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MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Report on Status of Operational Security

1. I feel that the continuing responsibilities of the I&S Staff for advice to you on formulation of security policy require a brief report on the current status of "Operational Security". The Operational Security of CIA is deteriorating rapidly. I believe that immediate remedial action is required.
2. While the Personnel, Physical, and Information Security of the Agency continues to improve and may be considered excellent, sound Operational Security is gained through command channels and can be attained only if all operations receive careful overall coordination and control in both the planning and implementation phases.
3. Examples of the lack of this overall control, as it effects security, may be cited as follows:
  - a. No coordination in planning nor in execution between clandestine intelligence projects (OSO) and clandestine operational projects (OPC); which is in some cases tending to compromise both.
  - b. Confused and multiple overlap between OSO, OPC, and OO/C in approaching and dealing with intelligence sources--such as aliens, agents, consultants, and foreign agencies, which is tending to threaten or "blow" sources or to make such persons too familiar with our operation.
  - c. Grave dangers arising when overall policies are lacking in the establishment of cover in both the training and field phases, and the transition of individuals through various types of cover.
  - d. While CE responsibility has been given to one Assistant Director, it is difficult to implement due to the necessity of impressing CE controls and guidance on parallel offices.
  - e. There is a need for better intra-CIA operational procedure in the working relationships between the collectors of clandestine intelligence and the producers of finished intelligence. While Operational Security demands a certain amount of isolation one from the other, overall security is weakened by

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the lack of guidance from one category of intelligence operations to the other; such as sound requirements to collectors and on the other hand sound CE guidance to evaluators and producers.

4. I realize that higher authority has prevented you from centralizing clandestine operations. However, pending decision as to the extent of your authority over OPC and in view of the threatened compromise to the security of the whole clandestine effort, I believe your legal responsibility for protection of sources permits you to adopt certain positive controls.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I therefore recommend that you activate in the Director's office an Operations Control Staff. This staff should be composed of three senior Intelligence Officials, plus necessary minimum assistants. These officials should be arbitrarily chosen from present Chiefs of Area Branches in order to insure the highest qualified persons available. I would suggest selecting one each from OSO, OPC, and ORE.

The functions of the Operations Control Staff would be to exercise in your name the broad control and coordination necessary to avoid the conditions mentioned above. It would insure that clandestine operations of all types would be kept at a high degree of security and efficiency.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

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