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SUMMARY

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The belligerent tone of Arab broadcasts continues to gather momentum, in spite of Soviet-U.S. agreement to support partition. On the other hand, actual threats of definite military action are confined to the statement that Arab troops will "enter" Palestine when the British leave,

Radio reports cast some doubt upon the likelihood that Egypt or Transjordan would fight, and there is almost no mention of Saudi Arabia in this connection.

Monitored broadcasts reveal few facts on troop strength, though an Egyptian organization claims 10,000 new volunteers.

Numerous minor items relate to troops on Palestine's northern and southern frontiers, especially the northern. For examples Syrian mechanized forces are reported near Kuneitra and east of Lake Tiberias; British forces in Roshpina are reported replaced by Transjordan Frontier Guards with an Arab majority; an Egyptian regiment has been ordered to El-Arish.

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I. INTENTIONS OF THE ARAB STATES

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Soviet-U.S. agreement to the partition of Palestine has not produced any noticeable diminution in the demunciations of partition on the part of the Arab radios, nor in the frequency of reports of military preparation. On the other hand, actual threats of war do not occur except in the following forme: melodramatic general threats; reports of border preparations; and assertions that the Arab troops will enter Palestine when the British leave.

There appear to be doubts about Egypt's readiness to fight, based on the fact that it did not participate in the general Arab protest-strike against partition, and on vehement denial of rumors that it is not standing with the other Arab states. There is also room for doubt about Transjordan's readiness, based on Ming Abdullah's statement of preference for peace. Saudi Arabia is almost never mentioned in this connection.

a. Little Effect of Soviet-U.S. Stand on Belligerence of Broadcasts: With regard to the likelihood that Arab readiness to use force right be reduced by the prospect of united Soviet-U.S. opposition in the $U_c N_{\phi_0}$ it should be noted that the belligerent tone of the Arab radio has, if anything, increased since 13 October, when the Soviet stand was announced. Both vilification of Zionists (chiefly over the Damascus radio) and miscellaneous references to army maneuvers, volunteers, etc., have continued with at least as much frequency and intensity as before that date.

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b. Tew Definite Threats of Wars In spite of their general belligerence, the Arab radios exhibit a noteworthy absence of specific threats of war which, if made, would involve loss of face in the event they were not carried out. The threats that do occur take the following forms: (1) melodramatic assertions that the Zionists are "assassins" who will be "exterminated" and that enforcing partition would cause "revolt" of all Arab: throughout the worlds (2) references to troops on frontiers and consultations of commanders; (3) definite statements that Arab forces will "go to Palestine"--without saying what they will do there--when the British withdraw. The Prime Minister of Iraq is quoted (by London) as saying "that the Iraqi Army would go to Palestine if the V.W. adopted partition. He decline d to give the dispositions of the Iraqi forces, but said that they would enter Palestine within a matter of minutes if the British troops withdraw." (London, 23 October 1947)

The Grand Mufti is quoted as follows: "Withdrawal of the British from Palestine is an essential prerequisite, and we have met their declaration with satisfaction. We are waiting for implementation of the evacuation to achieve our rights in full." (as told to Beirut paper AL-HAYAT, quoted by Sharq al-Adna, Jeffa, in Arabic, 16 October 1947)

c. Ambiguity in the Positions of Egypt and Transjordan; No Word on Saudi Arabia: The most emphatic and consistent support of the Arab cause, as judged by radio reports, comes from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Arabs of Palestine itself. Saudi Arabia is not heard from at all, nor have there been any monitored broadcasts describing military support by it. Pakistan and Iran report only "volunteers," though Jinnah announces "fullest support." There is also some ambiguity in the positions of Krypt and Transjordans

1. Egypt. There are several reports of Egyptian troops bying sent to the Palestinian border (see below), and it is reported that 10,000 Egyptian troops are being trained for the fight. King Farouk is said by the Beirut radio to be "Interested in rescuing Palestine as much as he is interested in liberating Egypt and uniting the Nile valley."

On the other hand, there have been no quoted official statements by Egyptian representatives; the Cairo radio is relatively non-belligerent; the general strike on 3 October against the UNSCOP recommendations is said to have "extended throughout all the Arab countries except Egypt"; and very recently (29 October) the Arab League issued a long and vehement dental of rumors that Egypt was not fully supporting the Arabs of Palestine. The wording of this denial suggests that there have been skeptical rumors also with regard to states other than Egypt, since it "completely denies all rumors and publications in this connection, whether regarding Egypt or any other Arab state." (Cairo, in Arabic, 29 October 1947)

2. Transjordan. Both Transjordan and Egypt are included in a report of a meeting of Army Commanders from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Transjordan to be held "on the frontier," (Sharq al-Adma, Jaffa, 12 October 1947) On the other hand, King Abdullah proclaims that he does not "seek enmity"? "the Transjordanian Premier has refuted news reporting that the Transjordanian Army was making dispositions on the Palestinian borders. King Abdullah seid that his country did not seek enmity with any other country but, contrariwise, preferred peace to war." (Ondurman, in Arabic, 14 October 1947)

IL. TROOP MOBILIZATION

References in monitored broadcasts to troop mobilization in the event of conflict include the following fragmentary reports: that 10,000 Egyptians have volunteered; that, according to an Iraqi chief, 250,000 Iraqi volunteers could be raised; and that Arabs and Jews in Palestine have appealed for volunteers.

a. <u>Egypt</u>: Eid Ramadan, Vice-President of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin association, declared that 10,000 young men of his organization had volunteered for Palestine's "defense." (Damascus, in Arabic, 23 October 1947)

b. Irag: Sheikh Kheirallah, member of the committee organizing a meeting of 1,000 tribal leaders on 22 October, said that the Iragi tribes could raise a quarter of a million volunteers. (Sharq al-Adna, Jaffa, 13 October 1947)



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c. Palestinian Arabs: "Arab organizations have appealed to all Arabs (to volunteer), by means of pamphlets distributed yesterday in the Jerusalem streets." (Beirut, 18 October 1947) "Leaflets were distributed throughout Jaffa urging Arab youths to volunteer immediately." (Cairo, 18 October 1947)

d. <u>Palestinian Jews</u>: "Jewish national Councils in various big Palestine cities have appealed to all Jews, den and women between the ages of 15 and 50, to volunteer for the Jewish Army." (Belrut, in Arabic, 1: October 1947)

III, PREPARATIONS ON PALISTINE FRONTIERS

There are numerous items regarding military preparations on Palestine's northern and southern frontiers, especially the northern. The eastern or Transjordanian frontier is not mentioned, except in the above-mentioned denial. ($I_o c_i 2$) Preparations in Jaffa and Haifa are montioned, and there are rumors of Zionist troops waiting in European ports.

a. . Northern Frontiers

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"The newspaper HA-BOEAN points out that tension among the Jews in the north of Palestine has reached such an extent that they are unable to do any work on account of their fear of the Arab forces stationed at the northern border of Falestine. They do not dare to plow their land while the Syriin Dakota planes roar over their heads. The nowspaper states that the road between Damascus and Beirut is full of light armoved units. The sight of the Syrian conver of cars is having a paralyzing effect on the Jews, who have not slept since last Saturday." (Cairo, ARAB PRESS SERVICE, im Arabic Morse, 15 October 1947)

"The Syrian Army stationed near the frontiers of Palestine and Transjordan is to start important maneuvers on Saturday (1 November)." (Brazzaville, 30 October 1947)

"Humors are current here (Cairo) that the Iraqi Army as well as the Transjordan Army have crossed their common frontiers with the knowledge of Egypt, and that they have reached the point of concentration planned by the Arab leader, Fawri al-Kawukji. It is said that Emir Nagid Arslan, the Lebanest Defense Minister, went to the frontier region which joins Palestine. He was accompanied by two officers of the Lebanese Chief of Staff. He was met by Lt, Gen, Emir Shihab, Commander of the Forces in Southern Lebanon." (Cairo, in Arabic Morse, 12 October 1947).

"Syrian forces from the north are still passing through Damascus on route for the Southern borders, with bands playing, and amidut the people's cheers for Palestine and Egypt." (Damascus, 17 October 1947)

b. Southern Frontiers

"An Egyptian regiment has received orders to move to El-Arish to join an infantry detachment stationed there. The regiment consists of one infantry detachment from Cairo, one from Alexandrie, a support unit, an arti-aircraft battery, artillery, signals, and administrative units." (Damascus, 17 October 1947)

"Fifteen Egyptian Army planes have arrived in El-Arish, carrying equipment to provide areas where the Egyptian Army will camp with water and electricity. These forces (will) reportedly (be) sent to the Egypt-Palestine frontier." (Beirut, 18 October 1947)

"The Egyptian Defense Ministry neither confirmed nor denied today's AL-AFRAM report that 7,000 soldiers would be sent to El-Arisb, near the Palestine frontiers." (Damascus, 17 October 1947)

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c. Haifa and Jaffa:

"The establishment of Arab guards for the protection of Arab regions and districts in Haifa has been completed. Villages in the neighborhood of Haifa which are adjacent to Jewish colonies were notified to send women and children to distant villages. Wight patrols have also been set up in all these villages. Some families in Haifa are beginning to leave the town for the interior. Mational organizations in (Jaffa) are continuing their meetings to arrange the necessary measures against any danger that may befall the town." (Cairo, 15 October 1947)

d. Rumors of Jews Coming from European Portes

"Rumors have been circulated by Zionists that they are planning an attack against Palestine. They are reportedly concentrating their forces on the Rumanian and Bulgarian shores and in Genca in Italy. Several ships will reportedly transport these criminals to the sacred land of the Arabs. Among those ships are two ships now in Constanta harbor." (Damascus, 27 October 1947)

IV. REPORT OF COLLABORATION AMONG ARAB ARMIES

Though it is obviously not based on authoritative information, the following reported plan for inter-Arab collaboration may be of some interest:

"Circles in close rolation with the Council of the Arab League believe that it has been decided to unite the efforts of the Arab Armies. Belief is prevalent that leadership of these Armies will be given to a well-known military personage, assisted by a chief of a staff organization representing the seven Arab countries, members of the League. Every Army will (preserve the national character of) each Army. Liaison officers will be appointed in each Army. It is understood that Transjordan will offer to the Arab United Army its mechanized and armed units. Syria will offer cavalry divisions, particularly the Al-Sharkas (Circassiani) Infantry. Lebanon will put into the field infantry divisions. The Saudi Arabian Army Air Force will be relied upon. In the case of Iraq and Egypt, they will minister to the Arab Army in preparing its meds in weapons and guns, medical equi ment, and the safeguarding of its lines of communication.⁵ (Cairo, ARAB PRESS SERVICE, in Arabic Morse, 12 October 1947)

(Note: The above mention of Saudi Arabia is the only one in monitored broadcasts from the Near East.)

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