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[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]

DEC

- 6 General Council of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU-communist), Sofia, 6-9 Dec.
- 12* Milovan Djilas sentenced to prison (arrested 19 Nov). 1956. TENTH ANNIVERSARY.
- 14* USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked aggression against Poland and Finland. 1939.
- 14 Budapest, World Trade Union Conference to Promote Foreign Trade and Oppose Monopolistic Discrimination against Underdeveloped Countries. Sponsored by WFTU (Communist) 14-17 Dec.
- 19* Vietminh attack on French installations at Haiphong begins 7 1/2 year war. 1946. TWENTLETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 20* Grigory Rasputin murdered; Czarist court and army circles begin plotting removal of Nicholas II, foreshadowing February Revolution. 1916. FIFTLETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 20* Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution (CHEKA) established in USSR, forerunner of GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and KGB. 1917.
- 21* Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879.
- 26* Mao Tse-tung born. 1893.
- Late December or early January Congress of International Union of Students (IUS, Communist front). Warsaw or Mongolia. [NOTE: Possibly to hinder covert action measures by opponents, IUS has adopted policy of not announcing dates of meetings more than one month ahead.]

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- 2* Fidel Castro assumes power following Batista's flight. 1959.
- 8* Charles de Gaulle inaugurated first president of French Fifth Republic. 1959.
- 15 Conference of Solidarity with Workers of Aden, sponsored by ICATU/WFTU, 15-18 January. Approximately 20 countries participating.
- 21* V.I. Lenin dies. 1924.
- 23-30* In Stalin's purge trials, Karl Radek, Grigory Sokolnikov, two other Old Bolsheviks imprisoned; 13 others condemned to death. <u>1937</u>. THIRTIETH ANNI-VERSARY.
 - 26* Republic of India proclaimed. 1950.
 - 28* Birthday of José Martí, leader of Cuban independence struggle. 1853.
 - 30* Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany. 1933.
 - 31* German Army at Stalingrad surrenders, World War II. 1943.

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1067 WH.

FREE CHOICE FOR PUERTO RICO

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<u>SITUATION</u>: The Communists have long used the subject of alleged U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico as a theme for their propaganda output, particularly in Latin America but also in underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia. They have claimed that the island is economically exploited by the United States, that it is used as a vast military base for aggression against "fraternal nations," that its young men are used as cannon fodder of American aggression and that the United States is deliberately wiping out the Puerto Rican cultural heritage in order to substitute monopoly capitalism in its stead.

These themes were prominently played at the January 1966 Tri-Continent Conference in Havana where delegates endorsed the "struggle" of the Puerto Rican Pro-Independence Movement (MPI) and advocated that it be given "moral, economic, and every other kind of aid." A representative of the MPI was appointed to the executive secretariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), which was created at the Havana Conference.

A joint U.S.-Puerto Rican Status Committee, appointed in 1964 to study relations between the continent and the island, issued a report in August 1966 recommending a plebiscite on the island to determine whether Puerto Rico should be (1) a commonwealth, (2) a state, or (3) an independent nation. The proposed plebiscite was immediately labelled a farce by the AALAPSO and its executive secretariat proclaimed 23 September a day of tricontinental solidarity with the Puerto Rican "struggle." Castro's Prensa Latina on 7 September disseminated both the AALAPSO solidarity appeal and a statement signed by Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the MPI, warning that the imposition of a "spurious and fraudulent plebiscite" might provoke a civil war. On 8 September Prensa Latina carried an interview with Mari Bras who indicated that the status committee's report should spur the U.N. Special Committee on Colonialism to speed up discussion of the Puerto Rican case. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa last October had formally requested that the U.N. Committee inscribe the Puerto Rican case on its agenda -despite the fact that a U.N. resolution of 27 November 1953 had recognized that Puerto Rico was a "fully self-governing and autonomous entity" and thus not subject to the committee's jurisdiction.

The AALAPSO call for a day of solidarity with Puerto Rico was gleefully accepted by the Communist nations. <u>Pravda</u>, Moscow, printed an article on the 23rd, NCNA, Peking, reported "Chinese Mass Organizations

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Support Puerto Rican Independence," and the Chicom government (though preoccupied with its domestic troubles) sent a telegram to the MPI annoucing its solidarity. As could be expected, Havana also printed articles, made speeches, and sent telegrams.

In December 1965, Moscow Radio had already said it would make its microphones available to Puerto Rican "fighters for independence," claiming that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission had prohibited Puerto Rican radio and TV stations from carrying MPI programs. Consequently, said Radio Moscow, it was "setting up a new section for Puerto Rican patriots to have their say," and it requested program material which would be read by Moscow announcers. A Moscow broadcast to Latin America at the end of August 1966 presented recorded statements by Puerto Rican opponents of the plebiscite. During the same program contributions were requested to this "feature," although there are no indications that it has become a regular aspect of Radio Moscow's Latin American programming.

While Moscow would undoubtedly like to stir up whatever trouble it can in Puerto Rico by its propaganda activities, it surely knows that the MPI represents an extremely small element (2-3%) of the island's population. The real targets of this propaganda output are the other countries of Latin America plus Africa and Asia. Capitalizing on general ignorance of the facts of Puerto Rico's real status, Moscow attempts to use this theme to substantiate its claims of "American capitalist, imperialist, colonialist aggression."

In truth, however, Puerto Rico's story is a heartening one for democracy and for private enterprise and brings credit to the United States. Its status of "Commonwealth," more accurately rendered by the Spanish "Estado Libre Asociado" (Free Associated State) came into being in July 1952. It was largely the creation of Luis Muñoz Marin, the first popularly elected governor of Puerto Rico. Under this relationship Puerto Ricans are responsible for the essential aspects of their internal government, which is carried out by a governor and a bicameral legislature. The island enjoys all the economic and financial benefits of a state, and other provisions of social legislation, but Puerto Ricans do not pay the Federal income tax.

The economic development of Puerto Rico over the past few decades is little short of astounding. Since 1940 the Gross National Product has soared from a \$28.7 million to \$2.5 billion and is currently growing at the rate of 10 percent per annum, a rate matched only by Israel and Japan. Per capita annual income has increased over seven times, from \$118 to about \$900 (the highest Latin American); manufacturing investment has increased from \$26.7 million to \$435 million; there are now over 25,000 automobiles on the island for a population of 2,500,000; illiteracy has dropped from 35 percent to 13 percent; there are over 23,000 students in the island's universities, compared with 5,000 in 1940.

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(1067 Cont.)

Withal, the island's economy is still only demi-developed, as present Governor Roberto Sanchez Villela put it. A giant's step has been taken, another remains. Overpopulation is a major problem; the population density is one of the highest on earth and is still expanding rapidly. Even though per capita income is the highest in Latin America, it is still well below that of Mississippi, the lowest among the 50 states. At 13 percent, illiteracy is still high.

But the most important fact is that these problems are being solved, and rapidly.

The Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico was established as the result of a form of compact approved by both the Congress of the U.S. and the people of Puerto Rico who, by a large majority, voted on 3 March 1952 in favorof a Constitution establishing self-government for the island. However, Commonwealth status is free to evolve to meet the changing needs of the Puerto Rican people. This was implicit in the establishment of the U.S.-Puerto Rico Status Committee, and in its recommendation that a plebiscite be held to enable the people of Puerto Rico to choose between continuation of their present status, statehood, or complete independence. Ironically, it is the Communists who are now protesting against holding a plebiscite. Apparently they fear that a plebiscite would show their lack of real support.

An unclassified attachment to this guidance sets forth in somewhat more detail the recent history of Puerto Rico, its economy and its government.

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used by both sides and played an extensive role in "Vltava." Although the Hungarian press mentions radiation problems, it downplays the role of nuclear weapons.

Another notable trend is the pronounced increase in publicity given to the Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Through 1962 there was virtually no press coverage of such maneuvers. The 1963 maneuvers near Dresden were reported after their termination; the reports appeared to be a sheepish confession that the event, which was well-known to the West, had already taken place. The 1964 maneuvers near Burgas were given limited publicity partly, it is believed, because of Soviet sensitivity to the poor show that was staged. In 1965, "October Storm" was broadly publicized before and after the maneuvers. One reason for this increase was to ease the fears of the populace, who had reacted negatively to the earlier maneuvers in East Germany. Interestingly, the East German press gave a full outline of the maneuvers, whereas the central Soviet press suppressed the information on the use of nuclear weapons. This year, "Vltava's" record flood of Bloc media output seems to have aimed not only to quiet the fears and impress the populace of Eastern Europe, but also to convey to the rest of the world the message that the Warsaw Pact forces are armed with the most modern means of destruction and are trained to carry out any military assignment. SovBloc propaganda also called attention to the ability of Bloc forces to come from some distance to the aid of a Warsaw Pact country under attack, and to collaborate under complex war conditions.

Hungarian units added political flavor to "Vltava" by the very fact of participating, which the Soviets managed by staging the maneuvers in an unlikely location in western Czechoslovakia and by supposing that a substantial attack would be launched from Austria. Westerners have remarked on the "coincidence" between Hungary's first participation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers outside of Hungary in over 10 years, and the imminent 10th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in which the army proved unreliable and mutinied. And in the sphere of intra-Bloc politics, the substitution of Hungary for Poland may have been intended in part to downgrade the widespread impression that the USSR's Eastern European Bloc is divided into a Northern Tier (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia) and a Southern Tier (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria).

The selection and phasing of the exercises for "Vltava," as for past Warsaw Pact maneuvers, were obviously done by the Soviets in conformity with their own strategic planning.* In one way, by having the Czechs absorb the brunt of the initial assault and then having reinforcements from the

^{*}Besides this obvious conclusion based on a study of "Vltava," we may cite Czech CP chief Novotny's complaint about the high cost of staging the maneuvers and, implicitly, the complaint that the Czechs didn't get their money's worth.

USSR and neighboring Satellites transported to Czechoslovakia to push back the "enemy," the Soviets evidently sought to demonstrate that the stationing of their own armed forces in all the Satellites was not necessarily required for their defense. The Soviets would thus benefit by establishing that their forces could not only be freed from assignment to specific areas, but that they could be speedily deployed for effective use in many other areas of the world.

In another way, "Vltava" probably will prove helpful to Soviet military theorists who for the past year or so have been reappraising military strategy and doctrine. Some Soviet military writers have raised serious questions concerning Khrushchev's implicit assumption that while general war was unlikely, any direct clash between the great powers would inevitably result in an all-out nuclear war. Prominent Soviet theorists tend to accept the thesis that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed without inevitably causing general war. Because of the probable vagueness of the emerging strategy and doctrine (e.g., what types of nuclear weapons are contemplated? would they be applied in Europe?) the results of "Vltava" will probably be put to immediate use by the Soviet military theorists.

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Reference:

Vitanovsky, Major General Vaclav, O <u>Soucinnosti</u> (<u>On Combined Arms</u> <u>Operations</u>) Nase Vojsko (Czech publishing house which produces material for limited distribution to Czech military officers) Prague, 1963.

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NASSER JAILS YEMENI CABINET

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SITUATION: Nasser, though he has had his ups and downs, has at least one unique accomplishment to his credit in the field of geopolitics. He has added a new dimension to the techniques of intervention by his blatant breach of trust in arresting the former Yemeni cabinet.

Nasser acted through Yemeni President Sallal, as he has done ever since the Yemeni revolution broke out nearly four years ago. In late September 1966, Sallal returned to Yemen from nearly a year's leave of absence in Cairo. His return provoked an immediate showdown: the Cabinet, headed by Premier al-Amri, flew to Cairo to demand that Nasser drop Sallal, whose pro-Egyptian sentiments are anathema to those republicans who want to assert their independence and seek new peace negotiations with Yemeni royalists.

While Sallal in Yemen announced the "resignation" of al-Amri and his cabinet, and the formation of a new strongly pro-UAR cabinet headed by himself, the Egyptiansin Cairo arrested all the former cabinet who had gone there to protest the return to Yemen of his protege and handyman.

Sallal has now taken over as Prime Minister as well as President, and on 23 September announced a new foreign policy for the Yemen Arab Republic, its principal doctrine being "The Government policy now follows the same revolutionary line of policy that the UAR pursues."

The UAR's move completely erases any illusions that the Sallal government rests on a popular basis; pressure to change the regime in Yemen has mounted, and violence including an attempt on Sallal's life on 29 September, has erupted. Widespread arrests of anti-Egyptian elements in Yemen, including military commanders, merchants, government officials, and powerful tribal leaders, have added to the tension and instability. These actions also raise serious questions as to the extent of Soviet machinations throughout the Middle East, and the degree to which Nasser is being used as an advance-man, preparing the ground for the eventual Sovietization and communization of the area.

At the beginning, the Soviet and Chinese Communist efforts in South Arabia were distinct and separate from each other and from that of the UAR. The UAR was the first of these three powers to establish a closer relationship with Yemen than minimal diplomatic representation. Exploiting the ambitions and weaknesses of the then Crown Prince of Yemen, Muhammad Badr, Nasser was able to win him over to his own concept of Arab Unity and Socialism. In 1956, under the advice and guidance of the UAR, Badr established diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; he also asked for and received economic aid from those countries, thus spreading an official welcome mat for communist presence in the Yemen. The UAR, finding Badr difficult to control, decided to develop a new instrument for its covert action in Yemen -- a policy that resulted in the September 1962 coup and the establishment of a pro-UAR "Republican" government under Sallal.

The Soviets were well aware of the subversive role played by the UAR in the Arabian Peninsula, and helped to assure the UAR's success in Yemen by supporting the costly military, paramilitary and subversion activities of the Egyptians.

The willingness of the Soviets to underwrite the efforts of the UAR in Yemen and the Federation of South Arabia underscores a gradual and subtle change in the ideological orientation of the UAR, and illustrates the new relationship that has developed between the Soviet Bloc and the UAR. Nasser's Arab Socialist Union attained recognition at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March 1966 when it was awarded the status of a fraternal party. This change also led Arab communist party leaders to instruct their followers that there was no difference between Arab Socialism and "Scientific Socialism" (i.e., Communism), thus implying that Nasser's retention of nationalism and religion in Arab Socialism was temporary window-dressing. Calls for unity and cooperation among "progressive" mass organizations, such as the Arab Socialist Union, communist parties and extreme socialists, soon spread throughout the Arab world.

The Chicoms have for the most part remained aloof from the Soviet-UAR presence in Yemen. And to a degree, the Soviets themselves have maintained a hands-off policy in the political situation in Yemen, leaving this field to their Egyptian surrogates. However, there is probably no facet of economic, military, or political life in the South Arabian Peninsula that is not affected by the activity of these countries, concentrated in the YAR. The country with the largest force there is the UAR with approximately 50,000 troops. In addition, the Egyptians have a large number of "advisers" at all levels of government in the YAR who exert almost absolute control over the decisions and policies made by the government. The secondary schools are almost completely staffed by Egyptian teachers, in a position to influence and indoctrinate the comparatively few students who will be the future leaders of Yemen. The Soviet Union has approximately 800 official personnel, including some 70 military, technical and economic advisors and 38 persons assigned to the diplomatic mission; the remainder are teachers, doctors and nurses. The third largest group is that of the Chinese Communists

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(over 400) who tend more to remain apart. Like the Soviets, they do not outwardly appear to be directly involved in the local political situation. They have not attracted many Yemenis to their ideology, yet they are working steadily to improve their image among the people and the government. As their aid projects come to completion, the impact of their presence will be significant. The official missions, and economic and technical advisors of the Eastern European Bloc countries add to this powerful Nasserite and Communist presence.

In the YAR, the Egyptians control all propaganda media. Radio and press releases repeat the official line from Cairo (via MENA, the official news agency of the UAR) which in turn often mirrors that of the Soviet Bloc. In addition to MENA, the official Soviet and Chicom news agencies, TASS and NCNA, are represented in the YAR.

Technically, the last Egyptian troops were to have left Yemen by the end of September 1966 under a peace agreement signed in August 1965 by President Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, but this died on the vine months ago. Instead of evacuation, Egypt's First Vice-President proclaimed at the end of September 1966 that Cairo's objective was to institute progress in Yemen and said: "We are ready to stay there 20 years to achieve this."

But in spite of their overwhelming physical presence, influence in the government and control over propaganda media, the Egyptians have not been able to create a favorable impression on the Yemeni. Some Egyptians are reportedly beginning to worry over this, and complain that when it is all over they will be forgotten while the Soviets and Chicoms will be remembered by the monuments they will have left behind. Egypt's recent 25X1C10b Coup-by-Abduction will hardly help.



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Approved For Release 1999 ADDIZIT: TCIA-RDP78-03061A000400070003-9

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Reference:

Biweekly Propaganda Guidance, dated 23 May 1966, Item 1024; "New Soviet 'Accommodation' in the Middle East."

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(1069.)

FREE CHOICE FOR PUERTO RICO

The alleged "colonialism" of the United States in Puerto Rico has long been a pet Communist propaganda theme. The Communists have claimed that the island is economically exploited by the United States, that its young men are used as cannon fodder of American aggresssion, and that the United States is deliberately wiping out the Puerto Rican cultural heritage in order to substitute monopoly capitalism in its stead.

In October 1965 the Cuban government urged the United Nations to submit the island's "case" to the UN Special Committee on Colonialism. The U.S. delegate promptly pointed out that a United Nations resolution of 27 November 1953 recognized Puerto Rico as "a fully selfgoverning and autonomous entity" and thus "not subject" to the committee's jurisdiction. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Puerto Rican people themselves freely approved the institution of the Commonwealth by a large majority in a vote in 1952, and have upheld this stance in subsequent elections in which candidates for independence have never won more than a miniscule part of the vote.

The view that Puerto Rico is self-governing and autonomous has even received some support from Communists. An article in the Yugoslav newspaper, <u>Politika</u>, on 12 September 1965 said that "very few Puerto Ricans" considered that there is anything in the links between Puerto Rico and the United States which "could smell of a colonial relationship." Although the island is not completely independent, it is a "self-governing Commonwealth" of the United States. It has its governor who resembles a Prime Minister, while in internal affairs the Puerto Ricans are practically independent. Calling attention to the remarkable economic development in recent years, <u>Politika</u> characterized the island "a compliment to the homeland, a pleasant, cheerful country where human wishes can be satisfied."

The Communist propaganda charges were renewed at the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana in January 1966, where the delegates endorsed the "struggle" of the Puerto Rican Pro-Independence Movement (MPI) and advocated that it be given "moral, economic, and every other kind of aid." A representative of the MPI was elected to the executive secretariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), which was created at the Havana Conference. It was even claimed at the Tri-Continent Conference that the Puerto Rican people overwhelmingly reject the war in Vietnam, which was promptly refuted by a vote in the Commonwealth Legislature approving by a near unanimous vote (only one against) President Johnson's policy in Vietnam.

The facts of the case of Puerto Rico are in stark contrast to the blatant allegations of the Communist propaganda machine. Indeed, the realities of the island's economic and political life bear so little

relationship to the Communist contentions that one wonders why they should attempt to make such wild claims about it.

Perhaps the most important fact about Puerto Rico's status is that it was chosen by the Puerto Rican people themselves. Further, the status question can be reopened by the people when they so desire. In August of this year a specially appointed U.S.-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico issued a report recommending that a plebiscite be held on the island to determine whether its people wish to become one of the United States, to become independent, or to retain their present status as a Commonwealth.

The Commission (familiarly known as STACOM) was created at the request of former Puerto Rican Governor Luis Munoz Marin, who was instrumental in developing the Commonwealth status which was granted to Puerto Rico on 25 July 1952, after ratification by the Congress of the U.S. and the people of Puerto Rico. In this system the island is self-governing within the framework of a permanent association with the United States based on a common market, common citizenship, fiscal autonomy, common defense, common currency, and a common loyalty to the democratic way of life. The Commonwealth status has fostered an economic growth which most nations could envy. However, in July 1962 Governor Munoz Marin wrote to President John F. Kennedy: "It seems clear that the people of Puerto Rico should be consulted again regarding the relationship of its government with the United States." This appeal resulted in the creation of STACOM to study the political, economic and social aspects of the island's link with the mainland. The commission consisted of six members from the U.S., including Senators Javits and Jackson and Ambassador Pat Harris, and six from Puerto Rico, including Munoz Marin, Teodoro Moscoso, the former director of the Alliance for Progress, Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia, president of the Puerto Rico Independence Party (who resigned from STACOM in May 1966), and Senator Miguel Garcia Mendez, chairman of the Statehood Republican party. The Commission's Chairman is James H. Rowe.

The Commission's report, issued after extensive hearings and investigations, concluded that: "The policy governing the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is and should continue to be based on the principles of mutual consent and self-determination." It noted that "an immediate or abrupt change in political status would involve serious economic risks and dislocations", but added that "these could be offset by special economic and financial arrangements." The commission did not indicate a preference for any of the three choices to be offered in the plebiscite, declaring simply that: "All three forms of political status -- the commonwealth, statehood and independence --- are valid and confer upon the people of Puerto Rico equal dignity with equality of status and of national citizenship." The choice, then, is to be made by the Puerto Rican people. If they should choose a different status than the present one, the new arrangement would be worked out in mutual agreement with the United States Congress.

The proposed plebiscite was immediately labelled a farce by the AALAPSO and its executive secretariat proclaimed 23 September 1966 a day of "tricontinental solidarity" with the Puerto Rican "struggle." Castro's <u>Prensa Latina</u> on 7 September disseminated both the AALAPSO solidarity appeal and a statement signed by Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the MPI, warning that the imposition of a "spurious and fraudulent plebisicte" might provoke a civil war. The AALAPSO call for a day of solidarity with Puerto Rico was gleefully accepted by the Communist nations. <u>Pravda</u>, Moscow, printed an article on the subject; NCNA, Peking, reported "Chinese Mass Organizations Support Puerto Rican Independence," and the Chinese Communist government (though preoccupied with its domestic troubles) sent a telegram to the MPI announcing its solidarity. As could be expected, Havana also printed articles, made speeches, and sent numerous telegrams.

A Moscow broadcast to Latin America at the end of August, presenting recorded statements by Puerto Rican opponents of the plebiscite, asserted that the status commission had recommended a "phony plebiscite," and charged the United States with resorting to "dirty maneuvers... to legalize imperialist domination of the country." Puerto Rican speakers on the program denounced the plebiscite, one branding it as "Hiterite."

In December 1965, Moscow Radio had already said it would make its microphones available to Puerto Rican "fighters for independence," claiming that the U.S. Government had prohibited Puerto Rican radio and TV stations from carrying MPI programs. Consequently, said Radio Moscow, it was "setting up a new section for Puerto Rican patriots to have their say," and it requested that listeners submit program material which would be read by Moscow announcers. The Moscow broadcast at the end of August, already mentioned, again requested contributions to this "feature" program.

While Moscow undoubtedly would like to stir up whatever trouble it can in Puerto Rico by its propaganda activities, it surely knows that the MPI represents an extremely small element of the island's population. The real targets of this propaganda output are the other countries of Latin America, plus Africa and Asia. Capitalizing on general ignorance of the facts of Puerto Rico's real situation, Moscow attempts to use this theme to substantiate its claims of "American, capitalist, imperialist, colonialist aggression."

In truth, however, Puerto Rico's story is a heartening one for democracy and for private enterprise and brings credit to the United States. Its status of "Commonwealth," more accurately rendered by the Spanish "Estado Libre Asociado" (Free Associated State) is a unique creation under the Constitution of the United States. Under this relationship the Puerto Ricans are responsible for the essential aspects of their internal government, which is carried out by a governor and a bicameral legislature. Basically, the island enjoys all the economic and financial benefits of a state, but Puerto Ricans do not pay the Federal income tax.

The economic development of Puerto Rico is little short of astounding. Since 1940 the Gross National Product has soared from \$28.7 million to \$2.5 billion and is currently growing at the rate of 10 percent per annum, a rate matched only by Israel and Japan. Per capita annual income has increased over seven times, from \$118 to about \$900 (the highest in Latin America); manufacturing investment has increased from \$26.7 million to \$435 million; there are now over 25,000 automobiles on the island for a population of 2,500,000; illiteracy has dropped from 35 percent to 13 percent; there are over 23,000 students in the island's universities, compared with 5,000 in 1940. Over 1,000,000 Puerto Ricans have migrated to the mainland in past years; thus providing relief to a burgeoning population problem. In recent years, however, the economic development of Puerto Rico has raised living standards there to the point that the migration began to reverse itself in 1964 and now the current is slightly in the other direction.

Even with this remarkable success story, which has attracted attentive visitors from most of the underdeveloped countries of the world, Puerto Rico's economy is still only "demi-developed," as present Governor Roberto Sanchez Villela put it. A giant's step has been taken, another remains. Overpopulation is a major problem; the population density is one of the highest on earth and is still expanding rapidly. Even though per capita income is the highest in Latin America, it is still well below that of Mississippi, the lowest among the 50

But the most important fact is that these problems are being solved, and rapidly, by the Puerto Rican people themselves.

<u>Total</u>	Regular	Forces*	of	Warsaw	Pact	Countries

USSR	3,165,000			
Bulgaria	156,000			
Czechoslovakia	220,000			
East Germany	122,000			
Hungary	109,000			
Poland	260,000			
Rumania	175,000			

Total: 4,207,000 Source: <u>The Military Balance</u> <u>1966-1967</u>, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1966.

*Includes only army, navy, and air forces; excluded are security and border troops, and other para-military forces such as members of voluntary military support organizations.

24 October 1966

EAST GERMAN PRESS ACCOUNTS OF WARSAW PACT MANEUVER

The closing phases of the "Vltava" Warsaw Pact maneuver in Czechoslovakia, which was concluded with a parade in Ceske Budejovice on 25 September 1966, received extensive coverage in the 22, 23, 24, and 25 September 1966 issues of the Berlin party organ <u>Neues Deutschland</u>. According to the accounts, reported by the paper's special correspondent, an East German motorized infantry division from Halle participated in the maneuver. Oberstleutnant WEISS is mentioned as CO of an East German unit. Minister of Defense Armeegeneral HOFFMANN, and deputy Defense Ministers Admiral VERNER and Generaloberst KESSLER were present as observers. Generalmajor Hans ERNST was listed as a spokesman for the East German forces at the conclusion of the exercise. Oberst RAUBACH was also on the scene.

The maneuver pitted the "pink" forces against the "green." Both sides employed nuclear weapons. Fighter aircraft, airborne troops, mine-dropping helicopters, and armored, antiaircraft, and engineer units participated in various phases.

Speaking at an international press conference on 23 September, Czechoslovak Generalmajor Jan VOSTERA "from the joint maneuver command" is quoted in the 24 September 1966 issue of the paper as saying that the maneuver involved "complex problems of operational combat actions by ground forces, Air Force units, and border troops." He added that the exercise was designed to test "the status of training of the staffs and troops, and to gather valuable experiences. Among other things, we practiced the command of large task forces under combat conditions, combined action by the armies of the participating countries, the operation and planning of combat actions, and cooperation among the individual service branches." Additional excerpts describing the action are cited below.

(22 September issue): "The following situation prevailed on the second day, at the beginning of the combat action: 'Pink 'had dropped operational airborne forces in the rear area of 'green'. They formed a bridgehead, teamed up with advance armored forces, and secured the landing of additional troop units at a captured airfield. An operation to gain possession of a crossing at the Vltava River was decided in favor of the 'pink 'forces; but they did not succeed in establishing contact between the airborne division and the forces of the first echelon (Staffel). Only the advance element achieved this goal.

The actions on the second day began with the employment of tactical aircraft against the positions of the advance elements of the 'pink 'motorized infantry regiment, following extensive troop movements during the preceding night. Territorial defense units engaged the landed enemy airborne troops in combat in the densely forested terrain of the Choustnik Mountain. Suddenly squadron after squadron of fighter bombers from the 'pink 'forces flew low over the valley while fighter aircraft, flying in several levels above them, quarded the air space."

The writer then describes troop landings by helicopter which are covered by fighter squadrons. An advance detachment is landed to guard the landing area for successive "pink" forces which will reinforce the airborne division. Mi-6 helicopters, "flying around the mountain...before they approach the landing area in the valley at a height of 20-30 meters," land troops, mortars, recoilless guns, twin antiaircraft guns, and armored personnel carriers and crosscountry jeeps equipped with antitank guided rockets.

"The precise landing is enthusiastically greeted by the maneuver guests. The excellent cooperation between the motorized infantry battalion of the division from Plzen and the Soviet helicopter crews enabled the motorized infantrymen to be combat-ready in a very short time and to take advantage of the success achieved by the "pink "forces the previous day. The battalion penetrated toward the south and, together with other units landed during the early morning hours, ensured that the airborne division could join the motorized infantry division of the first echelon of the "pink"

The next action described takes place on a large hill in the vicinity of Mnich. The forces fight for possession of a wooded mountain range to the east. "'Pink 'is unable to move up new reserves. 'Green, 'however, can employ two new divisions. 'Pink' fighter formations now guard the air space. Suddenly we are confronted by a 550-meter long black smoke screen. 'Green 'has demolished an antitank ditch in order to stop an offensive by the opponent and to bring up their own reserves...."

Fighter bombers subsequently attack the positions of the "green" forces. Two supersonic bombers eject "nuclear bombs." "A red fireball glows in the positions of the 'green 'following their explosion on the ground.... With this use of nuclear weapons, 'pink 'is preparing its offensive."

The writer then renders a description of armored units and paratroopers, which spread out in the valley, attacking the "opponent" under cover of artillery fire and aircraft overhead. "The other side tries to attack the ground troops from the air. Immediately after-

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wards a bitter struggle for air supremacy begins...." Both Soviet and Czechoslovak pilots participate in this action.

"Meanwhile, the reserves of the 'green 'forces have approached the front...." The "enemy" quickly takes up a defensive position and reinforces his antitank defenses. "Helicopters, descending up to 1 meter, are laying a nearly 600-meter long mine field as a barrier. From the hills, which they control, and which the 'pink' forces tried in vain to capture, a Soviet and a Hungarian motorized infantry division, which had been moved up, are attacking. Pink 'attacks both groups with nuclear weapons. But the 'green' troops cannot be stopped. Their commander decides to deliver 2 nuclear blows at the enemy positions.

"After hour-long aerial battles, tanks and motorized infantrymen penetrate the positions of the 'pink'. In taking advantage of a nuclear attack, the following happens which might well be typical for a meeting engagement during the initial phases of a modern war: Precisely at the boundary between the two attacking formations, the armored units of 'pink 'mount a counter offensive which is supported by air strikes. But the second echelons of the 'green 'prove superior. The airborne division of the 'pink 'has been beaten. 'Green 'has forced a change and tapidity pushes ahead."

The report in the 23 September issue describes the action on the morning of the third day of the maneuver. The writer's observation point is "high above the Vitava River." Densely forested hills line the opposite shore of the river. The outline of a small village can be seen in the distance. The sun eventually penetrates the dense fog. Both sides are engaged in "a bitter struggle." On the previous day, "green" had taken the initiative; "forced the other side back by employing its second echelon, and approached the Vltava River. Following up these successes, "green "now attempts to take advantage of its superior position and to defeat the "enemy" in a meeting engagement.

"'Pink, 'however, moves up two divisions from the rear of its territory to relieve its empattled motorized infantry division and its encircled airborne division. Furthermore, the opponent is to be prevented from crossing the river. The infantry units in the valley below start to fire. When the 'green 'reconnaissance personnel tries to look for crossing points, they meet up with enemy security measures. A reconnaissance aircraft of the 'green 'apparently is reconnoitering a suitable place for the employment of nuclear weapons.

"Long-range artillery fire of the 'pink 'forces is directed at the forces of the other side, which are headed toward the Vltava. At the same time, Air Force units deliver a nuclear blow deep inside the territory of the 'pink 'in order to fight their reserves.

The advance guard of the 'green 'meanwhile' has reached the village atop the hill. Suddenly, the positions of the defending troops at the left river bank are being fired upon....' Under cover of fire, tanks and motorized infantrymen push down the steep slopes into the valley and dislodge the enemy's security devices toward the river...."

The writer then describes another nuclear attack on the positions of the "pink" forces which was designed to pave the way for landing airborne troops. A battalion of border troops is landed by helicopter behind the advance lines of the "pink" forces. Both sides are now fighting for access to the river crossings. The "green" gain supremacy in the air, their artillery stops the enemy fire, and the "green" forces a vance to the river bank. They then cross the river "from the march" in amphibious armored

personnel carriers and medium tanks. As soon as they have reached the other side of the river, engineer units begin to construct a ponton bridge. At the same time, bridge components are flown in by helicopter on the other side. "New types of ponton tanks are being used for the first time." The "green" forces then penetrate enemy formations in the flanks and to the rear. Motorized infantry and armored units join an airborne unit and continue to advance. "'Green 'thus has created favorable conditions for combat with the 'pink 'forces which are advancing."

Despite their losses, the writer continues, the "pink" forces still manage to mount a counter offensive. There is a large-scale meeting engagement in the afternoon. "This type of combat is typical for the initial period of a modern war, when both sides try to gain their objective through offensives. The situation can then change rapidly. Many combat operations will be necessary to gain the initiative and -- in case there are open flanks -- to stop and dislodge the enemy. The quick establishment of combat formations and their changes on short notice, as well as the cooperation between the participating ground and Air Force units are extremely important in this connection."

The writer then describes an engagement between the advance guards of both sides in the hilly terrain east of Strakonice. Artillery units and "ground-fighting aircraft" and fighter planes join in the action. "The first echelon of the 'pink 'takes up its combat position and deploys for the attack, supported by fighter bomber formations. While it advances, nuclear weapons are employed against the 'green 'forces. Both sides employed nuclear weapons on several occasions during the maneuver; because the exercise is carried out under conditions which approximate a possible war as realistically as possible....

"The 'pink 'forces now advance rapidly. Enemy units push forward into the open flanks to the right and left of the 'pink' troops. Although their reserves can at first repulse these counter attacks through clever maneuvers, the superior forces finally prevail. 'Green 'occupies the hills and continues its advance. A motorized infantry division of the [East German] National People's Army is employed in this action. A Soviet general and a colonel from the Czechoslovak general staff are standing next to us. They watch a tank unit deploying for combat and advancing rapidly, together with the motorized infantrymen. Both military specialists praised the achievements of our soldiers. The Soviet general calls this offensive by our soldiers a master achievement....

Summing up the conclusion of the maneuver, the writer points out its important features. "Both sides acted under almost realistic conditions, practiced complicated teamwork among different units and component forces and tested new command methods and tactical variables...."

The 24 September .966 issue describes the events following the conclusion of the manager on 22 September. The units were transferred to their final concentration areas. Some troop components immediately moved of to Ceske Bude jovice. They set up a bivouac outside the city to prepare for the parade on 25 September. The Czechoslovak Minister of Defense visited the camp on 23 September. His arrival was announced by Oberscleutnant WEISS, the East German commander. The Czechoslovak befense Minister addressed the East German soldiers in Cerman during a ceremony, which was also attended by the East Cerman Defense Minister, Armeegeneral HOFFMANN, and by Admiral VERNER and Generaloberst KESSLER. The Czechoslovak minister bestowed special awards on three East Cerman soldiers, three NCOs, and four officers. Later on, HOFFMANN and KESSLER visited another camp east of Brotivin, where the "main forces" of the participating East German motorized infantry unit had moved into the final concentration area. According to the accounts, the East German soldiers were enthusiastically greeted by the Czechoslovak population after they crossed the border prior to the start of the maneuver. "For instance, one column was scheduled to complete its march to the concentration area in 5 hours, but it lasted 13 hours. 'Road barriers' were erected, so that our people had to stop, Oberst RAUBACH reported

" e harsh training of the motorized infantrymen, the artilleryme, and the armored and communications soldiers bore fruit. Armeeg, eral HOFFMANN was able to inform them that he had been asked 1 the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Marshal of the loviet Union GRECHKO, to express hisgratitude and appreciation. The artille ymen, who set uptheir antiaircraft machine-gun emplacement is a small forest on orders of their commander, and thus

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directed the fire superbly, received special praise from Marshal GRECHKO, who had many words of praise for this particular detail of the action.... 'I wanted to demonstrate that the antiaircraft machine gun batteries, which have recently been underestimated at times, really have a high degree of fire power, 'Oberstleutnant WEISS later said in explaining his decision." The above-mentioned motorized infantry unit reportedly came from Halle.

The article in the 25 September 1966 issue describes the final festivities, culminating in "friendship meetings" of troop units from the 4 participating armies in Ceske Budejovice, which were addressed by the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Hungarian Generalmajor Joszef KALAZY, East German Generalmajor Hans ERNST, and Soviet Generalleutnant . PLOTNIKOV. General LOMSKY stated that the chief aim of the maneuver was "the strengthening of the military defense coalition of the socialist camp...." PLOTNIKOV reportedly emphasized that the maneuver was "an important test of the soldiers' combat-readiness. We tried to demonstrate a high level of combat training, the ability [of the men] to act under complicated combat conditions, and to master their combat technology and weapons.... The soldiers of our armies speak different languages; but this was no obstacle to a correct mutual understanding and to cooperation during the course of the exercise " A field parade in Ceske Budejovice on 25 September by units of the four participating armies was scheduled to conclude the festivities.

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