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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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CONTENTS

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

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THE LIFE AND WORK OF STEPHAN HALLER

Patrick R. Beller

This true biography of an intelligence officer is doubly a study in intelligence: it shows how a goodly endowment of intellectual equipment, the honing of scholasticism, and a catholic diversity of interests and experience provide none too elaborate a base for intelligence work, but indeed create the potential for extraordinary success. Haller's contributions to U.S. intelligence began in war, with the OSS. Often unorthodox in his methods but always effective in his stubborn onslaught on the work assigned him, he lived a career that is now part of the tradition of the U.S. intelligence service, a tradition that he and many of his colleagues have been building since the days of World War II.

Stephan Haller—scholar, mathematician, and political activist—was not the model intelligence officer, because there is no such thing. The job is so vast that in addition to that first requisite—brains—all kinds of persons and talents are needed. But Haller combined more talents than most men—combined them and controlled them, so that even seemingly disparate traits were fitted together. He was a thoughtful and sensual, purposeful and humane man.

But trying to measure him is like trying to measure other natural forces, like explaining a storm as so many foot-pounds of wind-thrust. He was more than a sum of attributes.

Stephan Haller was not his real name.[1] *He did not want publicity or acclaim; he wanted to do his job. Those of us who knew him know that he would not only have chosen anonymity; he would have insisted on it for operational reasons. His identity and character merged with the work to which he was devoted, shaping it and shaped by it. The work is his memorial. And because we share in the work, we also share in his story.*

R. Helms

[1] A pseudonym is used here because his contacts are still active and several of his operations continue to be of a sensitive nature.

Stephan Haller was the second of two sons born to a middle-class family of German Jews. Manfred and Margarete Haller were living in Frankfurt am Main with their three-year-old Emil in 1906, the year of Stephan's birth. Later a daughter, Sara, was born. Manfred Haller was a Rabbi. In 1916, after Stephan had finished grammar school, the family moved to Kassel. Graduation from *Mittelschule* at the age of ten is unusual in Germany; young Stephan was a good student. From 1916 to 1924 he continued his studies in Braunschweig, and two years later he took his first degree, a BS, at Marburg/Lahn. The next five years were spent at a number of universities inside and outside Germany. The young man's studies showed the breadth of his interests. He became skilled in mathematics and statistics, physics, psychology, sociology, and political science; and he read widely in other subjects.

His father was lean, bearded, and strictly orthodox, whereas Stephan's broad interests and his studies in the sciences had increased his natural curiosity and his scepticism. The result was frequent clashes between father and son. But although Stephan argued from materialistic concepts, one of his closest friends has said that later in his life he was deeply religious, a fact he tried to conceal. In any event, the Rabbi and his younger son were never intimate in their association.

Margarete Haller died in 1923, when Stephan was seventeen. Ten years more, and the Nazis were to put his father in a concentration camp. Later the Rabbi, his daughter, and his older son all managed somehow to reach South America. Stephan found a different course.

Politician and Propagandist

European students have always been more precocious in political life than their American counterparts. Young Haller associated himself with the Social Democratic Party when he was nineteen, and soon became very active in its student groups. From 1925 until 1933, when he was forced to flee Germany, he was much occupied with politics and the educational programs of the German labor movement. For several of those years he was chairman of the Social Democratic Students' Movement at the University of Frankfurt and a member of the movement's national board of chairmen. He was also

district leader of this movement for southwest Germany, which included the Universities of Marburg, Frankfurt, Giessen, Heidelberg, and Munich, as well as the Polytechnic Institute at Darmstadt. At the same time he took part in the educational program of the German labor unions, serving both as educational director and as teacher at various large plants, including I. G. Farben, throughout Hesse.

Haller also became intensely and practically interested in the theory and uses of political propaganda. It was this interest that brought him into intimate contact with Kurt Schumacher, Ollenhauer, and other leading Socialists. He became a member of the SPD Propaganda Committee for Hesse, which worked under the direction of Reichstag Deputy Dr. Carlo Mierendorff. For three years, from 1930 to 1933, this committee maintained a continuous survey and analysis of the effect upon the German people of the propaganda of all the political parties. The purpose of the survey was to improve SPD propaganda and reduce the effectiveness of that of all opponents. Stephan Haller's education thus drew a little closer to his future work.

During the same period he put his analyses to use, appearing as the SPD speaker at nearly a thousand political rallies held all over Germany. About half of these were meetings of nationalistic groups: the Stahlhelm, the German National Party, and of course the NSDAP, the Nazis. He sharpened his wits and skills in debate against men whose names were later heard in intercession and anathema—Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda chief; Baldur von Schirach, Nazi youth leader; Dr. Franz Seldte, founder of the Stahlhelm. Selected as a delegate to the SPD's national convention, he twice ran unsuccessfully for office, once for the Hessian Landtag and once for the Reichstag. Politics is not an easy life anywhere; it was a hard and rewarding school for a young Jew in the turbulent pre-Hitler Germany.

A statement written by Haller for the OSS in early 1944 includes this comment:

> I shall not dwell upon the fact that in the course of the above mentioned activities, I could not fail to acquire a rather thorough knowledge of the German party system as a whole, of the structure, history, methods of propaganda and action of the German national parties, particularly the Nazi Party,

> the German National Party, and of the leagues and associations either connected to or collaborating with them; as well as, to a certain extent, a personal knowledge of many known leaders of these organizations.

He also learned how to assess people and how to deal with them, when to be friendly and kind and when to be hard or austere, whom to praise or reassure and whom to treat with just the right degree of that superciliousness so effective with certain Germanic types. His convictions gave him reason to act; his studies and political research had taught him how; and now experience was teaching him the hardest lesson, when to act.

Adolf Hitler became Reichschancellor on 30 January 1933. The night before the Reichstag fire, on 27 February, Haller made a pungently anti-Nazi speech at Darmstadt. Two days later the SS storm-troopers came to the Haller home. They did not find Stephan. A young student of his, a girl, had somehow learned what was coming and had warned him. The troopers smashed up the household, arrested the Rabbi, and hauled him off to the *Sammellager*.

The Wandering Jew

For six months Haller lived and worked underground with anti-Nazis in southwest Germany, the Ruhr, and Berlin. In September he escaped into Luxembourg. Here he continued his anti-Nazi work until the German government pressured the small duchy to arrest him and return him. A warrant for his arrest was issued, but he escaped again, to the Saar, which was then administered by the League of Nations. (Much later, at the war's end, Haller went back to Luxembourg with the American forces. He looked up the chief of police and identified himself: he understood, he said, that a warrant for his arrest and extradition was outstanding.)

He stayed in the Saarland until 1935, when it was returned to Germany. When the Nazis marched in he walked out, to Paris. There he resumed, at the Sorbonne, his studies in statistical mathematics, sociology, and political science. He became a volunteer statistician for the Pasteur Institute and a member of the National Center of Scientific Research, a branch of the French Ministry of Education. He was offered an assistant's post at the Institute of Atomic Physics of the

University of Lyon, despite the fact that in 1934 and 1935 France was suffering from unemployment, employed aliens were required to have work permits, and there were many times more refugees than permits.

When World War II started, all German aliens in France were arrested and confined in a detention camp. Soon thereafter Haller and some fifty other German and Austrian scientists were released and formed into a curious organization known as the *Prestation Savante* (Service of Scientists), organized by the French Ministry of War and attached to the University of Montpellier, where they worked under the orders of the Ministers of War and Education. The organization was semi-military, and the scientists were dressed in a compromise between soldiers' uniforms and the garb of monks. During this period Haller made friends with a number of fellow-scientists whom he later recruited and used as agents. Precisely what work was done by the *Prestation* until the fall of France is not clear now.

When France went under, Haller fled again. Both the Gestapo and the Vichy militia were looking for him. There was a price on his head. He went south, to the unoccupied zone. During his long sojourn there he became fluent in French and improved his accent sufficiently to pass as a Belgian. After the Franco-German armistice, the French set up numerous depots at which French military personnel could be demobilized upon request. Their proof of bona fides was the uniform; upon discharge they were given a few thousand francs and a civilian suit. Haller managed to go through the process three times in three different towns, living in each on his severance pay.

Finally picked up and placed in a camp for demobilized French soldiers, he escaped and made his way to the American Consulate in Marseilles, where he obtained an Emergency Intellectual Visa to the United States. After a brief delay in Spain in the summer of 1941, he reached New York via Cuba on a refugee ship. He arrived in wretched physical condition.

Rebel in Uniform

Ten months later, at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he was inducted into the United States Army. The Haller legend has it that some difficulty with the military psychologists ensued: asked

by one of them if he could sing, he replied with a *fortissimo* rendering of *Die Wacht am Rhein.* This opening scene foreshadowed some later events. Assigned as a student to an army engineering school in Kentucky, he was placed in an elementary class. The instructor made frequent errors, and Haller's helpful corrections were appreciated neither by the teacher nor by the commanding officer. The latter had Haller on the carpet and informed him incisively that he was not the assistant instructor. Haller explained that he did not know anything about the army but did know mathematics, whereas the instructor's specialties were obviously the reverse. A compromise was effected: he was to remain silent in class in exchange for a nightly pass.

From September 1942 until April 1944 he was assigned to five different Army posts, usually instructing in the operation of a computer, while the OSS was frantically looking for men who knew Germany well. At last an IBM run turned up Stephan Haller; he knew the language, had detailed area knowledge, was a well-known SPD member, knew important personages. Almost all the holes in the card were in the right places.

The OSS brought him to Washington and gave him intelligence training. In June 1944 he was shipped to London and assigned to the labor division of the BACH section, an organization which supplied cover stories and documents for agents working behind enemy lines. In August he was transferred to a forward combat area in France. He served with one of the first OSS field detachments that accompanied the armies from the Normandy landings to the war's end. These detachments provided liaison from G–2 to OSS headquarters, ran border crossers, recruited spies from POW cages, briefed and debriefed agents, and performed many other intelligence tasks. Haller's exceptional capabilities led to his being recommended for a commission. The recommendation included the following job description:

> Haller is in charge of all BACH research work at Field Base C and acts as immediate assistant to the CO in all intelligence operations. . . . He (a) questions officials . . . interrogates prisoners of war, deserters, and escaped foreign workers . . . (b) collects and analyzes documents . . . (c) prepares written reports . . . covering such topics as: The German Rationing

> System, Travelling in Germany, . . . Priorities in German War Production . . . (d) supervises the work of six other members of the detachment. . . .

When Haller's commanding officer was told to have him ready to appear before an ETOUSA commissioning board, he was advised to ensure that "Haller's actions in front of the board be strictly military," and to be sure that the candidate could salute and about-face correctly, that his uniform was neat, clean, and pressed, and that his buttons shone. Perhaps the candidate was aided less by the coaching than by his record. At any rate, on 20 April 1945, Stephan Haller was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army of the United States.

For the next few months his principal task was to interview prospective agents and work out their cover stories. Supplementing his intimate knowledge of German, Germans, and Germany was his painstaking care in details, an incisively logical mind, and a quiet devotion to duty. He went from Verdun to Luxembourg to Belgium. In May his unit moved to Wiesbaden, where his pay and allowances were further increased by two free bottles of champagne each month.

In Wiesbaden, where the unit was known as "Field Base C" or "Triangle," Haller located old SPD friends and began to pick up the broken threads of German politics, while at the same time busy with counterintelligence work. During this period he established the unorthodox operational pattern which he usually followed afterwards. He installed himself in a house well away from the base, living alone and working with his agents there. This pattern of activity was threatened with abrupt termination by an order from Security that he be separated, but his commanding officer and others who knew him well obtained a reversal. During the argument over this order the acting chief of the area wrote, "We have no one in Europe today who has his scientific background," and forecast for him a brilliant career.

"Baron" Haller at Hochheim

The prediction proved right. In the years after the war Haller obtained extremely valuable political and scientific technical intelligence. Although promoted to first lieutenant

in 1946, he asked to be given civilian status, and in July 1947 became an employee of CIG. He was graded at CAF–11 and paid $4,902 annually—a bargain if there ever was one. By this time he was established at Hochheim am Main, an imposing mansion—almost a castle—with marble halls and statuary, walls covered with damask and leather, and a cellar full of champagne. Thus ensconced in "Schloss Haller," which was listed in official records as a political research center, he began to exploit the intelligence potential of the SPD against East Germany and the USSR and to follow French activity in the French Zone of Germany and even in France itself. This second task, apparently carried out through friends made during the days of his exile, produced almost the only information available about Socialist activity in France and won him an official commendation.

The three years that Haller spent in Hochheim were probably the happiest of his life. The talents with which he was born, the scope and depth of his formal education, and the diversity of his international experience, both civil and military, now came into focus. He was working hard. At times he did not leave his apartment on the second floor of the "Schloss" for two or three weeks in a row. He held intense political discussions with visitors, many of whom were not agents but unwitting sources, friends and acquaintances who had known him as an SPD leader and who were more than willing to help him in the "political research" which he was now doing for the Americans. Among his visitors were Schumacher, Ollenhauer, Heine, and other German Socialist leaders. In fact, Haller even arranged formal meetings of the SPD Party Directorate in his quarters. The result of these meetings and discussions was unexcelled political reporting.

Hard as he worked, Haller also found time for fun and games. He was popular with both his colleagues and the townspeople, from the Mayor down. He always sat at the Mayor's table at civic festivities and was in demand as a dance partner among the wives of the local dignitaries. He drank and smoked with zeal, but few people claim to have seen him the worse for alcohol. His cellar was kept well stocked with champagne and the still wines of the Rhine and Moselle. He even had a false bottom installed in his car, so that whenever his driver was sent to the French Zone he could smuggle back

a few dozen bottles of Hoch. And his major domo, Kurt, was sometimes detailed to escort one or another fair young lady to the Schloss of an evening and drive her home again the next morning.

His pleasure in the present did not keep him from planning for the future. He suggested to his superiors that for operational purposes he renounce the U.S. citizenship acquired through military service and become a German again. He would then re-enter the SPD and thus give the newly established Central Intelligence Agency a high-level penetration of one of the two most important political parties in Germany. This position would make him an ideal agent, he felt, for both intelligence collection and political action. It would not be suspected that his renunciation of American citizenship and renewal of old ties were not genuine; the same thing had been done by others, including a former mayor of Hamburg. But Haller also made conditions. He wanted to keep his U.S. passport—he was quite proud of being an American—and he wanted assurances that when the time came he could return to the United States, his citizenship reactivated. This proposal was not accepted. He frequently referred to it in later days as a missed opportunity.

Haller was intuitive as well as logical. He had a remarkable ability to smell out Communist penetrations of the various civil governments set up in the German states. He felt sure, for example, that the Minister of the Interior for Land Hesse, Hans Venedey, was a Communist; and with his customary pertinacity he set out to prove it. His efforts led the Military Governor to complain to Haller's superior: he "had a good little government going there and Haller was upsetting it." It seems apparent that Haller then had a talk with the SPD leadership, for Venedey was expelled from the SPD for acts injurious to the party. He re-emerged as a functionary of the German Communist Party.

From Politics to Science

In March 1949 CIA headquarters for Haller's area moved from Heidelburg to Karlsruhe, and Haller set up shop in another castle, at Pforzheim. In part his work here was a continuation of the three years at Hochheim. His old SPD friends continued to visit him and furnish valuable political informa-

tion. These visits also gave him a chance to explain his own views, which were of course those of the U.S. Government, and thus to combine intelligence collection with political action. But some of his duties were new. Because of his scientific background, he was placed in charge of a U.S. program for paying subsidies to German scientists, part of a much larger operation designed to deny German scientific talent to the Soviets. This assignment required him to establish and maintain a new cover, one suited to its purpose.

In 1951, his cover well established, he was shifted to Berlin, there to direct operations against scientific targets in the East Zone of Germany. As usual, he took a house which served as both living quarters and base of operations. He responded to the tighter operational environment by intensifying personal control. He rarely went to parties now. He refused to let anyone else handle his agents, even when he was ill. He did not like to put on paper the mass of information accumulated in his head.

He began work, with others, on an operation designed to hinder the Soviet atomic energy program by inducing large-scale defection among German specialist craftsmen in the East Zone. These workers made the fine nickel wire mesh used for the essential separation of uranium isotopes. The scheme worked; technicians and their families defected in droves and were flown to West Germany. But Haller was disappointed to learn later that the Soviets were only inconvenienced, not thwarted. The vanished craftsmen were replaced. His own part in the operation, however, was well done, and in April 1951 headquarters sent him a congratulatory wire. One of his chiefs at about this time took written note of his lone-wolf tendencies, but all were unanimous that his work, and particularly his reporting of scientific intelligence, was excellent.

The German and Austrian scientists who had served with Haller in the *Prestation Savante* in France soon after the beginning of World War II now constituted a pool of assets. For two more years he worked with some of them in acquiring scientific and technical intelligence. A love affair with a young German actress ended when she married his rival, but his disappointment did not impair his work. The quality and

quantity of his output is evidenced in the repeated efforts of his superiors to get him paid more nearly what it was worth:

> His production is phenomenally high, and the many cases he runs are distinguished for the professionalism evident in their conduct. Although outstandingly qualified in background for conduct of positive intelligence operations covering technical and scientific subjects, he has demonstrated marked ability in conducting other kinds of positive intelligence and CE cases. . . . I should like to underline the fact that in the handling of agents and the production of intelligence, particularly in the scientific and technical field, in this area, Haller is, in my opinion, without a peer.

His scope expanded as scientific conferences in Switzerland and elsewhere enabled him to discuss the meetings with old friends who had attended, professors and other intellectuals. Both the briefings and the debriefings of this period are classics. In late 1955 he debriefed Leo Bauer, former leading functionary of the East German Communist Party, who because of his personal acquaintance with Haller had refused to talk to any other American official. He also debriefed Erica Glaser Wallach, who had gone to East Germany to locate her foster-father, Noel Field.

His friends remember only one interview that left him shaken. Dr. Gustave Hertz, one of the leading German scientists who worked on the Soviet atomic energy program, had returned to Germany with his secretary, Ellen Mueller, her husband, and their four children. The family was rushed to a safehouse, and Haller was called. As he began his careful questioning, little hands started tugging at his trouser-legs and clutching at his coat. Soon one and then another child, chomping hard candies, had struggled into his lap. While their mother beamed with a pride that was obviously a factor in her cooperativeness, the two continued the ascent, reaching Haller's sagging shoulders and making room for the other two members of the expedition. Haller has been called both a man's man and a lady's man, but no one ever called him a children's man. Somehow he struggled through the questioning. He emerged perspiring and a little stunned, as though he had been kicked in the stomach. Perhaps he had. All future dealings with Frau Mueller were handled by his assistant.

The Sheer Pinnacle

By now he was near the peak of his career. He was using fully his keen intellect, depth of recall, sensitivity, practical astuteness and imagination, his background in languages, science, and politics, and his feel for operations. His ability to deal with people amounted to genius. He was good at it because he was patient and, above all, because he was interested in people. Unlike most refugees, he had no political or personal axe to grind. He was an accurate observer and reporter. He could talk to all classes of Germans, from artists and professors to farmers and laborers, each in their own language—an indispensable skill in a country in which speech differences mirror both social levels and geography. His relations with his contacts were on two levels—of friendly personal participation and of impassive objectivity—without the latter being evident to them. Perhaps his membership in a race recently and bitterly persecuted by the Germans strengthened this faculty and sharpened his ability to use German agents for the purposes of his new homeland.

He did not grow careless or conceited with success. He remained a meticulous craftsman. Before he debriefed a source, he mastered the subject to be discussed. His agents were made comfortable not only by his cigars and beer but also by the easy flow of communication. And he did not end until he had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed, moreover, to remain alert for operational leads—potential agents, counterintelligence indicators, propaganda possibilities. When Haller was finished, there were no more questions to be asked. And though he groaned over the chore of putting it on paper, his reporting became thorough—and more than thorough, illuminating—for he rarely failed to make interpretive comments. Despite the bulk of his reporting he wrote everything in longhand.

His work remained consistently solid, even brilliant. Some of it was considered sufficiently important to be brought to the personal attention of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director, impressed, thought that the promotions which his superiors had got for him were not enough. Stephan Haller thus became a rarity, a man promoted to the top of Civil Service ranks not because he was an exceptional execu-

tive—he had never occupied an executive position—but solely because he was an exceptional case officer. The Director sent him a personal letter of congratulation, and shortly thereafter, when he was called to headquarters, gave a luncheon in his honor. Haller was deeply moved. He often spoke later of the great honor conferred on him in Washington. His life and work reached on that day the top of a rocket-like trajectory. It was for him a moment of true glory.

After his return to Germany and a period of hard work in Berlin, he went in mid-1956 to Darmstadt to visit friends. Awakening in a strange room, in the middle of the night, he reached out for the light, but on the wrong side, and fell out of bed. The fall broke his hip. A German doctor placed a pin in the fracture, but the leg kept on giving him trouble. He went to a hospital in Munich, where leeches were used in an effort to reduce his blood pressure. The results were not good. He developed phlebitis.

These physical misfortunes would not have been the beginning of the end for most of us, who can learn to be satisfied with past achievements and past honors, financial comfort, and a familiar circle of family and friends. Stephan Haller was a man of different breed. With all the intensity of his character he had wound his life around one thing, his work. Work and the feeling that what he did was recognized were his entire psychological sustenance. Now that appeared to be gone.

Lying month upon month in bed in the Army Hospital in Frankfurt, he grew ever more depressed, thinking of how he could do nothing now to justify those honors heaped on him, and how little he would ever be likely to do again. Remembering that it had once been only his performance which had saved him from the Security axe, he even developed a growing fear that he would be released from the service, after thirteen years, because he had stopped producing. No amount of reassurance by friends and fellow-workers could dispel this irrational figment of his frustrated energy. His collapse was so alarming that he was returned to Washington in February 1957 and treated at the George Washington University Hospital. About a month later he was discharged.

He took an apartment on Sixteenth Street. Far from familiar Europe, out of touch with his world of operational activity, Haller fell victim of that sense of uselessness with which the jealous gods, perhaps, had visited him at the summit of his life. On 26 April 1957 he was stricken by a heart attack and died.

Apologia and challenge for the covert reporter in a land where learning is an elite privilege, time is cheap, and the dignity of friendship dear.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN AN UNLETTERED LAND

Francis Hollyman

If analysts and estimators find their political information on the illiterate countries lacking in depth, confined to the ostensible policies and evident intrigues of a few dominant families and providing little insight into future moves, sub-surface trends, or popular attitudes, the reasons are not far to seek. Our reporters in these countries, both the Foreign Service officers who maintain correct official contacts and especially the covert reporter whose business it is to probe outside this official sphere, must pit their efforts against formidable obstacles deriving from the peculiarities of an anachronistic society.

25X1 Take [redacted] An American trying to use [redacted] citizens as clandestine sources of political information, however well versed in Arabic and well acquainted with the country he may be, has to get through three concentric barriers before he can begin to look for the information inside. The first is the fact that there are very few native residents in a position to have political information. Second, the odds are all against getting satisfactory covert access to any of those who do. And third, if you do gain access to a potential source, his patterns of motivation and behavior are such that it requires consummate skill in an American to get him to produce. 25X1

Unschooled Public and Rarefied Politics

The first difficulty, the scarcity of [redacted] in a position to have useful information, arises in part from meager opportunity for education and in part from traditional restrictions on participation in political and public life. [redacted] who are well educated by the standards of their country, including some businessmen and many government functionaries but 25X1 25X1

few others, have generally had no more than eight or nine years of school, with a large part of that devoted to the Koran. Well over ninety-nine percent of the populace has been given much less schooling or none at all. A slight expansion of secondary education in recent years has not yet had any appreciable effect on the general level of elite learning. Plans for higher education, aside from the training of religious figures and a few teachers, are still in the dream stage. Only a very small fraction of one percent of the population can go abroad and get a better education than is offered by the [redacted] elementary schools. 25X1

Even at the elementary level, [redacted] schools tend to leave large blind spots with regard to political matters. Subjects such as geography and world affairs are scarcely touched. It is not uncommon to find that a relatively well-educated [redacted] who occupies an important place in commerce or government cannot read a map, and he may not even be aware that the world is not flat! With this shocking elementary ignorance he cannot begin to comprehend or care about more complex or subtle things like the meaning of the Iron Curtain or problems springing from Communist imperialism. The extremely few who have overcome these educational deficiencies by going abroad are still far from politically sophisticated; they are likely to be swallowed in the sea of ignorance around them, and they have nowhere to turn to get accurate current information. 25X1 25X1

The public media of information are weak, and do little to remedy the collossal deficiency in education. Basic information in the form of published surveys, handbooks, lists, directories, statistics, charts, maps, etc., is virtually nonexistent. The official radio and press service, organized efficiently in recent years, has become more effective in preventive control of thought rather than in informational content. It gives little place for commentary except that promoting government policy and those slogans of Arab nationalism considered best suited to [redacted] interests. [redacted] newspapers similarly give only a small fraction of the news available, and the paucity of published information is often more striking in domestic matters than on important international questions. 25X1

The newspapers are in any case little read; scarcely one [redacted] in a thousand is a subscriber. But there is a con- 25X1

siderable amount of radio listening, and the people have generally come to rely on the powerful Egyptian radio as a source for news. At the height of the Suez crisis nearly all those who had access to radios listened also to at least one Moscow broadcast in Arabic daily; and they may now be turning to some extent to the Bagdad radio.

The restrictive character of the [redacted] government abets the low educational level in severely circumscribing the number of citizens in a position to be well informed about political questions of interest to us. A great deal of the most important information on political questions is restricted [redacted] A very few outsiders, no more than a handful at present, have succeeded in entering this charmed circle through personal ability based on a good foreign education; this phenomenon is the exception rather than the rule. Other officials of the government are generally mere functionaries, lacking access to much information on activities outside their own offices. 25X1 25X1

There is a tendency to keep the most important matters strictly [redacted] keep personnel of the ministries from being well informed. And in matters which do go to a ministry, an unusual degree of reliance is placed on the spoken word, the personal mission, and the personal memory of the minister himself. Furthermore, even when there are documents covering a transaction, they are not likely to be filed in such a way as to be easily accessible when they are more than a few days old. It is not unusual for an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, to spend hours in an unsuccessful search for some item, paging through irrelevant jumbled material or unindexed chronological entries. 25X1

Outside the ranks of the government, only a few [redacted] through powerful business or family interests, have even indirect access to authentic information on political questions. The general public completely lacks such access, and under present conditions does not concern itself very seriously about the lack. 25X1

Reaching the Rare Politico

The second major difficulty for the political reporter is the relative inaccessibility of those few [redacted] who *are* well informed about political matters. The hindrances to satisfactory access, being in part characteristic of the restrictive political and social system of the country, affect all kinds of reporting, but there are certain complications which make the effects of the system broader and more serious in the field of clandestine information-collecting activities than in the overt field. 25X1

Ways of life in a country like [redacted] make it hard to reach any good potential source some of the time, and hard to reach some of them at any time. The virtual absence of easy social contacts, the lack of suitable public meeting places, the staggering inadequacy of public communications, and the suspicions commonly aroused among native residents by outsiders attempting to move freely among them—all make the task unbelievably time-consuming. Hardest to see are the persons who are in the highest positions, or whose work does not call for contact with foreigners, or who speak only Arabic; and the majority of good potential sources are probably in these categories. 25X1

The travel habits of practically all important native figures make them an elusive quarry for the foreigner, who has little mobility in [redacted] Persons of interest to us often stay for long periods of time in [redacted] Government personages also absent themselves frequently for trips abroad. The religious requirements of Ramadan, the month of fasting, and of the annual *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca tend to damp down any information-collecting activities for considerable periods of time. In sum, almost any native source is likely to be out of reach for at least a few months of the year, in some instances for more than half of each year. 25X1 25X1

These difficulties are particularly trying when we are seeking initial contact with new potential sources. We sometimes have to wait for months because they are not in a place where we can see them and there is no other means of initial communication that carries any hope of secrecy. The choice of possible native sources is so narrow and the ways of access to them are so extremely few that almost any effort to find and develop new clandestine sources is vulnerable to detection by friend and foe alike. There is almost invariably a prolonged period of intense awkardness and insecurity in the preliminaries to initial clandestine contact.

Psycho-Cultural Characteristics

Characteristic peculiarities of attitude, motivation, and behavior constitute a third major difficulty in the use of native sources for political information. They are a considerable obstacle even to the overt reporter, but in clandestine information-collecting activities they also make it much harder to assess the personal reliability of a potential source. I do not refer here primarily to the obvious peculiarities of outlook caused by limited education, religious beliefs, social customs, restrictions in political and public life, and the thought patterns of a language so unlike our own. Peculiarities of this kind, readily identifiable, can be anticipated and partly compensated for in our training and preparation for the work.

More difficult to handle are other, subtler peculiarities, ones which would probably not be very apparent if we ourselves did not have definite expectations of a behavior which fits our requirements in those whom we want to use as sources. To a [redacted] the peculiarities lie in our expectations, not in the attitudes and motivations fundamental to his way of life.

25X1

One of these is his sense of time, a practical one from his standpoint, if impractical from ours. For him, infinity stretches out ahead, contiguous and real. He seldom, perhaps never, feels the pressure of time. The concept of a fiscal year is wholly foreign to him, either as a measure of time or as a means of controlling expenditures. The notion of "production" of political information in certain quantities within a certain period would puzzle him. He does not have our sense of a schedule, of a deadline, of a program. Nothing can be done to make him work at a set rate of speed, let alone hurry.

Another of these subtler peculiarities is his sense of purpose, which bears little obvious resemblance to ours. Aside from wanting to be a proper Arab and a good Muslim, he has no strong aims or convictions. His experience is too little, his ignorance too great, to provide a foundation for opposition to Communist imperialism as his motive force. He has no strong sense of socio-political responsibility, no felt need for thinking, for making a political choice. The idea of subscribing to a positive ideological program or doctrine, except as it incorporates his immediate Arab interests, is beyond him. He does not like to generalize about the world, because all he knows is his home, the marketplace, the desert, and the edge of the sea. Very often his attitude is that of the merchant, even if he is not engaged in commerce. His aims and desires are very simple ones, and he does not want to change them.

25X1

The [redacted] often reacts in ways that surprise those who do not know him, or fails to react in the ways they expect. He is essentially gentle, not belligerent. At the height of the 1956 Suez crisis he hoped for nothing more than an immediate end to the fighting; he could not comprehend the international forces at work, and he was afraid. He respects force partly because it is simple and within his comprehension. Although he is often distrustful of British diplomacy, he understands and makes allowance for a frank statement that such-and-such is in the British interest and British policy is planned accordingly. He rather distrusts the profession of lofty moral principle as a basis for policy on the part of any government, partly because the principle may be too complicated or too different from his own way of thinking, partly because he does his political thinking—such as it is—in terms of interest, not principles. He likes the material things which the western world may have made available to him to make life more pleasant, but if he has been abroad he generally returns happily home, not very much impressed by other aspects of western civilization.

Relying largely on oral communication, he tends to simplify and omit when he has to deal with complicated matters. He cannot easily distinguish fact from rumor. He is not good at making an estimate of a situation, or even at judging the state of public opinion, because he is not used to thinking along these lines. When a new situation develops, he does not fail to react, but his reactions are simple and direct, based on his

immediate interest. An observer or overt collector needs a long period of living among these people and learning to think in their way to acquire the instinctive appreciation that will make him a sensitive reporter.

25X1 The covert reporter has the further problem of assessing the individual [redacted] as a potential agent, and then of maintaining his motivation and his production. As a clandestine collector of information, it is hard for a [redacted] to 25X1 work in a methodical way, because method is not part of his make-up. He rarely if ever has the spirit of fighting for a cause; but on the other hand, even if he is venal, he will do very little to accomplish things he does not believe in. He cannot be ordered bluntly, because he cherishes the little niceties in personal dealings which are his way. He needs a great deal of orientation and encouragement. What he usually prizes most in this activity is an abiding personal relationship that gives him understanding, dignity, and friendship.

* * *

These, then, are the awesome obstacles to political reporting from a country where illiteracy [redacted] leave 25X1 only a handful of worthwhile sources of information, where customs make this handful difficult to reach and confidential dealings almost impossible, and where the cultural differences that wall off westerners go down to the very roots of motivation and thinking. These obstacles have been described with particular reference to [redacted] but the situation there is 25X1 not unlike that in a score of equally important other countries where the people are unfamiliar with the written word, reserved and imprecise with the spoken, and profoundly different in their way of life.

An amateur graphologist pleads for at least a dry run on an assessment technique of potential value in intelligence.

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS AS AN ASSESSMENT AID

Keith Laycock

The assertion that reliable clues to a person's character [1] and some of his capabilities may be derived from analysis of his handwriting usually evokes a vigorous *pro* or *con* reaction which seems to originate somewhere in the subconscious mind and not to reflect a reasoned consideration of the proposition. The reaction is at times so strong as to give a psychologist the impression that those who shrink from the idea do so because they fear exposure and those who eagerly embrace it are the kind who like to snoop and pry. Whatever the psychological reasons, one thing is certain: the proposition is a good one for starting a controversy.

The art of handwriting analysis—graphology, as it is more commonly called, especially in Europe—has two branches: an established and "respectable" one devoted to the identification of individuals by their handwriting, and a black-sheep branch dealing with the assessment of personality. The latter is the subject of this paper. I am not a professional graphologist, but I have explored the subject enough to be convinced that this black art has a practical application in the assessment of persons to whom access for other character tests is limited.

Since character assessment (as distinct from capabilities-testing) is as complex as human nature itself, and the art of handwriting analysis is exceedingly difficult in its detail, the most that can be achieved in any short paper is to give an outline of the theory involved, in the hope that those readers who have serious limited-access assessment problems will be encouraged to explore the matter further, independently,

[1] By *character* I mean the individual constellation and balance of drives, inhibitions, and habits which determines how (rather than how effectively) a man will behave in a given situation.

either through study or by enlisting the services of a professional graphologist.

Plotting the Terms of Reference

Anyone undertaking serious study or investigation of graphology—or of any assessment system, for that matter—must settle three formidable related questions before he can safely submerge himself in the "how" of the technique at all, to wit: 1) How far do we propose to go in plumbing the ramified depths of a subject's character? 2) How do we handle the semantic problems which plague character descriptions? 3) What do we do about standards for judging the ethical aspects of character?

It seems to me, on the first question, that we have to specify in some detail precisely what we want to know about a subject's character before we can proceed in any assessment operation, and then keep within these sharply delineated limits to avoid an extensive mire. Most executives appear willing to settle for any assessment system which will consistently and reliably tip them off to those *peculiarities* of a given individual which will be helpful and those which will be harmful in the job they are trying to fill. They seldom appear to be interested in ultimates about anyone's character, in complete "character-pictures" pages long, or in abstract conceptions that have to be interpreted. From the purely practical point of view, then, assessment starts with the job description, and that job description should be supplemented by a list of desirable, undesirable, and fatal traits. In the absence of such a guide, assessment becomes perforce an undertaking to describe all the traits of a given subject, an exceedingly unrealistic exercise in the present state of psychological knowledge and one which, if conscientiously carried out, results in massive and complicated reports, long delayed.

I should accordingly, without prejudice to the usability of graphology in the field of deeper research, answer the first question as follows: We should consider a reasonably acceptable result from this technique to be a report containing a reliable guide to those character-traits of the subject which make him fit or unfit for the job we have in mind, as specified by us, plus a warning on any character-traits that deviate strongly from the average. For example: We specify that we want to fill a bank-teller's job. For this (with apologies to bank tellers)

we want a stable and mediocre person who is conscientious, able to stand dull routine, accurate, and honest, one who is *not* quarrelsome, thieving, aggressive, or imaginative. We assume that in other respects he will be run-of-the-mill. The assessment turns up one candidate who meets the specifications of general mediocrity and willingness to handle other people's money without appropriating it but who is also exceedingly vain, in fact a peacock. Such a potentially dangerous factor ought to be reported to us, even if we have not required it.

Our second problem, semantics, can cause a great deal of difficulty either in the exercise of the graphological art or in the study of it; it is a pitfall into which many have tumbled. What is an "honest" man? What is a "brave" man? Definition of such words is a practical impossibility, since the third unknown, an ethical standard, is involved. If we could establish agreed ethical standards, we could, no doubt, compose definitions which would be adequate, but there does not now appear to be such a set of standards. In fact, at this point in human history there seems to be more confusion than ever over whether the end justifies the means or is inseparable from them. We are accordingly, as far as I can see, limited in using characterological terms to those denoting specific acts such as talking, stealing, lying, etc., and must eschew words with ethical overtones. Many writers and students on the subject have fallen into the ethics trap, so let both student and practitioner beware.

It is necessary to add yet another caution: The analysis of handwriting is an art, not a science, and the quality of the result is dependent upon the caliber and capacity of the artist. Consequently, the statistical evaluation of graphology according to the accuracy of the results obtained by a cross-section of its practitioners is meaningless. The question whether graphology can be used reliably in assessment work seems to me to depend on whether even *one* person can do it consistently, not whether a majority of those who claim to be competent can get results. The evaluator should be aware that a great many so-called graphologists are either dilettantes or charlatans, using an art of which they have a smattering to swindle or astound the gullible. It is, in fact, this swarm of fortune-tellers and mystics, with a small but noisy retinue of supporters making extravagant claims, who have done that recurring

damage to the reputation of graphology which has served to deprive many a harassed executive of its assistance.

Basis for the Art

As the reader will see from the bibliography attached at the end of this article, much has been written on the "how" of graphology. The bibliography could be much longer without exhausting the list of serious works. The student who reads these books will find that, while there is considerable divergence among them in the area of fundamental theory, there is striking unanimity on the more concrete technical level. This situation no doubt reflects the general dilemma of assessment: it is a lot easier to devise tests that reveal a hidden habit, such as "taking ways," than to uncover the underlying psychological reasons for the habit. We shall therefore try as far as possible to avoid the more abstruse aspects of the subject in discussing next the general validity of the thesis that reliable clues to the character and to some of the capabilities of a person may be derived from competent analysis of his handwriting.

Essentially, two points have to be established, first that the individuality of every person's handwriting is caused primarily by psychological, as distinct from mechanical, characteristics peculiar to the writer, and second, that there is reflected in a given handwriting, in symbol form, a hidden "story" about these psychological factors which a graphologist can "read." The individuality and peculiarity of every person's handwriting is accepted by the courts, and it follows that a person's handwriting must change very slowly and slightly or not at all during his adult life, since otherwise the courts would not accept holographic evidence.

If this individuality in writing were the result of mechanical influences only, then the enormous deviations from letter forms taught in school which some calligraphies exhibit would be due to extreme mechanical idiosyncrasies, not to say difficulties, peculiar to the writer. The fact is, however, that writers with exceedingly peculiar handwritings perform all other tasks with about the same mechanical competence as the next man, and conversely, persons who are markedly unadroit often have more regular handwritings than those of considerable mechan-

ical skill. Mechanical skill, in fact, is one of the abilities which can *not* be deduced from handwriting.

Handwriting is in reality brain-writing, as the following experiment will prove to any reader who cares to try it: Sign your name on a piece of paper. Now take the writing instrument between your molars and sign; then put the instrument between your big and second toes and write your name that way. With some practice legible signatures can be produced in this fashion, which on comparison will be found to resemble closely (with due allowance for mechanical factors!) the work produced by the hand. Even if you cannot control your neck or leg muscles sufficiently to produce legible scrawls, you will be able to see that you are *trying* to direct the instrument held in teeth or toes to produce *the image you have in mind.* (I would warn the reader who attempts this experiment either to make sure of privacy or to let any possible intruder know beforehand what he is trying to do. It can be very embarrassing to be caught barefoot in simian concentration on managing a pencil with your toes.)

There are a number of cogent reasons why psychological rather than mechanical factors dictate the main calligraphic peculiarities of a person who does not have a neurological condition of some sort. Let's look briefly at the influence of a dozen common psychological motivations.

Pride in Appearances. A writer usually feels that his handwriting's appearance represents him to the reader and to the community at large. He accordingly makes a certain amount of effort, depending on the degree to which he feels appearances are important, to make his calligraphy look "good." Therefore his writing will in some degree reflect his personal taste in what looks good, and how much importance he places on looking good.

Social Attitude. Except in the case of memoranda written for notekeeping, the act of writing has strong social implications. It is an act of communication, seeking to reach and influence one or more readers, whether with generous or sinister motives. How the writer moves across the paper toward the reader must, as a matter of common sense, reflect somewhat his attitude. A self-confident, outgoing, cheerful, trusting writer who loves people is bound to cross the page in a very different way than the writer who hates, fears, and dis-

trusts others, and perhaps himself as well. As a matter of common observation such opposite types *act* differently, use different gestures, have different smiles, etc.; it is hardly surprising that their gestures on paper would differ.

Docility and Truculence. The act of writing is an act of conformity: if certain standards are not met, the communication can be read only with difficulty or not at all. Here the people who like to make things difficult for others can have a field day by distorting their handwriting, leaving it just readable enough to make the reading a torture. Those who rebel in principle against conformity will also maim their writing, and so will some gentlemen who fear they may be called to account for what they have written. Others there are who conform rigidly to the set standards, some willingly, some desperately, some furtively, and some because they have no particular personal preferences to express.

The Shock of Early Battles. Writing may bear scars. Learning to write is one of the first great struggles with society which many of us undergo, faced suddenly with a frightfully difficult task which we must perform or remain illiterate. The job can be torture, or a game; that depends on many things. But the attitudes toward writing then established (cramped, worried, overanxious; or relaxed, confident, free-flowing?) are often reflected throughout life.

Emotional Disturbance. Writing is an act of self-expression, sometimes of feelings hidden from the conscious mind. A pen driven by boiling emotions will move very differently than one in the hand of a calculating or apathetic "cold fish." The writer who is tormented by ungratified (perhaps ungratifiable!) sex wishes will unwittingly interject some sex-wish symbols into his calligraphy. Where these wishes include a desire to commit rape-murders, the symbolism can be very sinister indeed.

Energy and Fatigue. Writing is a piece of work, to some a highly disagreeable chore and to all an effort requiring concentration and output of energy. Is the writer ebullient with energy? Or does he wearily drag one foot after the other? Is he tireless or easily fatigued? Is he liberal with his energies, or does he try to economize on every movement? The impact of his pen on the paper will certainly vary with these traits.

Agility and Impatience. As a means of communication, writing is a slow technique. It is adequate only for the slow thinker; to the man whose mind is leaping ahead of his hand it becomes an irritating impediment. But agile minds may react variously to this drag: some devise ingenious shortcuts, others butcher the script beyond recognition. The ruthless ones wade over the paper; the considerate ones torment themselves with conscientious printing.

The Devious Intent. The writer knows that what he has written can be used for purposes he never intended or even foresaw. Therefore the prudent man with ulterior motives writes cautiously, and the self-conscious criminal may choose ornate, imposing script. Men who prowl craftily through life seldom caper across paper.

One's Path to Glory. We all desire to attain status among our fellows. Do we try to gain it by hard work? By sudden, spectacular achievement? By illegitimate methods? By violence? By bragging? Would it not be strange, after receiving a letter full of exaggerated capitals and ornate flourishes, with various senseless embellishments for general effect, to find that the writer was a conscientious, self-effacing, hard-working drudge?

The Root of Evil. We all have some emotional relationship or attitude toward money. Do we spend nights dreaming of it? Squander it? Hoard it? Steal it? Despise it? Feel guilty about having it? Most accountants and bookkeepers can tell you, without even thinking, how a man feels about money by the way he writes a check. Some of them can make quite a good guess also about how far he trusts people.

Practice of the Art

At this point the reader will probably be satisfied that about as many factors in a man's habits, attitudes, and traits influence the formation of his handwriting as he has habits, attitudes and traits, and may agree that peculiarities in handwriting are mainly generated by the psychological peculiarities of the writer. We still, however, have not established the validity of point two, that a graphologist can consistently interpret peculiarities in writing to reveal the peculiarities behind them. If systematic interpretation of handwriting is to be possible, peculiarities or their combinations that indi-

cate a certain trait of character in one writer must indicate that trait in others, and be subject to interpretation according to some set of rules.

In an article of this length I cannot present the voluminous tabulations which have been compiled by graphological analysts relating specific peculiarities to specific traits. Moreover, simply presenting such tabulations would hardly convince the reader that the tabulated relationships are in fact correct; paper will, after all, put up with anything that is written on it. In my experience, the only way you can convince a real skeptic that this kind of interpretation is consistently possible is to perform it consistently, or else cite performance data from a source he respects. From my own files I can present quite a few cases where graphologists have made astonishingly accurate delineations of the character of persons in whom we had abiding interest of great importance, and I would like to cite two of the most striking ones very briefly. On these I am prepared to produce (for those with proper clearances only) precise documentary proof.

The first concerns a person who carried out a monumental performance in duplicity for several years at considerable risk. A grapholigist who knew nothing about him but his penmanship described him in such accurate terms that when a sterilized version of the graphological report was circulated without any other indication of identity to five persons who had known him well, all five recognized him from the description and four concurred in it entirely. The fifth acquaintance agreed on all points except one: he did not think the subject as intelligent as the graphologist assessed him to be. Meanwhile a standard assessment was made by psychologists, who were in agreement that the man had a very high order of intelligence indeed.

The other case, a man who had carried out an even more extraordinary deception, was processed by both a European and an American graphologist. The two descriptions not only concurred in all major points, but were ultimately proved to be far more accurate than we believed at the time they were produced.

This, of course, is not evidence, in the scientific sense, on the critical question of consistent performance. In both cases the handwriting specimens were of the striking kind which

even a layman would recognize as having elements of greatness from the espionage point of view. To the best of my knowledge, and strangely enough when one thinks of the controversy that has raged around this subject, a proper test run has never been devised and carried out, at least not in the United States, to determine whether *any* graphologist can consistently deliver accurate results in the area of character delineation. Consistent results in the psychiatric area concerned with the detection of mental illness appear to be pretty well established,[2] and these are certainly impressive. That is a different matter, however, from providing data on the character peculiarities of people who are "sane." It is high time that such a determination were undertaken, and at the end of this article I shall take the liberty of making specific recommendations on such a test.

In the absence of a present fund of test data to throw at the skeptic, I resort to offering him a brief description of one or two graphological techniques and the thinking behind them. I hope thereby to bring him to the point of joining the man who needs means for limited-access assessment and helping him generate pressure for carrying out a proper proving problem on the pivotal question—can anybody at all do this work with reasonable accuracy and consistency?

Sorting Out the Symbols

The techniques employed by the graphologist to bring out the hidden character-story in a given handwriting rest upon the interpretation of symbolism in the specimen. There are two kinds of symbol-groups—those common to a society or culture, and those which the writer may have devised on his own, usually unconsciously, to express subconscious wishes, fears, hatreds, and the like. We are all so surrounded and submersed in symbols and symbolism that we are often oblivious to the tremendous expressive and controlling force of this cultural factor. In some way not understood, symbols are linked with the deepest impulses of the mind. They are not merely a matter of simple association, as performed by Pavlov's dog. Some symbols are coarse—the Swastika, the Hammer and Sickle, the Rising Sun, the Dollar Sign, the Cross.

[2] See Lewinson & Zubin, *Handwriting Analysis*, King's Crown Press, N.Y., 1942.

Others are less so—the jagged, angular writing that suggest combat, cutting, tearing; the hidden rope and dagger; the blots and drips of ink, like poison and bloodstains, in some writing; the hidden treble clef of the music-lover. Some symbolism is subtle—the receding left margin, making inner reservations; the flung-lance t-cross harpooning its victim; the whole writing back-slanting, as though resisting or reneging.

The interpretation of these symbols requires a process of analysis more or less as follows: First, all deviations from the model calligraphy the writer was originally taught in school, insofar as this can be determined, are noted. That requires a very substantial knowledge on the part of the analyst as to scripts and formats taught in different parts of the world at different times. Second, these and other symbolic deviations are evaluated in terms of the extensive lists of character indicators compiled in tabular form by generations of graphologists. Then the individual indicators are compared and sorted to form groups comprising for example those indicating persistence or lack thereof, aggressiveness or lack of it; and the picture that emerges is then checked for consistency.

A complete re-evaluation has to be made when major inconsistencies are detected or where confusion results. This inconsistency or confusion is generally due to the fact that a given set of peculiarities in handwriting will reflect the corresponding set of positive peculiarities in the writer only about two-thirds of the time, and in the other third the symbolism may be *inverted,* reflecting not the positive trait but a subconscious wish for the missing quality. A bold and massive general's handwriting sometimes comes from a Mickey Mouse of a man who would like to be a general but doesn't dare and hasn't the capacity. At times a complex mixture of direct, inverted, and wish symbols is present, and the graphologist is stuck with a tiresome cut-and-try process until he comes up with a consistent picture. It is no wonder that the charlatan and the dilettante, who don't do the required cross-checking and therefore should stick to simple handwritings, from time to time fall on these inconsistencies and are exposed. Unfortunately, people then blame the art, not the practitioners.

These are the mechanics of the interpretive process, but there also is an "intuitive" factor involved. There are so

many aspects of symbolism to consider more or less simultaneously that something like a computer is really needed to perform the drudgery of comparison; and I believe that the art, if it is ever to become a science, will have to have electronic support for the human brain. But frequently some analysts seem readily to understand specimens of writing that baffle others, and vice versa. Still others seem to interpret handwriting by way of some subconscious response of their own to the latticework of symbols they see, without knowing how they do it.

A notorious case in point is that of Roda Wieser, who once undertook to analyze the handwriting of hundreds of jailed criminals and then compared it with that of "honest" men (i.e., men not in jail!). To cap the comedy, she picked policemen as the "honest" men, apparently not realizing that she was actually only comparing the handwriting of *unsuccessful* criminals with that of a group no better or worse than other men involved in crime, but hardly ipso facto honest. Entangled in the semantic problem and her ignorance of criminology, Roda labored long and hard and produced the strange book listed in the bibliography. Yet she was an almost phenomenal interpretive handwriting analyst; she appears simply not to have known how she did it.

A Kindergarten Case

Let us look, by way of elementary illustration, at one segment of the symbol structure and something of its interpretation. We shall stick to "direct" interpretation only, since the "inversion" and "wish" aspects would confuse matters and are not essential to getting a grasp on principles. In fact, if the reader sticks to the direct approach and does a little study on the side, he can soon qualify for dilettantism and might even become a quack.

When we write a letter by hand on a blank sheet of paper, we enter as it were an open area; and as we write across this field, we move upward, downward, and incessantly forward and backward as well. These four directions and the zones they point to immediately involve a common or "cultural" symbolism. In our society the four have relatively uniform implications; take at random phrases like *high* ideals, *low* life, a *backward* child, a *progressive* firm. In writing, the way

we behave with respect to these directions and how we distort our movements in these zones has a strong significance in individual symbolism. In interpreting the significance of these symbols the graphologist (as distinct from the charlatan, however well-read) spends hours and sometimes days matching up the various indicators to see how they jibe. He will study slant, pressure, the way of joining the letters, size of print, flow of the lines, speed of writing, extraneous symbols, etc., etc., etc., in each case building up a pyramid of data, which, if he is sufficiently competent, ultimately makes consistent sense. For the purpose of our illustration, we can only show a few fragments of the process.

In the specimen of Figure 1, the right margin goes further and further right and the left margin also slopes to the right. As the writer proceeds he strives to get closer and closer to the reader, ending up practically in his lap. The capitals and upper loops in this specimen show distinctly the writer's freedom of movement in the upper zones, above the line of writing, but note how repressed and hesitant he is in venturing below the line. We conclude that he is far more at home in the world of ideas and ideals than in material and animal activities. The letter-formations are extended toward the right, curtailed toward the left: the writer is in a hurry to get to his goal (or *away* from his origins, himself, his past, etc.). The whole slants upward and onward.

We thus have a small fragment of the giant composite picture we have to construct before we know what the fragments mean. The writer seems at this point to be an idea-man, idealist, or dreamer who is intent upon reaching the reader and careful to keep out of the mire, or else he is pretending to be that kind of person, or wishing he was, and moving full tilt.



FIGURE 1

Figure 2 reproduces a charlatan's analysis (in this instance correct) of two specimens for one pair of traits—talkativeness-secretiveness. I choose this example not only because it deals with one of the easiest human traits to detect in handwriting and by personal contact, but also because application of these indicators is within the capabilities of the lay reader, who may wish to experiment a little on his own, by scanning the writing of persons he knows and whose coefficient of garrulity he knows. I feel reasonably safe in saying that if the reader rules out those specimens which show contradictory indications (such as large scrawly writing with closed and knotted o's and a's) he will soon discover that there is a high degree of correlation between a given writer's talkativeness and the indicators cited in Figure 2, and that the more indicators of either group there are present in a given specimen, the more marked the trait will be.

If the reader wishes rather to test out the effectiveness of some graphologist, what material should he be prepared to submit? At least several pages of work, if possible from different sittings, one at least bearing a signature. The writing should be on unruled paper in ink or good pencil, produced with an instrument that suits the writer and under writing conditions to which he is accustomed. Ball-point writing is anathema because the effort to control the flow from this atrocious instrument makes the pressure-friction pattern meaningless. The graphologist is entitled to know the writer's age, sex, national origin, and profession, since he cannot tell these facts from the specimens, and they are invaluable interpretive aids. An "effeminate" handwriting produced by a male, for example, or the "masculine" writing done by some women must be examined with care to determine how much of the masculinity or femininity is real and how much is affectation, secret-wish expression, etc.

At this point I rest my Introduction to Graphology, hoping at least to have disabused the eager convert of the notion that he can soon and easily train himself to detect other people's secrets, and to have quieted the fear of exposure that may be haunting others. My object was to persuade the sincere skeptic that he cannot simply say "It can't be done," and to induce the man who has limited-access assessment prob-



Exhibit A



Exhibit B

A. An extreme case of talkativeness: The writing is large and sprawly, the a's and o's are open. The words tend to "grow" as they flood the page, ignoring the right margin and crashing into the reader. The writing is slanted heavily forward; letters run into each other; the writing slants upward; the capital letters are large but not meticulously formed; t-crosses are well to the right of the t-stem, indicating haste; the writing is broad, heavy and brutal.

B. A case of acute close-mouth: The writing is small and refined; o's and a's are closed and knotted; t's are hooked to the left. The left and right margins retreat. The slant is vertical and, in some instances, backwards. Lower loops are close-set and one is sealed shut.

FIGURE 2

lems (and some of our people really have them!) to explore further.

Scope of Intelligence Application

We have a limited-access problem when we have to uncover the character and capabilities of a person who 1) is dead, and so no longer available for questioning, 2) is unwilling to talk and be tested, 3) is out of reach of personal interview, maybe behind the "curtain," 4) is untruthful in his answers to tests and questionnaires, 5) cannot be formally tested and assessed because of expense, time factors, or security considerations, 6) is not supposed to know we are assessing him. Where full access is possible, a battery of tests, particularly of the real-situation type used in OSS, and a careful study of the subject's past performance and reputation will give as reliable a result as we can expect at this stage of our knowledge of man and yield something like a scientific picture of his inner workings. But where access is limited, graphology offers a not unsatisfactory substitute.

In most cases, competent graphologists can supply reliable estimates on the following important character-traits:

Disposition to talk too much. There are, to be sure, some people who can talk much and betray little, but by and large the man who talks a lot lets many a thing slip out of his mouth.

Emotional stability under stress. People who crack easily show cracks in their calligraphy.

Agressiveness, resistance, and tenacity.

Attitude toward money; ability to control the handling of it. (*Not* ability to invest it.)

Disposition to deceive, prevaricate, evade, double-talk (as distinct from capacity to succeed in it).

Ambivalence, *i.e.,* disposition to take both sides of an issue; to have divided loyalties.

Inclination toward opportunism, *i.e.,* to approach moral questions and matters of principle on the what's-in-it-for-me-I-have-to-make-a-living basis.

Desire for power, predominance, prominence.

Willingness to follow the lead of others.

Rebelliousness, crankiness, indisposition to conform, insubordination.

Recklessness and rashness.
Important changes in character (by comparison of present with past calligraphies).

The graphologist can also provide reasonably good estimates on certain capabilities:

Capacity for abstract thinking and logic.
"Diplomacy," ability to deal with people.
Powers of observation.
Imagination.

Then there are a few characteristics on which a graphologist can make a good educated guess:

Sex difficulties. Their existence is often detectable, but their nature may not be.
Disposition to engage in criminal activities, *i.e.*, violation of laws the validity of which the subject acknowledges.
Disposition to engage in violence against persons. (It is important to note that these dispositions may never be overtly expressed either because of fear or other restraining factors or for mere lack of opportunity, provocation, or need.)

Graphological techniques also have medical applications. Some calligraphies bear the warning signs of cancer and circulatory ailments; others the signs of incipient mental illness and nervous breakdown.

There are certain things a graphologist can *not* tell:

Sex of writer.
Age of writer (in chronological terms, as distinct from level of emotional maturity).
Mechanical ability or other special skills.
General level of ability to perform acts to which the subject may be disposed. (For example, subject may be strongly disposed to lie and evade, but inept at putting lies across.)
"Fortune" or future in store for the writer.
Past history of work, crime, etc. (although very cogent estimates can be made as to cultural background from the type and level of calligraphy).

I have the impression that most people with serious limited-access assessment problems would be very glad to get some of the information outlined above about the people they handle

at a distance. It is an odd coincidence that the graphologist can shed most light on precisely those character traits which are of significance in clandestine operations. The art has thus a peculiar potential in the half-world of espionage and counterespionage, where paranoid and split personalities abound and frustrated executives are the order of the day.

The Dry Run

I hope that there will soon be pressure to resolve the key question—can any person claiming to be a graphologist come up consistently with reasonably good character descriptions? If any one at all can do it, then it can be done. If after all these years no one can be found who can do it then it cannot (for our purposes) be done. It would be all too easy to devise a proving problem to show it can *not* be done, just as it is possible to prove mathematically that a bumble-bee cannot fly. The best way to get a meaningless result would be to tie it into the strange pattern of abstruse psychological jargon which has of late come to infest some quarters of the psychological world and which reflects what I believe to be the sheer delusion that any group of men is able to formulate scientific conceptions of the qualities of human character. Man is, after all, just emerging from the Sea of Ignorance and cannot at this point comprehend so simple a force as gravity. He is hardly in a position to claim to understand the most complex of natural phenomena, man himself. Practical executives want simple, practical descriptions of character-traits without implied moral judgments or technical jargon, and those with limited-access assessment problems are willing to settle for a good deal less.

I would like to recommend the following specific procedure for the proving problem that will eventually have to be run somewhere:

It should be controlled, and the final judgment made, by practical executives, not psychologists, psychiatrists, assessment men, or graphologists. They should be men who need help in assessment problems, and one or two should be executives handling espionage agents. In this matter, neither the graphologists nor the psychological-psychiatric fraternity are disinterested parties. The latter, rightly or wrongly, see in the graphologist what the

doctor sees in the chiropractor—a quack. To what extent this is due to vested interest I cannot presume to judge; but I rather feel it touches upon the Achilles' heel of the entire psyche-testing fraternity, the fact that man is not now competent to assess man scientifically.

A minimum of fifty sets of handwriting specimens should be secured, at least meeting the specifications and including the auxiliary data prescribed on page 37. They should bear false signatures and be written in ignorance of the fact that they are to be used for any purpose other than communication. The writers must be men whose character is a matter of record, not established by some other series of tests. (Famous men cannot be used; graphologists know their handwritings.) The greatest precautions should be taken both to prevent the writers from knowing what is afoot and to prevent the analysts from learning the identity of the writers.

It should be required that the analyses be couched in common everyday descriptive language, with jargon and technical terminology ruled out. They should be short and to the point, and exclude such ambiguities as "This man is basically honest and sincere, but is capable of theft and deception under pressure." A proper statement on these points would run something like one of the following: "The writer will say what he thinks as long as this is safe." "The writer will say what he thinks and take chances to do so, but does not speak recklessly." "The writer will say what he thinks, no matter what the risk." "The writer will steal anything not nailed down." "The writer will not steal under ordinary conditions." "The writer has strong moral scruples against stealing and would rather starve." These are definitive statements with which the layman can come to grips.

Each graphologist tested should be required to state what specific character-traits and capabilities (*cf.* pages 38–39) he can identify and describe, thus avoiding the danger of pushing him into having to deliver something he cannot. None should be required or permitted to go off the deep end and try to describe a character at large; they should stick to the specific character-traits each claims he can de-

lineate and let us assume that the rest of the picture will either be deducible from these main traits or "average."

Each graphologist should have the right to reject 20 percent of the specimens if he wishes. We do not want to force him into the educated-guess area, and it will also be most interesting to see whether they all reject the same 20 percent.

Some graphologists may wish to operate as a team, and that would seem as allowable as any other team exercise. But the tests must not be aimed at groups of graphologists; the purpose is to test the performance of individual graphologists without regard to affiliation.

Some European graphologists of stature should be included, as the art is far more advanced in Europe.

A few amateurs should be permitted to participate. Of these I should like to be one.

The content, procedure, and results of these tests should be circulated in the intelligence community.

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A professional assessor supports the amateur graphologist's appeal for validity tests, although not sharing his enchantment with the art.

THE ASSESSMENT OF GRAPHOLOGY

E. A. Rundquist

Two threads of argument run through the foregoing article on handwriting analysis. The first asserts the great need for research studies because "a proper test run has never been devised and carried out, at least not in the United States, to determine whether *any* graphologist can consistently deliver accurate results in the area of character delineation." The second asserts the value of graphology here and now as an assessment technique, making sweeping claims of what it can do. The arguments are essentially incompatible. If the claims are correct, the research is unnecessary; if there is no research evidence, the claims are unsupported. With the need for research to establish the value of graphology as an assessment technique I am in full agreement. I disagree with the claims for its current effectiveness.

The article makes a number of cogent points. It distinguishes between the well-established branch of graphology devoted to problems of personal identification and the branch devoted to character analysis; it stresses the need for research studies; it recognizes many of the pitfalls that need be avoided in carrying out such studies; it acknowledges that traditional psychological assessment is preferable to handwriting analysis when direct access to the individual is possible. With these points I am in general agreement. A little elaboration of all but the first, which is too well established to require comment, may be helpful.

Scope of Research

In evaluating graphology—or any other assessment technique—not just one, but many studies are required. Studies of agreement among graphologists, the development of objective techniques for measuring characteristics of handwriting,

refinements in the methods used, hypotheses such as "small handwriting with closed and knotted o's and a's indicates secretiveness"—all these are useful and interesting, but they do not answer the main question: How well does it in fact predict behavior? Or in the terms psychologists like to use: What is its validity? Studies should therefore be concentrated in this area, a point I stress not in disagreement with Mr. Laycock, but because of its importance.

Validation studies in the area of personality assessment are not easy to do. There are many complicating factors—getting a representative sample of persons to participate, getting the same kind of information about each, getting information in sufficiently specific terms on the behavior one is trying to predict. This last problem is recognized by Mr. Laycock as a semantic one. "What is a brave man?" he asks. If there is no agreement on what a brave man is, there is obviously no means of checking on anyone's assertion that a person *is* brave.

More Pitfalls

This semantic problem has another aspect which is often overlooked. It is not hard to write a personality description that applies to the vast majority of people. This "Barnum effect," as it has been called, is one of the charlatan's best friends. Psychologists prepare such descriptions to show their students that a person's agreement with the correctness of a personality description is not proper evidence of the value of any assessment technique. I once capitalized on the Barnum effect when instructing a group of twelve European intelligence officers, most of whom were favorably inclined toward graphology. I asked them for handwriting specimens, and after a suitable interval produced personality descriptions for each of them, which ten of the twelve agreed fit very well. Then they were allowed to discover that I had given them all the same identical description, one I found in a German periodical before I left the States.

To demonstrate further the dangers of accepting agreement with a personality description as evidence in favor of any assessment technique, I asked the twelve to describe themselves by answering true or false to a number of personality statements. All answered true to two of the statements—

"You have a tendency to be critical of yourself" and "You prefer a certain amount of change and variety and become dissatisfied when hemmed in by restrictions and limitations." And ten answered true to a third statement—"While you have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for them." Experimenting thus with a few more questions, one would soon have enough "true" statements to write a full description which every member of a group would agree applied to himself. This kind of demonstration underscores the passages in Mr. Laycock's article which call for specific, objective, and understandable items of behavior as the criterion or yardstick by which the validity of any assessment technique must be judged.

Capabilities of Psychological Assessment

"Where full access is possible, a battery of tests, particularly of the real-situation type used in OSS, and a careful study of the subject's past performance and reputation will give as reliable a result as we can expect at this stage of our knowledge of man and yield something like a scientific picture of his inner workings." I take this to mean that direct assessment of the kind done by my staff in the CIA Office of Training is to be preferred over the graphological technique when access to the individual is possible. With this view, of course, I should like to agree wholeheartedly. But this brings me back to the article's claim that "In most cases, competent graphologists can supply reliable estimates on . . . disposition to talk too much . . . emotional stability under stress . . . aggressiveness, resistance, and tenacity . . . attitude toward money . . . disposition to deceive . . . inclination toward opportunism . . . desire for power . . . willingness to follow the lead of others . . . rebelliousness . . . rashness" and "reasonably good estimates on . . . capacity for abstract thinking and logic . . . ability to deal with people, powers of observation, imagination" as well as "a good educated guess" about "sex difficulties . . . *disposition* to engage in criminal activities . . . *disposition* to engage in violence against persons."

Even for the extremely thorough assessment process conducted by my staff I would not claim so much. Either our own methods have greater capabilities than we credit them with, or the article errs in conceding the superiority of "direct-

access" assessment over handwriting analysis. If evidence can be produced to establish that graphology can do all this, I shall hasten to incorporate it into our assessment process and eliminate much of the interviewing and testing we do.

"There are certain things a graphologist can *not* tell," writes Mr. Laycock. Certainly my list here would be much longer than his. But I am genuinely puzzled by some of the things included in this list, and by the statement that "the graphologist is entitled to know the writer's age, sex, national origin, and profession, since he cannot tell these facts from the specimens, and they are invaluable interpretive aids." I am confused by the inclusion of sex, because there are studies indicating quite clearly that differences in handwriting do exist[1] which permit determination of sex at a better than chance level. I haven't seen any studies on the other characteristics, but except for exact profession they are the kind of thing I would think might be inferred from handwriting at a little better than chance level.

Psychologists are impressed by the difficulty of making predictions about a changing individual in a changing environment. They are very much aware that such predictions can refer only to probabilities. Psychologists desire, therefore, as the core of their assessment process, means and techniques which have been validated by methodical research. Tests of general intellectual ability, of some aptitudes, and of interests, along with information about past behavior, are among these means. New means can be developed only by testing claims for special techniques in the same methodical way.

Prospects for Graphology

Up until recently the evidence concerning graphology as an assessment technique has been so negative that psychologists generally have preferred to concentrate on techniques that showed more promise. The negative evidence came from studies of graphological tenets equating specific handwriting characteristics, such as upward sloping lines, with specific traits, such as ambition. On the basis of such studies, graphology as a means of assessment has been lumped with astrology, phre-

[1] A. Anastasi & J. P. Foley, Jr., *Differential Psychology* (Revised edition; New York: Macmillan, 1949) p. 663; C. L. Hull, *Aptitude Testing* (Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1928) p. 147.

nology, and other systems for reading character from physical characteristics such as length of fingers or color of hair.

Handwriting is, however, the product of a person. There is therefore some reason to expect it might tell something about him. This reasoning, fostered by graphology itself as it became concerned with the movements underlying handwriting rather than the handwriting itself, has led to the devising of different kinds of studies. These studies, while not yet convincing, do make it clear that the value of graphology is not yet a closed question. One of the better ones, for example, found that a graphologist trying to infer from handwriting how 50 neurotics would answer 27 questions (1,350 items in all) achieved an accuracy of 62 percent as against the 50 percent to be expected by chance.[2] The graphologist may have been helped by knowing that all were neurotics, and so the 62 percent may be a bit high. Even taking the data at face value, these predictions turned out not much better than chance results; but the study suggests that research in this area might be more worthwhile than many had thought. It also points to the need for more research to pin down just what kinds of things can be predicted and what kinds of things cannot.

In Mr. Laycock's list of things a graphologist can determine is included "important changes in character (by comparison of present with past calligraphies)." Research on change in handwriting over time and under various conditions appears to offer some promise. At least common observation suggests that changes are caused by illness, either physical or mental.

At the present time I do not consider the evidence for graphology as an assessment technique sufficiently impressive to include it in assessments for which we have direct access to the individual. I don't sponsor research on it for this purpose as a matter of economics. I have only so many dollars, and I think I will get a better return from other assessment techniques. And even if we did not have access to the individual, I'd still place my bets on investigation of his past behavior, his education, his jobs, social status, income, and so on.

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[2] H. J. Eysenck, "Graphological Analysis and Psychiatry: An Experimental Study," *British Journal of Psychology,* 1945, 35, 70–81.

It is interesting that graphologists, according to the article, require some of this investigative information (sex, age, national origin, and profession) as a prerequisite for their analysis. They also get the informational content of the handwriting specimens themselves. From these data a number of inferences are already possible. Consider, for example, the differences in characteristics one might assume with confidence between an age 50 female English secretary and a 21-year-old male German lawyer. I'd be inclined to rely on the implications of this information, and would be extremely cautious in accepting inferences, whatever their source, that were inconsistent with it. The article claims, for example, that "most accountants and bookkeepers can tell you, without even thinking, how a man feels about money by the way he writes a check." I'd rather have the evidence on how he uses his money that can be obtained by looking at his cancelled checks. So, I guess, would the banker, who lends money on investigation of background and permanence of job, not on handwriting analysis. It is dangerous to allow inferences from less well validated information to influence those obtained from valid sources.

For the clandestine services, however, graphology as a validated assessment technique might have application in a sufficient number of instances, those where background investigation is impossible, to warrant considerable research to determine its effectiveness. I would like to see these studies start on whatever simple verifiable characteristics graphologists are willing to try. Should these prove successful, studies of more complex traits can be undertaken.

I can agree with Mr. Laycock that the study should cover the abilities of a number of particular graphologists—that graphology may be an art, but certainly is not a science. In my mind there is even the nagging question whether it is a practical art. A problem with an art is that a particular person's skill in applying it may change over time. There is no way of knowing whether a practitioner's predictions a year later will have the same value as those he made when he was tested. It is for this reason that psychologists, as scientists, keep trying to find ways to convert the art of judging people to a science. They try to tease out, objectify, and measure the basis for their predictions, so that the assessment skill can be

communicated to others and used reliably with a variety of persons in a variety of situations.

Mr. Laycock is greatly concerned with getting some research started. So am I; for until we get more information on the validity of graphology for specific purposes, the differences between his views and mine on graphology as an assessment technique, and my concern over the danger of unwarranted credence in graphological findings, will persist. Psychologists charged with personnel assessment are ready to cooperate in such studies. Their only requirement is that the research be so conducted that a group of scientists will agree on the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from it.

Sketches a prospective space-age system for handling air intelligence data, centered on a massive electronic brain.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING: PROGRESS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Kenneth T. Johnson

Four preceding articles in this series described how the USAF Directorate of Targets has been seeking to increase its capabilities by developing mathematical models and other techniques for the mass handling of data. This final article will look briefly at the progress of these techniques since the articles describing them were published and then examine some other analytical tools in process of development for the target intelligence specialist.

The three mathematical models previously described were the Military Resources Model, the Air Battle Model and the Damage Assessment Model. The Military Resources Model [1] estimates the capability of the Soviet Bloc military establishment, with its supporting economy, to carry out military action and analyzes the effects of planned attacks. The Air Battle Model [2] war-games the interaction of battle forces on the basis of a most exacting layout of both sides. It answers the question, "After x time of the game, to what extent have offensive and defensive plans been carried through or disrupted?" But it must first be supplied data describing what resources are available to each side, what courses of action each will attempt, and all other conditions affecting the outcome; and the preparation of these data is a demanding task and a stimulant for intelligence. The Damage Assessment Model [3] predicts the probable physical, functional, or operational effects of atomic weapons on targets or target systems. It answers questions of the type, "Did the building collapse?" "How many casualties were caused?" The most recent article

[1] See *Studies,* Vol. II, No. 1, p. 51 ff.

[2] See *Studies,* Vol. II, No. 2, p. 13 ff.

[3] See *Studies,* Vol. II, No. 3, p. 23 ff.

of this series [4] treated these models as illustrating one aspect of the manifold problem of data handling, described the Consolidated Target Intelligence File, and highlighted the necessity for better and faster ways of storing and retrieving information.

The Analytical Models in Operation

Many months have been spent in developing these models to bring the fantastic capacity and speeds of electronic computers to bear on the increasingly complex data which must be considered in making operational decisions. How are the computer techniques working out in practice? The Air Battle Model has been in constant use, making test runs to evaluate different target systems, battle plans, and strategies. Lists of ground zeros—points of burst—from the Air Battle Model have been fed into the Damage Assessment Model for the calculation of damage and radiation effects. These results have then been used by target analysts to determine the residual capabilities of affected installations.

The Damage and Assessment Model has kept pace with the Air Battle Model's output of ground zeros and other data requiring effects analysis. Improvements in the form in which the results of the damage and contamination runs are presented have evolved from consultation between analysts and machine programmers. The latest of these improvements has been effected by feeding into the Model criteria for determining automatically from damage and contamination values whether an installation is still operational after attack.

Since publication of the article on the Military Resources Model in the beginning of 1958, a series of operational runs has been made on its economic grid to show the multiple direct and indirect economic effects of Soviet civilian and military programs. Completely effective use of the economic grid is still hampered, however, by data gaps in such important areas as guided missiles and atomic energy; and aggregations in the Model which exclude consideration of certain specialized items of equipment limit the results to statements of general economic capability.

[4] "Data Handling Techniques," *Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 95 ff.

Developmental work on the military logistics and transportation grids of the Military Resources Model, in progress in the spring of 1958, has provided the basis for the development of a new model covering USSR regional air defense capabilities. This model assesses the capability of a specific region—either an air defense district or a penetration corridor—to mount defensive sorties and missile firings after its logistic and transportation facilities have been damaged by an air attack of any given scope and magnitude. The initial model has just been constructed and an initial run made; further development is in process. The construction of this new model shows how the mathematical modeling technique can be adapted to serve new purposes.

Models have thus already assumed some of the targeting load, but much remains to be done in determining whether and how models can be used in other analytical areas. What is intriguing for intelligence analysts, however, is that in some areas models have brought them to the threshold of a precise means for determining what items of information are of critical importance, a determination which will provide new, sure guidance to collection and analysis activities. This "sensitivity analysis," as it is called, is done by rerunning the same problem several times with varying parameters to determine which variations have a critical effect on the results. It provides also a good antidote to the tendency of analysts, having available the models' huge capacity for data, to become involved in the pursuit of minutiae which have no substantial importance for their problem.

Although the article on Data Handling Techniques appeared in the most recent issue of the *Studies,* some new gains can be counted here, too. Of the more than 200 requests for machine processing of the CTIF already levied by analysts, about 65 can be handled by existing programs and another seven are now being programmed, leaving a substantial 128 yet to be translated into machine language. The bridging of the gap between an analyst's statement of his needs and the marching orders for the machine requires a high degree of rapport between analyst and programmer, and this rapport is being developed. The programmer must discuss the requirement step by step, and patiently record each step in an ungarbled instruction to the machine. Laborious

as this process is, it pays off in a better product, and the analyst man-hours that are made available for more difficult jobs grow and grow.

The acquisition of an electronic data plotter has very practically enhanced the utility of the CTIF system. The plotter accepts coordinates from a machine tape or from cards and records the locations directly on a linear projection map. Programs are now nearing completion which by converting latitude and longitude to linear coordinates will enable the machine to plot locations on a map of any projection and any scale that will fit on the 48″ by 60″ plotting board. Single symbols can be plotted at the rate of 65 to 70 points per minute. The usefulness of the machine is attested by the long queues of waiting analysts eager to short-cut the tedious task of massive data plotting.

In an earlier paper in this series [5] General Samford was quoted as saying that the extent to which intelligence should contribute to the process of war gaming might be disputable but that if an advanced war gaming process were kept closely in mind during all processes of intelligence preparation, the intelligence necessary to a strategy would be better. The validity of this statement is already being demonstrated as the need for detailed layouts of enemy capabilities reveals inadequacies in our estimates. The operation of the Air Battle Model has properly been moved out of Intelligence to the Directorate of Plans, but because Intelligence personnel did the pioneering work on the Model, the Air Battle Analysis Division in Plans is largely staffed with former intelligence analysts. This arrangement facilitates not only the feedback of requirements on intelligence but also the interpretation of the intelligence data to be fed into the Model and the understanding of intelligence requirements for data from its output.

At the Model Application Branch in the Directorate of Targets, a cadre of target intelligence analysts has been assembled and is being oriented to improve the input data for the Air Battle Model and the utilization of its output. The Branch must also keep under review the operations of the Damage Assessment and Military Resources Models, which are wholly and

[5] "Developments in Air Targeting: The Air Battle Model," *Studies*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 13.

appropriately placed in the Directorate of Targets; new questions arise every day about how best to use the existing models in solving targeting problems. At the same time it is working on the development of new models to handle current problems and anticipating other problems which targeting is going to face tomorrow.

The Data Problem

The inescapable task of assembling intelligence data assumes an aggravated form when the data is to be used as input for a mathematical model. It is not that the use of models creates a data demand; the data problem is there anyway, models or no models. But what the models often do is make the analyst face up to kinds of data the likes of which he had never considered, for example the number of metric tons of pumps and compressors required for each major military component in a prewar build-up of forces. A prolonged bout with the stern requirement of a model for enemy data coefficients, enemy strike plans, or the capacities of enemy installations can bring an analyst to the point of despair. Yet he can take comfort from the ease with which problems can be rerun. The data do not have to be perfect the first time, and a rerun with a new figure may show that the variation is not of critical importance. A capable officer of ours is wont to interrupt a hot debate over input data with "You don't like our figure? Give me one of yours; I'll use it."

The Consolidated Target Intelligence File described in the last article is proving a valuable device in this battle with the data and constitutes a giant step in facilitating mechanized support of target analysis. Another giant step is anticipated in the near future with the application of the new Air Force Intelligence Data Handling System, designated 438–L. The system is scheduled to be operational early in 1962 for the Washington area.

The development of System 438–L was initiated in response to a Headquarters USAF requirement, formalized in March 1956, for an integrated system to accept information from any and all sources and to organize, store, manipulate, and disseminate it without the limitations of capacity and speed inherent in present practices. The aim is the best possible system to meet present and anticipated requirements, whether a fully

automatic system of machines and computers, a combination of manual and machine methods, or just human beings. The contractor is putting a broad selection of talent to work on the system, including library scientists, experimental psychologists, computer programmers, and computer engineers.

Although the best approach to a design for this system is still being worked out, it is already apparent that it will be based on a large-scale, high-speed, general-purpose computer to accomplish many tasks. Such a computer will make feasible the development of a rich indexing system, not only by document but by key words on individual pages. This indexing system will enhance the ability of analysts to make subtle correlations of data and develop significant interrelationships which may exist in available information. Data storage and retrieval can be accomplished primarily through microfilm libraries.

The computer in the system will make possible the fast and accurate communication and dissemination of newly collected data, notably that necessary for evaluating enemy intentions and giving warning of attack. Many types of information must be examined rapidly, for example that obtained by missions flown specifically to develop certain intelligence data. It will also analyze reports and documents to produce Order of Battle, Current Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, etc., accumulating bits and pieces of raw information and associating them for development into meaningful products. In target analysis it will be invaluable, for example in the evaluation of foreign target systems, the charting of foreign air facilities, and the development of strategic and tactical targets.

The retrieval facet of the system may function in any of several ways. A question may be given by an analyst to the operator of a Flexowriter or similar device in his working area. It would be put into proper form and automatically transmitted to a Flexowriter in the computer area, which would print it out. Here it would be checked for format and validity and then fed to the computer system. The computer would differentiate among types of questions. The answer to one concerning evaluated intelligence holdings would be obtained from a file of evaluated intelligence directly connected to the computer system. As the result of automatic search procedures the answer would be printed out or displayed, as appropriate.

A demand for raw information, on the other hand, might be answered in any of three forms or some combination of them—a listing of documents or pages pertinent to a study, the documents or pages themselves, or statistical information derived from the documents. If the document itself were desired, the computer system would identify the specific document number. This identification would be hand-delivered to a separate raw information storage device, which would produce either aperture cards or a full-size reproduction of the document.

Information might also be added to the system in several ways. The evaluated intelligence provided by analysts of all agencies would be entered through the same Flexowriter-type device used for querying the system. Raw information selected and extracted from documents by a screening panel would be entered as part of an index storage file. The documents themselves would be microphotographed and placed in the raw information storage section of the system.

The analytic application of the system will cover war gaming, damage assessment, and determining the economic effects of military action, as foreshadowed in the mathematical models we have described. It will also cover target materials and production control, an almost independent area, under a fairly routine application of processing principles. It will provide document security control for all the highly classified information disseminated through the computer. It will make possible a more accurate formulation of collection requirements and furnish a means of evaluating both the requirements process and the collection process. Even our comparatively limited experience with the models we have been using gives us ground to anticipate that actual application of the proposed system will stimulate continuing development of new analytic techniques to enhance the capabilities of Air Force intelligence.

For target intelligence the 438–L system is indeed going to be a quantum jump ahead, and none too soon. The most intensive target analysis effort is now directed against Soviet guided missiles (especially operational launch sites), air defense (particularly the SAGE system), and command control systems, objectives around which the most stringent security barriers are arrayed. The most direct and forthright advances against these objectives could come from a successful collection effort—a drawing, a paper, a plan, a photograph, a defector.

But the more important the target to us, the more important it is to the Soviet that he deny us information on it, and the tougher the collection task. Some people seem even to believe that he can continue to be totally successful in this denial in the areas where it really counts. This brings us back to mass data handling and the possibilities it offers. The realistic solution in these high priority areas may be to break into the complex of activities associated with the target and let them lead us to it.

What is suggested is that we collect and process the less sensitive information, of which there may be an abundance, along with the sensitive. This approach is not new; intelligence analysts have always recognized that bits and fragments of information about persons, places, things, and movements can when assembled, analyzed, and synthesized enable us to make a sweeping end run around a formidable security barrier. What is new is that science has come up with the technology that will permit us to use this practice on a scale and with a speed never before possible. The exploitation now made possible of the vast amount of data already on hand in different forms in many agencies offers immediate promise. It gives impetus to the Air Force's effort to develop yet better techniques for the mass handling of data; for the consequences of failure to provide target information in these critical fields are grave indeed.

Lest the impression be left that target analysis begins and ends with data on individual installations, it is important to round out the picture somewhat. As the Soviet nuclear delivery capability and military might in general have assumed greater and greater proportions the targeting emphasis has shifted from economic and industrial targets to military forces and their immediate supporting resources. Furthermore, it has become more important than ever to draw the full implications of the effects of attacks—to translate the physical destruction calculated to result from planned attacks and the residual military inventories of men and materiel into terms of post-attack operational capability. The criteria for the selection of targets and target systems lie in the implications of these effects; and in this sense effects analysis is the mainspring and director of target selection.

It is clear that the models and data handling developments described in this and preceding papers all contribute in great measure to the central work of target selection and effects analysis. But this is only a part of the picture: the keystone of the effort is the human being, the target analyst, who emerges as the manager, collator, and interpreter of data, instructing the machines, guiding the collectors, using finished intelligence produced by other analysts in their specialized fields, and finally producing integrated intelligence on live enemy forces on a command basis. In these force studies the interrelationships of the forces, their bases, support facilities, and restraints of time, space, command, communications, and competition for common support items such as transportation and fuel are analyzed in detail.

The force study is prepared on a command-wide basis. The producer in effect puts on the enemy hat and examines the interrelationships of the forces in his command, say the First Long Range Air Army, the installations they occupy, the support facilities and activities necessary for their continued operation, their training and maneuvers. This presentation of real-life force intelligence gives new meaning to the importance of targets and target systems. It provides an integrated rational basis for the prediction of wartime deployment and missions and the prediction of qualitative and quantitative peacetime growth. Finally it provides the framework within which targets and target systems may be nominated for attack, a clear understanding of the reasons they are nominated, and, through analysis of the output from machine runs on the damage and contamination model, a realistic interpretation of the operational effects of given attacks.

The preparation of force studies is under way. One has been completed on the Soviet Northern Naval Fleet, another on the Ground Forces in the Caucasus area. Studies will eventually blueprint the opportunities for air action against all forces which threaten the United States and its allies and will be maintained current for immediate application in war planning and war gaming.

Future Data Problems

As the target intelligence analyst strains to see what lies ahead he is awed. As he thinks toward the 1970's he realizes that he must deal with enemy weapon systems not yet in

being, ones which Soviet strategists are currently engaged in planning to bring into the Soviet arsenal at that time. Qualitatively, they will attempt to outdo US and Allied weapon technology. Quantitatively, they will try to provide so many and varied means for fast delivery of nuclear weapons that US defenses will be insufficient to fend off the attacks and US offenses not quick or massive enough to neutralize the Soviet capability. It is the target analyst who must wrestle with the realities of this problem and figure out how to cope with the threat.

In this future period the collection and evaluation of target data will be performed with improved technology, and conclusions will be reached and decisions made with greater speed. Some of the technology for collection devices can be predicted now. For example, aerospace vehicles with a variety of sensing devices—electronic, radar, infrared—promise data in volumes never before dreamed of. The prospect that unfriendly neighbors can look into each others' back yards day in and day out is going to have a profound effect upon what they decide to try to hide, how they decide to hide it, and what they decide is just not worth hiding. Some of the new data, for example infrared detector readings which give warning of missiles being prepared for launching or being launched, will go directly to warning centers for immediate decision on US and Allied action. All of it will be grist for the analyst, to be evaluated against the background of the data stored in the 438–L or some improved system, and all will automatically be added to this massive store. From it the analyst, using advanced techniques, must draw conclusions on which to base action in an era when minutes can decide eternity.

CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE

MY TEN YEARS AS A COUNTERSPY. By *Boris Morros*. (New York: The Viking Press. 1959. Pp. 248. $3.95.)

The story told in this book is that of a Russian immigrant to the United States—the author—a person of sound educational background and musical competence, who after reaching professional heights in the entertainment and movie worlds got himself involved in espionage. According to his account, his desire to assist his aging parents in Russia led to a recruitment proposal by the Soviets for clandestine work against the United States, which he accepted under the threat of reprisals to his family. Subsequently, and quite belatedly, he came into contact with the FBI and under its guidance continued his association with the Soviet intelligence service for ten more years as a double agent or counterspy. The fruit of this effort was the dissolution of an important Soviet spy ring.

The value of the book is not the story told. Tales of the same ilk in numbers line the operational coffers of intelligence organizations throughout the world. Its true merit from a professional point of view is embodied, rather, in the operational data—those intimate, indispensable, but hard-to-come-by details—that it reveals concerning the formidable yet vulnerable chief target of U.S. counterintelligence, the Russian intelligence service. The validity of this assessment becomes immediately clear when one considers the cost in time, money, and personnel of procuring such details through other clandestine operations. Yet here are intimate and damaging data on RIS objectives, personnel, modus operandi, and vulnerabilities overtly available for the modest price of a book. The obvious conclusion is that the coordination of overt and covert information remains an important and obligatory aspect of the intelligence process.

The Communist cause is more than a political creed; it is a religion to an otherwise atheistic group. Its devotees are or are supposed to be dedicated men who preach and live by the credo that selflessness is the cornerstone of their religion. The concept of the Cause as overriding all considerations of per-

sonal loyalty and ordinary ethics is illustrated in passages like the following:

> "How in hell did Myra—who, like you, pretends to be my friend—write that terrible report about Katerina?" "What else could she do? She only did it for your own good."
>
> Myra looked like a full-blooded passionate woman. I am sure that if it had been necessary for the sake of the Cause to be unfaithful to her husband, she would not hesitate to give herself.
>
> I never got a chance to use that Sunday punch because of what he said next: "No matter what the Communists do, I'll always be true to them, ideologically."
>
> Korotkov's affection for his old friend was truly sincere. I am convinced of that. . . . But then he asked, "What in the world can I do if he continues to cause me so much trouble?" "Oh, he will come out of it in time," I said. "And if he does not? I suppose then there will be nothing for me to do but order him liquidated."
>
> [Comment on Beria's arrest:] "After all, to preserve the system requires continuous examination and re-examination of each of us."

It is important for the intelligence professional to understand this religion and the Marxist code of ethics, for they permeate the relations among Communists, the attitude of the intelligence center toward its agents, their operations, and even the conduct of the lowliest sub-source on the intelligence totem pole. In them lies the secret to their thinking and behavior. They are a source both of great strength and of critical vulnerability. For the utter self-abnegation required by the Cause is something more—or less—than human. This human vulnerability is illustrated in Morros' words:

> If a man like Soble is useful to his masters in Moscow, he is also an ever present danger to them. They have no choice; they must use men like him, and the Jack Sobles, no matter how often they are put through the psychological meat-grinders, remain *men*. Like everyone else, like all people everywhere, they have their vanity and pride, their weaknesses and strengths.
>
> "Idealists, you see," said General Korotkov, "have something soft in them always . . . and that soft side exposed to sufficient temptation will corrupt them."
>
> If it were up to [Korotkov], he would not let one of his men stay in America for more than a year. He said the

> capitalist regime, with its easy living and emphasis on false values, was too corrupting.
>
> [Soble] was pulled both ways. He believed with all his heart in the "Communist ideal." At the same time he wished to take his wife and son out of the ever-present danger that was an integral part of his role as a secret agent operating in a foreign country. The two dreams he nourished for the future were dragging him in opposite directions.
>
> The clue to the strange fate that caught up with Jack Soble may lie in his passionate love for his son and his wife. In the non-Communist world this sort of devotion is accepted as the norm. In the Soviet world it is regarded with deep distrust. If a man lets family love interfere with his duties to the state, the Kremlin considers his usefulness ended.

Moscow recognizes well this vulnerability in the persistent humanness of human nature, but its corrective efforts serve only to create other vulnerabilities, the rigidity of strong centralization and the resentment created by its mistrust of its people:

> "People back Home sat there with their maps, deciding what should be done in a certain city and how it should be done, even though they had never been in the United States themselves. . . . No detail of the plans they make at Home can be changed without permission. . . . They should know by this time that emergencies arise even in a checker game that one cannot foresee."
>
> They are always testing you, trying to find out if your sympathies have shifted, listening for the chance remark that will betray a weakness or character flaw. . . . Even when their conversation appears casual, there is some purpose behind it.
>
> These contacts, I was soon to find out, were continually being changed. The NKVD never trusted even its own people very far, did not believe it wise or safe to leave any secret agent in the same city for any great length of time.

Reviewing the Soviet intelligence effort as portrayed in this book, we observe specific differences between it and the parallel operations conducted by Western powers—the Soviet stress on sex both as a tool for the control of women agents and in the procurement of information from men; the regular use of threats for recruitment and control of agents; the extensive countersurveillance mounted over rendezvous and têtes-à-tête; murder as a means of agent disposal. But in broader view we

find that the principal difference lies in the insecurity of Soviet operatives stemming from their continual struggle to remain human beings under the demands of an autocratic, inflexible, and unrealistic credo that seeks to convert them into unquestioning instruments of the Cause.

SAMUEL R. BURVICK

THE HOUSE OF SECRETS. By *Gordon Young.* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pierce. 1959. Pp. 179. $3.75.)

Gordon Young, a veteran foreign correspondent whose name frequently appears on these pages, gives in this book an account of the Narodno Trudovoi Soyuz (People's Alliance of Russian Solidarists), or NTS, as the group is more commonly known. The NTS is an organization of Russian emigrés who believe that Communism in the Soviet Union can eventually be overthrown through popular revolution. To hasten this day, it has been active since 1930 in trying to introduce propaganda into the USSR.

During World War II members of the group reached the German-occupied areas of Russia and attempted to organize NTS cells. By infiltrating various German institutions and agencies, they had a direct influence on the initiation and furtherance of the Vlasov movement. This period of "collaboration" with the Germans was ended by the Gestapo's arresting the Solidarist leaders. After the war the NTS was reorganized in West Germany, began a boisterous search for Western support in all quarters, and in recent years has carried on a sizable propaganda program through leaflets, pamphlets, books, radio, and personal contacts with Soviets travelling abroad.

Mr. Young's description of the NTS organization, of the ideology of Solidarism which it proposes as an alternative to Communism, and of the group's propaganda operations is highly readable if somewhat superficial. The author has obtained most of his information from interviews with NTS leaders and members, rather than from the fairly large mass of available documentary material. Necessarily, the picture of the NTS that emerges is an extremely favorable one.

Available information does corroborate the bulk of the factual material in Mr. Young's book. There are exceptions, such as the grossly exaggerated claim that within the past five years more than 100 million copies of NTS newspapers and leaflets have been dispatched into the Soviet Union. (The 100 million figure is more probably the amount of literature printed by the NTS Posev publishing house for the five-year period.) By and large, however, the story of the group's unequal, often tragic, sometimes heroic struggle against the Soviet Goliath is told without the wishful thinking that has characterized pro-NTS publicity in the past.

For the professional intelligence man, *The House of Secrets* will be useful as an easy-to-read, rapid review of this militant emigré group.

W. P. ZIMMOCK

COUNT FIVE AND DIE. By *Barry Wynne,* as told by Colonel William Eliscu, O.B.E. (New York: Ballantine Books. 1959. Pp. 152. $0.35.)

This purports to be an OSS story, a recent addition to the literature of the over-stuffed American pocket. It was originally published in England early in 1958 [1]; it subsequently appeared in a Dutch edition [2] and in a movie version. Mr. Eliscu (who allegedly took part in the operation) is one of the sponsors of the OSS television feature which has appeared in the United States since the fall of 1957.

Both the English and American editions claim to be true accounts except for changes in "certain minor incidents and the names of leading participants." The American version reinforces this claim with a purported introduction by General Donovan. General Donovan's alleged accreditation of the story makes the book of interest to the intelligence specialist and injects an element of mystery into what appears to be a hastily scaled-up version of a movie script. The mystery: How was General Donovan led to underwrite as factual and truthful, if he did, an account of OSS activity so patently a figment of the imagination?

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[1] London: Souvenir Press.

[2] *Tel tot Vijf en Sterf!* (Amsterdam: Scheltens and Giltay, 1958.)

The book's story line is as diaphanous as the habit of its principal character, one Hannie Herodsen, a toothsome Abwehr agent. At the story's start in the spring of 1943, she is plying her blond lissomeness on a "nameless Lt. Colonel" of OSS Algiers. Having learned from the hapless officer the place and time of the Allied attack on Sicily and perhaps the details of some OSS missions, she repatriates to Germany by submarine at the end of 1943. She receives the personal attention of Canaris' successor, Kaltenbrunner, who sends her early in 1944 to England.

Infiltrated by submarine in March, Hannie is the same Dutch refugee she was in Algiers: cover in her case is as light as her baggage. She sets herself up in a London apartment and proceeds to take over direction of a resident German IS net consisting of four individuals, including two radio operators, which had presumably been successful in defying British security forces from the beginning of the war. Her principal target is the Americans; her mission is to ascertain the time and place of the upcoming Allied attack on the continent. With a lucky—though, one feels, predestined—assist she locks with an OSS officer in London, this time a Captain. Traces of her Algiers activity carried in the heads of officers in OSS London are her downfall.

A joint British-OSS operation ("Stampede") is laid on under OSS supervision to permit the Captain to develop the relationship unwittingly with Hannie and guide her into a specially tailored Dutch resistance organization in London. Thereafter Hannie, a singular example of an unwitting double agent, is built up and fed deception material on the cross-channel attack. OSS London sacrifices the lives of two Dutch resistance operatives in order to make this a better fly-trap. In a cops-and-robbers ending the GIS net in England is rolled up by OSS (and the British), but Hannie is permitted to deliver the tainted information to Berlin. The outcome, according to the author, was a diversion of Nazi military forces to Holland, a significant contribution to unbalancing the strength available to oppose the Allied landing in Normandy. Hannie forfeits her life to Kaltenbrunner when it is realized that her information was false.

All of this is fiction purporting to be fact. An examination of OSS and other official materials has produced no evidence to authenticate the account, even if one allows the maximum for changes "in certain minor incidents and the names of leading participants." Beginning with Mr. Eliscu's colonelcy, his O.B.E., and his claim of participation in the "Stampede" operation, the story comes apart at the seams when subjected to critical review. The record of German intelligence activity in World War II knows no character or composite identifiable with Hannie Herodsen. It is now known that the British security services controlled or neutralized all GIS operations in the UK during that period. There is no trace in OSS documentation of an operation entitled "Stampede" or otherwise identifiable with what is described in the book. The extensive interrogations and testimony of Kaltenbrunner in 1945–46 contain nothing to support the story. Finally, the official Dutch resistance has been unable to identify the two individuals purportedly sacrificed.

The mystery of the Donovan imprimatur is, therefore, of more than casual interest: the endorsement was decisive in quieting the skepticism of a reviewer in one of the national news magazines.[3] The issues raised by Mr. Eliscu's TV portrayal of OSS were put sharply in the press in 1957.[4] Because the OSS is the foundation of U.S. national intelligence and counterintelligence abroad, the questions raised by *Count Five*

[3] *Newsweek,* January 26, 1959, page 106: "If *Count Five and Die* were not introduced and vouched for by Gen. William J. Donovan . . . it could easily be mistaken for a highly implausible piece of spy fiction. However, British author Barry Wynne's story is true, and it's a corker."

[4] The New York *Times,* September 1957, observed: "There could be an engrossing TV series in some of the courageous and imaginative achievements of the men who served in O.S.S. But these are stories that should be presented with careful fidelity to detail and without the shabby, melodramatic flourishes that marked this telecast." In November 1957 the Washington *Daily News,* in a similar review, questioned whether "it's a good idea for the OSS to be memorialized on TV by the series under that name," which it found to be "nothing more than the same old foreign intrigue stuff that has cluttered the little screen since 10-inch days."

and Die are basic. Who are the residuary legatees of the OSS tradition? Is the tradition served by publicity which is as speculative in substance as it is in purpose?

JAMES G. WANNINGER

In
Memoriam

William J. Donovan

1 January 1883
8 February 1959

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Adaptation from an address delivered in tribute to the father of central intelligence.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Allen W. Dulles

It was my privilege to be associated with William J. Donovan both as a lawyer between the wars and then during World War II, when I served under his command in the Office of Strategic Services. His courage and leadership made a profound impression on me. I should like to convey to you something of that impression, and some idea of what his pioneering has meant to all of us.

His interest in our national defense and security started early. In 1912, as the war clouds gathered in the Balkans, he helped organize Troop I of the New York National Guard. In 1915 he went to Poland as a member of a Rockefeller commission charged with relieving the great shortage of food there, and particularly of milk for the children. When the National Guard was mobilized in 1916, he came home to join his Troop I on the Mexican border.

War Service

Then came his fabulous career in World War I with the 165th Infantry of the 42nd Division—the renowned "Fighting 69th" of the Rainbow Division. Here he got his nickname Wild Bill. The legend goes that after the regiment landed in France he ran them five miles with full packs to limber them up. As the men were grumbling with exhaustion, Donovan pointed out that he was ten years older and carrying the same 50-pound pack. One of the men replied, "But we ain't as wild as you, Bill!" Another story has it that the honorary title was transferred to him from a professional baseball pitcher of the same name whose control left something to be desired. Whatever its origin, the title stuck.

The citations Colonel Donovan received in France tell the military story: On July 28, 1918, a Distinguished Service Cross: "He was in advance of the division for four days, all the while under shell and machine gun fire from the enemy, who were on three sides of him, and he was repeatedly and persistently

counterattacked, being wounded twice." Three days later the Distinguished Service Medal: "He displayed conspicuous energy and most efficient leadership in the advance of his battalion across the Ourcq River and the capture of strong enemy positions. . . . His devotion to duty, heroism, and pronounced qualities of a Commander enabled him to successfully accomplish all missions assigned to him in this important operation."

And then, for action in combat in the Meuse-Argonne on October 14, the highest of all awards, the Congressional Medal of Honor: ". . . Colonel Donovan personally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very strongly organized position, and when our troops were suffering heavy casualties he encouraged all near him by his example, moving among his men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons and accompanying them forward in attacks. When he was wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet, he refused to be evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a less exposed position." "No man ever deserved it more," said General Douglas MacArthur, who had seen this action.

Three aids were killed at Donovan's side in the course of these actions. Reverend Francis P. Duffy, the chaplain of the 69th, said, "His men would have cheerfully gone to hell with him, and as a priest, I mean what I say." Several years ago General Frank McCoy, describing his close association with Bill Donovan during World War I, said he was one of the finest soldiers he ever saw in his life-long service in the Army, that he had the qualities of the ideal soldier, judgment and courage and the respect and affection of his men.

Law Career

In 1922 Donovan was appointed U.S. Attorney in Buffalo, N.Y., and shortly thereafter he entered a new phase of his career. In 1924 President Coolidge reorganized the Department of Justice and called Bill to Washington to be assistant to the Attorney General, heading the Antitrust Division. Here he showed both his fearlessness in law enforcement and his intense interest in making law a practical vehicle to promote the economic welfare.

He was firmly convinced that individual freedom is vitally linked to our system of free enterprise. He attacked restraints and monopoly with effective enthusiasm. In the Trenton Potteries case he won Supreme Court agreement that price fixing among dominant competitors is of itself illegal. He brought under legal attack such diverse industries as oil, sugar, harvesting machinery, motion pictures, water transportation, and labor unions. Yet he recognized that the uncertainties of our antitrust laws pose serious business problems, and accordingly instituted the practice of giving advance opinion on the legality of proposed mergers and other business activities that might be questioned under the law.

Offered the Governor Generalship of the Philippines when President Hoover entered the White House in 1929, Bill turned it down and went into law practice in New York City. He was soon appointed counsel to several of the New York bar associations in connection with a general overhauling of the bankruptcy laws. During this period he also served as counsel to a committee for review of the laws governing the State's Public Service Commission. In 1932 he unsuccessfully ran for Governor of the State.

As a corporation attorney he won in 1935 the important Humphrey case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the President could not arbitrarily remove a chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. He also won an important decision in the Appalachian coal case, upholding the right of coal producers to organize a joint selling agency in economic self-defense. This agency is still in existence.

During this period of corporate law practice, Bill never lost his interest in world affairs. He took time off to visit Ethiopia during the 1935 Italian invasion. He was in Spain during its Civil War, carefully observing the Axis efforts to test their new equipment in these foreign adventures.

Presidential Emissary

In the early days of World War II Donovan was called into action by President Roosevelt. In 1940 he was sent on a fact-finding mission to England and in 1941 to the Balkans and the Middle East. Anthony Eden told Washington that the Balkan

mission had been most helpful to the British assessment of the situation there.

From the first trip, the one to Britain not long after Dunkirk, Bill had brought back to Washington a very important report. You will recall there was skepticism at that time in some quarters as to whether the British could effectively carry out Churchill's thrilling promise, "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." Donovan reported to Roosevelt that the British could and would do just that. This had a direct effect on American policy. He also warned Harry Hopkins that the Germans might strike toward Suez through French North Africa—a prophecy that soon became a reality.

Donovan also recommended to the President that the United States start preparing immediately for a global war. He particularly stressed the need of a service to wage unorthodox warfare and to gather information through every means available. He discussed this idea at length with his close friends in the Cabinet, Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and with Attorney General Jackson.

The seeds which Bill planted bore fruit. In July 1941 the President established the Office of the Coordinator of Information and called Donovan to Washington to head it. In original concept this Office was to combine the information and intelligence programs with psychological and guerrilla warfare. This proved to be too big a package for one basket and in 1942 the organization was split. That portion of it coordinating wartime information services became the Office of War Information, and the intelligence and unorthodox warfare work, where Bill's greatest interest lay, was put under an Office of Strategic Services.

The O.S.S.

Truly one of the remarkable accomplishments in World War II was the organization and activity of the O.S.S.—feats which would never have been achieved without Bill Donovan's leadership and his vast interest in the unorthodox, the novel and the dangerous. Starting from scratch in 1941, he built

an organization of about 25,000 people that made a real contribution to the victory. Many of the deeds of O.S.S. will have to remain secret, but with the passage of time many have been disclosed.

Bill conceived the O.S.S. as a world-wide intelligence organization that could collect the facts necessary to develop our policy and war strategy. He was convinced that Axis secrets were to be found not only in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, but in other capitals and outposts around the world. So he immediately set about dispatching officers to key spots in Europe, Asia, and later Africa. The pay-off justified the effort. He was able to obtain information of great value from carefully established agents with contacts in Berlin, in the German High Command, and in the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service. The work of these agents gave us advance information about the development of German jet aircraft, about German work with heavy water in the effort to develop a nuclear weapon, about the V–1's and V–2's, and about the plot against Hitler.

In addition to his organization for the collection of strategic intelligence, Donovan provided means to help gather tactical information in the combat areas, forming teams of parachutists—Americans as well as indigenous—to drop behind enemy lines. But not content with passive intelligence, he also wanted action. He knew that well-organized guerrillas operating behind enemy lines in areas where the local population was friendly could wreak havoc on enemy lines of communication and tie down troops that could otherwise be used in combat. Working with our allies, he built up teams of leaders and communicators to organize resistance in the countries occupied by the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese. There were also air drops of supplies and equipment deep behind the Axis lines in France and Italy, in Burma and elsewhere.

These action teams were well supported by a headquarters technical group, which under Donovan's guiding hand was imaginatively developing new ways to sabotage the enemy war effort and new gadgets either to harass the enemy or help our own cause—equipment ranging from the most sophisticated communications systems to a repellent used by personnel forced to bail out in shark-infested waters. Not all of the products were so practical as these. Ambassador David

Bruce, one of Bill Donovan's closest associates, in a recent tribute to the General's qualities of leadership, vividly described his excitement over ideas. Ambassador Bruce wrote, and I subscribe to every word of it:

> His imagination was unlimited. Ideas were his plaything. Excitement made him snort like a race horse. Woe to the officer who turned down a project, because, on its face, it seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual. For painful weeks under his command I tested the possibility of using bats taken from concentrations in Western caves to destroy Tokyo [with delayed action incendiary bombs]. The General, backed by the intrigued President Roosevelt, was only dissuaded from further experiments in this field when it appeared probable that the cave bats would not survive a trans-Pacific flight at high altitudes.

Many ingenious ideas to work on the nerves of the enemy were born in another part of the O.S.S.—the Morale Operations Branch. This was the undercover psychological warfare branch of the war effort. While the Office of War Information was telling the enemy about the magnitude of the U.S. war effort and getting the facts and figures well circulated, this Branch was dedicated to confusing the enemy and breaking their will to resist.

General Donovan was convinced that there were great untapped reservoirs of information in this country about foreign areas which had become of vital interest in the war effort—data in the archives of business organizations, information acquired abroad by American scientists, academicians, and tourists, and also that held by foreign experts residing here. He set about to collect this information and data and a mass of photographs of foreign areas. As the war reached more and more areas of the globe, this information came to have great importance.

He also realized the importance of analyzing and presenting information to the policy makers in readily usable form—one of the most difficult tasks of intelligence. He established in the O.S.S. a major branch for research and analysis, assembling in Washington the best academic and analytic brains he could beg, borrow, or steal from the universities, laboratories, libraries, museums, the business world, and other agencies of government. Theirs was the task of probing the political and economic aspects of the war, assessing both our

allies and our enemies, both neutrals and the occupied lands. Theirs also was the task of estimating Axis vulnerability and war potential and the staying power of the Russians, who even then told us almost nothing about themselves.

Bill Donovan had the qualities a great intelligence officer must have. He took nothing for granted and at the same time was insatiably curious. He had a good nose for the news: a faint whiff of something unusual would speed his mind into a dozen possible explanations, generally as ingenious as the wiles of the enemy. He wanted to see things on the spot and judge for himself. He was constantly on the move and drove his staff wild trying to keep him from places they thought too exposed. He also put them into a state of near exhaustion trying to keep up with the pace he set himself. One of his great qualities was his dedication to the men who served under him, and his ever-readiness to give them his full support. He, in turn, had their complete loyalty, respect and affection. I vividly recall a personal instance.

For about two years, from November 1942 to September 1944, I was working for Donovan in Switzerland, then entirely encircled by the Nazi-Fascist forces. In September 1944 the American Seventh Army, coming up from Southern France, broke through to the Swiss border near Geneva. Under orders to return to Washington to report, I had joined a group of the French underground in a secret hideout in the Rhone Valley between Geneva and Lyon to await a clandestine flight to take me to London. As far as I knew, General Donovan was in Washington and had not the slightest idea where I was hidden. After weather had held up my plane for several days, there was a knock on the door of my hideout in the middle of the night. It was one of General Donovan's aides, telling me that the General was waiting for me at the nearest available airstrip south of Lyon, which had just been evacuated by the Nazis. He had been searching the area for some twenty-four hours before he discovered where I was.

Together we flew back to London, arriving, I well remember, on that day in September 1944 when the Germans launched the first of their ballistic missiles on the British capital. It descended near the center of London after a flight of nearly two hundred miles. Both the American and the British intelligence services had been closely following the development of this

missile. I have often wondered why, in this country, our technicians and strategists failed to see earlier the full implications of the success of the V–2, as I believe the Soviet did, and to realize much earlier in the game that the combination of the ballistic missile with the atomic bomb, which was then about to be unveiled, could change the nature of war and the security position of this country.

Few men of his time were more alert than Donovan to the new threats that might develop. In late 1944, sending a man to Cairo to take over the direction of activities at that post, he gave oral instructions to the effect that the main target for intelligence operations should now be what the Soviets were doing in the Balkans rather than German activities in the Middle East. The German threat was receding. The Soviet danger was already looming. Operations were to be adjusted accordingly, although such instructions could not be put into official writing.

Also, while the war was still in progress, General Donovan was looking forward to the peace. He foresaw the need for a permanent organization not only to collect intelligence but, perhaps even more important, to coordinate the whole government intelligence effort and see that the President and policy makers get comprehensive and consolidated analyses to guide their decisions as to our course of action.

The Father of Central Intelligence

In the fall of 1944 Donovan presented to the President a paper proposing an intelligence organization operating on a world-wide scale and having direct responsibility to the President. While it was not to take upon itself the responsibilities of the departmental intelligence services, it would act as a coordinating mechanism for all intelligence. The paper stressed that the proposed organization would have no police or subpoena powers and would not operate in the United States. President Roosevelt expressed considerable interest in this proposal, and a week before his death in April 1945 asked Donovan to poll the Cabinet and the heads of agencies concerned for comment on it. These comments, ranging from the opinion that there was no need for such a peacetime organization to the belief that it was vital to national security, make interesting reading today.

William J. Donovan

18 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944 I have given consideration to the organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period.

In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelligence services were mainly in and for military operations, the OSS was placed under the direction of the JCS.

Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.

This will require two things:

1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision of the President.

2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy.

I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the means by which I think this could be realized without difficulty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State and other agencies.

In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this (or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative action. There are common-sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at once.

The immediate revision and coordination of our present intelligence system would effect substantial economies and aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.

Information important to the national defense, being gathered now by certain Departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at the strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication.

Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions.

We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.

William J. Donovan
Director

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: MAJOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Apropos of your memorandum of November 8, 1944, relative to the establishment of a central intelligence service, I should appreciate your calling together the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various executive agencies, so that a consensus of opinion can be secured.

It appears to me that all of the ten executive departments, as well as the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission have a direct interest in the proposed venture. They should all be asked to contribute their suggestions to the proposed centralized intelligence service.

F.D.R.

Donovan received an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal for his wartime work, but his plan to develop the O.S.S. into a peacetime intelligence organization was beset with conflicting views. Some would have the new organization, like the O.S.S., report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while others preferred that it be put under the Department of State. And there was controversy as to whether one individual could or should be responsible for presenting a consolidated view of the intelligence picture to the policy makers, rather than leave this the collective responsibility of the chiefs of all the intelligence services. No agreement had been reached by the time the war ended in August 1945, and the O.S.S. was soon ordered disbanded.

A proposal for a central intelligence organization such as Donovan had conceived was contained in the first draft of the so-called unification act submitted by Ferdinand Eberstadt to Secretary Forrestal in October 1945. And in January 1946, to preserve assets while the issue was being settled, President Truman issued the order creating the Central Intelligence Group, which later picked up some of the functions and personnel still remaining from the O.S.S. and other scattered independent intelligence activities.

Bill Donovan's dream was not yet completely realized. Congress still had to act. After extensive hearings to which General Donovan contributed important testimony, the provisions for a Central Intelligence Agency were incorporated into the National Security Act of 1947, which created a Department of Defense and set up the National Security Council to advise the President and oversee the new intelligence agency. In July 1947 final executive and legislative endorsement was thus given to the views which Donovan had been striving to have accepted. I have always felt that the decision to place the C.I.A. under the President, as Donovan recommended, was wise and necessary.

Bill Donovan's restless energy had turned elsewhere with the disbanding of O.S.S., although he never gave up his interest in the organization or stopped hammering home to the public the necessity for providing adequate and accurate information to the policy makers of the government in order to protect the national security. His varied talents were being called on for other important services. His legal ability and

vast knowledge of German wartime activities were used to help prepare the Nuremburg trials for the Nazi war criminals. He went to Greece to investigate the murder of newsman George Polk, a clear effort of the Communists to prevent the truth about the extent of their activities in the Greek civil war from seeping out.

The more General Donovan saw of the Soviets in action the more concerned he was with alerting the American people to the dangers. He co-authored an article in the Yale Law Journal for July 1949 presenting a "Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service." The article said:

> The Communist Fifth Column . . . seeks to identify itself with every social grievance. Russian espionage and subversive operations are made up of trained and skilled spy technicians and intelligence officers, propaganda specialists, experts in spreading rumors. Instruction is planned so that the agent will find it as easy for a minority to operate a labor union, or a pacifist league, or any other such movement, as it is for a minority group to control a large corporation when most of the stockholders take no active interest in the management.

In 1950 President Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, presided on the occasion of the award to Bill Donovan of the Alexander Hamilton Medal, given by the Columbia Alumni Association for distinguished service and accomplishment in any of the great fields of human endeavor. In 1953 the President named him Ambassador to Thailand. At this time the ancient kingdom of Siam was a main target for Communist subversion. With a vigor that belied his years, this remarkable man of 70 threw himself into the job of helping the Thais bolster their defenses against the Communists so that this keystone of anti-Communism in Southeast Asia could continue free.

Upon his return to the United States one might have expected him to seek retirement, but nothing was further from his mind. He became National Chairman of the International Refugee Committee and the director of that group's fight against the Soviet program to induce Russians who escaped from Communism to return home. At the time of the Hungarian Revolution he turned his energies to aiding the refugees of this unsuccessful effort to win freedom from Soviet tyranny.

He was Chairman of the American Committee on United Europe from its inception in 1949, and through this organization he continued to further the efforts of our major allies in Western Europe to achieve a greater unity in the face of Communist danger.

Even after ill health forced his retirement to Walter Reed Hospital, General Donovan continued his interest in the fight against Communism and the development of our intelligence work. In recognition of his role in the intelligence field, President Eisenhower in 1957 awarded him the National Security Medal. The citation reads:

> Through his foresight, wisdom, and experience, he foresaw, during the course of World War II, the problems which would face the postwar world and the urgent need for a permanent, centralized intelligence function. Thus his wartime work contributed to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and a coordinated national intelligence structure.

In February 1959 he passed away at Walter Reed among the men he had led. As soldier, public prosecutor, leader of the bar, director of the Strategic Services in wartime, public servant in time of peace, he had left his record with the nation he served so well. He was a rare combination of physical courage, intellectual ability, and political acumen. He was a mild-mannered man, with an insatiable curiosity, an unflagging imagination, and the energy to turn his ideas into action.

The heritage of Bill Donovan is written in the national security. He woke the American people to the need of a permanent peacetime intelligence service. He bestirred Washington into creating a mechanism whereby all the government components which receive information on what is going on anywhere in the world pool their knowledge, share their interpretations, and work together to make one unified estimate of what it means. He helped place intelligence in its proper perspective and stimulated the policy makers to recognize its role in determining American policy abroad. He was one of the architects of an organization that should keep our government the best informed of any in the world.

History's epitaph for William J. Donovan will be:

He made his nation more secure.

CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE

A STUDY OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By General *Cheng Chieh-min.* (Taipei: Kuo-chia An-ch'uan-ch'u. 1958. Pp. 706.)

This work, whether or not it was so intended, is a summation of the experience and studies which have made General Cheng an authority in his field. While in substance it contains little that has not been presented elsewhere, its Chinese point of view gives a fresh perspective to familiar subjects. The author's background includes extensive research into Western thought, philosophic and military, from the writings of the ancient Greeks to training publications of the United States Army; but it also includes a solid grounding in Chinese thought and strategy from Lao-tse and Confucius to Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek. Clausewitz and Jomini, Lenin and Liddell Hart, Toynbee and Sherman Kent are seen in a new light when interpreted through the thinking of Hsün-tzu and Mencius, Sun-tzu and Szu-ma Kuang, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang.

The author, at the age of 60, in poor health and in semi-retirement, is still Director of the National Security Bureau, the highest intelligence agency in the Nationalist Government. A graduate of the second class of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1925, he studied in Moscow and Western Europe, served as combat commander and general staff officer in China, and had liaison duties with various Allied commands during World War II. He has been consistently close to the Generalissimo, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, Vice and Deputy Minister of National Defense, Director of Military Intelligence, Director of the Office of Mainland Operations, and a member of the President's Advisory Committee on Strategy. He spent 1957 in "a year of convalescence," revising and expanding his two previous works on intelligence into the present study.

General Cheng states that the purpose of his book, designed for the Chinese military community, is to correct long-standing misapprehensions about the nature of intelligence work, and to arouse interest or furnish guidance in a sadly neglected field. He proposes to take up in order "all questions connected with military intelligence" with a view to establishing a com-

plete and sound foundation for those who may be called upon to work as intelligence officers. Considerations of security and limitations of space, however, force him to gloss over details of intelligence organization and specific techniques of application.

He has nevertheless achieved a comprehensive study of the huge field marked out for treatment, embracing national policy, the nature of intelligence, national strategic intelligence, military strategic intelligence, combat intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological warfare, and including specifics on strategems, signal intelligence, the intelligence process, and intelligence training. He draws a thousand examples from as many sources—Hannibal's campaigns, the Napoleonic era, the two world wars, and every stage of Chinese history. He sometimes yields to a passion for categorizing and occasionally belabors seemingly obvious points; but such shortcomings seem inevitable in the light of his announced purpose to fill a void in the Chinese literature on intelligence. They are more than offset by the insights he gives into Nationalist Chinese ideas of national policy and strategy and the role of intelligence in their formulation and execution.

The author's discussion of such matters as the function of intelligence, its several types, the stages of the intelligence process and their interrelations, or intelligence training and its supervision follows generally the lines of standard Western works on the subject. More stimulating, to a Westerner at any rate, is his development of the concept of intelligence as the basis for effective strategems and for economical victory, the foundation of every type of activity in cold or hot war, and so the tool without which no adequate decision can be made, no determined policy executed. Here the argument is peculiarly Chinese.

General Cheng himself feels that he is taking a traditionally Chinese view, as opposed to Western glorification of power and naked force, when he says, quoting President Chiang, "War is based essentially on benevolence, though its methods are savage; war has peace for its end, though its means are terrible—even barbaric." He thus considers war the last-ditch defense of the people's welfare, to be waged only when there is no other means of safeguarding the welfare of the people in a "peace which is the external manifestation of benevolence." But even

victory in war, he emphasizes, does not necessarily mean profit for the nation; a military triumph can leave the people and the government far worse off than if there had been no war. Therefore any victory, as Sun-tzu insisted, must be economical. The sage military leader is the one who "fights without battles," who "creates victory out of opportunities offered by the enemy."

It is precisely here that intelligence is given its most important role and that the value of "strategems," repeatedly emphasized throughout the book, is most clearly illustrated. Strategems "are the struggle of wits in which intelligence copes with intelligence; they are unconventional but legitimate expedients, a method of war in which deception of the enemy is used as the only means to attain a predetermined objective. Under all conditions, favorable or unfavorable, they are the most valuable, most economical, and most effective activity of warfare." The author's pronouncement that strategems are to be used against enemy, neutral, and ally alike, together with his statement that there are inevitably differences of goals and policies between allies and "today's allies are tomorrow's enemies," shows the vigorous nationalism of his thinking. He believes that strategems are an aspect of strategy gravely neglected in Western studies.

It is unfortunate, with respect to these revelations of Chinese thought, that this authoritative book is not available in English. Since, however, the Chinese concepts of peculiar interest are scattered widely through the massive work, translation *in toto* or in significant part would hardly be worth while. For the Western student of intelligence it will probably remain little more than a reference, difficult of access.

WHY MEN CONFESS. By *O. John Rogge*. (New York: Nelson. 1959. Pp. 298. $3.95.)

The evaluation of the Chinese indoctrination process used on Americans during and immediately after the Korean War remains a topic of lively interest, and the search for antidotes to this kind of indoctrination gives purpose to continued studies of its nature. The dissemination of the Code of Conduct by the Defense Department, with its strong emphasis on training, has resulted in many attempts to synthesize current knowledge of the process in manageable and teachable form. But an oversimplified and distorted popular concept of "brain-

washing" has become so well established, not only with the man in the street but with many whose association with intelligence work should make them more sophisticated or at least better informed, that the problem of furnishing a better foundation for understanding, combatting and resisting Communist indoctrination becomes formidable.

Kinkead's *In Every War But One,*[1] written in support of the Code of Conduct, explicitly discounts any occult art of brainwashing, but in its straining to dramatize the need for better morale among enlisted men it bypasses the problem of preparing air force or intelligence officers, for example, for the kind of interrogation and indoctrination they may face as prisoners of the Communists. But if Kinkead's viewpoint is too narrow, it is almost impossible to round out the picture by pointing to books with a wider vista or with more specific applicability to the intelligence specialist. The more general books range from the obviously well-intentioned but scientifically inaccurate ones of Hunter [2] to those like the quasi-scientific but highly controversial *Rape of the Mind,* by Joost A. M. Meerloo.[3] The definitive book on the indoctrination process particularly as it pertains to the intelligence specialist is yet to be written.

Why Men Confess is certainly not the definitive book, but it does represent an important contribution to a growing literature. It treats the Communist process as one manifestation of a standard inquisitional method used by others today and in the historical past, and it becomes therefore an encyclopedia of the history of confession and a sort of concordance of literary allusions to the confession process. It does not have the journalistic polish of Hunter or Kinkead or the sensationalism of Meerloo. The skill of a practiced lawyer has been applied to produce what is in effect a brief on the subject as seen from his experience and reading. His experience is largely in the "confessions" of the criminal courts, which are so often fallible and sometimes dictated by pathological motives; his reading has been historical, literary and scientific. As far as can be determined, he has been both catholic and thorough in these re-

[1] New York: W. W. Norton. 1959.

[2] Edward Hunter, *Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956) and *Brainwashing in Red China* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1951).

[3] Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. 1956.

searches. Consequently, even though fault can be found with some of its conclusions, his work is very useful as a source book.

It is apparent that Mr. Rogge is more at home with historical and literary research than in evaluating scientific articles. Except in citing the Senate testimony of experts and the descriptive (rather than evaluative) paper of Hinkle and Wolff,[4] he uses scientific authorities inappropriately. His rather heavy emphasis on psychoanalytically based concepts that are at worst obscure and at best controversial is unfortunate. The book would be more solid if he had stuck to the approach he used with his literary and historical materials. Dostoevski, Gogol, and Beck and Godin [5] represent much more effective documentation for his position than Reik, Berg, or Freud. Perhaps this criticism would not be necessary were it not for the blurb on the dust jacket (for which the author is presumably not responsible) ". . . Mr. Rogge tells us all that psychology knows about the compulsion to confess."

Mr. Rogge uses his historical concordance to present a brief for protecting individuals against the inquisitional methods of modern states, including our own:

> The inquisitional method, which the communists have exploited for a quarter of a century, is a throwback to the past and should be abandoned, especially in view of the growth and power of modern states. (p. 29)
>
> Neither the system of legal proofs nor the use of physical force will explain the many confessions to communist, French, and clerical inquisitors. But there was one thing which the different regimes of these inquisitors had in common: the inquisitional system. (p. 199)
>
> All roads led to the same conclusion: the primitive and irrational nature of most of the mind together with the power of modern states, our own included, make it necessary to abandon not only the inquisitional technique but also any of its challenged fruits. The world should have done with investigative authorities questioning a suspected individual, like a powerful parent interrogating a helpless child. The inquisi-

[4] "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the States,'" *AMA Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, August 1956, Vol. 76, pp. 115–174.

[5] *The Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession* (New York: Viking, 1951).

> tional system stands in the way of the development of equalitarian societies and the growth of human beings into mature individuals. (p. 246)

Woven into this thesis and making up the climax is his belief that silence is a right of man that is basic, inviolable, and the only true defense against authoritarianism. The dust jacket promises a further application of these ideas in quoting Mr. Rogge: "*Why Men Confess* is the first of three books on the subject of confessions. I am now working on the next, which will deal with the First and Fifth Amendments."

THE SILENT LANGUAGE. By *Edward T. Hall.* (New York: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 240. $3.95.)

Practically everyone in and out of government is full of ideas for practical steps to make U.S. representatives abroad more effective. Dr. Hall's book seeks to lay a theoretical basis for these practical efforts, to the extent that they are directed toward minimizing the reaction that takes place when one moves into the area of a foreign culture. Some people have chosen to call this reaction a "culture shock." Hall explains it as the "removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues one encounters at home and the substitution for them of other cues which are strange." Proceeding from the proposition that "most people's difficulties with each other can be traced to distortions in communication," *The Silent Language* "treats culture in its entirety as a form of communication" as it seeks to outline "a theory of culture and a theory of how culture came into being" and to present "the technical tools for probing the secrets of culture."

The author is in a position to know what he is writing about. He is an anthropologist who has travelled and worked abroad to develop principles and concepts for teaching U.S. representatives how to be more effective. He has done such teaching in the State Department, the Strategic Intelligence School, and elsewhere. He now makes this subject his business.

The study points out basic differences in languages and ways of speaking, but emphasizes the actions which speak louder than words, and particularly the kind of communication that takes place "out of awareness." "This notion," it says, "that there are significant portions of the personality that exist

out of one's own awareness but which are there for everyone else to see may seem frightening. The point, however, is a crucial one and will grow in importance as men begin to grasp its implications." Another subtle complication in the communications process of particular significance for anyone who anticipates service abroad is brought out in elaborating the fact that "people reared in different cultures *learn to learn* differently."

Some readers may not be persuaded of the validity of the author's conceptual construction. His *time, space,* and *order* as communications media seem unnecessarily abstruse. His "map of culture" may be over-billed as "a mathematics of cultures." His classification of behavior patterns as formal, informal, and technical is an effort toward unattainable precision. He uses a great many words in a specialized sense when it seems that a garden variety of meaning would serve the purpose just as well.

But dissatisfactions such as these only serve to point up Dr. Hall's own contention that there is much work to be done in this field. The understanding of foreign cultures is critical to intelligence operations and to intelligence analysis; and such a considerable contribution of new thinking as *The Silent Language* makes can but stimulate more progress toward this understanding.

ROMMEL RUFT KAIRO (Rommel Calling Cairo). By *John W. Eppler.* (Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag. 1959. Pp. 300. DM 6.85.)

Operation Condor was a bold, even desperate stroke—the attempt to place a German resident agent in the heart of the British North African command center, one who could provide Rommel with vitally needed order-of-battle information. It failed, partly because of bad luck, but mainly because of the agent's cowboy operational methods, brash and almost incredibly insecure.

Published just on the heels of a British account of the same events,[1] Eppler's tale of his espionage activities in Cairo for Field Marshall Erwin Rommel during the struggle for

[1] Leonard Mosley, *The Cat and the Mice.* (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1958. 160 pp.)

North Africa reveals little new substantive information. Mosley's report, reviewed in the last number of the *Studies*,[2] will be of more interest to the professional intelligence officer. Eppler has told an adventure story in a romantic, intensely personal style characteristic of much of the recent spate of German war reminiscences. The fact that a motion picture is being made in Germany based on Operation Condor is perhaps indicative of the nature of the book.

We learn nothing from Eppler about how he was spotted and recruited by the Abwehr; the story opens with his posting to Rommel in North Africa, and the first 130 pages deal with the problems and experiences of his 4,000-kilometer trip across the Sahara to reach the target area. He gives passing mention to technical intelligence preparations for the mission, such as documentation, communications equipment, and clothing. Inasmuch as he is arrested by British security forces on page 216 and devotes himself from then on to his treatment by his interrogators, it will be seen that he gives relatively little space to his actual work in Cairo. Details on the recruiting of sub-agents are almost completely lacking, as well as a useful account of what, if anything, was accomplished. One incident is described, the separating of a British courier from his pouch of battle plans by the belly-dancer Hekmath Fathmy; a satisfactory account of this is available from Mosley. Mosley also deals at some length with the tracking down of Eppler by British security forces, to which Eppler's own account adds nothing of significance.

Eppler never again made radio contact with Abwehr base stations after his initial report upon arrival. The two special radiomen assigned to service him had been posted too close to the front by order of Rommel and had been captured with their codes during a raid by the Long Range Desert Patrol. Eppler was cut off (*eingemauert*) after this in order to prevent a play-back. Eppler's radioman tried night after night without success to make contact with base station, and the title of his story would therefore more logically read *Cairo Calling Rommel.* This book can safely be passed by, especially by those who have read *The Cat and the Mice.*

[2] Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1959), p. 139.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. By *Alexander L. George.* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company. 1959. Pp. 287. $6.)

This scholarly and imaginative book by one of Rand Corporation's social scientists is of special significance because it evaluates propaganda analysis techniques actually used in an operational situation and has therefore had to consider the dynamics of politics, rather than the formal structures to which the usual scholarly study in political science is devoted. Mr. George's validity research is based upon the analysis of German propaganda done by the FCC's Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service during World War II. He examines this in the light of information obtained later from German war documents and German officials, which provides a unique opportunity to validate the inferences drawn from propaganda bearing on intelligence problems and questions critical to Allied policy. Some 80 percent of the FCC inferences that could be scored proved to be accurate.

The reader who does not make a specialty of propaganda analysis will be most interested in Part III, "Methodology and Applications," in which 20 case studies are presented to illustrate the broad range of intelligence problems approached by the FCC. The analysts' reasoning is reconstructed and their inferences matched against the available historical record on such important problems as the question of a German offensive against Russia in 1943, German expectations in 1942 of an Allied second front in North Africa, the German public's attitude toward the Nazi information policy, and a predicted change in the propaganda presentation of military setbacks on the Russian front.

The first case study, on the German V-weapons propaganda, is cited as one in which the FCC analysts did not do so well as their British counterparts. The brilliant British analysis may be known to some readers. Reasoning from the substantiated hypothesis that German propaganda would not deliberately mislead the German people about an increase of German power, it concluded that the Germans actually had some sort of new weapon and were not merely bluffing. It accurately described the German leaders' evaluation of the new weapon and made the tentative estimate, based on subtle shifts in the propaganda, that in November 1943 the Germans

expected to have it ready between mid-January and mid-April 1944. This estimate proved amazingly accurate.

As Mr. George writes:

> The deduction concerning the German leaders' private estimate of the timing of the V-weapon was based upon ingenious use of a general observation about Nazi propaganda practice. The British analyst reasoned that Goebbels would be careful not to give the German public a promise of retaliation too far ahead of the date on which the promise could be fulfilled. . . . Taking a number of factors into account, the British analyst reckoned that Goebbels would give himself about three months as the maximum period . . . to propagandize forthcoming retaliation in advance.

One of the reasons advanced for the lower caliber of FCC analyses on this problem is that the FCC analysts, unlike the British, worked on their own and were not asked to coordinate their V-weapon research with that of other intelligence specialists. They assumed that other intelligence techniques more appropriate than propaganda analysis were being applied to the problem. This lack of coordination may also have damaged the quality of their analysis in another case study cited: they were not informed of TORCH or briefed to look for indications of Nazi concern over possible invasion of North Africa, and so continued to search for signs of the Nazi attitude toward a possible second front across the English Channel or in northern Europe.

These two cases, in both of which the analysis was directed toward predicting a major action, are not regarded as covering the range of situations with which propaganda analysis can fruitfully deal. The author recognizes and discusses at some length the possibility that leaders may decide to forego any propaganda preparation which might reveal a planned action in advance. In either event, he points out,

> The value to the policy maker of inferences assessing the nature and objectives of the major action once it is taken should not be underrated; in many cases they overshadow in importance the usefulness of having predicted the action before it occurred.

Writing for scholars and experts, Mr. George has set himself a much subtler task than presenting these interesting case studies. He has sought: (1) to identify general types

of inference made about conditions which helped to determine the communication content (for example propaganda goals and techniques, "situational factors," and elite estimates, expectations, and policies); (2) to identify other possible determinants about which the FCC did not attempt to make inferences, and then to depict the relationship among all the various factors making up the system of behavior; and (3) to identify reasoning patterns in individual inferences and codify the more general methods, direct and indirect, that were used. Out of this thorough and painstaking study comes his cautious conclusion:

> It seems that propaganda analysis can become a reasonably objective diagnostic tool for making certain kinds of inferences and that its techniques are capable of refinement and improvement.

The book is not easy to read, in part because of both undefined and overrefined terminology. The author never defines "propaganda," but apparently uses it interchangeably with other undefined terms, "propaganda communications," "political communications," and "public communication." Yet propaganda is distinguished from "mass communication," also undefined. Readers may find quite confusing the relationships between propaganda analysis, communications analysis, content analysis, quantitative analysis, and nonfrequency analysis. And many a reader may never get beyond a choker on page 79, in the introduction to Part II:

> 4. Dichotomous attributes (that is, meaning or nonmeaning characteristics which can be predicated only as belonging or not belonging to a given unit of the communication material).[4]

If he persists, however, footnote 4 on page 81 will refer him to page 96, where he can learn that a dichotomous attribute is merely "the presence or absence" of a designated symbol or theme.

Addressing an academic audience which historically has tended to make content analysis synonymous with counting, the author overstates his criticism of quantitative techniques in propaganda analysis. The casual reader may miss his references to the fact that quantitative techniques are important in the first elementary step in analyzing propaganda,

that is in describing its content, and his judgment that "another deficiency of FCC's procedure was its failure to make use of systematic quantitative procedures in evaluating certain aspects of Nazi V-weapon propaganda." Debate over quantitative *vs.* qualitative techniques is actually beside the point. The real question is how best to combine these techniques in attacking each specific intelligence problem.

Despite these minor shortcomings, it is gratifying to find such an eminently qualified and objective expert as Mr. George reaching conclusions like the following:

> Provision must be made for examining all of the output of a propaganda system and for evaluating its over-all propaganda strategy. Any division of labor which divorces trend analysis on individual subjects from cross-sectional analyses of the entirety of propaganda and propaganda strategy may result in incorrect or misleading interpretations of specific trends.
>
> The propaganda analyst makes the basic assumption that propaganda is coordinated with elite policies, but he needs more concrete knowledge which he can obtain only from a set of empirically derived generalizations about an elite's operational propaganda theory. . . . [He also] requires knowledge about technical expertise and skillfulness of propaganda systems under scrutiny and that of individual propagandists employed therein.
>
> The investigator must have rather specific, detailed knowledge of the propaganda organization whose output he is analyzing in order to appraise the situational context—who says it, to whom, and under what circumstances. . . . Comparison of what is said to different audiences is generally of considerable value in making inferences.
>
> In propaganda analysis, it is typical for the investigator to be concerned with establishing slight changes in propaganda lines or minute or subtle differences in the wording employed by different speakers or by the same speaker to different audiences.

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Dear Sirs:

This letter is prompted by the suspicion that B. B. Bennett's diverting essay, "The Greater Barrier," (*Studies*, Fall 1958) on the need for good English prose in intelligence was not calculated only to entertain, which it did, but was also intended to instruct, which, regrettably, it did not. The very solemnity of your journal compels the assumption that behind the author's frivolous shoals ("Chaucer, Shakespeare, Conrad, O'Neill, Wolfe, Spillane" [imagine putting Wolfe in there!]) lies the open water of Serious Purpose. The reader is admonished at the outset that "the time is upon us when we should face and begin to penetrate a barrier even greater than that of foreign languages—the English language barrier." Face it we then do, throughout much of the remainder of the article. But penetrate it we do not.

The article does seem about to get down to business in the section called "Spying the Land," devoted to discovering three constituent parts of the barrier, or perhaps factors which obscure its existence—"Self-Exculpation" (which is merely the universal human tendency to avoid recognition of self-guilt); the "Literary Bent" (a common subjective failing [or triumph, depending on who has it]); and the forced "Viability of the language," with its offspring, "linguistic chameleonism." But having identified these characteristics of bad writing, the author abandons us, the article ends. It is necessary to identify symptoms in order to diagnose an illness, but we do not ordinarily stop there and seek to cure the disease with a mere analgesic. The proper pathology finds the agent responsible for the condition and then treats it with antibiotics, not aspirin. The problem with diseased writing is not the determination of the all-too-obvious symptoms, but the identity of the causal virus.

A word or two must be put in here in defense of the writing in the estimates, where a "predictive conclusion," your author says, is "useful only to the extent that it is precisely qualified." Can this be an accurate axiom? We think not. As a matter of fact, estimates which are too liberally sprinkled with precise qualifiers sometimes seem to lose their way.

There is still room, we think, even in an estimate, for suggestions, degrees of emphasis, perhaps innuendo. For many readers, the neat shadings of probability are either lost or soon forgotten. What is more often remembered is the general drift of a paper, the over-all impression shaped by many things, qualifiers among them. Thus the writer of an estimate, though duty-bound to assign exact degrees of probability if he can, must also remember that he is usually creating more a rounded image than a sharp picture. We do not mean to rise here in defense of slovenly presentation or inexact qualification; we merely hope to refute the unkind notion that an estimate must stand or fall solely on the strength or weakness of its adverbs and adjectives, important as they are.

Moreover, the precision gained by assigning such words as "possible" and "probable" a value on a mathematical scale appears to upset your author most of all: by using mathematics, he says, we have "departed the realm of language." The fact that a word has a mathematical meaning, however, does not entitle him to suggest that it is no longer a part of our language. Words, after all, are used to express feeling or thought, mathematical or otherwise. Should we follow his argument to its absurd end and conclude that using the word "oak" would propel us from the "realm of language" into the realm of trees?

Beyond distinguishing the estimate from other varieties, "The Greater Barrier" makes no attempt to subdivide categories of intelligence writing. That is too bad, for there is no such thing as intelligence writing in general. Not yet, anyhow. And if that's what Dr. Bennett and the Office of Training would like to establish, then woe to us all. There is not now, nor should there be, a common school of prose for, say, current intelligence, national estimates, and technical memoranda. There are certain standards of good practice common to all intelligence writing, but most such standards can be applied to all prose; Self-Exculpation, the Literary Bent, and Viability are certainly not the exclusive properties of the intelligence community.

Perhaps, in some instances, we should admit that learning to write is a hopeless task; some of us just cannot master it. Why should this be any more disgraceful than the proposi-

tion that some of us just cannot draw, or paint, or sculpture? But let us assume that most of us are not completely hopeless, and need only apply to the Office of Training for instruction in the art. No special talent is needed to draw a recognizable chair, nor any great gift to write an understandable sentence. And presumably, with training and experience, the minimal chair or sentence can be improved upon.

Now one critical ingredient in such training and experience is not mentioned by your author and might be overlooked in the OTR. We should not begin by endlessly drawing chairs or endlessly writing sentences. First we must *look* at chairs. And first we must *read* before we write. Any normally perceptive person, exposed to a quantity of good reading, will soak some of it up. There is no point at all in instituting a course in creative writing, intelligence writing, or any other kind of writing for persons who have not read. This is not to say that reading will make it so. Not all readers are writers. But there is no such thing as a writer who has not read. And while this is—or should be—obvious, it is all too frequently forgotten.

Exhorting us to write better, to communicate more clearly, and to surmount the Greater Barrier is a pious exercise but one with little hope of practical accomplishment. It will remind those who probably cannot that they should. It may also remind those who can that they can. It may even lead to some worthwhile self-examination for those who are somewhere in between. But until Dr. Bennett loses his modesty and tells us how *he* penetrated the barrier, he must, in all good grace, rest content, albeit surrounded by all of us self-exculpitators.

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are printed without classification and without identification of the writers, for the convenience of readers who may wish to detach them from the classified body of the *Studies*.

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