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


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
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
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THE INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles submitted during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

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Evidence that Soviet plan fulfillment figures are not seriously fudged or fabricated, but need be interpreted with care.

THE VALIDITY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC STATISTICS

Edward L. Allen

The publication, beginning in 1956, of a variety of Soviet statistical handbooks on the economy of the USSR signalled the end of a twenty-year data drought. This shift from the Stalin-imposed era of virtually complete concealment, when even a report on the production of samovars was considered a state secret, has been most welcome. No longer is the student of the Soviet economy forced to function like an archeologist, spending most of his time digging for individual isolated facts. He now can start with figures which, while far from complete, indeed quite skimpy by comparison with data published on the U.S. economy, provide a sufficient basis for serious analysis.

A sufficient basis, if a valid one. Can we accept these Soviet-supplied data as reliable and bona fide? Has the Central Statistical Agency at the bidding of N. S. Khrushchev perhaps erected a Potemkin village of false figures, deliberately fabricated to deceive the West? Or, alternatively, are the data so distorted at their source on the enterprise level as to be meaningless when aggregated? Both these possibilities are briefly examined in this paper.

Checks at the Enterprise Level

First, let us look at the possibility of falsification at the source. Consider at the outset the environment in which the enterprise director works. He is an instrument of the centrally directed, government-owned and -operated economy. The government collects economic data in order to facilitate planning and as a basis for the allocation system which channels materials and supplies where they are needed to fulfill its objectives. The operation of an economy through a system of material balances, by allocation, requires accurate data. It is therefore to the interest of the central control authorities

that enterprises provide accurate statistics, and falsification has been made subject to severe punishment.

Yet plant managers do manipulate output and inventory data, at the risk of their careers and stiff jail terms, as evidenced by the many horrible examples cited in the Soviet press and technical journals. Why is it they resort to extra-legal practices? The usual reason is that the centrally determined production goal for the enterprise is very high; and also the director is at the mercy of his suppliers in his efforts to fulfill the plan. The successful industrial leader in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, plays the game by the rules which are actually in force, not according to a strict interpretation of legal statutes. The question is whether these manipulations are so widespread or of such a magnitude as to invalidate production figures across the board.

There are a number of in-built controls over the director within the enterprise itself. The chief accountant is responsible to the state for refusing to execute any orders from the director or other senior officials to fudge his accounts and for reporting such demands "up the line." Another plant official, the chief of the quality control department, is subject to imprisonment if he falsely certifies substandard products as meeting stipulated technical requirements. A more knowledgeable representative of central authority within the enterprise is the secretary of the Party organization in the plant, and his salary is paid from Party funds, not by the enterprise. The role of the Party apparatus in guiding and monitoring the activities of enterprises has been greatly increased since Stalin's death.

Another completely independent plant official is the chief of the "special section," or secret police, who is extremely well paid and who maintains dossiers on all key enterprise personnel. This enforcement officer is almost certainly aware, through his network of informers, of any shady or illegal activities being carried on in the plant. If some such activities, however, are necessary to carry out the government's plans—black-market purchase of materials needed to meet the current production goals of the enterprise, for example—he may decide to tolerate them.

Finally, the books of the enterprise are subject to inspection by outside agencies reporting directly to the Council of

Ministers. Representatives of the Ministry of Finance, periodically collecting profits and taxes, check this aspect of the enterprise's financial performance against the plan. The Ministry of State Control polices all enterprises charged with carrying out the decrees of the Council of Ministers and has broad powers to subpoena the records of any unit under suspicion.

The State Bank also plays an important role as a control and inspection arm of the Council of Ministers. Virtually all financial activities of an enterprise—its purchases, wage payments, sales, etc.—are reflected in the transactions recorded in its account at the Bank's local branch. The Bank is responsible for auditing these transactions to insure that they correspond in detail to the specifications of the plan for production. Capital expenditures of the enterprise are similarly controlled and reviewed by the Construction Bank of the Ministry of Finance, which disburses investment funds.

As long as the enterprise is functioning successfully, the watchdogs of the central authorities permit the director legal elbow-room. Thus, if he needs to "borrow" one percent of next month's expected output to reach this month's plan goal no one is likely to object to his reporting the plan as fulfilled. But this borrowed production must be made up in the next accounting period by subtraction from the then current production. If the director continues to fall behind, one or another of the enterprise watchdogs will denounce him to the higher authorities and receive credit for uncovering the "skandal."

The system, as it is reported by hundreds of Soviet refugees to operate in practice, thus lets only marginal and discontinuous manipulation of output data go unpunished. The error introduced into Soviet production figures by such distortions, one would then conclude, is in all likelihood too small to interfere with their usefulness.

Intelligence Verifications

We in intelligence have further means to check the reasonableness of individual enterprise reports. Military and civilian embassy officials have been engaged in observational reporting from iron curtain countries for many years.

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Within the past few years, opportunities for observational reporting have been multiplied as a result of the East-West exchange program. Visits to the USSR by U.S. experts which followed the signing of the Lacy-Zaroubin agreement of 27 January 1958 have been particularly valuable in providing a check on official reports of industrial production. In 1958 and 1959, U.S. technical personnel visited Soviet factories in the iron and steel, electronics, plastics, electric power, and anti-biotics industries. Similar exchanges have taken place between USSR and United Kingdom experts.

¹ See H. H. Hemenway's [redacted] *Studies*
II 4, p. 7.

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In some cases, though not in all, the Western experts have been able to check production records against observed plant capacities. In the Soviet iron and steel industry such a check was extensively carried out, plants representing 40 percent of total Soviet capacity being included on the itineraries. No case of falsification has been reported, although some data given the U.S. delegates by the Soviets are regarded with skepticism.

Agricultural Enterprise

Special mention should be made of particular problems which affect the collection of agricultural statistics. First of all, there is the problem of the competence of the rural collector. Despite the sweeping claims made for Soviet education, only 40 percent of the adult population in 1959 had had eight years of schooling, and the proportion in the rural areas was undoubtedly lower than this nation-wide average. The quality of Soviet agricultural statistics has suffered from the consequent lack of adequate training given the collectors.

Secondly, the typical peasant expertise at *ochkoviratel'stvo*—throwing dust in the eyes—had developed to a fine art in response to the challenge of the Tsar's tax collectors. That it continued to be practiced long after the Communist takeover was shown by the 1951 Soviet decree that no report of a collective farm claiming the death of an animal from natural causes would be accepted without a veterinary's corroboration.

Through most of the years of the Soviet regime, the final authority for estimating crop production lay with the Office of the Chief Inspector for Estimating Crop Yields, attached to the Council of Ministers. This office relied on a staff of local agents to inspect reports and used historical correlations of weather conditions with crop yields to check the validity of local reports and determine output. It is interesting that U.S. intelligence officers now use this same technique to judge the reasonableness of official Soviet claims for agricultural crop production. Agricultural output statistics are still regarded as generally less reliable than industrial production data, and the agricultural delegations which have gone to the USSR under the exchange program have provided few, if any, checks on the published figures.

There are, however, a number of current developments favorable to improved agricultural reporting, to wit:

The rapidly increasing size and decreasing numbers of collective farms—from 250,000 in 1950 to about 55,000 in 1959—must be resulting in the assignment of better qualified personnel to prepare statistical reports.

The increasing percentage of agricultural output given food-industry processing before going to consumers requires that the center receive relatively accurate data in order to plan for the food processing plants.

The progressive substitution of money wages for payments in kind to labor will reduce independent marketing of collective farm produce, putting more of it under state control and facilitating the spread of economic accountability.

Integrity at the Center

We can move now from the origination of statistics at the farm or factory to their collation and publication at the center. Statistics are an essential operating tool for an economy that relies on allocation rather than a market price system as its controlling mechanism. Lenin's decree of 1918 set up the first Soviet statistical organization, and an industrial census was taken the same year. Since 1948 the Central Statistical Administration has been an independent agency reporting to the Council of Ministers, with jurisdiction over reporting forms and authority to check on the accuracy of reports received from subordinate echelons. The CSA runs its own schools for training accountants and statisticians, writes textbooks, and develops calculating machinery. It receives quantities of reports covering quarterly, monthly, ten-day, and, if the subject is important enough, even daily results.

The reports that CSA receives must be reasonably accurate if the central system of allocations is to work. Despite cut-backs, from 700 to 800 commodities were still reported under centralized distribution in 1959, including the most important ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fuels, chemicals, and machinery. The question of the integrity of the CSA statistics is thus reduced to whether it publishes total production figures unrelated to the sum of the plant production figures it receives.

In other words, does it keep two sets of books, one for the internal operation of the economy, and another to throw dust in Western eyes?

Our most comprehensive check on centralized reporting became available at the close of World War II. The German Army, in its penetration of the USSR, had captured a 750-page statistical document carrying the official Soviet security classification *Not for Publication* and entitled "State Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in 1941." This document was recovered from the Germans by U.S. intelligence personnel, and the data contained in it were compared with openly published statistics, particularly those given at the 18th Party Congress. It was found that the openly published data were identical, except for minor discrepancies that could be accounted for, with those in the classified document intended for the official use of Soviet planners.

It should also be remembered that Soviet officials need not falsify data to keep the West uninformed. The USSR can easily withhold information either for security reasons or because it would reflect unfavorably on the regime. Since the Communists first came into power they have followed a policy of selective release of data. The controlled release of information, although usually designed to mislead, is conceptually and practically quite different from falsification.

One of the best examples of Soviet manipulation of data for propaganda purposes was in reporting grain production, when they shifted, for the years 1933-1954, from quantity harvested (barn yield) to the larger figures for the size of the crop in the field (biological yield). Although they made no secret of this switch from standard world-wide procedure, some unsuspecting and careless Western writers accepted the biological yield figures without correction for comparison with Western barn yields.

Need for Interpretation

The interpretation of Soviet commodity statistics, in common with those of other countries, depends upon definition of the categories being measured. Soviet definitions and usage are often different from those commonly accepted in the United

States. Some such lack of direct statistical comparability exists, of course, in the economic data of any two countries, but the reconciliation of Western data is usually an easy task because of explanatory notes appended or explanations available in convenient source books.

Such is not the case in the USSR. Often terms are not explicitly defined, and their meaning must be determined by laborious cross-checking. For these reasons, the statistics released by the Soviet Union must be screened very carefully and not assumed to be comparable to U.S. figures unless so proved by rigorous analysis.

Finally, Soviet aggregate statistics, such as those stating total industrial and agricultural production and national income, whatever merits they may have for internal measurement of progress or external propaganda purposes, cannot be compared with similar measures of total economic activity released by Western nations. The conceptual differences between East and West are too great. For example, the Soviet definition of national income is one of physical production, excluding most of the governmental, professional, and domestic services included in Western income definitions. Variant methods of pricing manufactured products probably introduce another area of noncomparability.

The Soviets have released enough data on physical production, however, to enable us, by augmenting it with additional commodity figures obtained through intelligence research, to compute reasonably satisfactory indexes of both industrial production and national income in terms of Western concepts. These computations will remain a necessity: no matter how liberal the data disclosures of the Soviet leadership in the future, it is unlikely that they will supply us with computations of aggregate indexes based on non-Marxist definitions.

We can be reasonably sure that economic data presented by the Soviet Union will continue to have both meaning and significance. The major research problem will remain in the future what it has been in the past—to find out just what this meaning and significance is.

Description and empirical analysis of the interrogation process as applied to East European defectors, bona fide and mala.

THE INTERROGATION OF DEFECTORS

Stanley B. Farndon

In time of war the most massive source of information regarding the enemy is the flow of prisoners and deserters from his ranks. In a cold war era an important segment of positive and operational intelligence is similarly derived from defectors, refugees, and would-be agents. Their offering of information, however, is not laid freely and untainted at our feet. It must be extracted from them, sometimes against the utmost resistance, and the authentic sorted out from the deceptive, the useless from what fills our needs. This process, the job of the interrogator, is made less difficult in wartime by our having the prisoner wholly at our mercy for the duration; over peacetime enemy sources the equivalent control must for the most part be achieved by psychological means.

Particularly the critical first phase of an interrogation—that undertaken to determine whether the defector is genuine, an enemy agent, or just a swindler—demands much poise, knowledge, human understanding, dexterity, and perseverance. The interrogator must have the manner and bearing to impress his subject as a person of authority. His knowledge of the subject's country should be such as to evoke respect, and his command of the language so fluent as to permit easy, natural conversation and an instant grasp of subtleties. He needs to sense the kind of person he is dealing with and discern quickly any change of attitude reflecting uneasiness, relief, reserve, or unrestraint. He must be able to convince the subject of his deep personal interest in his welfare. He must be tactically skilled and flexible in his approach, keeping the spun threads of the story effortlessly in mind, spotting inconsistencies, exploiting openings, recognizing significant information, learning without revealing his interest. With some subjects he needs inordinate patience and determination.

Aims and Precepts

In all three types of defector interrogation—the initial counterintelligence probing of the subject's bona fides, debriefing a bona fide defector of his knowledge useful to intelligence, and the extraction of operational information from the purported defector in intelligence employ—the interrogator's aim is to get the subject to give information willingly and without reserve. This he can accomplish best by achieving a harmonious atmosphere and creating a close personal rapport with the subject, a rapport based on the subject's respect for the interrogator and confidence in his good will. To this end he must on the one hand be understanding, just, and friendly, and on the other maintain the psychological superiority essential to control.

During the early stages of an interrogation, the interrogator's main objective is to discover exactly what sort of person he is dealing with, and so how best to use his own personality to get the subject to answer questions willingly and truthfully. But the subject also tries to use his personality. He usually assumes a number of poses by means of which he hopes to gain the good will and trust of his interrogator in order to assure his own future well-being, or if he is an agent, in order to pass safely through the security channel and end up in position to fulfill his mission. Regardless of the capability of the interrogator and the character of the subject, these assumed poses make it very difficult to achieve frankness and sincerity during the initial interrogation periods.

The process can be hastened, however, by preparation in advance, and the interrogator should try to forearm himself with all available information on the subject's professional interests and the details of his everyday existence in his homeland. Thus he can start a flow of conversation on topics within the range of the subject's knowledge and interest. Then as he senses the subject's outlook on life and his views on matters discussed, his sympathetic understanding of these will lead the subject to talk more freely. Every effort should be made to induce him to speak freely rather than merely answer questions. Uninterrupted privacy is an important condition at this stage. Once the interrogator has gained his own

impressions of the subject's personality and character, his background knowledge of the case and his first-hand observations will enable him to sort out the various poses from his true characteristics, motives, and intentions.

The tension of the interrogation situation makes the subject wide awake and perceptive to everything that goes on. The interrogator must therefore also maintain a state of keen perceptiveness in the battle of wits, fitting his observations quickly into the emerging picture as the interrogation progresses. An interrogator not physically rested and mentally alert will have a most difficult time gaining psychological superiority. Even intellectually inferior defectors have a fine instinct for sensing the interrogator's qualities and spotting flaws in his attitude or reasoning which tend to destroy the respect necessary for psychological control.

The fact that a defector is dependent on the West's good will for his future well-being is a lever which the interrogator can utilize to control him; it does not take a defector long to realize that he enjoys favors in direct proportion to his cooperation. Yet the prospective source may be under physical control and still fight the interrogator with his brains and spirit. At least he may be sizing the interrogator up, carefully observing his statements and mannerisms, in order to find an area for maneuvering. And if he should be an agent, he can be expected to have been carefully trained and briefed in anticipation of questions he'll be asked. The problem is one of motivating the subject to cooperate, usually of developing confidence in the integrity of the interrogator and assurance that his future will be adequately taken care of in resettlement.

The best results are obtained when the subject is impressed with his interrogator's good judgment and sense of justice. The interrogator should make only such commitments as lie within his authority and ability to keep. One of the worst possible practices is that of making promises that he cannot or knows he will not keep. The reversal of promises indiscriminately made destroys the subject's respect for him and the rapport between them. The interrogator should have enough authority and latitude to approve or disapprove most

of the requests made by a subject; he needs to create the impression that he is a person of consequence, not just a linguist who must check everything out with his boss. When faced with a request beyond his authority he should give the subject a logical reason for delay without revealing that he must ask permission from above, explaining perhaps that this is a matter to which he must give some thought before deciding. In rejecting a request he should be careful not to leave any suspicion that he is discriminating against the subject (unless he is using this tactic as a device in the process of breaking an agent subject).

It is best for the subject to be brought into the interrogation room after the interrogator is already seated there in a good position to observe him during the interrogation. A common error made by some interrogators is to keep the subject waiting for some time for them in the interrogation room: waiting gives the subject too much chance to get a comfortable familiarity with his surroundings. The questioning should be done in carefully chosen phrases on the subject's own language and vocabulary level. The questions should be clear, direct, and simple: a subject is often unwilling to expose his ignorance by asking for clarification of intricate ones. Leading questions should be avoided; they generally result in the subject's giving an answer he thinks is wanted, and so, frequently, to a good deal of fabrication.

The subject's behavior must be interpreted in the light of the interrogator's observations of his personality. A fundamental point is whether he is naturally communicative or hard to draw out. If an inhibited man is taciturn when questioned on personal aspects of his life, that reticence is significant only in showing the interrogator that he must work the harder to gain his confidence. But if an uninhibited subject becomes suddenly taciturn, the interrogator can conclude that his reticence, not being characteristic of his personality, hides deception. Some subjects, particularly Russians, pretend to be quite simple-minded and stupid in order to avoid talking too much, but reveal their native intelligence once they are induced to talk freely.

Defector Behavior Patterns

With the hazards that always attend thinking in terms of types and with the reservation that the essential thing is to understand the individual subject's background and psychology, it is helpful to have in mind some behavior patterns observed in the East European defector and several distinct variant types of personality which occur among the Slavs.

Like all human beings, Slavs are particularly talkative after a harrowing experience such as that which they have usually had in escaping from their homeland. Whatever their beliefs and loyalties may have been in the past, the treatment they experience in the West creates a tremendous psychological impact. They realize how much better Western standards of life are than those in the Soviet orbit. Since self-preservation is a strong factor in defection motivation, they can be expected to try to ingratiate themselves with their interrogators in the hope of getting special consideration in their resettlement. They are susceptible to flattery and can readily be convinced that sincerity and cooperation will exonerate them from any guilt in defecting. They tend to undervalue the importance of any information they have, especially if it appears that the West already has some knowledge along the same lines.

Slavs are inclined to be cooperative when confronted by superior authority. They are particularly sensitive at having outsiders belittle their national heroes. They respond humanly and well to kindness, consideration, and understanding. Once induced to talk, it is a simple matter to keep them talking on subjects of interest to intelligence.

I have found it advantageous, in my experience with East European defectors, to conceive of four variant types of personality requiring distinctively different approaches in interrogation. Two or more of these conceptual types, of course, can mingle and modify one another in a concrete individual, and the interrogation must be adjusted accordingly. The personality structure predominant in the four types is respectively what I shall call rational, vital, emotional, and tense.¹

¹ Cf. *Guide for Intelligence Interrogators*, 707 European Command Intelligence Center, April 1948, col. 10ff.

The *rational-structure* personality is one under superior control by the mind and will. It is characterized by natural assurance and reserve, with very little outward display of emotions such as fear, surprise, joy, or sadness. An individual of this type is attentive during interrogation, frankly curious, and privately he is estimating the situation with objectivity. His speech is well controlled and modulated. There is little difficulty in establishing points of contact for conversation with him, but it soon becomes evident that there is a well-defined area of personal matters to which he uncompromisingly denies access.

The interrogator must recognize these characteristics in time to avoid using an inappropriate approach that would spoil all chance of achieving any degree of psychological superiority. He must be something of a rational type himself to cope with one, adopting an objective, cause-and-effect attitude. He must recognize the logical validity of the moral or material considerations that underlie the subject's behavior. It is rarely that a rational-structure personality turns out to be an agent.

The *vital-structure* personality, characterized by self-assertive energy and resilient vitality, is most often found in Russian subjects. Its intense energy often gives it charm and the momentum of great self-confidence, but it is likely to be driven by instinctive urges without deliberate rational purpose. It can endure long suffering and emerge with vigor and self-assurance.

If a subject of this type is met with inconsiderate harshness, he will defend himself with tenacity and resilience. He patiently stores up his emotions to react when he finds a vulnerable spot in his interrogator. On the other hand, any soft, sentimental approach makes him suspicious. He is shrewd and adaptable, and can conceal his true character by playing any part assigned him or one to support some theory he feels the interrogator has formed. Then he can reverse the field and produce an entirely different story, rendering the results of all previous interrogation useless, in order to gain time and a fresh stand for resisting the investigation.

Psychological superiority over the vital-structure type is hard to attain. The interrogator must likewise display a

strong and assured personality, with similar vitality and resilience. He must avoid any effort to play on the emotions, because these subjects do not soften up in their attitude. Under no conditions should he attempt to bluff one of them; all his declared intentions must be meticulously carried out. Patience is an important virtue for the interrogator dealing with a vital-structure personality, and he should do more listening than questioning. The best method of establishing rapport with such a subject is by showing an interest in the details of his life history, his environment, profession, family, and his desires for the future.

The *emotional-structure* personality is dominated by ill-controlled emotion, rather than mind and will or the drive of ebullient energy. It is manifested by visible or audible expression of any joy, excitement, pleasure, depression, defiance, or other feeling caused it, by sensitive or violent reaction to any changes of treatment, by emotional exaggeration and pleading, and by general sentimentality of outlook. Emotion may drive this type to overflowing recklessness and the senseless risk of his whole career and life, or to a blind beating of his head against obstructions and limitations. He usually has a basic yearning to escape the realities of life and a tendency to lean emotionally on another person, and so to hero-worship.

The emotional type, being easily impressed, is susceptible to almost any skillful approach employed by the interrogator. But the interrogator must be particularly alert, self-controlled, and quick on his feet in dealing with these subjects in order to take full psychological advantage of their changes of mood. They tend toward extremes, and the interrogator must catch them at the right extreme. Logical arguments and persuasion can rarely bring about a change in their mood, and delving into their emotional depths should also be avoided. They should be made to feel at ease in conversation on some objective topic, and a rapport established with developing acquaintance on the basis of confidence and respect for the interrogator.

It is particularly advantageous with this type that the interrogator be presented as a person of rank and dignity. He can take full advantage of the subject's characteristic need

for another person to lean on, one in whom he has a feeling of personal confidence. Under no circumstances should the interrogator be persistently cool to the subject when he seeks support. This is the proper psychological moment for him to show not only strength and firmness but sufficient benevolence and interest in the subject's future to warrant the subject's putting himself in his hands.

An intelligence agent with an emotional-structure personality normally does not bear up well under long strain. It is often possible to catch him off guard by deliberately arousing certain emotions. After tenaciously holding out for some time he may suddenly abandon his position, having decided that it is senseless to continue his deception, and in a display of characteristic recklessness confess that he is an agent. This breakdown usually follows an inner struggle that is sometimes obvious or at least noticeable in an attitude of gloom, brooding, and apathy. The interrogator should be sufficiently sensitive to recognize that such an inner struggle is going on and not be too aggressive: overvigorous handling could cause stubbornness and an increased will to resist. He should observe perceptively the source's moods and calculate what steps he can tactfully take to remove the last obstacles of reason and will power. Then a little prompting at the right moment can often bring on the spontaneous outburst with a full confession. Sometimes a change of quarters and treatment produces the additional momentum needed. This spontaneous self-abandonment is usually genuine in an emotional-structure personality, but is sometimes simulated by others, most successfully by the vital-structure type, in order to get the pressure off and feed the interrogator a new cover story.

The *tense-structure* personality results from an irreconcilable discord of psychological forces which prevents the subject from achieving a satisfying dignity and meaning for his life. His behavior manifests his desperate striving for such dignity and meaning; he is strongly egocentric, with a tendency toward absurd boasting and exaggeration. He often appears to act from contradictory motives. His artificial poses and unnatural attitudes may sometimes genuinely express his personality, but even then they appear insincere and inappropriate to his true character.

Most such subjects act diffident and are difficult to approach. They are unlikely to have any appreciable reserve of vitality. Close scrutiny of a subject's life history may reveal symptoms of a tense-structure personality in advance—frequent personal quarrels with superiors and equals, claims of intrigues and plots against him, evidence of difficulty in adapting himself to social environments, explanation of his failures as the result of vicious actions of others, or pretended resignation to the whims of fate.

Subjects of tense-structure personality are most difficult to interrogate. By nature distrustful of people, they shy away from the interrogator's efforts to win their confidence. It is hard to find a thread of continuity on which to build rapport with them when they deny obvious truths stubbornly and senselessly, becoming subjectively convinced of the plausibility of their stand. In their constant striving to protect their own egos, they lose the normal instinct to tell the truth. All facts obtained from them have to be checked out carefully against other sources of information. It is quite often impossible to establish their bona fides, and even when they have confessed to being agents the truth of their accounts must be constantly rechecked.

The CI Interrogation Center

A safehouse should be established in a somewhat isolated area for exclusive use as a CI interrogation facility. If it is used as a holding area where several defectors are handled at the same time, its internal arrangement should be such that no one of them can ever see or contact another. Quarters for the defectors should be of three types—ordinary rooms furnished with a bed, small table, and a dresser; a more elaborate room for high-level defectors or for those who, their bona fides established, are awaiting transfer for positive intelligence debriefing; and a cell with only cot and mattress, a small indirect light, and a slop bucket—no furniture, no wash basin, no conveniences.

There should be at least two ordinary interrogation rooms and one special isolation room for obstinate cases. One of the two ordinary ones must have an adjoining room for making recordings and visual observations unseen. They should be furnished formally, with facilities for either a friendly or an

unfriendly atmosphere, for example with a desk and executive chair, one or two easy chairs, a small table, one ordinary straight-back chair, and one uncomfortable straight-back chair. There should be a buzzer to summon the guard.

On the wall behind the interrogator's desk there should be a one-way mirror, in which the interrogator, ostensibly not watching the subject as he asks a key question, can observe his unguarded reaction. The mirror also provides for observations from the adjacent room: agents who, for example, after a particularly strong session the image of abused innocence, are left alone, have been seen through it to smile slyly and preen themselves at having put their act over on the interrogator.

The Establishment of Bona Fides

The defector is brought to the safehouse at night, on a roundabout route and wearing dark glasses, to protect its location. He spends most of the first day in administrative formalities, being photographed and fingerprinted, taking a medical examination and an IQ test, and filling out a questionnaire that covers the salient facts of his life history and defection. He also begins to get acquainted with his interrogator before the day is over, at an informal dinner on the first night. The interrogator encourages his subject to relax and talk freely on topics of his own choosing. Recorded for later comparison with statements made during the formal interrogation, this spontaneous talk immediately after the shock experience of successful defection often provides valuable leads. Even penetration agents are affected by the informal atmosphere and let slip clues that prove useful in unmasking them.

The interrogator studies his subject's personal history questionnaire for further clues to his personality, as a basis for planning conversation and the sequence of investigation topics, and to spot items that appear illogical or vulnerable. Then on the second day the formal but friendly CI interrogation sessions begin. The initial phase is important. The interrogator should be formal but not officious, sympathetic but not maudlin. He should strive to be the subject's superior and yet his good friend, an investigator and yet a defense counsel. This attitude produces good results even when the subject turns out to be an agent.

There are many psychological burdens weighing heavily on a defector. Regardless of his motivation for coming over, his spirits are low at this stage of what might be called defection shock. Guilty about his desertion and apprehensive over his future, he feels lost and friendless in a foreign land. Above all else, he wants to be understood. The interrogator can profit from his feeling of loneliness by showing the friendliness and solicitude he needs and thus earning his gratitude. This moral support is probably more important to him at this time than any possible material considerations. An atmosphere of relaxed, natural orderliness will help to eliminate his fears and increase his desire to cooperate with his benefactor. If he is an agent, the growing sense of relaxation may still throw him off guard and cause slips that can be exploited later.

Natural behavior on the part of the interrogator often induces his subject to drop any feigned idiosyncrasies by which he had hoped to keep the interrogator from prying too deeply into his background or extracting information of such significance as to aggravate his guilt in deserting his native country. Slavs seem to feel a deeper devotion than some other peoples to their native land, but most of them do readily adjust their psychological outlook. Often they are receptive to the suggestion that in cooperating with their interrogator they are not traitors to their country but rather fighters against its alien Communist rulers.

The approach of the friendly interrogation can be slanted to take advantage of the subject's individual propensities. If he has deep religious convictions he can often be made cooperative by pointing out the great harm done to religion by the preachings of Communism. Even agents, if they have been coerced into espionage by fear of reprisal against themselves or their families, can be helped by religious convictions to throw off this fear and cooperate in a crusade against Communism. With vain subjects, and ones in lowly status accustomed to being ignored, the interrogator can successfully employ a subtle flattery, building up their egos to the point where they brag about the things they know to show what big men they were in their own country.

It takes from one to four weeks to establish the bona fides of a legitimate defector. Most of them are thus cleared for positive exploitation within two weeks or so, but when they stubbornly refuse to talk about details of their biographies that happen to be embarrassing to them, more time is required to clarify discrepancies. After each session the interrogator should write a report of the interrogation and analyze the data obtained, particularly with respect to those aspects of the subject's biography, stated motivation for defection, and escape story which experience has shown to be vulnerable points in an agent's legend.

A good biographical legend for an agent is likely to follow quite faithfully his true life story, omitting only his recruitment and intelligence activity. It is to this point we look for danger flags in a defector's story. Certain incidents he describes may be ones which normally would be followed by some kind of security service investigation and involvement with him. If he claims there were no such consequences, the suspicion arises that this purported lack of security service action is attributable to a relationship between him and the service. Unless he can explain any such flags, the defector must be considered suspect and be subjected to more intensive interrogation. No single flag is necessarily an indication that he is controlled by the hostile service, but several such flags establish a strong prejudice. Some important flags are the following:

Contact with foreigners which the security service is claimed not to have investigated or questioned. (Makers of such contacts are usually interrogated and warned.)

Mere reprimands for anti-regime activities while a student. (Such activities usually call for severe punishment.)

Blackmarketeering or embezzlement.

Arrest and periods of imprisonment for criminal or anti-Soviet activity. (Often used to account for a long gap in employment history actually devoted to thorough agent training.)

Inability to account for any period of time.

Membership in anti-Soviet elements during World War II, including German POW labor force and any underground movements.

Membership in an ethnic underground movement.
Success in having lived under a false name.
Admitted informant activities for the security service. (A tactic to gain the interrogator's confidence and lull suspicions, as well as to account for any reactions that may show up on the polygraph.)
Manifestations of security service interest in him, but no approach. No recollection of topics, events, and people that he obviously should remember.
Indications of high standard of living or educational advantages but denial of Party membership.
No normal fear of the security service while planning defection and escaping.
Residence in the United States and return to the Soviet Orbit in the early thirties.
Relatives living in the United States.
Understanding of terms normally known only to persons familiar with intelligence activities.

The subject's real motivation for defection is an important determination in establishing his bona fides. Agents under defector cover usually claim to be anti-Communists, saying that regime reprisals against family members, for example, caused their defection, or that they escaped to take up the fight against Communism through Western émigré organizations. Questionable motivation claims, however, do not constitute evidence of espionage, since most genuine defectors also claim to be ideologically motivated. A detailed probing with a follow-up polygraph test is often necessary to obtain the truth. Under searching interrogation many of them reveal that they escaped to avoid prosecution for a crime, because they had family trouble or an unfaithful wife, or because they had violated some decree and feared exposure.

In analyzing motivation for defection, a careful look at the defector's financial status is important. It is unlikely that a man of ample financial means occupying a position of dignity and a satisfying station in life would give all this up for an unpredictable future in the unfamiliar competition of the Western world.

The defector's escape story also provides a number of flags signaling the possibility of an agent legend. Some points to be considered suspicious and in need of clarification are the following:

The claim that he burned or buried all his documents before crossing the border, or that he does not remember what documents he used to pass known security check points.

The claim that he encountered no patrols, barbed wiring, or other border controls at places known to have them.

The claim that a person he met by chance willingly aided him in spite of the risk.

Implausibility of escape with respect to weather conditions, mode of transportation, border guard, or internal security measures.

Physical condition inconsistent with declared hardships of escape.

Condition of clothing, especially shoes, inconsistent with escape story.

Inadequate explanation for having large sums in money or jewelry.

Participation in tourist group trip while under investigation for anti-regime sentiment.

Inadequate explanation for success in escaping from the main body of the tourist group and its security officer.

In a careful review with the subject of all the information and background furnished by him, the interrogator must keep in mind that people's lives in Communist countries are deeply and directly affected by the internal security services. Above all, a defector fears reprisals against his family if the regime authorities learn that he has escaped to the West and is cooperating with the American intelligence service. This fear is often sufficient reason for a bona fide defector to give evasive and misleading answers. By showing full understanding of this and using every means at his command, the interrogator must convince him that truthfulness and cooperation will not cause hardship to his family, since the information he gives will never be disclosed.

The defector's story is checked out against every available record and all other sources of information, care being taken

not to divulge to him any information received from other sources. Then, after analysis of all this material and its implications, a series of questions designed to resolve all discrepancies is composed and presented to the defector in a polygraph examination.

The moment of polygraph soul-searching is one of the most strategically valuable parts of a CI interrogation. The polygraph should not be used, however, until the interrogator is certain that he has obtained all pertinent information or has reached an impasse. It should be used not to reach but to *substantiate* conclusions. When working with a suspected agent source, the interrogator should try to obtain a confession before polygraphing. In borderline cases the polygraph will usually pinpoint the area of sensitivity and perhaps help to resolve doubts, but it should not be allowed to become a crutch. The psychological approach by the polygraph operator plays an important part; when feasible he should be proficient in the required language, so that the interrogator can remain outside the room and monitor the test by listening in and by one-way mirror.

Quite often, the defector clarifies the discrepancies in his story during or immediately after the polygraph examination. If a re-examination verifies these explanations, and if the preponderance of the interrogation material indicates that the defector is genuine, a statement of his bona fides is issued and he is removed, at night, from the CI safehouse to an overt residence for positive intelligence exploitation.

Positive Intelligence Debriefing

The newly assigned PI interrogator normally needs only a very short time to get into rapport with his source. He picks up where the CI interrogator left off, and his task is made much simpler by his being able to approach the source without suspicion. Since his duties call for promoting his well-being, he should be able to gain his full confidence and respect and elicit whatever information he has. Nevertheless he should put some effort into cultivating a friendly relationship before jumping into direct questions, and he should continue to emphasize that all information divulged will be carefully insulated from the authorities of the source's homeland.

As a bona fide source, the defector enjoys a comfortable life in which he receives lodging, excellent meals, clothes, toilet articles, and a small salary. In return for this support, he has to report for work five days a week, or oftener if necessary, and give his full cooperation in the PI interrogation. Although he is a free man in the West, he is thus immediately dependent upon the intelligence service for lodging, sustenance, and clothing, and ultimately for documentation to legalize his immigration and for assistance in resettlement. Because of these controls and because he is no longer under any suspicion, it is assumed with reasonable certitude that he will be truthful in the information he furnishes.

Before beginning his debriefing, the interrogator should study carefully the report of the CI interrogation in order to provide himself with all available background information and foreknowledge of the source's psychological characteristics, his special fields of knowledge, and the extent to which he can be exploited. Familiarity with the details of the source's past life will also be of immense help in establishing quick rapport.

The aim of the PI interrogation is to fill consumer requirements without revealing to the source what specific information is sought. It is most important that the interrogator know exactly what information is required. The more he learns about the customer's needs, the more flexible and ingenious he can be in the interrogation. On his broad understanding of requirements depends also the degree to which wandering off from specified topics is permissible. Such wandering sometimes leads to topics of even greater value than the requirements being serviced, but the interrogator must be capable of distinguishing useless drivel from worthwhile information. The amount of research he needs to do in any particular case depends upon the subject matter and what the particular source is likely to know; but the interrogator's chief weapon is knowledge, and his effectiveness is directly proportional to its readiness.

The debriefing will usually proceed much more smoothly if the questions asked are worded in such a manner as to elicit specific answers. Each topic should be thoroughly explored and completed before going off into another area. The inter-

rogator should never accept a negative response to a question until he has covered all possible variations on it: quite often a source knows things which he does not even realize he knows until a probing question brings them to the surface. His first answer covers what immediately comes to mind, but his thoughts can be channeled to surface further observations by brief follow-up questions—"Can you explain that in more detail?" "Can you give an example?" "How did you learn this?" Under no circumstances, however, should the interrogator ask leading questions or make hints which might influence the substance of the replies.

The PI interrogation is usually not recorded verbatim; a record is written up from the interrogator's notes. These are best transcribed on the same day as the interrogation session. Then if they are found to be incoherent or incomplete at any point, they can be clarified at the next session.

In most respects the PI interrogation of a bona fide defector parallels ordinary debriefing and interviewing procedures. Let us return now to the CI interrogation which does not issue in the establishment of bona fides.

The Extraction of Confessions

When the CI interrogator feels that a preponderance of evidence turned up by interrogation and polygraph examination indicates that the defector is an intelligence agent, he begins a more intensive interrogation. This intensive approach to the clarification of existing discrepancies must be carefully planned. The methods that may be used are complex and varied, depending among other factors on the character of the subject and the capabilities of the interrogator. If the interrogator decides that drastic measures and strong control are necessary, he must be sure that he can play the tough disciplinarian's role.

The variety of techniques for unfriendly interrogation run from mildly unpleasant ones to measures just short of violence. In one type of approach the subject may be made to feel it futile to protect information that apparently is already in the interrogator's hands, especially if he has to experience discomfort and unpleasantness to do so. The interrogator must be thoroughly briefed for this approach; he begins by

posing questions to which he already has the answers. When the subject hesitates to reply, the interrogator then scornfully gives the answer himself, until the subject feels foolish at trying to hide things that appear to be common knowledge when by cooperating he would become eligible for better treatment.

The interrogator may exploit the subject's emotional entanglement in personal problems and desires, playing up his anger, jealousy, homesickness, or other passions until he has developed a state of emotional confusion and instability. He may create in the subject a sense of insecurity and anxiety by becoming vociferous, kicking furniture around, banging on the table, and giving vent to well-acted rage, until the subject is willing to talk simply to escape this wrath. He can let the subject know that he is fully familiar with Soviet interrogation tactics and could practice them himself if provoked by continued lack of response to humane methods. He can bluff with specific threats if he is sure the bluff won't be called.

Sometimes it is decided to use two interrogators with two completely different approaches, the first displaying a great deal of aggressiveness, discourtesy, bluster, and threat, the second soft-spoken, kind, and sympathetic. The subject often comes to look to the second man for sympathy and protection from the first, and eventually converses freely with him.

If the subject is especially stubborn, he may be moved to the windowless room with only a small light built into the wall. He is deprived of most of his cigarette rations and reading materials. Only his underwear is left for clothing. He has very little chance for suicide with no light cord and little clothing. He is not permitted to shave. He is deprived of all human contact and attention except for being brought basic sustenance. The interrogator keeps reminding him that he wants to be a friend, that he would like to ease the discomfort, that he could make everything all right if only he had a statement of the full truth, whatever it might be. Most people, and especially the gregarious and talkative Slav, cannot endure this prolonged confinement in utter loneliness, and in time become willing and eager to talk freely, resorting to the interrogator as their only friend.

If the bewilderment of loneliness does not produce results, however, two or more interrogators familiar with all of the facts of the case may take turns at continuous interrogating, so that the subject cannot rest and keep his mind clear. His resulting confusion leads to slips that disclose new evidence. Under further continuous questioning he usually reaches in time a point where he sees no sense in resistance and makes a confession. When the confession is reduced to writing and signed, a probing for details should commence immediately, tempered only by the subject's condition at the time.

Among the psychological pressures that can be brought to bear at various phases of these techniques are the following:

Pointing out the subject's untenable position, the fallacy of his story, persuading him that his service sold him down the river by providing him with such a stupid legend; emphasizing that American intelligence has no interest in punishing him, but does have interest in his cooperation in the future.

Isolation in a dark, sound-proofed room, depriving him of sight, hearing, and mobility; consequent development of claustrophobia. (A psychiatrist should check to ensure that his sanity does not reach the breaking point.) Return to isolation after removal and questioning without response.

Irregular scheduling of interrogation, waking subject say at 2 a.m. for a six-hour debriefing and on the following day at 1 a.m. for a 12-hour session.

Alternating light and dark, preventing rest and sleep.

Sound waves.

Creation of terror illusions.

Raising or lowering temperatures to point of discomfort.

Limiting washing and latrine facilities.

Cutting food ration to minimum sustenance. Manipulating cigarette ration.

Jostling without actual physical harm.

Heavy physical training exercises.

Medical examination disclosing fictitious dread disease; treatment to depend entirely upon the good will of the interrogator.

If all else fails, the interrogator may request permission to use drugs and narco-hypnosis or hostile methods that may endanger the subject's mental and physical health. The need to apply hostile methods represents a degree of moral victory for the suspect even though he may subsequently confess. Before making such a request the interrogator must have exhausted all other means, must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the subject is an agent, and must have reason to believe that his confession would reveal information of critical importance to the national security.

The severer methods seldom need be used. Agents sometimes follow instructions to be insubordinate and insolent if pressure is brought to bear on them, an attitude which bolsters their self-confidence and may also incite an interrogator into thoughtless punitive action that in turn reinforces the agent's resentment and increases his will to resist. But the exceedingly stubborn agent suspects are relatively few. Most suspects, after a period of shocked innocence and steady denials, suddenly and recklessly confess. When the interrogation first became unfriendly they realized that they were suspect, and their worry, loss of sleep, and fear of the future began eroding their will to resist, especially if they had been forcibly recruited by the intelligence service, having neither stomach for espionage nor patriotic motivation.

Under these conditions the interrogator can utilize his subtlest weapon, his art of asking just the right question at just the right moment, and in just the manner to elicit an answer that may lead to a confession. The questioning may either aim directly at the discrepancies in the defector's story or search roundabout and apparently random paths for clues to concealed facts.

When a confession comes too quickly, a thorough and probing inquiry for detail should be made. The hostile services know that a man cannot be successfully prosecuted for spying against the Americans in Europe, and that if an agent confesses he may before long be legitimately documented and free to carry on any line of activity he wishes. The interrogator should obtain as much information as possible about the ready confessor's service and his purported intelligence activities. When he seems to have told all he knows, he should be poly-

graphed again. If discrepancies still exist, the interrogation must be continued until they are clarified or until the permissible period of confinement is exhausted.

Operational Interrogation

In any case, the debriefing of a confessed agent for operational information should normally be conducted by the CI interrogator. A confessed agent will frequently try to conceal certain elements of his mission and training, and it is a relatively simple matter for the CI interrogator to switch from debriefing back to his old technique to impress the agent with the error of his ways and obtain his subsequent cooperation. When all operational information has been obtained he can be transferred if desired for regular PI debriefing. The CI debriefing should cover:

- Name, rank, position, unit, personality description, and all details regarding his case officer and any other intelligence personnel with whom he has been associated.
- Assigned mission, in detail, and time limit for completion.
- Area in which the mission is to be performed and main target field—American intelligence, military installations, political organizations, émigré groups, economic information.
- Exact method of crossing border and passing various check points.
- Communications, *i.e.*, radio, codes, dead drops, courier, secret writing, rendezvous points.
- When recruited, how, and by whom.
- Remuneration.
- Intelligence training, *i.e.*, location of school, names of instructors, kinds of courses taken, duration, number and names of other students, unit sponsoring the school.
- Documents, currency, equipment, and clothing furnished for his mission.
- Names of any persons who may have assisted him to cross the border.
- Method of accomplishing his mission.
- Extent to which the mission has been accomplished.
- Knowledge about his own intelligence service, its organization, command structure, personnel.
- Knowledge about American intelligence.

- Any special knowledge he may have.
- Overall positive and operational intelligence knowledge.

Extreme caution must be exercised when a confessed agent discloses his knowledge readily, divulges important-appearing information, and offers his services as a double agent. It is quite possible that, acting according to the hostile intelligence service's plans, he is making a play to gain the confidence of American intelligence. The authenticity and completeness of his operational statements should be rigorously checked on the polygraph.

If the results of probing operational interrogation and of the polygraph examination are compatible, then a double-agent play may be considered. Upon the man's agreement to work for American intelligence, his true intentions must be examined again by polygraph with extreme care. It is desirable to place him under careful surveillance and closely evaluate the take resulting from his activities. He should be checked periodically by all possible means.

Some past results and future prospects for technical instruments to sense deception.

THE POLYGRAPH IN AGENT INTERROGATION

Chester C. Crawford

Philosophers and psychologists, and indeed most of mankind, have always been fascinated with the phenomenon of lying as an aspect of human behavior. It is only during the past sixty years, however, that researchers and investigators have proceeded beyond the study of its cognitive phase (the decision to lie) and behavioral phase (the overt act which deceives) to examine its emotional phase (the ensuing bodily agitation), which is the most significant of the three for purposes of detection. It is therefore only recently that attempts to detect deception have advanced from the uncertainty of personal judgment and the brutality of primitive physical ordeals and torture to the use of scientific aids in humane interrogation. The "lie detector" or polygraph in use today, a simple but sensitive device for tracing blood pressure, respiration, and perspiration, is the most advanced instrument thus far developed for the detection of deception.

Deception is intrinsic to espionage activity: the ability of a clandestine operator to deceive his opponent is his most critical qualification. Conversely, however, the ability to detect the deceptions of the opposition is the most critical requirement of a counterintelligence force, and it was inevitable that the polygraph would become a counterintelligence aid. Although the use of this instrumental technique is associated in the popular mind primarily with criminal apprehension, the history of its application in clandestine government operations is almost as long as that of its connection with police matters.

One of the first plans for instrumental means to detect deception was in connection with clandestine operations. In October 1917, at the request of the Psychological Committee of the National Research Council, research was undertaken at Harvard University to investigate the value of using instru-

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ments in deception tests on World War I court-martial cases and in Military Intelligence Department investigations of suspected enemy agents. Early in World War II an officer of the Berkeley Police Department in California advocated the use of the lie detector in the interests of national defense. In 1945 Leonarde Keeler carried out polygraphic experimentation on several hundred prisoners of war in Rhode Island with an eye to assessing the practicability of lie detection programs in government agencies.

Successes of a CIA Program

On 12 August 1948 CIA ran its first polygraph case—the routine security screening of an applicant. In 1949 it began planning the use of the technique in Europe to test the honesty of agents recruited for clandestine operations. In 1951 it conducted polygraph experiments in the Far East. By 1952 the CIA polygraph program was operating on a world-wide basis. Its effectiveness in practice has firmly established it as a valuable adjunct to clandestine operations.

Its achievements can be illustrated in three studies analyzing the results of polygraphic interrogation over sample periods of time in operational cases from particular geographical areas. The first, covering the period from inauguration to 1953, is based on the area interrogators' reports for some three hundred cases. The use of the polygraphic technique elicited not otherwise obtainable admissions of deception in the following categories from the indicated numbers of the 300 agents.

Falsification of vital statistics (age, birthplace, employment, education, etc.)	32
Concealment of past membership in Communist and Communist-front organizations	16
Concealment of other past Communist activities	23
Deception regarding past association with hostile or friendly foreign intelligence services	18
Deception regarding past criminal arrests	22
Concealment of past undetected crimes	17
Concealment of aliases	11
Deception regarding security violations	23
Deception regarding medical or mental treatment	4
The filing of false reports	4
Deception regarding use of drugs	21

In addition, 21 instances of deception indicated by the polygraph but not admitted were later confirmed through other sources. Only 6 instances of indicated deception remained unconfirmed.

Thus more than one in ten of the agents and prospective agents had deliberately falsified his biographic data; honest biographic mistakes were not counted as deception. More significantly, six percent of them had hidden their past connections with other intelligence services. It is obvious that without polygraphic interrogation this sample of 300 could not have been properly assessed.

In another study 123 agent interrogation reports made in a different geographic area from January to December 1958 were carefully examined. With the aid of the polygraph the interrogators had obtained previously unknown information in the following categories from the indicated numbers of the 123 subjects:

Biographic information	61
Counterespionage information	17
Past employment by a foreign intelligence service	8
Present employment by a foreign intelligence service	4
Fabrication of reports	5
Hidden ideological affiliations	5

This time at least half the agents were shown to have practiced deception of some kind, and the percentage is still higher if the 61 listed as having misrepresented their biographies does not include all the deceivers in other categories. Six percent had worked for foreign intelligence services, and three percent were still so employed. At least ten agents were terminated as a result of these polygraph interviews. But about fifty—and this is an important positive product of the polygraph technique—were cleared of allegations that had been made against them.

The third study covers 70 agents interrogated between January and June 1959, who revealed previously unknown information as follows:

Biographic information	24
Counterespionage information	2
Past employment by another service	10
Current employment by another service	5
Fabrication of operational reports	11
Hidden ideological affiliations (usually Communistic)	6

Here at least one agent in every three was shown to have practiced deception of some kind. One in seven was found to have had past connections with other intelligence services and one in fourteen to have current affiliations. The polygraph interrogations led to the termination of at least five of them, and twenty-three were cleared of allegations against them.

In summary, out of about five hundred agents and prospects whose polygraphic interrogations were analyzed in these three studies, from ten to fifty percent revealed deceptions of some significance. A total of thirty-six agents were shown to have previously unknown connections with other intelligence services, some of them current affiliations which presumably made them instruments of infiltration.

Procedures and Limitations

It should be strongly emphasized that these results, although unobtainable without the polygraph, must not be credited to the polygraph *in vacuo*. They were achieved by professional interrogators using the instrument as an aid to diagnose deception in their agent subjects. The interrogator is thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the subject's personality, from sense of humor to skill at sports, on all available biographic data, on questionable and verified items in the subject's account of his background, and on the extent of his access to other intelligence services. He studies the reports from any previous medical or psychiatric examinations and from any previous interrogations, particularly any previous polygraph tests. In consultation with the case officer he determines the topics to be covered in the test and constructs questions designed to elicit information on them. He is prepared to probe for detail regarding the modus operandi, personnel, and tradecraft of a foreign intelligence service with which the subject is suspected of having past or present contacts.

The examination begins with a pre-test period in which the interrogator and the subject preview the questions for discussion and qualification. The examiner often takes advantage of this opportunity to make his own first-hand assessment of the subject, chatting about apparently unimportant matters and watching for any tell-tale reactions or idiosyn-

cracies that may be exploited in the test. The polygraph is then connected and the test itself administered—perhaps twice, four times, or on occasion many more. Then, when indicated by a study of the charts, there follows a post-test interrogation wherein an explanation, admission, or clarification of recorded emotional responses is sought.

The polygraph lays no claim to one-hundred-percent reliability. Test results can be as varied as the individuals tested, and the interpretation of the charts is not a simple question of deciding whether the subject reacted or did not react. Many charts are quite definitive; but some indicate only a probability, and from two to five percent of the cases tested end up being classified as inconclusive, with crucial areas left unresolved.

Although sources of error in the instrument itself can be eliminated—it is not hard to maintain a perfectly functioning machine—the human variables in the interrogator and the subject are less easily controlled. And while error potential in the interrogator can be reduced by careful selection and long training, the endless variety of human subjects and their endless variety of reactions to human situations will not ever be subject to measurement with infallible precision. Different subjects tend to put different weights on the value of individual questions; deceivers may show emotional disturbance only at the points where they know their fabrication is weakest, and sometimes not even then.

For all this reservation, the polygraph technique has established its place in clandestine operations. Although in many situations there is no need for polygraphic scrutiny, the problem of veracity being more easily resolvable through other sources, in many others, as these studies show, the duplicity of an agent cannot be discovered without the use of the polygraph. Add to these revelations the previously unknown information of a positive nature that is a by-product of an agent's polygraph test and the many cases of confirmed veracity that enable a project to get under way, and the value of the technique to clandestine operations becomes a thing beyond debate.

A more general dividend realized from the polygraph is its disciplinary effect on the agent. He is usually a better clan-

destine operator after being polygraphed. He realizes that he is working for a highly professional service, concerned about security for itself and for him. He sees that he will be expected to account for his activities. Loyal agents almost always appreciate this attitude and look with greater respect on the American service after their "ordeal."

An even greater role may be played by the technical detection of deception in clandestine operations of the future. There are indications that sensational developments are about to occur in its instrumentation, and drastic changes in technique made possible by the utilization of new recording devices. The polygraph of the future may require no physical attachments on the subject, perhaps utilizing electronic circuitry to tap physiological phenomena far more subtle but every bit as diagnostic as the currently used blood pressure tracings, respiration recordings, etc. It is unlikely that improvements will ever fully eliminate the human variables that make any technical assessment less than infallible, but a paper written on this subject ten years from now may show the uncertainties and limitations still further reduced.

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Technical devices and plan of operations for eavesdropping on the adversary.

AUDIOSURVEILLANCE

Alfred Hubest

The relatively modern art of technical audiosurveillance is the counterpart of audiocommunications, following like a shadow close on the heels of every development in the latter's techniques. Shortly after the first telegraph for commercial purposes was installed between Washington and Baltimore in 1844, private individuals began intercepting its messages in order to grab profits in east-west marketing manipulations, to steal exclusive news stories, and to further other unlawful purposes. By 1862 public concern over the interception of telegraph messages was shown in California's enactment of legislation prohibiting the practice. Extensive military use of wire-tapping during the Civil War established it as a recognized tool of the intelligence services of both armies.

Similarly, telephone tapping had its beginning soon after the first commercial telephones were installed in 1878 in New Haven, Connecticut. During the early 1890's it was practiced to some extent throughout the entire country by private individuals, and police services had adopted it for active use. In 1892 New York State made telephone tapping a felony.

The clandestine installation of concealed microphones—"bugging"—was not long in following. Newspaper files and court records have for years been full of scandals and exposures featuring not only the tapping of telephones and wires but also the bugging of rooms, both by the police and by private citizens. The records of intelligence services are less readily available, but there is abundant evidence that even in World War I intelligence made extensive use of microphones along with other forms of clandestine eavesdropping. During this period the monitoring of all kinds of communications media, including radio, came into its own with the establishment of large organized systems of illegal listening-in and

cryptanalysis as necessary arms of the military and political intelligence services.¹

During the past 10 years there has been a great new surge in the use of audiosurveillance by intelligence services. This phenomenon can be attributed in large part to the development of improved listening, transmitting, and recording devices, new installation tools and techniques, a systematized operational approach to making audio installations, and advances in rapid processing and full exploitation of the take.

Technical Developments

All the many methods of audiosurveillance are variations of three basic forms. First, both in frequency of use and in volume of take obtained, is the telephone tap; second comes the concealed microphone connected by wires with a recorder; and third, the microphonic pick-up of a concealed wireless transmitter in circuit with a monitoring receiver. There is no mystery about any of these methods; the principles involved are common knowledge among communications and electronic engineers, and they are employed in practice to a greater or less extent by all intelligence and policing agencies and by private investigators. There is considerable variation, however, in the technical sophistication of these devices and in techniques of using them for audio operations. Many inventions for the development of hearing aids, radio communications, broadcasting, and recording have been adopted or adapted for use in organized eavesdropping. The mention of only a few of these that have had an especially great impact on audiosurveillance will serve to convey an idea of the technical advances recently achieved.

It is now virtually impossible to detect when a telephone is tapped by the most sophisticated methods without visually inspecting every inch of the wires and every element servicing it, down to the last screw connection. Only crudely placed taps cause give-away noises such as clicks or crackling or produce easily detectable changes in line voltage. Electronic search has been frustrated by the use of new devices. And the tap can be made more productive by any of several effec-

¹ See Wilhelm F. Flicke, "The Early Development of Communications Intelligence," *Studies III* 1, p. 99.

tive techniques for "hot miking" which convert the telephone into a microphone for general eavesdropping when it is not being used to make a call.

For telephone calls an instrument known as the Dial Recorder automatically starts a recording on magnetic tape as soon as the earpiece of the tapped phone is picked up. It records the number of the outgoing call being dialed. It transfers the conversation from the tap to the recorder at a constant output level, so that a play-back of the tape will show no volume variations with the distance of the answering telephone. When the earpiece is returned to its cradle the recording is stopped. The electrical characteristics of the Recorder's input section can be made such that an electronic check of the line will not reveal the presence of a tap.

Developments in the hearing-aid field, together with the invention of the transistor, have opened new horizons in the design of miniature microphones, amplifiers, and recorders. Highly efficient microphones only half an inch square and a quarter-inch thick, small enough to hide behind a dime, are now commercially available. Wires and shielding for them have also been vastly improved, made stronger, more resistant to weather and bruising, and at the same time thinner: some of them are no thicker than a human hair. Miniature pre-amplifiers combine with the high-quality microphones and new mike wire to make possible runs to greater distances without loss of signal, deterioration from moisture, or rupture under stress. Telephone lines have also been turned to use as clandestine carriers.

Transmitters have undergone a similarly tremendous change with the advent of transistors. The small size of these elements and the fact that they generate no heat have opened the way to miniaturization, and their low current requirements have made it possible to design smaller and better batteries for use with them. We now have self-powered transmitters only slightly larger than a package of cigarettes. Both these and current-powered transmitters can be equipped with remote-control switches to turn them off during inspections by countermeasures technicians or simply to prolong their service life. They are made in a variety of different shapes to facilitate concealment.

There has also been considerable improvement in the tools and materials for making audio installations—quiet drills, pipe-pushers, collapsible ladders, acoustic plasters that need no audio opening, better paints and paint-matching methods, and an array of new techniques for installing microphones without actually entering the target area. The countermeasures technician can only hope to find traces by examining all wall surfaces for merest pinpricks and exploring behind every crack in the walls and floors, as well as every fixture and electrical outlet.

Important corollary advances have been made in the development of recorders. The first magnetic recorders, patented in 1898, used wire as the storage medium. They were inefficient, however, and further development was slow. It was not until 1935 that tape coated to retain magnetic impressions was successfully, if still clumsily, used for audio recording, and not until 1948 that it was developed to the point that it revolutionized broadcasting practices.

Up to that time the effectiveness of audiosurveillance in intelligence operations had been limited by its dependence on bulky and inefficient equipment and, more importantly, by the requirement that a monitor familiar with the language, dialect, and terminology actually listen to the live conversation and with the help of notes retain the desired information from this single hearing. The advent of an efficient tape recorder brought a completely new concept of audio operations. Recordings could now be taken to a processing point for full transcription and thorough analysis. The fact that three or four hours are now devoted to processing each hour of tape, and considerably more if there are several different languages on it, gives some measure of the limitations from which audio operations have been freed by the availability of a compact, dependable recorder of high fidelity.

Effective systems of processing the recorded material have been evolved in order to extract quickly items of immediate intelligence or operational value. These systems feature both technical advances and other processing devices. Fundamental factors are the improved fidelity of the take and the training of personnel in translating and evaluating it. The accumulation of voice libraries and aids like lists of dou-

ble meanings have also helped to get more out of the raw material. IBM machines and other electronic classification devices are being used increasingly to speed up analysis and tabulation of the product.

Organizing an Audio Operation

Viewed from an operational standpoint, the setting up of an audio installation must be the execution of a "perfect crime." It must be perfect not only in that you don't get caught, but also in that you give no inkling, from the inception of an operation until its termination sometimes five years later, that such an operation was even contemplated: any show of interest in your target would alert the opposition to lay on countermeasures. This secrecy and smooth dispatch require much foreknowledge, a well-laid plan, and the synchronized coordination of a many-talented team.

Today's audio operations are a far cry from those of the very recent past, when the responsibility for making an installation would simply be turned over to a technician. The audio installation team now includes operational officers who are experts on the area, skilled in the tradecraft necessary for the particular operation, and professionally committed to the success of the job. They work in unison with technicians who take pride in demanding of themselves that each job show the flawless perfection of a masterpiece and who have the versatility to become at different times master carpenters, plumbers, masons, plasterers, painters, gardeners, laborers, and artists.

Since most audio operations are directed against targets of opportunity, they must be got under way on short notice. It is therefore necessary, in any given locality, to have accumulated data in advance regarding local building practices, radio frequencies in use for civilian and military purposes, telegraph, telephone, power, and water plants, equipment, methods, and service practices, traffic patterns and regulations, local policing capabilities, and other pertinent conditions. A capability for covert casing and surveillance must also have been established in advance. Then when an opportunity for making an audio installation presents itself, the local operational officers, having this background information on hand, can concentrate on casing the target and collecting the spe-

cific information necessary to plan the operation while they are awaiting the arrival of technicians.

When all the required information, together with photos, sketches, and floor plans of the target in its orientation to the listening post, has been assembled and screened, the operational officers and technicians together formulate a plan that covers in detail all the facets of the coming operation, however complex it may be. In every case the plan will contain the following elements:

Cover and method for approaching and entering the target to be bugged or the place where a line is to be tapped.

Preparation of the required tools and equipment and method of packaging and delivering.

Protective surveillance prior to and during the operation, with a primary and an alternate means of communication between the surveillance team and those inside the target.

Membership of the team assigned to the job, its chain of command and distribution of responsibility.

The specific assignment for each man, and how it is to be executed. For example: planting the mike or transmitter and the exact method to be used; digging a channel in the garden; manning the communications link with the surveillance team; checking for any tell-tale traces of the work done—scuff marks, scratches, bits of wire, etc. No detail is left unassigned.

Manner and timing of departure from the target on completion of the job, and alternatively in the event of emergency.

The operational plan is set forth on a master sketch of the area, so that each move is marked out much as in the diagram of a football play. When the action begins every man will know exactly what he is to do and when.

Equal care is exercised in renting and establishing a listening post to monitor the target: a never so perfect installation would be useless if compromised before activation by attracting attention to the listening post or the monitors being quartered there. These arrangements must usually be so handled as to assure secure operation over a long period of time, sometimes years. And finally, with the greatest circumspec-

tion of all, communications are established from the listening post to the intelligence center receiving the take; the exposure of this link would not only spoil a particular operation but set off a compromising chain reaction that might have far-reaching effects on the intelligence service itself. The whole operation is undertaken in full awareness that it will be only as successful as its weakest point, and no foreseeable circumstance is left to an on-the-spot decision.

Countermeasures

Our Sino-Soviet bloc adversaries are aware of the danger of audiosurveillance—more so, unfortunately, than we—and accordingly take elaborate precautions to thwart our efforts. In selecting new quarters for diplomatic or trade mission offices, they regularly make it a point to show equal interest in as many as eight or ten different buildings at the same time, and at the last minute close a deal for one on terms of immediate occupancy. They then post a guard and closely supervise any alterations or improvements to be made, in most cases selecting their own contractors. They are likely to import their own equipment and technicians to set up the internal telephone switchboards. In some cases they have dug a trench six feet deep around the entire building, and have severed and inspected every pipe and wire servicing the installation. Their technicians “sweep” the premises immediately upon occupation and periodically thereafter. They take similarly great pains to protect the residences of their officials abroad.

Despite these extreme preventive countermeasures, we have continued to operate successfully against them. Our operations, profitable during normal periods, sometimes become even more productive during crises when security is sacrificed for speed and clarity.

Our success in the face of such vigilance makes dubious the security of our own overseas offices against hostile audio operations. Although it is not proposed to treat here the countermeasures we should take, it should be noted that we are mere sitting ducks by comparison. Since March 1949, when the first hostile audio device was found in the Prague residence of our military attaché, several hundred have turned up in

many locations, mostly behind the iron curtain; and their advanced technical sophistication is illustrated in the Great Seal installation recently publicized by Ambassador Lodge. Yet, even after more than 100 devices were discovered in the first few months of 1956 and the National Security Council alerted the intelligence community to take countermeasures, U.S. installations overseas have tended to be complacent about being targets of hostile audio operations. A thorough exposition of the dangers and of the possibilities for countermeasures should be the subject of an article in a future issue of this journal.

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Some of the possibilities, methods, and results of submitting written materials to examination by test tube and microscope.

LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF SUSPECT DOCUMENTS

James Van Stappen

Seven or eight years ago an intelligence officer came into possession, under circumstances which aroused his professional ardor, of a small scrap of notepaper bearing only an address and a very common first name scribbled underneath it. For two years he persisted in trying to identify the writer of this note, collecting handwriting specimens from a number of likely places and submitting them for laboratory comparison. Some of them matched the original. The points of venue of these marked the writer's trail through several trouble-ridden countries, but none identified him. Finally, back in his own country, the traveler wrote to one of the prospectively useful acquaintances he had made on the trip, and this correspondent was careless enough to let the letter fall into our intelligence officer's hands. Verified as the same handwriting, it gave a complete name and home address. A search of visa records and other materials on file now yielded the true identity of the writer, his cover story, background, and even photographs of him. He is a Soviet intelligence officer, who since then, thanks to this identification, has unwittingly kept us informed by his presence of certain activities of his organization.

For twelve years, beginning during World War II, an agent in Europe had provided generous and significant reports from around and behind the iron curtain. He had apparently built up a network of informants extending deep into the denied areas. But now a sharp-eyed postal intelligence officer noticed an incorrect postal cachet on one of his envelopes, and his whole file of 300-odd reports was therefore brought to the questioned document laboratory. Analysis showed that the

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reports were written by eight different typewriters, which might correspond to eight different informants; but some reports from widely separated places had been produced on the same day by the same machine, and the principal agent's own correspondence turned out to have been written on one or another of the typewriters supposedly used by his secret informants behind the curtain. It was not a crude paper mill, but careless enough to get caught, finally.

At a time when one of the countries that are pulled between East and West was negotiating for a tremendous Western loan, one of its pro-U.S. representatives, a personage internationally well known, offered a letter typed on blue stationery as a sample of the Communist blandishments which he was trying to resist. An awkward signature prompted the submission of this letter to the questioned document laboratory. The signature was found to be indeed a crude attempt at handwriting disguise, executed in American-made fountain-pen ink, Waterman's Blue Black. The blue watermarked stationery could have been bought only in Australia or New Zealand, on the other side of the world from the purported Communist writer. Moreover, the Communist's letter was typed on the same machine—a 1927 Underwood Standard rebuilt after 1940—that this Friend of America had some time before used to address an envelope to us. A file of miscellaneous documents our Friend had turned over to us in the past was now examined, and all were found to be forgeries. Upon interrogation he admitted his duplicity and begged not to be exposed.

These are three of the more startling questioned document cases of the 1,500-odd on file, some of them not worth to anyone the paper they were written on, some of international consequence. They include analyses of propaganda leaflets which led to the very presses that printed them. They include restorations of charred documents, erased and obliterated writings, carbon paper impressions, and writings indented on sheets of paper underneath the ones used by the writer. They include the investigation of crank letters and of forgeries using both Dulles brothers' names. They include examinations of credentials, complementing the work of the

identity document analyst¹; in one outstanding case a suspected hostile agent's passport was found to have 27 recordable errors in make-up, and a complete physical analysis disclosed its probable area of origin and a considerable amount of information on adversary capabilities and modus operandi in agent documentation.

Of the tell-tale manifestations by which any intelligence operation necessarily runs the risk of exposing itself, documents constitute one of the most rewarding to the investigator. Being as they are a permanent, physical item, they are devoid of the human foibles which so often bear uncertain witness—poor observation, bad judgment, opinion and hearsay, insincerity, malice. Used to support duplicity, they often, under expert analysis, tell the truth, and in many cases much more, not only exposing the particular operation that occasioned them but supplying intelligence of far-reaching significance. By laboratory examination it may be possible to develop the complete text of indented or other imperfect writings, establish the validity of a document, detect any alterations or erasures, identify the author by analysis of the handwriting or typewriting, determine the kind, specific type, origin, and approximate age of the paper and ink used, and find the kind, specific type, and origin of the writing instruments.

Analysis of Paper

Although a document is legally defined as being of any material on which marks may be inscribed, including gravestones and in a recent case a silver goblet engraved with Josef Stalin's true signature, the material used for most documents is of course paper. The laboratory analysis of paper must take into account its color and opacity, the size of the sheet, its weight and thickness, its fiber content, the direction of the grain, the finish, and the watermark. Comparison in these respects with exhaustive files of domestic and foreign paper stock samples serves to identify most papers. If the paper is a common, low-grade type, it will yield no clues to the originator of the document except perhaps his area of operation.

¹ For a description of this field see David V. Brigane's "Credentials—Bona Fide or False?" in *Studies IV* 1, p. 37ff.

But if it is a rarer and more expensive one, with few dealers and retail outlets, it may be possible to trace through these the limited number of people who had access to it. A unique paper may be, and in actual cases has been, traced to a single individual. The secret markings that identify paper used by governments, banks, and other official organizations are also many of them on file along with the paper stocks, as an aid in checking the authenticity of official documents.

It can be established that a document is forged by showing that its paper is not as old as its purported date. Sometimes the age of the paper can be determined from its composition or watermark, by referring to a file of manufacturers' formulas and watermarks in use at different dates. More often it is necessary to measure the effects of age on its chemical content and color, taking into consideration the type of fiber in the paper and the climatic conditions under which it was stored. Using chemical reagents and a tintometer or similar instrument for gauging shades of color, the expert can usually determine the approximate age of the paper. If the paper has been artificially aged, a practice forgers often try, the age test will not be valid; but the false aging can often be detected and the document thus proved a forgery.

Analysis of Inks

The identification of an ink is begun by determining the type to which it belongs. The three chief types in use today are gallotannic (the most common), chromic, and anilin. Others are China ink, the colored vegetable-dye inks, a few dark ones like those made from wolfram and vanadium, and those for special application as for mimeograph and stamp pads. Chemical differences enable the laboratory to identify these types.

The age of the ink, which has the same bearing as paper age on the validity of a document, may sometimes be determined through data on file regarding changes in the manufacturers' formulas. Waterman, for example, has changed formula four times in ten years, so that a sample of Waterman's may often be associated with a particular period of manufacture. Another test is color. Permanent inks contain a temporary dye which soon fades, an iron and sulphur compound, and a weak acid. The action of the acid, oxygen, and humidity produces

first a dark color and then over a period of years a slow fading to a weak stain. By using chemical reagents, the age of the ink can be approximated by comparing its color, taking into consideration the color of the paper, with standard color charts. If ink has been artificially aged the age test is impossible, but the induced aging itself is sometimes detectable.

Writing Instruments

When a stroke of ink writing is magnified fifteen or more times, the two tracks made by the point of the pen stand out much clearer than the line of ink between them. If the pen is new, the width of these tracks, compared with standard-brand widths shown in test charts, sometimes serves to identify the type of pen. When a well-worn pen has been used, the difference in width and appearance between the two tracks usually indicates whether the user is right- or left-handed. If a pen is worn badly enough, it may leave regular, easily identified scratches which provide positive identification of the very pen itself. The fact that most people fill their fountain pens with different kinds of ink at different times may also serve to identify an individual pen through the unique combination of inks in it.

The ball-point pen is more easily identified than an ordinary one. It uses a unique ink, there is a specific width of the ball point for each brand, and the surface of the ball, smooth as it may seem to the unaided eye, is really full of scratches which leave a pattern on the paper—the pen's own fingerprints. Any non-standard type of pen is the more readily identified because of its scarcity.

If a document is written in pencil or crayon, the laboratory may be able to determine the formula of the material and through file comparisons perhaps identify the manufacturer. The age of pencil or crayon writing can be determined only as to whether it was done within the last ten or fifteen days. A unique or unusual pencil or crayon may possibly be traced to the individual who used it.

Identification of Handwriting

Handwriting, like other physical acts performed by adults, is characteristic of the individual writer; there is probably no act more characteristic of an adult than his writing. It can

therefore be used for positive identification of the writer through comparison of the unknown specimen with known writings. This comparison is a matter not only of letter forms but also of many other characteristics, among them movement, muscular habits, pen position, line quality, shading, retrace, proportion, connections, spacing, and embellishments. If a sufficient number of similarities are found between a known handwriting and the questioned specimen, with no dissimilarities which cannot reasonably be accounted for, it can be concluded that both were written by the same person.

A person's handwriting is developed by constant repetition over the years until it becomes second nature to him, a succession of deeply ingrained habits. The obstacles which confront a forger or a disguiser of his own writing are therefore manifold and great. It is practically impossible for a writer to divorce himself from certain inherent characteristics manifested in pressure points, pen lifts, the shading of strokes, etc., of which he is not even aware. In order to succeed in a forgery he needs not only to throw off his own characteristics but to assume the inherent characteristics manifested in another person's writing, also a virtual impossibility. Handwriting comparison, however, should not be attempted by an amateur. Its most difficult aspect is evaluating the weight to be given each of the various distinguishing characteristics.

Typographical Identification

The identification of typewriting is similarly based on a sufficient combination of peculiar characteristics. Some of the more outstanding of these characteristics are the defects in type faces, the design of the type, misalignment due to maladjusted type bars, and uneven printing due to twisted type faces. The make and model of a typewriter can be determined by an examination of its product, and a used typewriter can be individually identified with certainty. Since manufacturers change type design from time to time, a document may also be proved fraudulent by showing that its type was not yet manufactured at the time of its purported date.

Aside from type design and the individual peculiarities of used type, the machine may be identified as one on which worn type has been removed and replaced with a new set. This new "retread type" may be distinguishable by its sharp, angu-

lar corners, by special retread designs, or by comparison with the type faces of the numerals, which get little use and are rarely changed, and therefore will not match the retread font used for the other characters.

It is occasionally possible to identify the individual who typed a document from his habit of using particular pressure on certain keys, making unique mistakes, and in some instances using unique spacings. If a suspect is made to type a dozen copies of the questioned document on the same machine, he will follow the same psychological patterns each time, and a comparison of the test specimens under magnification with the original document will make it apparent that they were typed by the same person. A person who uses the "hunt and peck" system, for example, characteristically hits the period so hard that he punctures or almost punctures the paper. Many people put much more pressure on combinations of letters found in their own names than on the other letters they type.

The Submission of Questioned Documents

The fruits of this analysis are available, of course, only when documents have been questioned or found suspect and submitted to the laboratory. This questioning is generally the obligation of the intelligence officer who first receives a document or of some staff analyst who finds that it does not fit well into the pattern of things already known about a case. The decision to request technical aid for analysis of written materials connected with an operation has in retrospect often turned out to be the most important decision made during its course. The use of this facility for counterintelligence purposes has been a steadily growing thing, for every find encourages other intelligence officers to bring dead files back to life for comparison with the newly identified material. Different areas have on numerous occasions found, when certain documents were compared, that they were host to the same adversary agent.

Many intelligence officers, however, still overlook the very evidence which might successfully terminate a case for them. It is often thought, for example, that a handwriting expert's services are necessary only when a document is suspected of being forged, whereas the results of expert examination may

be much more far-reaching in identification cases. The handwriting on an automobile ownership certificate, a piece of paper found at the scene of a meeting, an ink offset on a blotter, notations in a memorandum book, or any of a multitude of other writings may upon analysis prove to be of value to an operation. In clandestine operations where secret writing is used as a means of communications, it is often advisable to have the developed secret writing, as well as the cover letter, checked in the questioned document laboratory against the possibility that the agent has been killed, captured, or doubled and his communications taken over by the adversary. An earlier article in the *Studies*² showed the value of this procedure also for the purpose of assessing the agent's stability under strain.

In order to obtain a maximum benefit from the laboratory analysis, the intelligence officer should exercise great care in collecting and preserving the documents he submits. He should make every attempt to get samples of a suspect's handwriting without his knowledge—his signature on pay vouchers, for example, or reports or letters in his natural writing. The highest quality of evidence is an uncontaminated original document. Anything less than that, such as a photocopy, is better than nothing, but still yields only qualified results. When it is known in advance that a document is to be submitted to the laboratory, it should be enclosed in a transparent plastic envelope large enough that folding is unnecessary. Thus protected, it can be read in transit on both sides and handled without soiling, wetting, or any physical alteration that might modify or destroy elements of the evidence.

This brief review should be sufficient to show that the science of questioned document analysis requires highly qualified professionals and, like surgery, should not be attempted by do-it-yourselfers. Among the cases on file that attest to the hazards of self-service in this matter is that of the 12-year-old paper mill cited above; it would have been detected at least two years sooner if the case officer involved had not imagined he could train himself in the technique. Even the experts employed in Washington are professionally impotent if sepa-

² "Graphological Assessment in Action," III 4, p. 49ff.

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Suspect Documents **SECRET**

rated from their standards, specimens, files, reference material, and technical facilities. Therefore this work cannot be done on a local basis in the field with any assurance of success.

The sharp-eyed philatelist spots vestiges of wartime intelligence operations and learns something of their nature.

POSTAL FORGERIES IN TWO WORLD WARS

Gordon Torrey and Donald Avery

The history and high state of development of stamp collecting has long since made collectors alert to forgeries of postal stamps. Not long after the first stamp appeared in 1840 forgery began to plague collectors, and as early as 1862 a Brussels dealer published a treatise on the subject. As stamps proliferated and the rarer early issues brought a higher price, the forgers' techniques improved. Collectors were forced to educate themselves in methods of production, papers used, postal rates, and cancellations. Today thousands of collectors in all countries can differentiate at a glance among fine color shadings, perforation gauges, papers, and printing methods.

Government-sponsored postal forgery for intelligence purposes began near the end of the first world war. Thereafter, and again after World War II, collectors found on the philatelic bourses of Europe both forgeries and political parodies of wartime postage stamps. Although the intended or actual use of these stamps is obscured from the public by government secrecy, serious devotees of philately were able to identify the origin of many issues by deductions from sketchy evidence and a comparison of production techniques. They found that in both wars stamp forgery proper was done only by the western allies, and that of these the British were by far the most active. For intelligence officers, the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency contain definitive operational information on American forged printings and reveal by analogy the probable purposes of those sponsored by Great Britain.

Purposes and Problems

Postal forgery was done for purposes of psychological warfare rather than of espionage. Agent communications are in

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such small volume that genuine stamps could be obtained and used without risk. But the mass nature of psywar mailing operations precluded purchase of genuine stamps from legitimate dealers in neutral countries, once hostilities were under way. A sudden demand in Sweden or Switzerland, for instance, for 100,000 12-pfennig German stamps of the regular 1941 issue would have betrayed the probability of a mass mailing operation, which then might have been traced to its source before it started. Thus large-scale forging was the only feasible approach.

Also to psychological warfare belonged the political parodies of enemy postage stamps. Whereas the forgeries were a means for disseminating black propaganda through the enemy postal services, the political parodies were themselves black propaganda. The production of both kinds of stamps was a sub-operation of complex and varied clandestine printing enterprises that included stickers, leaflets, music, pornography, newspapers, surrender passes, and false documents. The elaborate stamp operation also usually produced forged envelopes, addresses, postmarks, and sometimes even mailbags.

The quality of the intelligence forgeries varied considerably. The British were by far the best because they were done by regular postage stamp production facilities in England. Those of the Americans and the French resistance were a good deal poorer, reflecting the cruder production facilities available in the field. It was apparently considered unnecessary to create exact reproductions for mass mailing purposes, and imperfections were probably unavoidable because of wartime shortages of material and technicians. A major problem in some British and all American issues was color control, achieving and maintaining precisely the right mixture of the printing ink; in wartime this is a problem even for legitimate postal administrations. Field production required substitute printing methods as well, with photolithography replacing engraving. Paper shortages and the apparent lack of suitable perforating machines led to other major technical discrepancies. But the imitation of watermarks on postal paper proved unnecessary: the watermark is undetectable once the stamp is affixed to an envelope.

The production and operational use of postal forgeries reached a climax toward the end of World War II. British production, judging from the relative quantities of stamps that eventually reached collectors and the time periods during which the German and French originals were in use, appears to fall roughly into two stages—a few issues of high quality during the first years of the war, and more varieties of a slightly poorer quality in later years. American postal forgeries were first used in full scale in early 1945. Political parodies also multiplied as the war went on, the intensification of effort paralleling the social disintegration of Germany. Opportunities to use the intelligence forgeries increased as enemy postal services were increasingly disrupted, and the divisive potential of the political parodies was augmented with the growing prospect of Axis defeat.

Britain Takes the Lead

In 1918 the British, having decided to organize a propaganda system to undermine the enemy will to resist, mounted from Crewe House, their propaganda headquarters, an operation for distributing antiregime pamphlets, leaflets, and newspapers in the territory of the Central Powers. They planned to use air drops but also to post propaganda to selected addresses through the enemy mails. For this purpose they reproduced regular-issue common-denomination stamps—the German of 10 and 15 pfennig, the Bavarian of 5, 10, and 15 pfennig, and the Austrian of 5, 10, and 25 heller. All of these were probably printed within the same period of a few months, and the die proof of one shows the date “25 September 1918.” The end of the war overtook the project before it became operational, but it is worth noting that it contained all the basic ingredients used by the allies during World War II.

When copies of these stamps appeared on the philatelic market in 1921 the philatelists soon discovered where and by whom they had been printed. They found, by comparing the papers, printing methods, gums, and perforations, that they could have been produced only in England, and only in the plant of De La Rue and Company, one of the three printers then making stamps for the British post office. The British government, pleading the Official Secrets Act, has never admitted to authorship of these issues.

Postal Forgeries



British forgeries of
German stamps, 1918

French stamps
produced in the
U.K. in World
War II



British




American



Genuine

Hitler heads

"Cornflakes"
stamped envelope
and meter mark



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Examples of many of the stamps described
in this article are currently on exhibit in
the CIA Administration Building.

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In World War II the first reported instance of postal forgery was a German operation: in December 1939 British newspapers said envelopes containing German propaganda had been delivered to British householders. These, franked with stamps of neutral countries, had forged postmarks and had not passed through the mails. But this early case is the only evidence that the Germans were at all active with postal forgeries, and the British held their lead.

The British origin of many forged French and German stamps could be conclusively established by virtue of a slightly misplaced pin in the perforation machine used in their production. The resultant perforation drop at a certain position in the second vertical row of stamps in each sheet is exactly the same as that occurring in the regular British 1937 issues printed by the government's contract printer, Harrison and Sons of London. It is therefore virtually certain that Harrison's produced the stamps; they were definitely perforated on a machine owned by that firm.

French Stamps

Forgeries of French stamps used during the Pétain regime are practically all British in origin. Earliest were the 25- and 30-centimes values of the 1938 "Mercury" regular issue, which was in use until 1942. The forgeries are typographed, like the originals, and the color matching is very good. But aside from minute but definite printing variations, they differ from the originals in the gauge of their perforations. The forgeries of the Pétain issues could pass scrutiny the more readily because of a wide variation in the printings of the genuine French stamps resulting from the scarcity of proper paper and inks.

The British also forged a single value of the "Iris" issue of 1939 and eight varieties of the Pétain regular issue used from 1942 until the invasion. While no samples of the forgeries have turned up in used condition, it is likely they were widely and successfully used in the extensive agent operations run against France from the United Kingdom.

A single forgery of the Pétain issue was produced in France itself by the French resistance movement at the so-called "Atelier des Faux de Défense de la France" on the Rue Scribe

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in Paris. Its actual use in mailing operations is questionable: it is un gummed, printed on poor quality paper, obviously perforated differently from the originals, and lithographed instead of typographed; the whole design is clogged with color. Reminders were exhibited in November 1945 as part of the production of the Atelier.

German Stamps

Both the United States and Great Britain forged German regular issues. That the British started early in the war is evident in the existence of a forged 12-pfennig stamp of the 1933-36 issue with a portrait of President Hindenburg: by the end of 1942 all stamps of this type had been superseded by those with Hitler's portrait. This stamp is technically the most deceptive forgery of the Second World War; single copies almost defy detection. It is identical with the original in color, paper, perforation, and method of reproduction. It was printed in sheets of four, however, and examples with sheet margins are readily distinguished by a wide colored band not seen on the margins of original sheets. It was used on envelopes, probably dropped inside Germany. An envelope with stamp uncanceled, containing a propaganda leaflet and addressed to Munich, is extant. None showing postal usage have been discovered.

The British subsequently forged the 3-, 4-, 6-, and 8-pfennig values of the Hitler head regular issue current from 1941 until the end of the war. They were printed in accurately perforated sheets of twenty (5x4) with plain margins, but the forgery has no watermark and the gum is yellowish rather than clear. The engraving also can readily be differentiated from the original by highlights on the portrait. It is fairly certain that these saw operational use, probably in airdrops.

Military franchise labels for German army field mail were also reproduced by the British and apparently used in disseminating propaganda to troops on active duty. Except for some small discrepancies of color and perforation the reproduction is quite passable. They were printed in sheets of twenty with plain margins, rather than the colored and numbered margins of original sheets.

American forgery of German stamps was first made public with the sale of President Roosevelt's stamp collection after the war. The examples in this collection were accompanied by a letter from OSS head General Donovan saying they had been "printed in Switzerland by O.W.I. representatives" and used since November 1942 in cross-border mailing of the Frankfurt Zeitung and other propaganda material.

These forgeries are rather poor in quality and easily distinguished from the originals by a great difference in perforation, a poor cloth match, and in the case of the 12-pfennig stamp by the fact that they were done by photolithography while the originals were recess printed (engraved). In one case the reproduction was reportedly so poor that a second printing was necessary before it could be used.

Italian and Dutch Stamps

Only one forgery of an Italian stamp is known; details of its production suggest that it is British. It is an unwatermarked reproduction of the 25-centisimi green of the 1929-42 regular issue bearing the portrait of King Victor Emanuel. It is extremely deceptive, being readily distinguishable only by sheet size (20) and the lack of a watermark. Like the original, it was produced by photogravure, and its perforation differed only very slightly from the original. In 1941 the only printers among the allies with facilities and experience in the photogravure process were Harrison and Sons, the owners of the faulty perforation machine. The absence of further Italian issues is probably accounted for by Italy's early surrender.

There was a very poor forgery of unknown origin of the 1½-cent stamp of the 1934-46 Netherlands issue, used during the war to mail printed papers. The reproduction was presumably intended for propaganda papers and leaflets. Its poor technical quality suggests that it may have been done by the Dutch underground in the Netherlands itself or with makeshift facilities abroad. The color, paper, perforation, and even size are wrong. The ink is a bluish gray, not the clear gray of the original, and sunk into the paper. It could have passed in a dim light, but it is doubtful that any postal clerk used to handling the genuine article would be deceived.

Operation Cornflakes

In mid-1944 the Office of Strategic Services began planning that led to the production of forged 6- and 12-pfennig stamps of the regular German issue to be used for mass mailing of anti-Nazi propaganda. Earlier attempts to disseminate propaganda widely in the Reich had been frustrated by lack of access. A complicated operation was devised by which the Army Air Force, after shooting up enemy mail trains, would drop faked German mail sacks containing subversive material in forged envelopes alongside them.

During the first four months of 1945, 21 people in the OSS Morale Operations unit attached to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations were occupied in carrying out this scheme, labeled "Operation Cornflakes." Their task was to exploit the disintegration of German administrative functions in the last weeks of the war by infiltrating printed propaganda—principally the "underground" newspaper *Das Neue Deutschland*—into the Reichspost. Their objectives were to weaken further the will of the German people to fight, to increase confusion in the communication and transport services, and to convince the German people that there was an anti-Nazi underground in Germany especially active in business and banking circles.

"Cornflakes" was built up from scratch. Interrogators, under cover of "administrative research," debriefed former mail clerks among the German prisoners on postal procedures and packing and labeling methods. The MO unit studied the latest German postal regulations and reproduced German stamps, postal cancellations, business stationery, and mail sacks. A special unit in Rome culled from German telephone books more than two million names and addresses in cities all over the Reich, and typists addressed forged envelopes at the rate of 15,000 a week. Some envelopes were addressed by hand to provide a plausible mix in each bag.

The drops were executed by the 14th Fighter Group of the 15th Air Force, a unit which was successfully conducting low-level air attacks against rail traffic in southern Germany and Austria. The letters to be dropped on each bomb run had to be so addressed that they would have been carried to, from, or through towns on one of the rail lines on the day's hunt;

and this meant that postal cancellations, prepared and predated in Rome, had to be stamped on the envelopes at the airfield immediately prior to takeoff. In order to avoid the telltale traces left by the ordinary leaflet bomb, a special bomb was developed that would eject the mail sack from the canister on signal from a control button on the pilot's panel.

The 14th Fighter Group worked out its technique for the mixed mailbag and high explosive bomb runs in several practice sessions and began operations in early 1945. The Group would seek out an enemy train, preferably with a mail car attached, moving north from southern Austria, and attack and demolish it. The mailbags would be ejected from fifty feet above the train, so that they would drop undamaged. In the resulting confusion the bags would be picked up from the debris and forwarded to the nearest post office.

In February and March 1945 ten sorties were successfully run and about 120 mail sacks dropped. Prisoners interviewed following the surrender of the German army in Italy verified the receipt of *Das Neue Deutschland* through the military post and said the paper was known as far north as the Baltic ports. They reported it widely rumored in Germany that an underground movement called "Das Neue Deutschland" existed in Austria and parts of Germany.

"Cornflakes" was not executed without mishaps, however. At least one bag, dropped near St. Poelten, Austria, in February 1945, was neutralized by the misspelling of a return address printed on an envelope. A German postal clerk noticed the substitution of C for K in the word "Kassenverein," and postal inspection followed. The project was also endangered at one time by attempts of the screened German prisoners employed for hand addressing to use it for their own purposes. They were discovered addressing envelopes for letters written home.

Propaganda Stamps

Propaganda variations of enemy postage stamps resulted naturally from combining the practice of stamp forgery with the simultaneous production of miscellaneous propaganda stickers and labels. They can be considered in two classes—comparatively subtle changes meant to serve specific propa-



Goering and Himmler substitutions



Liberation propaganda



Hitler skulls



WENN EIN VOLK RETTEN WIL
KANN NUR HEROISCH DENKEN



German anti-British efforts

ganda ends, and broad propagandistic parodies probably intended for world philatelic markets.

In the first category, several stamps produced by the British and apparently intended to promote divisions within the Nazi leadership may represent different facets of a single operation launched late in the war. They all follow the principle of removing Hitler's portrait from a regular stamp and substituting that of another Nazi leader. The Hitler birthday commemorative was used as the prototype for a souvenir sheet of six stamps showing Field Marshal Goering and commemorating his birthday on 12 January 1944. The frequently forged 6-pfennig Hitler head regular issue was changed to show Himmler. (Harrison's perforating machine is again in evidence on sheets of the Himmler stamp.) Hitler's head was also removed from one value of the Polish occupation issue and replaced with that of Governor Frank. This stamp was reproduced by Harrison's photogravure method.

Two efforts, one German and one British, were made in support of national liberation and resistance movements. In 1944, when the leader of the Azad Hind movement, Subhas Chandra Bose, followed the Japanese into India, the state printing works in Berlin issued a series of ten Azad Hind stamps which were never used. And the British, some time after the August 1944 execution of General Erich von Witzleben, one of the chief conspirators in the 20 July bomb plot, substituted his portrait for Hitler's on a German stamp issued in November 1943 to mark the 20th anniversary of the Munich uprising. Changing also the legend on the original, they retained its color and design.

The broad propaganda parodies are chiefly American and German. American production centered around a reworking of the 12-pfennig Hitler head stamp to show a Hitler skull, under which "Futsches" (Collapsed) was substituted in the legend "Deutsches Reich." One important item in this production was a photolithographed parody of a Hitler Souvenir sheet with four skulls resembling Hitler.

German efforts were late, amateurish, and ineffective. Himmler reportedly broached the idea of philatelic parodies to Hitler in February 1944 in answer to the Fuehrer's complaints that the German foreign propaganda organs had failed to tell

the world how completely Britain had sold out to the Russians. He was authorized to market parodies throughout the philatelic world to deliver this message and use the proceeds to finance SS development.

Parodies were made of one value of the 1935 issue commemorating the Silver Jubilee of King George V, of a single stamp issued for the Coronation of George VI, and of six low values of the then current regular British issue. Himmler's design ideas are reflected in liberal use of the Star of Zion and the substitution of Stalin's head for those of the British monarchs. Some of the regular issues were overprinted to advertise the "Liquidation of Empire." The German parodies were printed on the watermarked paper used for ration books. Few examples are extant because the idea never got far beyond pilot production.

Himmler's scheme met with widespread resistance from officials of the intelligence services, who regarded it as a waste of time. Attempts to market the stamps through the "Operation Bernhard" network, already engaged in forging and selling British banknotes, and through agents of the foreign Sicherheitsdienst never panned out. Himmler, at last thoroughly frustrated by the failure of his idea, ordered that the stamps be given to Sir Oswald Mosley's Black Shirts for dissemination in England, but with the incipient collapse of Germany the confusion in Berlin overtook this final alternative as well.

The Outlook

Forgery of postage stamps for intelligence purposes may be unnecessary in future operations. Postage meter marks have already largely replaced stamps for commercial mailing purposes in most countries of the world. The most widespread use of meters is for bulk mail and newspapers, printed matter, precisely the medium through which written propaganda is most easily disseminated. Meter marks eliminate the need for both stamp and cancellation forgeries, and reproduction of the simple red-inked double-purpose impression should be quite easy and effective. In any one country, meter impressions are to a high degree standardized in design, differing only in the letter and serial number of the machine. Unlike postage stamps, moreover, which are changed every few

years, meters remain in use for long periods of time, the widespread distribution of all sizes of machines in post offices and business firms precluding frequent change. The American directors of Operation Cornflakes anticipated this development in including a meter mark—the only meter mark known to have been forged in wartime—in their mailbag mix.

The Soviet system of devious techniques to circumscribe the overt observations of foreign experts.

OBSTACLE COURSE FOR ATTACHÉS

Thomas W. Wolfe

It may be useful, now that it seems possible the Soviet Union may one of these days agree to admit nuclear inspection teams to its territory, to review the kinds of obstacles it regularly strews in the path of other legitimate trained foreign observers, the military attachés. As Soviet officials have already given voice to their suspicion that any nuclear inspectors will be bent on spying, so they have taken the attitude, in their obsession with secrecy, that the attachés are spies when they exhibit an interest in matters which in most other countries lie open in the public domain. Hence, although as a bow to international usage they accept the military attachés of foreign diplomatic missions, they severely circumscribe their opportunities to travel and make observations—a traditional attaché activity ever since the system came into being during the Napoleonic era.

Soviet measures to limit the observations of military attachés fall into two categories. First, there are express legal proscriptions on attaché movement and activities—off-limits areas, travel registration, prohibitions on photography, etc. Second, there is a large body of unannounced restraints—administrative, psychological, and physical—which take up where the legal obstacles leave off. It is this second category of obstructive techniques over and above the formal restrictions which I shall illustrate from my own experience in Russia as American Air Attaché from October 1956 to October 1958.

Manipulating transportation. This is one of the most common methods of interference through administrative measures after an attaché has obtained formal permission to travel. For example, you have made reservations for a flight in daytime from Moscow to Baku, but at the last minute you find that your seat has been switched to a night plane. If you

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announce your intention of waiting for the first available day-time flight, you are informed that all day flights are sold out "for the indefinite future." The same thing happens on trains. Sometimes the schedules are altered to keep you from passing points of interest in daylight. I have been on trains which for no apparent reason pulled into a siding and waited until dark, to the bewilderment of Russian fellow-passengers and even some members of the crew. Similarly, civil air flights have altered their routes or skipped scheduled stops in perfectly good weather for no other reason than to deny us observation of some inconveniently located installation.

Compartment companions. Rarely are attachés able to secure a compartment to themselves on a Soviet train, no matter how far in advance they book transportation. The Soviet citizens who turn up to share a compartment are in most cases readily identifiable as security agents. They keep the attaché under constant scrutiny during waking hours and occasionally can be found going through his belongings in the middle of the night. An auxiliary practice is that of splitting up foreign travellers: even American husbands (including myself) have on occasion been obliged to spend the night in one compartment and their wives in another with male Russian companions. This sort of thing naturally does nothing to endear the watchdogs of Soviet security to members of the attaché corps, and run-ins with them have been frequent. After one such skirmish with a particularly obnoxious security type in the Caucasus, I was called a "hooligan" and other uncomplimentary names in the Soviet press, a publicity measure which serves to put psychological pressure on the attachés as well as to foster among the Soviet populace the desired attitude of suspicious vigilance toward foreigners.

Timely interruption technique. Even if an attaché and his friends or family have managed to secure a train compartment without Soviet company, their privacy is seldom respected for long. Whenever the train approaches the industrial section of a city, for example, the car attendants suddenly find it necessary to tidy up your compartment. If the door happens to be locked they let themselves in with a pass key, so great is their urge to look after your comfort. The window always seems to need the most attention, and they swipe

away at it with a dust-rag, effectually blocking the view, until you have passed through the factory district.

If this routine cannot be stretched out long enough, there is a variation which I encountered once while travelling through a large industrial city on the Volga. Factories were strung out for several miles on the outskirts of the city, among them a big aircraft plant. It stood alongside the tracks, offering about the same view you get from a train of the Martin plant in Baltimore, except that the Soviet plant was boxed in by a high board fence. On this occasion I found the view spoiled not only by the fence and the customary activity of the car attendant. Making doubly sure that I would have no chance to observe this particular stretch of industrial scenery, the attendant rubbed the window down with a greasy rag.

Frosted window routine. On train trips in winter, nature often cooperates with the Soviet authorities by frosting over the windows of your car. When nature fails to do the trick, however, there is usually someone around to lend a hand, as I found once when boarding a train in Rostov. It was a clear, cold day and every window in the train was completely free of frost and ice, with one exception. The window of my compartment, in the middle of a car, had been sprayed on the outside until it was covered with a quarter-inch glaze of ice. When I attempted to chip some of the ice away, I was immediately stopped by a detail of militiamen. "You are violating Soviet regulations," they said. "You might scratch the glass."

Helpful hostess. When attachés board an airplane for a trip in the Soviet Union, word is passed along to the crew that foreigners are aboard. The hostess then makes it her business to distract the attention of the foreign traveller at moments when he might observe installations of military or industrial significance. A favorite technique when an airplane is taking off or approaching an airport is for the hostess to lean over your seat with an offering of reading material. Somehow she usually manages to hold a magazine in front of your face so you can't see out the window. If you wave the solicitous girl away at such a moment you are of course being rude and unappreciative.

Smoke screen. When the Soviets are particularly anxious to conceal some installation from foreign eyes, they may use this standard military device. It takes a certain amount of preparation and good communications to time a smoke screen to go up just as an attaché drives down the highway or passes on the train, but they usually pull it off without a hitch. This technique, however, has the disadvantage of calling attention to the very object they wish to hide. On one train trip in central Russia an airfield we passed at a distance of three or four miles was ringed with upwards of 50 smoke generators belching away. "What's going on over there?" I asked one of the Russians who had been assigned to keep an eye on me during this journey. "It looks as though that airfield is on fire." I got a blank stare in return. "Airfield? Fire? I don't see anything," said the Russian, as though he could persuade me thus that there was nothing in sight but the natural Russian landscape.

Highway escort. When attachés undertake an automobile trip in the Soviet Union, they are accompanied by several cars of plain-clothes security agents. These keep shifting the order of their line-up along the highway to preserve the fiction that there is no surveillance of foreigners; but since auto traffic on most out-of-town roads in the Soviet Union is very light, the pretense is bound to wear thin as the same "protective" cavalcade of Pobedas and Zims rolls along behind you hour after hour. When you stop by the roadside to stretch your legs, the cavalcade pulls up a hundred yards or so away. For some reason, the security personnel always make a minute inspection of your stopping place after you have moved on. Perhaps they imagine that attachés may plant nefarious devices or hide messages to conspirators along the highways.

Roadside reception committees. Should an auto trip take you through a region in which military or industrial installations are located, the motor escort is usually deemed inadequate to keep a proper curb on your curiosity, and the local militia and troops from the nearest military base are turned out en masse. They stand guard at every intersection to prevent you from turning off the designated route. Along some stretches of road they are posted at 10-yard intervals to keep you from making an "unauthorized" stop, thus often calling

attention, like the smoke screen, to the very installation you are supposed not to observe. Running the gauntlet of such reception committees is generally bothersome, however, especially when they bar access to the only decent roads in the vicinity and require you to detour along rutted backcountry wagon trails to get to your destination. Frequently the only satisfaction an attaché gets from such a trip is the knowledge that the Soviets have tied up an inordinate amount of manpower to control his itinerary.

Phoney militiaman routine. Around cities it is not always feasible to have a guard posted at every corner when attachés happen to be in town, and a portable militiaman must be improvised. The militia are the uniformed police, whom you are legally required to obey when they flag your car down and tell you to turn around. Not so the security agent in plain clothes unless he shows his credentials, a revelation which security operatives are loath to make. To get around this difficulty, each auto-load of security men has in its kit a militia uniform which one of the operatives may put on as occasion demands. The car speeds ahead, the phoney militiaman jumps out still buttoning up his jacket, and you are hailed to a stop. This technique more or less effectively confines attaché sightseeing in the environs of a Soviet city to churches, cemeteries, and other approved cultural attractions.

Frequent interceptions on a drive about a large city may produce the curious result that you keep encountering the same phoney militiaman at widely separated points. Once in Leningrad an agent with a torn shoulder strap on his militiaman's uniform flagged us down several times in the same afternoon. As the crowd of onlookers would gather around we would ask him, each time a bit more caustically: "So it's you again. Haven't you got that strap fixed yet? Bozhe moi! you sure are setting a sloppy example for all the genuine militiamen in Leningrad!" His wrathful frustration was a pleasure to behold, for no one wants less than a security agent to become the butt of attention in front of a crowd of fellow-citizens: his next assignment might involve checking up on one of those same citizens.

"Road under Repair" routine. The pretense that a bridge is out or that a particular stretch of road is under repair is

often used to keep motoring attachés from reaching a destination the authorities do not want to declare formally out of bounds. On one occasion, when some travellers were told by local Soviet officials that they could not proceed to the town of Pskov because a bridge en route "had been washed out in a storm," they insisted on going ahead anyway. They had not got very far along the road when a truck full of soldiers sped past. A few minutes later they came to a small wooden bridge in time to see the soldiers beginning to take it apart plank by plank.

Kerosene in the crankcase. When other devices fail to discourage attachés from an undesirable motoring itinerary, there is always the alternative of a little midnight attention to their automobile. Cars which had passed a searching inspection before the start of a trip sometimes used to develop peculiar ailments after having been parked overnight in the courtyard of a Soviet hotel. I had a brand-new automobile, mileage still under 3,000, break down with burned-out engine bearings on a trip in southern Russia. Kerosene in the crankcase—hardly the work of a mere prankster—turned out to be the cause.

Indignant citizen act. The attitude of ordinary Soviet citizens toward foreigners is generally a combination of curiosity and friendliness. Deliberately hostile behavior is quite out of character, for ordinary citizens are aware that they can get into trouble by unsanctioned demonstrations of ill will. It is an obvious artifice, therefore, when planted agitators attempt to incite a crowd of Soviet citizens against attaché travellers. I recall a typical instance wherein two attachés were set upon while visiting the historic Kremlin of the city of Kazan.

The Kremlin, sitting on high ground, affords a distant view of the city's industrial suburbs. Apparently the Soviet authorities thought it best to deny this view to foreign attachés, but since the Kremlin was open to the public they had no plausible excuse for barring admittance. Professional agitators were therefore called into action to create a scene. They collected a crowd, ranted at the travellers, and threatened to shoot them if they did not leave the premises at once. When the agitators were asked to show their credentials, they

claimed to be "indignant citizens" who did not have to identify themselves. This tactic usually proves effective, for attachés cannot afford to become involved in altercations with Soviet citizens, however strong the provocation, lest they be officially accused of violating Soviet order. As on many similar occasions, the attachés in this case were harried off the streets and obliged to take refuge in their hotel room until time to catch the next train out of town.

The foregoing provides a sample of the harassments and petty subterfuges by which Soviet authorities prevent military attachés travelling in nominally open areas from making the most commonplace observations, observations of a kind which Soviet representatives in Western countries are perfectly free to make without hindrance. It seems reasonable to expect that nuclear inspectors, if they are admitted, will be faced with the frustration of these and similar obstructive contrivances.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

The Military Attachés

Dear Sirs:

Lyman Kirkpatrick's "Unrecognized Potential in the Military Attachés"¹ is such a good summary of important considerations with which I have been closely concerned over quite a period of time, as a former G-2 and Army attaché now with CIA, that I cannot resist the temptation to comment on it. The article, affirming that attachés contribute heavily to our national intelligence and defending them against some of their critics, notes deficiencies resulting from the cross accreditation system; but its main burden is that attachés in many countries have a natural entrée, one that should be more fully exploited, to political leaders with a military background, and especially to junior officers who are likely to become the country's future leaders. In an extension of this thesis the author notes that of the many foreign officers that come to the United States for training a number have later turned out to be political leaders in their countries; he suggests that there is a great potential for intelligence and covert action operations in this situation.

Mr. Kirkpatrick's observations are all sound. If anything they are too conservative. The distressing thing about them is that they need to be made at this late stage of the intelligence community's development. For this reason I make bold to amplify his views, speaking in perhaps painfully plain terms, and make some further suggestions, particularly with reference to the role CIA should play.

The attaché system is recognized, at least in military intelligence circles, as an effective collection arm. As in any system, there are some weak individuals and features and some reportorial sins of omission and commission, but it is my observation that the percentage of these is very low indeed, comparing most favorably with that of any other group of U.S. intelligence collectors. Certainly there is continuous attention to the selection and training of attachés, to the guidance of collection, and to the evaluation of performance: the

¹ *Studies* IV 2, p. 1ff.

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important practice of commenting on reports is, at least in the Army, on a sound and effective basis.

In the matter of distribution of attachés and the problems of cross accreditation, it would seem wise in the long run to work out a scheme of joint service representation by an attaché in residence. Most observers recognize that an embassy without a service attaché lacks an important component. Although in some cases the attaché's value will lie more in prestige considerations than in intelligence collection, that value is nevertheless a real one. The services have repeatedly wrestled with this problem and sought various joint ways of meeting it. I agree that the results of these efforts have not been quite adequate; but at least they have been made. Budgetary and personnel considerations may be at the root of the trouble. There is a role that CIA could play in this matter that is worthy of reconsideration.

Mr. Kirkpatrick is too diffident about the practicability of attaché contact with junior officers for assessing their potential. He need have no qualms on this point. Such contact is, as a matter of fact, a part of basic attaché guidance. While the situation varies in each country, a study of reports will show that most attachés can and do make these contacts. In friendly countries junior officers can be cultivated through all sorts of activities: one attaché organized an annual golf tournament between officers from two areas; one used to make it a point to attend any amateur dramatic presentations; an air attaché arranged that a delegation including junior officers visit U.S. military installations. Arrangements like these are difficult or perhaps even precluded where the atmosphere is unfriendly, but something can generally be developed.

One of the more disturbing aspects of Mr. Kirkpatrick's comments is that he finds it necessary to emphasize the political intelligence value of contacts with the military. This potential is recognized and stressed in guidance to Army and Air Force attachés, and although I do not know about the Navy, which has not combined its attaché training with that of the other services, I assume that its position is similar. Perhaps the civilian agencies need to be prodded; but to my knowledge the importance of military contacts has more than once been raised in CIA. If the needed U.S. interdepartmental

coordination is not in effect, the proper steps to capitalize on this important opportunity should be taken by command decision.

It is similarly disturbing that there should be a need to point out the intelligence potential of foreign officers studying in the United States. I know that the Army is alert to the situation, and I know that it has been brought to the attention of responsible persons in CIA. I know of cases where individual attachés have worked along these lines. But I also know of efforts to take advantage of this opportunity which failed to gain support. After a British officer, formerly a Leavenworth instructor, had spent time, money, and effort establishing informal contacts between UK and U.S. Leavenworth graduates in England, the expected U.S. help fell through. Remarking on Iranian and other foreign officers who wore with pride the badges of the U.S. schools they had attended, I was told there were no measures, not even subtle ones, being taken to keep alive this alma mater spirit. A project to provide a periodic news letter to foreign officers failed to win support. A regularized system for getting the kind of biographic data on foreign military students that Mr. Kirkpatrick advocates was deemed comparatively unproductive when proposed a few years ago.

It should be evident that activities like these would be highly useful and that they can be accomplished cheaply. We can, however, not rely on the armed services alone to carry them out. They constitute a project that needs centralized development and coordinated execution both in the interest of full coverage and for the sake of efficiency. Such a venture could advantageously be coordinated with other programs involving foreign officers that come to the United States for school and other purposes. CIA has the intelligence coordinating job. This is one part of it it should pursue.

Mr. Kirkpatrick's analysis does not cover three other aspects of the military attaché program which are of significance for the intelligence community—attaché-MAAG relations, CIA briefing of attachés, and collection coordination in the field. In the first, the ball is only partly in our CIA court, but in the others the next move is squarely up to us.

There are a great many papers and doctrines treating the relationship between attachés and MAAG's in the matter of intelligence collection, but their application is no simple matter; certainly it is not uniformly successful. While both our friends and our enemies assume that MAAG's as well as attachés collect information, we must maintain the fiction that MAAG's do not. Open recognition of their collection mission would in fact result in many embarrassments, because MAAG personnel lack understanding and skill in intelligence collection. Although a MAAG is for obvious reasons the dominating U.S. military influence in a nation while it is there, its job is to work itself out of business; and we cannot afford to let misguided views on intelligence collection damage the attaché collection system, the permanent mechanism upon which we will have to rely when the MAAG's are gone. It would be most logical that the attaché be given responsibility for coordinating the MAAG's collection activity with his own. A standing operating procedure covering the subject might be established whenever the attaché or MAAG chief is changed.

One item on which we can and should take action is the matter of CIA briefing of attachés. There are good Agency directives on this point, but the follow-through is spotty. We leave too much to busy and often too security-conscious persons who may lack confidence in the discretion or understanding of military personnel. It is to our advantage to make good briefings, and in my experience any personal foibles are evenly distributed: neither military nor civilian intelligence operators have a corner on good sense or on blundering.

Another place CIA can help is in better collection coordination in the field; this will be particularly needful under the new DCID's. Here the onus is strictly on us and on the embassy. One aspect of this coordination should be the development of a process for adjusting NIS collection responsibilities to the facts of the collection situation in the field. Responsibilities for formulating the different NIS sections, established after long and thoughtful study, fit the U.S. intelligence and government structure quite well. The same distribution of responsibility for collecting the information, however, does not always meet conditions in the field, sometimes because the

structure of the foreign government differs from ours, sometimes for other reasons.

To illustrate, the Army is supposed to collect information on railroads; but railroads often come under a part of the foreign government with which military liaison is impracticable or unwise. The supply and finance aspects of many foreign military forces are controlled by civilian agencies to which State might have best entrée. On the other hand, matters for which State is assigned responsibility are sometimes to be found in agencies with which the service attachés have unusually good contact. In addition, it often happens that personal relationships are such as to give opportunities for collection in fields outside assigned areas: one attaché had a golfing companion who gave good economic and political information, while a colleague in the political section of the same embassy had a lucrative contact in the general staff, and a USIS officer had one in the troop information service. Surely such opportunities should be exploited in disregard of bureaucratic allocations of responsibility. Finally, no matter how wise Washington may be, it often turns out that what seemed at headquarters to require covert collection in fact does not, and vice versa.

There is no reason why the collection responsibilities at each embassy should not be adjusted periodically to the facts of life. If necessary, agreements on this point could be reduced to writing and forwarded for official approval. Or if Parkinson's Law and other bureaucratic propensities make such flexibility too difficult in Washington, the collectors should perhaps just go ahead and collect as convenient for them, give each other the appropriate credit in their reports, and let it go at that. Either from Washington or through its Chief of Mission, CIA should play a leading role in such a coordinating process. It can be done without prejudice to security if we are as skillful as we ought to be.

In summary, I agree with Mr. Kirkpatrick's views on the attaché system and its new horizons, with the reservation that what is needed in order to reach those horizons and certain further ends is for CIA to get moving. We have the men and the resources. All we need is the decision to act.

Peter J. Dorondo

Assessment by Graphology

Dear Sirs:

Keith Laycock's extravagant article in your journal on the use of handwriting analysis in character assessment,¹ which claimed for graphology the capability of disclosing personality traits ranging from talkativeness through capacity for abstract thinking to sex difficulties, was answered by Dr. Rundquist's skeptical appeal for scientific evaluation;² but you have now left the last word with James Van Stappen, who writes that there is no need for such scientific proof.³ As a layman to both psychology and graphology but a professional in intelligence, I should like to take up the cudgels for science on behalf of all intelligence officers who refuse to be seduced by untested claims.

I note with pleasure that Mr. Van Stappen does not claim the swamiesque capabilities listed by Laycock. But neither does he deny them; and his smokescreen of European university citations and long bibliography do nothing to lift the veil of swami from graphology. That graphologists are sometimes the product of European rather than Indian universities does not preclude their being charlatans. A number of fakers have held degrees from first-line universities, especially from European ones; European schooling in psychology runs the gamut from excellence to pure fakery. Phrenology and astrology have had their day there, and physiognomics (the art of determining character by facial contours) is still in vogue in European police schools and seriously studied at leading universities. Only two years ago, the Chief of Training of a European intelligence service asked which American university he should write to for a bibliography of American scholarly works on physiognomics! The fact that graphology is seriously studied in Europe does not make it a valid science. Nor does a long bibliography make it valid: there are extensive bibliographies on astrology, phrenology, and physiognomics too.

¹ *Studies* III 3, p. 23.

² *Studies* III 3, p. 45.

³ *Studies* III 4, p. 49.

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The live illustration given in the Van Stappen article demonstrates changes in a single individual's handwriting as that individual underwent a disturbance. Even in the United States, where graphology has not been generally accepted because scientific testing has not validated its claims, psychiatrists in some cases use graphology as one of many tools in their attempts to probe the roots of a mental disturbance. Van Stappen's case is a valid example of such use. Periodic testing of an agent's handwriting by competent psychiatrists may tell whether he is undergoing emotional strain.

It is also possible that graphology, used as a tool by professional psychologists, may have a place in agent assessment; but the Van Stappen article does not show this, and by failing to deny the claims made by Laycock it implies acceptance of them. Its description of the Lewinson method is interesting, illustrating a device for graphic representation of differences in samples of handwriting. But it leaves us in the dark as to the next step—how one can determine an individual's "disposition to talk," for example, from a single sample of handwriting. Its silence in this respect leads one to suspect that the author is afraid to lay his cards on the table or submit graphology to scientific checks.

The article lists four other categories of cases where graphology may be of assistance because it is the "only available method—the unknown source who supplies your agent information, the agent who refuses to submit to ordinary assessment, the VIP who cannot be asked to undergo tests, and the writer of anonymous letters." These are cases in which we are interested, but no examples of how successful graphology may be in such cases are offered. The fact is that these are situations where no controls for scientific investigation are available, and operations chiefs and case officers who use this "service" therefore have nothing upon which to base an estimate of its value. With Dr. Rundquist, I am afraid of unwarranted credence in graphological findings until we have a statistically valid comparison of the performance records and standard assessments of individual agents matched against their graphological assessments under controlled circumstances.

To the Editors: Graphology

I am not one of those too skeptical to try out graphology. But I will refuse to consider it seriously until a methodical validation of its use for intelligence purposes is carried out. I have had experience with its misuse and the dangerous consequences thereof, and sincerely hope that its advocates will have the courage to submit it to scientific tests instead of appealing to the "authority" of European universities and a bibliography which beclouds the question by citing a number of works that have absolutely no application to the points at issue.

Peter Showell

Jet-Age Reporting

Dear Sirs:

A well-known Washington plumber once answered an irate housewife's complaint that after his ministrations the water tasted terrible, "Dear lady, all I do is handle the pipe. What goes in and comes out ain't my department." Like the plumber, the designer of our jet-age reporting system¹ has designed a many-splendored network of pipes without adequate attention to either input or outflow. He has made only a half-hearted attack on the real problem vexing intelligence collectors and users since Eve failed to recognize the significance of the biological intelligence she received from the first E-5 source, SERPENT (fnu).

In his system overt, marginal information, or information responsive to a parochial request not even remotely related to a set of priorities, is carefully reproduced by the perforator unit of a standard M-19 teletype machine, with its rows of up to five holes in different position combinations, each representing a letter or function punched on the keyboard of the machine. This is then fed with loving care into a flexowriter, by-passing all intelligence criteria, and sent on its mechanistic way to a staff communications group, where it is put into permanent form and disseminated. Bilge is thus mingled indiscriminately into the untreated effluent of the pipeline. One can imagine that over every automatic machine in this vast jet-age system there hangs mockingly a sign which reads "THINK."

The jet-age contraption really reaches its ionospheric apogee when the afterburners are turned on. The feedback to disseminators (machines!) and the feedback to collectors are the Vernier burners which are supposed to impart the correct azimuthal attitude control. Every analyst can then influence directly the orbit of our intelligence missile, and every punch-card nuance can have its impact in space. We can confidently look forward to some analyst's query as to whether the moon is *really* made of green cheese; and we can be sure that, in the absence of any critical control, the green cheese requirements will carry priorities equivalent to those on the ca-

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¹ William Earling, "Design for Jet-Age Reporting," *Studies* IV 2, p. 7.

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pability of submarines lurking in the Chesapeake Bay. Bilge, untreated effluent, and green cheese in the feed-back hold great promise of causing a flame-out in our intelligence missile in outer space.

Francis Tempone

* * *

Dear Sirs:

Even in the jet age there are still areas in which the analyst does not need to get his field report within a week, areas in which pouch reporting is adequate and even preferable to more rapid channels. Much economic intelligence falls in this category. Among the very best economic reports are detailed documentary lists and studies which are best presented in upper *and* lower case, with full punctuation and adequate attention to proofreading. Speed of transmission is only a minor factor in presenting such information to the proper customer.

A great deal of other good information is being reported satisfactorily by pouch. True, there is much marginal and bad information arriving daily by pouch, to be disposed of at leisure by area desks, not rushed to customer analysts. We should be well advised to leave this pouch channel open and allow the inevitable flow of marginal information to settle there. Faster channels will not improve the judgments of field reporters, and unless there is a careful screening of incoming information by officers with specialized area knowledge there is real danger that more speed will not mean more quality, but rather the opposite.

Your jet-age writer, conceding that "formal collection requirements alone cannot do the job" of controlling quality, seems to believe that formal requirements plus numerous rapidly transmitted evaluations can. No one would deny the usefulness of requirements, especially in fields where collectors need support from technical specialists; but already too much effort has been devoted to generating requirements which any red-blooded intelligence officer would take for granted or which bear no relation to existing collection potential. There are fields—politics, for example—where requirements are feeble aids indeed and where one politically alert case officer is worth more than volumes of questions unrelated to the facts of any specific operation.

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As for his "new system for rapid and frequent user criticism of individual reports in order to point up good material and weed out at the source any information below the level of significance for the intelligence community," those who have observed the impact of customer evaluations on field operations will be unimpressed. While evaluations from customer analysts range from very useful to counterproductive, their net effectiveness in guiding the collection effort is not very high. Furthermore, because they are normally prepared by persons unaware of what access and potential the producing sources have, even good evaluations of a report at hand are not very helpful regarding problems of further exploitation. With respect to significance of information, customer evaluations in general are not thorough enough in their review nor well enough coordinated with the scale of priorities to provide a reliable guide. On the big question of which sources to terminate and which to encourage, their impact, if any, is difficult to detect.

Bad evaluations, on the other hand, can have a negative effect. And so many evaluations are prepared cursorily, in haste, that perhaps we should try rather for fewer evaluations to which more time could be devoted. It is not uncommon that evaluations indifferently prepared or unrelated to existing priorities serve to encourage the marginal operational activity which we are striving to eliminate. The prospect that they might be fired indiscriminately to the field in greater numbers is frightening to contemplate. It would certainly do more harm than good.

In any age, information from a source with real access to a good target looks impressive even when it is a few weeks old; but in the horse-and-buggy age, the marginal product from not-very-well-placed spies must have looked like old lettuce leaves by the time it finally arrived at headquarters. Possibly we have been somewhat slow in eliminating marginal operations because rapid communications have given their product enough timeliness to make them appear worth while. Why don't we try reporting all but the very best information by pouch for a few months and see which sources are being upheld just by the rapid transmission of their marginal output? Sources with no real access will wither and grow cold in the

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To the Editors: Jet Age

weeks required for a pouch report, and it will be easy to terminate them. This practical approach offers better prospects for refining intelligence collection than a mechanistic scheme for greater speed.

E. H. Maydalle

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Intelligence Articles IV 3

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Aspects of a classical scouting and resistance-leading unit behind Japanese lines in Burma, from the viewpoint of its commander.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF OSS DETACHMENT 101

W. R. Peers

For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mission. The Detachment did plan and carry out espionage operations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, and psychological measures. Its intelligence activities were therefore augmented rather than decreased when large-scale guerrilla operations were initiated in the spring of 1944.

Early Operations

The history of Detachment 101 began in the spring of 1942, when a small group of officers and men was assembled in Washington under the Office of the Coordinator of Information. Captain (later Colonel) Carl Eifler was the first commander. After a short period of training and equipping, the unit shipped overseas to the China-Burma-India Theater. In the summer of 1942 it received its first directive from General Stilwell, short and to the point: "Establish a base camp in northeast India and from there plan and conduct operations against the roads and railroad leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the Japanese the use of the Myitkyina airfield. Establish liaison with the British authorities to effect coordination with their operations."

The remainder of the year was spent in locating and developing a base camp in Assam Province of northeast India and in recruiting and training agent personnel for subsequent operations. An office was established in Calcutta to receive supplies from headquarters in the United States and to procure

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bulk goods from the Army Service of Supply. At that time there was available no small, portable military or commercial radio capable of transmitting from northern Burma to Assam, a distance of 200 to 500 miles. Accordingly it was necessary for the unit to design and construct its own radio set. The result was crude, but it worked well. It became the model from which the SSTR series of sets was built by OSS, which by now had succeeded to the intelligence and paramilitary function of COI.

In 1943 exploratory field operations were carried out in Burma on a trial-and-error basis. Some of them were failures; but they taught us many lessons as to what could be done and, even more important, what should not be done. By the end of the year six base camps had been established behind the lines in northern Burma, three east of the Irrawaddy River and three to the west. Each of these had recruited and trained a small group of indigenous Kachin personnel for local protection and to perform limited operations, principally simple sabotage and small ambushes. Each also trained a few native personnel as low-level intelligence agents, who reported their information by means of runners or via the bamboo grapevine. From the field bases this information was forwarded to the base camp in India by radio. By the end of the year it was possible to assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of Japanese strengths and dispositions in northern Burma.


The field bases also selected native recruits for more intensive intelligence training. These were flown by light aircraft or infiltrated through the Japanese lines to the airfield at Fort Hertz in the northern tip of Burma and thence flown to the base camp in India. Their training, of three to five months duration, followed the normal curriculum for intelligence agents. The Kachins were particularly adept at CW radio communications; by the end of the course most of them were able to operate at 25 to 45 words per minute. When their training was completed, some of them were returned to their field bases to expand local information procurement and others were parachuted into Burma for independent operations.

The Myitkyina Campaign

With the initiation of orthodox military operations in the winter of 1943-44 by the Chinese ground forces, later augmented by Merrill's Marauders, General Stilwell directed the Detachment to expand its guerrilla force to a strength of approximately 3,000 in order to assist in the drive down the Hukawng Valley and the eventual attack on Myitkyina, and also to extend its intelligence operations south of Myitkyina at least to the area of Bhamo and Katha. He made available the arms, ammunition, personnel, and airlift necessary to fulfill this directive. He also stated that should the Detachment be successful in providing this clandestine support to the combat forces, approval would be forthcoming to expand its guerrilla forces to a strength of 10,000, with a commensurate increase in intelligence and other operations.

That the Detachment was indeed successful in this assignment can be illustrated by several incidents from the Hukawng-Myitkyina campaign. The final drive on Myitkyina was made in May 1944 by the Galahad Force (Merrill's Marauders and two Chinese regiments) across the Kumon Range and thence south through Arang to the Myitkyina airfield. Detachment 101 assisted this movement by providing two companies of Kachin guerrillas to reconnoiter and screen the front and flanks. When the Galahad forces reached Arang they picked up additional guides and scouts from a Detachment field base located there. One of the scouts, who had been bitten by a poisonous snake and was so weak that he had to ride horseback, nevertheless led the Galahad Force to the airfield over some old unused trails, completely surprising the Japanese. The airstrip was thus occupied with but little resistance. The part played by the Detachment in this operation points up the interrelationship between its intelligence and other activities.

A day or so before the Galahad Force seized the airfield, Detachment 101 had some of its agent personnel in and out of Myitkyina town. They estimated the Japanese strength there at that time to be only approximately 300, and this information was given to the Northern Combat Area Command and the Galahad Force. After the airstrip was seized, two Chinese



units were therefore assigned to secure the town. It was to be a double envelopment, one Chinese unit moving north along the Irrawaddy River and the other attacking from the west. All went well until the two converged on the railway station in the center of town at about dusk. It has been reported that Japanese snipers between them started picking them off. Whatever the reason, they soon became heavily engaged with each other and inflicted such severe mutual casualties that they had to be withdrawn. The attempt at an early seizure of the town thus came to nought.

It was two days before the forces were reorganized and made another assault on the town, and when they did they encountered a hornets' nest. In the interim the Japanese had reinforced the town from every direction. They came by road and railroad from Mogaung to the west, from the supply installations to the north along the Irrawaddy, from Maingna and Seniku across the river from the town, and from elsewhere. Within two days, it was estimated, Japanese strength in the town had been augmented to over 1,500, by the end of a week it exceeded 3,000, and it still continued to grow.

This build-up was so rapid as to create for a while the feeling in some quarters that our original strength estimates must have been wrong. But Detachment intelligence agents and guerrilla patrols placed along all the access roads and trails leading into the city confirmed by observation the frantic effort of the Japanese to reinforce the garrison. And subsequently the interrogation of Japanese POW's by NCAC and Galahad intelligence staffs verified as proximately accurate the 300 figure which had been provided by the Detachment. The only discrepancy was in the other direction: an original strength figure of 275 for the Myitkyina garrison was obtained through the interrogations.

The battle for Myitkyina town continued beyond June and into the monsoon. Meanwhile Detachment 101 had expanded its activities to the south as directed by General Stilwell and was providing intelligence and operational support to the combat forces. By the time Myitkyina fell to the allied forces in August 1944, the Detachment had organized its guerrilla forces across an area generally 100 miles farther south and was well on its way toward its ultimate strength of 10,000. Intelligence operations were also increased, and espionage groups were deployed along Japanese lines of communication as far south as Toungoo, approximately 400 miles away.

Mandalay and Beyond

In the fall of 1944 the allied forces in northern Burma opened their drive from Myitkyina toward central Burma. Detachment 101 moved its guerrilla operating area to a line generally through Lashio to Mandalay and thence to the Chindwin River and the India border. At that time it reached its greatest strength and highest stage of development. In the area

of Lashio there were seven separate battalions, each capable of independent operations. North of Mandalay there were approximately 2,500 guerrillas, organized into units of varying size, depending upon the local situation. To the west, between the railway corridor and the British 14th Army in the Imphal area near the India-Burma border, lay a stretch of over 250 miles in which no allied combat forces were operating. Through this gap ran a series of parallel corridors, excellent natural approaches for the enemy to the Ledo Road being constructed behind the allied combat forces. General Sultan, who had succeeded General Stilwell as Commanding General NCAC, directed Detachment 101 to utilize its guerrilla and intelligence resources to block these several approaches. Guerrilla forces were accordingly deployed in each of them, and with information supplied through intelligence activities were able—although not without some severe fighting—to fend off several Japanese probes through the area.

Intelligence operations during this phase of the campaign were widely developed and reached their greatest degree of reliability. There were over 100 operations involving in excess of 350 agent personnel. Through these and the collection of information by the guerrilla forces, Detachment 101 was able to stay abreast of the changing organization, deployments, and strengths of the Japanese forces. In fact, its intelligence officers probably knew at least as much about the Japanese tactical organization and capabilities as the Japanese themselves did.

When Lashio and Mandalay were captured by allied forces, the Detachment was directed to withdraw its forces from the field and inactivate. Soon, however, the combat situation in southern China became extremely critical, and it was necessary to withdraw all Chinese and American combat forces from northern and central Burma to try to stem the Japanese drive there. General Sultan therefore directed the Detachment to reconstitute whatever force was necessary to conduct a mopping-up operation in the southern Shan States and seize the Taunggyi-Kengtung road, the Japanese escape route to Thailand. Most of our intelligence operations had been retained, fortunately, so there was a sound basis for embarking on this assignment: with some of the Kachin guerrillas as a nucleus,

a force approximately 3,000 strong was organized into four battalions. The Japanese, however, had evidently not been told that this was to be a mopping-up operation; it resulted in some of our bloodiest fighting of the war. In less than three months the Detachment's forces killed over 1,200 Japanese and suffered more than 300 killed in action themselves, far more than in any other period. When the escape route to Thailand had been secured, Detachment 101 was inactivated. This was 12 July 1945.

Requirements and Collection

Intelligence requirements on the Detachment stemmed from a variety of sources. Tactical information was required chiefly by Headquarters NCAC, its subordinate commands, and the 10th Air Force, but requests were also received from the British 14th Army and Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia. Information of a strategic type would be requested by higher OSS headquarters, CBI Theater Headquarters, and the allied Strategic Air Command under General Stratemyer in Calcutta. Detachment 101 itself required information of all varieties for planning and conducting its field operations.

With the NCAC, broad intelligence requirements were normally received from the Commanding General in conference. Specific requests came through the Detachment's liaison officer maintained on his G-2 staff. The same general procedures obtained with the 10th Air Force. On the basis of these requirements, along with all others, an intelligence plan would be drawn up, outlining the information to be obtained, the probable target areas, and the likely sources. If sources were already available in the target area, they could simply be asked for the information through normal communication channels. When sources were not available, it was necessary either to adjust operations to obtain the information or to plan new intelligence operations, for which indigenous personnel would have to be recruited, trained, and infiltrated.

The infiltration of agent personnel into proposed areas of operation was effected by parachute or light aircraft or along land routes. The infiltration procedures were in general similar to those used in other theaters of war; but there was one

device we employed that involved a unique use of pigeons. Each agent parachuted behind the lines had attached to him a small bamboo cage just large enough to hold a pigeon by which he could report the condition of the radio that had been dropped along with him. After the agent had landed, cleared the drop zone, and had an opportunity to test his radio, he would release the pigeon, preferably near daylight, with a coded message either indicating that all was well or giving instructions when and where to drop another one. For ranges up to two or three hundred miles the pigeons were highly reliable; beyond 400 miles their dependability decreased rapidly.

The intelligence requirements levied on the Detachment were such that almost anything taking place behind the enemy lines was of interest. Primary emphasis was placed upon military information, such items as the strength, identity, and movement of Japanese units, details on supply installations, airfields, and equipment, and whatever else was required to provide a continuous, composite picture of the enemy situation. Much terrain information was also reported, principally on the condition of roads and railroads, the water level and fordability of streams, and the location of potential airfields and drop zones. Since most of the Detachment's personnel were indigenous to the area and intimately familiar with its physiography, this information was rather easy to assemble and report. Economic, sociological, and political intelligence was also in great demand in higher OSS headquarters in the theater, in such agencies as OWI for psychological warfare operations, and in air units for pilot briefing and survival training. It was also needed by the Detachment itself both for morale operations aimed at psychological subversion and for developing agent cover.

The main sources of information were the numerous intelligence agents trained at the Assam base or in the field. Each major field unit had an intelligence officer, usually an American but in some instances a foreign officer or an indigenous recruit trained for the position, whose principal duties were to interrogate captured enemy soldiers or agents, debrief guerrilla personnel, and direct the activities of the espionage agents assigned to the unit. Intelligence personnel at the forward operational headquarters and at the base camp were

also engaged in collecting information, principally through interrogation of prisoners and debriefing of operational personnel returned from the field.

Weather and Air Targets

In conjunction with Air Weather Service of 10th Air Force, the Detachment developed a capability for collecting and reporting weather data. The Weather Service provided the equipment, instruction, and weather codes. These were given to selected agents who were then so dispersed, singly or with other groups, that in the aggregate they provided coverage of all of central and northern Burma. According to the A-2, 10th Air Force, this service was of considerable assistance in developing meteorological forecasts for cargo flights over the "hump" and for tactical air operations in northern Burma.

Of especial interest were some of the procedures used in reporting air targets for the 10th Air Force. In the lower reaches of the Hukawng Valley an intelligence agent worked out some simple but ingenious ways to pinpoint and report Japanese supply installations concealed by dense jungle foliage. One method was to select a landmark such as a trail junction, bridge, or prominent tree which could be identified readily on an air photo or by the pilot of the fighter-bomber aircraft. From the landmark the location of the target was given by polar coordinates (distance along a given azimuth). Another method was to lead the pilot from such a landmark to the target by a series of reference points.

Numerous Japanese installations located by these means were bombed or strafed without the pilot being able to see his target; huge explosions or fires erupting through the trees would indicate a successful attack. The Japanese knew that something was amiss. Since the targets were completely hidden from the air, they deduced that the attacks were being directed from the ground and suspected the Kachins. They accordingly restricted entry to their supply areas and would shoot a Kachin on sight. To protect the Kachins these operations had to be suspended for a time.

In the later phase of the Burma campaign procedures were worked out with the 10th Air Force for immediate air strikes against targets of opportunity. Pilots flying air alert and

agents on the ground were given duplicate sets of air photos with a special grid superimposed. To obtain action against a target the agent would send a coded radio message specifying the type of target and its grid location to the Detachment's forward operations headquarters, located in the immediate vicinity of Headquarters NCAC and the 10th Air Force. 10th Air Force would relay this to the pilot in the aircraft, and after a normal elapsed time of 20 to 30 minutes from the origination of the message an air strike would be made on the target.

Transmission Channels

To expedite the flow of intelligence to user agencies the Detachment established comprehensive handling and transmission procedures. All messages from the field came in to the forward operations headquarters, where field operations were coordinated by an operations officer and a staff including members of the morale operations, intelligence, resistance, and other sections. The intelligence personnel on the operations staff screened all incoming information. If it was of an urgent nature, it was given a hasty evaluation and immediately dispatched to the using agency. Other intelligence messages were routed to the intelligence section for review and subsequent transmission to user agencies on a routine basis.

Detachment 101 had liaison groups with each of the major combat commands it supported—NCAC, 10th Air Force, British 14th Army, and ALFSEA. These officers represented the Detachment in all operational matters, an arrangement that served to enhance their stature and give them considerable prestige in their intelligence dealings within the headquarters. Intelligence-wise, they were responsible for accepting information requests from the headquarters and forwarding them to the Detachment, for passing information and intelligence received from the Detachment on to the intelligence staff, and for representing the Detachment in all other intelligence matters. Information was transmitted to NCAC and the 10th Air Force by teletype and could be moved most rapidly. The communication link with 14th Army and ALFSEA was radio, which required additional time for coding and transmission; the elapsed time, however, was sufficiently small that it could be measured in terms of minutes.

Field liaison groups were also maintained with the Chinese 1st and 6th Armies, the British 36th Division, and the Mars Task Force, which had succeeded Merrill's Marauders. These liaison groups were small, normally consisting of one officer (generally one with considerable field experience) and a radio operator. They performed intelligence functions comparable to those of the higher headquarters liaison groups.

The intelligence transmitted via radio and teletype was summarized and supplemented in the Detachment's weekly and monthly situation reports, distributed through ordinary military messenger service. These were given fairly wide distribution in the theater, going to approximately 100 agencies.

Reliability and Security

Detachment personnel concerned with the evaluation of information arrived at some unusual conclusions. They found, for example, that information reported by the Kachins was generally highly accurate, but that their reports of enemy strength were almost invariably about three times the actual figures. Strength reporting was then stressed in the training program to the extent that the pendulum swung the other way, and the strengths given in Kachin agent reports were so underestimated that they had to be increased by a factor of three. It was not until the winter of 1944-45 that it was possible to obtain reliable strength figures from Kachin personnel. Other ethnic groups were found to have comparable traits, more or less uniform within each group. The evaluators developed correction factors for the Shans, Chins, Burmese, Padaungs, and even the remnants which had remained behind in Burma from the original Chinese Expeditionary Force. All of these groups overestimated strengths, but the Chinese grossly exaggerated them. Their strength figures had to be reduced approximately ten times, and this practice remained constant to the end of the campaign.

The Detachment's counterintelligence operations were purely defensive, designed to protect it and its field operations from infiltration by enemy agents. The number of counterintelligence personnel assigned was consistently small, 3 to 5. They arranged for the physical security of base installations and for the indoctrination of U.S. and indigenous personnel.

The indoctrination was concerned principally with the methods used by Japanese agents to penetrate and mislead allied clandestine operations and with means for isolating such agents. Counterintelligence functions in the field were the responsibility of the Area Commander or Group Leader in charge of a unit. As a general rule the commander relied mainly on his intelligence officer to ferret out enemy agents, uncover double agents, and of course determine what should be done with them. The Detachment attempted to make all personnel security- and counterintelligence-conscious for their own benefit and to avoid attracting undue attention to the clandestine activity. As a result, the security of the Detachment and its operations, despite some minor infractions, was very good. Not a single agent or operation was known to have been eliminated through enemy intelligence penetration.

Appraisal

Detachment 101's two principal intelligence consumers made attempts to weigh its intelligence contribution to the northern Burma campaign. G-2, NCAC, estimated that it provided between 80% and 90% of all of the combat intelligence utilized by that headquarters. The 10th Air Force reported that it furnished up to 70% of its usable information and designated between 90% and 95% of its air targets. In addition, the Detachment was one of the principal sources of bomb damage assessment information for the 10th Air Force and for SAC. No attempts were made to measure the intelligence contributed to other headquarters, but letters of appreciation showed that it was welcome and considerable. This intelligence was also an indispensable ingredient in the development of the Detachment's own resistance and other clandestine operations.

Units comparable to Detachment 101 collected information behind the lines in France, Italy, the Philippines, China, and other areas. In the aggregate they represented an immense intelligence capability of a type for which, if there should be another war, there would in all probability be a strong requirement. Each of these operations, however, experienced growing pains, and there was a lag time of from one to two years before they were able to produce tangible results. It would be highly desirable, therefore, that the personnel who

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may be used in such operations in the future should be so oriented, trained, and organized that this critical lag could be minimized. How this is to be accomplished appears as a pressing and continuous problem for the intelligence community.

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Academic studies in international relations might usefully be supplemented by a course in intelligence processes.

FOR COLLEGE COURSES IN INTELLIGENCE

The transition in the U.S. national posture accomplished during the first half of this century, from a seeking of security in isolation to recognition that our national welfare depends upon active participation in international politics, had its corollary in the academic world. Many non-government organizations, foundations, universities, and colleges have played an important role in increasing the public knowledge and administrative skills prerequisite to effective U.S. action in the international arena. A wide variety of new courses and entire schools have been devoted to foreign affairs and international relations, and additional ones still continue to be established.

The new public interest in global matters has by and large, however, not been extended to intelligence and the principles and processes by which it is prepared. At the end of World War II there was, to be sure, the debate about Allied intelligence in the Bulge, the congressional inquiry into the Pearl Harbor surprise, and a good deal of general regret for the lack of pre-war interest in intelligence, to which General Eisenhower contributed with comments in *Crusade in Europe*. But this kind of soul-searching was confined largely to official circles. In the academic world, I believe, U.S. intelligence is treated only in its strictly military aspect, in specialized ROTC courses. There have been academic studies dramatizing business espionage¹ and some pedagogical treatment of research methods applicable in intelligence, but no college training in the subject as a coordinated whole.

There are good reasons why this has been so. Intelligence traditionally and for the most part necessarily does its work behind the scenes, and its influence on the national welfare seldom strikes the public eye. Nor does this country have be-

¹For example *Competitive Intelligence*, by students at the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A46.

hind it the centuries of international leadership which developed the acknowledged British competence in intelligence and made the British public proud of it. Now that the United States has come to occupy the center of the international scene, the role of intelligence is well recognized among officials of the government; public interest and academic concern have yet to be awakened.

There are signs of a public awakening, however. Commentators showed concern over faltering intelligence on Chinese Communist participation in the Korean War, on the strength of the Ho Chi Minh forces in Indochina, and on the British-French-Israeli Suez venture. More recently a persistent and widespread discussion of intelligence processes has been set off by the Senate inquiry into the "missiles gap." Cartoonist Berryman's J. Q. Public, worried by the intelligence estimates controversy and saying, "I wish someone would explain it to me," seems to represent truly a deep interest and a legitimate requirement of the U.S. citizen. The U-2 incident and its repercussions at the summit are certain to give this interest a new impetus.

It is the thesis of this paper that the awakening public concern with intelligence offers our universities and colleges an opportunity and a challenge—the opportunity to take advantage of a rising interest and to meet a clear need, and the challenge to meet it effectively and thereby ultimately contribute to improving U.S. intelligence doctrine and competence.

It is suggested that a good beginning could be made by establishing a basic course of study in the meaning of intelligence, its significance as the foundation for policy planning and a guide for operations, how it plays those roles, and the principles and processes by which it is produced and formulated. Such a course should not be narrowed to the specialties of political or military intelligence, but develop broad principles applicable in all fields. It should highlight the concept of intelligence and intelligence processes as a critical factor in almost every form of human social endeavor—economic, scientific, and cultural, as well as military and political—being essentially a processing and use of facts and a making of judgments in a logical program for a specific purpose.

The intelligence course would apply the teachings of many academic disciplines. Specialists in economics, politics, sociology, and logic, in written, oral, and visual presentation could among others be used in the instruction. The program should be framed and guided, however, by a competent teacher with extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience, not merely a few years in some particular intelligence field. The course would need to run through two semesters at three class hours per week, and should be offered to students at the graduate or at least immediately pregraduate level. Lectures should be minimized in favor of reading, discussion, conferences, and practical exercises. It would not be proposed in this basic course to cover the history of intelligence or to go deeply into special problems involved in the guiding of the intelligence effort by its users and its application in the conduct of operations. Some of these subjects could be incorporated into existing courses in international affairs, others would be left to separate advanced courses as the program developed.

The course in intelligence fundamentals, taken by the student at point of maturity, would have the broad educational advantage of employing and expanding his earlier learning and making it meaningful within a single coordinated, purposeful program. It would be of direct value to students contemplating government service, whether in intelligence or elsewhere, and of cogent interest to the intellectually inquisitive heading for careers in most fields of private enterprise. More importantly, perhaps, since our government is one responsive to the will of informed citizens, it would provide an indispensable ingredient to those studies of the policy-making and decision-reaching process which presently loom so centrally in university courses devoted to creating an informed citizenry in the fields of public administration, foreign affairs, and international relations.

All too generally such courses treat only the policies made and the mechanisms through which they are effected. The heart of effectiveness, however, in public administration or the conduct of international affairs is the making of sound decisions, and these must be based on what in broad sense we call intelligence. In present curricula the student seldom has the opportunity to learn what kinds of raw materials are

needed or how they are collected and consolidated to give the unitary understanding essential in formulating sound plans and guiding their execution.

Even a prospective business executive should learn not only the principles of economics, commercial and industrial organization, corporate finance, and the other usual subjects, but also what kinds of facts he needs to know in applying these principles and how such facts can be collected, evaluated, and consolidated for use in planning. Study of the intelligence process can bring home to him the need to take into consideration kinds of factors of which he might otherwise not be aware. For the student in foreign relations the study of the production and use of intelligence is of more immediate application, bringing out the importance of factors such as cultural differences, economics, and religion, which present college courses rarely treat in a meaningful way. In short, such study should round out a student's understanding of his chosen field, no matter whether it lies in sociology, politics, or business, and help him to become the kind of citizen demanded by the role this country must now play on the stormy international scene.

The Soviets see in us an undifferentiated and repugnant threat to their security, much like Soviet espionage and subversion in U.S. eyes.

SOVIET PUBLICISTS TALK ABOUT U. S. INTELLIGENCE

Peter Deriabin, in *The Secret World*,¹ recalls that an old Soviet pamphlet on the subject of U.S. intelligence treats the CIA, CIC, Naval and Air Intelligence, and even the FBI as components of a single organization. This concept is entirely in accord with the standard Soviet public attitude, which regards U.S. intelligence as a distinct service or function in which many different U.S. government and private agencies may participate at one phase or another. The Soviets most often, therefore, refer generically to "U.S. intelligence," ignoring the niceties of bureaucratic organization. When they do mention individual components of the intelligence community, they are likely to blur or confuse their operational roles. If this imprecision seems a deliberate device to permit indiscriminate name-calling or to hide what they do know about U.S. intelligence organization, one should recall that U.S. citizens, officials, and even intelligence officers are likely to discriminate poorly among the several Soviet intelligence agencies, which have nevertheless been thoroughly described in Deriabin's book and others.

Spies of the State Department

The espionage activities of U.S. intelligence are generally depicted as being carried out under the guidance and direction of the State Department by virtually every group or individual that deals in any way with foreign governments or peoples. Several Soviet sources have recently described the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research as "the liaison link between striped-pants diplomats and the cloak-and-dagger personnel abroad." All U.S. embassy personnel are presumed to be involved in espionage activities directed against the Soviet Bloc. A Kozev article in *Pravda* alleged that Gen-

¹ Doubleday, 1959. Reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 109.

eral Bedell "Smith's guidance [of the Moscow Embassy] was notably distinguished by the fact that he forced literally every single member of the staff, down to the last clerk and regardless of the department in which he was employed, to engage in intelligence work."

The Soviets see verification of the relationship between diplomacy and espionage in such facts as General Smith's having been posted, after his tenure as Ambassador to the USSR, first to CIA and then to State, in Admiral Kirk's position in Naval Intelligence prior to his assignment as Ambassador to Moscow and his subsequent chairmanship of the American Committee for Liberation, and of course in the teaming of the Dulles brothers at the head of the twin foreign affairs agencies. Over the past eight years Soviet spokesmen have frequently quoted Annabelle Bucar's *The Truth about American Diplomats*,² particularly the examples she gives to show that "intelligence agents are sent to the USSR under various guises: as counsellors, second and third secretaries, attachés, and even ordinary clerks." Khrushchev's 9 May 1960 remark at the Czechoslovak Embassy exculpating Ambassador Thompson of complicity in the U-2 incident was a benign exception to the general view that there is no cleavage between U.S. diplomats and U.S. espionage.

A book by I. Nikitinsky, *The Perfidious Methods of the Subversive Activity of Imperialist Intelligence Services*,³ comments on the excellent espionage training given U.S. diplomats. It says that the student body at Columbia University's Russian Institute is made up primarily of Foreign Service officers, cadets from West Point, and students from the Naval Academy, and that the Universities of Indiana and Pennsylvania, Yale, and the Air Force School at Syracuse University have similar spy-training programs.

The State Department is also considered the focal point for espionage against the USSR done by official and unofficial groupings as diverse as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, MSA, ICA, IBRD, the Jehovah Witnesses, the Rand Corporation, the Vatican, the IRO, journalists, correspondents, and

² Republished in the Soviet Union by *Literary Gazette* in 1950.

³ Moscow, 1954.

many others. Moscow University students have been cautioned particularly against tourists, "50 percent of which are spies connected in one way or another with American intelligence." A 4 February 1960 *Red Star* article on the "U.S. espionage octopus" pointed out to Army personnel that "American intelligence employs military attachés, diplomats, and other official and unofficial observers as spies." Such warnings were given with increasing frequency as East-West exchanges and tourism were expanded.

In general, the Soviet military press carries more material on U.S. intelligence activities than say *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, with the obvious purpose of maintaining a high state of counter-espionage alert within the Soviet military. Although U.S. military attachés are described as the main link to the intelligence organs of the armed forces, the distinction between military and other intelligence is generally presented, as by a 13 March 1959 *Red Star* article, as a purely functional breakdown: the military attachés are primarily concerned with military dispositions and technology, whereas others spy out political and economic matters.

During the past year the Soviets have taken increasing notice of U.S. intelligence collection by scientific and technological means. References to electronic devices for monitoring Soviet rocket tests and the launching of earth satellites, to the pilotless SD-3, and to project "Sentry" for using earth satellites to photograph Russian territory have been published. Discussions of scientific espionage are sometimes introduced by quoting Mr. Dulles' 15 October 1959 statement in New York, "We feel that the scientific side of intelligence collection should be emphasized to the point where radar and electronics tend to take the place of the wiles of the Mata Hari of several decades ago."

These warnings and other propaganda alerting the people to U.S. espionage activity are addressed chiefly to those who might disclose classified information unwittingly, rather than to the few "bourgeois degenerates" who would deliberately betray state secrets. A typical story is that of a young Soviet flyer on a train who got involved in a discussion of the relative merits of Soviet and foreign aircraft. Out of patriotic pride and in order to show off his knowledge, he cited Soviet

advances that were classified information and even described aircraft in the testing stage. One of the passengers on the train took little part in the conversation, but occasionally expressed doubts about the young flyer's knowledge in a way that incited him to even more revelations. This quiet man, of course, was a U.S. agent.

Cutthroats of CIA

Several Soviet publicists have recently commented at length on CIA activities, particularly in connection with H. H. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*,⁴ which has obviously been carefully studied by responsible officials in the Soviet Union. An April 1959 *New Times* article by J. Yudin quotes data from the book on the new CIA building, the number of buildings currently occupied, the number of employees, an estimate of the total budget (\$2 billion), and some of the functions of CIA.

Although these commentators take note of its role as coordinator of intelligence, CIA is normally presented primarily as the agency responsible for planning and carrying out subversive activities in the USSR and other Bloc countries, for the direction of psychological warfare campaigns, and for paramilitary operations related to the East-West struggle in the non-Communist world. The Soviet citizen is given the picture of a dangerous and wily adversary willing to stop at nothing to recruit agents, train them, and give them weapons, explosives, poison, money, false papers, and other equipment for organizing subversion in the Soviet camp. These operations have a dual purpose—an economic one, to disrupt the work of industrial and agricultural components, and a political one, to prepare revolts, rebellions, street riots, and general disorder. It is said that CIA subversion was a major contributing factor in the Berlin riots and in the Hungarian revolt, and that such operations are not carried out without the knowledge of the high diplomats in U.S. embassies.

CIA's clandestine activities are ascribed variously to its "Secret Operations Branch," its "Department of Dirty Tricks," or its "Department of Covert Activities." The overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala is cited as the prime

⁴ Cambridge, 1958. Reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* II 4, p. 79.

example of such activities outside the Bloc, with the coup against Mossadegh in Iran a regular second. The Moscow broadcast of a recent *Neues Deutschland* article on CIA adds "two new examples which are fresh in our mind: Jordan, where the coup succeeded, and Syria, where it failed." The attempted assassinations of Togliatti, Duclos, and Tokuda and the murder of Julien Lahaut, however, were attributed generally to imperialist intelligence services, not to CIA.

Soviet sources refer frequently to the recruitment and use of defectors as agents against the Bloc. Since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act in October 1951, CIA is presented as having inexhaustible funds for this purpose. Propagandists constantly refer to the \$100,000,000 granted by the Kersten Amendment and imply that the figure has increased since that time. It has also been alleged that large U.S. monopolies such as DuPont and General Motors spend \$350,000,000 annually for subversion and that the AFL provides \$100,000 every month for U.S. intelligence. Occasionally an essayist seeks to sort out the roles of U.S. private and governmental agencies in subversive work: in the February 1957 *International Affairs* K. Ivanov distinguishes among the CIA, CIC, ICA, Office of Special Warfare, and USIA, and among the several foundations, the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee for Liberation, etc., noting that they are all coordinated by the OCB.

A book by P. Yakhlakov, *Vigilance is the Tested Weapon of the Soviet People*, describes U.S. subversive activities as the work of unscrupulous people who recruit "gangsters, pimps, criminals, and bandits from the dregs of society for whom espionage and subversion are a means of livelihood and profit." Several books and newspaper articles have referred to an alleged statement in late 1951 by C. D. Jackson, then described as the leader of the fascist organization Committee for a Free Europe: "We need the support of cutthroats and hoodlums, as many as we can recruit." The procedure is typically described as follows: U.S. intelligence agents screen displaced persons who are detained by force under miserable conditions in refugee camps in West Germany. All kinds of pressure, including deceit, bribery, and blackmail, are applied against these people to compel them to carry out subversive activity

against their homeland. Selected persons are then sent to the village of Bad Wiese near Munich where they are taught the arts of sabotage, terror, espionage and murder. When their training is completed they are given the necessary equipment and dropped by parachute from unmarked American aircraft over the Ukraine. They are instructed to get into Kiev and use whatever means are necessary, including murder, to obtain genuine Soviet documentation. Then they are to get into touch by radio with the American espionage center in West Germany for further instructions regarding espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

Soviet publicists also charge CIA with psychological warfare operations, of which the Free Europe Committee is seen as the archtype, and apparently quite dangerous. The Yudin article of April 1959 says that CIA provides about three-quarters of the funds for the Committee. Another CIA function in Soviet eyes is to oversee and subsidize the intelligence services of other Western governments, but published statements on this subject are vague and propagandistic. The West German intelligence service is most frequently cited as closely tied to CIA. The recent *Neues Deutschland* commentary on CIA had the establishment of a West German center for psychological warfare originating "in the CIA manure pile." "The espionage-sabotage service of the Hitlerite intelligence officer, Reinhard Gehlen, lives on American dollars under the guardianship of Dulles' CIA," says an article by V. Makhov in a 1957 collection, *About Those Who Are Against Peace*.

The ten-page Makhov article is probably the most detailed and comprehensive description of CIA and its works in the open Soviet literature. It expounds all the themes enumerated above, illustrating them—with characteristic organizational imprecision—from press reports of General Donovan's activities in Thailand and during the Hungarian revolution, from published U.S. allusions to Ambassador Peurifoy's and Allen Dulles' part in the Guatemalan coup, and from confessions of former members of "Dulles' full division of agents" who have been apprehended behind the iron curtain. It includes a biography of the evil genius Dulles himself, stressing his Wall Street background and his status as an agent for the monopolists in all foreign and military affairs from

insuring the domination of U.S. capital abroad to establishing naval strength ratios. It affirms, on the basis of captured Nazi Foreign Ministry documents and other evidence, that his chief wartime mission in Switzerland was to see to the preservation of German economic and military might as a bulwark against the USSR.

Analysis, Estimates, and the Shaping of Policy

The very little that is published in the USSR on the U.S. intelligence community's estimative function is cast in tones of satire and belittlement. In a recent example, an article by Leontyev in the 31 January 1960 issue of *Red Star*, entitled "The Spies Count Rockets," noted Defense Secretary Gates' statement on Soviet ICBM capabilities and said that his information was derived through the following calculations: "There are five crows sitting on one fence and three crows sitting on another fence. Now, how many rockets does the Soviet Union have?" More generally the Soviets take the line that our ability to estimate their capabilities accurately is impeded by our preconceptions and by our inability to see the world situation in realistic terms.

The Nikitinsky book cited above mentions that "sociologists, historians, economists, geographers, transportation and communication engineers, and other 'scholars' are . . . a part of the western intelligence service." These so-called scholars are said to have sold themselves to U.S. intelligence and bound themselves to carry out assignments on the demand of their masters. This and other such statements imply that academic or intellectual elements in the community merely prove what they are told to prove without any attempt to arrive at logically reasoned conclusions. The Soviets do not present the U.S. intelligence community or any part of it as an intellectual organization.

But they leave no doubt that the intelligence community, and CIA in particular, wields a critical influence in the formation of U.S. policy, for "every step a government takes is determined by the nature and the slant of the intelligence information it receives," and U.S. intelligence is an integral part of the Wall Street machinery that determines foreign policy. The Yudin article cited above says that Allen Dulles,

“though normally only an advisor to the National Security Council, has become the chief figure in all its deliberations.” Several Soviet publicists have quoted a *Washington Post* article to the effect that “CIA serves as a refuge for dare-devil cutthroats. . . . Through their activities they can start the ball rolling in the field of foreign policy.” The 1955 summit conference had hardly ended, Makhov says, when Allen Dulles demanded that there be no yielding to the spirit of Geneva.

This Soviet view of the effect of intelligence on policy is consonant with that of the relationship between their own policy-making and intelligence organs. There was more than just scapegoating in Soviet statements that Beria, operating in his capacity as an intelligence chief, was primarily responsible for the rupture in relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. And Soviet spokesmen’s treatment of the exposure of U.S. overflights in its effect on the summit conference epitomizes their distrust of the force that intelligence activities exert on the framing and carrying out of national policy.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

INTELLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A Non-Communist Manifesto. By *W. W. Rostow*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1960. Pp. 179. Cloth \$3.75, paper \$1.45. Also London: Cambridge University Press. 1960.)

This is an important book. Professor Rostow's thoughtful and imaginative study takes the masses of discrete facts that have marked the development of the many modern national economies and puts them into a single common framework. In the course of identifying and defining five progressive stages of development applicable to all the individual cases, the author presents not only a general theory of the economic growth of nations but also a synthesis of modern history. His work is more than provocative analysis of the past, however, for its concepts have also the predictive value of sound scientific theory.

The analysis is built around the proposition that the economic activity of any nation at a given time can be identified as falling within one of these stages—the inertia of the traditional society, fulfillment of the preconditions for takeoff, the takeoff, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. The traditional society is described as one in which per capita production is limited by inability or failure to use modern technology in any systematic fashion. Traditional societies in general concentrate most of their human and capital resources on agriculture; the resultant social structure is quite rigid, and people are resigned and fatalistic about long-run prospects for improving the levels of living.

The transition to sustained economic growth is preceded by a period in which the preconditions for takeoff are met. In this second stage the ideas and institutions making for modernization gain, not necessarily the upper hand, but first toleration and then enough freedom of action to initiate and

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sustain a process of economic transformation. Some of the more important of the complex variety of preconditions are a change in value judgments involving the acceptance of economic progress as a desirable goal, the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs, and the creation of institutions for the mobilization of savings. Probably most important is the establishment of an effective centralized national state.¹

The third stage, the takeoff, is "the great watershed in the life of modern societies." At this point the forces making for economic progress achieve critical mass. Rapid growth occurs in a few key sectors of the economy. Investment increases from 5 to 10 percent or more of national income. New techniques power the rapidly growing manufacturing sector and penetrate the agricultural sector as well. In short, growth becomes the normal condition and is sustained by dynamic forces, irreversible as the loss of innocence.

Some 60 years after takeoff, with surprising uniformity, the modern economies have reached maturity, a stage defined as one in which they demonstrate the ability to apply advanced technology over the total range of their activities. Then follows finally the stage of high mass consumption, where the leading sectors shift toward the production of durable consumers' goods and services. The decisive element in this stage, the author notes, has historically been the quantity production of inexpensive automobiles, with its concomitant revolutionary social and economic effects.

Professor Rostow emphasizes that there is nothing preordained about a society's passage through these conceptual stages of growth: at every stage it is confronted with fundamental policy choices, and making these choices is an exer-

¹ Professor Rostow and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have expanded their analysis of the preconditions period—perhaps the most crucial one in economic growth, requiring a vast array of economic and non-economic changes in the traditional society—in a study prepared for the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Economic, Social and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for U. S. Policy" (86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D. C., 1960).

cise in value judgments far outside the province of economic analysis. In the author's words:

The stages of growth are not a set of rigid, inevitable, predetermined phases of history. The process of growth imposes for men and societies certain problems and possibilities from which they must choose, and modern history can be viewed as the consequences of choices made by various societies at various stages of growth.

The erection of an alternative rational framework into which the history since 1700 of all nations may be fitted inevitably clashes with the dogma of Communism, and the final chapter of this book is therefore devoted to a comparison between Karl Marx's construction of history and the stages-of-growth concept. Writing 120 years after Marx, Professor Rostow has an enormous advantage in the experience of the many nations which during that interval have developed their economies to the point of high mass consumption. Marx's predictions about the future evolution of industrial capitalist societies, based on the single experience of the United Kingdom's drive to maturity, have not been borne out, and the Marxist-Leninist alternative to capitalism is appraised here as follows:

Communism is by no means the only form of effective state organization that can consolidate the preconditions in the transition of a traditional society, launch a takeoff, and drive a society to technological maturity . . . Communism takes its place . . . as one peculiarly inhumane form of political organization capable of launching and sustaining the growth process in societies where the preconditions period did not yield a substantial and enterprising commercial middle class and an adequate political consensus among the leaders of the society. It is a kind of disease which can befall a traditional society if it fails to organize effectively those elements within it which are prepared to get on with the job of modernization.

Such a disenchanting appraisal could not be expected to bring approving shouts of agreement from the Kremlin. The Rostow thesis was formally denounced in a *Pravda* article ("Snipe in the Bog," October 19, 1959), for its failure to take account of the class struggle and of social formations. This criticism of the stages-of-growth theory is simply untrue, as its author, Mr. Yuri Zhukov, head of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, undoubtedly

knows. His party-line invective may, however, reflect a genuine concern at the appearance of this new, persuasive theory of economic development. The men in the Kremlin know that many decisions fateful for the future of the world are not being made in Moscow or Washington, but in capitals like Karachi, Conakry, Djakarta, and Cairo. They are also aware, from their experience in the spread of the Communist ideology, of the truth of the late Lord Keynes' observation:

Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.²

The Rostow thesis has also been attacked from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum for its emphasis on the important role the state must play in economic development. See, for example, Professor David McCord Wright's criticisms in the December 1959 *Fortune*. To those who believe strongly that free enterprise provides the only true path to growth, Professor Rostow's proposition that the vital entrepreneurial spark can come from either the public or private sectors is pure heresy. Thus we find the crux of denunciation from the strange bedfellows of extreme right and left to fall on the author's conclusion that there are many institutional roads to sustained economic growth.

This bare outline of the stages-of-growth argument and the kinds of criticism levied at it gives some indication of the significance of the Rostow thesis for intelligence. First, as a scholarly challenge to the Marxist economic interpretation of history and a solid refutation of many of the key myths in Communist lore, this could be one of the most influential books of our time. For those who are actively working to see that the newly emerging, fragile nations of Asia and Africa follow a non-Communist course of development, the Rostow thesis, with its impressive historical documentation, offers a powerful weapon to combat the central challenge of our time. The book should receive the widest dissemination among the intellectual elite, in and out of government, of those countries setting out on the path of modernization.

²John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York, 1936) p. 383.

Secondly, for those engaged in the reporting and preparation of current intelligence and the making of estimates on nations in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Professor Rostow has forged a theoretical framework for thinking logically about national economic growth. Some of his descriptive characterizations of the individual stages of growth—the preconditions stage and the takeoff, for example—are already a part of the language of economists grappling with problems of economic development.

The first publication of Professor Rostow's views came after his relevant lecture series at Cambridge in the autumn of 1958. The fact that they have stirred up a furious international debate in this short period of time is eloquent testimony not only to their stimulating content but also to their effectiveness in challenging certain aspects of conventional economic wisdom on both sides of the iron curtain.

INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY STRATEGY

THE TURN OF THE TIDE—1939–1943. By *Arthur Bryant*.
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co. 1957. Pp. 624.
\$6.95.)

TRIUMPH IN THE WEST—1943–1946. By *Arthur Bryant*.
(Garden City: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 438. \$6.95.)

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee during the critical war years, made a careful and detailed entry in his diary every day. This diary forms the basis for these two volumes aggregating more than a thousand pages. British historian Arthur Bryant has indexed it, edited out superfluous material, and provided continuity as necessary.

To say that this work will be a treasure house for the historians of World War II is putting it mildly. Here are chronicled among other things the conflicts between the British and the American strategy, with the British viewpoint, of course, dominant and convincingly laid out. From the beginning there was a constant struggle over the date when the invasion of Europe should be mounted, the Americans pressing for an earlier assault. Then followed disagreement on how the German armies should be destroyed, the British urging an offensive across the north German plains. And throughout all, until the collapse of Germany, there was the issue of getting what the British considered sufficient strength in Europe in the face of U.S. pressures for devoting more resources to the Pacific.

If Montgomery's autobiography was blunt in expressing his thoughts about American inadequacies, the Alanbrooke diary is even blunter, particularly in its comments about General Eisenhower and other revered American leaders. And Alanbrooke will be taken more seriously than the flamboyant Montgomery. He was an extraordinarily able Chief of Staff for the British, one of few who could have done so well.

For the student of intelligence, there is considerable material to be found in these volumes for the searching. Alanbrooke is no great admirer of intelligence; he grumbles sev-

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eral times about having to labor through JIC "appreciations" and about the inadequacies of information on enemy activities and intentions. Intelligence being not an end in itself, however, the rich insights conveyed here into its end products and end uses will be important to any more detailed analyses that may be made of intelligence successes and failures in World War II, and of how intelligence was utilized by the commanders.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. By *Oskar Morgenstern*. (New York: Random House. 1959. Pp. 306. \$3.95.)

As its title implies, this book examines national defense policy in the missile age, in particular the relative vulnerabilities of fixed and mobile defenses. The author, described as a consultant to various defense groups, must be presumed to speak with more than academic authority, and his analysis is clear and well written. He makes a very strong case for mobile defenses—or perhaps one should say retaliatory forces—specifically, pending the advent of a mobile ICBM with solid fuel, for the Polaris submarine and an airborne SAC.

Professor Morgenstern devotes one chapter of about forty pages exclusively to intelligence, making a practical comparison between the problems facing U.S. intelligence in Soviet security barriers and other circumstances and the relative ease with which the Communists get information on the United States. Here his analysis lacks sophistication: Dr. Morgenstern has given too much credence to what he reads in the press or hears on the cocktail circuit without checking it against the facts. The chapter is nevertheless correct in its main thesis and should despite its inaccuracies be of help to the lay reader.

FREELY I SERVED. By *Stanislaw Sosabowski*. (London: William Kimber. 1960. Pp. 203. 25/—.)

There are two matters of intelligence interest in these contentious memoirs of the man who conceived and built up in the UK the Polish Parachute Brigade and commanded it in the lost battle of Arnhem. The first is the boldness of his suc-

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cessful devices for avoiding arrest in his underground work and escape from Poland in the confusion after Warsaw's fall in 1939. The other is his opinion that the major cause of the Arnhem fiasco, more decisive even than Eisenhower's "dilatoriness" and the blunders of all the British commanders involved, was the failure of intelligence on the German strength in the area and its probable reaction to the assault on the Rhine bridges.

General Sosabowski presents a viewpoint which of course is lost in the Eisenhower, Montgomery, and other British-American accounts; but he would have done well to employ a ruthless editor to weed out personal trivia and damp the I-knew-better-but-they-wouldn't-listen and I-didn't-want-to-be-a-personnel-problem-but-I-had-to-stand-up-for-Polish-rights tone of many passages.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

THE NILI SPIES. By *Anita Engle*. (London: Hogarth Press. 1959. Pp. 245. 25/—.)

From the remote past to modern times, from Rahab at the fall of Jericho to Ethel Rosenberg in World War II, women have engaged in some of history's most spectacular espionage. An analytical study might reveal that women, directly or indirectly, had more radically changed the course of history through their clandestine efforts than men. Certainly Sarah Aaronsohn, the field leader of the Nili spies, belongs to the category of strong-willed history makers from the weaker sex. She has not yet become a legendary figure only for lack of public knowledge of her deeds.

The Nili spies, who took their code name from the initial letters of the biblical phrase *Netzach Israel lo Ishikare*—"The eternity of Israel will not fail"—were a dedicated group of early Zionists engaged in haphazardly courageous endeavor to save the Yishuv, the Jewish colony in the Turkish province of Palestine, from oppression and destruction during World War I. They hoped by collecting detailed and timely intelligence on the situation in the province to catalyze the inertia of British Headquarters at Cairo into an early military action which would liberate it. Sarah and her brother Aaron believed, long before the Balfour Declaration and the concept of a Mandate Authority, that once Palestine was under British control British law, order, and humanity would eventually permit the establishment of a homeland for the Jews.

Upon the outbreak of war in 1914, Aaron Aaronsohn, a botanist who had achieved considerable fame, especially in German and American academic circles, for his rediscovery of wild wheat, founded the Nili underground espionage organization with the object of sending intelligence to General Allenby in Egypt. His sister Sarah helped him in this dangerous work; and after Aaron left Palestine to join Allenby in Cairo and Absalom Feinberg, her sister's fiancé whom she loved, had been killed trying to slip through the Turkish southern front, she bore the main burden of organizing the spy network throughout Palestine, collecting the material and sending it

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to Egypt until she was captured. She escaped her torturers by a hideously executed suicide and without the consolation of knowing that her efforts, perhaps more than any other person's, had been instrumental in the successful launching of Allenby's Palestine campaign.

To the professional, Nili operations, precisely because they were amateurish, make interesting reading; they offer many examples of tactical errors whose inevitable result was the death of members of the ring. Although the network had a safe foundation in the loving and trusting devotion of one family, the Aaronsohns, and their relatives or close friends, their operational cover was inadequate protection, not, strangely enough, from the Turks, but from the Jewish community. Ideological and Zionist rivalries for control of the early colonizers, along with genuine fear of the Ottoman practice of holding an entire community responsible for the treason or even misdemeanors of individuals, made the Aaronsohns and their friends suspect and disliked. The fact that Nili became the channel through which Diaspora gold was brought to the starving Jewish community did not mollify the local leaders' attitude towards them. They issued what Sarah considered a cowardly ultimatum to cease operations, on threat of exposure, shortly before the net was rolled up by other means.

The local Turkish administration and military forces, corrupt and venal, were bought off almost weekly with Nili gold; perhaps they would never have been fully conscious of the espionage in their midst if they had not finally been alerted and goaded by German intelligence. Meanwhile Nili agents speaking fluent Turkish, Arabic, Hebrew, and several other languages managed to carry on unmolested until 1917. Their ultimate exposure, if one can rely on the accuracy of the author's details, can be attributed to three important factors—the lack of proper security precautions and compartmentation, the unstable personality of one conspirator, and very poor communications.

All of the Nili leaders and some of their agents knew one another by their true names and personal recognition, a not unnatural result of their recruitment from among friends, from whom they could not hide their identity. Many of these

agents and some couriers knew the location of Nili headquarters in Aaron's experimental station at Athlit. Too many, including Sarah's old Arab carriage driver, were aware of the clandestine beach contacts with a British naval ship from Egypt.

The British courier ship, for various reasons that are not always explained, maintained an irregular and undependable schedule which necessitated hurried and haphazard exchanges of intelligence, gold, and supplies. The failure of the ship to keep a scheduled rendezvous and the urgency of what Sarah considered vital information influenced her to send a message to Egypt by courier pigeon, a method which had already been proved unreliable. The pigeon, apparently bereft of homing instincts, flew north instead of south and was intercepted by the Turks, who, with the assistance of the Germans, began a methodical counterespionage investigation.

Even this exposure might have been unproductive for the Turks until too late if the unstable braggadocio Yosef Leshansky, who had unnecessarily antagonized the elders of the community and the Hashomair Hatzair Marxists, had not boasted of his exploits, his contacts, and his influence to untrustworthy individuals, foolishly relying on the loyalty of some of his Bedouin and Turkish friends. After his arrest he talked freely, thereby implicating almost everybody.

Reflecting the intricate patterns of human affairs in the Middle East, the book includes many interesting asides to the main story. The author almost, but not quite, succeeds in destroying the myth that Lawrence of Arabia dedicated his famous *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* to Sarah Aaronsohn.

Written more as a eulogy than a treatise on espionage, *The Nili Spies* is based primarily on the voluminous reports and diaries of Sarah and Aaron, which in turn are supported by official British documents and memorabilia of World War I. The author, who inclines towards the lyrical to the detriment of her text, adulates Aaron as the unsung hero of the Balfour Declaration and the man whose imagination and determination established the foundations upon which Chaim Weizman, Ben-Gurion, and others built the State of Israel. She nourishes a gentle animosity towards the present Israeli regime for failure to grant Sarah and Aaron the recognition they

justly deserve. It does seem strange that Israeli and Zionist circles, known for their celebration of outstanding contributions to the cause, should have remained almost silent about the accomplishments of a valorous woman whose exploits would have made her a Joan of Arc in other countries.

ORDE WINGATE. By *Christopher Sykes*. (London: Collins. 1959. Pp. 575. 35/—.)

This is a long, well-written, painstakingly researched biography of one of the most interesting leaders of World War II. Orde Wingate was a regular British Army officer, a mystic, a Zionist, an intelligence officer, and a guerrilla leader. Beginning his career in North Africa, he soon was moved to Palestine, the land that became his major interest and love. As British Army intelligence officer turned rabid Zionist, he apparently perfected a counter-guerrilla system to enable the Jewish communities to protect themselves from Arab raiders. Later in Burma he likewise made considerable effort to know the area, peoples, and languages, and as guerrilla leader there his peculiar talents were again particularly effective.

Wingate could almost be described as instinctively an intelligence officer but, because of his eccentricities and oddities, never as a great one. It is a credit to the British that they recognized his considerable virtues in spite of his aberrations. Mr. Syke's biography weaves in a wealth of material on intelligence techniques, countersubversion, and guerrilla warfare that is worth the digging out for today's intelligence operator.

ONE MAN IN HIS TIME. By *Serge Obolensky*. (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1960. Pp. 324. 25/—.)

This autobiography, perhaps an important one for socialites, qualifies as an intelligence reference because in World War II its princely author commanded two OSS paratroop operations, one in 1943 that secured the loyalty of Italian troops on the Sardinian flank of the Salerno action, and one in France in 1944, undertaken to prevent the withdrawing Germans from sabotaging a transformer station important for the Paris electric power supply.

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As with other potentially interesting aspects of the book, however—his childhood and adolescent impressions of the life of the imperial Russian nobility, his description of cavalry actions in World War I, and his participation in White Russian and Tartar resistance to the Bolsheviks in the Crimea—the light he might throw on these events is buried under a bushel of trivia. Prince Obolensky has written not for history nor even for a popular audience, but for himself and his exclusive circle of celebrities, tracing their intricate family relationships to one another and to royalty and recounting in detail the things they said and did in the endless round of games and parties that was their life.

PROPAGANDA

DOCTOR GOEBBELS. By *Roger Manvell* and *Heinrich Fraenkel*. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1960. Pp. 306. \$4.50. Also London: William Heinemann. 1960. Pp. 329. 30/—. Published in France as *Goebbels: Sa Vie, Sa Mort*. Paris: Robert Laffont. 1960.)

This biography of Hitler's indefatigable propaganda chief and most staunchly loyal comrade traces a thread of continuity in the history of the Nazi movement and the Third Reich which no single other life story but Hitler's own could match, a thread unbroken from the early struggles of the mid-twenties to those charred bodies in the garden outside the Fuehrerbunker on May Day 1945. Nor is it a slender thread: Joseph Goebbels fancied himself the future historian of the great era and alone among the Nazi leaders kept a diary for posterity. Only fragments of its some thirty volumes have been found; but these, the diaries of his aides, his correspondence, and the testimony of surviving acquaintances have enabled the authors to clothe the man in flesh and blood and follow him through his career.

The story is of particular interest to propaganda analysts and propaganda strategists. Goebbels' definition of propaganda was of the broadest, and he regarded command over propaganda as virtually equivalent to command over the lives and actions of the audience. Hitler's Minister of Propaganda was thus in Goebbels' eyes his deputy in charge of the home front, the captive audience, and after July 1944 he could almost be said in fact to have run Germany while Hitler ran the war. The conquest of Europe, too, if he had been doing it, would have been undertaken not by force of arms but by the power of the spoken word over men's minds.

Goebbels' direction of the powerful Third Reich propaganda organs was meticulous and comprehensive; in spite of Ribbentrop's efforts to take over foreign propaganda and the fact that Hitler or one of the other leaders occasionally stepped out of line, essentially everything that was said in the German press and broadcasts or shown in the German films and public spectacles flowed from this one man. Thus today's propaganda strategist, on the one hand, studying the model

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of the extraordinarily effective Nazi system, will find its most significant feature to be, not what Goebbels characterized as massive reiteration of simple truths and the Nazi's enemies dubbed "the big lie technique," but the integrity of unitary control and consistent one-man direction. The propaganda analyst, on the other hand, will in this same feature see fulfilled his necessary assumption that the propaganda he studies has a logical, self-consistent content aligned with the purposes of the regime. The Nazi propaganda was in fact so distressingly self-consistent that it left the Anglo-American analyst little foothold for that digging into factional differences and divergencies among the leaders' policies that has been the aim of much analysis of Communist propaganda since the war.

THE REVOLT OF THE MIND. By *Tamas Aczel* and *Tibor Meray*. (New York: Praeger. 1959. Also London: Thames and Hudson. 1960. Pp. 449. 35/—.)

The subject of this revealing book is not intelligence, but a conflict of profound interest to the many intelligence officers who wondered, all through the three middle years of the fifties, at the strange things being said by the Hungarian press and radio and tried to divine their portent. Although it became clear in November 1956 to everyone that this surfacing of ideological unrest had reflected no mere administrative difficulties "of little consequence and likely to diminish," as some had theretofore concluded, the intellectual crisis of the time has nowhere been so perceptively and thoroughly delineated as here by Aczel and Meray.

The authors were prominent young Party writers of sincere Stalinist persuasion, well representative of the Hungarian Communist intelligentsia. They were able by and large to contain their normal artistic passion for individual, non-conforming creativity and to maintain unwavering loyalty to the Party through the early phases of the Nagy-Rakosi struggles over the best road to socialism, although the corps of Communist writers was indeed deeply divided between the two leaders. It was the revelation late in 1954 of the contrived and groundless arrests, tortures, imprisonment, and executions in the wake of the Rajk trial—a revelation made through

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the release of Janos Kadar and a score of other surviving victims—that reunited the writers and many other intellectuals in open revolt against the Rakosi leadership, almost against the very Party. Then a year of ever severer defeats for the rebels, until the twentieth Soviet Party congress and Khrushchev's "secret" speech turned the tide.

At this stage the authors' Hungarian emotions betray them into oversimplification, and they make Nagy too much the martyred hero, Rakosi too much the despicable villain, and Kadar too easily the Judas of their idol Nagy. Earlier character portraits, like that of the Hungarian Zhdanov, Jozsef Revai, had been unbiased, sympathetic, and enlightening. Yet for all this fault the book is a unique documentary on the beliefs and motivations of Communist intellectuals, on an important aspect of what makes Communism work and wherein it fails to work, and—more profoundly—on the contradictions between the individual and the social ideals of man at large.

MISCELLANY

THE DOUBLE DEALERS. Edited by *Alexander Klein*. (London: Faber & Faber. 1958. Pp. 381. 21/—.)

This anthology of grand hoaxes includes short accounts of half a dozen intelligence deceptions, one from the Civil War and the rest from World War II and after. They are the story of Emma Edmonds, whose first mission as a Union spy was executed in the guise of a negro lad; Donald Q. Coster's account of how he persuaded the Germans in North Africa to expect an American landing at Dakar; Clifton James' recollections of his appearances as General Montgomery at Gibraltar and in North Africa in order to divert German expectations of the Normandy landings; Al Newman's story of a Spanish spy for the Nazis whom the British impressed by showing the same air squadrons, fleets, and troops repeatedly moved up along his travel route; the exposure as a fake of Quentin Reynolds' book on George DuPre's purported four years as a British agent with the French resistance; and the escape of five political prisoners from East German prisons engineered in 1953 by Hasso Lindemann with forged release orders and false telephone calls.

The collection also includes, curiously, one intelligence story that is not a hoax, Richard Sharpe's reconstruction from open sources of Allied foreknowledge of the V-2 weapon. Sharpe credits the discovery of the Peenemuende test area as early as 1938 to a traveling British writer-agent, the mapping of the experimental station to Polish forced laborers, and the first air photo identification of the weapon to Constance Babington-Smith. He attributes the catastrophic timing of the 17 August 1943 obliteration raid to Allen Dulles' source Gisevius and details about material and construction, capped finally by shipment of one of the missiles intact, to Polish underground intelligence from the new test range at Blizna and Sarnaki.

THE MAN THEY COULDN'T KILL. By *Dennis Holman*. (London: Heinemann. 1960. Pp. 232. 16/—.)

This is the story of a thread of exceptional luck woven through the life of one man, Robert Oldfield. Behind it lies

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the provocative possibility, of no small interest to intelligence, that intensive study of many Oldfields might yield a better understanding of luck's chemistry, and perhaps even a means of predicting accurately whose ventures will be blessed.

A Royal Navy stoker active in submarines during World War II, Oldfield's path took him through innumerable close brushes with death. Characteristic of his experiences was an incident in prewar Haifa in which he stepped from a truck seconds before a terrorist-planted bomb demolished the vehicle. In subsequent years deliverance by a matter of seconds or inches became almost commonplace with him. Among the perils from which he emerged relatively unscathed were an earthquake, bombings, a major naval battle, torpedo attacks, a ship-submarine collision, the sinking of the submarine *Saracen* by depth charges, a break from a POW camp, an action with Italian guerrillas, two sentences to death before firing squads, a stay in a German concentration camp, and a near electrocution. Between these more dramatic incidents there were many minor ones that did not want for lethal quality: on several occasions, for example, last-minute developments removed him from the crews of submarines destined not to return.

Although the account of Oldfield's adventures touches on POW interrogation, escape and evasion, guerrilla activity, sabotage, and other matters of intelligence interest, its brief treatment of these subjects offers nothing particularly new or significant. The keynote of the book is luck.

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

- Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* . . . EDWARD L. ALLEN
- Engle's *The Nili Spies*
- Books on Propaganda
- Holman's *The Man They Couldn't Kill*

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