


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OFFICE OF SECURITY
SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
FISCAL YEAR 1967

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


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OFFICE OF SECURITY

SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS - FY 1967

I. GENERAL MANAGEMENT

a. Executive and Planning

1. USIB Security Committee

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(a) USIB Policy Establishing Uniform Security Processing Procedures for Foreign [REDACTED] Liaison Personnel

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In April 1965, the Board directed that the Security Committee consider the problems raised by the differing security procedures used by member agencies in dealing with foreign liaison [REDACTED] personnel. After reviewing each member's internal procedures, a uniform procedure for security processing such foreign personnel was agreed upon by the Committee and received USIB approval on 20 September 1966.


(b) Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information

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One of the recommendations made by PFIAB in its analysis of the [REDACTED] case was the establishment of uniform personnel security criteria for all personnel having access to sensitive information. A draft of the standards prepared by the Security Committee and coordinated with the SIGINT and COMOR Committees was approved by USIB and issued as DCID 1/14 on 23 June 1967. This represented a major breakthrough for the Security Committee's efforts to standardize personnel security criteria and should serve as a springboard for similar uniform practices in other areas of security concern.

(c) Review of Courier and Pouching Procedures for Sensitive Intelligence Information

As a result of several incidents in the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) which exposed highly classified



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material to possible compromise, and accelerated by the revelations of the [REDACTED] case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized a detailed survey of ARFCOS. The security recommendations of that survey, which were concurred in by the Security Committee, raised serious questions about the suitability of ARFCOS as a channel for sensitive intelligence. Both the SIGINT and Security Committees have been kept advised periodically by ARFCOS officials of their implementation of the JCS approved recommendations, and a joint Security and SIGINT Committee paper will be forwarded to the USIB on this subject.

(d) A Study of Provocations and Harassments Against Attaches and Other U. S. Officials in Sov Bloc Areas

For some time the Security Committee received from its members reports of harassments and provocations directed against military attaches, U. S. civilian employees and private citizens in the Soviet Bloc. After a detailed analysis, a study of this problem was approved by the Committee and forwarded to USIB for approval of its dissemination to the intelligence community for use as a briefing aid for all travelers to denied areas.

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2. [REDACTED]

The Office of Security participated in the exercise by reviewing and updating OS relocation plans (including personnel rosters), the OS Emergency Team and all emergency credentials. The pertinent Vital Records at the [REDACTED] were reviewed and steps were taken to update such records.

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3. NDPC

(a) Reorganization


The Office of Security was represented on a working group to reorganize the United States Military Information Control Committee (US-MICC) to what is now known as the

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National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC). The working group, chaired by the State Department, reviewed the policies and procedures of the old US-MICC. The document, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, drafted by the working group, was approved by the Secretary of State on 27 September 1967.

(b) Surveys

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b. Special Security

(Submitted as Tab A in separate channel).

c. Administrative Support

1. Suggestion Awards

Eleven suggestions were presented to the Agency Incentive Awards Committee for evaluation. Five of these were accepted with a total of \$1,255 being paid to the suggestors.

2. Quality Step Increases

A total of twenty-eight Quality Step Increase Awards were granted to Office of Security Career Service personnel.

3. Training and Briefings

(a) Enrollments in OTR courses for FY 1967 totaled 187. Fifty-one OS employees attended external training courses, including the Advanced Management Program and the Program for Management Development at Harvard University; the Armed Forces Staff College; and a one-year academic program at Stanford University under the auspices of the National Institute for Public Affairs. In addition, the following OS component courses were

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presented: Special Agents Training, Physical Security Training, and Security Officers Field Training.

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(b) With the cooperation of the Office of Computer Services, a special orientation on Automatic Data Processing was presented for [REDACTED] professional Security Officers.

(c) The Security Indoctrination Program for new Agency employees was presented to [REDACTED] persons.

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(d) Attendance at other briefings, including Security presentations in the Introduction to Intelligence, Support Services Review, CIA Review, Orientation to Overseas, and various special briefings totaled 1,472 persons. Briefings were given to 458 summer employees.

4. Savings

By review of excess material listings of equipment for the Agency and GSA, the Office of Security was able to effect budgetary savings in excess of \$36,500.

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II. PERSONNEL SECURITY

a. Counterintelligence

1. CI Briefings

Security briefings were given to a number of staff employees relative to foreigners with whom they had been in contact. In some instances, the foreigners had questionable backgrounds and the employee was so informed and cautioned accordingly as to future contacts. In a limited number of cases, the foreigner was identified as being a citizen of the USSR or a satellite country.

2. Crank Writers

At the direction of the DCI, daily contact is maintained with the U. S. Secret Service regarding the identity of mentally disturbed correspondents who write the DCI or other senior officials of government agencies and departments with whom the Office of Security is in liaison.

3. The New Left

Guidance was provided to Area security officers and Division case officers regarding personalities and organizations of the "New Left," a splinter group [REDACTED]

25X6

4. Analysis of Harassment Activities

A detailed analysis of harassment activities directed against Agency recruiters on college and university campuses, identifying the principal organization responsible and documenting its history and trends, was provided to the Deputy Director for Support, the Director of Personnel and the Assistant to the Director.

5. Trace Metal Detection Technique

A series of lecture-demonstrations of the trace metal detection technique were given to OSI/USAF, the Director and staff of the National Security Agency, and the Arlington, Fairfax County,

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New York City, and Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Departments.

b. Personnel Security

1. Agency Policy Guide

25X1A Work continued leading to the issuance on 17 July 1967 of [REDACTED] an Agency Policy Guide Covering Unofficial Public Appearances and Open Publication. The notice, a guide to Agency employees and supervisors, has produced a clearer understanding of the potential security problems in these activities and a smoother approach to the processing of requests in this area.

2. Denied Area Realities Briefing

A revised and updated Denied Area Realities Briefing was prepared in coordination with CI/CE components and experts within the Agency. This briefing has become the authoritative guide to would-be travelers to denied areas whose exploitation by foreign intelligence services could jeopardize intelligence sources and methods.

3. Travel

A new system was initiated under which area divisions of the DDP are routinely and quickly advised of all unofficial travel by Agency employees into their areas of responsibility.

4. Polygraph

A debriefing program was initiated which acquires significant feedback information from female staff employees immediately following their polygraph interviews.

5. Reinvestigation

A total of [REDACTED] staff employee reinvestigations were completed.


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III. PHYSICAL SECURITY

a. Security Support of Overseas Installations

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emphasis continued to be placed on providing additional and improved protection of classified material by means of modern safekeeping equipment, alarm systems, secure areas or vaults, adequate destruction capability and all aspects of proper handling of classified material.

2. Near East Crisis


Security support during the Near East crisis was provided to NE and AF Divisions regarding existing physical security safeguards and destruction capabilities at stations and bases in the critical area. A program was established to interview returning evacuees from the crisis area to identify all security problems encountered during the emergency period. At the present time, data is being compiled with regard to the present status of equipment, the volume of classified material on hand and the estimated destruction time, in order to determine the current security posture of stations affected and to enable Headquarters to reconstitute classified material and destruction equipment at each post. Stations which were completely evacuated and those which became susceptible to physical and technical penetration due to reduced personnel and/or physical damage are being thoroughly inspected by Headquarters security personnel.

3. Vulnerability of Equipment

Book Dispatches were prepared and disseminated to the field alerting personnel to the vulnerability of reproduction equipment and typewriters. These included directives concerning the control, purchase, usage, and inspection of such equipment.

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


5. Physical Security Training

Comprehensive physical security briefings (both verbal and written) were provided a number of DDP personnel who had been newly assigned as a Chief of Station or Chief of Base.

6. DDP/SSU Assistance

Pursuant to a request by the newly established DDP Special Security Unit, assistance was provided by a review of existing files in the analysis of those overseas areas which would be considered more vulnerable to technical and physical penetration by opposition forces. As a result, the SSU identified stations and bases to receive priority attention.



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2. Paging System

The Office of Security/DCI Security communications capability has been increased by addition of a paging system which is operational 24 hours a day and utilized to facilitate contacting senior Agency officials and the emergency duty officers.

c. Safety

1. Accident Prevention Efforts


In response to the President's request regarding Mission Safety-70, a report was prepared for the DCI's signature

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outlining the accident prevention efforts undertaken by the Agency and the Agency's future plans regarding safety.

2. Safety Surveys

Comprehensive fire and safety surveys were conducted at Agency buildings in the Washington, D. C. area, JMWAVE



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
IV. TECHNICAL SECURITY

a. Inspections


1. General

In FY 1967 the Technical Division increased the number of technical inspections conducted over the previous reporting period. In addition, more special technical inspections were conducted in FY 1967 than in any previous annual reporting period.

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


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inspections were conducted at Agency buildings in the Headquarters complex of buildings. Technical security support was provided to the DCI during his appearances before Congressional committees on 30 separate occasions.

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2. Agency Briefings

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██████████ Agency employees departing for overseas stations on PCS assignments were given the Hostile Audio Surveillance (HAS) briefing which included the 25-minute Office of Security film on audio countermeasures security. This is a regularly scheduled, year-round service for Agency personnel.

3. Audio Countermeasures Training

Training courses were conducted in basic audio countermeasures, X-ray, laser, IR, and signal analysis for Agency technical personnel and personnel of USIB/TSCC member agencies.

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V. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Industrial Security Handbook

At the specific request of the Security Management Staff, DD/S&T, a handbook was prepared for use by technical and project officers of the Agency who are involved in the procurement program. The purpose of the handbook is to provide a ready security reference to technical and project officers in order to facilitate their efforts in fulfilling their responsibility to insure the application not only of maximum but of uniform standards of security compatible with contract operational procedures. The handbook is designed to be utilized as a supplement to existing Agency procurement handbooks such as [REDACTED]. Informal coordination has been effected with most of the Agency components concerned.

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VI. INVESTIGATIONS

a. Investigative Case Load

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
During the FY 1967, a total of [REDACTED] cases involving Staff Applicants and other persons of overt and covert interest to the Agency were completed by the Investigations Division. Of this total, [REDACTED] cases involved field investigations. This is the highest number of field completions in the history of the Investigations Division.

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b. Overseas Investigations

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In November 1966, a Book Dispatch was sent to [REDACTED] selected stations and bases throughout the world, soliciting detailed information regarding available sources of information and other investigative assets and capabilities within the scope of operations of these stations and bases. Information resulting from this questionnaire has enabled the scheduling of more realistic overseas investigations and has eliminated the levying of investigative requirements not able to be fulfilled.



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administrative considerations, will make available a reservoir of manpower that will be capable of responding more rapidly and effectively to operational requirements and without any adverse effect on the normal processing of field investigations.

e. Secure Communications

A cryptographically secure, on-line TWX network, linking all

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
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3. ACM Receiver

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A two-phase, R&D-production contract was executed with [redacted] to provide an advanced, portable ACM receiver designated the [redacted]. These receivers will replace current equipment, mostly [redacted] receivers, and will provide the Technical Division with receivers representing the latest technology in receiver state-of-the-art. The [redacted] prototype is programmed for delivery in January 1968 and the first production models are programmed for late FY 1968.

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f. Flying Glass Project

The coordinated research effort to develop methods of protecting personnel from injury as a result of flying glass was completed. A book dispatch was forwarded to the field relating the results of the study and requesting an assessment of the potential threat or hazard at each station and base. In those instances where the threat is reported to be serious due to physical characteristics and location of the buildings, political instability and terrorist activity, immediate



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g. Electronics Entrance Control System

In coordination with ORD/DD/S&T, specifications were developed and a contract negotiated for the production of the first unit of an electronic entrance control system for use in the Headquarters area. The system has been designed to effect positive identification of individuals entering Agency buildings.

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IX. AUTOMATION AND RECORDS

a. COINS

The expanding use of automatic data processing requires continuous monitoring to insure that proper security is maintained. As part of this effort, the Office of Security provided security requirements and recommendations to Agency COINS (Computer On-Line Intelligence Network System) Task Force.

b. Classified Clear Text Distribution System

In conjunction with Technical Division, OS, and Communications Security Staff, OC, the minimum security requirements were developed for a Classified Clear Text Distribution System for the Headquarters building. If implemented, it could also service future video, secure voice and automatic dissemination of cable requirements.

c. SANCA

In October 1966, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) became operational. During the period from October 1966 through June 1967, the Security Records and Communications Division successfully searched 318,790 names with the new computer system. Transition from the manual to the computer system was accomplished with relative ease considering the number of persons in the Office of Security who required training and familiarization with the new system. As of the end of the fiscal year, the SANCA system was handling over 80% of the name check requirements for the Office of Security.

d. An agreement was reached with the [REDACTED] to install an encrypted data-communications link utilizing IBM 1050 terminals. The link will be used to exchange National Agency Check requirements in machine language and will have one terminal in [REDACTED] and one in the Security Records and Communications Division/OS.

e. Fifty-one Rol-Dex card file units were released which occupied 1,186 square feet of floor space. These units were replaced with 19 Shaw Walker card file units which not only had the same capacity as the 51 Rol-Dex units but had been declared surplus by another

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Federal Agency, thereby avoiding the purchase of such equipment, and releasing sufficient floor space to install 2,088 linear feet of open shelf filing.

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f. [REDACTED] Security files were retired to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] thus releasing 517 cubic feet.

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g. A total of 103,376 Outside Agency Name Checks were completed which represents an increase of 21,053 over FY 1966. Through procedural applications, no increase of personnel was required and the stability in processing time was maintained.