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THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THE WARExtent of our Knowledge.

1. Knowledge of the German Intelligence Service, its organization, its personnel, and its activities against the Western Powers and in the Balkans, is imperfect from 1939 to 1940, adequately representative from 1940 to 1943, and from 1943 to 1945 probably complete. In spite of lack of current intelligence about the earliest period, the fullness of our knowledge during the last two years enables us to infer earlier conditions, and much evidence referring to that period has come in, and is still coming in, in the form of interrogations and captured documents. The interrogation of SCHELLERBERG, the head of the GIS in its final form, has provided a great mass of inside information; but the value of this information lies less in the new evidence which it has supplied than in the confirmation which it has given to the conclusions already reached from more impersonal, and therefore more objective sources. In this paper, the statements of SCHELLERBERG will sometimes be cited as evidence for a conclusion; they are cited not because they are the sole evidence, but because they are the most convenient evidence; and they will never be cited to support a conclusion which is not already deducible from independent matter. The conclusions summarized in this paper are based on familiarity with a wide range of evidence, and are believed to be valid.

Organization of the GIS.

2. From 1935 till 1944, the principal German intelligence service was the OKW Amt Abwehr, a department of the OKW under the control of Admiral Canaris, who also controlled a parallel department, the Amtgruppe Ausland. The AG Ausland received reports from non-secret sources, mainly service attaches, and was the department of the OKW in liaison with the Auswaertiges Amt. The Abwehr was a secret department. It had HQ in Berlin, and out-stations in Germany and abroad. In Germany and in occupied countries, its organization followed the pattern of the German military organization and was static or mobile according as the German armies were occupational or operational. In neutral countries the Abwehr was dependent on the German diplomatic representation and the principal officers had diplomatic status and cover. Functionally the Abwehr was divided into three departments, concerned respectively with (I) Operational Espionage, (II) Sabotage and political and military subversion, (III) Counter-Espionage.
3. Details of the structure of the Abwehr can be found in the publication, "The German Intelligence Services" issued in October 1944 by Supreme HQ AF. G-2. C-I Subdivision (reference EDS/G/9) and will not be repeated here.

Cryptography.

4. It will be noticed that this subdivision of the Abwehr excludes all mention of cryptography; and in fact the GIS never controlled the processes, though it frequently had access to the results, of cryptography. Cryptography was in fact never centralized in Germany, and this lack of centralisation is of cardinal importance for the understanding of the history of the GIS, and is indeed one aspect of a phenomenon which was of much wider relevance in Nazi Germany. For although in theory the structure of the administration was 'pyramidal' and centralized, in fact the apex of the pyramid, or the centre of the circle, was not a unitary structure at all but a vortex of competing personal ambitions. Thus all German politicians of consequence sought to set up their own information bureaus, (just as they also sought to establish private armies) as additional supports for their political authority; and it was essential to the purpose of these bureaus that their results should be the private property of their chiefs, and not pooled at an administrative level. Thus HIBBENTROP had his bureau of personal informers as a means to securing the Foreign Ministry for himself, GOERING had the Forschungsamt which successfully preserved for himself the results of telephone-interception, HIMMLER had the SD (Amt III) and Amt VI of the RSHA to supply him with intelligence from within Germany and abroad respectively. The Abwehr was almost universally regarded, not as an administrative department of the OKW, but as the personal bureau of Admiral CANARIS. Cryptography was dissipated among those and other various offices.

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It was done (reputedly with great success) by GOERING's Forschungsamt; it was done by the Foreign Ministry; it was done by the OKW (Abt Chi), and separately by the three service ministries (OKM, OKL, and OKN). And although the cryptographic section of the OKM was ultimately (1944) merged in that of the OKW, this was done not in the interests of administrative efficiency, but because the OKM, after the Putsch of 20 July 1944, was politically suspect. This system led, not only to the stagnation of intelligence in private pools, but also (as was inevitable in a subject so dependent on central research as cryptography), to technical inefficiency.

Achievements of the GIS

5. The reputation of the Abwehr in Germany stood, at the beginning of the war, very high; and this reputation was not seriously questioned until after 1941. Although our knowledge of its activities is less complete during that time than later, it is clear that such a reputation was not really due to its achievements. In fact, if the achievements of the GIS are analysed functionally, it is clear that Abt I (positive espionage) was consistently unsuccessful, at least as a source of secret operational material; that Abt II (sabotage and subversion) had some successes in areas where the Germans had a degree of effective control which the Allies had not (e.g. especially in the Balkans in 1941), or diplomatic superiority (e.g. in Spain 1939-43), but was regularly unsuccessful in areas where these advantages were with the Allies (e.g. in the Middle East and in liberated areas); and that Abt III was generally successful. Between the work of Abw. Abt III and RSHA Amt IV (i.e. the Gestapo), the Allied intelligence services in the Low Countries were deeply penetrated at the beginning of the war, and throughout the history of resistance movements in occupied territory there were many instances of effective German penetration, some of them on a large scale (e.g. in Holland in 1944). It must be remembered, however, that this success was achieved mainly on the agent level, and that the GIS learnt - or at least pieced together - very little about the higher level organization of the Allied intelligence services (see para 31 (4)).

6. Inside Germany, however, the record of the Abwehr was not subjected to such a functional analysis, which would anyway have been difficult owing to the secrecy with which any secret service must enshroud its activities. In the early years of the War, the Abwehr lived on the success of the German armies (which was naturally taken to imply good intelligence), and on the success of its own counter-espionage, which as stated above, was considerable. With the turn of the tide of war in 1942, the achievements of the GIS assumed greater importance to the Germans, and its failures were submitted to greater criticism. These failures were regular and conspicuous, and, aided by certain secondary causes, led to the complete collapse of the Abwehr, which was absorbed by Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) or central office of HITLER's Sipo and SD (see below).

Particular operations of the Abwehr

7. A few selected instances of Abwehr activity in the years 1939-41 will illustrate both the extent and the efficiency of its operations.

8. Abt I (positive intelligence) was throughout the war the most unsuccessful of Abwehr departments, and this was in a very large measure due to the character of CANARIS himself, although there are also independent reasons for its failure, inherent in the work itself. It was in positive espionage that CANARIS took most personal interest (he showed little interest in the other departments of the Abwehr), and it was this branch of activity that was least creditable to the Abwehr. The explanation is, to a large extent, that CANARIS was, firstly, a bad judge of men, and secondly, himself a professional intriguer rather than an organizer. In consequence of the first fault, he chose worthless officers; and in consequence of the second, he gave them practical independence. In effect, the 'operational' officers of the Abwehr set in Paris and Athens, in Biarritz and Estoril, enjoying the opportunities for self-indulgence provided by these resorts, undisturbed (thanks to a complete lack of centralisation at HQ), so long as a quota of reports was sent in. Whether these reports were true or false was unimportant, since there was no centralised evaluation;

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and since truth or falsehood did not matter (at least while the German armies were victorious), it was equally unimportant whether the agents were controlled by the Allies or not. 'It was better to have a controlled agent than none at all', observed one cynical officer when it was suggested to him (correctly) that his principal source of information was under Allied management; and, another officer, when a similar suggestion was made about another agent (again correctly), raised his hands in horror at such an indecent reference to these undisputed but irrelevant facts of life. If he were to admit that to his chief, he said, he would be shot for defeatism. There were no other agents producing information of similar value, and the SIS could not afford to admit that it had no genuine agents in the U.K. The reductio ad absurdum of this system came when it was realised that if truth and falsehood were irrelevant, it was a waste of money to pay real agents. By the end of the war there were several officers or head agents who were regularly inventing (and being paid for) their agents and their agents reports; and it is an ironical commentary on the whole system that in fact the best reports did come from two sources, viz; controlled agents, whose false reports were necessarily interlarded with a proportion of truth; and notional agents whose inventors were attentive readers of the newspapers. The most successful of the latter class was Paul FIDRUMIC, @ OSTRO, who operated in Lisbon, and whose reports were considered 'correct without qualification' to the end. Both those types of agents had no difficulty in maintaining themselves; hence their success. They were valued because they survived; and the real cause of their survival was never examined. Genuine agents sent into Allied territory dried up almost immediately.

9. In these circumstances there is very little to say about particular operations of Abt I. The agents who were sent to the UK in the summer of 1940 were, for instance, quite useless. They were captured almost immediately, since the system was already penetrated; but even if they had survived, they were neither trained nor equipped nor intellectually or morally qualified to perform the service. The same is true of the agents in the USA and the Middle East who were also controlled. But the same lack of centralisation which made most of the operations of Abt I discreditable, did also enable a few Abwehr officers of initiative to perform work which (if it had been appreciated or correctly used) might have been valuable. Thus a Hungarian desert-explorer of distinction, ELMASY, made an expedition across the Libyan Desert from Rommel's Army to the Middle Nile which would in any circumstances have been creditable; and the fact that the agents whom he left there were worthless was a reflection on the Abwehr, not on himself. But the most conspicuous, perhaps the only, success of Abt I, was achieved in the special conditions which favoured all Abwehr activities in Spain and which once again, were a consequence of the personality of CANARIS.

10. From the time of the last war, when he had been interned in Spain, CANARIS had many influential friends in the Spanish political world. These contacts were confirmed or extended during the Spanish Civil War, and the German intervention, in which CANARIS played a personal part (he is credited with having been the architect of the Hitler-Franco agreement); and by the beginning of this war, CANARIS was a familiar figure in Gen. Franco's entourage, and officers of the Kondor Legion which had fought in Spain, were familiar figures in the higher posts of the Abwehr. Prominent among these Spanish friends of CANARIS were Gen. Franco himself, whose signed portrait dominated CANARIS' office in the Tirpitzufer, Count JORDANA (his foreign minister), General VIGON (his air minister), Gen. SENCIO (his war minister), and Gen. MARTINEZ CAMPOS (his chief of General Staff Intelligence). MARTINEZ CAMPOS, in some ways the most useful, received a Christmas box from Abwehr funds. Thus CANARIS enjoyed a highly privileged position in Spain and Spanish Morocco, and this privilege embraced the Abwehr also, not as the Abwehr, but as Admiral CANARIS' personal bureau. On at least three occasions, Allied documents which came to the hands of the Spanish I.S. were handed over to the Abwehr; Spanish police, coastguards, customs-officials, and army officers acted for the Abwehr with the approval or connivance of their superiors; special radio-beacon and meteorological stations were set up by the Abwehr with Spanish support, labour and personnel, at Seville and near Vigo; attacks on British and Allied shipping were regularly attempted from Spanish harbours with Spanish divers; and an elaborate and successful system of reporting the passages of British warships through the Straits of Gibraltar was perfected with Spanish assistance. This last undertaking, the so-called Unternehmen BODDEN, and its by-products, was the most successful undertaking carried out by Abt I, although energetic British protests prevented it from achieving its full aims and eventually reduced its efficiency very considerably. It was absolutely dependent on the far-reaching cooperation which was given by the Spanish government; and insofar as this cooperation was available to CANARIS personally rather than to the German government, it was a personal success for CANARIS. The German naval and air authorities are unanimous

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in regarding it as the most important contribution made by the Abwehr to the conduct of the war, and the fact that neither the German navy nor the Luftwaffe were able fully to exploit it is irrelevant. It did not indeed materially influence the course of the war; but (as long as it lasted) it materially strengthened the personal position of Adm. CANARIS.

11. After the Spanish ship-reporting service, the service which brought the greatest credit to Abw Abt I was the so-called Dienststelle Klatt in Sofia. The exact position of Klatt, in spite of all efforts to clarify it, remains something of a mystery. Briefly, the facts are as follows. Richard KLATT is a Hungarian Jew, whose value to the Abwehr consisted in his connection with an extensive circle of White Russian emigres centering upon a notorious professional spy, General (alias Prince) Turkul, normally resident in Rome. Through Turkul's organisation, and particular through one member of it named Ira LONGIN @ LANG, Klatt claimed to dispose of a large network of agents in Soviet Russia who since 1941, supplied him with operational intelligence about the movements and disposition of Russian troops. This intelligence was in many ways exceptional. It was delivered with quite extraordinary punctuality, in quite extraordinary quantity, and was regarded by the evaluation section of OKH Fremde HEHRE which received it as of quite extraordinary reliability. KLATT (whose personal position was further complicated by his Jewish origin) kept his organisation personal to himself, and the Germans themselves knew, or were allowed to know very little about it. But from the start certain suspicions were entertained; and after local investigations, one of the few able officers in the Abwehr (Dr. Wagner @ Delius, head of K.O. Bulgaria) satisfied himself that KLATT (who worked for Abw I Luft) was deceiving the Germans. WAGNER's suspicions led at first to an enquiry; but this enquiry had scarcely begun before it was suppressed on the demand of OKH Fremde HEHRE which declared that the Max reports (as these Russian reports were called) were indispensable and must on no account be jeopardised. KLATT thus survived, but suspicions of his loyalty continued to arise, and although none of the investigations produced proof of KLATT's duplicity, he was ultimately dropped as a character too suspicious to be trusted.
12. Several suspicious features are noticeable in KLATT's reports. It is almost certain that the original matter was in Russian and this applies not only to the intelligence from Russia but also to the so-called Moritz reports which were alleged to be derived from the British Middle East. KLATT is known to have had contact with the Soviet Legation, which continued to operate in Sofia throughout this period. He also maintained and concealed mysterious relations with the Bulgarian police. His extensive and infallible system which delivered intelligence with equal speed from Leningrad, Kuibishev, Nororossisk and the Western Desert, was suspiciously free from the administrative hitches to which most spy systems are liable. All these facts taken in conjunction strongly suggest that KLATT at least in respect of the Max reports was a Russian controlled deception agent, although it is possible that he himself was unconscious of the fact. The matter however has not yet been conclusively settled and the Moritz reports are difficult to explain even on this hypothesis.
3. If KLATT was really working for the Germans, it must be admitted that he was very highly valued by them; and since we are unable to establish the degree of truth in his reports on purely Russian operations, we must credit the Abwehr with having scored at least one success in the use of operational agents. On the other hand no certainty is possible; and if (as seems more likely) KLATT was in reality a Russian double-agent then no exception need be made to the generalisation that the only constant and 'reliable' agents used by the Abwehr were either controlled or notional.
4. One other branch of Abw Abt I activity deserves mention. This is the work of Abt I. W1 (Wirtschaft), which obtained economic intelligence (Allied production figures, etc), by simply buying in Portugal and South America, British and American industrial and statistical publications, from which intelligent deductions could be made. This matter was not secret, and therefore in some ways falls outside the ordinary definition of secret service work; but the results obtained from it were probably of more value than other intelligence obtained from more secret sources.

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15. The principal successes of Abw. Abt. II (sabotage and subversion) in the earlier part of the war were obtained in Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1941. Yugoslavia, thanks to its political divisions, the weakness of its administration, and the degree of German economic penetration which had already been achieved, was ideally suited to this kind of work; and by penetration and controlling various dissident or wavering groups, the Abwehr succeeded in sabotaging the mobilisation of the Yugoslav forces, and in preventing the demolition of bridges, etc., to an extent which materially assisted the advance of the German armies, and which affords a strong contrast to the ineffectiveness of its operations in the same area when the German armies were in retreat. The contribution of the Abwehr to the dissipation of French resistance in 1940 is less easy to determine; but it is believed that some success was obtained there by the Brandenburg Regiment z.b.v. 800 (afterwards Brandenburg Division) or private army of Abw. Abt. II. The Brandenburg Regiment also operated in Russia, but the extent of our knowledge does not entitle us to make general deductions concerning success or failure.
16. Abw. Abt. III was the most consistently successful of Abwehr departments, although it is not always easy to distinguish between its operations and those of the Gestapo (RSHA- Amt IV). Thus the capture of Stevens and Best in Dec. 1939, the most spectacular coup of the German counter-espionage service, was the work of the Gestapo. Similar activities in Belgium were also successful; and with the conquest of France and the Low Countries, Abw. Abt. III was able to penetrate the local resistance movements and, through them, the Allied agencies which relied on them. The penetration of the Dutch resistance movement in 1944, after the Allies had already landed successfully in France, shows that Abw. Abt. III continued to act with vigour and success, later than any other Abwehr department. It is interesting to note that in the various purges to which the Abwehr was subjected in 1942-44, Abw. Abt. III alone kept its personnel and constitutions almost intact - a strong argument that its efficiency was admitted.
17. In the years before the war, Abw. Abt. III, thanks to its control of Allied agents, also acted as a medium for strategic deception, passing out to the Allied Intelligence Services material supplied to it by (particularly) the German Admiralty. This strategic deception was not, however, fully exploited after the beginning of the war; when it seems that the German Service departments were no longer willing to re-lease deception-material in the same measure as in peace-time.
- The Crisis of the Abwehr.
18. The period of crisis which led to the fall of the Abwehr lasted from Nov. 1942, when the Allies landed in North Africa (Torch), till June 1944, when they landed in France (Overlord), and was directly connected with its failure in respect of Allied strategic intentions over this period. Since this was the crucial period of the war, and since success or failure in giving notice of Torch, Husky and Overlord might have materially altered the course of the war, the answer to the question whether the GIS had any appreciable influence on the course of the war lies in the events of this period. Before 1942 and after the summer of 1944, the relative strategic and material situation of the belligerents was such that good or bad intelligence could only have tactical significance.
19. It is therefore significant that neither Torch, nor Husky, nor Overlord, was correctly forecast by the Abwehr, which, on the contrary, drowned the OKW with misinformation, sometimes invented, and often deliberately supplied by the Allies. This uniform record of failure was the prime cause of the collapse of the Abwehr. Secondary causes were the growing and inescapable evidence of financial corruption and political disaffection among its members, and the competition of MEYER's SS intelligence service, which ultimately replaced it. The fall of the Abwehr was rendered slow and gradual by other secondary causes; and in particular, the personal success of CANARIAS in Spain. These successes enabled CANARIAS to survive the preliminary purges of the Abwehr, and when he fell (Feb. 1944) a change of policy in Spain was one of the immediate causes of his fall. To signalise the change from non-belligerency to neutrality, the Spanish politicians suddenly refused to receive CANARIAS on one of his regular visits, and thus made it obvious to the German Government that his special justification no longer existed. (see below - para 43).

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The Abwehr's record of sabotage in the same period was no higher. An elaborate plan to leave saboteurs in all evacuated areas in the Mediterranean, which was projected at this time, was afterwards admitted to have been a total failure. This incident contrasts instructively with the successful sabotage carried out in the same area in 1941, when the Germans had effectively penetrated the area (see above para 15), and again suggests that agents are only effective in areas freely accessible to their employers. (see below para).

The Rise of the RSHA.

1. Meanwhile a change in the political bias of Germany was effecting all administrative and service departments, including the OKW and Abwehr. This was the decline of the German General Staff (OKH) and the rise of HIMMLER. Up till the Autumn of 1941, the OKH had succeeded in retaining general control over the German army and German strategy, at the expense of yielding in certain matters to the political directorate which it affected to despise. But after the failure to take Moscow in Nov. 1941, and the dismissal of HALDER, the political directorate obtained control of the details of strategy and organisation to an extent which had hitherto been impossible. In consequence, the German General staff, already doubtful of final victory, began to think in terms of compromise, and to become suspect to the Nazi party; and the Nazi party began to rely more and more on the S.S. By 1942-43 these tendencies were no longer latent and almost every administrative department in Germany in which 'conservative' elements were powerful (e.g. General Staff and Foreign Office) was feeling the pressure of the S.S.

2. The rise of HIMMLER at the expense of the General Staff entailed the rise of the RSHA at the expense of the Abwehr. The RSHA was the coordinating bureau and

central HQ of all HIMMLER's activities in respect of espionage, sabotage and repression; in other words its functions corresponded (though on a different scale and with different degrees of emphasis, for the importance of repression was much greater) with those of the Abwehr. Reinhardt HEYDRICH, who was in many respects the brain behind HIMMLER had conceived and founded it as an organ of SS Centralisation. He was assassinated in Prague in 1942 and succeeded (after a long interval) by Ogruf. Ernst KLEINBRUNNER; but about the same time a new spirit was introduced into the organization by the final replacement of the unenterprising JOST, as head of its foreign intelligence department (Amt VI) by the young and ambitious Brigf. Walter Schellenberg. SCHELLENBERG had originally been in Amt IV of the RSHA (Gestapo); he had attracted notice by his handling of the affair of STEYERS and BEST in December 1939, and had become, as he remained to the end, a personal favourite of HIMMLER. By 1943 Amt VI of the RSHA, under SCHELLENBERG's direction, had become a serious rival to the Abwehr, ever watching to exploit its failures. Amt VI had originally (by a Gentlemen's Agreement' between CANARIS and HEYDRICH) confined its interest to political intelligence, leaving operational and economic intelligence to the Abwehr; but this moderation was abandoned, and the last days of the Abwehr were also days of cut-throat competition between Abwehr and RSHA Amt VI, in all spheres, particularly economic. In this struggle, HIMMLER and SCHELLENBERG enjoyed all the political advantages.

The RSHA was not necessarily more efficient than the Abwehr, but it enjoyed three advantages in particular:

(1) it had direct access to HIMMLER and, through him to HITLER (a political advantage, though administratively dangerous, see below para 33);

(2) it had developed a technique of penetrating Allied and neutral embassies and other offices which was an advance on the Abwehr's reliance on low-grade agents (although Amt VI had not abandoned the use of low-grade agents as well);

(3) Amt VI had begun to develop a new form of sabotage which was far more spectacular than the operations of the Brandenburg Division. This was a combination of sabotage and terrorism, carried out (at least in theory) by indoctrinated fanatics. It was associated with the name of Ostuba; Otto SKORZENY, whose reputation was blown up to an exaggerated height after his rescue of Mussolini in 1943.

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Causes of the Failure of the Abwehr.

27. The failure of the Abwehr was thus due partly to its inefficiency as an organ of operational intelligence, partly to independent political reasons. The inefficiency of the Abwehr can be ascribed to the following principal reasons, not all of which are internal to itself:
28. (1) The personal faults of CANARIS. Those were an incapacity for organization and an inability to choose good men. The Abwehr was filled, in its higher ranks, with personal friends and dependents of CANARIS, and they were (in general) idle and corrupt. They were not General Staff officers and got neither sympathy nor support from the General Staff. The Abwehr was a personal bureau. The General Staff referred to it cynically as "Canaris Familie GmbH". The only remedy or mitigation of such a situation would have been firm discipline; but CANARIS had no conception of organization. The Abwehr was thus a loose and irresponsible collection of worthless characters whom CANARIS refused to dismiss. Instead of organization, CANARIS relied on personal astuteness. This saved himself longer than some of his officers, but not much longer.
29. (2) Lack of Centralisation. The Abwehr's sources of operational intelligence were all (relatively) unreliable sources - i.e. personal sources. This made proper centralised evaluation impossible. There was no criterion of value, because the Abwehr did not receive results of cryptography, or other impersonal reports. It sent its reports on to service departments for evaluation; but these service departments lacked the means of discriminating between Abwehr reports. This lack of centralised evaluation, on the basis of the quality of the material, was harmful in both directions. Thus false reports were passed to OKH as 'absolutely reliable' and believed; and genuine reports, or genuine objections to sources, were rejected on internal grounds by OKH. This lack of centralisation was not peculiar to the Abwehr; it obtained throughout the German intelligence world (e.g. in cryptography), and was partly the consequence of the lack of administrative unity in high political circles. The desire of ministers to run independent personal intelligence bureaus in competition with each other was partly responsible.
30. (3) Lack of Coordinated Deception. This form of strategy was practised by the Germans in the years before the war. (See above, para 17); but ~~since~~ once hostilities began, it was never systematically or scientifically developed. Deception seems always to have been regarded as the release of material; and in war-time such release is attended by too many hazards to be undertaken when the extent of the enemy's interest or knowledge is uncertain. During the war, deception material was indeed passed to the Allies; but it was never properly coordinated. The Germans put out deception material primarily in order to keep up the credit of captured Allied agents, not to delude Allied General Staffs; and this deception material, in these circumstances, was rather reluctantly released than systematically concocted by the German General Staff. In the period between Torch and Husky, the individual C's-in-C did attempt to deter invasion by creating notional divisions throughout Europe; but the adoption of this policy was so sudden, and the technique so amateurish, that it was completely ineffective. The absence of centralisation and coordination of means and ends was as fatal to the success of the deception as it was to that of evaluation.
31. (4) Penetration. The same faults which prevented the Abwehr from making good use of deception, or from evaluating intelligence, prevented it from achieving successful penetration. When SCHELLINGBERG was interrogated by us, one of the facts which most humiliated him was the evidence that we knew the names, functions, achievements, etc. of every significant member of the Abwehr and Amt VI, while he was extraordinarily ignorant about the names, organizations, and policies of the Allied Intelligence Service.

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32. (5) Allied Counter-measures. Counter-measures are of course expected by an Intelligence Service, and are not to be regarded as particular or exceptional or unfair disadvantages when encountered; but certain Allied counter-measures were so conspicuously successful, and exploited so appropriately the particular weakness of the Abwehr that they both illustrate a general point and must be included in this survey, since the action of the Abwehr in respect of them probably affected the course of the war. Owing to the lack of understanding of deception and penetration, and owing to the exceptional facilities (and centralised methods) which we brought to this work, the G.I.S. fell an easy victim. Two incidents are of particular significance. Agents reports fabricated by the Allies in the Middle East and the U.K., which went through the machinery of the Abwehr, caused the German General Staff to move divisions into the Balkan Peninsula in preparation for Husky; and it is now clear that similar deception practised in the U.K., and including the use of Abwehr operational agents, was one of the basic sources of the German General Staff's appreciation of Allied Order of Battle before and after D-Day.
33. (6) The Fuhrerhauptquartier. Finally, it must be remembered that, to an increasing extent, all strategy, and indeed all decisions of policy and interpretation of facts, became increasingly dependent on the arbitrary whims of a group of ignorant maniacs. The evidence of the way in which military and political expertise was gradually subjected to this irresponsible element is now familiar; and in the sphere of intelligence this danger grew as the war developed, not merely in consequence of the rise of the RHQ, but also because the growing control of Himmler over intelligence cause more and more of the products of the GIS to be withdrawn from national evaluation and subjected to somnambulist interpretation. Thus the most successful scoop of Amt VI, being the capture of genuine documents from which the nature and incidence of Overlord might have been inferred, was never acted upon; partly because SCHELLLENBERG, inhibited by the record of German failure and paralysed by his admiration of the British Intelligence Service, could never persuade himself that it was not deception; largely because it was sent direct to the FHQ, where Hitler (it is reported) 'scoffed at the idea of anyone trying to breach the Atlantic Wall, and declared the idea fantastic'.

Attempts at Internal Reform.

34. Faced by this record of internal failure and external rivalry, the Abwehr, or at least certain members of it, did occasionally contemplate reform. Unfortunately for its hopes of survival, the reformers never had the countenance of CAWARIS; and the history of the Abwehr includes many episodes in which able men were discouraged because their proofs that agents were controlled were safely suppressed by interested parties. The interrogation report on Major Friedrich BUSCH @ BERGMANN, of I Luft, is the most revealing of such stories. The most conspicuous of these efforts were made by officers of the General Staff, who, both from traditions of efficiency and from political necessity (for their entry into politics in the period 1942-44 emphasized their need of an efficient intelligence service) were eager to remedy the now obvious defects of the Abwehr.

The first of these Staff Officers who sought to reform the Abwehr was Major i.G (der Luftwaffe) BRUNDE, who was head of the Luftwaffe department of the Abwehr (Abt. I Luft) from March 1941 until January 1943. In the course of this time, BRUNDE recognised three major defects:-

- (1) he recognised the necessity for closer cooperation between the operational reporting section of the Abwehr (Abt. I Luft) and its corresponding section in the OKL (Luftwaffenfuhrungstab).
- (2) he realised the importance of rapid communication of operational intelligence, if it was to be of use to the Luftwaffe;
- (3) he realised that any general reform of the Abwehr was dependent on the introduction of a higher morale, and the ruthless removal of corrupt elements.

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36. In the first two of these matters, BREDE achieved some success. He succeeded in associating Abwehr I Luft with the Luftwaffenführungstab to a degree which had hitherto been impossible, and which was never achieved in the Military or Naval sections of the Abwehr; and he obtained special communications, independent of ordinary Abwehr communications, for his department; so that (among other improvements) the office of the Fliegerführer Atlantik in Paris received shipping reports from the Abwehr observer in Lisbon without any intermediary delays. BREDE's term of authority in the Abwehr had been generally recognised as a period of exceptional work in the limited sphere of Abt. I Luft, which enjoyed a temporary independence of the ordinary Abwehr machinery and its inconveniences. But in the third of his reforms (i.e. the one reform which extended beyond the limits of Abt. I Luft), he failed completely; and his failure led to the ruin of the rest of his work. In the Spring of 1942, BREDE suggested to Admiral CANARIS, in the presence of his deputy, Oberst. PIECKENBROCK (head of Abt. I) that the head of the Abwehr in Portugal, Major KRIEGER VON AUEIRODE, and part of his staff, be dismissed for palpable corruption. CANARIS, who was fundamentally averse from dismissing any of his "personal bureau", refused even to consider such a proposal; and BREDE asked to be relieved of the duty of supervising K.O. Portugal. This was granted. Within a year, BREDE had resigned in disgust from the Abwehr.

37. Shortly after the resignation of BREDE, another attempt at internal reform was made by another General Staff officer. This was Oberst. I. G. HANSEN, who succeeded PIECKENBROCK when the latter was finally removed, in 1943, in one of the Abwehr purges. HANSEN enjoyed the advantages of a stronger position than BREDE, being head of all operational intelligence and deputy to CANARIS. He came from OKH Fremde Heere and was therefore familiar with the inadequacies of the section which he was to control. HANSEN introduced several other General Staff officers (particularly ENGHARDT and KUEBARTH) and made systematic and energetic efforts to convert the Abwehr from a 'family racket' into an integral organ of the General Staff, as far as this was compatible with the continued rule of CANARIS and the watchful hostility of the S.S. In fact it was not compatible. HANSEN's efforts failed (partly for political reasons - see below, paras 44 and 45), largely because he could not get rid of the dead wood; and by the time CANARIS was dismissed and succeeded by HANSEN, the time when the Abwehr would be saved by internal reform was over.

The Stages in the Fall of CANARIS.

38. Demonstrably incompetent, incapable of reform, threatened from without, only an extraordinary combination of favourable circumstances could have saved the Abwehr once the military situation of Germany had become desperate; and the actual incidents which precipitated the fall of CANARIS are only of historical interest. Historical interest may however justify their inclusion in this account.

39. The failure of the Abwehr to give warning to "Torch" in November 1942 was followed, at last, by a thorough-going purge in its higher ranks. CANARIS was impelled to this unusual and uncongenial task not only by the dangerous inefficiency of his organisation, but also by the increasing evidence of personal corruption within it. Thus, in the winter of 1942-43, General OSTER, the head of the administration department of the Abwehr, was found to have used his official position to enable seven rich Jewish families to escape to Switzerland, nominally as agents but actually as an excuse to transfer the sum of 100,000 U.S. dollars from Abwehr funds to his personal account in Switzerland. In the first seven months of 1943, CANARIS successively got rid of all his immediate deputies as the price of his own survival; and in the operational intelligence section, with which he was personally identified, a clean sweep was made of all senior officers. By this wholesale sacrifice, and thanks to his personal usefulness in Spain (now of increased importance, since the war had entered the Mediterranean phase) his own position was temporarily saved.

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40. In the Spring of 1943 the Abwehr sought feverishly to guess the next Allied move aight, and in the months immediately preceding Husky (July 1943) the insistence from HQ on the necessity of accuracy assumed an almost hysterical tone. In response to this need, literally hundreds of reports were sent in, and prophecies, more or less circumstantial, were made of impending landings on almost every part of the European coastline from the north of Norway to the Dardanelles. By their mere number and variety, these reports overwhelmed any element of accuracy which any single one of them might contain; and in fact that element was negligible. Many sources guessed what was anyway likely, that the blow would fall in Sicily; but these were a minority among the frantic prognostications which pointed to the South of France, Italy, Dalmatia, Albania, Greece, Crete, and Rhodes. These various reports were to a large extent the result of the confusion deliberately created by us in the minds of the Abwehr; a report which, after three months of evaluation, elicited the personal congratulations of KESSELRING, had been composed in London; and this deception successfully diverted German divisions to the Balkans. The build-up of Allied forces in North Africa, which the Abwehr, in obedience to orders, was reporting, was also largely fabricated by us. There is no doubt that the period of 'Husky', when the need of an efficient intelligence service was most imperative, was the period when the GIS was shown up at its worst.
41. After 'Husky', the next spectacular event was the fall of Mussolini. Again the Abwehr failed; and, what made its failure more dangerous, on this occasion Amt VI of the RSHA was right. To the last minute, the Abwehr in Italy, and KESSELRING, whose intelligence came in large part from the Abwehr, assured the OKW that BADOGLIO offered all the advantages of a Petain and must on no account be weakened or frightened by a misconceived attitude of suspicion on the part of Germany; while the representative of Amt VI in Rome protested that BADOGLIO was a potential traitor to the German cause, and advocated swift action. When the Italian armistice had been declared, the swift action was taken; Mussolini was rescued from the Gran Sasso by SKORZENY, and again the credit went to the SS.
42. In the winter of 1943-44 another Abwehr plan miscarried. This time Amt VI was involved in the failure also. It was proposed by the Abwehr and Amt VI in Buenos Aires to send a private Argentine citizen, HELMUTH, under business cover, to Spain, but with secret instructions to continue his journey to Berlin, and there to act as unofficial Argentine minister after the breach of open diplomatic relations. The German Foreign Office was highly suspicious of this scheme and demanded (and received) the fullest guarantees of complete secrecy. HELMUTH in fact was taken off his ship at Trinidad, and confessed his mission; and the German Foreign Office was able to justify its hostility to the Abwehr.
43. Almost immediately after the HELMUTH incident came another, this time a public blow. Three members of the Abwehr in Istanbul, including one (Erich VON EBEREN) who had official status in the German Embassy, deserted to the Allies. Finally there was trouble in Spain. There the Abwehr had committed successful acts of sabotage on a number of Italian ships which had been handed over to the Allies by the B.oglio Government, and the British Government pressed the Spanish Government to expel certain members of the Abwehr who were considered responsible. The Spanish Government yielded, and CANARIAS decided to intervene by making one of his regular visits to Madrid. A conversation with his friends in Franco's government was the ordinary way of dealing with such incidents. In January 1944 he flew to Biarritz. He invited MARTINEZ CAMPOS to visit him there. MARTINEZ CAMPOS refused; and CANARIAS returned empty-handed to Berlin. The significance of this incident was obvious to the German Government. CANARIAS had lost the privileged position which alone justified his retention. In February 1944 CANARIAS was sent on indefinite leave. HAYSEN became acting head of the Abwehr.

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The Destruction of the Abwehr.

44. The months immediately following the fall of CANARIS were months of negotiation and compromise behind which the unresolved conflict between the General Staff and SS was continued. In the negotiations, the SS held all the trump cards, and both sides acted on the assumption that HITLER would in fact take over the Abwehr, though some face-saving formula would be found. The General Staff's plans however were not confined to the field of these negotiations. They were planning the elimination of HITLER and HEIMLER and the whole Nazi leadership by political conspiracy, and it was therefore immaterial if the negotiations went against them.
45. Of these two parallel developments, the negotiations over the Abwehr and the political conspiracy of the General Staff, the former matured first. After a series of preliminary conferences in which the Abwehr was represented by HANSEN and ENGELHORN and Amt VI by SCHELLENBERG and SANDTBERGER, the representatives of the Abwehr and the RSHA were summoned to the Kursalon at Salzburg for a final session lasting from 10th May to 15th May. There the decision was promulgated by HEIMLER. In a bombastic speech, he declared that the name Abwehr was "unGerman", and the thing was to be abolished. A new organisation, the RSHA Militarisches Amt, was to be founded. He would decide which of the Abwehr officers should have the privilege of being transferred to this new organisation, which would come officially into being on June 1st. He ended his speech with a peroration extolling the statesmanship, skill and wisdom of the Fuehrer, praying for an immediate invasion from the plutocratic west, that it might be 'drowned in the streams of their own blood'; and promising that, in 1945, the Russians would be driven headlong beyond the Urals, where a Chinese Wall would be built by Russian slave-labour, to keep them from ever returning.
46. The nature of the Salzburg decision, which preserved much of the original form of the Abwehr under the authority of the RSHA, need not be specified, for it was short-lived. Within two months, the Generals' putsch had taken place and failed; and its failure enabled the extremists of the SS to substitute for the Salzburg formula a far more radical solution.
47. Almost all the General Staff officers in the Abwehr were involved in the conspiracy. When it failed they were eliminated. HANSEN was hanged. Freytag von LORINGHOVEN, until recently head of the Sabotage Section (II), who had supplied part of the explosive from captured British material in his stores, committed suicide. ENGELHORN was executed. KURBETH was arrested and tried, but by a miraculous failure of evidence escaped. Graf MAROGNA-REDWITZ, head of the Abwehr in Vienna, and one of its few able officers, was executed. Several lesser figures were normally executed; and in the holocaust which followed throughout Germany, junior officers disappeared unnoticed. The fate of CANARIS is uncertain. He was evidently imprisoned on suspicion of complicity; and most sources agree that he was executed in January 1945, when incriminating evidence was at length discovered. The failure of the Putsch completed the ruin of the old Abwehr. Already exposed as incompetent, HEIMLER could now show that it had been disloyal. Deprived of all its leaders, the fragmentary remains were now placed under the direct rule of SCHELLENBERG as the Militarisches Amt of the RSHA.

The RSHA and Amt VI

48. The RSHA before the incorporation of most of the old Abwehr in the new Militarisches Amt, was divided into seven departments (Aemter) of unequal size and importance; the three most important were Amt IV (the Gestapamt), Amt III (the Sicherheitsdienst within the Reich) and Amt VI (the Sicherheitsdienst abroad). Of these three Amt IV was the largest and Amt VI the smallest. Amt I and Amt II were purely administrative and of no direct counter-intelligence interest, and Amt VII, nominally responsible for the protection and dissemination of Nazi culture as interpreted by the SS, was no more than a perverted and largely useless research institute.

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49. The nominal head of the RSHA was Ogruf Dr. KALTENBRUNNER, HEYDRICH's successor, a ruthless but easy-living Austrian equally unqualified as statesman or departmental organizer. Hitler had approved his appointment previously because he did not enjoy HIMMLER's full confidence and would not upset the balance of power with the SS. Ogruf MEYER, Amtschef IV, continued to report directly to HIMMLER and even SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI, finally succeeded in largely excluding KALTENBRUNNER from effective direction and even knowledge of the work of his office. KALTEBRUNNER dabbled in the politics of central Europe and used the results of the SD's investigations inside Germany to maintain his position at HITLER's court.
50. The successes of the Gestapo both in counter-intelligence and generally in the repression of conspiracy and unrest were considerable. As in the Abwehr, so on a much larger scale in the RSHA, the natural advantages were all on the side of the defensive, rather than of offensive espionage; and better information was in fact obtained by the use of penetration agency than by the use of direct informers. As an example, it is worth noting that the Gestapo, by questioning in the interest of security German workers and technicians returning from Russia, had a less adequate picture of Russia's war potential in 1941 than either the Abwehr or Amt VI; in June 1944 both the Gestapo and the military counter-espionage units in the field, by the penetration of French resistance movements, could infer the imminence of D-Day which Amt VI and the old Abwehr had failed to predict. Between 1941 and 1944 the Gestapo succeeded in penetrating many of the resistance movements in the west and in destroying by penetration at least one effective Russian espionage network. But in spite of the ruthlessness and organizing ability of MUELLER, the Gestapo, and particularly its regional stations, was filled with corrupt party officials, who showed no ingenuity or solidarity in defeat; what was expected to be the one coherent and resisting element within the RSHA had in fact dissolved with the rest.
51. Amt III under Gruf OHLENDORF was of more political and governmental intelligence interest. Its reports on public opinion and governmental efficiency were a useful political weapon for KALTENBRUNNER. But both the extent and influence of the SD network seem to have been much less than had been believed; nor were either its officers or its agents and informers conspicuously loyal Nazis. OHLENDORF was an able official who did not enjoy HIMMLER's confidence, and was therefore unimportant; he was not a fanatic, and therefore made no use of his exceptional opportunities to plan resistance after defeat.
52. The personality of SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI was the determining factor in the later history of the GJS, as was the personality of CANARIS in its earlier phases. At the outbreak of war he was a young Gestapo official already obsessed with the ambition of building a Secret Service, by careful cultivation first of HEYDRICH and latter of HIMMLER he had by May 1944 realised his dream of controlling a unified Geheimdienst. This instrument, which he was fashioning after what he believed to be the English model, he hoped to use as a channel of communication with the Western Powers. He had no support from KALTENBRUNNER either in his attempts to improve the efficiency of the GJS or in his attempts to convert HIMMLER to defeatism.
- The RSHA was at the top and at the centre a loose agglomeration of warring personalities, united only by mutual fear and loyalty to HIMMLER or HITLER. The heads of the various departments pursued their own ends and had independent plans to guarantee their own survival in defeat. It was against this background of political intrigue that SCHELLENBERG began to build his independent intelligence service. But he began too late (summer of 1944), and when he came to give an account of his work to his interrogators he admitted that his grandiose plans had not and could not have been realised.
- Amt VI and Mil. Amt.
54. The fusion of the old Abwehr as the Militarisches Amt with Amt VI under SCHELLENBERG did not bring an immediate increase in efficiency. Neither SCHELLENBERG nor any of his small group of advisors had the time to investigate the reliability of the Abwehr's services, nor were there more than two or three Abwehr officers left in whom SCHELLENBERG had the slightest confidence. He tried to persuade the Services

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to provide better officers for the Geheime Meldedienst, and adumbrated a scheme of training and of interchange with the Services. The rump of the Abwehr had only three sources of intelligence which were considered of any value -- one in Lisbon (Fidrome @)Ostro) one in Stockholm (KRAEMER), one in Vienna (KLATT) - and the genuineness of all three was rightly doubted. There was no time to overhaul the Abwehr; its outstations were renamed but not re-staffed, and its mobile units in the field were nominally subordinated administratively to the Amt VI, but actually received their orders from the military commanders to whom they were attached. In fact the reorganisation made little difference to the ordinary Abwehr officer either in his method of reporting or in his immediate subordination.

55. Amt VI itself, like the Abwehr which it absorbed, had a tradition of failure and incompetence; but there had been a few isolated successes and these had been well advertised by HIMMLER. Great publicity had been given to the escape of Ramon GAYOTHA, the Amt VI representative in Persia, from that country after the Allied occupation. More important than GAYOTHA's escape, however, was the work of Franz MAYR who remained in the country and, together with SCHULZE the I-Luft representative, had been successful in creating a potentially dangerous fifth column in a theatre which assumed considerable importance at the end of 1942. It is significant, however, that this highly successful work of MAYR had been carried out independently of Amt VI, and that the Amt failed to take advantage of the situation. The RSMA's representative in Rome, the police attache, KAPPLER had anticipated the Italian armistice, and his information service made possible SKORZENY's rescue of Mussolini. SKORZENY was an officer of Amt VI, and his exploit was the greatest and most evident success of the GIS since the first year of the war, and it came at a time when the Abwehr's failures were most conspicuous. A previous success of Amt VI, less well known, had been in 1941 and 1942 when a single Amt VI officer observed and reported every move in the labyrinth of Vichy politics. In Spain, in spite of the complaisance and encouragement of General Franco's government, nothing of real importance seems to have been achieved and elsewhere in Western Europe, both occupied and neutral, number of insignificant agents were recruited to no purpose by officers who had little or no knowledge of what they wanted. Few people of power other than SCHELLENBERG himself realised how ineffective Amt VI had been, and he could present the facts as he chose to Himmler, while Hitler and the OKW regarded all secret services with impartial indifference.
56. SCHELLENBERG tried to cure the diseases of Amt VI by the creation of a central office under his personal direction which would be the brain of the organisation. But the brain still lacked the limbs and nerves which could execute its purposes. SAIDBERG, SCHELLENBERG's chief administrative officer, made a quantitative and qualitative survey of the personnel needs both of Amt VI proper and the Mil. Amt., but he could not implement his conclusions in the last six months of war. A single intelligent naval officer (von BECHTOLSHEIM) was the only recruit worth mentioning from the Services, and a journalist (WERSING) was found in the political world to produce pessimistic essays to be shown to Himmler. But the totalitarian GIS developed no new sources of genuine secret intelligence. SCHELLENBERG's most solid achievement was to explore the results of interception and cryptography (see paragraph 4 above). Preliminary enquiries were made as to how far commercial and industrial firms could be used to provide intelligence from their own sources abroad; and the first steps, but only the first steps, were taken to set up a central office for strategic deception; not until 1944 had the heads of the GIS REALIZED AND admitted the extent to which they had been the victims of Allied deception, and the necessity of centralized planning in this work; they realised too late.
57. Amt VI never disposed of any direct source of intelligence either in the UK or the USA, nor had it any officers capable of evaluating any political intelligence indirectly received from these countries; in this respect even the Abwehr, buying what it could in Spain or Portugal, had been better supplied. More practical efforts were made in the despatch of agents to Russia, but we have no evidence that any results of consequence were achieved by the multitude of low-grade agents used.

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58. SKORZENY's reputation after the liberation of Mussolini was such that, although nominally a part of SCHELLENBERG's totalitarian GIS, he was in fact responsible only to Kaltenbrunner and Hitler; he directed a unified organization for sabotage and corruption which included what remained of Abwehr II. Its only real successes were achieved by special naval units whose control he shared with the German Navy. His parachutists and terrorists achieved no military effect, though the threat of them sometimes nearly became a diversion. SKORZENY himself was the type of military hero and not an intelligence officer or political organizer, and he was neither able nor inclined to lead an underground resistance movement. As he had concentrated under his control everyone who had been trained in sabotage and irregular warfare, the only possible nucleus of immediate resistance was dissolved when he, posing as a soldier and a good Austrian, surrendered. He had incorporated and trained the more active members of the fascist minorities of Europe in special legions, called SS Jagdwachende; in the last months of the war they were a threat, but were never in fact used in a large scale operation. SKORZENY designed his unified sabotage service to achieve a series of spectacular coups of the kind of the rescue of Mussolini, but the unreliability of his agents, the superficiality of their training and the demoralization of retreat combined to frustrate him. As his agents were trained in groups and platoons, the capture of a single parachute agent led to the identification of many more potential agents; by the end of hostilities the Allies had an almost complete order of battle of SKORZENY's organization.

59. The failure of Amt VI and the GIS was largely due to lack of support not only from Hitler and the OKW but also from Ribbentrop's Foreign Office. Both KALTENBRUNNER and SCHELLENBERG were personal and political enemies of Ribbentrop, who jealously resented their independence in foreign affairs. Amt VI officers abroad could not generally rely on the cooperation of the German Embassy; only in Turkey were relations between Amt VI and the Embassy reasonably good. German diplomats suspected with good reason that the representatives of the RSIA were surveying and criticising them, and that they would miss no opportunity for unofficial diplomacy. At no stage in its history did the GIS exchange information or coordinate policy with the Foreign Office. Only once did Amt VI produce material which was, or could have been, of real value to the Foreign Office and which was not immediately exploited by Himmler without reference to the Foreign Office (see Paragraph 38 above which refers to the same case); these documents were not only of the greatest political interest to the Foreign Office officials who studied them, but could have been the basis of some negative inferences about the time and place of the Allied landing in Europe. Apart from the successes in Vichy and Rome already mentioned, this was the most substantial achievement of Amt VI, and the methods used were the classical methods of secret service. But the genuineness of the papers was never fully accepted, precisely because the GIS had not trained its customers to expect material of this quality.

Operational reporting by SCHELLENBERG's GIS.

60. There was however one incident which occurred during SCHELLENBERG's tenure of power which deserves mention. At the time of the British airborne landing at Arnhem, the GIS received a report from Sweden which announced that such a landing was likely to take place. This report did not however affect any military dispositions. It arrived too late. (In fact it almost certainly represented not accurate information but an intelligent guess, and is therefore of no general significance). On the other hand, at the same time, the counter-espionage section of the GIS had so successfully penetrated the Dutch resistance movement that it was only by chance that accurate information on this subject was not in fact obtained. This incident illustrates the general conclusion which emerges from a study of the GIS; that operational agents often only endanger their employers (cf. paragraph 18 above); and that operational intelligence is often more reliably obtained by systematic penetration than from individual reporting. Out of over 300 operational agents left behind by the retreating German armies in the west, it is established that none kept in W/T contact with their headquarters except those controlled by the Allied services; and SCHELLENBERG had admitted that, owing to the failure of aerial reconnaissance, these agents' reports were treated with disproportionate respect.

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The End of the GIS.

61. The end of the GIS was as sudden and as complete as that of Nazi Germany. Forbidden to envisage defeat, SCHELLENBERG was unable to plan either espionage or resistance after defeat; when defeat occurred there was therefore no purpose to be served by avoiding surrender. SCHELLENBERG and all his important subordinates, including SKORZENY, surrendered voluntarily, and SCHELLENBERG has talked freely. Amazed by the extent of our knowledge, and assisted by his preconceptions, he has concealed no information about his organization, for nothing seemed worth concealing.
62. The GIS is now dead and nothing remains except to complete the rounding up of its surviving members. The reasons for its failure have been made sufficiently evident during the course of this report and it is clear that it was not solely due to Allied counter measures, important though they undoubtedly were. It is sufficient to say in conclusion that despite all the time, trouble and expense lavished by the Germans on their Intelligence /Service, it was never able to materially affect the fortunes of the war, and the sphere where it could have made the most important contribution to the success of German arms, viz. that of operational intelligence, was the one where its results were worst and its failure most complete.

W.R.E.
1st December, 1945

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