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Comments on Rail Interdiction in Korea

Supply requirements of Chinese Division engaged in N. Korea during relatively static battle conditions.

1 Chinese soldier 10 pounds per day compared to 60 pounds per day for UN soldier

Chinese division required 50 tons of supplies per day - 48 percent food, 22 percent clothing, weapons, equipage; 10 percent POL, 20 percent ammunition

With approximately 60 divisions at front, some 3,000 tons of supplies had to be moved from Manchuria to battle front each day.

Peace time capacity of double tracked ~~main~~ line in Western Korea from Sinitju to Pyongyang was estimated at from 6,000 to 9,000 tons per day. Conservative estimates were that after extended interdiction capacity was reduced on this line to 500 to 1,500 tons per day to battle area.

Eastern rail system had peacetime capacity of 5,000 tons per day. After interdiction this was reduced to less than 500 tons. However, because supplies were also moved to front by truck and footpath Communists were able to stockpile materiel at the front.

Air Force staff study of April 1952 admitted that after 7 months of extensive interdiction the Communists were more than meeting minimum requirements. "The accepted figure for the enemy's minimum supply requirement is 2,700 tons per day, in the present static situation. It is an established fact he is getting more than this . . . HQ FEL estimates 1,000 tons per day average, over and above his daily requirements . . . the enemy has been able to stockpile approximately 100,000 tons, or a 37 day supply during the seven months of the rail interdiction program."

Sources: Applications of FEAF Effort in Korea, 12 April 1952, Randolph and Mayo. ~~SECRET~~.

Sea War in Korea, Cayle and Mason

USAF Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, No. 72.

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Sources: Applications of PMAF Effort in Korea, 12 April 1952, Randolph and Ngyc. ~~SECRET~~.

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