

JCSM-967-64

18 NOV 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia (U)

1. This memorandum derives from your conversation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 November 1964, concerning a possible US program of actions in Southeast Asia comprising a controlled program of systematically increased military pressures against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) applied in coordination with appropriate political pressures.

2. It is desirable that a clear set of military objectives be agreed upon before further military involvement in Southeast Asia is undertaken. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964, sets forth their preferred course of action to reverse the unfavorable trend in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Laos with the objective of causing the DRV to cease supporting and directing the insurgencies in those countries. However, should a controlled program of systematically increased pressures referred to in paragraph 1, above, be directed, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth herein on how such a program should be implemented.

3. For a program of graduated military pressures, the following objectives are appropriate:

a. Signal the willingness and determination of the United States to employ increasing force in support of national objectives with respect to RVN and Laos; namely, an independent and stable noncommunist government in RVN and a free and neutral Laos under the terms of the Geneva Accords of 1962.

b. Reduce, progressively, DRV support of the insurgencies in RVN and Laos to the extent necessary to tip the balance clearly in favor of the Governments of RVN and Laos by:

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(1) Reduction of the amount of support available through destruction of men, material, and supporting facilities;

(2) Reduction of the amount of support available through diversion of DRV resources to increased homeland defenses and alerts; and

(3) Reduction of the rate of delivery of the available support through destruction of bridges and other LOC choke points; staging facilities and transport; and through interruption of movements by attacks on selected fixed targets, armed route reconnaissance, raids, and waterborne interdictions.

c. Penish the DRV for DRV-supported military actions by the Viet Cong/Pathet Lao (VC/PL) against the Governments of RVN and Laos, including the US casualties which have resulted from those actions.

d. Terminate the conflicts in Laos and RVN only under conditions which would result in the achievement of US objectives.

4. In JCSM-955-64, the Joint Chiefs of Staff analysed certain possible enemy reactions to US air strikes against North Vietnam and appropriate VC/allied responses thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the salient conclusion which arose from that analysis, which is equally applicable to this program, that the United States and its allies can deal adequately with any course of action the DRV and/or CHICOMs decide to pursue. The logistic, personnel, and intelligence considerations contained in the above memorandum are also applicable to this program.

5. Should a course of action to apply controlled, systematically increased pressures against the DRV be directed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the program of actions contained in the Appendix and the objectives contained in paragraph 3, above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EDWIN S. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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APPENDIX

ACTIONS FOR A CONTROLLED PROGRAM OF SYSTEMATICALLY
INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

SEQUENTIAL ACTIONS

1. Resume DeSoto Patrols (Annex A). 1
2. Intensify 34A Operations with emphasis on MAROPS and 2
initiate air operations against selected targets (Annex B). 3
3. Expand air and initiate (within existing capabilities) 4
ground cross border operations to interdict the flow of 5
communist personnel and material through the Laos Panhandle 6
area (Annexes C/Air and D/Ground). 7
4. At the discretion of Saigon authorities, permit RVN 8
forces to pursue and destroy VC forces which cross into 9
Cambodia. 10
5. Conduct US armed reconnaissance and interdiction on 11
Routes 6, 7, 8, 12, and 23 in Laos (Annex E) and conduct 12
air strikes on PL/VM forces and facilities throughout Laos 13
(Annex F). 14
6. Conduct low level reconnaissance probes of infiltration- 15
associated targets near the Laos border in the DRV (Annex G) 16
and attack LOC in DRV near the Laos border and the DMZ 17
(Annex H). 18
7. Expand the reconnaissance coverage of the DRV (Annex I), 19
with extension to Cambodia if necessary, and conduct air 20
strikes against infiltration-associated targets in the DRV 21
(Phase I - 13 targets south of the 19th parallel, followed by 22
Phase II - 14 targets north of the 19th parallel) (Annex J). 23
8. Conduct aerial mining of DRV ports (Annex K), initiate 24
a naval quarantine/blockade of the DRV (Annex L), and attack, 25
with increasing severity, targets in the DRV (Annex M). 26
9. Be prepared to extend maritime operations as necessary 27
to control shipping to Cambodia. 28

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10. Conduct air strikes against remaining military and industrial targets in the DRV. Targets are as contained in "94 Target" list (JCSM-729-64).

11. Conduct amphibious/airborne operations to establish lodgement on one or more coastal areas in the littoral of the DRV. The lodgement(s) to be of sufficient magnitude to pose a plausible threat to the DRV. (Concept and forces required are being developed separately for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

REPRISAL ACTIONS

12. Take appropriate reprisal actions in the event of DRV/VC serious provocations (Annex N).

COLLATERAL ACTIONS

13. At the time a decision is made to undertake the program outlined above, collateral actions and movements are required in order to increase the security of US and friendly forces, to deter undesirable DRV and/or CHICOM aggression or, to defeat such aggression should it occur. The collateral actions and movements are:

a. Maintain current levels of forward deployments of US combat units in Southeast Asia (Annex O).

b. Prior to initiating US air strikes against North Vietnam, deploy, as necessary, US forces for security and deterrent purposes in accordance with appropriate CINCPAC OPLANS (any changes to force lists to be provided by CINCPAC), and evacuate dependents from the RVN and Laos (Annex P).

c. Reintroduce a MAAG type Supply and Training Mission (SATM) into Laos (Annex Q).

d. Deploy additional US (and Thai or other Allied) forces as necessary to:

(1) Conduct required operations.

(2) Deter further communist escalations.

(3) Defend Key Mekong points.

(4) Logistically support operations.

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ANNEX A

RESUMPTION OF THE DESOTO PATROL

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| 1. Forces | 1 |
| a. Two (2) Destroyers. One ship equipped for intelligence collection. Both ships will have on-line crypto communications and one destroyer will have a star shell capability. | 2
3
4
5 |
| b. Two (2) Aircraft Carriers (CVAs) with their respective air wings. | 6
7 |
| c. Detachment of SP-2 aircraft with a searchlight capability. | 8
9 |
| d. Destroyer escorts for CVAs and Watch Dog station. | 10 |
| 2. Concept of operation | 11 |
| a. Prior to initiating the DeSoto Patrol, an increased readiness for reprisal will be attained by positioning the following PACOM forces as necessary: | 12
13
14 |
| (1) 2 CVAs to Western portion of the South China Sea | 15 |
| (2) 2 Sq B-57 | 16 |
| (3) 2 Sq F-105 | 17 |
| (4) 3 Sq F-100 | 18 |
| b. The Patrol Group would consist of two destroyers with one ship collecting intelligence and the other acting escort. The itinerary of the Patrol would be as follows (See Tab). | 19
20
21
22 |
| c. Patrol procedures. The destroyers would operate on a random patrol in accordance with the itinerary above. They would retire seaward one hour prior to sunset and during periods of reduced visibility. The Patrol would commence one hour after sunrise. | 23
24
25
26
27 |
| d. Air Patrol | 28 |
| (1) During the period that the Patrol was in the Gulf of Tonkin, air support would be provided by the | 29
30 |

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CVAs. The Combat Air Patrols (CAP) would be capable of 1
a short notice response to calls from the Patrol Group. 2

(2) During the hours of darkness, an SP-2 aircraft 3
with searchlight and flare capability would orbit over 4
the Patrol. The SP-2 aircraft would be under the control 5
of the DeSoto Commander while in the area and would be 6
used to illuminate surface targets which have a closest 7
point of approach of five miles or less to the Patrol 8
Group. 9

3. Coordination with OP 34a. OP 34a MAROPS would be 10
suspended 48 hours prior and subsequent to each DeSoto Patrol. 11

4. Rules of engagement. Ships earmarked for future patrols 12
have been given intensified training in handling the specific 13
conditions anticipated, including the use of flares and star 14
shells. In the event the DeSoto Patrol came under attack, 15
the following rules of engagement would apply: 16


"The patrol ships and aircraft are authorized to attack 17
with the objective of insuring destruction of any vessel or 18
aircraft which attacks, or gives positive indication of intent 19
to attack, US forces operating in international waters or air 20
space over international waters. 21

"In event of hostile attack, the patrol ships and air- 22
craft are directed to fire upon the hostile attacker with the 23
objective of insuring destruction. Ships are authorized to 24
pursue the enemy to the recognized three mile territorial 25
limit. Aircraft are authorized hot pursuit inside terri- 26
torial waters (three miles) against surface vessels and into 27
hostile air space (includes DRV, Hainan Island and Mainland 28
China) against attack aircraft when necessary to achieve 29
destruction of identified attack forces. Ships and aircraft 30
will confine their actions to the attacking ships and/or 31
aircraft."

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TAB TO ANNEX A TO APPENDIX



DESOTO PATROL	OVERT
MISSION DETAILS	
SHIPS: TO BE ASSIGNED.	
AREA:	GULF OF TONKIN
DATE:	TO BE ASSIGNED
CAP:	PROVIDED BY YANKEE TEAM CVA'S
SAB:	BY SUBMARINE
ITINERARY	
D-Day Minus ONE - DD's with YANKEE TEAM CVA, underway replenishment	
D-Day Commence patrol. Patrol between points ALFA, BRAVO and CHARLIE.	
D-Day Plus ONE - Patrol between points CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF.	
D-Day Plus TWO - Patrol between points GOLF, FOXTROT, ECHO, DELTA and CHARLIE.	
D-Day Plus THREE - Patrol between points CHARLIE, BRAVO and ALFA. Withdraw from Gulf of Tonkin and terminate the patrol.	
NOTE: Patrol will be conducted at moderate speeds along designated segments of the track each day. Patrol will commence on coastal track not earlier than sunrise and retire to seaward no later than sunset.	
Closest Point of Approach - 12 NM off NVN mainland and offshore islands.	
MISSION OBJECTIVES	
1. Assert U. S. rights in international waters off North Vietnam.	
2. Collect intelligence.	

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Tab to Annex A to Appendix

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ANNEX B

OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS

1. By CM 221-64* dated 30 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded COMUSMACV's proposed OPLAN 34A actions for November 1964 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval. The maritime operations section of the proposed actions represents a maximum utilization of resources.
2. However, the procedure now in effect requiring approval at Washington level for each individual maritime operation substantially increases the time between missions, thus reducing the tempo of operations and the intensity of pressure on the DRV. An immediate intensification of maritime operations could be achieved by returning the individual mission approval authority to the operational commanders. Package, or monthly approval authority, could still be retained in Washington. This procedure is already in effect for air resupply and reinforcement missions. A revised approval procedure would allow COMUSMACV to obtain maximum utilization of his resources and take full advantage of favorable weather conditions and intelligence information.
3. As reported to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in CM 221-64, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that covert operations against the DRV should be extended and expanded. As a part of this program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that air strikes, utilizing unmarked aircraft flown by VNAF pilots, should be initiated against selected targets. The VNAF currently possesses the capability to execute such a program. In response to a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, COMUSMACV has proposed** an initial, small scale series of

* Appendix to JCS 2343/482
 ** COMUSMACV msg to CINCPAC, MAC SOG 13086, DTG 030911Z Nov; on file in Joint Secretariat

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air strikes. These strikes are designed to intensify the 1
harassment action against the DRV. 2

4. By CM 258-64* the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded 3
COMUSMACV's OPLAN 34A air strike program for November 1964 4
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval. 5

* Enclosure to JCS 2343/489

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ANNEX C

AIR OPERATIONS LAOS PANHANDLE

1. FORCES - RLAF T-28s (approximately 13) 1
 - US Thai and RVN based F-100s, F-105s; CVA 2
 based aircraft 3

2. CONCEPT 4

a. RLAF, since 14 October, has been conducting air 5
 strikes against infiltration facilities in the Laos 6
 Panhandle. Since 2 November, the RLAF effort in southern 7
 Laos has been principally in support of FAR ground opera- 8
 tions and not against infiltration targets. US air 9
 strikes as previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs 10
 of Staff, will increase the effectiveness of the program, 11
 provide evidence of US resolve to both friend and enemy, 12
 and demonstrate capabilities for destruction of supplies, 13
 equipment and installations. 14

b. Operations will consist of strikes against targets 15
 already identified (22 target list as modified) and 16
 against those subsequently identified, and armed 17
 reconnaissance. 18

3. <u>TARGETS</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>ESTIMATED SORTIES</u>	<u>1/</u>	
Muong Phine Mil/Area*	1	8		20
Muong Nong*	2	8		21
Tchepone Barracks**	3	4		22
Tchepone Mil Area**	4	4		23
Kong My Mil Area*	7	4		24
Nape Bridge**	8	8		25
Mil Area Route 8A*	9	4		26
Ban Dong*	10	8		27

1/ Sorties based on no damage by RLAF. Targets and sorties will be modified in accordance with RLAF damage.

* Already struck by RLAF
 ** RLAF strikes authorized

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<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>ESTIMATED SORTIES</u>	<u>1/</u>
Ban Riach*	11	4	2
Ban Trim*	12	8	3
Ban Na Kok*	13	8	4
Ban Na Kayon Bridge*	14	8	5
Ban That Hai Bridge (Deferred by RLAF)	15	20	6 7
Tchepone Bridge (East end collapsed by bank erosion)	16	12	8 9 10
Mil Installation, S. E. Saravane*	18	8	11 12
Ban Thay**	19	8	13
Muong Phine Supply Area*	20	8	14
Mil Strong Point Route 12 *	21	4	15
Ban Na Nhom*	22	8	16
4. <u>TIMING</u>			17
a. Minimum strike days to hit targets identified - four days.			18 19
b. Armed reconnaissance - daily by four USAF or USN aircraft.			20 21

1/ Sorties based on no damage by RLAF. Targets and sorties will be modified in accordance with RLAF damage.
 * Already struck by RLAF
 ** RLAF strikes authorized

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ANNEX D

GROUND CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS INTO THE LAOS PANHANDLE

1. CONCEPT. Intelligence collection-reconnaissance patrols 1
would be infiltrated into the Laos panhandle by parachute, 2
helicopter and/or foot to seek out VC Infiltration Routes, 3
Liaison Stations, and Military Areas. They would confirm 4
suspected targets, identify new targets and locate targets of 5
opportunity. The teams would remain for a maximum of 30 days 6
and would be exfiltrated by helicopter or overland. Upon 7
receipt of firm target information from a patrol, GVN ground 8
or air forces would be deployed to destroy the target. 9
Penetration would be initially limited to 20 km and the GVN 10
ground forces employed would not exceed two company equivalents 11
in any one operational area. 12
2. OPERATIONAL AREAS. Three operational areas have been 13
established -- Northern (LAO BAO), Central (DAK PROU) and 14
Southern (DAK TO). Operations in the northern area would be 15
initiated by eight-man intelligence collection-reconnaissance 16
patrols infiltrated overland or by air. Exploitation of 17
targets developed by these patrols would be by Airborne Ranger 18
Companies committed by helicopter, parachute or overland. 19
Operations in the other two areas would be conducted by 20
reconnaissance and combat patrols of up to company size. In 21
the southern area, operations would be characterized by ever 22
expanding overland ground probes; in the central area, a 23
combination of overland and air launch would be required. 24
3. GVN FORCES AVAILABLE. Four (eight man) reconnaissance 25
teams and four (approximately 80 men) Airborne Ranger 26
Companies are currently available for these operations. Other 27
units can be trained for subsequent use if experience with 28
initial operations is favorable. 29

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4. AIR SUPPORT. Air support for these operations will, in 1
normal foreseeable circumstances, be provided by the VNAF. 2
This would include air drop, re-supply, exfiltration, air 3
strike support and SAR operations. FARM GATE and/or overt US 4
air support would be provided in the event of an emergency 5
which exceeded the VNAF capability. 6

5. US ADVISORS. The use of US advisors to accompany 7
ground units and the use of US Jumpmaster/Advisors with 8
infiltrated intelligence collection-reconnaissance patrols is 9
a prerequisite to successful operations. A minimum of two 10
US advisors per separate GVN ground unit or patrol employed 11
is required. 12

6. TIMING. Operations within the central (DAK PROU) area 13
can commence between 1 December 1964 and 1 January 1965 14
providing authorization is received 15 days prior to execution. 15
Expansion of operations to the northern and southern areas 16
will be dependent on the results achieved by the initial 17
operations in the central area. 18

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ANNEX E

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE AND INTERDICTION ON
ROUTES 6, 7, 8, 12 AND 23 IN LAOS

1. FORCES - Thai and RVN based US F-100s and F-105s; 1
CVA based aircraft. 2
2. CONCEPT
- a. US aircraft will fly armed reconnaissance missions 3
along communist controlled sections of Routes 6, 7, 8, 12 4
and 23 in Laos at random times destroying identified 5
PL/VM targets. Approximately 420 miles of roads are 6
involved. Missions will be comprised of flights of 7
four aircraft covering the PL controlled section of 8
the routes twice weekly and should not require more than 9
an average of 4 sorties each day. 10
- b. Key interdiction targets, e.g., Ban Ken bridge 11
on Route 7, will be struck with a high probability 12
(85 per cent) of destruction. To assure an 85 per cent 13
probability of dropping one span of the Ban Ken bridge 14
up to 30 F-105s (with four AGM-12B missiles each) will 15
be scheduled with eight F-100s (two CBU-2A and two 16
NAPALM each) for flak suppression. 17

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ANNEX F

AIR STRIKES ON PL/VM FORCES AND
FACILITIES THROUGHOUT LAOS

- | | | |
|--|---------------|----|
| 1. <u>FORCES</u> - Thai and RVN based US F-100, F-105, and B-57; | 1 | |
| CVA based aircraft. | 2 | |
| 2. <u>CONCEPT</u> | 3 | |
| a. This action represents an expansion of the US air | 4 | |
| strike program in Laos. It is a demonstration of US intent | 5 | |
| and of capabilities. | 6 | |
| b. Initial targets and estimated sorties | 7 | |
| (1) Ban Liang Hq, supply | 3 complexes - | 8 |
| and barracks area, | 31 sorties | 9 |
| and ordnance area | | 10 |
| (2) Ban Ban Ord. Depot | 8 sorties | 11 |
| (3) Muong Phanh Barracks | 9 sorties | 12 |
| (4) Sala Muong Katt | 7 sorties | 13 |
| (Phong Savan) | | |
| (5) Nonghet Supply & Storage | 3 sorties | 14 |
| (6) PL/VM troop concentrations - sorties as | | 15 |
| required by | | 16 |
| latest intelli- | | 17 |
| gence | | 18 |
| 3. <u>TIMING</u> - Minimum strike days - three. | 19 | |

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ANNEX G

LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE PROBES OF
INFILTRATION - ASSOCIATED TARGETS
NEAR THE LAOS BORDER IN DRV

1. FORCES - RF-101 appropriately escorted; or 1
RF-8 appropriately escorted; or 2
RA-3 appropriately escorted. 3
2. CONCEPT - Recce aircraft with escort will make 4
low-level probes along routes 7, 8 and 12 from Laos into the 5
DRV to a depth of 10 miles. Escort aircraft will suppress, 6
or retaliate to ground fire and provide HI-CAP. 7
3. TIMING - Each route will be covered twice weekly. 8

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ANNEX H

ATTACK LOC IN DRV NEAR THE LAOS BORDER

1. FORCES - Thai and RVN based US F-100/F-105; CVA based aircraft. 1
2
2. CONCEPT 3
 - a. This action expands US air strikes against targets on Routes 7 and 12 inside the DRV. 4
5
 - b. Targets and estimated sorties 6
 - (1) Barthelemy Pass area (Route 7) - 14 sorties. 7
 - (2) Mu Gia Pass Area (Route 12) - 8 sorties. 8
3. TIMING - Minimum strike days - ONE. 9

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ANNEX I

EXPAND RECOE COVERAGE OF THE DRV

1. FORCES - RF-101 with appropriate escort; or RF-8 with appropriate escort. 1
2
2. CONCEPT
 - a. Reconnaissance aircraft will penetrate DRV from RVN, Laos or the South China Sea covering main highways and suspected infiltration routes from Route 7 south. Routes will be covered twice weekly. 3
4
5
6
 - b. Escort will conduct suppressive or retaliatory action against ground fire and provide HI-CAP. 7
8
 - c. Photo coverage of targets north of Route 7 will be by LUCKY DRAGON operations until item 7 (Annex M) has been implemented. 9
10
11
 - d. Conduct pre- and post-strike reconnaissance for subsequent operations. 12
13

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ANNEX J

AIR STRIKES AGAINST INFILTRATION
ASSOCIATED TARGETS IN DRV*Phase I - south of the 19th parallel

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ESTIMATED^{1/} SORTIES</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>	
36	Vit Thu Lu Barracks	4	Staging area for VC.	1
39	Chap Le Barracks	10	Hq extensive military complex. Can control Route 1 and assist infiltration activities to RVN and Laos.	2 3 4 5 6
64	Xom Bang Ammo Depot	39	Supports VC elements moving into RVN. Suspected of supporting PAVN and PL forces in Tchepone area.	7 8 9 10 11
33	Dong Hoi Barracks, WNW	32	Units probably participate in direct support of insurgencies in RVN and Laos.	12 13 14 15
24	Chanh Hoa Barracks & Hq	115	Hq 325th Inf Div supports MR IV in DMZ.	16 17
91	Route Armed Recce, Route 12	36	Main supply route to PL/VC in south.	18 19
90	Route Armed Recce, Route 8	38	Part of main supply line from NVN to PL forces in central Laos.	20 21 22
38	Vinh Army Barracks & Hq	89	Control Hq for MR IV. Communications center for command & control of PL/VC.	23 24 25 26
52	Vinh Army Supply Depot E	13	Suspected of providing direct logistic support to PL/VC.	27 28 29
41	Phu Van Ammo Depot E	22	Provides ammo support to PL/VC. Located between Routes 7 and 8 both important avenues for DRV support for operations in Laos.	30 31 32 33 34 35
42	Phu Van Ammo Depot NE	24	Same as above.	36
53	Phu Van Army Supply Depot SE	16	Supports DRV units & probably provides military materials to support PL/VC forces.	37 38 39 40
55	Vinh Son Army Supply Depot SE	8 446	Probably minor support to PL/VC.	41 42

Phase II - north of the 19th parallel

40	Phu Qui Ammo Depot	52	Probably supports PL	43
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<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ESTIMATED^{1/} SORTIES</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
89	Route Armed Recce, Route 7	40	Main supply route to PL/VM forces in Plaine de Jarres area. 1 2 3
94	Route Armed Recce Alternate to Route 6	34	Active line of access to Laos from Hanoi and Thanh Hoa areas & com- plements Routes 7 & 12. 4 5 6 7
43	Qui Hau W Ammo Storage	97	Only 35 NM from Laos border. Could support PL via Route 6 or by water via the Song Ma. 8 9 10 11
93	Route Armed Recce Route 6	28	Principal road and most direct channel of access from Hanoi to Sam Neua region of NE Laos. 12 13 14 15 16
28	Ban Xom Lom Barracks	42	Capable of training and supporting PL/VC forces. 17 18 19
37	Moc Chau Army Barracks	18	Same as above. 20
22	Xuan Mai Barracks, SSW	87	Reportedly site of special insurgency training center for large infiltration groups for PL/VC operations. 21 22 23 24 25 26
23	Xuan Mai Barracks, NNW	20	Same as above. 27
56	Son La Army Supply Depot	71	Major logistical in- stallation in NW North Vietnam suspected of supporting PL opera- tions. 28 29 30 31 32
46	Ban Phiang Hay Ammo Depot	16	Probably implicated in PL support. 33 34
25	Son La Army Barracks	48	Probably supports PL operations. 35 36
26	Dien Bien Phu Barracks	27	Direct support of PL in central and north- ern Laos. 37 38 39
92	Route Armed Recce, Route 19	14	Part of only route with traffic capabi- lity servicing PL forward area in north- ern Laos. 40 41 42 43 44

NOTE: 1/ Now under revision. 594

* Initially, opposition from DRV/CHICOM fighter aircraft will be met by CAP. At any time during Phase I or Phase II however, when enemy air opposition warrants additional protective measures for US forces, the jet capable airfields and jet aircraft in the DRV (Targets 6, 3, 8 - Annex M) should be scheduled for destruction by air attack.

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
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ANNEX K

AERIAL MINING OF DRV PORTS

ESTIMATED SCHEDULE

- a. Halphong Approaches
Priority field
Full field
- b. Cam Pha (one (1) field)
- c. Hon Gay
Priority field
Full field

5
36

7

12
20

COMMENTS

Halphong as the single principal port, handles 85% of all important DRV imports and 70% of all exports. Ocean-going ships number an average of 40 per month. Stopping or appreciably reducing import shipping would cut seriously into the DRV economy and would force diversion of traffic to alternate transportation routes.

Reduction of export shipping by mining Cam Pha and Hon Gay would produce a long-range deteriorating effect on the DRV economy and would restrict the free use of alternate ports following the mining of Halphong.

NOTE: 1/ Now under revision.

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ANNEX L

NAVAL QUARANTINE/BLOCKADE OF THE DRV

1. The object of the blockade is to assist in bringing
 about a cessation of DRV support to insurgency in RVN and
 Laos. The DRV will be denied access to the sea in order to
 (1) impair the flow of strategic materials and military sup-
 plies; (2) increase economic pressure by denying use of Red
 River delta ports and thus cause disruption of the transpor-
 tation system; and (3) reduce its military capability.

2. A blockade zone would be established wholly within the
 Tonkin Gulf with its eastern boundary running in a southerly
 direction from the intersection of the DRV/Communist China
 border with the Asian coast line. It would encompass the
 entire DRV coast. Shipping to and from other than DRV ports
 would be free to transit the Gulf of Tonkin at will. Patrol
 aircraft (land or sea based) would conduct air surveillance
 and intercept of shipping in the area and along the zone
 boundary. Destroyers would conduct surface surveillance
 and ocean control by patrolling stations within the area.
 Four destroyer patrol stations would be established covering
 the approaches to Haiphong, Hong Gay and Cam Pha. A fifth
 destroyer would patrol in the vicinity of Isle du Kersaint
 near the DRV/Communist China border. Three destroyers would
 patrol the eastern boundary of the zone to intercept all
 shipping entering the Gulf of Tonkin through Hainan Strait
 and between Hainan and South Vietnam. Destroyers would inter-
 cept shipping spotted by the patrol aircraft. Carrier air-
 craft would provide air cover. An underway replenishment
 group would provide logistic support. The foregoing patrols
 would be augmented by mine fields laid in shallow coastal water
 areas to intercept junk and barge traffic and to funnel shipping
 away from shallow water and into the channels serving the major
 ports. Force requirements include:

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- a. Six VP patrol aircraft operating from Da Nang or from a seaplane tender. They would fly over the blockade zone in the Gulf of Tonkin. 1
 - b. Eight destroyers on station in the Gulf of Tonkin. 2
 - c. A carrier task force operating on station in an area generally west of the Paracels and south of Hainan. 3
 - d. A logistic replenishment group to support the foregoing, consisting of a fleet oiler, a reefer, a supply ship and an ammunition ship. 4
 - e. Initially 4-6 ocean/coastal minesweepers to sweep the areas patrolled by US forces in the Gulf. 5
3. The estimated results of such a blockade are about an 80 per cent decrease in total shipping into the major ports of Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha and rerouting of DRV imports and exports overland through Red China with a resultant strain on existing rail and road facilities with delay in deliveries. 6
4. Be prepared to extend maritime operations as necessary to control shipping to Cambodia. 7

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ANNEX M

ATTACK WITH INCREASING SEVERITY, TARGETS IN DRV			1
TARGET NO.	TARGET NAME	ESTIMATED SORTIES	2/
<u>FIRST STRIKE DAY:</u>			3
6	Phuc Yen Afld	40	4
3	Hanoi Gia Lam Afld	8	5
5	Vinh Afld	6	6
49	Hanoi POL Storage	9	7
51	Thach Loi POL Storage	14	8
8	Haiphong Cat Bi Afld	20	9
30	Hanoi AD Hqs	13	10
48	Haiphong POL Storage	10	11
10	Ninh Binh Bridge	13	12
4	Dong Hoi Afld	9	13
64	Xom Bang Ammo Depot	13	14
83/84	Road/Rail Rte 1 (Hamrong to Hanoi)	4	15
85/86	Road/Rail Rte 1 (Vinh to Hamrong)	4	16
87/88	Road/Rail Rte 5 (Hanoi to Haiphong)	2	17
89	Rte 7 (Laos/NVN Border)	2	18
90	Rte 8 (Vicinity Nape, Laos to Roa Qua)	2	19
91	Rte 12 (Laos/NVN Border to Xom Ma Na)	2	20
FIRST STRIKE DAY RECAP: 11 targets/9 Armed Route Recce Rtes/171 sorties			21
<u>SECOND STRIKE DAY:</u>			22
15	Viet Tri Bridge	24	23
12	Hanoi Red River Bridge	42	24
23	Xuan Mai Bks & Hqs SSW	12	25
16	Dap Cau Bridge	48	26
10	Ninh Binh Bridge	14	27
64	Xom Bang Ammo Depot	26	28
89	Rte 7 (Laos/NVN Border)	4	29
SECOND STRIKE DAY RECAP: 6 targets/1 Armed Recce Rte/170 sorties.			30

<u>TARGET NO.</u>	<u>TARGET NAME</u> ^{1/}	<u>ESTIMATED SORTIES</u> ^{2/}	
			1
			2
<u>THIRD STRIKE DAY:</u>			
43	Qui Hau. Ammo Depot W	25	3
46	Ban Phieng Hay Ammo Depot	29	4
23	Xuan Mai Bks NNW	6	5
22	Xuan Mai Bks & Hqs SSW	33	6
70	Haiphong Port Fac	32	7
14	Thau Hoa Bridge	26	8
89	Rte 7 (Laos/NVN Border)	4	9
90	Rte 8 (Vicinity Nape, Laos to Rao Qua)	4	10
92	Rte 19 (Dien Bien Phu to Tay Chang Pass)	4	11
93	Rte 6 (Suyut to Sam Neva)	2	12
94	Rte -(Suyut to Thiet Tra to Muong Min)	2	13
87/88	Road/Rail Rte 5 (Hanoi to Haiphong)	2	14

THIRD STRIKE DAY RECAP: 6 targets/7 Armed Recce Rte/165 sorties. 15

FOURTH STRIKE DAY:

26	Dien Bien Phu Bks & Hqs	29	16
56	Son La Army Sup	48	17
22	Xuau Mai Bks & Hqs SSW	55	18
14	Thanh Hoa Bridge	26	19
85/86	Road/Rail Rte 1 (Vinh to Hamrong)	4	20
87/88	Road/Rail Rte 5 (Hanoi to Haiphong)	4	21
90	Rte 8 (Vicinity Nape, Laos to Rao Qua)	2	22
91	Rte 12 (Laos/NVN Border to Xom Ma Na)	2	23

FOURTH STRIKE DAY RECAP: 4 targets/6 Armed Recce Rtes/170 sorties. 24

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<u>TARGET NO.</u>	<u>TARGET NAME</u> ^{1/}	<u>ESTIMATED</u> ^{2/} <u>SORTIES</u>	
			1
			2
<u>FIFTH STRIKE DAY:</u>			
52	Vinh Army Supply	13	3
63	Thuan Chau Army Supply	39	4
56	Son La Army Supply	13	5
11	Hai Duong Bridge	51	6
16	Dap Cau Bridge	12	7
41	Phu Ban E. Ammo Depot	13	8
42	Phu Ban N.E. Ammo Depot	13	9
89	Rte 7 (Laos/NVN Border)	4	10
90	Rte 8 (Vicinity Nape, Laos to Rao Qua)	4	11
91	Rte 12 (Laos/NVN Border to Xom Ma Na)	2	12
83/84	Road/Rail Rte 1 (Hamrong to Hanoi)	4	13
<u>FIFTH STRIKE DAY RECAP: 7 targets/5 Armed Recce Rtes/ 168 sorties.</u>			14
<u>NOTE 1:</u> In those cases where targets have been attacked before implementation of this action and post strike recce indicates desired level of damage achieved, targets will be deleted from above listing.			15 16 17 18 19
<u>NOTE 2:</u> Now being revised.			20

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ANNEX N

REPRISAL ACTIONS TO DRV/VC INITIATIONS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that CINCPAC 1
FRAG ORDER NO. 3, which includes four target options, 2
to be the proper basis for reprisal action for clearly 3
identifiable attacks against the DeSoto patrol. This order 4
will be the subject of a separate memorandum to the 5
Secretary of Defense. 6
2. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider 7
the recommendations presented to the Secretary of Defense 8
in JCSM-933-64* and as amplified in JCSM-955-64** of 9
14 November 1964 as the proper response for the VC attack 10.
on Bien Hoa airfield or other serious provocation in South- 11
east Asia.

* Appendix to JCS 2339/153
** Enclosure A to JCS 2339/152-1

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ANNEX O

PRESENT FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS OF COMBAT UNITS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(To include forces in WESTPAC)1. US ARMY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
1 Airborne Brigade	Okinawa	1
1 Special Forces Group	"	2
1 Missile Bn (Little John)	"	3
8 Aviation Companies (Air Mobile)	RVN	4
2 Aviation Companies (FW) (LT) - CARIBOU	"	5
1 Aviation Company (FW) (LT) - OTTER	"	6
1 Aviation Company (Aerial Surv) (LT)	"	7
1 Special Forces Group	"	8

2. US AIR FORCE

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
Tactical Bombers	38 B-57s	Philippines	9
Tactical Fighters	17 F-100s	"	10
Fighter Interceptors	17 F-102s	"	11
Transports	16 C-130s	"	12
Tactical Fighters	71 (22 F-100s) (49 F-105s)	Japan	13
		"	14
Fighter Interceptors	44 F-102s	"	15
Tactical Recon.	20 (4 RB-57Es) (16 RF-101s)	"	16
		"	17
Transports	31 (16 C-124s) (15 C-130s)	"	18
		"	19
Tankers	13 KB-50s	"	20
Tactical Fighters	74 F-105s	Okinawa	21
Fighter Interceptors	29 F-102s	"	22
Tactical Recon.	11 RF-101s	"	23
Transports	60 C-130s	"	24
Tactical Fighters	4 F-100s	Taiwan	25
Tactical Fighters	28 (18 F-105s) (10 F-100s)	Thailand	26
		"	27
Fighter Interceptors	4 F-102s	"	28

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
Tankers	4 KB-50s	Thailand	1
Tactical Bombers	5 B-57s	RVN	2
Tactical Fighters	29 F-100s	"	3
Fighter Interceptors	12 F-102s	"	4
Attack Aircraft	33 A-1Es	"	5
Tactical Recon.	14 (12 RF-101s) (2 RB-57Es)	"	6 7
Tankers	4 KB-50s	"	8
Transports	67 C-123s	"	9
<u>VNAF</u>			
Attack	63 A-1Hs 15 T-28s	RVN "	11 12
3. <u>US NAVY*</u>			
<u>NO. AND TYPE</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
3-4 Aircraft Carriers (CVA)	172 attack aircraft	WESTPAC (2 in SoChina Sea)	14 15
USS HANCOCK with 70 a/c			16
USS RANGER with 79 a/c			17
USS TICONDEROGA with 57 a/c			18
USS CONSTELLATION with 76 a/c			19
CVS			20
USS KEARSEARGE with 44 a/c			21
LPH			22
USS PRINCETON with 24 a/c			23
VP Squadrons			24
a. VP-1 Det	4 a/c		25
VP-1	6 a/c		26
b. VP-6	11 a/c		27
c. VP-9	8 a/c		28
d. VP-47	13 a/c		29

* This represents the present deployment to WESTPAC. Unit designations will change in accordance with scheduled rotation. The number of CVAs will vary from 3 to 4. For example, TICONDEROGA is now scheduled to return to EASTPAC, sailing about 2 December.

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<u>NO. AND TYPE</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
VW Squadron			1
VW-1	7 BCL21K		2
VQ Squadron	16 c/e		3
VQ-1			4
<u>NO. AND TYPE</u>		<u>LOCATION</u>	
2 Guided Missile Cruisers		WESTPAC	5
38 Destroyer Types		"	6
14 Submarines		"	7
32 Amphibious Types		"	8
4. <u>US MARINE</u>			
<u>UNIT</u>			
2/3 Marine Div/Wing Team		Okinawa/ Japan	9 10
(1 Special Landing Force		SoChina Sea)	11
1 Marine LAAM Battalion		On Route WESTPAC	12 13
1 Med Hel Sqdn		Da Nang	14
Other combat units (to include security forces and a detachment of Marine Air Base Sqdn)			15 16 17 18

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ANNEX P :

EVACUATE DEPENDENTS FROM RVN AND LAOS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the US Govern- 1
ment dependents in SVN (approximately 1600) and Laos (approx- 2
imately 410) should be completely evacuated prior to US air 3
strikes against the DRV. In this regard, they note that 4
there are an additional 3100 non-military US nationals and 5
US-sponsored personnel in SVN and approximately 550 in Laos. 6
Their withdrawal should also be considered in light of the 7
proposed increased tempo and scale of activity and the re- 8
quirement for their participation in the counterinsurgency 9
program. Commercial air or military air, if required, will 10
be used. 11

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ANNEX Q

REINTRODUCE A MAAG-TYPE SUPPLY
AND TRAINING MISSION INTO LAOS

1. CINCPAC OPLAN 64-64 provides for establishing in Laos 1
a US Supply and Training Mission (SATM) in order to provide 2
assistance to the Royal Laotian Government in the maintenance 3
of internal security and in the attainment of the maximum 4
feasible capability to resist external aggression. 5
2. Initially, the expanded US military advisory role will 6
be effected by deployment of Deputy Chief, JUSMAG Thailand 7
and staff (approximately 55 personnel) into Laos as a nucleus 8
of the US Supply and Training Mission, Laos (US SATM), to 9
accelerate MAP support for Laos and to assume responsibility 10
for MAP and related advisory functions. The advisory augmen- 11
tation assigned to the Attache Staff will be integrated into 12
US SATM. 13

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