEV, Fedor R. TASS correspondent Libya

BOLENTSEV was quietly PNG'd from Libya on about 7 December 1966. The story broke in the Italian press ("Il Giornale d'Italia") on 15-16 December. According to the Italian article BOLENTSEV was a secret agent, an expert in Arabic, and had attempted to corrupt, with money and promises of support, the country's most influential officials and personalities.

21. OBUKHOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Attache Thailand

OBUKHOV was declared PNG in Bangkok, Thailand on 28 September for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status which affected the

national security. His expulsion closely followed that of L.A. MAMURIN, Sovetsksporhleb employee, who was arrested for espionage on 26 September and expelled from the country.

22. ORLENKO, Vladimir Ivanovich Doorkeeper Ghana

ORLENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

23. OVECHKIN, Vladimir Yevgenyevich TASS engineer Ghana

OVECHKIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

24. PETRUK, Boris Georgiyevich Instructor, Ideological Ghana
Institute, Winneba

PETRUK was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

25. POPOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich First Secretary Ghana

POPOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

26. REVIN, Valentin Alekseyevich Third Secretary U.S.A.

On 1 September 1966 the U.S. Department of State declared Valentin A. REVIN PNG for having attempted to buy secret information on the United States space program, missiles, and aircraft. He had paid over \$5,000 to an American businessman who was secretly cooperating with the FBI while pretending to engage in espionage for the Soviets. The American had been cultivated by Soviet diplomats since 1961.

27. SHELENKOV, Albert A. Consular Officer Ghana

SHELENKOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

28. SHPAGIN, Mikhail Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Cologne West Germany

On 20 January 1966 the Federal Interior Ministry of West Germany denounced a Soviet spy ring operating in that country. It was based on a West Germany scientist who had been forced to work for the Soviets in order to secure the release of his wife from East Germany. The scientist reported the situation to his government and the Soviets were observed in their clandestine contacts by West Germany security officials. Four of the five Soviets denounced for their part in this spy ring had already left the country when the announcement was made. The fifth, SHPAGIN, was recalled by the Soviet Government at the request of the West German government in January 1966.

29. SHVETS, Vladimir Fedorovich Embassy Administrative Officer Uruguay
SHVETS was one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)
30. SILIN, Boris A. Attaché's driver Ghana
SILIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
31. SMIRNOV, Leonid Vasilyevich Third Secretary Tunisia
SMIRNOV was ordered expelled from Tunisia on 16 March 1966 in retaliation for a similar measure taken against a Tunisian diplomat in Moscow.
32. SOLYAKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich TASS representative Kenya
SOLYAKOV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.)
33. TARASENKO, Sergey Ivanovich Engineer, Office of Economic Counselor Ghana
TARASENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
34. YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich Sovexportfilm representative Kenya
YAKOVLEV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.)
35. YANGAYKIN, Sergey Alekseyevich Cultural Attache Uruguay
YANGAYKIN was one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)
36. YUKALOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich First Secretary Kenya
YUKALOV was expelled from Kenya on 10 March 1966. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.)
37. ZINKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy V. Sovexport representative Ghana
ZINKOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)

38. ZUDIN, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Embassy Press Officer Uruguay

ZUDIN was one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)

YUGOSLAVIA

1. STRELEC, Ronald Third Secretary -- Cultural Affairs Argentina

Ronald STRELEC was declared PNG by the government of Argentina on 22 July 1966 for proselytizing among Yugoslavian emigres in Argentina and for illegal distribution of propaganda.

JAPAN TIMES
29 April 1967

2 Couples Found Guilty of Spying

PARIS (UPI)—The state security court Thursday found a West German couple and a Czech couple guilty of spying on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for East Germany.

The court sentenced Peter Kranick, a 36-year-old West German to 20 years in jail, for passing out information collected by his wife from the former headquarters of NATO in Paris.

Kranick's wife, 27-year-old Renee who worked as a secretary at NATO for about two years received a 14-year jail sentence.

Hans Bammler, a 41-year-old Czech who was sent by East German intelligence to act as liaison man and who transmitted the information supplied to East Germany was sentenced to 18 years in jail.

His wife Maria was sentenced to 12 years in jail for helping her husband.