The INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

A Digest from
Strategic Intelligence
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Chapter 1

INTELLIGENCE IS ACTIVITY

In the language of the trade, the word intelligence is used not merely to designate types of knowledge. It is also used as a synonym for the *activity* of an intelligence organization. I will discuss in this paper, intelligence as activity, or better, as process. My primary concern will be the large number of methodological and other problems to which this process gives rise. But before discussing these problems, I shall briefly discuss the intelligence process itself.

The knowledge, which I call strategic intelligence, serves two uses: it serves a protective or defensive use in that it forewarns us of what other powers may be hatching to damage our national interests; and it serves a positive or outgoing purpose in that it prepares the way for our own foreign policy or grand strategy. Here the important thing to grasp is that, no matter what its diversity, this knowledge is produced by the process of research.

Sometimes research is formal, highly technical, and weighty; sometimes it is informal, untechnical, and speedily arrived at. Sometimes a research project requires thousands of man-days of work, sometimes it is done in one man-minute or less.

This research process, in strategic intelligence, is initiated in two chief ways. When the policy people or planners of our government begin formulating something new in foreign policy they often come to intelligence and ask for background. (They should do this more than they do.) In their request for this or that block of knowledge, they stimulate the intelligence force to embark upon a piece of research and a course of specially directed observation or surveillance. There is, however, a second way in which this process is initiated. This is through the systematic and continuing surveillance activity of the intelligence staff itself. So important is this surveillance that it is often conceived of as separable from research. I do not think it should be.

Surveillance, as I am using the word here, is the observation of what goes on abroad and the deliberate attempt to make sense of it.

Thus, in foreign countries we carry on through a multitude of open-and-above-board personnel -- some civilian, some military -- whose duty is to keep eyes and ears alert and report what they learn. They are the foreign service officers and attaches. Each of them has his field of special interest and competence, whether it be political, military, commercial, or cultural, etc., and each is supposed to keep himself and his principals at home posted within this specialty.

Some foreign governments supplement the work of their overt officers with espionage activities; that is, they send out secret agents, or undercover recruiters of secret agents, to discover and report on matters which would be difficult to discover overtly. If you would like a sample of how such activities are established and operate, read Richard Hirsch's "The Soviet Spies", or the "Report of the Royal (Canadian) Commission"...upon which it is largely based.

Not all surveillance activities take place abroad; some very important ones take place at home. Queer as it may seem to observe a foreign country from a home observation post, there are several reasons for this paradox.

First, there must be surveillance at home purely and simply for convenience. For example, what the official French radio beams on the rest of the world is of considerable interest to us; we should like to know the content of its political news and commentary. But this can be done easier domestically. Hence, that extremely important surveillance organization known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch is established at home. Its monitoring stations pick up the most significant programs; the home office transcribes them, translates (and sometimes abstracts them), reproduces them, and sends them around to officers of the governments. Departmental, i.e., Army, Navy and State intelligence organizations are, of course, the chief beneficiaries.

Sharp newspaper foreign correspondents though they have no connection with intelligence work, are important observers of foreign affairs and important, though inadvertent, contributors to the surveillance activity. Wise is the government that does not intercept their dispatches at point of origin, but lets them land in the home cable rooms of our domestic papers, there to put the content to official use. Doing business this way means that intelligence engaged in overt surveillance must have some small force at home which follows the best foreign news.

There is a second reason for home surveillance. It is based upon the proposition that anything being hatched abroad to our detriment is conspiratorial, i.e., it is hatched in secret; but there are several people or groups party to it. In the world of international relations these parties to the conspiracy may be residents of half a dozen countries, and the story of what they are up to, must be pieced together from fragments supplied from the half-dozen different sources. For example, what Franco was considering at a given moment might be less available from Madrid than from Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Lisbon, Bayonne, and Rome. This is not to argue that Washington is the only place where surveillance should take place, but it is to argue that given the complicated nature of the modern world, there must be a listening and observation post and clearing house in a central spot.

However conducted -- overtly or clandestinely, abroad or at home -- surveillance, as it goes about uncovering a policy or an action hurtful to our

national interest, stimulates our desire and need for knowledge. Thus it stimulates the production of defensive-protective knowledge and tells us what we must know about affairs abroad if we are to implement our own active outgoing policies. It is surveillance, then, which produces that wide range of phenomena without which strategic intelligence would have little content of current importance.

In talking of surveillance there is always the danger of portraying something passive. Surveillance sounds like sitting back and awaiting the impression. But surveillance worthy of the name must be vigorous and aggressive; aggressive in that the observer covers as much ground as possible, seeking to expose himself to a mixiumum number of phenomena; and more importantly, it must be aggressive in that the observer does a maximum amount of following up his impressions of these phenomena.

So long as I use the imprecise term "following up" I am on safe ground with the general reader and intelligence brotherhood. It implies checking the accuracy of sources, comparing divergent accounts, and gaining perspective by broadening the field of inquiry, finding new leads--out of which emerges a proposition which seems the truest of all possible propositions. Now I would like to call this process of following-up by the more precise term of "research" and say that it must accompany the surveillance activity. Such research consists of a systematic endeavor to get firm meaning out of impressions. Lacking it, surveillance will produce spotty and superficial information.

Research has greater importance than merely supplying the cutting edge to surveillance. It has a role entirely its own. In wartime, research produces the knowledge of enemy strategic capabilities, enemy specific vulnerabilities; it produces knowledge of the political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the enemy; and knowledge of the physical plant which the enemy is using. On such knowledge our own offensive military plans are based. In peacetime, research produces that knowledge of foreign lands which you would wish if you had to decide whether to sponsor a European economic recovery program; and then defend it before Congress and your fellow countrymen.

Research is the only process which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable of giving us the truth, or a close approximation to truth. We insist, and have insisted for generations, that truth is to be approached, if not attained, through research guided by a systematic method. There is such a method in the social sciences, which largely constitute the subject matter of strategic intelligence and in which, for the purposes of this paper, I include the science of military strategy. The method is much like that of the physical sciences. It can be described, for instance, by paraphrasing the discussion of physical sciences as set forth by President Conant of Harvard. One could say that the method of the social sciences involves the development of new concepts from observations and that these concepts in turn indicate and lead to new observations. But perhaps this is less useful

than to spell out seven steps or stages in the research process specifically designed to meet the requirements of strategic intelligence. They are:

1. The appearance of a problem requiring attention of a strategic intelligence staff.

2. Analysis of this problem to discover which facets of it are of importance to the U.S. and which of several lines of approach are most likely to be useful to its governmental consumers.

3. Collection of data bearing upon the problem as formulated in stage 2. This involves a survey of data already at hand and available in the libraries of documentary materials, and an endeavor to procure new data to fill in gaps.

4. Critical evaluation of the data thus assembled.

5. Study of the evaluated data with the intent of finding some sort of inherent meaning. The discovery of such meaning can be called the moment of hypothesis. In reality there is rarely such a thing as one moment of hypotheses nor can it be said categorically at what moment hypotheses appear. One would wish that they appeared here at respectable stage 5, but in actual practice they begin appearing when the first datum is collected, and may appear long after the project is closed out.

6. More collecting of data along the lines of the more promising hypotheses, to confirm or deny them.

7. Establishment of one or more hypotheses as truer than others and thus as the best present approximations of truth. This is the last stage and is often referred to as the *presentation* state.

At each of these stages two problems arise. One is characteristic of all systematic research in the social sciences, the other derives from the peculiarities of intelligence's research activities. My principal concern in the next chapter will be with these latter methodological problems.

Chapter 2

PROBLEMS OF METHOD IN INTELLIGENCE WORK

Before proceeding with an analysis of the problems in intelligence, I would like to clarify my use of the adjectives methodological and substantive. By "methodological" I mean a problem characteristic of the method of trying to establish a new approximation to truth. By "substantive" I mean a problem in the subject matter of strategic intelligence. As an example of a "substantive problem" consider the strategic stature of the Chinese Communists; as an example of a "methodological problem" consider the means you would employ to get the basic data on the Chinese Communists' military establishment.

1. *Stage One, the appearance of the substantive problem*

The substantive problem in strategic intelligence can emerge in three principal ways.

a. It may emerge as a result of the reflections of a man employed to do nothing but anticipate problems. In actual fact, the intelligence business employs too few such men. Their job is to ask themselves the hard, the searching, and the significant question and keep passing it on to professional staff. An intelligence operation should be bedeviled by such questions, and a substantial part of its work program should be concerned with getting answers. A Pearl Harbor may be ascribed in no small measure to the absence of that unpleasant and insistent person, who, conscious of the growing animus of Japan, would have kept asking when is the attack coming, where is it coming, and how is it coming?

The methodological problem involved here is a slight one, on the surface. It consists of devising means by which the question-askers will be sure of formulating good substantive problems. The only answer lies in picking a man who knows the area in which he is supposed to ask questions, who has an inquiring mind, and then see that he has ready access to every scrap of incoming evidence, access to everyone who knows about it, and freedom from other burdensome duties.

b. The substantive problem may emerge when surveillance makes one aware of something unusual. For example, suppose the people watching Great Frusina (my hypothetical country) learn it is expanding its Christian mission program in the Belgian Congo and that it has named Brother Nepomuk as aide to the new director. If surveillance is sharp enough to recognize this shift in a minor Great Frusinan policy it has initiated a substantive problem which may be very important when followed-up; or be of no importance at all.

The methodological problem here is similar to that just touched upon; how can surveillance be sure of putting the finger on the three unusual and potential things per week out of the thousands it observes and the millions that happen? The answer is again: procure wise men, wise in the subject, and pray that they will produce hypotheses of national importance.

c. The last way in which the substantive problem may emerge is at the request of the consumer. For example, let us suppose that the policy people, who are the prime intelligence consumers, are facing a revision of the established China policy. They summon some of the control and professional staff of intelligence to a meeting where the problem is put on the table. In this meeting aspects of the China question will appear which the policy people have not considered before. Let us assume that they have to do with population. A prospective change in policy has caused a substantive problem to emerge.

Here there is no methodological problem. Intelligence feels things have gone just as they should. True, the assignment is so large and general that serious difficulties are presented but since intelligence was at the meeting, it may assume further guidance from the consumers in shaping the substantive problem to their needs. But what usually happens is that decision to revise policy is taken without intelligence. Weeks later, when the policy people are up against a deadline, they discover they need a new population estimate and that at once. They pose a problem all right, but they pose it to the consternation of intelligence, which is asked to do a month's work over night.

2. *Stage Two, the analysis of the substantive problem*

The substantive problem has at last emerged in rough form. It must now receive some close and searching analysis. The aim is not merely to discard what is irrelevant or unimportant, but to shape the problem toward solution.

For example, to return to Brother Nepomuk, the surveillance people have many courses of observation opened to them by their discovery of Great Frusina's new missionary zeal. They can begin watching the church-state relationship looking for new angles; they can start an observation of the Great Frusina-Belgium relationship; they can skip over Great Frusina, Belgium, and the Congo, and start chasing after developments in the general field of missions to find new church policies therein. They are almost certain to turn up interesting leads no matter what lines they pursue. But the question is, what particular line of observation is likely to prove most important to the security of the United States?

The research people back from the policy-on-China meeting are posed a somewhat similar problem. They were asked to come up with some population data; no more explicit than that. Obviously there are dozens of kinds of population data. But only one or two will have bearing on the task of the

policy people. What are these data, and in what detail should they be worked up?

As the surveillance and the research people search for the most fruitful line of attack they will seek guidance. This guidance should come both from their own inner selves and from the policy, planning, or operating people whom they are endeavoring to serve. Let me take the problem of guidance as it appears to the surveillance man.

He discovered that Great Frusina was enlarging its Christian missions program in the Congo; he knows that the Congo has large uranium deposits; he asks himself, is there a connection? Then his foray into research reveals that Brother Nepomuk won a Nobel prize for work in geology. He now sees a connection and has uncovered *the most fruitful line of attack.* He now has a hypothesis that Great Frusina is trying to get uranium from the Congo and that Brother Nepomuk is a Great Frusinan agent. At this point he must get outside guidance. What other lines of attack will the people whom he serves designate as fruitful; what do they propose to do if such and such a line confirms an ill-intentioned activity on Great Frusina's part?

The sequence may be exactly reversed with the research people working on the population of China. They will promptly go back to policy and ask advice about lines of attack. They will also ask how the policy people see the task shaping up, and what their aim is in revising the old policy. If they get answers they can state the substantive problem and answer it in a way which will have practical utility to policy. Moreover, as research advances their study will get useful hypotheses which spring from familiarity with the subject matter, and which the policy people might never have got on their own.

The methodological problem here is not that of inner guidance but guidance from the users of the knowledge. Here is one of the critical problems of intelligence, i.e., the relationship between its producers and consumers. Intelligence often finds it impossible to get that guidance which it must have if its product is to be useful. One of the places where this lack of guidance produces its most disastrous results is right here at stage 2 of the intelligence process. Unless the intelligence organization knows what use its product is designed to serve, and what sorts of action are contemplated with what sorts or implements, the analysis and proper formulation of the substantive problem suffer.

3. *Stage Three, the collection of data*

The collection of data is the most characteristic activity of intelligence. There can be no surveillance nor research without the collection of data. Accordingly, an intelligence organization cannot exist until it does a broad and systematic job of collecting. But in this very task lie methodological problems so tough that they are a perpetual source of inefficiency.

a. One such problem is that which a member of the professional staff encounters when he embarks upon a piece of research. He has blocked out his substantive problem. His next step is to see what data bearing upon the subject exist in his own and other intelligence organizations. Let us assume that his own files are in good shape and that his outfit has a centralized library of properly indexed documents. The materials from his own sources, so to speak, indicate, as will also his horse sense, that there are other kindred materials in neighboring intelligence organizations. He must reach these, but there are real difficulties if (1) he must work through a third person in his own organization who has an exclusive mandate to collect data, and (2) if the other organizations possess no central library of indexed documents. Unfortunately, many intelligence organizations raise these considerable barriers.

b. Now, let us assume that the staff member discovers that even after canvassing every resource in his headquarters city there are still a number of unanswered substantive questions which he must explore. He must communicate with the field; he must try to explain to someone in a foreign capital what he wants. Now if the man on the other end of the wire was formerly a worker in the home office, has a feel for home-office functioning, and personally knows the staff, he then will more readily understand what he is being asked to do and will do it with efficient good grace. He will quickly grasp the instructions (which can be given in office shorthand) and will act pretty much as an overseas projection of the home staff. But if he has not served in the home office, and instead has gone to his foreign post improperly briefed on home problems then there may be difficulties.

It is not easy to explain in a letter or cable precisely what is desired to someone who starts from scratch. Requisitions of this sort must be spelled out in detail and to achieve results they must communicate in their substance a sense of urgency and importance. Such a requisition is time-consuming. If it is no more than a blunt command it is likely to be handled in a perfunctory fashion.

The problem increases when the recipient is a stranger to the subject. The home office may wish to have a foreign official interviewed on a technical demographic matter or wish to have someone audit and report on a scientific congress. But the men in the field may have had the wrong kind of professional training or no professional training at all, and thus be totally incompetent to handle such a request. Or, most likely, the field staff is completely engulfed in making good on a previous request which seems to them to be of highest importance.

The foregoing problems of collection are not too formidable because simple good sense can probably beat them. But there are other problems not so easily disposed of and they are inherent in the surveillance phase of intelligence.

The surveillance force is supposed to watch actual, fancied, or potential ill-wishers or enemies of the United States and report on their

activities. It is also supposed to procure information which, though possibly less dramatic, is none-the-less calculated to forward the success of our own policies. In both areas the surveillance force must work clandestinely, or it could not deliver on a small but extremely important part of this task. Thus a certain fraction of the knowledge which intelligence must produce is collected through highly developed secret techniques. Herein lies the major methodological problem of the collection stage of intelligence.

It begins with the segregation of the clandestine force. This segregation is dictated by the need for secrecy. The minimum of people must know anything about the operation, and the greatest caution and dissimulation must attend its every move. But unless this clandestine force watches sharply it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows security to cut it off from all guidance, it destroys its own reason for existence. Guidance, in the nature of things, should come from the ultimate consumer directly or indirectly, i.e., through the overt part of intelligence to which the consumer has gone for help. As this relationship is stopped down (as it may have to be for long periods); as it becomes formalized to the point where communication is by the written word only; as it loses the informality of man-to-man discussion, some of its most important tasks become practically impossible. Requisitions become soulless commands. The consumer may ask for something the organization is not set up to deliver, or he may ask for so wide a range of information that the resources of the organization would be fully deployed for months, or he may ask for something which the clandestine force knows is not worth the effort. With a high wall of impenetrable secrecy the consumer has great difficulty in not abusing the organization, and the organization has equal difficulty in shaping itself along lines of greatest utility for the consumer. It is constantly in danger of collecting the wrong and not collecting the right information.

Clandestine intelligence involves highly complicated techniques: the correct approach to a source, its "development," its protection once developed, the security and reliability of its own communications, and so on. Isolated by the security barrier, the perfecting of these techniques sometimes becomes an end in itself. One can understand the technician's absorbed interest in the tricks of his trade, but it is hard to pardon him when he gets his means and ends confused. There are records where clandestine intelligence has exploited a difficult and less remunerative source while it has neglected an easy and more remunerative one. This kind of mis-collection would be less likely to occur if the operation were less free to steer a course behind the fog of its own security regulations.

4. *Stage Four, the evaluation of data*

If the language of intelligence were more precise it might use the word "criticism" in place of the word "evaluation", and if "criticism of data" were permitted we might move forward with a little more certainty and speed. The word criticism means the comparison of something new and unestablished with something older and better established. The best critic,

in these terms, is the man who has the greatest number of established somethings in the right sort of mind, for he will be able by comparison to appraise the validity of the new somethings as they come in. Thus he rejects a report which puts Great Frusina's steel capacity at 45 million tons because he knows from other evidence of unquestionable reliability that her capacity is 36 million tons.

In intelligence research the collected data bearing on the substantive problem must be criticized before they can become the stuff from which a hypothesis emerges. If incorrect data are not rejected the emergent hypothesis will be incorrect, and thus the final picture incorrect. The methodological problem boils down to the expertise of the critic, the breadth of his understanding, and the freedom he is permitted in arriving at his appraisal of the data. Maybe, as in an earlier problem, this is as much a problem of administration as of methodology. But the point is, that intelligence which tries to run itself on an assembly-line basis and tries to substitute administrative techniques for high-class professional personnel is all too likely to fall down on its all-important criticism of the data. This is just another way of saying that intelligence is a pursuit which cannot get along without men of knowledge and wisdom.

There is, however, a problem in the area of evaluation which can properly be called methodological. It arises because of the two ways in which the produce of the surveillance operation is distributed to the consumers. The first way of distribution is through the finished digest, report, or daily or weekly summary. The new stuff is put on the expert's desk; he criticizes it, judges its importance, mixes it with other data he received yesterday and the week before, gives it background and point, and sends it on to the consumer. This activity may be called "reporting", but as can be seen it contains all of the elements of research.

The second way in which the produce of the surveillance operation is distributed is in a much less finished form. The collectors pass to a sort of middleman what they have picked up. The middleman grades the data for reliability of source and the accuracy and reliability of content. He may then distribute direct to the consumer or to the research staff of his own organization or to other intelligence organizations. There is reason for the existence of this middleman, i.e., he is handling data which have been collected clandestinely and his organization must protect its sources. But the middleman -- regardless of his reason for existence -- often does far more than obliterate the sources's identity. He attempts to grade the reliability of the data. In doing so he is sometimes guided by some strange patterns of thought.

The middleman, according to standard practice, is restricted to a very narrow language in making evaluations. He is permitted to grade the reliability of the source according to the letters A, B, C, D, and the content according to the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4. Thus A-1 would designate a report of unvarnished truth straight from the horse's mouth. Data from less dependable sources, and less accurate, might be B-2, C-4, etc. If the data happen to have

come from a document, a newspaper or press release, one school of evaluators designates their value with the single word "documentary". Middlemen have insisted on not amplifying their comments beyond this elementary code and have done their best to see that others who might well amplify were prohibited from so doing. They cling to this procedure on the ground that they are purveyors of a raw commodity and that it is their duty to distribute the commodity in the rawest state possible.

If this argument has force the middlemen themselves at times do much to negate it by distributing the commodity in a state anything but raw. They edit it, abbreviate it, or otherwise obscure its import, frequently losing the point-of-observation or slant of the information: Was it a French Communist, Socialist, or Rightist source which told the number of machine guns on the headquarters of the Communist newspaper, *L'Humanite'*, or told of new political instructions from the Vatican? When the information lands on the consumer's desk, it is no raw commodity but a semi-finished one.

Evaluation of the source by the middleman may be a valid and valuable service. If the source is known to be a good one and if it must be protected at all costs, to label it as grade A is helpful. But it is helpful and valid only in so far as the middleman knows what he is talking about, or in so far as the validity of the source has bearing on the content. But middlemen if they lack independent line on the reliability of the source have been known to grade the source based on the apparent reliability of the content. This is neither helpful nor valid, particularly as the ultimate intelligence consumers often tend to use the data without further and systematic criticism. Accepting the evaluation at face, they are accordingly misled.

Middlemen have at times been people who neither directed clandestine operations nor sat in a place where they were forced to view *all* incoming materials. By all incoming materials I mean those collected overtly from newspapers, government reports, transcriptions of foreign radio broadcasts, etc., as well as those collected clandestinely from other secret sources. Middlemen so placed were insulated from both the field experience of the operator and the desk experience of the research man who is constantly and aggressively working at a specialty. I can understand how a man living in Rome and spending all his time collecting information on Italian politics can develop a high critical sense. I can understand how a research man in Washington who immerses himself in the data of his specialty and every moment of his professional life runs an obstacle race with his own and other people's hypotheses must have a high critical sense and ability. It is less easy to understand how a man who passively reviews a wide range of material *without doing anything about it except grade it*, can possibly have the necessary critical faculties.

To illustrate further: During the war a document graded as A-3 was circulated which told of the American failure to take care of the inhabitants of the city of Oran, Algeria, in the winter of 1943. The source was given an A rating because it appeared to be someone familiar with Oran; the content

was graded as unreliable because the evaluator knew conditions there were not as bad as represented. One recipient of this document poked around until he identified the source as none other than an important French official and the document as the text of one of his off-the-record speeches. Now the official was unquestionably an A source; his knowledge stemmed from first-hand informants or even his own experience. But what he said about Oran under the Americans was of relatively little importance even if it had happened to be correct. The importance of this document was that the source -a man who was allegedly a friend and close ally-had voiced violent adverse criticism of Americans. Yet this, its real value, had been completely obscured by the encoded evaluation. To serve the more important use, the evaluation should have called attention to the authorship of the document. If the document had fallen into American hands through the work of a secret agent whose identity had to be protected, the evaluation would have required four or five sentences instead of one. But suppose that these sentences could not be written without compromising the agent, is this adequate reason for misleading the consumer through the A-3 evaluation? I would say not. I would say that the middlemen should think up some other method of handling the problem or get out of the business.

The crowning peculiarity that is met at times in this sort of evaluation is that of removing the name of the newspaper from the reproduction of a newspaper clipping and substituting the word documentary. What purpose this can serve has always eluded me. Without the name of the newspaper the recipient is deprived of perhaps the most useful piece of information in making his own evaluation. For example, would you not like to know whether the *New York Times* or the *Daily Worker* was responsible for an estimate that Henry Wallace would poll ten million votes for President in 1948? Or would you settle for the attribution "documentary"?

5. *Stage Five, the moment of hypothesis*

What is desired in the way of hypotheses, whenever they may occur, is a large number of possible interpretations of the data, a large number of inferences, or concepts, which are broadly based and productive of still other concepts.

There are two things an intelligence organization must have in order to generate more and better hypotheses: (1) professional staff of highest competence and devotion to the task, and (2) access to all relevant data.

There were many men who lived contemporaneously with Mahan and Mitchell, with Darwin and Freud, with Keynes and Pareto who could have made these men's discoveries, for to a very large extent the facts were there for anyone. But the great discoveries of the race are the result of rigorous, agile, and profound thinking. The many failed because they lacked the brains capable of such thinking and the stamina to face up to an intellectual responsibility. This all points a moral for intelligence: worthwhile discoveries

are not made by a lot of second-rate minds, no matter how they may be juxtaposed organizationally. Twenty men with a mental rating of 5 put together in one room will not produce the ideas of one man with a mental rating of 100, and you cannot add minds as if they were so many fractional parts of genius.

But even if intelligence recruited its professional staff from among the nation's most gifted people it does not follow that there are no problems other than those which face any university researcher or journalist. Even gifted people would not produce the good hypotheses unless they had access to all the relevant data. This is by no means easy to arrange in intelligence. One of the things that gets in the way is again security.

The worker in intelligence is dealing with state secrets upon which the safety or well-being of a nation may rest. On the theory that the secrecy of a secret is in inverse ratio to the number of people who know about it, a highly important secret cannot be too widely known. But a man cannot produce the good hypothesis in any area if he does not know as much as there is to know. It is interesting to speculate on how far Lord Keynes would have got if libraries withheld large blocks of economic data on the ground that they were operational, or how far Dr. Freud might have progressed if mental clinics sealed their records against him on the ground that they were too confidential. Yet intelligence people are constantly confronted with this very argument which seeks to restrict the scope of knowledge on the grounds that an important secret is involved. Security here is bought at great cost in terms of results. Secrecy should be allowed to interfere only so far as absolutely necessary.

7. *Last Stage, presentation*

I am skipping stage 6 (i.e., more collecting and more testing of hypotheses) in the intelligence process because it contains few, if any, problems not covered in stages 2 and 3. The last stage, the one in which the established hypothesis is presented as a new and better approximation to truth, contains at least two important problems.

The form which the finished product must take is one of unadorned brevity and clarity. To be sure, intelligence produces long reports - some may reach many hundred pages -- but there are few studies, reports, or monographs which do not also furnish a one or two-page summary. This limit forces the intelligence producers to be clear in their thought and concise in their presentation, and it enables the hurried consumer to digest while he runs. The result is by no means an unalloyed good. There is such a thing as a complicated idea; one that cannot be expounded in 250 words, or in two pie-charts, an assemblage of little men, little engines, and three-quarters of a little cotton bale. The consumer who insists that no idea is too complicated for the 300-word summary is doing himself no favor. He is requiring the impossible and paying heavily for it in two ways: he is kidding himself that he really knows the subject, and he is contributing to the demoralization of his intelligence outfit.

The intelligence people who spend weeks of back-breaking work on a substantive problem and come up with an answer whose meaning lies in its refinements are injured at the disortion that may occur in a glib summary. Next time they go at such a problem they will have less enthusiasm for exhaustive work, will turn in a poorer study with a still poorer summary tacked on the front. This is not a plea to the harassed man of action to read all the hundreds of pages which come his way, but it is a plea for the middle ground. If he lets it be known he will read nothing longer than one double-spaced page, many of his most loyal and hardest workers will lose some of their fervor in serving him.

A second problem of the presentation stage is that of footnote references. Intelligence consumers, unlike most serious and critical readers. have not demanded footnotes; in fact, they have often condemned footnoting as mere evidence of an academic mind. Thus in those intelligence organizations where rules of styling are made by men who do not understand the methods of research there is opposition to the reference note. Even in organizations where the value of citing sources is fully understood, many sources must be concealed for the reason of security. Thus on both sides there are reasons for skimping on citations and citations are skimped.

I know of no formula for evil any surer than sloppy research unfootnoted. Sloppy and footnoted is not good, but sloppy and unfootnoted multiplies the danger in a way the layman can hardly imagine. The following example is in point.

The military staffs of two countries, X and Y, had some pre-war conversations about the airfields which Y had in one of its colonies. Y told X that it had some airfields built, some about to be built, and a third group to be built when the land had been purchased. On the outbreak of war the content of these conversations became an important item of intelligence, and one of Country X's intelligence outfits distributed a report which accurately named and located the fields, noted that some were ready, others not yet built, and others only planned. It cited its source and gave the dates of the conversations. So far so good.

A few months later another intelligence outfit in another country, Z, got out a report on the colony. The report had a section on airfields. The information which it contained came from the earlier study, but it was changed: those airfields the land for which had not yet been bought were not so indicated, and the citation of source was omitted. We now have a report in which three categories of airfields have been reduced to two, i.e., those in operation and others soon to be completed.

A little later a second intelligence outfit of Country Z took the second report and entered the airfield data on cards. These cards were printed forms which had no appropriate box for noting that an airfield was in operation or merely in the process of construction. The cards carried no footnote references. All three categories of airfield thus dropped into one category.

Taking information from the cards you would have thought that the area had some fifty more airfields than it in fact possessed.

It was about this time that a third intelligence outfit of Country Z came into being and inherited the card file. It developed a technique of presenting airfield data on maps with symbols to indicate length and type of runway. Now back in the original document no length was given for the runways of fields to be, but it was noted that the areas to be purchased for development were to be one mile square. This datum had been repeated in all the succeeding reports. But when the map-makers landed upon it they found it inconvenient. They did not wish to do the unrealistic thing of depicting a square runway one mile by one mile, so they compromised. They reasoned that the runways would be of maximum length, hence must follow the diagonal, and hence be something over a mile, say 7,000 feet, in length. This point decided, they made their maps and assigned a symbol indicating a 7,000 to 8,000 foot runway to fields, some forty-eight of which were never completed.

This sort of error is not entirely ascribable to a lack of footnote, but I would say that the lack considerably enhanced the chance of error. Furthermore, the lack of the footnote made correction more and more unlikely as the data went through the producer-consumer-producer-consumer chain. By the time the map was made a discovery of the error demanded hours of time from the most studious and professionally competent man who might have had the hours to spend. Even so the damage was irreparable, for his more correct and cautious appraisal of airfields in Y's colony could not possibly reach all the consumers of the erroneous reports, or convince all those whom it did reach that his was the truer picture.

The methodological problems which I have discussed above appear to be the most vexing ones, but my catalogue is not exhaustive. There are other problems and there are other facets. Taken together they make the calling of intelligence a difficult one, and cause the results of the intelligence process often to fall below necessary standards of quality.

Chapter 3

PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS OF INTELLIGENCE

There is no phase of intelligence more important than the proper relationship between producers of intelligence and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, one would expect this relationship to establish itself automatically, but it does not do this. It only results from persistent and conscious effort, and is likely to disappear when effort is relaxed.

Proper relationship between intelligence producers and consumers is one of utmost delicacy. Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity. To spell out this meaning is the task of the next pages.

The Problem of Guidance

One of the main propositions of this paper may be summarized as follows: Unless the kind of knowledge herein discussed is complete, accurate, and timely, and unless it is applicable to a specific problem or one coming up, it is useless. In short, intelligence is knowledge solely for the practical matter of taking action, and this requires that the intelligence staff know a great deal about what is under discussion in other units of, say, the department charged with policy, plans, and operations, and that it have all the guidance and cooperation from them which can be afforded. The need for guidance should be evident, for if the intelligence staff is sealed off from the action to be planned and carried out, the knowledge which it produces may not fill the bill.

Let me be precise about my use of the word guidance. To be properly "guided" in a given task intelligence must know almost all about it. If you wanted to find out from a road contractor how big a job it was to build a particular piece of road, you should not go to him and ask: "How hard is it to make a road?" Before you could expect any meaningful answer you must stipulate what two points the road was to connect, what volume of traffic you wished to run over it, the axle loading of your heaviest vehicle, and so on. After you had made your specifications clear the contractor might still be unable to give you the final answer. He might give a rough estimate but refuse to commit himself until he had investigated the terrain to be traversed, the weather with which he would have to contend while putting in the road, the local labor force, etc. When he had made these investigations he might come up with a figure answering all preliminary specifications but which was prohibitively high in cost. At this point he must return to you to begin conversations on compromises. Will you accept two lanes instead of three of four? Will you accept a more circuitous route with fewer cuts, fills, and difficult grades? Will you accept a less expensive surface? As you talk these matters

over with him you find yourself, although you are not a professional road-builder, batting up suggestions on how he can avoid this or that technical difficulty, and he, though no professional transportation man, begins asking questions about your problems. If things go well, you fetch your technical people in to the discussion, and he does also. Before you are done, your two organizations are working together straight across the board and a community of interest and understanding emerges that produces a workable plan and a smooth operation. Naturally and unconsciously the guidance which was mandatory for his (and your) success has been brought into being.

Now this guidance is essential at all levels of strategic intelligence. Intelligence does not formulate objectives; does not draft policy; it is not the maker of plans; nor does it carry out operations. Intelligence, to use the dreadful cliché, performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well-informed; to stand behind them with the book opened at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting, and--at their request--to analyze alternative courses without indicating choice. Intelligence cannot serve if it does not know the doers' minds; if it has not their confidence. It cannot serve unless it can have the kind of guidance any professional man must have from his client. The uninitiated will be surprised to hear that the element of guidance present in the full at the lowest operational levels becomes rarer and rarer as the job of intelligence mounts in augustness.

Without proper guidance and the confidence which goes with it, the surveillance operation, while relatively certain to keep its eye on obvious foreign problem areas may well neglect the less obvious though significant ones. There will be a playing of hunches: "Watch Bolivia, they'll be screaming for information on it in a month", "Isn't it about time we began watching for unrest in Madagascar or Soviet activities in India"; "Say, how about the Spanish underground, how about West African nationalism?" There will be plain and fancy guess work on what is to be watched and what can be left to cool off. There will be differences of opinion as to what is and is not important; on where this, that, and the other matter belongs on the priority list. This striving to anticipate the trouble spot is not to be discouraged, but it certainly should be supplemented continuously by the very best advice that intelligence consumers can offer.

Research in intelligence suffers even more than surveillance when improperly guided. In the first place the knowledge which it purveys may be inapplicable to the use it is to serve, incomplete, inaccurate, and late. It is not reasonable to expect otherwise, when through lack of guidance intelligence is asked to do in a week's or a day's time what may be simply beyond human competence. To be able to deliver would demand a research staff large enough to codify and keep up to date virtually the sum-total of universal knowledge. Even then it is doubtful if what was required would emerge unless intelligence had had some advance warning.

In the second place, the want of sharp and timely guidance is chief contributor to the worst sickness which can afflict intelligence -- that of irresponsibility. When intelligence knows little or nothing of what lies behind a request, it loses desire to participate in the thing to be accomplished; it loses the drive to make exactly the right contribution to the united effort. When this stage is reached, men cease to be either intelligent or sensitive; they begin behaving as dumb and unhappy automatons who worry, if at all, about the wrong thing. What they hand on of knowledge is strictly non-additive; it must be worked over by someone else up the line, less well-informed, before it has value. It may even be out of date or inadequate because long ago they quit caring.

There are a number of reasons why intelligence producers and consumers have difficulty in achieving the proper relationship. Some of these are perhaps less typical of civilian departments than of the armed services. The services, of course, are organized on the well-known staff pattern. This is composed of six divisions responsible respectively for: personnel, *intelligence,* organization and training, service-supply-procurement, plans and operations, and research and development. Now it is to be expected that loyalties, as they jell in this organizational structure, will jell first up and down the vertical administrative line of the division. Only secondarily, will loyalties spread horizontally to coordinate divisions under the commander. Thus there is reason inherent in staff structure why Intelligence might experience difficulty in getting the proper guidance on plans, projected operations, the strength of one's own forces, etc., from its coordinate staff associates. Some critics of staff organization then go further and point to a doctrine buried deep in service formulae called "The Estimate of the Situation." They assert that herein lies something which further adds, and in no small way, to an unsatisfactory relationship between intelligence producers and consumers.

The estimate of the situation is what a military commander must make before he decides upon a course of action. In the preparation of this estimate each staff officer has a clearly defined role: personnel, operations, and logistics tell the commander precisely about his own force; intelligence tells him about the physical environment and the enemy force, etc. However, the degree to which intelligence is permitted knowledge of his commander's own forces and the courses of action which the commander may be mulling over are not spelled out in the formula. It has been argued, however, that the G-2 (intelligence officer) should approach his job of estimating the enemy with complete objectivity, and that if he has full knowledge of his own forces and how they may be employed, his thought may jump ahead to the showdown of strength. He will see his side about to win or lose, and his elation or fear will effect his estimate of the enemy. If he sees his side the easy winner, the argument runs, he will tend to underrate the enemy; if the loser, to overrate the enemy. The commander, having enough difficulties conquering his own subjective self, may not wish to complicate his task by having to screen out that of his intelligence officer. He may feel justified in keeping his whole intelligence arm in ignorance; or he might tell his G-2 everything but only on

the expressed condition that the information be withheld from all subordinate members of the G-2 staff.

It must be said, however, that no matter how good this reasoning may appear to the commander, it rarely seems good or compelling to his intelligence officer. The latter will always be miffed at the thought that his chief doubts his ability to overcome his subjective self, or that his chief holds him or his organization as a poor security risk. To top it all, he will be even more than miffed feeling that no matter how hard he works, he runs the risk of turning out a useless product.

Those who argue that staff structure and the doctrine of the estimate-of-the-situation have within them the means of stultifying a free give and take between intelligence producers and consumers have a point. I would be more impressed if this doctrine were the only discernible cause and if civilian departments which have inherited no such doctrine did not also have their difficulties in the producer-consumer relationship. There are other causes and the first of these arises as a psychological by-product of intelligence practice itself.

This practice separates out the thing called intelligence from all other elements necessary to accomplish an end, and then bestows upon one group of men, to the formal exclusion of others, all contact with the various steps necessary to the intelligence process. Deep in their subconscious selves, then, the excluded may well harbor the feeling that someone has told them they are not quite bright--has said, in effect, "Now don't worry, your thinking is being done for you. We've arranged to give you an external brain. Whenever you want to know something, just ask Intelligence."

If Intelligence were staffed with supermen and geniuses who promptly and invariably came up with a correct and useful answer, the sting might wear off; intelligence might come to be revered by its users as a superior brain. But so long as intelligence is not so staffed (what is?) the relationship between producers and consumers will continue a troubled one.

Another cause for a not too happy relationship is again that of "security" which I have discussed in other contexts heretofore. Policy makers and planners will, in the nature of things, deal with secrets of state. The disclosure of such secrets would amount to a national calamity. (What if one month before the Allied assault on Normandy or the American landing at Leyte, the enemy learned the exact time, place, and magnitude of the projected attack?) Likewise, intelligence must have *its* secrets. A powerful intelligence organization can develop sources of information of value beyond price. They themselves can even become the points of departure and the guarantors of success for a policy, a plan, or an operation. The revelation of such sources or even a hint of their identity will cause their extinction. Their loss can be likened to the loss of an army or all the dollars involved in the Marshall Plan, or, upon occasions, the loss of the state itself.

The stakes being what they are, security and its formal rules are an absolute essential and, as I have said before, the first rule of security is to have the secret known by as few people as possible, all of established discretion. What is the effect of this rule in the intelligence producer-consumer relationship?

When the rule is rigidly applied the consumers are entitled to a legitimate doubt as to the validity of the producers' findings. Suppose you, as a planner, were told something which was contrary to all previous knowledge and belief and contrary to the laws of common sense? Would you accept it blindly and stake a policy or a plan upon it? What would be your emotions, your considered judgment, and your final decision if, after receiving such information, you went back to the producer and got "Sorry, but I cannot say more than I put in the memorandum"?

Likewise, when the consumers--the policy people and planners--rigidly apply the rule, they give the intelligence producers good cause for non-compliance; or the production of useless knowledge. Suppose you were an intelligence producer and one of your consumers appeared with a request for everything you could find out about Java. Suppose the request was phrased just this way. Suppose your entire staff were occupied on other high-priority jobs and that you could not put any of them on this request without some justification. Suppose you told him this. It might be that he would feel he could not give you the justification without a breach of security. You are at cross-purposes. Possibly the consumer would drop the matter there. But then again he might carry his request up through two echelons and see to it that it came back to you through two higher echelons of yours. You would be given your orders to get to work on Java.

The chances are excellent that a request thus routed is one in which security is paramount. The consumer does not really want to know all about Java; he wants to know merely about some tiny fraction of it. But he dares not stipulate the fraction for fear of revealing his intent. So he asks for all of it, hoping to get his information out of one paragraph or chapter of your encyclopedia. He has no guarantee that this paragraph or chapter is not the very one you consider unimportant and accordingly leave out. Nor have you any guarantee that if you write the paragraph or chapter you will write it in the way that will best serve his interests.

Now what I have said above is the extreme. When the issues are of highest importance both producers and consumers go to all permissible lengths to help each other forward the success of the common task. But this very leaning over backwards merely confirms the basic problem which security throws in the way of a perfect relationship. Furthermore, when the substantive issue is of some lower order of importance no one may lean over backwards and something akin to an impasse can easily develop.

I am not playing down in these paragraphs the importance of security regulations and their observance. I am concerned with the point that security is like armor. You can pile on armor until the man inside is absolutely safe and absolutely useless. Both producers and consumers of intelligence in safeguarding their secrets can so insulate themselves that they are unable to serve their reasons for being. This problem is critical and it deserves the continuing study of a high-powered board. It cannot be met by the earnest, informal but sporadic efforts current today. Nor do I believe it would vanish with the passage of an official secrets act. Such an act would help enormously, but it would not be the all-powerful panacea its proponents would have it.

A final reason for misunderstandings between intelligence producers and consumers is the understandable reluctance of consumers to embark upon a hazardous task on the basis of someone else's say-so. After all, if anyone is going to be hurt it probably will not be the producers. I will warrant that the Light Brigade's G-2 was high on the list of survivors in the charge at Balaclava. The casualties, in both the literal and figurative senses, will be to the intelligence users first, and to the producers late down the line. Hence it is easy for the users to adopt the attitude expressed in the rhetorical question: "Why should intelligence worry about doing a perfect job, after all it's not their neck?" From this there can emerge a disrespect, perhaps even a derogation, for the opinion of those who do not carry the weight of operational responsibility. Let intelligence make any mistake from which a penalty follows and relations are likely to worsen.

One last word: intelligence is bound to make mistakes. Some of the questions it must answer demand a divine omniscience; others demand more painstaking work than can be accomplished in the time allotment; still others can be had only with the most elaborate of undercover preparations which have never been made. But let intelligence make a mistake or come up with an inadequate answer and all too often the reaction of the consumers is on the bitter side: "I wouldn't ask those geniuses to tell me how many pints there were in a quart." When intelligence errs there seems to be less tolerance than for the error of other specialists. For example, when a dentist pulls out the wrong tooth (as the best dentists have done) or a lawyer loses a case, the client's reaction is not that he, himself could have done a better job, and that hence forth he will do his own dental and legal work. Yet in intelligence, pardonably wrong diagnosis and understandably inadequate presentation very often arouse just such reaction. For good reason or bad, an intelligence failure seems to rankle out of proportion to its importance, and to justify the consumer in doing his own intelligence henceforth.

Thus there are a number of reasons why the relationship between producers and users may at times be extraordinarily difficult. The result is that the all-important element of guidance is lost. Once this occurs, intelligence must remain innocent of the consumers' requirements, and the consumers innocent of intelligence's capacity to contribute to their problems. In wartime the closer to the fighting front and the smaller the operating unit, the better

the relationship and the keener the guidance; the more remote and the larger the unit, the worse the guidance. There are few situations even comparable to the fighting front, and where they exist they lack that element of common physical peril which makes all men of one side friends and brothers. Thus in peacetime, top-level intelligence must function in the very worst area of wartime relations without the leaven of what you might call front-line tolerance. The relationship is likely to remain poor. This danger of intelligence being too far from the users appears to be a lesser danger than that of being too close. But what of this other danger?

The Problem of Objectivity and Integrity

The danger of being too close to the consumers is not to be readily dismissed. In a moment of intense exasperation intelligence producers and consumers might agree to knock down the administrative barriers and move intelligence piecemeal into the policy, plans, or operations section, or to break up intelligence into its regional and functional units and disperse them among appropriate parts of the operating organization. If this were done, intelligence would likely acquire all the guidance it could wish, perhaps even more than it could legitimately stomach. There will be great and obvious advantages; there will also be costs, some of them prohibitive.

Intelligence is likely to be diverted from its essential task. I mean this in its most crude sense: the intelligence personnel who are professionally studious yet possessed of some of the talents of the doer are going to find themselves asked to share a non-intelligence burden of office. Personnel raids of this sort are very familiar to intelligence people; practically everyone not in intelligence has a way of fancying the best intelligence staff as a pool of unencumbered and elite manpower ready to be tapped at will. Fighting off such raids is a well-known necessity. Once the intelligence man has crossed into operations he will have much difficulty arranging his return. He will soon find himself engulfed in the day-to-day business of the new job. Soon the intelligence staff is whittled down to its least valuable members and has thus lost its identity and its functional integrity. This very thing has happened enough times to be worthy of serious consideration.

Intelligence, if brought too close to its consumers, is likely to be diverted in a less crude sense, but scarcely a less damaging one. For instance, the detailed problems of an operating office can be many and compelling. A great many of them require the production of "spot intelligence." The tendency will be to divert intelligence personnel to this kind of work. This is not to argue the work's unimportance, but it is to argue that too much diversion of this kind makes poor use of an intelligence staff and deprives it of those long stretches of uninterrupted time required to carry out important long-range projects.

Finally, if intelligence is brought into and dispersed among appropriate planning or operations sections, the substantive integrity of intelligence can be seriously injured. Under these conditions the components (regional

or functional) of the former intelligence organization become relatively free agents responsible solely to the planning or operations chief. They are then under no compulsion to coordinate their views with other intelligence groups with cognate interests. It thus becomes increasingly difficult to be sure that all resources are brought to bear on the problem. Indeed, it is highly probable that it will be dealt with solely by those expert in but a single sector of the subject.

This, and the want of substantive give and take which it implies, is not the only disadvantage. In addition there are the contrasting standards of performance as a price of dispersal. An intelligence outfit, which is administratively separated from its consumers and unified within itself, is able to strive for a uniformly excellent product. The best work will inevitably become the scale against which other work is measured. Destroy that centralization and unity and you destroy the best and most natural method of competition and the good deriving from it.

To all the foregoing, there may be administrative remedies. They will not be wholly effective, but they may be able to meet the worst objections. There is, however, one high-order disadvantage in bringing the producers and consumers too close together which will elude the most ingenious administrative devices.

Almost any group of men confronted with getting something planned or done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider the single most desirable course of action. Usually they will try to reach this solution as quickly as possible. It is not unlikely, therefore, that they may have arrived at this solution in ignorance of many relevant and important facts; with their prejudices and cliches of thought discriminating in favor of the facts which they do use. This kind of off-the-cuff solution tends to harden: Their "view" is thus and so; their "position" therefore, thus and so; their "line" in support of the "view" and "position" thus and so. Now add the ingredients of time and opposition and you have something which may be termed "policy."

Now it's rather easy for an intelligence staff itself to fall into this error; to have its own difficulties with that view, position, slant, and line which tends to harden into policy. In spite of the fact that professional scholars, i.e., intelligence officers are supposed to have acquired a technique in guarding against their own intellectual frailties; they are by no means always successful. Intelligence is full of battles between the pro-Mihailovitch and pro-Tito factions, between the champions and opponents of aid to China, between defenders and detractors of the Jewish nation home in Palestine. The fact that there have been such differences of opinion among supposedly objective and impartial students who have had access to substantially the same material, is evidence of someone's surrender to his irrational self.

If intelligence separately administered and thus under the best of conditions finds itself guilty of hasty and unsound "policy", it is likely to find itself doing more of this sort of thing when it is under the administrative

control of its consumers in plans or operations. I do not see how, in human nature, it can be otherwise. Nor under these conditions do I see how intelligence can escape, every so often, from swinging behind the "policy" of the operating unit and prostituting itself in the production of what the Nazis used to call *kampfende Wissenchaft* (roughly, knowledge to further aims of state policy.)

I cannot escape the belief that where intelligence is under the administrative control of consumers, it will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst. As Walter Lippmann sagely remarks, "The only institutional safeguard (for impartial and objective analysis) is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which investigates. The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of men, recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds, responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each other's personal success." (quoted from *Public Opinion*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1922 with the kind permission of the publisher. Chapter XXVI, Section 2).

For these reasons, when intelligence is too close to operations what is unquestionably gained in *guidance* may well be lost in *integrity* and *objectivity*. The absorption of intelligence producers by the consumers may prove to be too heroic a cure for both disease and patient.

The only way out of the dilemma seems to lie in the very compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the users and the producers familiar with each others organization.

The Problem of Intelligence and Policy Formulation

Intelligence must not be the apologist for policy, as I have said, but this does not mean that intelligence has no role in policy formulation. Intelligence's role is definite and simple and might be described in two stages: (1) the exhaustive examination of the situation for which a policy is required, and (2) the objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy problem offers.

It goes without saying that intelligence can skew its findings, so that one alternative will appear many times more attractive than the others. It is not heartening to reflect that just this has been done, though it would be hard to prove that each such crime was one which intelligence embarked upon entirely on its own responsiblity. For instance, during the war British intelligence could prove at the drop of a hat that there was such a thing as a soft underbelly and that compared to it all other portals to fortress Europa were as granite. Merely because intelligence is capable of getting off the

beam is not sufficient reason to exclude it entirely from policy considerations or to condemn it as unprincipled. As long as its complement of professional personnel is of high intellectual and moral caliber, the risks which the policy-making users run in accepting its analysis of alternatives are far less than those they would run if intelligence is excluded from councils.

The Problem of Intelligence (the Product) and its Acceptance

What intelligence desires above all else is that its findings prove useful in making decisions. There is, however, no universal law which obliges policy, plans, and operations to accept and use these findings. If intelligence is guilty of poor method or errors in judgment, there is nothing to coerce its consumers into acting upon its advice. This fact has its benefits and its evils. The benefits are almost too obvious to mention: for example, no one would advocate taking a course of action which evidence, not considered by intelligence, indicated to be suicidal. Just because an intelligence aberration happens to indicate the law of gravity is inoperative in Lent does not constitute sufficient reason to jump off a high roof on Good Friday. But in this very laudable liberty to discount intelligence lies a source of danger. Where is one to start and stop discounting intelligence?

In one of the books for children written by James Willard Shultz there is a story of some Indian tribes readying themselves for the warpath. The combined chiefs met to discuss the operation and instructed headquarters G-2 (a medicine man named White Antelope) to give an estimate of enemy capabilities. In a couple of days' time White Antelope, having gone through the necessary professional gyrations, came back to the combined chiefs. It seems that the gods had favored his ceremonial by granting him a vision in which he saw a lone raven seated on the carcass of a dead deer. As the raven feasted he did not notice a magpie who slipped into a tree overhead and took some observations, nor did not notice that the magpie gave the signal for the concentration of his deployed force. When the magpies' build-up in strength was sufficient, they dropped down upon the raven and attacked. The raven put up a game fight, but as things moved from bad to worse decided to retreat to prepared positions. If White Antelope were an irresponsible G-2 he might have left it at that, but being responsible and feeling that he should make his contribution to the common cause, he hazarded an interpretation. To him the raven was the allied force and the magpies were the enemy--the facts would justify such an interpretation--and plainly the enemy's capabilities were more than adequate. The allies were in for a licking. But Bull Head who was supreme commander spoke up and said in effect, "What you tell us is not much more than that the expeditionary force will be in danger. This we already know. As to the raven and the magpies, it is my belief that we are the magpies, and the enemy, the raven. We start tomorrow." The G-2's estimate had not been accepted.

It is important to notice that White Antelope had done his best according to a method which was standard operating procedure. Bull Head himself would have admitted as much. Bull Head did not override his G-2 because of

a reasoned distrust of his data or a rational doubt of his objectivity; he overrode him on the basis of a hunch and probably a wishful one at that.

Now I do not wish to reject all hunches and intuitions as uniformly perilous, for there are hunches based upon knowledge and understanding which are the stuff of highest truth. What I do seek to reject is intuition based upon nothing and which takes off from the wish. The intelligence consumer who has been close to the problem of the producer, who knows it inside out, may have an insight denied the producer. His near view of the broad aspects of the problem and his remoteness from the fogging detail and drudgery of surveillance or research may be the very thing which permits him to arrive at a more accurate synthesis of truth than that afforded the producer. But let the consumer beware. If he overrides the conclusions of his intelligence arm, and makes a correct estimate, let him deeply ponder why this came about. Let him not get the notion that he need only consult his stars to outdo his G-2. If he gets that notion, he will destroy his intelligence organization--its members will not seek truth if a mere soothsayer may negate their conclusions.

Adolf Hitler was such a consumer. There is every reason to think that his intelligence at both surveillance and research levels was technically adequate, and that his general staff was technically competent. There is every reason to believe that he got accurate knowledge from his intelligence and good advice from the staff which based its judgments upon this knowledge. But Hitler had his hunches and the first few of them were brilliant. Because of luck, or because of a profound and perhaps subconscious knowledge of what was at issue, he called the turn correctly and in opposition to his more formal advice. But the trouble was that he apparently did not try to analyze the why of his successful intuition. He went on as if it were a natural, personal, and infallible source of truth. When he ordered a cut-back in German war production in the fall of 1941 he began to reap the penalties for his own errors, i.e., overestimating the Luftwaffe's capabilities and underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union. Thus, he not only took some direct and positive steps, but he also took indirect and equally hurtful steps to lose the war. He succeeded in damaging severely the continuing utility of his staff and intelligence service.

Where intelligence producers realize that there is no sense in forwarding knowledge which does not correspond to the consumer's preconceptions, there ceases to be intelligence. The consumer is out on his own with no more guide than the tea leaf and the crystal ball. He may do well with them, but for the long haul I would place my money elsewhere. Without discarding intuition as a false friend, I would urge the consumer to use it with full knowledge of its frailties. When the findings of the intelligence arm are regularly ignored because of intuition, the consumer should recognize that he is turning his back on the instruments by which western man has, since Aristotle, steadily enlarged his horizons--those of reason and scientific method.