

5 NOV 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (1).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

FOR THE USIB

- a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

In Section (5). "Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure".

In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".

5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 5, 1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly

where intelligence and special source material is involved. These supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of security requirements peculiar to the department or agency concerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem common to the intelligence community.

6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate in security procedures. The IAC did not have a committee for security matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been inoperative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIB Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in conformity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint; and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities.

Security directives carried over from the IAC and the USCIB which are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCID No. 11/2 Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for Comint.

The continuous review of security directives and concern with overall security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.

7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their

normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded the investigative function in that there was no established central coordinating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of intelligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an overall community basis.

8. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of information than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence information who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a community basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative standpoint in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level, there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest, there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.

9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to unauthorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a community level will merely compound the security problems involved. The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective actions.

10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed of the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities established for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his special responsibilities set forth in Section 5 of NSCID No. 1.

11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

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**Attachments:**

Proposed DCID