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PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to make a brief statement on Guatemala.

This is my first opportunity to express publicly our Government's and my personal sympathy for the people of Guatemala in the unparalleled tragedy which has befallen them and their country.

Americans have always traditionally responded generously in thought and deed to the needs of the suffering. Reflecting that humanitarian spirit, our Government, joined by its citizens and charitable organizations, is mounting a major effort to assist the Government and people of Guatemala to ease the suffering caused by the earthquake.

I will visit Guatemala on February 24 in connection with my Latin American trip.

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Q Mr. Secretary, the State Department Spokesman has this week consistently refused to comment on the reports of the microwave bugging of the Embassy in Moscow. Will you now tell us the facts and what action you have taken to get the Russians to cease this activity, which has been going on for years?

Also, could you discuss the radiation hazard that is involved in this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This issue is a matter of great delicacy which has many ramifications. Our overwhelming concern is, of course, the health and welfare of State Department and other personnel in Moscow. We have made unilateral efforts to reduce any dangers, and we are also engaged in discussions on the subject. But I do not believe it would serve these purposes if I went into any greater detail.

Q May I follow it up, please, because radiation in the minds of many Americans means radioactivity? Can you rule out that this is radioactivity?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not know exactly. These matters have to be related to accepted health levels, and they have to be related also to the safety standards over a period of time. I would not use the word

Q Mr. Secretary, in light of the diplomatic and military successes of the Popular Movement in Angola, is the United States prepared to follow the OAU line and recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, or at least open diplomatic contacts with them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has declared consistently that its objection was not to the MPLA as an organization, nor to its political views as such. Our objection has been to the imposition of a minority government by what is now 12,000 Cuban troops and nearly \$300 million worth of Soviet equipment. Since January alone the Soviet Union has introduced over \$100 million worth of military equipment into Angola.

Those facts will not be changed by the military victory that will inevitably result when one side is deprived of restraint and the other is given no opportunity to resist.

What the United States will do when a de facto situation exists, we will decide under those circumstances. But I have said before our objection is to the outside imposition of a government and not to the African component of the government itself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last year you spoke eloquently of the principles that give purpose to our strength --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I beg your pardon?

Q. Last year you gave a number of speeches dealing with the principles that give purpose to American strength. In your opinion, what are these basic principles of American constitutional democracy, and how do you conform your official conduct and that of the State Department to the dictates of these principles?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't seen this gentleman in over a year and a half, and I think we will go to another question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could ask another question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Certainly.

Q. Specifically in a government such as ours, which functions by the consent of the governed, do you feel that public officials such as yourself have a duty to fully, currently, and truthfully inform the public, their employers, so that the consent will be informed and not blind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was the last?

Q -- consent of the governed will be informed consent and not blind consent.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In a democracy the government has an obligation to keep the public informed and to get support by the existing constitutional processes. In a democracy also, it is not possible to have effective government unless there is a minimum of restraint and a minimum of decency in the public debate so that the essential element of confidence that must exist if a society is to get through its difficulties is preserved.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the status of the SALT talks is, the prospects for your return to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As we have pointed out, in the SALT talks there were a number of propositions made in Moscow, and a number of proposals were made by the Soviet Union in reply to the propositions that we have advanced. These moved matters forward somewhat. We are now studying the Soviet reply, and we are developing a position to transmit to the Soviet Union within the next week or so. After we have a Soviet reply, we will be able to judge how close we are to an agreement and what the next step should be.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the question of the Lockheed reports, could I ask you a three-part question, please?

What effect do you think these revelations will have on both the diplomatic and economic interests of the United States abroad?

Two, could you tell us about a letter that was published in the New York Times yesterday which says that you supported pleas by Lockheed that the names of officials to whom it had made payoffs, along with the names of their countries, be kept secret?

And three, could you tell us when the Department first became aware of these matters?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not have the exact answer to your last question. We became aware of these matters some months ago when we were asked about the foreign policy implications of some of these revelations. And we pointed out that the implications for the domestic stability and the domestic situation of other countries could be extremely serious.

The impact of these revelations has been serious. On the other hand, we not only do not condone these actions,

we strongly condemn them. We think it is an inappropriate way to conduct business, and we regret very much that these actions, if they are true, in fact took place.

Q Could I take you back to part two of that, sir, as to why you thought not revealing the names, that the names be kept secret, was in the interest of the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because the revelation by a Congressional committee of the names of senior officials of other countries is bound to have serious consequences in those countries. And that is a matter that we thought the Committee should keep in mind.

But I repeat, this has nothing to do with our approving or condoning the actions that are revealed in those reports, if they are true -- which I do not know.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, does it disturb you at all that an American company was engaging in activities involving foreign officials, including in many cases right-wing officials, that from your statement was apparently unknown to U.S. intelligence officials or the State Department?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It disturbs me. I

think it is a matter that should not take place and
we must make every effort to prevent in the future.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are your future plans for any sort of negotiations regarding the Middle East situation, and also can you confirm reports of meetings between Israeli and Jordanian officials concerning the West Bank?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think other governments have to confirm or deny meetings that they may be having. We are not involved in any such activities. We have had full and, on the whole, satisfactory talks with Prime Minister Rabin. We will have some more exchanges with the Israeli Government, and then we will bring back our Ambassadors from the Middle East, from the Arab countries, for consultation to discuss what the next move should be. And we will then convey our best judgment of the various opportunities that are available to all of the parties within the course of the next month.

Mr. Lisagor?

Q Mr. Secretary, a representative of Zaire has been here talking to the President and yourself. Does this Administration plan some overt course of policy in relation to those countries that surround Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to overt actions as they apply to Angola, I do not think it has been generally understood the difficulty that any overt request would have from a legal point of view, because it would in effect say that the United States is asking for funds for some country to intervene in a civil war in some other country. So that part of it is a matter of extreme legal and political difficulty.

The second problem we now face is that, as a result of this war and of the Cuban and Soviet intervention, there is grave concern in countries like Zaire and Zambia and other countries of Africa that this pattern might be repeated, or that the weapons that have been accumulated there might be used for purposes beyond the borders of Angola.

We are talking to the Governments of Zaire and Zambia, and we will be talking to other governments, to make sure that we understand what they consider their necessities, and to do the best that we can to prevent the pattern of Angola from setting a precedent for the rest of Africa. And when I go to Africa later this year, this is one of the subjects that I plan to discuss.

Q Can I follow that up by asking if they are requesting specific American actions now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they request specific American action now, we would take it very seriously and we would, of course, discuss it fully with the Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have gone to quite a bit of trouble in the last few weeks to set forth your views about the kind of debate on foreign policy that ought to take place in 1976, particularly with reference to the Soviet Union. How do you feel, having done that, about the statements which have recently been made that the only result of detente is advantages to the Soviet Union and the ability of the United States to sell some Pepsi-Colas in Siberia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that there are a lot of candidates, and they all have a problem about getting into the headlines. I can not spend my time answering every candidate making some political charge.

I believe that the Administration has attempted to set forth our over-all philosophy, tied to our interpretation of realities. I believe that a debate ought to deal with some other version of reality, with some other concepts, and not with slogans. And I think that the

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relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples Republic of China is too delicate, too important for the peace of the world to be used for simply partisan sloganeering.

Q Mr. Secretary, the president of an outfit called Hudson Engineering in New Jersey claims that he has seen Soviet trawlers using sonic equipment testing for oil off the Jersey coast. Mr. Hudson claims to have been in touch with the State Department, and to have heard from the State Department that the Soviets have tried to begin talks on this subject, and that such talks are in fact underway. Would you respond, please?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never heard this, and I will have to check into it. I have never heard this argument.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you comment, please, on two things -- Angola and the Moscow Embassy affair? Do these have a cumulative effect which at least affects the climate in which the other aspects of detente, such as SALT, proceed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Moscow Embassy affair, I have tried to point out, is a matter of great complexity

and sensitivity.

Angola, we have stressed since November, is a pattern of behavior that the United States will not accept, that if continued it will have serious consequences for any possibility of easing of relations with the Soviet Union, and if continued, and if it becomes a pattern, must affect other relationships.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you comment on recent changes in Peking, and on what effect this might have on U.S.-China relations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We were not previously consulted before these changes were made. Indeed, at the risk of undermining our reputation for foreseeing things, we were surprised by the changes.

We believe that the basic foreign policy of the Peoples Republic of China, as well as ours, depends on the basic conception of the national interests of both countries. Those interests will determine the policies, and their personalities, in this sense, play a secondary role. So we expect that the basic lines of our foreign policy, as the basic lines of Chinese policy, will continue.

Q Mr. Secretary, you saw former President Nixon

in San Clemente before it was announced that he was going to go to China. What do you think of his trip, and what does it mean for American-Chinese relations? What are the Chinese trying to tell us by that invitation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When I saw President Nixon he did not tell me that a trip by him to the Peoples Republic of China was imminent. He talked in very general terms of his intentions eventually to take a trip, but not that it was as imminent as it turned out to be.

President Nixon was responsible for the opening to China, and I believe this to have been one of the major American diplomatic initiatives of the recent period.

The Chinese are undoubtedly attempting to underline the importance they attach to this relationship by their invitation.

This Administration has repeatedly made clear that we attach very great significance to the relationship with the Peoples Republic of China, and therefore we consider anything that symbolizes this to be, on the whole, helpful.

On the other hand, President Nixon is going there as a private citizen, and what the intentions of the

Chinese were, beyond what I have stated, is really a matter that they have not discussed with us.

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to Angola, now that the MPLA seems to have won a military victory, how serious a setback do you think this is for the United States, and what lessons does this tell the rest of the world about the attitudes and divisions in Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The MPLA did not score a military victory. Cuba scored a military victory, backed by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the fighting was done by Cuban forces.

What it should make clear is that we can conduct foreign policy only as a united people, that these victories and setbacks that I am being asked about are not victories and setbacks for the Administration, they are setbacks for the United States; and not so much for the United States as for those who have to make the decision what to do in similar circumstances when similar pressures appear again.

It cannot be in the interest of the United States to establish the principle that Soviet arms and Cuban expeditionary forces can appear in situations of turmoil.

As we look around the world at areas of potential conflict, it cannot be in the interest of the United States to create the impression that, in times of crisis, either threats or promises of the United States may not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze us.

So, leaving aside the merit of the particular argument as between one branch or the other, the absolute requirement of the United States is to come together on a unified position, and this cannot wait for our electoral process to work itself out.

Q Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, there is a catch phrase that has been kicking around the hemisphere for about twelve years -- the export of revolution -- with reference to Cuba. Premier Castro denies that he is exporting revolution. The Soviets deny they are exporting revolution. Premier Castro this week in Havana was saying this. Do you feel that the Soviet Union and Cuba are attempting to export, if not revolution, at least their system in the Angola matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not care what label you give it. There are 12,000 Cuban troops and hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equipment in a situation that, had it been left alone, would have led to some African solution of a coalition of all of the factions in which over a period of time one or the other might have prevailed, but in a local context.

This is a pattern which, as one looks at other parts of the world, would have the gravest consequences for peace and stability, and it is one which the United States treats with indifference only at the risk of buying graver crises at higher cost later on.

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Q Well, if you had your "druthers", what would you do vis-a-vis Cuba?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We stated our preferences in December, when the situation in our judgment was manageable and negotiable. It did not get out of hand until our domestic divisions deprived us of diplomatic leverage.

What we will do in the future is not for me to say right now, except that we cannot leave the impression that we will be indifferent to a continuation of these efforts. And if we continue to speak about Angola it is not because we have any illusions about what is going on in Angola, but because we want the American public to understand, we want other countries to understand, that at least the Executive Branch understands what the problem is and that it will exercise its responsibilities in a democracy to try to bring home to the public and to the Congress what our future obligations may be.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a published account of the Pike Committee report, including dozens of charges against you, ranging from the allegation that your policy resulted in a willful massacre of Kurds, and also that your practices of withholding information

on the SALT talks produced comments by you which are at variance with the facts, which of course is a

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euphemism for lying. Can you direct yourself specifically to any of these charges so that we can run through them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, it is extremely difficult to reply to charges in a leaked document. And I do not know what version of the Pike Committee report is now being circulated.

The Pike Committee report presents two problems. One, the use of highly classified information in violation of an agreement between the Executive Branch and the legislative Branch.

Secondly, the use of classified information in a manner that is so distorted, so geared to preconceived ideas, that the total impact is to produce a malicious lie.

And therefore, even where documents in themselves are correct, they are taken so out of context and they are so fitted into a preconceived pattern that we are facing here a new version of McCarthyism.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question?

It is indicative of the general interest that until now no question has been asked about Latin America.

Why are you going to Latin America? And in connection

with the previous discussion on Angola and the role of Cuban troops, are you going to take this up and possibly propose putting Cuba back into the Hemispheric diplomatic doghouse?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The trip to Latin America has been planned for a long time, and it had to be postponed on a number of occasions because overwhelming other events occurred. It is designed to discuss primarily Hemispheric problems: the relationship of Latin America to the United States; the relationship of the Western Hemisphere in which we are facing the problems of the traditional Hemispheric pattern in a world of interdependence; in which the regional concerns of some of the countries are now competing with the interests in the developing world in general; and in which in Latin America we deal with countries of similar backgrounds, similar histories, but a different economic development.

So that how we manage this relationship is of very great importance.

What is happening in Angola may or may not come up. It is not the primary purpose of my trip. I am not travelling through Latin America in order to line up

Latin Americans on the Cuban problem.

It is clear that the evolution towards normalization of relations with Cuba, which had started last year and with which we had been prepared to cooperate, has been interrupted.

But we are not going to Latin America on a crusade against Cuba.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the United States encourage the Kurds to expect our support and then suddenly double-cross them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is a total falsehood. But it is impossible in these covert operations to explain the truth without creating even more difficulties.

But the charges that have been made are utterly irresponsible.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the UN resolutions concerning Namibia, what would be the U.S. position if the military operations now in Angola extend through the frontier to Namibia and involve now South African troops against Cubans or against Angolans?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a problem that we have not yet had to face. But I can only say we cannot look with equanimity to the sending of Cuban

expeditionary forces around the world.

Q Mr. Secretary, the West German Republic and the United States have just concluded an international treaty on social security matters. Before this treaty was signed, about \$1 billion worth of insurance policies held by American citizens were cancelled by the West German Government. These people are now in suspense. Cannot some pressure be borne on the West German Government to re-institute them into their contractual rights?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the risk of undermining public confidence, I do not know what you are talking about. (Laughter) We will look into this.

Q Mr. Secretary, referring to your characterization of the Pike Committee leaks, could you tell us to what extent they will affect your conduct of the foreign policy of this country?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the misuse of highly classified information in a tendentious, misleading, and totally irresponsible fashion must do damage to the foreign policy of the United States and has already done damage to the foreign policy of the United States. As far as my conduct of foreign policy

is concerned, the best I can do is to recommend what I believe to be in the national interest, to defend it within the government and to the public as best as I can, and then let the democratic process and history sort it out.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the irreconcilable clash between your enemies, those who attack you, and your own determination to continue foreign policy as you best see fit, at which point -- and I hope you won't dismiss it again with a joke -- at which point does it become necessary for you to consider whether you in effect should not step down in the interest of American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I should conclude that it is in the interest of American foreign policy, I would step down. But what one also has to consider is whether the style of public debate should be that any public figure can be destroyed by the most irresponsible and flagrant charges, and that then the argument should be made that the effectiveness is affected because totally irresponsible and essentially untrue charges are made. That, too, has to be weighed.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you receive a

gift from General Barzani, and if so where is it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a question --

Q Following up Mr. Marder's question.

He asked you in generalities; I'm asking you for details.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: General Barzani sent a gift to the White House which was never in my possession, which I have never received, which I never in any way dealt with, which was kept in the White House in some regular procedure. And I have never received a gift either from General Barzani or a gift I kept from any other foreign leader. And I think it is a disgrace to believe, and to imply, that the United States would conduct foreign policy because of gifts that senior officials may receive.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on our buying oil from them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are negotiating the purchase of 10 million tons of oil a year, which is about three percent of our total imports. This involves a number of issues -- price, shipping rates and related matters. There is a particular interest in it, because our shipping is going to the Soviet Union

anyway, delivering grain, and could therefore be advantageously used on the return trip carrying oil.

The negotiations are still in process. There is an agreement that 10 million tons a year will be available if we can agree on a price that is advantageous to the United States or surrounding benefits that will make this competitive with other purchases.

Q Don't you think the price is below what the OPEC countries are charging?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One has to look at the over-all package, including all the related matters, before one can make a judgment whether it is a competitive deal.

Q Mr. Secretary, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, the press credentials of the Radio Free Europe correspondents in Innsbruck were lifted by the International Olympic Committee. I wonder whether or not you think that is a violation of the Helsinki agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not considered this. But of course as you know we support Radio Free Europe, and we have always encouraged it.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how your wife is doing after her operation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: She is improving daily,

thank you.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(Whereupon at 12:45 p.m. the press
conference was concluded.)