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41532

Title: The Record and Potential of Air Attacks in Attaining US Objectives in Vietnam

Project No: 00.4771

Problem: To assess the past performance and potential of the US/GVN air offensive -- Rolling Thunder -- in attaining its objectives.

- a. to reduce the ability of or increase the cost to North Vietnam of infiltrating men and equipment into South Vietnam.
- b. to increase the political cost to North Vietnam of continuing to support Pathet Lao and Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam.
- c. to encourage the people and government of South Vietnam.

Project Outline and Assignments

I. Objectives of the Campaign

A brief statement of the objectives, basically as stated in the "Casualties" report and as amplified in public statements of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

Action: ONE: Due to ORR/D/T: 28 Jan 66

II. The Logistic Supply of VC/PAVN Forces

A. Total Daily Requirements at

- a. Present level of forces and combat
- b. Present level of forces and escalated combat
- c. Increased forces and escalated combat (upper limit, 155 battalions, engaged in combat every 3 days)

B. Requirements from Abroad -- under each of the situations outlined in II. A. with added consideration of effect of a denial of supplies from sources within South Vietnam.

C. Capacity of Routes -- present and projected capacity at end 1966, and estimate of all-weather capacity.

- a. Land (Road and Inland Water)
- b. Sea
- c. Cambodia

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D. Options for Resupply

An analysis of the measures which may be taken by DRV to maintain supply movements if the Panhandle route is successfully interdicted.

25X1A9a

Action: ORR/T/TR -- [REDACTED] Due to ORR/D/T: 11 Feb 66

Contributions -- II A: DIA -- due to RR/T/TR -- 28 Jan 66

II C: DIA -- if necessary

ONI -- (statement of confidence limits of Market Time 24 Jan 66)

III. The Rolling Thunder Attack

A. No. of sorties, number of targets, "operations analysis"

B. Factors conditioning the nature and scale of attacks, geographic limitations or casualties, etc.

C. Present Delivery Capabilities of US/GVN Forces (including B-52's)

25X1A9a

Action: ORR/R/FP - [REDACTED] Due to ORR/D/T 11 Feb 66

Contributions -- J-3 Due to ORR/R/FP 31 Jan 66

IV. An Assessment of Rolling Thunder Through (24 December 1965)

A. Discussion of Sources Used; i.e., the evidence on which the inventory of physical damage and casualties inflicted is based -- photography, pilot reports, interrogations, intercepts, etc.

B. Inventory of Physical Damage (as complete and specific as time permits)

1. Economic
2. Military

C. Estimate of Casualties

1. Fixed Targets -- Civilian and Military
2. Armed Reconnaissance -- Civilian and Military

D. North Vietnamese Countermeasures

1. Recuperation and Repair
2. Development of Alternative TR Routes
3. Increased flow of supplies from other Communist Countries
4. Adjustments in civilian living standards
5. Other actions to minimize effects of air attack

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E. Costs to Communist China and USSR of Additional Support to DRV (1961 deliveries)

F. Evidence of "political" costs, i.e., effective pressure on the Hanoi regime.

Action:

	25X1A9a	<u>Due Date to D/T</u>
IV, A, B and C -- RR/T/IR -- [REDACTED]		5 Feb 66
DIA to contribute specifics for IV, B, 2; IV, C, 1 and IV, C, 2 (military casualties in each instance; civilian casualties since 28 Oct.) Due to T/IR -- 28 Jan	25X1A9a	
IV, D -- RR/T/CST -- [REDACTED]		5 Feb 66
	<u>Due Date to T/CST</u>	
IV, D, 1 and IV, D, 2 - T/CST	28 Jan	
IV, D, 3 -- T/IR [REDACTED] 25X1A9a	28 Jan	
IV, D, 4 -- A/F [REDACTED]	28 Jan	
IV, D, 5 -- P/SS [REDACTED]	28 Jan	
IV, E -- T/IF -- [REDACTED]		28 Jan 66
IV, F -- ONE/CCT [REDACTED]		28 Jan 66

V. Potential of Air Attacks as a Weapon to Achieve Rolling Thunder

Objectives

A. Military Significance of DRV

1. Logistic Base
2. Manpower
3. Control Center for Insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos

B. The Logistics Target System

An assessment of the physical destruction necessary to reduce the capacity of the DRV logistic lines of communication to a point where they cannot meet VC/PAVN requirements ("requirements" defined three ways as in II, A, above); including also an assessment of the possibility in any case of reaching this degree of destruction.

1. "Choke-point" study -- rail, road and inland water
2. Effort required (ordnance, strikes) to reduce capacity of choke points to desired level
3. Limits of possible reduction
4. Air attack on other infiltration systems -- e.g., sea infiltration through mining of ports
5. The Cambodian route -- its potential and vulnerability

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C. Will of Regime as Target System

1. Prime economic targets
2. Control and Command system
3. Manpower -- rural vs. urban and effect on mobilization
4. Agriculture
5. The air effort needed to immobilize 1 through 4 above

D. Lessons from the Korean War

<u>Action:</u>	25X1A9a	25X1A9a	<u>Due Date to D/T</u>
V, A --	[REDACTED]		11 Feb 66
V, B --	D/T/RR -- [REDACTED]		11 Feb 66
			<u>Due Date to T/TR</u>
V, B, 1 --	DIA, J-3		28 Jan 66
	OBI/GRA -- Consultation		
V, B, 2 --	DIA, J-3		28 Jan 66
V, B, 3 --	DIA, J-3		28 Jan 66
V, B, 4 --	DIA, J-3		28 Jan 66
	(particularly for mining studies)		
V, B, 5	25X1A9a		28 Jan 66
V, C --	[REDACTED]		11 Feb 66
			<u>Due Date to A/F</u>
V, C, 1 --	ORR/D/T		28 Jan 66
V, C, 2 --	ORR/T/COM (telecom)		5 Feb 66
25X1A9a	OBI (politics)	25X1A9a	5 Feb 66
V, C, 3 --	ORR/D/A/F -- [REDACTED]		5 Feb 66
	25X1A9a OBI/GRA (City Studies)		5 Feb 66
V, C, 4 --	R/AG -- [REDACTED]		5 Feb 66
	OBI/GRA -- to contribute "dike" target study to R/AG		23 Jan 66
V, C, 4 --	J-3, DIA	25X1A9a	28 Jan 66
V, D --	R/ [REDACTED]		11 Feb 66

VI. Summary and Conclusions

Action: DD/RR and Ach/D/T 28 Feb 66

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